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ULYSSES S. GRANT.—FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1865.



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## INTRODUCTION.

COLONIZATION OF THE COUNTRY which became the United States of America.—The Colonists of one Race, and almost of one Condition.—Difference in Occupation, Religious Character, and Education.—Slavery.—British Arrogance and Oppression.—First Colonial Congress.—Continental Congress.—Revolutionary War.—Independence won, not by any Colony, but by the United Colonies.—A Nation in Fact, but not in Form.—Lack and Need of a Sovereign Power.—Constitutional Convention.—A "National" Government formed, and not a Confederation.—Sovereignty in the Central Government: States never Independent Sovereignities.—Constitution adopted by the People, and not by the State Governments.—Prosperity.—The one Element of Discord and Misfortune.—Necessary Compromise of Opinions and Interests.—Great political Advantages gained by the Slave Interest.—Consequent Tendencies in the Slave States to Oligarchy.—Addition of new States to the Union.—Slavery retains its political Advantage.—Great Increase of the Free States in Wealth and Population.—Formation of a Slavery Party.—Reprobation of Slavery throughout Christendom.—The Colonization Society.—The Missouri Compromise.—The Abolitionists.—Effect of the Abolition Agitation.—Aggressive and proscriptive Policy of the Fire-eating Slaveholders.—Endeavors to extend and to limit the Area of Slavery.—John C. Calhoun's Position.—The Fugitive-slave Law.—Obedience to the Letter by the People of Massachusetts.—The Kansas-Nebraska Bill.—The Territorial Issue.—The Struggle in Kansas.—Assault on Senator Sumner.—The Dred Scott Decision.—Resistance by Free States.—Personal-liberty Laws.—Breaking up of the Democratic Party.—John Brown's Raid.—Presidential Nominating Conventions of 1860.—The Democratic Convention broken up on the Slavery Issue.—This Result brought about by the Politicians of the Cotton States.—Nomination of Bell and Everett, of Lincoln and Hamlin, of Douglas and Johnson, of Breckinridge and Lane.—Treasure in President Buchanan's Cabinet.—Election of Abraham Lincoln.—No sectional Division of the Country.—Homogeneity of the People of the United States.—The Difference produced by Slavery and Ignorance, and Freedom and Education.—Excitement

upon the Election of Mr. Lincoln.—Preparations for Secession in South Carolina.—The People of the other Slave States not ready or willing to secede.—Agitation throughout the South.—Forced Inaction of the Government.—Gloom at the North.—Opposition to the Course of South Carolina throughout the Slave States.—Meeting of Congress.—President Buchanan's vacillating Message.—An empty Treasury.—Efforts to Preserve the Union.—Obstinacy of South Carolina.—Passage of her Ordinance of Secession.—President Buchanan found wanting.—Financial Disturbance and Ruin in Northern Cities.—Confidence at the South.—Fraud and Treason in the Cabinet.—Gloom and Despondency at the North.

THE people of the North American colonies lying between New Brunswick on the north and Florida on the south took a place among the nations in the year 1789. They were English people. For the Dutch colony of New Netherlands was so small and so inert that, even in its Dutch day, it made little impression upon the country, and none at all of an enduring kind upon the character of the new nation; while the Swedes, who settled near the mouth of the Delaware, were such a mere handful of men that, in this respect, they are not even to be taken into consideration.<sup>1</sup> The new nation was singularly homogeneous, whether in regard to the race or the condition of the people who composed it. The nation from which it

<sup>1</sup> In 1647 the population of Virginia and Maryland was 20,000; that of New England as many more; while in New Netherlands, including the Swedes on the Delaware, there were only between two and three thousand; and of these so large a proportion were Englishmen that, some years before, it had been found necessary to appoint an English secretary to the Dutch governor, and to promulgate ordinances in English. To New England, Virginia, and Maryland were afterward added the English colonies of Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, and Georgia.



had severed itself, being composed of English, Welsh, Scotch, and Irish elements—four distinct peoples, of widely different origin, traits, and habits, having been gathered by accident and the sword into the kingdom of Great Britain—was upon this point notably its opposite. But even in England proper there was not a greater predominance of sheer English blood; while the absence of any distinction of rank, and the comparative rarity of any wide difference of condition among its citizens, was almost peculiar to it among the states of Christendom. The sameness of its component parts was therefore so great that, compared in its substance with any other nation, it consisted of but a single element. Its marked and almost unprecedented homogeneity was its distinctive character.

Such difference as there was between the people of the several commonwealths which formed this nation was caused almost entirely by variety of occupation, of religious conviction, and of consequent social habits; and thus the difference was, both in kind and in degree, merely such as always exists among people not only of the same nation, but of the same city and the same neighborhood. The settlements at the North were made by men who sought chiefly that liberty in religious affairs which they, in their turn, austere denied to others: those at the South were planted, not settled, by men of wealth and rank in England, who sent over such adventurers as they could induce to embark in their enterprise, while they themselves remained at home to receive the lion's share of the profit. To those who went out as adventurers to the Plantations, as the American settlements were called,<sup>2</sup> there were added quite a large number of convicts, many of whom doubtless secured there the opportunity of reformation, and the means of reputable life. At the North the settlers clustered in farm-houses round their churches, and wrung a frugal living from a reluctant soil, seeking to lead a thrifty, independent, "godly" life, according to their stern notions of godliness. At the South men sought great profit by the rude culture of large tracts of rich land, upon which labor soon began to be performed chiefly by negro slaves; and dwelling-houses were consequently scattered widely through the Plantations, until at last each farm came to be called a plantation. At the North, religion, as distinguished from the practice of the Christian virtues, was mingled with all public and private affairs; the tone of society was ascetic; and there was no hierarchal church government. At the South religion was not regarded, except in so far as it was a proper and a reputable thing to be attended to; no artificial restraint was placed upon social intercourse; convivial habits prevailed; and in religious affairs, except among a few Scotch devotees of Presbyterianism, the Church of England had full control. To these traits of unlikeness must be added one other, which, in the event, proved to be of greater importance than either, or, indeed, than all of those which have been named. In New England, hardly were the comforts of life moderately secured, when provision began to be made for the intellectual education of the people, and this not only by the establishment of a college for the cultivation of the higher branches of learning, but by the instruction, in grammar-schools and by clergymen, of all the children in the colony. But at the South, only persons of some wealth and social position, and not all of those, sought the advantages of intellectual culture for their sons.<sup>3</sup> From the beginning to the present day this education of the mass of the people has been the grand distinctive feature between the country lying north of the Potomac and the Ohio, and that upon the south, with some exception as to Maryland and Kentucky. Consequently, the education of the country at large, and its position in literature, science, and the arts, are almost entirely due to the northern part of it. The men of the South who were educated received their education mostly at New England colleges, or in those of states which were settled by New England men, or had been brought under New England influence; or they were taught at home by tutors who were themselves educated in those colleges; and the comparatively little knowledge diffused through the mass of poor and untaught people around them has been due to intercourse with men who, born and bred in the northern, have sought homes in the southern part of the country. But, although the mental instruction of the whole country has thus come mainly from the North, the original difference in moral training and social organization between the northern and southern colonies has been mainly preserved.<sup>4</sup>


In one point society in these colonies was somewhat peculiar: the people of all of them, north and south, held negro slaves, and dealt in them. But neither the presence of the negroes nor their enslaved condition was due to the direct agency of the colonists; nor were they, in this respect, absolutely distinguished from their fellow-subjects of the mother country. Slaves were transported to the colonies at first against the wishes of the colonists; and whoever chooses to examine the London papers of the last century may find, even as late as 1776, advertisements of "black boys," and even of "black girls," who "have lived in England several years," and who are to be "sold at a bargain." There was, then, no essential difference between the Englishmen of America and the Englishmen of Great Britain. The former, taken as a whole, corresponded to the middle class of Englishmen in the mother

country, exhibiting about the same moral, intellectual, and social variety of character, modified, and perhaps not for the worse, by the enterprise and self-reliance taught them by their comparative isolation, by privation, and adversity.

Such was the people which the British government began to alienate, about 1750, by denying them their rights of birth as Englishmen; by treating them as mere creatures of convenience, to be worked for the benefit of British commerce and the aggrandizement of the mother country; by imposing burdensome taxes and irritating laws upon them without their consent; by rejoining to their plea in behalf of the establishment of a college in Virginia, that they had souls to be saved, "Souls! damn your souls! plant tobacco!"<sup>5</sup> Of this arrogance of purpose and insolence of manner, and of this notion that Anglo-Americans should exist chiefly for the benefit of British commerce and British manufactures, we shall see that two wars and the lapse of more than a hundred years have not quite rid the governing classes of Great Britain. This unnatural and selfish policy had its natural antagonizing effect. The outside pressure bound together the people upon whom it was brought to bear. Though scattered over a wide extent of country, and having separate local governments, they had free intercourse; and their common trial made them feel that they were not only one in blood, but one in interest. They began to act in concert, not for independent political existence, but for self-defense within the British Constitution.

In 1765 the first Colonial Congress for redress of grievances assembled at New York. But it was in no sense an authoritative body. It was composed of delegates from the several Colonial Assemblies, with three exceptions, who acted under special instructions. They set forth a Declaration of Rights and Grievances; they petitioned the King, and sent memorials to Parliament. But they only claimed all the privileges of Englishmen as their birthright, and therefore protested against being taxed by a body in which they were not represented. Their doings were warmly approved by the Assemblies and the people of all the colonies, and the first step was unconsciously taken toward the political union, the separate national existence, of the English race in America. The lapse of nine years, passed in the endurance of a common oppression from their common mother, and in continuous consultation as to their means of resistance, developed rapidly a unity of feeling in the colonies, which took form in the Continental Congress, composed of leading men from twelve provinces, which assembled in Philadelphia. Under the guidance of this body the power of the British government was in the course of events defied, and the independence of the colonies declared and maintained; but at first it merely imitated its predecessor in adopting a Declaration of Rights, in which the privileges of Englishmen and British subjects were claimed—most important of all, the right of being bound by no law to which they had not consented by their representatives. It took no active measure of resistance, and merely recommended one which may be called passive—a voluntary association, pledging the associators to entire commercial non-intercourse with Great Britain. It is desirable to bring to mind these well-known facts in view of the character and the pretensions of the rebellion the course of which we are about to trace, and also of the grounds on which the government of the United States took up arms for its suppression.

The Continental Congress, assembling first as a mere deliberative body, assumed, in the rapid course of events, the sole and absolute direction of the common interests of the colonies; and this assumption received the hearty, though informal, assent of a majority of the people so large that to all intents and purposes it was unanimous. As the War of Independence went on, as the people of the several provinces shared each other's anxieties and bore each other's burdens, as they stood shoulder to shoulder in defense of their common birthright, their common liberty, and their common interests, and saw each other in great masses face to face, as the leading men of one province were placed in authority over the people of another—the Virginia planter, Horatio Gates,



HORATIO GATES.



NATHANIEL GREENE.

commanding the northern army, and the Rhode Island iron-master, Nathaniel Greene, the southern—as social intercourse became at once more diffused and more intimate, they felt with unanimity that since they had declared themselves no longer part of the British nation, they were one nation of themselves. Their identity of blood was a patent fact, like the presence of the sun in the heavens, neither to be denied nor to be asserted; and sentiment, interest, and future security led them to regard their union as of paramount importance.

These people were at last solemnly


<sup>2</sup> Plantation was merely another English word for colony, colonizing.

<sup>3</sup> In 1671, more than sixty years after the settlement of Virginia, Governor Berkeley, of that colony, said, in a report to the Privy Council, "I thank God there are no free-schools nor printing, and I hope we shall not have these hundred years; for learning has brought disobedience, and heresy, and sects into the world, and printing has divulged them, and libels against the best government: God keep us from both."

<sup>4</sup> John Adams, writing to Joseph Hawley, Nov. 25th, 1775, says: "The characters of gentlemen in the four New England colonies differ as much from those in the others as that of the common people differs; that is, as much as several distinct nations almost. Gentlemen, men of sense, or any kind of education, in the other colonies, are much fewer in proportion than in New England. Gentlemen in the colonies have large plantations of slaves, and the common people among them are very ignorant and very poor. These gentlemen are accustomed, habituated to higher notions of themselves, and the distinction between them and the common people than we are."—*John Adams's Works*, vol. ix., p. 367.

<sup>5</sup> Reply of Seymour, Attorney General under William and Mary. See *Franklin's Correspondence*, vol. i., p. 155.





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PAUL REVERE'S RIDE, APRIL 19, 1775.

DRAWN BY CHARLES G. BUSH.

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absolved from the bond which bound them politically to the mother country—a bond which, instead of being a tie of kindred, love, and mutual respect, as they at first assumed it was and then hoped it might be, had been made, against the protests of the best and brightest intellects in the British Parliament—chief among them Pitt (Lord Chatham) and Edmund Burke—



WILLIAM PITT.

EDMUND BURKE.

a galling fetter. They were independent, they were united, they were one people. In the fierce heat of their fiery trial and under the blows which had fallen so thickly and heavily upon them, they had been welded together as iron is welded into iron. But, although a nation in fact, they were not a nation in form. Distinguished as we have seen that this people was among the nations by its essential homogeneity, it yet lacked that formal political unity which was necessary alike to its government as one nation at home and its recognition as one nation abroad. This great defect was felt the more from the exhaustion, the confusion, and the partial disorganization of society which followed the long War of Independence. But it was chiefly brought to the attention of the thinking men of the country by the jealousy with which the states began to watch and defend their interests, and by the inability of the Continental Congress, which was the representative power of the Confederation, to fulfill treaties, raise revenue, and maintain an army. There was no sovereign authority. The col-

onics or provinces had never possessed sovereignty. They had their Assemblies, by which their local laws were made, which, in most of them, required the assent of a governor appointed by the British crown; but the sovereignty over all of them was in the government of Great Britain. In 1776 they declared, not their individual sovereignty, but their independence as "united colonies;" as united colonies they won that independence, under the almost absolute exercise of power by the Continental Congress. Not only did no colony assert its sovereignty, but no colony won its independence. Yet it is not strange that a people who had just cast off the restraint of one sovereignty should have been slow, in their first days of relief, to assume that of another, especially when they were provided with local governments of ample powers to administer their local affairs. And beside all this, local interests, local ambitions, local jealousies, such as exist in the oldest and most compact nations, could be used by designing men to prevent consolidation, and might have an influence that way even with the candid and the patriotic. So the very Articles of Confederation themselves were adopted only after long hesitation.<sup>6</sup> Proposed by the Continental Congress in 1777, they were not ratified by all the states until 1781. By these articles the states entered into "a firm league of friendship" with each other for their common defense and general welfare; each state renounced the right to send embassies, make treaties, and declare war; and the union was to be perpetual. But aside from the fact that a league implies sovereign "high contracting" parties, by the second of these Articles of Confederation it was expressly set forth that each state retained its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and all rights and powers not explicitly granted by that instrument to the Congress. The vote in the Congress was by states; each state had but one vote; and each paid its own delegates. There was no supreme executive, legislative, or judicial power for the whole country. The ministers and commissioners of the Congress, and the people themselves, proudly claimed the position due to "an independent nation;" and yet the nation was, politically, not one, but many. In a very few years the consequence was discord and confusion within, impending anarchy and threatening danger without. The Continental Congress, once omnipotent, was every day more and more disregarded. The new nation found that, in spite of its colonial Assemblies, which had been renamed State Legislatures, if it would continue its existence, something was needed in place of the sovereignty which had been cast off. That needed, but perhaps not altogether desired, supremacy, it found at last in the Constitution of the United States.

<sup>6</sup> *Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union between the States of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia.*

ARTICLE 1. The style of this confederacy shall be, "The United States of America."

ART. 2. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled.

ART. 3. The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare; binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretext whatever.

ART. 4. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these states (paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted) shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any state to any other state, of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided, also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction shall be laid by any state on the property of the United States, or either of them.

If any person guilty of or charged with treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor, in any state, shall flee from justice, and be found in any of the United States, he shall upon demand of the governor, or executive power of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, and removed to the state having jurisdiction of his offense.

Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every other state.

ART. 5. For the more convenient management of the general interests of the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in such manner as the Legislature of each state shall direct, to meet in Congress on the first Monday in November in every year, with a power reserved to each state to recall its delegates or any of them, at any time within the year, and to send others in their stead for the remainder of the year.

No state shall be represented in Congress by less than two nor by more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any office under the United States, for which he, or any other for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind.

Each state shall maintain its own delegates in any meeting of the states, and while they act as members of the committee of the states.

In determining questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each state shall have one vote.

Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Congress; and the members of Congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from and attendance on Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.

ART. 6. No state, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send an embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty, with any king, prince, or state; nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the United States in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of nobility.

No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confederation, or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall continue.

No state shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with any stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States in Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state, in pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the courts of France and Spain.

No vessels of war shall be kept up in time of peace, by any state, except such number only as shall be deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled for the defense of such state or its trade; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any state in time of peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the United States in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defense of such state; but every state shall always

keep up a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and accoutred, and shall provide and have constantly ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field-pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage.

No state shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, unless such state be actually invaded by enemies, or shall have certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such state, and the danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the United States in Congress assembled can be consulted; nor shall any state grant commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by the United States in Congress assembled, and then only against the kingdom or state, and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States in Congress assembled, unless such state be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine otherwise.

ART. 7. When land forces are raised by any state for the common defense, all officers of or under the rank of colonel shall be appointed by the Legislature of each state respectively by whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such state shall direct; and all vacancies shall be filled up by the state which first made the appointment.

ART. 8. All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in Congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states in proportion to the value of all land within each state granted to or surveyed for any person, as such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the United States in Congress assembled shall from time to time direct and appoint.

The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by the authority and direction of the Legislatures of the several states, within the time agreed upon by the United States in Congress assembled.

ART. 9. The United States in Congress assembled shall have the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war, except in the cases mentioned in the sixth Article: of sending and receiving ambassadors: entering into treaties and alliances; provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made whereby the legislative power of the respective states shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever: of establishing rules for deciding in all cases what captures on land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or appropriated: of granting letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace: appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and establishing courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of captures; provided, that no member of Congress shall be appointed judge of any of the said courts.

The United States in Congress assembled shall also be the last resort on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting, or that hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever; which authority shall always be exercised in the manner following: whenever the legislative or executive authority or lawful agent of any state in controversy with another shall present a petition to Congress, stating the matter in question, and praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order of Congress to the legislative or executive authority of the other state in controversy, and a day assigned for the appearance of the parties, by their lawful agents, who shall then be directed to appoint by joint consent commissioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question; but if they can not agree, Congress shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as Congress shall direct, shall, in the presence of Congress, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the judges, who shall hear the cause, shall agree in the determination; and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day appointed, without showing reasons which Congress shall judge sufficient, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each state, and the Secretary of Congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing; and the judgment and sentence of the court to be appointed in the manner before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to appear, or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence or judgment, which shall in like manner be final and decisive, the





PORTRAITS OF THE SIGNERS OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

As the formation of the people of the colonies into one independent state, or nation, had been brought about not suddenly, but by events extending



judgment or sentence, and other proceedings, being in either case transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress for the security of the parties concerned: provided, that every commissioner, before he sits in judgment, shall take an oath, to be administered by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of the state where the cause shall be tried, "well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of reward;" provided also, that no state shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States.

All controversies concerning the private right of soil, claimed under different grants of two or more states, whose jurisdictions as they may respect such lands and the states which passed such grants are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction, shall, on the petition of either party to the Congress of the United States, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes respecting territorial jurisdiction between different states.

The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective states; fixing the standard of weights and measures throughout the United States; regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians not members of any of the states; provided, that the legislative right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated; establishing and regulating post-offices from one state to another, throughout all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers passing through the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of the said office; appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of the United States, excepting regimental officers; appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers whatever in the service of the United States; making rules for the government and regulation of the said land and naval forces, and directing their operations.

The United States in Congress assembled shall have authority to appoint a committee to sit in the recess of Congress, to be denominated "a Committee of the States;" and to consist of one delegate from each state, and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States, under their direction: to appoint one of their number to preside, provided that no person be allowed to serve in the office of President more than one year in any term of three years; to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for defraying the public expenses: to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half year to the respective states an account of the sums of money so borrowed or emitted: to build and equip a navy: to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from each state for its quota, in proportion to the number of white inhabitants in such state; which requisition shall be binding, and thereupon the Legislature of each state shall appoint the regimental officers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip them in a soldier-like manner, at the expense of the United States; and the officers and men to be clothed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled; but if the United States in Congress assembled shall, on consideration of circumstances, judge proper that any state should not raise men, or should raise a smaller number than its quota, and that any other state should raise a greater number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped in the

through half a century—brief period though that seems to the student of history—as their very independence was declared and won by a body appointed originally for no such purpose, so the constitution under which they assumed political form and unity was but the perfected fruit, the bud and blossom of which were the old Colonial and Continental Congresses; and it was elaborated by a convention at first designed for a minor, incidental purpose connected with commerce and navigation, and which finally assembled with nothing more than the bettering of the Articles of Confederation as its avowed and immediate object. Among that assembly of fifty-five men were George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, Roger Sherman, Robert and Gouverneur Morris, Oliver Ellsworth, Rufus King, Edmund Randolph, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, John Rutledge, William Livingston, and James Wilson, a man whose reputation is beneath his merits, of whom Washington said that he was "as honest, candid, able a member as the Convention contained." It is not surprising that a convention composed of such men, and of those who were worthy to be their associates, soon found that the Articles of Confederation were past all mending, except such as consists in remaking. In fact, the nation had far outgrown them. In spite of some jealous, short-sighted anxiety about state "sovereignty," and some doubts whether the Convention was empowered to do more than amend and work over the old confederation, the very first resolution adopted in Committee of the Whole, after twenty-one days' debate, was, "That a National government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary." The national and supreme character of the government which they were about to frame being thus deliberately decided upon, and explicitly declared, they addressed themselves to their labors. These were based in the main upon two plans by Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, and Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina. Mr. Randolph's plan proposed a national Legislature of two branches, the most numerous to be chosen by the people, the right of suffrage being in proportion to the rate of free population, or taxes paid; a national ex-



JOHN RUTLEDGE

same manner as the quota of such state, unless the Legislature of such state shall judge that such extra number can not be safely spared out of the same; in which case they shall raise, officer, clothe, arm, and equip as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared. And the officers and men so clothed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States in Congress assembled.

The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense and welfare of the United States or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy, unless nine states assent to the same; nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning from day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the United States in Congress assembled.

The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any time within the year, and to any place within the United States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the space of six months; and shall publish the journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each state on any question shall be entered on the journal when it is desired by any delegate; and the delegates of a state, or any of them, at his or their request, shall be furnished with a transcript of the said journal, except such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the Legislatures of the several states.

ART. 10. The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be authorized to execute in the recess of Congress such of the powers of Congress as the United States in Congress assembled, by the consent of nine states, shall, from time to time, think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine states in the Congress of the United States assembled is requisite.

ART. 11. Canada, acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and entitled to, all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony shall be admitted into the same unless such admission be agreed to by nine states.

ART. 12. All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, and debts contracted by or under the authority of Congress, before the assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present Confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged.

ART. 13. Every state shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which, by this Confederation, are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterward confirmed by the Legislatures of every state.

These Articles shall be proposed to the Legislatures of all the United States, to be considered, and if approved of by them, they are advised to authorize their delegates to ratify the same in the Congress of the United States; which being done, the same shall become conclusive.





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EVACUATION DAY—WASHINGTON'S ENTRANCE INTO NEW YORK NOV. 25, 1783.

FROM A DRAWING BY W. S. L. JEWETT.

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executive and a national judiciary, both to be chosen by the national Legislature; the national Legislature to have a negative on all state laws inconsistent with the Articles of Union, and the national executive and judiciary to have, as a Council of Revision, a qualified negative upon all laws, state as well as national. These were its most important and characteristic points. Mr. Pinckney's plan proposed essentially the same system, but attained its ends by simpler means; and this seems to have been the actual groundwork of the present Constitution of the United States.

Another plan was proposed by the delegates from New Jersey, Delaware, and New York. This plan was the result of an avowed attempt to perpetuate the old confederation. It proposed to empower the Congress to appoint an executive of federal laws, officers for the federal army, and to establish a federal judiciary. It was but a make-shift; but even this plan proposed that the acts of Congress in accordance with the Articles of Confederation, and the treaties ratified by it, should be the supreme law of the land—a proposition which showed the necessity of that which the plan sought to avoid; for, without the establishment of a supreme government, it would have been impossible to enforce this provision against any powerful state which chose to set it at naught. The vital difference between the government proposed by this plan and that proposed by Virginia and South Carolina was, that the former dealt with states as the individuals responsible to it, and the latter with the whole people individually, as citizens of the United States, into which union, for all national purposes, the individuality and so-called "sovereignty" of the states was entirely merged. There was no misapprehension of the issue. It was clearly stated. "The true question is," said Mr. Randolph, "whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or introduce the national plan. . . . A national government alone, properly constituted, will answer the purpose." After a debate of four days, the national plan was adopted, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, the two Carolinas, and Georgia voting for it, New York, New Jersey, and Delaware against it, the vote of Maryland being divided.<sup>1</sup> It is worthy of special note that Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, which then included Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, were all supporters, in express terms, of the "national" government, and that the plan which was the foundation of the system adopted was proposed by a delegate from South Carolina, while that which was its counterpart came from Virginia.

After four months of patient, thoughtful labor, free discussion, consideration, reconsideration, commitment, and recommitment, and of mutual concession to interest and to feeling, the Convention perfected the Constitution as it now exists, without the amendments made immediately upon its adoption. Probably not one of the delegates was entirely satisfied with it. Franklin avowed his dissatisfaction with several parts of it; Hamilton had proposed a



ALEXANDER HAMILTON.



JOHN JAY.

system essentially different from that which it established; yet they both devoted themselves earnestly to the task of securing its adoption by the people, the latter (aided by Madison and Jay) in a series of papers which enjoy the rare distinction of having moulded popular opinion in their day, and of becoming authority in statesmanship and classics in political literature. But, whatever the merits of the system of government established by this Constitution,

there was no misapprehension of its character in any quarter. Of two men in Virginia who opposed its adoption, Patrick Henry said in the Convention of that state, June, 1788, "Who authorized them to speak the language of 'We, the people,' instead of 'We, the states?'" States are the characteristic and the soul of a confederation. If the states be not the agents of this compact, it must be one great consolidated national government of the people of all the states." And George Mason in the same body also said, "Whether the Constitution



PATRICK HENRY.

be good or bad, the present clause clearly discovers that it is a national government, and no longer a confederation." The reply was not a denial of the nationality of the government, or an attempt to soften or glaze over its

consolidated character, but the avowal of these features, and the showing, by James Madison, that they were necessary. The same eminent patriot and statesman replied also to an inquiry by Hamilton, on the part of New York, whether the Constitution could be adopted with a reserved right to secede, in case certain amendments were not made, by a decided negative; the Constitution "required an unconditional adoption *in toto*, and forever." By June, 1788, nine states had adopted the Constitution, and thus merged their independent political existence in that of a new nation; but it was not until May, 1790, that Rhode Island, the last of the thirteen, consented to be absorbed into the Union, and the many became one.

As by the Constitution the powers not delegated by it to the United States, or prohibited to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people, let us see what rights and powers they were which the people of each state gave up. They were the right and power to levy taxes and impose duties, to regulate commerce, to make naturalization laws, to coin money, to regulate post-offices and post-roads, to define and punish piracies, to declare war, to provide an army and navy, to enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation, to issue letters of marque and reprisal, to emit bills of credit, to keep troops, ships of war in time of peace, and to enter into any agreement or compact, either with each other, or with a foreign power. They placed the decision in any controversy between either one of them and another, or the citizen of another, or the United States, in the hands of the national judiciary; and, most important and significant concession of all, they gave up the right to change their very form of state government. This Constitution, according to one of the most eminent of its framers, was adopted by all the states "unconditionally, in *toto*, and forever;" this Union, by the terms of that Constitution, was to be "perpetual." Had the revolted colonies secured an individual sovereignty when they won their collective independence, this instrument would have left them none of it, according to the manifest intention of its framers. After its adoption there would have remained no semblance of sovereignty, but simply the right of independent self-government in local matters—that wise reservation which has secured the strength of centralization with the protection of local interests and the development of local resources by the people who are most concerned in them and best understand them; which insures the vast fabric based upon this Constitution from falling to pieces by its own weight, like the great empires of the past, by giving it stable support throughout its wide extent, instead of making it rest solely upon its central point; which frees us from an exhibition of that political incongruity seen in the mother country, where all interests, small or great, are controlled by the Imperial Parliament, and where we see the attention of that most important body given, day after day, to one petty county or parish matter or other, about which its members know little and care less. But this sovereignty the revolted states did not achieve. Sovereignty is the attribute of that power alone which has no superior; and of that sovereignty the colonies had none before their declaration of independence; and by that declaration which they made as united colonies, and which they won only as united colonies or states, they can not be said to have gained an individual sovereignty which they had not before. Upon this very point Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, of South Carolina, one of the delegates for the formation of the Constitution, in course of the debates in the Legislature of South Carolina herself on the adoption of the Constitution (January, 1788), said of the Declaration of Independence, "This admirable manifesto sufficiently refutes the doctrine of the individual sovereignty and independence of the several states."

\* \* \* \* The several states are not even mentioned by name in any part, as if it was intended to impress the maxim on America that our freedom and independence arose from our union, and that without it we never could be free and independent. Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this union by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses." If this be the bearing of the Declaration of Independence upon state sovereignty, what is that of the Constitution—an instrument which vests all the attributes of sovereignty in the national government, and which does this not by the act of the individual states, but by that of "the people of the United States?" It is also of importance to note that the Constitution was submitted, not to the Legislatures and corporate representatives of the states, but to the people; and for the very reason that it was supposed that the pride of state sovereignty would prevent the former from adopting it. James Wilson said, "I know that they [the Legislatures and state officers] will oppose it. I am for carrying it to the people of each state." It was unavoidable that the people should act by states, not only because that was the only mode of combined action in their power, but because the very question to be decided touched the resignation of power by the state as an individual. It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that, after the adoption of that Constitution, there was no avoidance of its obligations or withdrawal from its pale, except in virtue of that inalienable right of revolution, which, to be



CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY.

<sup>1</sup> New Hampshire and Rhode Island were not represented in this Convention.



complete, must have good cause, and power to maintain that cause. And this right belongs not to the people by virtue of state organization, or of residence within state limits, but to the inhabitants of any country or locality who are like-minded, and can make their rebellious determination good. As if to put this question, as far as he could, beyond a peradventure, the leader

of the armies in the War of Independence, the president of the Convention who formed the Constitution, the first president of the United States under that Constitution, said of it in his Farewell Address to his Countrymen, "Until changed by an explicit and deliberate act of the whole people, it is sacredly obligatory upon all."<sup>8</sup>

## CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

### PREAMBLE.

We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

### ARTICLE I.

#### SECTION I.

All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

#### SECTION II.

1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states; and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.

2. No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen.

3. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have at least one representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the state of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

4. When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.

5. The House of Representatives shall choose their speaker and other officers, and shall have the sole power of impeachment.

#### SECTION III.

1. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two senators from each state, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six years, and each senator shall have one vote.

2. Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be, into three classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.

3. No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state for which he shall be chosen.

4. The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided.

5. The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a president pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.

6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the chief justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.

7. Judgment in case of impeachment shall not extend farther than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States, but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law.

#### SECTION IV.

1. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing senators.

2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

#### SECTION V.

1. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each house may provide.

2. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.

3. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house, on any question, shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

4. Neither house during the session of Congress shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting.

#### SECTION VI.

1. The senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to or returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either house, they shall not be questioned in any other place.

2. No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.

#### SECTION VII.

1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.

2. Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

3. Every order, resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment), shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

#### SECTION VIII.

The Congress shall have power—

1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes;

4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, throughout the United States;

5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;

6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;

7. To establish post-offices and post-roads;

8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;

9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

10. To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations;

11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;

12. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;

13. To provide and maintain a navy;

14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;

16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

17. To exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the Legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings; and,

18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

#### SECTION IX.

1. The migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each person.

2. The privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

3. No bill of attainder, or ex-post-facto law, shall be passed.

4. No capitation, or other direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

5. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state.

6. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one state over those of another; nor shall vessels bound to or from one state be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.

7. No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.

8. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.

#### SECTION X.

1. No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex-post-facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.

2. No state shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any state on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress.

3. No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.

## ARTICLE II.

### SECTION I.

1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows:

2. Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the state may be entitled in the Congress; but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.

The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then, from the five highest on the list, the said House shall in like manner choose the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states; the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be the Vice-President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them by ballot the Vice-President.\*

3. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors and the day on which they shall give their votes, which day shall be the same throughout the United States.

4. No person except a natural-born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States.

5. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President; and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President; and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed or a President shall be elected.

6. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.

7. Before he enter on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States."

#### SECTION II.

1. The President shall be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States and

\* Altered by the 12th amendment.





THE UNITED STATES SLOOP OF WAR "BROOKLYN."



## DECLARATION OF

In Congress

## A Declaration by the Representatives of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in General Congress assembled.

When in the course of human events it becomes necessary for <sup>one</sup> people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to ~~assume among the powers of the earth the same and equal station to which the laws of nature & of nature's god entitle them.~~ a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> separation.

We hold these truths to be ~~self-evident~~ <sup>self-evident</sup>; that all men are created equal & independent; that ~~they are endowed by their creator with certain rights~~ <sup>that among these are life, liberty, & the pursuit of happiness</sup>; that to secure these ~~rights~~ <sup>rights</sup>, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government shall become destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, & to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles & organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety & happiness. prudence indeed will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light & transient causes: and accordingly all experience hath shewn that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed but when a long train of abuses & usurpations, [beginning at a distinguished period] & pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to ~~reduce them to absolute despotism~~ <sup>reduce them to absolute despotism</sup> it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government & to provide new guards for their future security. such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies & such is now the necessity which constrains them to ~~alter~~ <sup>change</sup> their former systems of government. the history of the present ~~usurpations~~ <sup>usurpations</sup> is a history of ~~unremitting~~ <sup>unremitting</sup> injuries and usurpations. [among which, ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> to contradict the uniform tenor of the rest, ~~all of which~~ <sup>all of which</sup> have] in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states to prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world. [for the truth of which we pledge a faith yet unsullied by falsehood] he has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good; he has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate & pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained, and when so suspended, he has neglected ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> attend to them; he has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people unless those people would relinquish the right <sup>of representation</sup> ~~of representation~~, a right inestimable to them & formidable to tyrants only; he has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, & distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures; he has dissolved Representative houses repeatedly ~~for opposing~~ <sup>for opposing</sup> with manly firmness his invasions on the rights of the people; ~~he has refused for a long time~~ <sup>he has refused for a long time</sup> to cause others to be elected,

whereby the legislative powers, & the people at large for their exposure to all the dangers of ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> has endeavored to prevent the obstructing the laws for naturalization to encourage their migration; ~~he has~~ <sup>he</sup> has ~~suffered~~ <sup>suffered</sup> the administration of justice by refusing his assent ~~he has made~~ <sup>he has made</sup> ~~judges~~ <sup>judges</sup> dependant ~~and amount of their salaries~~ <sup>and amount of their salaries</sup> he has erected a multitude of ~~their~~ <sup>their</sup> swarms of officers to harm

he has kept among us in times of ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> has affected to render the military he has combined with others to subvert the laws and unacknowledged by our ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> legislation for quartering ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> protecting them by a ~~multitude~~ <sup>multitude</sup> of soldiers which they should commit on ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> cutting off our trade with all ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> imposing taxes on us without ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> depriving us of the benefits of ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> transporting us beyond seas to ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> abolishing the free system of English laws in many places, and enlarging its boundaries so as to render the rule into these ~~states~~ <sup>states</sup> ~~abolishing~~ <sup>abolishing</sup> our most ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> taking away our charters, & ~~for~~ <sup>for</sup> suspending our own legislation ~~legislate~~ <sup>legislate</sup> for us in all ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> has abdicated government here, of his allegiance & protection; he has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, & ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> is at this time transporting ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> works of death, desolation, & ~~of~~ <sup>of</sup> cruelty, & perfidy, in the most ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> has endeavored to bring on the ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> savages, whose known rule of ~~all~~ <sup>all</sup> ages, sexes, & conditions; ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> has incited treasonable insurrections, & ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> has ~~constrained~~ <sup>constrained</sup> others to follow ~~he~~ <sup>he</sup> has ~~usurped~~ <sup>usurped</sup> our ~~rights~~ <sup>rights</sup> of life & liberty, in ~~fended~~ <sup>fended</sup> him, captivating & ~~where~~ <sup>where</sup> there, or to incur miserable ~~piratical~~ <sup>piratical</sup> warfare the oppressor ~~Christian~~ <sup>Christian</sup> king of Great Britain where MEN should be

John Hancock Saml. Lewis Richd. Stockton Francis  
Robt Morris John Penn Wm Whipple Jos. B. Vass  
Benjamin Rush Wm Paca Samuel Chase John Hart  
Benj. Franklin Tho. Stone Wm Ross Peter Clark  
Joseph Hewes Wm Lloyd John Witherspoon Button Guinness  
Wm Hooper John Adams John Jay  
John Morton James Wilson Thos. Hopkinson Geo. Walton



# INDEPENDENCE

July, 1776.

of annihilation, have returned to state remaining in the mean time without, & convulsions within: of these states, for that purpose foreigners, refusing to pass others raising the conditions of new ap-

ice [totally to cease in some of these or establishing judiciary powers: all alone, for the tenure of their offices,

by a self-assumed power, & vent his & eat out their substance;

without the consent of our

dent of & superior to the civil power: jurisdiction foreign to our constitution

his assent to their pretended acts of armed troops among us,

and punishment for any murders parts of these states;

re, world;

ent;

any;

or pretended offences:

province, establishing therein an arbitrary government

simple & fit instrument for introducing the same absolute

is fundamentally the forms of our governments,

of themselves invested with power & power:

us out of his prohibition & using war against us.

ing his governors & declaring us out

acts, burnt our towns & destroyed the

sub and other

is of foreign mercenaries to complete

already begun with circumstances

and totally

a civilized nation.

of our frontiers the merciless Indian

in undistinguished destruction of

of our fellow-citizens with the

your property

to their arms against their country & to the

and the execution of their friends & brethren

atize itself, violating it is most so

of a distant people who never of

into slavery in another lands

their transportation thither. this

del powers, is the warfare of, the

for suppressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or to restrain this detestable trade: and that this assemblage of horrors might want no fact of distinguished die, he is now exciting those very people to rise in arms among us, and to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them by murdering the people upon whom he also shrouded them: thus paying off former crimes committed against the liberties of one people, with crimes which he urges them to commit against the lives of another.

in every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms: our repeated petitions have been answered by repeated injuries. a prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a people who mean to be free. future ages will scarce believe that the hardships of one man, adventured within the short compass of twelve years to lay a foundation for broad & unguised tyranny, over a people fostered & fixed in principles of freedom.

Nor have we been wanting in attentions to our British brethren: we have warned them from time to time of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over these our states. we have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration & settlement here, no one of which could warrant so strange a pretension: that these were effected at the expense of our own blood & treasure unassisted by the wealth or the strength of Great Britain: that in constituting indeed our several forms of government, we had adopted one common king, thereby laying a foundation for perpetual league & amity with them: but that submission to their parliament was no part of our constitution, nor over in ideas of history may be credited: and we appealed to their native justice & magnanimity, as well as to the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations which were likely to interrupt our correspondence & connection. they too have been deaf to the voice of justice & of consanguinity. [when occasions have been given them by the regular course of their laws, of removing from their councils the disturbers of our harmony, they have by their free election re-established them in power, at this very time too they are permitting their chief magistrates to send over not only soldiers & our common blood, but Scotch & foreign mercenaries to invade & deluge us. these facts have given the last stab to agonizing affection and manly spirit bids us to renounce for ever these unfeeling brethren. we must endeavor to forget our former love for them, and to hold them as we hold the rest of mankind enemies in war, in peace friends we might have been a free & a great people together. but a communication of grandeur & of freedom it seems is below their dignity, be it so since they will have it: the road to happiness is open to us too; we will tread it in a separate & quiet manner, and acquiesce in the necessity which has pronounced our separation. External separation!

We therefore the representatives of the United States of America in General Congress assembled, do in the name & by authority of the good people of these states reject and renounce all allegiance & subjection to the king of Great Britain & all others who may hereafter claim by, through, or under them; we utterly dissolve & break off all political connection which may have heretofore subsisted between us & the people or parliament of Great Britain; and finally we do assert and declare these colonies to be free and independent states and that as free & independent states they shall have full power to levy war conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce & to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do. And for the support of this declaration we mutually pledge to each other our lives our fortunes, & our sacred honour.

not Lee Arthur Middleton Stephen Hopkins Th. Jefferson  
 on George Wythe, Henry Harrison, Tho Nelson Jr.  
 ny Richard Henry Lee, John Adams  
 Richard Josiah Bartlett, Matthew Thornton  
 Roger Sherman  
 Hildre Sam<sup>l</sup> Huntington William Ellery Charles Carroll of Carrollton  
 as a Jun<sup>r</sup> Geo. Clymer  
 h Jun<sup>r</sup> William R. Hoar Paine  
 was Morris A. Smith  
 Sam Adams Oliver Wolcott Elbridge Gerry



Thus one in blood and like in condition, blessed with an unexampled diffusion of intelligence and Christian morality, possessor of a vast expanse of rich and varied soil yielding wealth and inviting immigration, freed from the political burdens which oppressed and the social bonds which cramped the people of older states, presenting to the world outside a single, compact government, but secured from centralization within by absolute local independence, this nation rapidly rose to the first rank; and so solidly based were its power and prosperity, that, but for one element of internal discord, it would have remained forever, as nearly as man can judge, a happy example of the working of republican institutions. Nor, in fact, are republican principles at all affected by the events which shook that power and disturbed that prosperity.

At the time of the formation of the Constitution all the states but two admitted negro slavery. But in all except two this institution was regarded as an exotic, inherited evil, to be borne as well as might be until it should pass away with time. All the statesmen and leaders of the Revolutionary period, including those from Virginia, so regarded it. Jefferson himself did

of the militia of the several states, when called into the actual service of the United States; he may require the opinion in writing of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices; and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.

2. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

3. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of the next session.

#### SECTION III.

He shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them; and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper; he shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the United States.

#### SECTION IV.

The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

### ARTICLE III.

#### SECTION I.

The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior; and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

#### SECTION II.

1. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of another state; between citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states; and between a state, or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

2. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make.

3. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.

#### SECTION III.

1. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

2. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

### ARTICLE IV.

#### SECTION I.

Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

#### SECTION II.

1. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.

2. A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime.

3. No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.

#### SECTION III.

1. New states may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state; nor any state be formed by the junction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the Legislatures of the states concerned, as well as of the Congress.

2. The Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any particular state.

#### SECTION IV.

The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and, on application of the Legislature, or of the executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.

### ARTICLE V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress; provided, that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first Article; and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.

### ARTICLE VI.

1. All debts contracted and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

not hesitate to denounce it openly as "a violation of human rights," and to say that not only the honor, but "the best interests of the country" demanded its extinction. In the original draft of the Declaration of Independence, which is in Jefferson's own hand, one of the grievances most strongly insisted on as a justification for the Revolution is the infliction of slavery upon the colonists, and the perpetuation of the infamous traffic in human beings.<sup>9</sup> But in the Convention for the formation of the Constitution, the delegates from South Carolina and Georgia announced, upon the proposal to suppress the slave-trade immediately, that if this were done those states would not become part of the Union, for they must have slaves. Rutledge said, "Religion and humanity had nothing to do with this question. Interest alone is the governing principle with nations. The true question at present is whether the Southern states shall or shall not be parties to the Union." Charles Pinckney said, "South Carolina can never receive the plan if it prohibit the slave-trade. In every proposed extension of the powers of Congress, that state has expressly and watchfully excepted the power of meddling with the importation of negroes. If the states be all left at liberty on this subject, South Carolina may perhaps, by degrees, do of herself what is wished, as Maryland and Virginia already have done."

2. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.

3. The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several state Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States, and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office, or public trust, under the United States.

### ARTICLE VII.

The ratification of the conventions of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the states so ratifying the same.

Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the states present, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the twelfth. In witness whereof, we have hereunto subscribed our names.

GEORGE WASHINGTON, *President and Deputy from Virginia.*

*New Hampshire.*—JOHN LANGDON, NICHOLAS GILMAN.

*Massachusetts.*—NATHANIEL GORHAM, RUFUS KING.

*Connecticut.*—WILLIAM SAMUEL JOHNSON, ROGER SHERMAN.

*New York.*—ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

*New Jersey.*—WILLIAM LIVINGSTON, WILLIAM PATTERSON, DAVID BREARLY, JONATHAN DAYTON.

*Pennsylvania.*—BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, ROBERT MORRIS, THOMAS FITZSIMONS, JAMES WILSON, THOMAS MIFLIN, GEORGE CLYMER, JARED INGERSOLL, GOVERNOR MORRIS.

*Delaware.*—GEORGE READ, JOHN DICKINSON, JACOB BROOM, GUNNING BEDFORD, jun., RICHARD BASSETT.

*Maryland.*—JAMES M'HENRY, DANIEL CARROLL, DANIEL OF ST. THO. JENIFER.

*Virginia.*—JOHN BLAIR, JAMES MADISON, jr.

*North Carolina.*—WILLIAM BLOUNT, HUGH WILLIAMSON, RICHARD DOBBS SPAIGHT.

*South Carolina.*—JOHN RUTLEDGE, CHARLES PINCKNEY, CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY, PIERCE BUTLER.

*Georgia.*—WILLIAM FEW, ABRAHAM BALDWIN.

Attest,

WILLIAM JACKSON, *Secretary.*

### ARTICLES IN ADDITION TO AND AMENDMENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION.

ART. 1. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

ART. 2. A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

ART. 3. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

ART. 4. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

ART. 5. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war, or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

ART. 6. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

ART. 7. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law.

ART. 8. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

ART. 9. The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

ART. 10. The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.

ART. 11. The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

ART. 12. The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted; the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately by ballot the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.

The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of the whole number of senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.

But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

<sup>9</sup> See this complaint in the fac simile of the original draft given on pages 6-7. It was stricken out before the adoption of the instrument in deference to the feelings of South Carolina.



COATS OF ARMS OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNION.





Baldwin, of Georgia, also declared that that state "would not confederate if not allowed to import slaves." The existence of the nation as one and indivisible seemed of more importance at that period to the men to whom this announcement was made than the immediate suppression of a traffic which was then looked upon without the horror which it now excites; and so, to satisfy South Carolina and Georgia, in the dainty phraseology of the Constitution, "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states existing shall think proper to admit" was allowed until the year 1808. Men who held negroes as property naturally expected, and reasonably claimed, that if they united themselves under a national government with other men who would soon pass laws for the extinction of such a right of property under their own local governments, these laws should not operate to the injury of those who did not adopt them; and so that other dainty but stringent clause was added, providing that any person "held to service and labor in one state under the laws thereof," escaping into another, "shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." It had been proposed in the Continental Congress that in the apportionment of taxation (which was to be according to population) slaves should be reckoned at three fifths of their actual numbers, because, as it was argued, the labor of five negroes was not more than equal to that of three white men. This principle of tax apportionment was adopted in the Constitution; and, consequently, as taxation and representation were to go hand in hand, representatives were apportioned in the same manner. Slaves were not to be represented as property; but three fifths of their actual number in each state went to swell the aggregate, according to which the representation of each state was more or less numerous in the popular branch of Congress and in the College of Electors for President and Vice-President.

The two former provisions of the Constitution in regard to slaves were, at the time of their making, the more highly prized by the slaveholders, but the last was of far the greatest importance in regard to the strength and perpetuation of slavery. For it gave to every citizen of a slave state, whether a slaveholder himself or not, a preponderance in the national government greater than that of a citizen of a free state, by three fifths of the number of slaves in his state; so that while thirty thousand citizens of a free state would send but one representative to Congress, twelve thousand citizens of a slave state would also send one representative if they collectively owned thirty thousand slaves. This provision also made it desirable, as far as regarded political preponderance, for slaveholders to discourage the presence in their state of citizens who were not also slaveholders, and to increase the aggregate number of slaves; for it is clear that, the greater the number of slaves and the fewer the number of their owners, the greater the concentration of political power in the hands of the latter. Thus a provision of the Constitution, made for the purpose of insuring the proper relation between representation and taxation, actually destroyed the political equality of citizens of the United States, in theory the very corner-stone of the republican government which it was framed to establish, while, at the same time, in the states which got the advantage in this inequality, two fifths of what was really productive property was exempted from direct taxation. Thus special privilege was added to the disproportionate political preponderance of the slaveholder. It was the power conferred by this inequality and this privilege on the one side, co-operating with the growth of the feeling against slavery throughout civilized Christendom on the other, which brought about the great rebellion against the government of the United States.

At the time when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, seven of the thirteen states which formed the Union, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, either had abolished slavery or were sure to do so; but the six which retained it, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, were in the aggregate the more populous and the wealthier, while, as we have just seen, their citizens had by the terms of the Union acquired peculiar privileges and advantages of representation. Consequently, at the beginning, the interests of the slave states, as a body, outweighed those of the free states, as a body. This advantage was assiduously preserved, until it was swept away by the irresistible onflow of events. On the 11th of March, 1784, Thomas Jefferson, Virginia's most eminent representative, proposed, in the Continental Congress, that after the year 1802 there should be "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude" in any state to be thereafter formed from the territory of the United States. This proposition failed to become an ordinance only by the lack of the vote of New Jersey, which was lost by the absence of one of her delegates. But in 1787 the important ordinance was passed by which slavery was prohibited in all territory of the Union northwest of the Ohio River. It was more than thirty years, however, before this ordinance had a direct influence upon the great question which was to shake the Union. Meantime Kentucky and Vermont, offshoots of Virginia and New Hampshire severally, were admitted to the Union in 1792, the former slave, the latter free. The slave state of Tennessee came in in 1799, and in 1802 the free state of Ohio. In 1803, the Territory of Louisiana, then a French colony, and including (after the indefinite fashion of colonial boundary claims) all the vast tract of land lying around the mouth of the Mississippi, and stretching westward and northwest thence from the banks of the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean. Slavery was already established in this territory, from which, in 1812, a slave state was admitted into the Union. Free Indiana followed in 1816. Mississippi and Illinois, Alabama and Maine, alternately slave and free, were formed and recognized between 1817 and 1820.


Ten states had now been added to the original thirteen. Five admitted

slavery, and five excluded it; so that in the Senate, where the states, large and small, were equally represented, the original distribution of power between the free and the slave states had not been disturbed. But in the House of Representatives and in the College of Presidential Electors the aspect of affairs was much changed. At the time of the first census, 1790, the aggregate population of the states which had abolished slavery, or were about to abolish it, and of those which had not and since have not done so, was about equal; while the advantage of wealth and the anticipated increase in numbers were altogether on the side of the latter. But the census of 1820 showed authoritatively what all observing men well knew in a general way, that the states which had abolished slavery were increasing in population and in wealth much more rapidly than those which had retained it. In that year the population of the free states was found to be nearly three quarters of a million greater than that of the slave states, and the tide of immigration from Europe, which had then begun to set strongly in, bore its wealth of labor to the free states almost entirely. In itself there was nothing either surprising or alarming in this revelation. Had the country been in its normal condition, with its political power equally distributed, and all its citizens counting each a unit, and no more, in the choice of its executive and legislative officers, it would have been a matter of no political moment to any particular number of states where the increase of wealth and population was, so long as they were individually prosperous. For, as to their local affairs, the absolute control of those was secured to them by the Constitution, which also pledged to the preservation of their equal voice in the Senate. But in the thirty years which had passed since the formation of the national government a great and important change had taken place in the relations of slavery to the country at large. We have seen that it was regarded at that period, except by two of the states, as a legacy from the mother country, which conferred no benefit sufficient to compensate for its reproach and its disadvantages, and as an institution which must gradually disappear. The two states which were not of this mind were South Carolina and Georgia, who, it will be remembered, had refused to enter the Union if the slave-trade were immediately made illegal. In these states a small and active school of politicians soon arose, which devoted itself not only to the protection of slavery where it already existed, but to its extension and the increase of its power. This school rapidly attained a potent influence throughout the slave states, where it soon included nearly all the wealthy planters. This class of men saw the advantage which, in virtue of their slaves, they enjoyed by reason of their more numerous representation in Congress and the choice of President. They saw, too, that the tendency of affairs under their local government was to make them richer, and the poor men round them, who owned few or no slaves, poorer, and thus their mere dependents and creatures; and so, misled by mistaken self-interest, their power was gradually massed and marshaled under the direction of what may be conveniently and correctly called the South Carolina school of politicians, and slavery became a compact interest, to be protected and advanced in the councils of the nation. The only single and sectional interest to be so cared for, in fact; for in the free states men asked for nothing else than that freedom of action which was already secured to every citizen of the republic; nothing else was needful to their prosperity. Agriculture, manufactures, commerce, were interests, indeed, in which different parts of the country had different stakes; but they existed in a greater or less degree in all parts of the country; they were natural and universal manifestations of activity and civilization; and they existed in virtue of no special law, and required none for their undisturbed security. But with slavery it was not so; and the politicians who had chosen it, both as the interest which they were to defend and the weapon which they were to wield, saw with apprehension the rapidly increasing voice of the free states in the House of Representatives and in the Electoral College. The privilege which they feared to lose had become more precious in the very lapse of time which had also brought about the events which threatened them with its loss. By the invention of the cotton-gin the means of producing that staple in a marketable condition had been increased a hundred-fold, and the introduction of the steam-engine into the sugar-mill had more than doubled the value of the plantations in Louisiana. Not only so. These new processes, requiring capital and inviting capital, tended not more to the increase of the aggregate wealth of the states which profited by them than to the concentration of wealth of all kinds, and particularly of land and slaves, in the hands of the few. Consequently, the rich planters saw themselves, year by year, with more political power in their hands; and society in the slave states came to consist in the main of a small governing class of planters, with the bankers, merchants, and professional men whose functions were required by the business of the plantations, and a large class of poor people, becoming every day poorer, more wretched, more dependent, and, at the same time, prouder of their political advantages over the poor men of the free states, by which they were raised to a sort of equality with the wealthy slaveholders upon whose sufferance they existed. This anti-republican, oligarchal system of society the South Carolina school of politicians sought to protect, perpetuate, and propagate.

Meantime the anti-slavery sentiment had spread widely over the civilized world, which in this respect followed the humane lead of the government and the mass of the people of the United States. In the year 1794 Congress passed an act against fitting out vessels for the slave-trade, and in 1800 another, forbidding citizens of the United States from holding property in foreign slave-ships, and also authorizing United States ships to seize slavers. In 1807, as the bringing of slaves into the United States was to become unlawful by constitutional provision in 1808, an act was passed prescribing heavy penalties for this crime. During all this time the slave-trade was lawfully carried on in British ships; and it was not until March 25, of this



A NEW REGIMENT OF MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS PASSING FANEUIL HALL ON THEIR WAY TO THE WAR.





very year 1807, that the carrying off of negroes from Africa into slavery under the British flag was forbidden by act of Parliament. The returns of the Charleston Custom-house, quoted in Congress, show that, of 39,075 negroes imported into South Carolina from Africa between the years 1804 and 1808, 19,649, or more than one half, were imported by British subjects. 25,834, or nearly two thirds of the whole number, were imported by foreigners, while traders of the maritime free states imported only 8838. In 1820 Congress passed an act declaring the slave-trade piracy, punishable with death. In 1833 slavery was abolished throughout the British Possessions after the 1st of August, 1834, as it had been a generation back in the most enlightened and Christianized states of the American Union, and as it would have been in all were it not for the absolute protection secured by the Constitution to every state in regard to its local government. The special advocates of universal freedom may think ill of a provision which resulted in the perpetuation of bondage in a part of the republic. But we must never forget that the men who framed our national government found slavery in the land, or that this provision has but incidentally kept in bonds a race which takes easily to compelled servitude, which under kind treatment can be happy in bondage, which continues servile after generations of freedom, taking pleasure in serving the superior race, pleased when it pleases that race, and proud when noticed by it, or, finally, that this provision was absolutely necessary to secure the political unity, and therefore the independence and peaceful progress of the race, which has made the American Republic the hope and the lode-star of the advocates of popular government throughout the world.

But the rights of states, however guarded, could not stay the advance of opinion; and the year 1816 saw a new attempt to do away with slavery—the Colonization Society was formed at Washington, having for its object the removal of free negroes from a country where they were in contact with a superior race having instinctive repugnance to equal association with them, to one where, being surrounded only by people of their own blood, they could attain such elevation as they were capable of, and even become the nucleus of a negro civilization. The benevolent hope was also expressed by the founders of this society, that slavery might be gradually abolished in the states which then permitted it, and that this so much desired end might be furthered by the means afforded of ridding the country of the freed negro, and enabling him to set out in his new life with some comfort and prospect of success. The leading members of this association were slaveholders, James Madison, John Randolph, and Judge Bushrod Washington, of Virginia, Henry Clay, of Kentucky, Charles Carroll, and Wright, of Maryland, being among them. The feeling of which this society was the fruit was akin to that which, according to Professor St. George Tucker, of William and Mary College, Virginia, produced ten thousand manumissions in that state between 1782 and 1797. But the leading men of the cotton-growing states looked askance upon this project, although it was directed neither directly nor indirectly against any of their rights as slaveholders.

Such was the position of affairs when the question of the organization and admission of Missouri as a state came before Congress. Missouri, as part of the ceded French territory, Louisiana, was already slave soil; as lying northwest of the Ohio River, it was debarred from slavery by the ordinance of 1787. The residents asked to be admitted to the Union with a state Constitution allowing slavery. The delegates from the slave states said "Yes; for slavery is already attached to the soil;" those from the free states said "No; for slavery is excluded forever northwest of the Ohio." Upon this question suddenly great warmth of feeling was manifested on both sides, and all party distinctions at once faded away. The occasion is of particular interest to us, not only as the beginning of that strife which, after a lapse of forty years, came to bloody arbitration, but from the fact that, in the course of the fierce altercations to which it gave rise, the determination of the extreme slavery party to carry their point, at all hazards to the country, was even then distinctly avowed. It having been proposed by James Talmadge, of New York, to restrain the further introduction of slavery into Arkansas, and by John Taylor, of the same state, to impose a similar restriction as to Missouri, the debate thereon was long and violent; and Mr. Cobb, of Georgia—ominous name!—in the course of a furious speech said, directing himself particularly to Talmadge, that "a fire had been kindled which all the waters of the ocean could not put out, and which only seas of blood could extinguish;" adding that if the Northern members persisted "the Union would be dissolved." To this fierce onslaught Talmadge replied by firmly and calmly reasserting his position and that of his constituents, maintaining it with arguments which even those who do not allow them to be conclusive must admit are clear and cogent, and saying, "If the civil war which gentlemen so much threaten must come, I can only say, let it come!" Thus early did the two parties to this question show the style in which they would act upon it: the one in passion and with ferocity, the other in calmness and with fortitude.

Few readers need be told how this dispute was then settled. Missouri was admitted with her slave-bearing Constitution, with the proviso that forever after there should be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any territory of the United States north of the parallel of 36° 30' (the southern boundary of Missouri), but that south of that line states might be admitted either with slavery or without it. With this "Missouri Compromise," although it was first proposed by a Northern member, John Taylor, of New York, the whole country, and particularly the South, appeared to be well content; and it was believed that the firebrand of disunion was extinguished. But, alas! it smouldered.

From this period the political power of the slaveholding states became

practically a unit upon the subject of slavery, and all questions which bore upon it; and this being the only subject upon which there was a compact organization, and a united and vigorous policy conducted by men born and bred to conduct it, the slave interest soon came to be the controlling power in the government. The leaders of its extreme, or South Carolina school, generally assumed an arrogant, insolent tone to the members from the free states, and attempted, too often with success, to browbeat them openly upon the floor of Congress. Seeing how much destructive power the dogma of "state sovereignty" placed in their hands, they assumed it as the cardinal point of their political creed, in the very teeth of the assertions, the teachings, and the counsels of their own statesmen of the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary generations. At what she thought a convenient occasion, South Carolina undertook to act upon this principle; but what short and sufficient measures for the maintenance of the power of the national government her attempted nullification of the Tariff Act of 1832 met at the hands of General Jackson, need not be told here. Her conduct in this affair, and her headlong rush into the rebellion of 1861, impatient to be the leader in the attempt to destroy the republic, form her chief claims to distinction in American annals.

In her nullification outbreak, South Carolina had not the support of even her sister slave states. Yet after her subjection the slave power continued to maintain its united front, and through an alliance, rarely broken, with the great Democratic party, North and South—each using the other for its own ends, after the universal practice of politicians—it always had a potent, and generally a controlling voice in the national government. For a few years there was no occasion for political controversy as to slavery. But soon a small, virulent, and fanatical body of men did yeoman's service to the cause of the extreme school of slaveholders by commencing an agitation upon the subject, which had, under the circumstances, no possible good end in view. But this mattered little to the Abolitionists. They were in their very nature impracticable men. Either not knowing, or not caring for the fact that government has to deal with existing powers and obligations, and not with abstract principles, they reduced statesmanship in America to one simple syllogism: It is wrong to hold man in bondage; the negro is a man; therefore negro slavery is wrong; therefore it ought at once to be abolished utterly. Regardless of all the circumstances by virtue of which the master found himself in possession of the slave; regardless of all traits of race in the slave and considerations of treatment by the master which modified the nature of the relation between them; and equally regardless whether the government of the United States, or even the people, had either the right or the power to abolish slavery, they clamored and agitated for its abolition. The people of the slave states, solemnly guaranteed in the undisturbed possession of their slaves by the organic compact of the nation, were naturally indignant at this movement toward a violation of their vested constitutional rights. Nor were they alone in this feeling. The mass, practically the whole of the people of the free states, wrongful as they felt slavery to be, yet knew that as citizens of the United States, or members of free commonwealths, they were in no way responsible for it, and had no power over it, and they regarded this agitation as dangerous to society and subversive of government. The Chancellor (Walworth) of the State of New York, and David B. Ogden, one of its most eminent and upright jurists, declared that "the doctrine of immediate emancipation" was "a direct and palpable nullification of the Constitution." This it undoubtedly was, and an attempt to carry it into effect would have been revolution, rebellion.

But the multitudinous opponents of the Abolitionists, North and South, not content with discountenancing, persecuting them, and, as a natural consequence, abolitionism took firm root and began to spread. Placed under a ban, it became bitter, vehement, denunciatory, void alike of common decency and of Christian charity. It denounced slavery, an institution which prevailed over one half the country, and among some of the purest and most eminent citizens of the republic, as "the sum of all villainies,"<sup>10</sup> and it did not hesitate to brand the Constitution itself as "a covenant with death and a compact with hell." It is not in the nature of man that an agitation should be carried on in such a spirit without provoking violent antagonism. Every man who held slaves—every man who, although he owned no slaves, did not believe that George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson, and Charles Carroll, to say nothing of perhaps his own grandfather or father, had passed their lives in villainy—every man who did not believe that the Constitution was a bargain with death and hell, was an opponent of abolitionism; and in the South the new movement did more than any other possible agency could have done to produce a unity of Southern feeling, to imbitter that feeling toward the North, and to mass more compactly the vast political power of slavery. The leaders of the extreme school were not slow to avail themselves of the weapons which their opponents had placed in their hands. Working remorselessly toward their end, and having already almost entirely the political leadership in their several states, they boldly assumed the whole control of Southern social and political affairs. They brought the press of their own states into entire subserviency to their purposes; they made it social damnation to subscribe for any newspaper or periodical in the free states which was not itself also subservient to their faction; they managed to exclude from political preferment all rising men who were not heart and soul devoted to that faction. By all manner of misrepresentation and craft they exasperated their numerous poor slave-less dependents against the Abolitionists; and taking ground that whoever was not for them was against them, they fixed the stigma of abolitionism upon all who did not look upon negro slavery as a just, wise, and beneficent institution—a test which, it need hard-

<sup>10</sup> John Wesley furnished the first of these stock phrases, and William Lloyd Garrison the second.



ly be said, ranged nearly all the people of the free states among the Abolitionists, where, indeed, it would have placed the best, if not the most of those of the slave states a generation before. Thus these adroit and unscrupulous managers were enabled to excite among the residents of the slave states what they most desired—a wide-spread prejudice, deepening into enmity, against their fellow-citizens north of the Potomac and the Ohio. They represented the latter as a body of fanatics, ready to set the Constitution recklessly at naught in their disregard of the rights of those who differed with them in opinion. The loose and reckless lives of a large proportion of the Southern and Southwestern population, and their readiness to quarrel and to use arms, especially the knife, upon slight provocation; the rigid conformity to the "code of honor" among the better born and bred; and, on the other hand, the devotion of the people at the North to the pursuits of peace, their absolute subservience to law, their disuse of the duel, and the contempt and odium into which it rapidly fell among them, made it easy to implant a belief among the former that the latter were poor, mean-spirited, cowardly creatures, bound up in fanaticism and love of money. This was done; and no means were left untried by the Southern leaders to produce a conviction among their blinded followers that the inhabitants of the free states and the slave states were a different and an antagonistic people, the former being the superiors of the latter in all the heroic virtues, as the latter were their superiors in mechanical arts and the tricks of trade.

The feeling thus excited was, however, factitious and artificial; and it was possible only because the mass of those in whom it was implanted were ignorant—so uneducated, in fact, as generally to be unable to write, and, in a large proportion of cases, even to read; because, also, the great mass of them were never in a free state, or out of their own neighborhood, and never saw a "Yankee," except a peddler, who, perhaps, cheated them, and who certainly had to worry them for payment if they bought of him; and chiefly because their leaders, or "big men," as they called them, were able to shut out from them all knowledge of the free states through newspapers, except by extracts either from those which lauded or palliated slavery, or from those which denounced it and slaveholders in rancorous and unmeasured terms. But their influence in this regard stopped at the boundaries of slavery. The animosity which they excited was not reciprocal. Throughout the free states there was a disposition to soothe and to conciliate, and to make all sacrifices of feeling and of interest which could reasonably be asked, and even more, to what was regarded as the waywardness, the morbid sensitiveness, and the exasperated feeling of the people of the slave states. The interests of trade, too, interposed their influence; and merchants and manufacturers brooked without resentment many a provocation upon the subject of slavery from alarmed and apprehensive men, who, if deprived of their slaves, would be both without the occasion to buy and the means of paying for that which they had bought already. Of these feelings, as well as of the political importance which their compact organization and positive policy gave them, the extreme, or, as they began now to be called, the "fire-eating" Southern men took advantage. There were no bounds to their assumption of superiority in Congress, and little to their insolence and arrogance of manner. To any stand against the aggression of slavery they replied by threats of disunion; to any protest against insult, by such retort as brought the issue to the alternative of submission or a bloody encounter. All this the free states endured for peace' sake and for the Union.

But the South was not content. Encouraged by the deprecatory attitude of their opponents, and impelled by economical considerations, the leaders of the slavery interest undertook to make the whole power of the government subservient to their will; to break down the landmarks which, with their own consent, had been set up; and to change the political standing of slavery from that of a local institution, existing in virtue of municipal law, and having certain specified and sharply-limited guarantees in the Constitution, to that of a national institution, existing in virtue of the Constitution, and protected every where by the national flag.

Exhaustive in its agriculture, and constantly needing new soil to make the labor of the wasteful, shiftless negro profitable, seeking also to preserve its superiority in the national government, slavery was unsatisfied with the acquisition of Florida and Louisiana, especially after the establishment of the Missouri Compromise line. For below the parallel of 36° 30' the advance of slavery westward was stopped by the territory of Mexico, which bounded Louisiana and Arkansas on the west, and stretched along the Arkansas River and the 42d parallel of latitude to the Pacific Ocean. Hence the discussion in the Southern and Southwestern states of the annexation of Texas, as early as 1829, on the express ground that it would strengthen and extend the influence of slavery, and raise the price of slaves. Hence the indecorously-hasty recognition of the independence of that vast country and its admission to the Union, the consequent Mexican war, and the acquisition of California, New Mexico, and Utah. Hence the attempts, by browbeating and bowie-knife, to drive the free state settlers from the golden shores of California—an attempt which, after a little promise of success, failed utterly; and California, rapidly becoming populous and rich, and stretching far below the Missouri Compromise line, chose to exclude slavery, and was admitted to the Union as a free state, with Oregon soon to follow her. The manifest intention of the leading Southern politicians to use the national flag and the national forces, not only for the protection of slavery where it existed in virtue of local law, but for its diffusion throughout the national domain, led to the counter attempt in the bill brought in by David Wilmot, of Pennsylvania, and known as the Wilmot Proviso, which provided that slavery should be excluded from all territory which had been or should be acquired from Mexico. In spite of the union, for better for worse, between the Democrats of the slave and the free

states, this bill passed the House of Representatives, and only failed to become an act by a majority of ten against it in the Senate. The feeling against the propagation of slavery was now becoming stronger and stronger in the free states; petitions for the abolition of the internal slave-trade and of slavery in the District of Columbia were presented to Congress; and the Free Soil party came into existence, with the motto, "Free soil, free speech, free men." The counter move was one, not of conciliation or of compromise, but of extreme audacity. Mr. Calhoun, who had been a member of



JOHN C. CALHOUN.

President Monroe's cabinet when the Missouri Compromise was adopted, but who had led the nullification movement in South Carolina, who had nursed the doctrine of state sovereignty, and developed it from a querulous crotchet into a dangerous dogma, and who was the unblushing advocate and fearless champion of negro slavery, brought a series of resolutions into the Senate which denied the right of Congress to legislate upon the subject of slavery in the Territories, and declared any law which prevented the citizens of any state from going with their "property" into any of the Territories of the United States unconstitutional and void. This he did in face of the action of Congress in first establishing the Missouri Compromise line, and afterward extending that line to Texas. The effect and the intent of these resolutions was to throw the whole territory of the United States, from the southern boundary of New Mexico to the line of the British Possessions on the north, open to slavery. Mr. Calhoun also wrote and published a letter, in which he said to his fellow-citizens of the slaveholding states, "It is our duty to ourselves, to the Union, and our political institutions, to force the issue on the North," for the reason, as he sagaciously saw, that "we are now stronger relatively than we shall be hereafter, politically and morally." He also proposed, in direct violation of the Constitution, if the free states did not allow slaveholders to bring their slaves when they visited or traveled through them, and did not refrain from putting any hinderance in the way of returning fugitive slaves, to exclude their ships from the ports of the slaveholding states; and he recommended a convention of the cotton-growing states to take these matters into consideration. His resolutions did not pass, and his proposed convention was not then held; but his movement was only a few years too early.

From this time events tending toward the rebellion of the slaveholders succeeded each other rapidly. The passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 was another attempt to allay the excitement in which the "fire-eaters" at the South, with the aid of the reckless Abolitionists of the North, managed to keep the country. As this act imposed no new duties upon the residents of the non-slaveholding states, but, on the contrary, relieved their local officers of any responsibility in the matter of returning fugitives by the appointment of special commissioners for that purpose, and as its only operation was to give efficiency to a provision of the Constitution, delegates from the free states, not admirers of slavery, gave it their votes, and justified their course by the state of feeling in the slaveholding states. There had been a convention of delegates from the slave states at Nashville; the Legislatures of South Carolina and Mississippi had proposed the assembling of a Southern Congress; in the former body secession from the Union was openly advocated; and on the 4th of July, 1850, the memories of the day were not allowed to abate, for even a few hours, the feverous folly of the slave-monomaniacs, whose festivities were deformed by toasts defamatory of the Union. But the great excitement which was produced at the North by the passage of this law for the mere enforcement of a compact as old as the nation, and yet not so old as to have become antiquated and obsolete, showed the great change of feeling which the aggressive policy of the slavery propaganda had produced in a single generation. The Abolitionists, of course, were frenzied; and even those who were not of that faction regarded the law in form and spirit as intentionally aggravating and humiliating. The feeling upon the subject was deepened by the sudden flight to Canada, from the most northern free states, of large numbers of negroes, some of whom had lived there many



years. The people of these states, although not very anxious to retain the negroes for their own sakes, yet saw with sorrow, and sad foreboding, what a multitude of their humble fellow-creatures they might have been, and still might be, called upon to send back into bondage. Yet they did not, as a body, flinch from their loyalty to the Constitution. Slaves claimed were delivered to claimants who established their cases, repulsive though the duty of rendition was. The slaveholders pressed their claims with a pertinacity which would have been very unwise if they had desired unity and good feeling; but which, as their object was to either provoke discord, hatred, and disunion, or to bring about the absolute subjection of the free states to their dominion, was shrewdly politic.

At last a negro named Anthony Burns was claimed in Boston, and put in detention during the investigation of the claim. Some of the more reckless of the Abolitionists, assisted by free negroes, attacked the building in which he was detained pending the examination, and a deputy marshal was shot. There was popular commotion, and a riotous disposition among a small part of the townspeople. But order was preserved and the law sustained by the state and city, as well as by the national authorities. The ablest counsel in the state appeared for the negro, and the investigation was protracted. The excitement increased and quickly spread throughout the state and the whole country. The claimant established his ownership, the negro was remanded; and on that day was seen in Boston one of the most imposing sights the world ever looked upon. Popular feeling was at its height, and the streets swarmed with people, not only from the city itself, but the adjacent country. It was feared that there would be an attempt to take the slave from the marshal as he was on his way to the vessel which was to carry him southward. The marshal had special aids well armed, and there was a company of marines at his command; but, in addition to these, and to prevent any contact between the excited people and the United States officers, the whole militia force of the vicinity was placed under arms, and acted as an escort to the marshal and the slave. Considerably more than ten thousand men thus voluntarily took up arms in support of a law which they loathed, and throughout that swarming, excited city there was not an act of violence committed on that day. Such deference to law merely as the law, in a populous city where feeling upon the subject of the law was all-pervading, and excitement had been rising for days, is unprecedented. But the slavery party were not satisfied with such sacrifices. They declaimed against the necessity of calling out ten or fifteen thousand troops to insure the return of one slave, as an evidence of a desire on the part of the community in which it occurred to violate their constitutional obligations; they did not see, or, seeing, chose to disregard the fact that those troops were volunteers, residents of Boston and the surrounding villages, and that, had not the people of Massachusetts been determined to fulfill their constitutional duty to the very letter, the United States would have been obliged to send an army, and a large one, to take that one negro away from Boston. The slaveholders claimed, in effect, a hearty and cheerful performance of this duty; but that they could not have, and had no right to exact.

The last test of the willingness of the free states to submit to aggression for peace' sake was applied in 1854 by the passage of the bill for the territorial organization of Kansas and Nebraska. Senator Douglas, of Illinois, a



STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS.

bold, adroit, persistent man, having in some excess the politician's failing of regarding the end rather than the means, and almost openly ambitious of the presidency, brought the bill for the organization of these territories into the Senate, and made one enormous, and, as he thought, overwhelming bid for the support of the whole South by introducing a clause which (in accordance with Mr. Calhoun's resolutions before mentioned) set aside the Mis-

souri Compromise as unconstitutional, and opened the whole western territory up to the British line to slavery. The proposition fell upon the country like a thunder-clap. The Missouri Compromise was looked upon as a solemn settlement of the question to which it referred for all time, and was held in the free states and in the border slave states in veneration second only to that felt for the Constitution itself. Yet such was the condition of parties, such the ability of those who undertook to bring about the passage of this important and portentous measure, such, too, the effect of the suddenness with which it was sprung upon the country, that it received a majority of both houses of Congress, and became the law of the land. But the event created a deep-seated and wide-spread alarm throughout the whole population of the free states. Large numbers of Northern Democrats, who dreaded the advance of slavery more than the breaking up of their party, clove away from it; and of these, and the Free Soil party, and a large remnant of the old Whig party, whose leader was slaveholding but not slavery-propagating Henry Clay, was formed the Republican party, which waxed



HENRY CLAY.

strong apace, and soon found that it must fight its way with weapons physical as well as moral.

The issue before the country was now sharply defined. The Democratic slavery party said, "You shall not exclude the Southerner from the territory of the republic, purchased with the common blood and treasure of its citizens. You can go there with your property, and shall he not go there with his?" To this the Republican replied, "There is no such exclusion. The Southerner can go into the Territories and take with him all that the Northerner can. There is, as there should be, no difference in this respect between them. But no; the Southerner demands that he shall not only take with him such property as the Northerner takes, but something else—property of a very extraordinary character, which is property only in his state by local law or custom, and which is not secured to him by the Constitution any where else except for its return to him there—property, the presence of which excludes the Northern citizen, whereas the exclusion of that property does not exclude the Southern citizen. This can not be." And then began the open, final struggle.

The first battle-ground of the new party was Kansas itself, whither the free soil men flocked to secure that fair land for free labor. Some went only of their own motion and with their own means; but many were sent out by emigrant-aid societies formed in the East. They went, however, as settlers in good faith. But how they were harried by ruffians from the border of Missouri; how they were outvoted at the polls by armed men, who swarmed into the Territory just before the elections, to return to Missouri immediately after they were over; how they were shot in cold blood and in hot blood; how they had to stand guard over their log cabins, their wives and children, and their cattle, as our forefathers stood guard over theirs against the savages; how there were two capitals and two constitutions, and governor after governor was sent out at the bidding of the South to support the false and crush the true; and how not one had either the ability, or the conscience, or the heart to do it; and how, finally, after a Congressional investigation, the shameful story was all rightly told, and truth triumphed—this we all know. But in all these sad commotions the country took great strides toward revolution, though at the time we did not see it. Then came an outrage which shocked the world—the assault upon Senator Sumner. He was not entirely blameless. A member of the highest legislative body of one of the foremost civilized nations might have done a wiser and a better thing in a set speech upon a momentous subject than call one senator, who was tall, "the Don Quixote," and another, who was short, "the Sancho Panza of slavery;" for this designation of Mr. Butler, of South Carolina, and Mr. Douglas, of Illinois, may be called the point of a studiously irritating speech by which Mr. Sumner provoked the wrath of the slaveholders, without any hope of either curbing their party or strengthening his own. What he said might have been wiser and better, indeed, but not more cutting, be-



cause it was severe, personal, and true. But for all that, when Preston Brooks attacked Mr. Sumner as he sat bending over his desk in the deserted Senate-chamber, and beat him senseless, he played not only the part of a ruffian, but of a traitor to the liberties of his country. He brought shame upon it throughout all Christendom; shame which the free states cast from them without soil by their indignant denunciation of the act at the voice of men of all parties among them; shame which the South Carolina politicians and their followers took with effrontery to themselves by making a hero of the assailant, and by assuming in Washington an air of greater defiance and insolence than ever. This act of violence provoked the resistance it was meant to intimidate, and added many thousands to the large vote cast in 1856 for Colonel Fremont, the first candidate of the new Republican party. Bearing the Sumner outrage in mind, men voted for Colonel Fremont who had never gone to the polls before since they became of age. Indeed, so strong had the conviction become in the free states that the safety of the republic demanded a firm check upon the aggressions of slavery, that it seemed at one time as if the Republican party would carry the day at its first struggle; and then went up the usual threats of disunion from the "fire-eaters;" and Governor Wise, of Virginia, declared that, if Colonel Fremont were elected, he would march with the militia of his state upon Washington and seize the Capitol and the national archives. But Fremont was not elected, and the country had another breathing-spell, and the rule or ruin party of the South another four years' period of preparation—preparation for their attempt to destroy the republic; for as to aggression they had no more to make; the Supreme Court having decided, in the case of Dred Scott, a negro who claimed to be free on the ground that his owner had taken him into a free state, and afterward into a part of the old Louisiana territory north of 36° 30', that the Missouri Compromise Act, in prohibiting slavery north of that parallel, was unconstitutional, and also that slave-owners might take their slaves into any state of the Union without detriment to their right to the service and labor of those slaves. This decision virtually converted the whole Union to the purposes of slavery, regardless of any local law; and in the Union there was nothing left for slavery to gain.

The position taken by the Supreme Court in this case was regarded throughout the free states as a direct attack, under cover of law, upon that independence in local legislation so carefully secured by the Constitution, and consequently as an open attempt upon their liberties. Nearly all of them at once took measures of the same kind as the resolution passed in the Legislature of New York, which body declared, by large majorities in both houses, "that this state will not allow slavery within its borders, in any form, or under any pretense, for any time, however short, let the consequences be what they may." This, however justifiable, was revolution—indirect, and it might have been bloodless, but still revolution; for either the State of New York must fail to make good its solemn asseveration, or else maintain a position in the teeth of the Constitution, as it was declared by the authority appointed to interpret it. So also were the Personal Liberty Laws passed in some of the free states revolutionary. That of Vermont, for instance, which provided that every person who might have been held as a slave who should in any manner go into that state should be free; and that any person who should attempt to hold any free person as a slave in that state for any time, however short, on the pretense that that person was or had been a slave, should be subject to imprisonment for five years or a fine of not less than \$1000 and not more than \$10,000. Upon this point, however, no occasion offered of open rupture. The free states continued to return fugitive



JAMES BUCHANAN.

slaves, though sometimes rescues were attempted; and no slaveholder ventured to test the willingness of New York or any other free state to allow slavery within its jurisdiction at the bidding of the Supreme Court. President Buchanan, Colonel Fremont's successful competitor, acted on the assumption that the only way to preserve the Union was to yield every thing to the de-

mands of the South Carolina faction, whose infamous policy in Kansas he sustained so unscrupulously that he disgusted even those who used him as their tool, and gave Mr. Douglas an opportunity to win support in the North by opposing him upon the very question which Mr. Douglas himself had thrown like a fire-brand into the country. The support even of the border slave states fell away from President Buchanan. Mr. Douglas gained some of it, the Republican party the rest.

While these events were taking place, the aggressive slaveholders were lashing themselves and the humble non-slaveholders around them into hatred and fury against their fellow-citizens of the free states. Of the manner of doing this and the result, there is one notable and melancholy instance. In the summer of the year 1855 the towns of Norfolk and Portsmouth were desolated by the yellow fever. The pestilence was so fearful that many of the native physicians fled before it, and of those in the neighboring country few could be induced to visit the scene of its ravages. Under these circumstances, a large number of medical men from Northern states hastened to the aid of their suffering countrymen, and remained with them, serving them night and day until the scourge had passed. Unacclimated as they were, weary and worn with watching in the pest-houses, many of them were attacked by the fever, and fourteen died and were buried in the land whither they had gone as ministers of mercy. It might be reasonably supposed that where their bodies lay would be hallowed ground; that it would be marked by some enduring token of the gratitude of the people for whom these men laid down their lives; that fathers would take their children there to teach them the noblest lesson of Christianity, self-sacrifice. But the truth is sadly, shamefully otherwise. The simple stones that marked their graves were made the targets of opprobrium. They stood there silent witnesses of what Northern men could dare to do for their countrymen, their brethren, who had reviled them for years without mitigation or remorse: they testified without ceasing that opposition to the spread of slavery did not spring from hatred of slaveholders; and to those who hardened their hearts they became an unendurable reproach. At last a leading newspaper in one of these towns<sup>1</sup> openly declared (it can hardly be believed of men in civilized Christendom) that the state of feeling toward the North "required the removal" of the bodies of these martyrs to benevolence. Such was part of the machinery, the infernal machinery, which was contrived for the destruction of the republic!

This was the condition of affairs when an event occurred which, although without immediate consequences of moment, except to the actors in it, seems as if it had been foreordained to precipitate the impending revolution. John Brown, an anti-slavery fanatic of the blindest and most furious sort,



JOHN BROWN.

but with determination in his nature and method in his madness, who had been harried and hunted by border ruffians in Kansas, and had in turn harried and hunted them as they deserved, made in October, 1859, that raid upon Harper's Ferry which is so fresh in all memories. How we all wondered when the telegraph told us that the national arsenal at that place had been seized by a band of men who proved to be only twenty-two in number! How we wondered still more when it proved that this treason against the United States was committed merely for the purpose of running off as many slaves northward as could be excited to fly! How, in the midst of our condemnation of the act, we felt a certain admiration of the calm self-devotion of the old man and his followers, whom it took a company of marines to dislodge, and whom the State of Virginia hanged with great pomp and formality, and with a display of military force which the pretense of an apprehended rescue by the Abolitionists did not prevent from being ridiculous. Virginia should not have been allowed to punish an offense committed, not against her local law, but against the sovereignty of the United States. But she boldly assumed the control of the affair. The occasion was too valuable

<sup>1</sup> The Norfolk Argus.



to the conspirators against the republic (for such we must now call them) to be lost. It must not be slobbered over, but made the most of, as a means of stirring up the masses of the people in the slave states into the proper state of turbulence for revolt. And, indeed, like all of the radical abolitionist movements, its only effect, its only possible effect, was, to carry the excitement, the antagonism, and the genuine fears of the slave states to a higher pitch than before. Had the disunionists of the South deliberately contrived to bring about some event which would give a new and resistless impulse to their cause, they could not have planned one which would have served their purpose half as well as this reckless raid of a poor old fanatic frontiersman. And so, although the closest and most jealous investigation of "the John Brown affair" had failed to connect any party or any leader at the North with it, the militia of Virginia were kept under arms until the middle of November, and South Carolina was placed under martial law, not for defense, but to beget an opinion that defense was necessary.

Opportunely for the disunion party, this strange event—unique of its kind in the annals of the country—happened but a short time before the canvass for the presidential election of 1860 was about to begin. John Brown was hanged in December, 1859, and the Democratic Nominating Convention assembled in Charleston in April, 1860. In that body the delegates from the slave states demanded an adoption of the doctrine that slavery existed by virtue of the Constitution in all of the Territories, as one of the principles of the Democratic party. They made this demand knowing that it would not be acceded to; and they were not disappointed. The Democrats from the free states had yielded year after year, for the sake of the party and the Union, until they felt that it would be ruinous to both to yield any farther. The platform of the slavery propaganda was rejected by a decided, immovable majority, and that of the free state delegates, which on the great question conformed to the decision of the Supreme Court as to the territories, but asserted the right of the people of the territories to admit or exclude slavery, was adopted. Upon this the delegates from Alabama, South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, Florida, and Texas withdrew from the Convention, which, thus diminished to a bare majority of its members, adjourned to meet at Baltimore on the 18th of June. It should be observed that, of the fifteen slave states, eight, Georgia, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, including, as will be seen, four of the most important, did not join in this attempt to disorganize the Democratic party for the purpose of making the election of the Republican candidate sure. This purpose was clearly seen at once by all the people of the free states, and equally by all the members of the Democratic party in the great and important slave states whose delegates had not taken part in the movement; and Mr. Douglas, the acknowledged leader and presidential candidate of the Democratic party in the free states and this part of the slave states, exposed in his speeches thoroughly and mercilessly the underhand measures by which the South Carolina faction had sought to use the Democrats of the North for the furtherance of their designs. The feeling occasioned by these events was profound; and it was seen that the old alliance between the slavery party and the Democratic party was at an end, that the power of the latter was destroyed, and, as regarded the immediate issue, that Mr. Douglas's chances of an election had vanished.

Foreseeing and dreading evil consequences from the election of a President by the Republican party, a large and influential body of citizens in both slave and free states sent delegates to a convention at Baltimore, in which John Bell, a Tennessee slaveholder of moderate views and unsuspected patriotism, was nominated for the presidency, and Edward Everett, of Massachusetts—a man who had been United States Senator, Governor of Massachusetts, President of Harvard College, and American minister to Great Britain, and who, with the knowledge, as it afterward appeared, of the great need of his exertions, had devoted himself for a few years to the preservation of the bond of union between the free and the slave states, and who had thereby incurred the sneers of the extreme Republicans as a "Union-saver," which was with them a term of reproach—was nominated as vice-president. The representatives of no party, and having no political organization or electioneering machinery at their command, the gentlemen who nominated these eminent citizens had no hope of electing them at the ballot-box. But it was thought probable that they would receive votes enough to prevent any choice by the people, and that thus the election would be thrown into the House of Representatives; in which case the election of Messrs. Bell and Everett or Messrs. Douglas and Lane was looked for.

Third in order, but first in importance, was the Convention of the Republican party, which took place at Chicago on the 16th of May. The nomination of Senator Seward, the congressional leader of this party, was regarded as a foregone conclusion. But, to the surprise of the country, Mr. Seward failed of a unanimous nomination at the first ballot; and one Abraham Lincoln, of Illinois, was his chief competitor. Of Mr. Lincoln little was known out of his own state. Only those who devoted more than a common attention to politics remembered that he had been a member of the House of Representatives for Illinois; that he had "stumped the state" with some effect in opposition to Mr. Douglas as candidate for the Senate in 1859; and that he had made a clever speech upon the great issue before the country at the Cooper Institute, in New York, in February, 1860. Yet the plea that he could be elected, and that Mr. Seward certainly could not, was urged with such effect that after a sharp contest he received a large majority of the votes. The nomination of Mr. Polk, or of Mr. Pierce, was not a greater surprise to the country; and as the captain of the homeward-bound China ship, when he approached Sandy Hook, hailed an outward-bound vessel and inquired, "Who's President of the United States?" and being answered "James K. Polk," hallooed back, "Who in — is James K. Polk?" so the

people of the United States with one accord asked, "Who is Abraham Lincoln?" The answer had some significance. He was the grandson of a Kentucky pioneer, a fellow-emigrant and friend of Daniel Boone. Left an orphan at six years of age, the eldest of a family of four, he could be spared to go to school but six months, and began to earn his living ere he was well out of his childhood—first as a shepherd-boy, then as an apprentice in a saw-mill, then as a Mississippi boatman, then as a farm-hand on new clearings, in which employment he performed great feats in splitting rails. All this before he was legally a man; and when he came of age he went to Illinois, where he became general helper in a country store, then salesman, giving all his spare time to self-education. In the Black Hawk war he volunteered; and his capacity and popularity were soon acknowledged by his election to the captaincy of his company. His military service over, he was chosen member of the State Assembly of Illinois, to which position he was re-elected thrice. He now was admitted to the bar of his state, and practiced with no little success. He mingled much in politics, and in 1846 was elected member of Congress, but soon found it necessary to give his attention exclusively to his profession and his family. But the crisis of 1859 was too momentous for him to stand quietly aside, taking no part in it; and he entered the field again as candidate for the Senate in opposition to Mr. Douglas, his controversy with whom showed him a match for that daring, dexterous debater and practiced politician. He had early gained, and through all these vicissitudes of fortune, had kept, with the consent of co-workers and opponents, the name of "Honest Abe." Such was the man who was suddenly placed before the American people as a candidate for the most important office in their gift. Of all those who had been placed in a like position, Mr. Lincoln was the most perfect example of the working of that republican principle which puts the highest honors of the state within the reach of the humblest born and bred among its citizens. Not one of the men who had preceded him as a candidate for the presidency had started in life upon so low a level, or had passed so many years without any advantages of intellectual and social culture. Born in a slave state, and having chosen his wife from the same community, he was, although a Republican, a conservative—not tinged in the least with the revolutionary mania of abolitionism. The Republican Convention selected him because of his availability; he accepted its nomination modestly.

The adjourned Democratic Convention, which assembled at Baltimore in June, excluded the delegates which had withdrawn from its Charleston session, but admitted new delegates from Alabama and Louisiana who were known to be supporters of Mr. Douglas. Upon this the delegates from Virginia withdrew, accompanied by most of those from the other slave states, and some of those from the free states—all, in fact, who were determined, in Mr. Calhoun's words, to "force the issue" upon the country of slavery throughout the Union or disunion. This faction organized itself, and nominated as president John C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, a man who had hard-



JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE.

ly attained middle age, and who, without remarkable ability, had been made a pet by the extreme slavery party and by the politicians of the South generally, and as vice-president General Lane, of Oregon. The original body nominated Senator Douglas for the presidency, and Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia, for the vice-presidency.

Of the four parties now in the field, only one—that of Breckinridge and Lane—represented the rule or ruin, slavery or disunion, principles. Indeed, this party was obliged to nominate its candidates only because of the distinct avowal of all the other three that slavery in the Territories of the United States was not placed by the Constitution out of the control of the people of the United States, and that in any case the perpetuity of the republic was before the propagation of slavery. The party at the other extreme, whose candidates were Lincoln and Hamlin, were the advocates of free soil in the Territories, but absolute non-interference with slavery in the States. This





THE GREAT MEETING IN UNION SQUARE, NEW YORK, TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT, APRIL 26, 1861.




party the Abolitionists not only refused to vote with, but constantly denounced; so that the latter were not represented in the contest. It is important to remember these facts in measuring the significance of the vote cast at this strange and momentous election.

The influence of the President, the Cabinet, and the holders of office throughout the country was openly and shamelessly exerted for the rule or ruin party. Mr. Howell Cobb, Secretary of the Treasury, while on a visit to



HOWELL COBB.

New York pending the canvass, avowed himself a disunionist; said that, in case of Mr. Lincoln's election, secession would have the sympathy and co-operation of the administration; and even declared that he did not believe another Congress of the United States would meet. The threats of disunion in case the Republican candidate were elected increased in violence; but, such was the temper of the people, they were no longer regarded as of old. "Gentlemen," said a Virginia planter, trembling with passion, in a conversation between half a dozen persons in the parlor of a New York insurance office, before the Republican nomination had been made, "gentlemen, if you elect Mr. Seward President, we shall break up this Union." "I think not, sir," calmly replied the man to whom he seemed more particularly to address himself. "You'll see, sir—you'll see; we will surely do it." "Then, sir," said the other, as quietly as before, but looking him steadily in the face, "we shall nominate Mr. Seward. Mr. Seward is not my man; for I am a free trader and an old Democrat. But if Virginia, or any other state or states shall declare that, upon the constitutional election of any citizen of the United States to any office, the Union shall be broken up, then I nominate that man and vote for him on principle;" and all present, with a single exception, uttered a hearty Ay. Such was the feeling of the canvass: a canvass conducted, nevertheless, with a notable moderation of language and bearing, except in a few isolated places in the Gulf states; a canvass remarkable, too, for the fact that, while in the free states the advocates of the extreme slavery or disunion party spoke freely and worked vigorously, without hindrance and almost without rebuke, in the slave states, with one or two exceptions, no word was uttered—none would have been allowed to be uttered—in behalf of the Republican party. Had any man ventured to declare publicly in South Carolina, or south of that state, that Mr. Lincoln was a proper person for President of the United States, he would have done so at imminent peril of his life. Not, as we shall see, because there were not many persons there who were willing, though not desirous, that he should assume that office, if constitutionally elected to it, but because the fierce faction which had seized the control of affairs in those states were determined, right or wrong, to brook no interference, and would either have made way with their presumptuous fellow-citizen by the knife, or driven him with violence out of their states into others where the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution really existed, and where respect for law was enforced by an enlightened public opinion. In those states the Repub-



JOHN B. FLOYD.

ISAAC TOUCEY.

licans, the better to marshal and manage their forces, organized "Wide Awake Clubs," the chief, in fact the only function of which seemed to be to parade the streets at night in oilskin caps and capes, each man carrying a

swinging lamp. But, as if even this harmless way of wasting time and oil could not be contrived without helping the disunionists, these torch-light processions were made, not in the customary order of civic processions, but by platoons in companies, with captains and lieutenants, each club having a sort of military organization. It was at once pretended that the real object of all this nightly drill and parade was a preparation to invade the South, and a new impulse was given to the formation of volunteer companies and bodies of minute-men in the slave states. Secession, in case of the election of Mr. Lincoln, was openly proposed in the Legislatures of South Carolina and Alabama; the governor of the former recommending the reorganization of the militia of the state, and the immediate enlistment of one thousand volunteers.

Meantime a species of treason was going on in the very cabinet at Washington. Mr. Floyd, Secretary of War, and Mr. Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, used their official authority to place the government for a time at the mercy of the conspirators. The former sent to arsenals and forts in slave states all the arms and ammunition of the United States which he could move without attracting too much attention, and dispersed the little army to widely distant quarters, where it was not needed, placing at the same time officers born in slave states, as far as possible, in command at the most important points. Mr. Toucey, a Connecticut tool of the South Carolina faction, dismantled many vessels of the navy, and scattered the remainder to the four winds of heaven.

Under these forboding circumstances the presidential election of 1860 took place on the 6th of November; and so complete were the arrangements for counting the votes and transmitting the returns to the telegraph stations, that on the morning of the 7th it was known from Maine to Texas, from Florida to Iowa, that Mr. Lincoln was elected. Thirty millions of people, scattered over an area of more than three millions of square miles, learned within a few hours of its occurrence an event more momentous to their country than any other which had taken place since its Declaration of Independence. Mr. Lincoln's majority over all his opponents in the electoral college proved to be sixty-four; but of the popular vote Mr. Douglas received nearly as many as Mr. Breckinridge and Mr. Bell did together, and



JOHN BELL.

within less than five hundred thousand of as many as were given for Mr. Lincoln himself.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, of the popular vote, Mr. Douglas and Mr. Bell together had nearly one hundred thousand more than Mr. Lincoln; and the majority of Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell over Lincoln was nearly a million, and the entire electoral votes of Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee were given for Bell. Let us analyze this vote more carefully; for the South Carolina politicians at once began to take measures to bring about an immediate disruption of the Union, on the ground that the election had drawn a geographical line across the country, dividing it into two hostile sections of radically different people; and it is necessary to our purpose that we should see the audacity (for when impudence and outrage attain large proportions they have that name) both of the pretense and of the undertaking founded upon it. We must remember that Mr. Breckinridge represented the people whose purpose was that slavery should rule or the republic be destroyed; the other three candidates, however divergent their principles upon other

<sup>2</sup> The electoral vote was: for Lincoln, 180; for Breckinridge, 72; for Bell, 39; for Douglas, 12. The popular vote, for Lincoln, 1,857,610; for Douglas, 1,365,976; for Breckinridge, 847,953 (exclusive of South Carolina, where there is no popular vote); for Bell, 590,631. It must be remembered, in estimating the popular vote, that every ballot in the free states represents a citizen of the United States, while the ballots in the slave states represent three fifths of the slaves.



subjects, having been nominated in express opposition to the disunion faction. Now, the entire popular vote for Breckinridge in the slave states was 571,135, while in those very states the vote for Bell and Everett was



EDWARD EVERETT.

515,953, and that for Douglas 163,525, so that by adding the 26,430 votes which Mr. Lincoln himself received in the five slave states of Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware, there were 705,908 voters who declared themselves distinctly opposed even to bringing the Calhoun issue before the country, while of the 571,135 who in effect declared for it, many, it is known, and multitudes, there is reason to believe, gave their votes for Mr. Breckinridge without regarding the mere election of Mr. Lincoln, in case it should take place, as sufficient cause for an attempt to break up the Union. So far, in fact, was the result of this election from showing an absolute division of the free and the slave states upon the question at issue, or, in truth, upon any other, that of Mr. Douglas's 1,365,976 votes, 1,202,451 came from the free states and 163,525 from the slave; and of Mr. Bell's 590,631 votes, 515,953 came from the slave states and 74,678 from the free; while in the free states Mr. Breckinridge himself received 276,818, or nearly one third of his entire number—California giving him 34,334; Connecticut, 14,641; Indiana, 12,295; Ohio, 11,405; Pennsylvania, 178,871; and even Massachusetts 5939.

These facts make it plain that, whatever division of feeling or interest there was between the mass of the people of the free states on the one side, and those of the slave states on the other, Mr. Lincoln's election was in itself no proof or sign of it. Still less was there at the time of his election any radical or material unlikeness between the masses of the people of those two divisions of the country. They were not different nations or peoples, united by a mere political bond, as those of England, Wales, Scotland, and Ireland are in the kingdom of Great Britain, but one nation, composed to all intents and purposes of but a single element. We have seen that in the beginning the people of the United States were English people, and that, as a nation, they were distinguished above all others for their homogeneousness. An English people they continued to be, with their homogeneousness not materially impaired in the course of two generations; while of such bonds as bind the inhabitants of one country together, not only did those which first existed between them still endure, but they had been greatly strengthened and multiplied by the passage of events, and the development of the national character and resources, during more than half a century. The most mobile people in the world, and favored in this respect by the natural formation of the country, intercourse among them had been more constant and intimate than among the people of any other nation. Having equal, or rather identical, political rights in all parts of the country, vast numbers of them continually exercised those rights, sometimes in one state, at others in another,

as business, inclination, or necessity caused them to change their places of residence. Men born and bred in the free states went into the slave states, became slaveholders as merchants or planters, and rose to distinction in the professions, in society, and in politics. An enormous and entirely unrestricted internal trade caused a constant and assimilating attrition among the whole people. As a consequence of this daily intermingling, intermarriage was constantly going on, if, indeed, that can be properly called intermarriage which is the union of individuals of the same race and the same nation. There was no town or considerable neighborhood, no society or corporation, no social circle in one of these divisions which was not bound by interest, or blood, or close association to some town, or neighborhood, or society, or social circle in the other. The language and the literature of the several parts of the country could not properly be called like; for likeness implies some difference; they were identical; the variations in speech and idiom being of such a trifling nature that, unlike the people of Switzerland, for instance, where the people of one canton, or those of England, where those of one county, can not understand those of another, the people of this country, even in its rudest and remotest districts, had not two dialects of their vernacular tongue. The ties of a common religion stretched over the land from north to south and from east to west. Not only so, but the chief religious and benevolent organizations of the various slightly divergent sects included the whole country in their scope, and derived their support from its people at large. Since the adoption of the Constitution a Spanish and a French province had been added to the country at the South; and of the large immigration, coming chiefly from Ireland and Germany, the greater part, but by no means all, had settled in the Northern states. But in the case of Louisiana and Florida, the number of citizens of a different race which were added to the republic was too insignificant to effect any change in the character of the population, except in two or three towns; and the same remark is even more true with regard to the influx of immigrants into the free states, which, having mainly taken place since 1816, there had not yet been time for it to effect any material change in the native blood of the country, even had that been possible. But such an event seems impossible; for, owing to intermarriage, and still more to the dominant influence of that English race which peopled this country, the immediate descendants of Germans and Irishmen, born therein, pass at once indistinguishably into the mass of its inhabitants; and, as in the mother country under like circumstances they become Anglo-Britons, so here they become Anglo-Americans. It was such a nation, thus homogeneous, thus bound together, and the individuals of which were ceaselessly commingling, as the very soils of the various parts of their country were commingled by a system of navigable rivers, unlike that which exists in any other country on the globe, and the various commonwealths of which were separated, not by natural boundaries, but by imaginary lines studiously drawn so as not to make visible separation, establish lines of defense, or secure exclusive privileges—a nation more marked by unity than any other in the world—a nation, those individuals of which who had enjoyed a like and moderate advantage of social and intellectual culture, could not, in familiar intercourse, be distinguished one from another in manners or in speech by a stranger, although they were born and bred a thousand miles apart—it was such a nation that the political leaders whom the election of Mr. Lincoln had unseated undertook to break into hostile fragments, and partly on the ground that the people of the states whose electoral votes had been cast for him were a different people from those of the states whose electoral votes had been cast against him.<sup>3</sup>

But with all the likeness, the real identity between the people of the whole country, there was a line which divided universal freedom and the elevation and intelligence of the mass of the citizens on the one side from the enslavement of an inferior race and the degradation and ignorance of the mass of the citizens on the other. In these points of difference and their consequences consisted the entire difference between the people whom the defeated Southern leaders sought to array against each other. To perpetuate the enslavement of that race, and to carry slavery into the territory of the Union, and with it the degradation of labor and of all citizens not slaveholders, was the object of the leaders of the rebellion. And that which made rebellion desirable made it also possible; for the ignorance, the poverty, the dependent position, and the blunted sensibilities of the millions of non-slaveholding citizens in the slave states, enabled the few thousand slaveholders to deceive them as to the issues involved, to excite in them groundless animosity against the people of the free states, to cause them to underrate the courage

<sup>3</sup> See, for instance, the following extract from the Louisville (Ky.) *Courier*, published at Nashville, whither its editor had fled before the advance of the national forces in March, 1862:

"This has been called a fratricidal war by some, by others an irrepressible conflict between freedom and slavery. We respectfully take issue with the authors of both these ideas. We are not the brothers of the Yankees, and the slavery question is merely the pretext, not the cause of the war. The true irrepressible conflict lies fundamentally in the hereditary hostility, the sacred animosity, the eternal antagonism between the two races engaged.

"The Norman cavalier can not brook the vulgar familiarity of the Saxon Yankee, while the latter is continually devising some plan to bring down his aristocratic neighbor to his own detested level. Thus was the contest waged in the old United States. So long as Dickinson doughfaces were to be bought, and Cochrane cowards to be frightened, so long was the Union tolerable to Southern men; but when, owing to divisions in our ranks, the Yankee hirelings placed one of their own spawn over us, political connection became unendurable, and separation necessary to preserve our self-respect.

"As our Norman kinsmen in England, always a minority, have ruled their Saxon countrymen in political vassalage up to the present day, so have we, the 'slave oligarchs,' governed the Yankees till within a twelvemonth. We framed the Constitution, for seventy years moulded the policy of the government, and placed our own men, or 'Northern men with Southern principles,' in power.

"On the 6th of November, 1860, the Puritans emancipated themselves, and are now in violent insurrection against their former owners. This insane holiday freak will not last long, however, for, dastards in fight, and incapable of self-government, they will inevitably again fall under the control of the superior race. A few more Bull Run thrashings will bring them once more under the yoke as docile as the most loyal of our Ethiopian 'chattels.'"











and the determination of those whom they taught them to hate, and generally to mislead these poor hoodwinked people and mould them to their own selfish purposes. For a whole generation the disunionists had devoted themselves to undermining the loyalty of their fellow-citizens to the republic and its flag, and inflating them with the petty pride of state sovereignty, to the representation of the people of the free states as mean-spirited cowards, who were scheming to cheat them of their birthright, and to the exaltation of that sort of chivalry which consists in the use of the bowie-knife and the revolver. Now the time had arrived when or never all this wicked work was to bear its natural fruit.

The Republican party was somewhat surprised and very exultant over its decided victory; but, although the country at large had become used to violent threats from the political leaders and writers of the slave states, the election of a Republican to the presidency was felt on every side to be no ordinary political event. Over the whole land there was a pause of expectation; the stock-market was troubled, and all eyes were turned southward. And first upon South Carolina, whose governor, William H. Gist, only the day before the election, had formally recommended secession to the Legislature of that state "in event of Abraham Lincoln's election to the presidency." Men were not left long in doubt as to the purposes of the leaders of opinion in that fractious and presuming commonwealth. They were bent upon the destruction of the Union, and that immediately. The Legislature of the state, which was in session, proceeded at once to consider the propriety of calling a convention of the people; and, in spite of some attempts to induce delay until there could be a consultation leading to combined action among the slave states, took ground in favor of instant and separate state action. The United States senators for South Carolina resigned their seats. The Grand Jury of the United States District Court at Charleston declined making its usual presentment, on the ground that the election of Mr. Lincoln had "swept away the last hope for the permanence of the federal government of these sovereign states;" and Judge Magrath, the United States judge



JUDGE MAGRATH.

for the district of South Carolina, formally laid off his robes and resigned his office, saying that he felt assured of what would be the action of the state, and considered it his duty to prepare to obey its wishes by ceasing to administer the laws of the United States within the State of South Carolina. His example was promptly followed by all the United States officers in Charleston, except the postmaster, the officers of the army, and those in the revenue service. The inhabitants of the town began to enroll themselves as minute-men, and the palmetto flag was hoisted on some of the vessels in the harbor.\*

Georgia, which, in the Convention for the formation of the Constitution, had united with South Carolina in insisting that the slave-trade should be left open for a term of years, now quickly joined her former colleague in the attempt to destroy the government which was then established on their own conditions, and which had since been administered in their own interests, and chiefly by men of their own choice. The Governor of Georgia also recommended separate state action. He did not deem a general convention of the slave states practicable. He proposed that Georgia and each other slave state should protect itself by imposing, in defiance of the Constitution, heavy duties upon the manufactures of Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, and other "offending" states. He urged the appropriation of a million of dollars for putting the state in a condition of defense, and said that to all propositions for conference and compromise the answer should be, "Argument is exhausted; we stand to our arms." A public meeting was held in Savannah, at which it was resolved that "the election of Lincoln and Hamlin ought not to be, and will not be submitted to;" and it was recommended to the gov-

ernor to call a convention of the people. Blue cockades, the old sign of South Carolina nullification, began to appear in the streets.

In the other slave states, although there was no little excitement, there was not such ardor and precipitancy in the cause of disunion. In North Carolina, in Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Missouri, the general feeling, in spite of isolated outbursts of wrath and denunciation, was decidedly in favor of waiting, at least, until the President elect had assumed office, and made some attack upon the peculiar interest of the slave states. Mississippi alone of the other slave states seemed ready to emulate the headlong course of South Carolina and Georgia. The extreme men of the South Carolina school in all quarters broke out in denunciation, in incitements to resistance, and in frothy declamation; but, in all the slave states except these three, there were various opinions expressed; the situation was discussed with a greater or less degree of calmness; and the weight of public opinion, as shown both by public meetings and the press, was largely and decidedly against any violent and unprovoked opposition to the proper results of a constitutionally conducted election. Thus, although Governor Wise, the previous governor of the State of Virginia, had declared before the election that, if Mr. Lincoln were chosen, he "would not remain in the Union one hour," and although some Virginia minute-men at once offered their services to South Carolina, a large meeting was held in Rockbridge County, in the centre of the state—a county containing a large number of slaves, and where is the Virginia Military School, and a college endowed by Washington—at which resolutions were unanimously adopted denying that "Virginia is so hitched to the Southern states that they can drag her into a common destiny;" asserting that "nine tenths of the people are opposed to resisting the general government so long as it is administered in conformity with the Constitution;" and also that "Virginia owes no duty to the South." These declarations are of value as indications of the state of feeling in central and eastern slaveholding Virginia. The vast division of the state which lay west of the Shenandoah Valley, containing one quarter of its inhabitants, one third of its agricultural wealth, and its chief commercial town, was unconditionally and heartily devoted to the Union. Like demonstrations were made in Maryland, in North Carolina, in Tennessee, Kentucky, and in Alabama. Thus divided were the people of the slave states upon the issue, as it was at first presented; the great majority being directly opposed to an attempt to break up the government because of the constitutional election of a president who not only had made no war upon their interests, but who, for four months, would have no more power to do so than the humblest of his fellow-citizens. It seemed for a day or two—for then days were counted—as if South Carolina would be left to herself, or perhaps to the company of Georgia. Nevertheless, she and those whom she had infected with her poison kept up their rebellious agitation, availing themselves of the pettiest means to foment an anti-Union feeling where none existed, and to magnify that which did exist. So, some foolish, loose-tongued, if not loose-lived, medical students in New York, having met and resolved to "withdraw their patronage from Northern institutions" and to leave the city for their homes, much was made of this silly proceeding. All this and much more like it had happened within a week of the election, and on the 12th of November, only six days after that event, Lawrence M. Keitt, member of the House for South Carolina—he who had stood by pistol in hand while his colleague beat Senator Sumner senseless in the Senate-chamber—openly declared in a public speech at Washington, that President Buchanan "was pledged to secession, and would be held to it," and that "South Carolina would stand for the accursed Union;" adding, in that blind, bombastic language, which political speakers and writers of his stamp so much affect, that, "if she could not accomplish it otherwise, she would throw her arms round the pillars of the Constitution, and involve all the states in a common ruin." This declaration of the complicity of President Buchanan in the schemes of the disunionists, which, it will be remembered, had also been made by his own Secretary of the Treasury, furnishes a clew to their precipitate action, which subsequent events will enable us to follow out to a conclusion shameful to the nation, and deeply dishonorable to all who were involved in it.

The effect of this single week upon the country was itself a disaster. Trade was seriously disturbed: stocks fell rapidly; foreign and domestic exchanges were embarrassed. The payment of debts to creditors in the free states was very generally refused in South Carolina and in Georgia, on the ground that they were due to men who might prove enemies. Nevertheless, the banks of those states drew on New York and Boston, and had their drafts honored in specie, although their own suspension of payment was daily expected. The government was powerless for the time. Congress was not in session; and therefore the President could not declare the policy of his administration during the remainder of its existence, which, brief though it was, was big with woe to the nation—to the world. Nothing had been done, even in South Carolina, which required executive interference or even furnished occasion for a proclamation. The agitation of any subject, however dangerous, he had neither the right nor the power to restrain, and thus far only agitation had been attempted. Had he desired to strengthen the garrisons of the military posts in the most disturbed districts, he could not have done so; for the army was so small, and had been so scattered, that he could not have concentrated a sufficient force in time to be of any service. The navy was equally out of his reach. He was embarrassed, also, by the fact that not only had no overt act been committed, but no authoritative revolutionary declaration had been made; there was only much excitement every where, and fierce agitation in some quarters. But the determination of the agitators was clearly seen; and it was seen, too, that, instead of attempting to attain their end by a convention of the people of the United States, which, by amending the Constitution or abrogating it, could

\* The arms of South Carolina are a palmetto-tree.





LIEUTENANT GENERAL WINFIELD SCOTT.



have permitted the peaceable withdrawal of certain states, or have resolved the republic again into its elements, they were determined to set the Constitution at naught by the mere exercise of their own will, and thus force the alternative of resistance to their action, or the humiliation, and, in fact, the extinction of the national government. Gloomy forebodings filled the public mind, and a financial panic fell upon the whole country.

Yet it can not be too clearly or too constantly borne in mind by those who would justly appreciate the manner in which the rebellion was brought about, that thus far South Carolina was the only state in which the movement for secession was so general as to seem virtually unanimous. Even in Georgia many meetings were held to denounce the leaders of the movement for secession, although in the Legislature resolutions were introduced and ordered to be printed, which demanded that, as the States of Massachusetts, Vermont, Maine, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania had "nullified the Constitution," they should be regarded as no longer constituent parts of the United States of America, and that their votes in the electoral college should be thrown out; and instructing the members of Congress for Georgia, if this were not done, to resign their seats. This those members were ready and anxious enough to do; for at the head of the agitators of disunion were Alfred Iverson and Robert Toombs, United States Senators from Georgia, the former of whom had not hesitated to suggest, under his own signature, the outlawing and killing of any man who should accept office under Mr. Lincoln. Yet on the 4th of November, Alexander H. Stephens, a man whose integrity and ability had justly won him the first place among the political leaders of Georgia, which he had long represented in the Congress of the United States, addressed, by formal invitation, a large concourse in the State Hall of Representatives at Milledgeville on the condition of the country, and took ground, without hesitation or qualification, not only against secession, but against the right to secede under the circumstances. Upon this, the cardinal, in fact, the only point of the issue then presented, he said: "The first question that presents itself is, Shall the people of the South secede from the Union in consequence of the election of Mr. Lincoln to the presidency of the United States? My countrymen, I tell you frankly, candidly, and earnestly that I do not think that they ought. In my judgment, the election of no man, constitutionally chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any state to separate from the Union. It ought to stand by and aid still in maintaining the Constitution of the country. To make a point of resistance to the government, to withdraw from it because a man has been constitutionally elected, puts us in the wrong."<sup>5</sup> A slaveholder, an unqualifying advocate of slavery, a politician

of long experience and continued success, his estimate of the causes of the secession movement are of the highest significance and of the greatest weight;



ROBERT TOOMBS.

<sup>5</sup> Speech of A. H. Stephens, delivered in the Hall of the House of Representatives of Georgia, Nov. 14, 1860.

FELLOW-CITIZENS,—I appear before you to-night at the request of members of the Legislature and others to speak of matters of the deepest interest that can possibly concern us all of an earthly character. There is nothing—no question or subject connected with this life—that concerns a free people so intimately as that of the government under which they live. We are now, indeed, surrounded by evils. Never, since I entered upon the public stage, has the country been so environed with difficulties and dangers that threatened the public peace and the very existence of society as now. I do not now appear before you at my own instance. It is not to gratify desire of my own that I am here. Had I consulted my own ease and pleasure, I should not be before you; but, believing that it is the duty of every good citizen to give his counsels and views whenever the country is in danger, as to the best policy to be pursued, I am here. For these reasons, and these only, do I bespeak a calm, patient, and attentive hearing.

My object is not to stir up strife, but to allay it; not to appeal to your passions, but to your reason. Good governments can never be built up or sustained by the impulse of passion. I wish to address myself to your good sense, to your good judgment; and if, after hearing, you disagree, let us agree to disagree, and part as we met, friends. We all have the same object, the same interest. That people should disagree in republican governments upon questions of public policy is natural. That men should disagree upon all matters connected with human investigation, whether relating to science or human conduct, is natural. Hence, in free governments, parties will arise. But a free people should express their different opinions with liberality and charity, with no acrimony toward those of their fellows, when honestly and sincerely given. These are my feelings to-night.

Let us, therefore, reason together. It is not my purpose to say aught to wound the feelings of any individual who may be present; and if, in the ardency with which I shall express my opinions, I shall say any thing which may be deemed too strong, let it be set down to the zeal with which I advocate my own convictions. There is with me no intention to irritate or offend.

The first question that presents itself is, Shall the people of the South secede from the Union in consequence of the election of Mr. Lincoln to the presidency of the United States? My countrymen, I tell you frankly, candidly, and earnestly that I do not think that they ought. In my judgment, the election of no man, constitutionally chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any state to separate from the Union. It ought to stand by and aid still in maintaining the Constitution of the country. To make a point of resistance to the government, to withdraw from it because a man has been constitutionally elected, puts us in the wrong. We are pledged to maintain the Constitution. Many of us have sworn to support it. Can we, therefore, for the mere election of a man to the presidency, and that, too, in accordance with the prescribed forms of the Constitution, make a point of resistance to the government without becoming the breakers of that sacred instrument ourselves, withdraw ourselves from it? Would we not be in the wrong? Whatever fate is to befall this country, let it never be laid to the charge of the people of the South, and especially to the people of Georgia, that we were untrue to our national engagements. Let the fault and the wrong rest upon others. If all our hopes are to be blasted, if the republic is to go down, let us be found to the last moment standing on the deck, with the Constitution of the United States waving over our heads. (Applause.) Let the fanatics of the North break the Constitution, if such is their fell purpose. Let the responsibility be upon them. I shall speak presently more of their acts; but let not the South, let us not be the ones to commit the aggression. We went into the election with this people. The result was different from what we wished; but the election has been constitutionally held. Were we to make a point of resistance to the government, and go out of the Union on that account, the record would be made up hereafter against us.

But it is said Mr. Lincoln's policy and principles are against the Constitution, and that, if he carries them out, it will be destructive of our rights. Let us not anticipate a threatened evil. If he violates the Constitution, then will come our time to act. Do not let us break it because, forsooth, he may. If he does, that is the time for us to strike. (Applause.) I think it would be injudicious and unwise to do this sooner. I do not anticipate that Mr. Lincoln will do any thing to jeopard our safety or security, whatever may be his spirit to do it; for he is bound by the constitutional checks which are thrown around him, which at this time renders him powerless to do any great mischief. This shows the wisdom of our system. The President of the United States is no emperor, no dictator; he is clothed with no absolute power. He can do nothing unless he is backed by power in Congress. The House of Representatives is largely in the majority against him.

In the Senate he will also be powerless. There will be a majority of four against him. This, after the loss of Bigler, Fitch, and others, by the unfortunate dissensions of the National Democratic party in their states. Mr. Lincoln can not appoint an officer without the consent of the Senate; he can not form a cabinet without the same consent. He will be in the condition of George III. (the embodiment of Toryism), who had to ask the Whigs to appoint his ministers, and was compelled to receive a cabinet utterly opposed to his views; and so Mr. Lincoln will be compelled to ask of the Senate to choose for him a cabinet, if the democracy of that body choose to put him on such terms. He will be compelled to do this or let the government stop, if the National Democratic men—for that is their name at the North—the conservative men in the Senate,

should so determine. Then, how can Mr. Lincoln obtain a cabinet which would aid him, or allow him to violate the Constitution?

Why then, I say, should we disrupt the ties of this Union when his hands are tied, when he can do nothing against us? I have heard it mooted that no man in the State of Georgia, who is true to her interests, could hold office under Mr. Lincoln. But, I ask, who appoints to office? Not the President alone; the Senate has to concur. No man can be appointed without the consent of the Senate. Should any man then refuse to hold office that was given to him by a Democratic Senate? [Mr. Toombs interrupted, and said, if the Senate was Democratic, it was for Mr. Breckinridge.] Well, then, continued Mr. S., I apprehend no man could be justly considered untrue to the interests of Georgia, or incur any disgrace, if the interests of Georgia required it, to hold an office which a Breckinridge Senate had given him, even though Mr. Lincoln should be President. (Prolonged applause, mingled with interruptions.)

I trust, my countrymen, you will be still and silent. I am addressing your good sense. I am giving you my views in a calm and dispassionate manner, and if any of you differ with me, you can, on any other occasion, give your views as I am doing now, and let reason and true patriotism decide between us. In my judgment, I say, under such circumstances, there would be no possible disgrace for a Southern man to hold office. No man will be suffered to be appointed, I have no doubt, who is not true to the Constitution, if Southern senators are true to their trusts, as I can not permit myself to doubt that they will be.

My honorable friend who addressed you last night (Mr. Toombs), and to whom I listened with the profoundest attention, asks if we would submit to Black Republican rule. I say to you and to him, as a Georgian, I never would submit to any Black Republican aggression upon our constitutional rights. I will never consent myself, as much as I admire this Union for the glories of the past, or the blessings of the present, as much as it has done for the people of all these states, as much as it has done for civilization, as much as the hopes of the world hang upon it, I would never submit to aggression upon my rights to maintain it longer; and if they can not be maintained in the Union, standing on the Georgia Platform, where I have stood from the time of its adoption, I would be in favor of disrupting every tie which binds the states together.

I will have equality for Georgia and for the citizens of Georgia in this Union, or I will look for new safeguards elsewhere. This is my position. The only question now is, Can they be secured in the Union? That is what I am counseling with you to-night about. Can it be secured? In my judgment, it may be, but it may not be; but let us do all we can, so that in the future, if the worst come, it may never be said we were negligent in doing our duty to the last.


My countrymen, I am not of those who believe this Union has been a curse up to this time. True men, men of integrity, entertain different views from me on this subject. I do not question their right to do so, I would not impugn their motives in so doing. Nor will I undertake to say that this government of our fathers is perfect. There is nothing perfect in this world of a human origin—nothing connected with human nature, from man himself to any of his works. You may select the wisest and best men for your judges, and yet how many defects are there in the administration of justice? You may select the wisest and best men for your legislators, and yet how many defects are apparent in your laws? And it is so in our government.

But that this government of our fathers, with all its defects, comes nearer the objects of all good governments than any other on the face of the earth, is my settled conviction. Contrast it now with any on the face of the earth. [England, said Mr. Toombs.] England, my friend says. Well, that is the next best, I grant; but I think we have improved upon England. Statesmen tried their apprentice hand on the government of England, and then ours was made. Ours sprung from that, avoiding many of its defects, taking most of the good and leaving out many of its errors, and from the whole constructing and building up this model republic, the best which the history of the world gives any account of.

Compare, my friends, this government with that of Spain, Mexico, the South American republics, Germany, Ireland—are there any sons of that down-trodden nation here to-night?—Prussia, or, if you travel farther East, to Turkey or China. Where will you go, following the sun in its circuit round our globe, to find a government that better protects the liberties of its people, and secures to them the blessings we enjoy? (Applause.) I think that one of the evils that beset us is a surfeit of liberty, an exuberance of the priceless blessings for which we are ungrateful. We listened to my honorable friend who addressed you last night (Mr. Toombs) as he recounted the evils of this government.

The first was the fishing bounties, paid mostly to the sailors of New England. Our friend stated that forty-eight years of our government was under the administration of Southern presidents. Well, these fishing bounties began under the rule of a Southern president, I believe. No one of them, during the whole forty-eight years, ever set his administration against the principle or policy of them. It is not for me to say whether it was a wise policy in the beginning; it probably was not, and I have nothing to say in its defense. But the reason given for it was to encourage our young men to go to sea and learn to manage ships. We had at the time but a small navy. It was thought best to encourage a class of our people to become acquainted with seafaring life, to become sailors to man our naval ships. It requires practice to walk the deck of a ship, to pull the ropes, to furl the sails, to go aloft, to climb the mast; and it was thought, by offering this bounty, a nursery might be formed in which young men would become perfected in these arts, and it applied to one section of the country as well as to any other.





FORT PICKENS.

From Harper's Weekly.



and upon this subject he said: "Some of our public men have failed in their aspirations; that is true, and from that comes a great part of our troubles." The feeling of his audience may be gathered from the fact that this statement was received with prolonged applause. Yet in less than three months from that night a Georgia Convention had passed an ordinance of secession, and Mr. Stephens himself was vice-president of the provisional government set up by the insurgents. Some notion of the sort of influence which was brought to bear during that interval upon him and others like minded may be formed from the fact that, during this long, carefully considered, and solemnly uttered speech, he was constantly interrupted by Mr. Toombs, in a tone of sneering menace, on one occasion for the purpose of objecting to Mr. Stephens's suggestion that nothing should be done by Georgia without submitting the great question of the day to a convention of the people!

The persistency and precipitancy of South Carolina offended the border states. They even resented it as a wrong done to the common cause. They claimed a right to be consulted upon a question of such stupendous importance as the severance of the republic for the cause of slavery. The Vir-

The result of this was, that in the war of 1812, our sailors, many of whom came from this nursery, were equal to any that England brought against us. At any rate, no small part of the glories of that war were gained by the veteran tars of America, and the object of these bounties was to foster that branch of the national defense. My opinion is that, whatever may have been the reason at first, this bounty ought to be discontinued—the reason for it at first no longer exists. A bill for this object did pass the Senate the last Congress I was in, to which my honorable friend contributed greatly, but it was not reached in the House of Representatives. I trust that he will yet see that he may with honor continue his connection with the government, and that his eloquence, unrivaled in the Senate, may hereafter, as heretofore, be displayed in having this bounty, so obnoxious to him, repealed and wiped off from the statute-book.

The next evil that my friend complained of was the tariff. Well, let us look at that for a moment. About the time I commenced noticing public matters, this question was agitating the country almost as fearfully as the slave question now is. In 1832, when I was in college, South Carolina was ready to nullify or secede from the Union on this account. And what have we seen? The tariff no longer distracts the public councils. Reason has triumphed! The present tariff was voted for by Massachusetts and South Carolina. The lion and the lamb lay down together—every man in the Senate and House from Massachusetts and South Carolina, I think, voted for it, as did my honorable friend himself. And if it be true, to use the figure of speech of my honorable friend, that every man in the North that works in iron, and brass, and wood has his muscle strengthened by the protection of the government, that stimulant was given by his vote, and, I believe, every other Southern man. So we ought not to complain of that.

Mr. Toombs. The tariff assessed the duties.

Mr. Stephens. Yes, and Massachusetts with unanimity voted with the South to lessen them, and they were made just as low as Southern men asked them to be, and that is the rates they are now at. If reason and argument, with experience, produced such changes in the sentiments of Massachusetts from 1832 to 1857, on the subject of the tariff, may not like changes be effected there by the same means—reason and argument, and appeals to patriotism on the present vexed question? and who can say that by 1875 or 1890 Massachusetts may not vote with South Carolina and Georgia upon all those questions that now distract the country, and threaten its peace and existence? I believe in the power and efficiency of truth, in the omnipotence of truth, and its ultimate triumph when properly wielded. (Applause.)

Another matter of grievance alluded to by my honorable friend was the navigation laws. This policy was also commenced under the administration of one of these Southern presidents who ruled so well, and has been continued through all of them since. The gentleman's views of the policy of these laws and my own do not disagree. We occupied the same ground in relation to them in Congress. It is not my purpose to defend them now; but it is proper to state some matters connected with their origin.

One of the objects was to build up a commercial American marine by giving American bottoms the exclusive carrying trade between our own ports. This is a great arm of national power. This object was accomplished. We have now an amount of shipping, not only coastwise, but to foreign countries, which puts us in the front rank of the nations of the world. England can no longer be styled the Mistress of the Seas. What American is not proud of the result? Whether those laws should be continued is another question. But one thing is certain: no president, Northern or Southern, has ever yet recommended their repeal. And my friend's efforts to get them repealed were met with but little favor, North or South.

These, then, were the true main grievances or grounds of complaint against the general system of our government and its workings—I mean the administration of the federal government. As to the acts of the federal states, I shall speak presently; but these three were the main ones used against the common head. Now, suppose it be admitted that all of these are evils in the system, do they overbalance and outweigh the advantages and great good which this same government affords in a thousand innumerable ways that can not be estimated? Have we not at the South, as well as the North, grown great, prosperous, and happy under its operation? Has any part of the world ever shown such rapid progress in the development of wealth, and all the material resources of national power and greatness, as the Southern states have under the general government, notwithstanding all its defects?

Mr. Toombs. In spite of it.

Mr. Stephens. My honorable friend says we have, in spite of the general government; that without it I suppose he thinks we might have done as well, or perhaps better, than we have done this in spite of it. That may be, and it may not be; but the great fact that we have grown great and powerful under the government as it exists, there is no conjecture or speculation about that; it stands out bold, high, and prominent, like your Stone Mountain, to which the gentleman alluded in illustrating home facts in his record—this great fact of our unrivaled prosperity in the Union as it is admitted; whether all this is in spite of the government—whether we of the South would have been better off without the government—is, to say the least, problematical. On the one side we can only put the fact against speculation and conjecture on the other. But even as a question of speculation I differ with my distinguished friend.

What we would have lost in border wars without the Union, or what we have gained simply by the peace it has secured, no estimate can be made of. Our foreign trade, which is the foundation of all our prosperity, has the protection of the navy, which drove the pirates from the waters near our coast, where they had been buccannering for centuries before, and might have been still had it not been for the American navy, under the command of such spirits as Commodore Porter. Now that the coast is clear, that our commerce flows freely outwardly, we can not well estimate how it would have been under other circumstances. The influence of the government on us is like that of the atmosphere around us. Its benefits are so silent and unseen that they are seldom thought of or appreciated.

We seldom think of the single element of oxygen in the air we breathe, and yet let this simple, unseen, and unfelt agent be withdrawn—this life-giving element be taken away from this all-pervading fluid around us, and what instant and appalling changes would take place in all organic creation!

It may be that we are all that we are in "spite of the general government," but it may be that without it we should have been far different from what we are now. It is true there is no equal part of the earth with natural resources superior perhaps to ours. That portion of this country known as the Southern states, stretching from the Chesapeake to the Rio Grande, is fully equal to the picture drawn by the honorable and eloquent senator last night, in all natural capacities. But how many ages and centuries passed before these capacities were developed to reach this advanced age of civilization? There these same hills, rich in ore, same rivers, same valleys and plains, as they have been since they came from the hand of the Creator; uneducated and uncivilized man roamed over them, for how long no history informs us.

It was only under our institutions that they could be developed. Their development is the result of the enterprise of our people under operations of the government and institutions under which we have lived. Even our people without these never would have done it. The organization of society has much to do with the development of the natural resources of any country or any land. The institutions of a people, political and moral, are the matrix in which the germ of their organic structure quickens into life—takes root and develops in form, nature, and character. Our institutions constitute the basis, the matrix, from which spring all our characteristics of development and greatness. Look at Greece. There is the same fertile soil, the same blue sky, the same inlets and harbors, the same Ægean, the same Olympus; there is the same land where Homer sung, where Pericles spoke; it is in nature the same old Greece, but it is living Greece no more. (Applause.)

Descendants of the same people inhabit the country; yet what is the reason of this mighty difference? In the midst of present degradation we see the glorious fragments of ancient works of art—temples with ornaments and inscriptions that excite wonder and admiration—the remains

of a once high order of civilization which have outlived the language they spoke—upon them all Iliad is written—their glory has departed. Why is this so? I answer, their institutions have been destroyed. These were but the fruits of their forms of government, the matrix from which their grand development spring; and when once the institutions of a people have been destroyed, there is no earthly power that can bring back the Promethean spark to kindle them here again any more than in that ancient land of eloquence, poetry, and song. (Applause.)

The same may be said of Italy. Where is Rome, once the mistress of the world? There are the same seven hills now, the same soil, the same natural resources; nature is the same, but what a ruin of human greatness meets the eye of the traveler throughout the length and breadth of that most down-trodden land! Why have not the people of that Heaven-favored clime the spirit that animated their fathers? Why this sad difference?

It is the destruction of her institutions that has caused it; and, my countrymen, if we shall in an evil hour rashly pull down and destroy those institutions which the patriotic band of our fathers labored so long and so hard to build up, and which have done so much for us and the world, who can venture the prediction that similar results will not ensue? Let us avoid it if we can. I trust the spirit is among us that will enable us to do it. Let us not rashly try the experiment; for if it fails, as it did in Greece and Italy, and in the South American republics, and in every other place, wherever liberty is once destroyed, it may never be restored to us again. (Applause.)

There are defects in our government, errors in administration, and shortcomings of many kinds, but, in spite of these defects and errors, Georgia has grown to be a great state. Let us pause here a moment. In 1850 there was a great crisis, but not so fearful as this, for of all I have ever passed through, this is the most perilous, and requires to be met with the greatest calmness and deliberation.

There were many among us in 1850 zealous to go not once out of the Union, to disrupt every tie that binds us together. Now do you believe, had that policy been carried out at that time, we would have been the same great people that we are to-day? It may be that we would, but have you any assurance of that fact? Would you have made the same advancement, improvement, and progress in all that constitutes material wealth and prosperity that we have?

Notice in the Comptroller General's report that the taxable property of Georgia is \$670,000,000 and upward, an amount not far from double that it was in 1850. I think I may venture to say that for the last ten years the material wealth of the people of Georgia has been nearly, if not quite doubled. The same may be said of our advance in education, and every thing that marks our civilization. Have we any assurance that, had we regarded the earnest but misguided patriotic advice, as I think, of some of that day, and disrupted the ties which bind us to the Union, we would have advanced as we have? I think not. Well, then, let us be careful now before we attempt any rash experiment of this sort. I know that there are friends, whose patriotism I do not intend to question, who think this Union a curse, and that we would be better off without it. I do not so think; if we can bring about a correction of these evils which threaten—and I am not without hope that this may yet be done—this appeal to go out, with all the provisions for good that accompany it, I look upon it as a great, and, I fear, a fatal temptation.

When I look around and see our prosperity in every thing, agriculture, commerce, art, science, and every department of education, physical and mental, as well as moral advancement, and our colleges, I think, in the face of such an exhibition, if we can, without the loss of power, or any essential right or interest, remain in the Union, it is our duty to ourselves and to posterity to—let us not too readily yield to this temptation—do so. Our first parents, the great progenitors of the human race, were not without a like temptation when in the garden of Eden. They were led to believe that their condition would be bettered—that their eyes would be opened—and that they would become as gods. They in an evil hour yielded; instead of becoming gods they only saw their own nakedness.

I look upon this country, with our institutions, as the Eden of the world, the paradise of the universe. It may be that out of it we may become greater and more prosperous, but I am candid and sincere in telling you that I fear, if we rashly evince passion, and, without sufficient cause, shall take that step, that instead of becoming greater or more peaceful, prosperous, and happy—instead of becoming gods, we will become demons, and at no distant day commerce cutting one another's throats. This is my apprehension. Let us, therefore, whatever we do, meet these difficulties, great as they are, like wise and sensible men, and consider them in the light of all the consequences which may attend our action. Let us see first clearly where the path of duty leads, and then we may not fear to tread therein.

I come now to the main question put to me, and on which my counsel has been asked. That is, What the present Legislature should do in view of the dangers that threaten us, and the wrongs that have been done us by several of our confederate states in the Union, by the acts of their Legislatures nullifying the Fugitive Slave Law, and in direct disregard of their constitutional obligations? What I shall say will not be in the spirit of dictation. It will be simply my own judgment, for what it is worth. It proceeds from a strong conviction that, according to it, our rights, interests, and honor—our present safety and future security, can be maintained without yet looking to the last resort, the "ultima ratio regum." That should not be looked to until all else fails. That may come. On this point I am hopeful, but not sanguine. But let us use every patriotic effort to prevent it while there is ground for hope.

If any view that I may present, in your judgment, be inconsistent with the best interests of Georgia, I ask you, as patriots, not to regard it. After hearing me and others whom you have advised with, not in the premises according to your own conviction of duty as patriots. I speak now particularly to the members of the Legislature present. There are, as I have said, great dangers ahead. Great dangers may come from the election I have spoken of. If the policy of Mr. Lincoln and his Republican associates shall be carried out, or attempted to be carried out, no man in Georgia will be more willing or ready than myself to defend our rights, interest, and honor at every hazard, and to the last extremity. (Applause.)

What is this policy? It is, in the first place, to exclude us by an act of Congress from the Territories with our slave property. He is for using the power of the general government against the extension of our institutions. Our position on this point is, and ought to be, at all hazards, for perfect equality between all the states, and the citizens of all the states, in the Territories, under the Constitution of the United States. If Congress should exercise its power against this, then I am for standing where Georgia planted herself in 1850. These were plain propositions which were then laid down in her celebrated platform as sufficient for the disruption of the Union if the occasion should ever come; on these Georgia has declared that she will go out of the Union; and for these she would be justified by the nations of the earth in so doing.

I say the same: I said it then; I say it now, if Mr. Lincoln's policy should be carried out. I have told you that I do not think his bare election sufficient cause; but if his policy should be carried out in violation of any of the principles set forth in the Georgia Platform, that would be such an act of aggression which ought to be met as therein provided for. If his policy shall be carried out in repelling or modifying the Fugitive Slave Law so as to weaken its efficacy, Georgia has declared that she will in the last resort disrupt the ties of the Union, and I say so too. I stand upon the Georgia Platform, and upon every plank; and say, if those aggressions therein provided for take place, I say to you and to the people of Georgia, keep your powder dry, and let your assailants then have lead, if need be. (Applause.) I would wait for an act of aggression. This is my position.

Now upon another point, and that the most difficult, and deserving your most serious consideration, I will speak. That is the course which this state should pursue toward these Northern states, which by their legislative acts have attempted to nullify the Fugitive Slave Law. I know that in some of these states their acts pretend to be based upon the principles set forth in the case of *Prigg* against Pennsylvania; that decision did proclaim the doctrine that the state officers are not bound to carry out the provisions of a law of Congress—that the federal government can not impose duties upon state officials; that they must execute their own laws by their own officers.



state would be "out of the Union" by the 18th of December. In all this time there not only had not been a single overt act of treason, but the laws of the United States had been scrupulously obeyed.

The temper and the purposes of the radical Abolitionists were now most significantly shown by their choice of this time, of all others, for a public apotheosis of John Brown. The 3d of December, the day on which Congress was to assemble, was also the anniversary of his death by execution of the law; and this occasion was to have been celebrated at the Tremont Temple, in Boston, by various exercises, which were to continue morning, afternoon, and evening. But the organizers of so flagrant an affront to public decency were doomed to disappointment. At the opening of the doors there was a small assemblage of negroes and white men, to the latter class of which there were soon large additions, among them the Chief of Police, with part of his force. Upon an attempt to organize the meeting for the purpose for which it was called, groans and hisses broke out all over the house, followed by cheers for the Constitution. Mr. Richard S. Fay, an eminent merchant and a strong anti-Abolitionist, was then nominated from the

And this may be true. But still it is the duty of the states to deliver fugitive slaves, as well as the duty of the general government to see that it is done.

Northern states, on entering into the federal compact, pledged themselves to surrender such fugitives; and it is in disregard of their obligations that they have passed laws which even tend to hinder or obstruct the fulfillment of that obligation. They have violated their pledged faith; what ought we to do in view of this? That is the question. What is to be done? By the law of nations you would have a right to demand the carrying out of this article of agreement, and I do not see that it should be otherwise with respect to the states of this Union; and in case it be not done, we would, by these principles, have the right to commit acts of reprisal on these faithless governments, and seize upon their property, or that of their citizens wherever found. The states of this Union stand upon the same footing with foreign nations in this respect. But by the law of nations we are equally bound, before proceeding to violent measures, to set forth our grievances before the offending government, to give them an opportunity to redress the wrong. Has our state yet done this? I think not.

Suppose it were Great Britain that had violated some compact of agreement with the general government, what would he first do? In that case our minister would be directed, in the first instance, to bring the matter to the attention of that government, or a commissioner he sent to that country to open negotiations with her, ask for redress, and it would only be when argument and reason had been exhausted that we should take the last resort of nations. That would be the course toward a foreign government, and toward a member of this confederacy I would recommend the same course.

Let us, therefore, not act hastily in this matter. Let your Committee on the State of the Republic make out a bill of grievances; let it be sent by the governor to those faithless states, and if reason and argument shall be tried in vain—all shall fail to induce them to return to their constitutional obligations, I would be for retaliatory measures, such as the governor has suggested to you. This mode of resistance in the Union is in our power. It might be effectual, and if in the last resort, we would be justified in the eyes of nations not only in separating from them, but by using force.

[Some one said the argument was already exhausted.]

Mr. Stephens continued: Some friend says that the argument is already exhausted. No, my friend, it is not. You have never called the attention of the Legislatures of those states to this subject, that I am aware of. Nothing has ever been done before this year. The attention of our own people has been called to this subject lately.

Now, then, my recommendation to you would be this: In view of all these questions of difficulty, let a convention of the people of Georgia be called, to which they may be all referred. Let the sovereignty of the people speak. Some think that the election of Mr. Lincoln is cause sufficient to dissolve the Union. Some think those other grievances are sufficient to dissolve the same, and that the Legislature has the power thus to act, and ought thus to act. I have no hesitancy in saying that the Legislature is not the proper body to sever our federal relations, if that necessity should arise. An honorable and distinguished gentleman the other night (Mr. T. R. R. Cobb) advised you to take this course—not to wait to hear from the cross-roads and groceries. I say to you, you have no power so to act. You must refer this question to the people, and you must wait to hear from the men at the cross-roads and even the groceries; for the people in this country, whether at the cross-roads or the groceries, whether in cottages or palaces, are all equal, and they are the sovereigns in this country. Sovereignty is not in the Legislature. We, the people, are the sovereigns. I am one of them, and have a right to be heard, and so has any other citizen of the state. You legislators, I speak it respectfully, are but our servants. You are the servants of the people, and not their masters. Power resides with the people in this country.

The great difference between our country and all others, such as France, and England, and Ireland, is, that here there is popular sovereignty, while there sovereignty is exercised by kings and favored classes. This principle of popular sovereignty, however much derided lately, is the foundation of our institutions. Constitutions are but the channels through which the popular will may be expressed. Our Constitution came from the people. They made it, and they alone can rightfully unmake it.

Mr. Toombs. I am afraid of conventions.

Mr. Stephens. I am not afraid of any convention legally chosen by the people. I know no way to decide great questions affecting fundamental laws except by representatives of the people. The Constitution of the United States was made by the representatives of the people. The Constitution of the State of Georgia was made by representatives of the people chosen at the ballot-box. But do not let the question which comes before the people be put to them in the language of my honorable friend who addressed you last night. Will you submit to abolition rule or resist?

Mr. Toombs. I do not wish the people to be cheated.

Mr. Stephens. Now, my friends, how are we going to cheat the people by calling on them to elect delegates to a convention to decide all these questions without any dictation or direction? Who proposes to cheat the people by letting them speak their own untrammelled views in the choice of their ablest and best men, to determine upon all these matters, involving their peace?

I think the proposition of my honorable friend had a considerable smack of unfairness, not to say cheat. He wished to have no convention, but for the Legislature to submit their vote to the people—submission to abolition rule or resistance? Now, who in Georgia would vote "submission to abolition rule?" (Laughter.)

Is putting such a question to the people to vote on a fair way of getting an expression of the popular will on all these questions? I think not. Now, who in Georgia is going to submit to abolition rule?

Mr. Toombs. The Convention will.

Mr. Stephens. No, my friend, Georgia will never do it. The Convention will never secede from the Georgia Platform. Under that there can be no abolition rule in the general government. I am not afraid to trust the people in convention on this and all questions. Besides, the Legislature were not elected for such a purpose. They came here to do their duty as legislators. They have sworn to support the Constitution of the United States. They did not come here to disrupt this government. I am, therefore, for submitting all these questions to a convention of the people. Submit the question to the people whether they would submit to abolition rule or resist, and then let the Legislature act upon that vote? Such a course would be an insult to the people. They would have to eat their platform, ignore their past history, blot out their records, and take steps backward, if they should do this. I have never eaten my record or words, and never will.

But how will it be under this arrangement if they should vote to resist, and the Legislature should reassemble with this vote as their instruction? Can any man tell what sort of resistance will be meant? One man would say secede; another pass retaliatory measures; these are measures of resistance against wrong—legitimate and right—and there would be as many different ideas as there are members on this floor. Resistance don't mean secession—that, in no proper sense of the term, is resistance. Believing that the times require action, I am for presenting the question fairly to the people; for calling together an untrammelled convention, and presenting all the questions to them whether they will go out of the Union, or what course of resistance in the Union they may think best, and then let the Legislature act when the people in their majesty are heard; and I tell you now, whatever that convention does, I hope and trust our people will abide by. I advise the calling of a convention with the earnest desire to preserve the peace and harmony of the state. I should dislike, above all things, to see violent measures adopted, or a disposition to take the sword in hand, by individuals, without the authority of law.

My honorable friend said last night, "I ask you to give me the sword; for, if you do not give it to me, as God lives, I will take it myself."

Mr. Toombs. I will. (Applause on the other side.)

Mr. Stephens. I have no doubt that my honorable friend feels as he says. It is only his excessive ardor that makes him use such an expression; but this will pass off with the excitement of the

floor as chairman, and elected by acclamation, to the utter astonishment of the John Brown people. Resolutions were adopted strongly denouncing John Brown, his aiders, abettors, and admirers, and the meeting adjourned. The defeated party attempted forcible resistance, but they were ejected by the police and the house was closed—proceedings somewhat irregular, it must be confessed, but under the circumstances not quite unjustifiable. They gathered together again in the evening in the Negro Baptist Church, and were protected by the police during their meeting against a large concourse of exasperated citizens who surrounded the building.

On the 3d of December Congress assembled at Washington. The attendance of members was unusually large in both houses. In the lower the representatives of South Carolina appeared in their places; but in the Senate-chamber stood two empty chairs, silent witnesses of her refusal to be any longer numbered as one of the states of the Union. On the 4th of December President Buchanan sent his message to Congress. Never was an important state paper more eagerly looked for; never did one more entirely disappoint all expectations. The President attributed the attitude of the

hour. When the people in their majesty shall speak, I have no doubt that he will bow to their will, whatever it may be, upon the "sober second thought." (Applause.)

Should Georgia determine to go out of the Union, I speak for one, though my views might not agree with them, whatever the result may be, I shall how to the will of her people. Their cause is my cause, and their destiny is my destiny; and I trust this will be the ultimate course of all. The greatest curse that can befall a free people is civil war.

But, as I said, let us call a convention of the people; let all these matters be submitted to it; and when the will of a majority of the people has thus been expressed, the whole state will present one unanimous voice in favor of whatever may be demanded; for I believe in the power of the people to govern themselves when wisdom prevails and passion is silent.

Look at what has already been done by them for their advancement in all that ennoble man. There is nothing like it in the history of the world. Look abroad from one extent of the country to the other; contemplate our greatness. We are now among the first nations of the earth. Shall it be said, then, that our institutions, founded upon principles of self-government, are a failure?

Thus far it is a noble example, worthy of imitation. The gentleman, Mr. Cobb, the other night, said it had proven a failure. A failure in what? In growth? Look at our expanse in national power. Look at our population and increase in all that makes a people great. A failure? Why, we are the admiration of the civilized world, and present the brightest hopes of mankind.

Some of our public men have failed in their aspirations; that is true, and from that comes a great part of our troubles. (Prolonged applause.)

No, there is no failure of this government yet. We have made great advancement under the Constitution, and I can not but hope that we shall advance higher still. Let us be true to our cause.

Now, when this convention assembles, if it shall be called, as I hope it may, I would say, in my judgment, without dictation, for I am conferring with you freely and frankly, and it is thus that I give my views, I should take into consideration all those questions which distract the public mind; should view all the grounds of secession so far as the election of Mr. Lincoln is concerned, and I have no doubt they would say that the constitutional election of no man is a sufficient cause to break up the Union, but that the state should wait until he at least does some unconstitutional act.

Mr. Toombs. Commit some overt act.

Mr. Stephens. No, I did not say that. The word overt is a sort of technical term connected with treason, which has come to us from the mother country, and it means an open act of rebellion. I do not see how Mr. Lincoln can do this unless he should levy war upon us. I do not, therefore, use the word overt. I do not intend to wait for that. But I use the word unconstitutional act, which our people understand much better, and which expresses just what I mean. But as long as he conforms to the Constitution he should be left to exercise the duties of his office.

In giving this advice I am but sustaining the Constitution of my country, and I do not thereby become a Lincoln aid man either (applause), but a Constitutional aid man. But this matter the Convention can determine.

As to the other matter, I think we have a right to pass retaliatory measures, provided they be in accordance with the Constitution of the United States, and I think they can be made such. But whether it would be wise for this Legislature to do this now is the question. To the Convention, in my judgment, this matter ought to be referred. Before we commit reprisals on New England, we should exhaust every means of bringing about a peaceful solution of the question.

Thus did General Jackson in the case of the French. He did not recommend reprisals until he had treated with France, and got her to promise to make indemnification, and it was only on her refusal to pay the money which she had promised that he recommended reprisals. It was after negotiation had failed. I do think, therefore, that it would be best, before going to extreme measures with our confederate states, to make presentation of our demands, to appeal to their reason and judgment to give us our rights. Then, if reason should not triumph, it will be time enough to commit reprisals, and we should be justified in the eyes of a civilized world. At least let the states know what your grievances are, and if they refuse, as I said, to give us our rights under the Constitution of our country, I should be willing, as a last resort, to sever the ties of this Union. (Applause.)

My own opinion is, that if this course be pursued, and they are informed of the consequences of refusal, these states will secede; but if they should not, then let the consequences be with them, and let the responsibility of the consequences rest upon them. Another thing I would have that convention to do—reaffirm the Georgia Platform, with an additional plank in it. Let that plank be the fulfillment of the obligation on the part of those states to repeal these obnoxious laws as a condition of our remaining in the Union. Give them time to consider it, and I would ask all states south to do the same thing.

I am for exhausting all that patriotism can demand before taking the last step. I would invite, therefore, South Carolina to a conference. I would ask the same of all the other Southern states, so that if the evil has got beyond our control, which God, in his mercy, grant may not be the case, let us not be divided among ourselves—(cheers)—but, if possible, secure the united cooperation of all the Southern states; and then, in the face of the civilized world, we may justify our action; and, with the wrong all on the other side, we can appeal to the God of battles to aid us in our cause. (Loud applause.) But let us not do any thing in which any portion of our people may charge us with rash or hasty action. It is certainly a matter of great importance to tear this government asunder. You were not sent here for that purpose. I would wish the whole South to be united if this is to be done; and I believe, if we pursue the policy which I have indicated, this can be effected.

In this way our sister Southern states can be induced to act with us, and I have but little doubt that the states of New York, and Pennsylvania, and Ohio, and the other Western states, will compel their Legislatures to recede from their hostile attitudes, if the others do not. Then, with these, we would go on without New England, if she chose to stay out.

A voice in the assembly. We will kick them out.

Mr. Stephens. I would not kick them out; but if they chose to stay out they might. I think, moreover, that these Northern states, being principally engaged in manufactures, would find that they had as much interest in the Union under the Constitution as we, and that they would return to their constitutional duty; this would be my hope. If they should not, and if the Middle states and Western states do not join us, we should at least have an undivided South. I am, as you clearly perceive, for maintaining the Union as it is, if possible. I will exhaust every means thus to maintain it with an equality in honor. My principles are these:

First, the maintenance of the honor, the rights, the equality, the security, and the glory of my native state in the Union; but if these can not be maintained in the Union, then I am for their maintenance, at all hazards, out of it. Next to the honor and glory of Georgia, the land of my birth, I hold the honor and glory of our common country. In Savannah I was made to say by the reporters, who very often make me say things which I never did, that I was first for the glory of the whole country, and next for that of Georgia.

I said the exact reverse of this. I am proud of her history, of her present standing. I am proud even of her motto, which I would have duly respected at the present time by all her sons—Wisdom, Justice, and Moderation. I would have her rights and that of the Southern states maintained now upon these principles. Her position now is just what it was in 1850 with respect to the Southern states. Her platform, then, has been adopted by most, if not all the other Southern states. Now I would add but one additional plank to that platform, which I have stated, and one which time has shown to be necessary.

If all this fails, we shall at least have the satisfaction of knowing that we have done our duty, and all that patriotism could require.

Mr. Stephens continued for some time on other matters, which are omitted, and then took his seat amid great applause.





UPRISING







slave states to the fear of servile insurrections; when the planters, on the contrary, said, and, as it proved, with reason, they had no fears whatever on this score. He placed the responsibility for the disturbed state of the country entirely upon the shoulders of the anti-slavery party in the free states, utterly ignoring the aggressions of the slavery propagandists and the radical difference between the principles of the slaveholding founders of the republic and those of which John C. Calhoun was the great exponent; he declared that, in his opinion, unless the personal liberty laws of some of the free states were repealed the Union could not be preserved; but he passed no censure upon the studiously harsh and insulting provisions of the fugitive slave law which provoked their passage, but, on the contrary, he recommended the incorporation of that law into the Constitution; he denied the right of a state to break up the government merely of its own motion, and he admitted that he was bound to execute the laws of the United States throughout all the territory of the United States; but he added that neither the President nor Congress had the power to coerce a state, thus passing by the vital point that, according to the Constitution, the executive officers of the United States had to do, not with states, but with individual citizens of the United States. The message, in fact, said to the country, "First, in this quarrel the free states are all wrong and the slave states all right; next, no state has a right to secede; but, finally, if any state choose to do so, no one has any right to stop her." The effect of this pitifully shuffling manifesto was to encourage the seceders, to irritate the Republicans, and to dishearten the public at large. With the message came another document which deepened the despondency now fallen upon the country. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury showed the public coffers empty, large and pressing liabilities to be met, the national credit failing, and the revenue rapidly diminishing. All this in the face of a real wealth and prosperity during the previous year, indicated by an export trade of \$400,000,000, an import of \$362,000,000, and the more than sufficiency of the customs duties, \$60,000,000, for the ordinary expenses of government. For the change the political condition of the country was entirely answerable. Wealth was vanishing, prosperity was at an end, for national dissolution seemed impending. The events of one month had cast over the future an impenetrable gloom.

The nation fell into a pitiable condition of uncertain opinion and vacillating action. A similar crisis in the affairs of a country dependent for the direction of affairs upon one central government would have brought on the inevitable alternative of anarchy or despotism. But this nation was saved by the complete sufficiency of its local governments, sustained as these were by the intelligence and the integrity of the mass of the people, whom they directly represented. Within the limits of each state, the relations between man and man, and between the individual and society, were undisturbed.

On the 10th of December the House of Representatives appointed a committee of thirty-three, one from each commonwealth, on the State of the Union. What was the state of the Union thus far we have already seen; and a mere recital of the principal events of the few days which intervened between the appointment of this committee and the nominal severance of the Union will give a better idea than can be conveyed by any other means of the confusion which prevailed in political affairs and the distracted condition of the public mind. A report had been circulated at the South that the Secretary of War, Mr. Floyd, had said that he would employ the United States troops to resist any attempt to seize the United States forts in the slave states. This rumor that he would perform his sworn duty he hastened to deny by telegraph, on the very day of the appointment of the committee on the State of the Union. At this time it was suggested among some of the corrupter politicians of the city of New York, that that city, with Brooklyn, Long Island, and Staten Island, should secede from the state, and form themselves into an independent commonwealth. But as Brooklyn was jealous of New York, and deemed that the two places had conflicting interests, it was feared that, if secession once began, Brooklyn might secede from New York; the inconvenience of which, as most of the inhabitants of the former were engaged in business in the latter, was so apparent, that the suggestion, after a little newspaper ventilation, vanished into silence. The excitement in Charleston rose apace, and, on the 8th of December, a guard was placed over the United States Arsenal at Charleston to prevent the transfer of supplies of ammunition to Fort Moultrie, the United States military post in that harbor, which was about four miles from the city. On the 10th, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Cobb, resigned his portfolio, giving as his reasons that the honor and safety of his state, Georgia, were involved in the consequences of the presidential election; that his duty to her was paramount; and that his views made it improper for him to remain any longer a member of the cabinet: decorous scruples, the mere assumption of which was not common among those who, having like responsibilities, had like designs. On the 12th, Senator Wigfall, of Texas, a man whose extravagance and bombast made him laughed at, and whom we shall meet again under circumstances both rueful and ludicrous, made a set speech in the Senate-chamber, in which he announced that the Union would be dissolved; that "the eight cotton states" would secede; that they would be followed by Virginia, Tennessee, Maryland, and Kentucky; and that then Washington would be the seat of government of the new confederation. He also declared that he owed allegiance, not to the United States, but to his own state; a declaration afterward repeated in the same body by Senator Mason, of Virginia, with regard to his relations to his own state. On the 15th it was announced that General Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, had resigned, because of the President's determination not to re-enforce Fort Moultrie, and of his consequent conviction that the republic was approaching its dissolution. General Cass was one of the oldest and most experienced among the promi-

nent politicians of the past generation who kept the field, and he had thus far been a strong supporter of what was called "the Southern Rights Party." The resignation of such a man, for such a cause, however honorable to him-



LEWIS CASS.

self, was a most depressing occurrence. It made that painfully clear concerning which before there had been little doubt, that the President was about to shrink meanly from the responsibility of his office upon a great occasion. Preparations now were heard of from Louisiana to bring about the secession of that state. At the North efforts at conciliation began to be made, and a repeal of the Personal Liberty bills was freely talked of. On the 15th a private meeting was held of the most influential bankers, merchants, manufacturers, lawyers, and other professional men of conservative politics, for the purpose of appointing a committee of conference to urge delay upon the states about to secede, and to give assurances that any reasonable concessions for the sake of the preservation of the Union would be made. Such a position, taken by such men, seems, as we look back upon it, almost abject; but, in the excitement and under the feverous apprehension of the time, it appeared to most men the mere putting forth of a brotherly hand of depression. It failed utterly. An announcement that a committee of conference would shortly visit Charleston, met with a rebuff, in which cold-blooded arrogance was thinly concealed beneath the forms of courtesy. Judge Magrath, who spoke for his state, wrote, that nothing could swerve South Carolina from the course she had resolved on; adding, "The presence of any persons among us, however respectable, charged with the task of urging upon us a change of purpose, would be unprofitable and unpleasant." On the 17th, the South Carolina Convention assembled at Columbia, but, in consequence of the epidemic prevalence of the small-pox there, it adjourned the next day to Charleston, where it became immediately apparent that its members were bent upon ringleading the disunion movement. Throughout the state military drill was constantly kept up by all men capable of bearing arms. On the 18th, a bill for arming the State of North Carolina passed the Senate by a vote of forty-one to three. On the other hand, the repeal of the Massachusetts Personal Liberty Law was urged upon the state in an earnest manifesto, signed by numbers of its most respected citizens, headed by ex-Chief-justice Shaw, Judge Curtis, of the United States Supreme Court, and four ex-governors. On the 18th, Senator Crittenden, of Kentucky, one of the oldest, ablest, and most esteemed of the slaveholding members of Congress, brought forward a series of resolutions in that body which he and many others hoped would be adopted by both parties as a final settlement of the controversy. These resolutions, which were known as the Crittenden Compromise, after a preamble which stated their object to be that the sectional differences then distracting the country might be permanently quieted and settled by constitutional provisions, proposed certain amendments to the Constitution. These prohibited slavery north of the line of 36° 30' north latitude, and admitted it south of that line; they deprived Congress of the power either to abolish slavery in places under its jurisdiction in slave states, and (except under certain specified conditions) in the District of Columbia, or to interdict the transportation of slaves from one slave state to another; they provided that, in case of resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law, and the rescue of a slave, the United States should pay the owner the value of the slave, and have a claim upon the county in which the rescue took place, which, in its turn, should recover from individuals. These articles, and others upon the same subject in the Constitution, were to be declared unalterable. Mr. Crittenden's compromise was not received with favor by the extreme members of the party whose prospective advent to power had occasioned its proposal. But, on the 19th, the General Assembly of Virginia passed resolutions inviting the various states to send commissioners to Washington to adjust the sectional differences of the nation, and recommending the Crittenden Compromise as the basis of action. This assembly, thus called together, obtained the name of "The Peace Congress." But this effort toward the preservation of the Union met with a sudden and severe rebuff; for, on the 20th day, the South Carolina Convention formally passed an



ordinance of secession by a unanimous vote.<sup>6</sup> That 20th of December, 1860, was a sad day in the annals of America and of the world—a day full of woes and bitter memories—a day on which disappointed politicians, the representatives of an arrogant and selfish oligarchy, essayed the destruction of the most beneficent government ever established, and vainly strove to stem the tide of human progress, which was about to sweep their petty personal interests and parish politics into oblivion. But the event itself produced at the moment a comparatively slight impression. Some guns were fired and some meetings held in a few towns in the country lying on the Gulf of Mexico; but in the slave states north of Charleston, the taking of the final plunge by South Carolina created no more excitement than many of the minor incidents which had previously occurred in the sad tragedy then beginning to be acted. One reason of the apparent apathy with which this secession was regarded was, because it was South Carolina, factious, querulous, headstrong, and loud-mouthed, which had passed with words a verbal Rubicon; another was, that, after what the political leaders of the state had said and done, the passage of an ordinance of secession was inevitable, unless they wished to stand confessed the merest braggarts and boasters. But the chief cause was, that the country had been stunned by the suddenness with which its national politics had fallen into disorder, and its national government had been brought to a dead lock without violence or even the threat of violence from any quarter. Its capacity for excitement seemed to be exhausted; and when that came which had been apprehended from the first, it was taken as a thing of course. South Carolina, however, did not treat the matter as one of course, but exhibited to the full that sense of the importance of her own acts which had always made her the subject of remark among her sister states, especially by those who were as much her superiors in power, and wealth, and general culture, as they were her inferiors in pre-

tension. Immediately upon the passage of the Ordinance of Secession, a declaration of the causes which led to it was issued to the world;<sup>7</sup> an oath of supreme allegiance to the state was prescribed for all officials, the first form of which having contained the words "exercise my office," these were altered, after grave consideration and debate, to "exercise my high office;" and commissioners were appointed to proceed to Washington to treat with the United States. Immediately, too—most characteristic fact—the newspapers of Charleston headed their letters and the extracts from journals which they received from the other parts of the country, "Foreign News," bringing derision upon themselves far and near by this childishness. On the 24th the South Carolina delegates withdrew from the House of Representatives, not resigning, but sending a letter to the Speaker, in which they informed the House that their state had dissolved their connection with the House; and, putting their destructive and debasing doctrine in its most offensive form, spoke of their fellow-members as those with whom they had been "associated in a common agency."<sup>8</sup> Thus far had South Carolina politicians been led to pervert the truth to gain their little ends. Thus did the state which was the first, as we have seen, to propose the formation of a national government, and whose leading man in the convention which framed the government solemnly pronounced the doctrine that each state was separately and individually independent a "political heresy," did not hesitate to declare before the world that George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, and their peers had thought and toiled, not to bring about a real union of the people of the country into one nation, but only to make a bargain or contract between different corporations, in which, for certain considerations, and upon certain conditions, those corporations agreed to submit to a general administration of affairs for certain distinctly specified purposes of

#### SECESSION ORDINANCE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

*An Ordinance to Dissolve the Union between the State of South Carolina and other States united with her under the compact entitled the Constitution of the United States of America.*

We, the people of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us in Convention, on the 23d day of May, in the year of our Lord 1788, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and also all acts and parts of acts of the General Assembly of this state ratifying the amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed, and that the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other states under the name of the United States of America is hereby dissolved.

#### *South Carolina's Declaration of Causes.*

The people of the State of South Carolina in Convention assembled, on the 2d day of April, A.D. 1852, declared that the frequent violations of the Constitution of the United States by the federal government, and its encroachments upon the reserved rights of the states, fully justified this state in their withdrawal from the federal Union; but, in deference to the opinions and wishes of the other slaveholding states, she forbore at that time to exercise this right. Since that time these encroachments have continued to increase, and farther forbearance ceases to be a virtue.

And now the State of South Carolina, having resumed her separate and equal place among nations, deems it due to herself, to the remaining United States of America, and to the nations of the world, that she should declare the immediate causes which have led to this act.

In the year 1765, that portion of the British Empire embracing Great Britain undertook to make laws for the government of that portion composed of the thirteen American colonies. A struggle for the right of self-government ensued, which resulted, on the 4th of July, 1776, in a declaration, by the colonies, "that they are, and of right ought to be, FREE and INDEPENDENT STATES; and that, as free and independent states, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do."

They farther solemnly declared that whenever any "form of government becomes destructive of the ends for which it was established, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government." Deeming the government of Great Britain to have become destructive of these ends, they declared that the colonies "are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved."

In pursuance of this Declaration of Independence, each of the thirteen states proceeded to exercise its separate sovereignty; adopted for itself a Constitution, and appointed officers for the administration of government in all its departments—legislative, executive, and judicial. For purposes of defense they united their arms and their counsels; and in 1778 they entered into a league known as the Articles of Confederation, whereby they agreed to intrust the administration of their external relations to a common agent, known as the Congress of the United States, expressly declaring, in the first article, "that each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right which is not, by this Confederation, expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled."

Under this confederation the War of the Revolution was carried on; and on the 3d of September, 1783, the contest ended, and a definite treaty was signed by Great Britain, in which she acknowledged the independence of the colonies in the following terms:

"ARTICLE 1. His Britannic majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz.: New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, to be FREE, SOVEREIGN, and INDEPENDENT STATES; that he treats with them as such; and, for himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government, propriety, and territorial rights of the same, and every part thereof."

Thus were established the two great principles asserted by the colonies, namely, the right of a state to govern itself, and the right of a people to abolish a government when it becomes destructive of the ends for which it was instituted. And concurrent with the establishment of these principles was the fact that each colony became and was recognized by the mother country as a FREE, SOVEREIGN, and INDEPENDENT STATE.

In 1787, deputies were appointed by the states to revise the Articles of Confederation; and on the 17th of September, 1787, these deputies recommended, for the adoption of the states, the Articles of Union known as the Constitution of the United States.

The parties to whom this Constitution was submitted were the several sovereign states; they were to agree or disagree; and when nine of them agreed, the compact was to take effect among those concurring; and the general government, as the common agent, was then to be invested with their authority.

If only nine of the thirteen states had concurred, the other four would have remained as they then were—separate sovereign states, independent of any of the provisions of the Constitution. In fact, two of the states did not accede to the Constitution until long after it had gone into operation among the other eleven, and during that interval they each exercised the functions of an independent nation.

By this Constitution certain duties were imposed upon the several states, and the exercise of certain of their powers was restrained, which necessarily impelled their continued existence as sovereign states. But, to remove all doubt, an amendment was added, which declared that the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. On the 23d of May, 1788, South Carolina, by a Convention of her people, passed an ordinance assenting to this Constitution, and afterward altered her own Constitution to conform herself to the obligations she had undertaken.

Thus was established, by compact between the states, a government with defined objects and powers, limited to the express words of the grant. This limitation left the whole remaining mass of power subject to the clause reserving it to the states or the people, and rendered unnecessary any specification of reserved rights. We hold that the government thus established is subject to the two great principles asserted in the Declaration of Independence; and we hold farther, that the mode of its formation subjects it to a third fundamental principle, namely, the law of compact. We maintain that in every compact between two or more parties the obligation is mutual; that the failure of one of the contracting parties to perform a material part of the agreement entirely releases the obligation of the other; and that, where no arbiter is provided, each party is remitted to his own judgment to determine the fact of failure, with all its consequences.

In the present case that fact is established with certainty. We assert that fourteen of the states have deliberately refused for years past to fulfill their constitutional obligations, and we refer to their own statutes for the proof.

The Constitution of the United States, in its fourth article, provides as follows:

"No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

This stipulation was so material to the compact that without it that compact would not have been made. The greater number of the contracting parties held slaves, and they had previously evinced their estimate of the value of such a stipulation by making it a condition in the ordinance for the government of the territory ceded by Virginia, which obligations, and the laws of the general government, have ceased to effect the objects of the Constitution. The states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa have enacted laws which either nullify the acts of Congress, or render useless any attempt to execute them. In many of these states the fugitive is discharged from the service of labor claimed, and in none of them has the state government complied with the stipulation made in the Constitution. The State of New Jersey at an early day passed a law in conformity with her constitutional obligation; but the current of anti-slavery feeling has led her more recently to enact laws which render inoperative the remedies provided by her own laws and by the laws of Congress. In the State of New York even the right of transit for a slave has been denied by her tribunals; and the states of Ohio and Iowa have refused to surrender to justice fugitives charged with murder, and with inciting servile insurrection in the State of Virginia. Thus the constitutional compact has been deliberately broken and disregarded by the non-slaveholding states, and the consequence follows that South Carolina is released from her obligation.

The ends for which this Constitution was framed are declared by itself to be "to form a more perfect union, to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity."

These ends it endeavored to accomplish by a federal government, in which each state was recognized as an equal, and had separate control over its own institutions. The right of property in slaves was recognized by giving to free persons distinct political rights; by giving them the right to represent, and burdening them with direct taxes for three fifths of their slaves; by authorizing the importation of slaves for twenty years; and by stipulating for the rendition of fugitives from labor.

We affirm that these ends for which this government was instituted have been defeated, and the government itself has been destructive of them by the action of the non-slaveholding states. Those states have assumed the right of deciding upon the propriety of our domestic institutions, and have denied the rights of property established in fifteen of the states and recognized by the Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted the open establishment among them of societies whose avowed object is to disturb the peace and to eloign the property of the citizens of other states. They have encouraged and assisted thousands of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain have been incited by emissaries, books, and pictures to servile insurrection.

For twenty-five years this agitation has been steadily increasing, until it has now secured to its aid the power of the common government. Observing the *forms* of the Constitution, a sectional party has found within that article establishing the Executive Department the means of subverting the Constitution itself. A geographical line has been drawn across the Union, and all the states north of that line have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery. He is to be intrusted with the administration of the common government because he has declared that that "government can not endure permanently half slave, half free," and that the public mind must rest in the belief that slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction.

This sectional combination for the subversion of the Constitution has been aided in some of the states by elevating to citizenship persons who, by the supreme law of the land, are incapable of becoming citizens; and their votes have been used to inaugurate a new policy, hostile to the South, and destructive of its peace and safety.

On the 4th of March next this party will take possession of the government. It has announced that the South shall be excluded from the common territory, that the judicial tribunal shall be made sectional, and that a war must be waged against slavery until it shall cease throughout the United States.

The guarantees of the Constitution will then no longer exist, the equal rights of the states will be lost. The slaveholding states will no longer have the power of self-government or self-protection, and the federal government will have become their enemy.

Sectional interest and animosity will deepen the irritation; and all hope of remedy is rendered vain by the fact that the public opinion at the North has invested a great political error with the sanctions of a more erroneous religious belief.

We, therefore, the people of South Carolina, by our delegates in Convention assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, have solemnly declared that the union heretofore existing between this state and the other states of North America is dissolved, and that the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the nations of the world as a separate and independent state, with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.

#### *Letter of South Carolina Members of the House of Representatives.*

SIR,—We avail ourselves of the earliest opportunity since the official communication of the Intelligence, of making known to your honorable body that the people of the State of South Carolina, in their sovereign capacity, have resumed the powers heretofore delegated by them to the federal government of the United States, and have thereby dissolved our connection with the House of Representatives. In taking leave of those with whom we have been associated in a common agency, we, as well as the people of our commonwealth, desire to do so with a feeling of mutual regard and respect for each other, cherishing the hope that in our future relations we may better enjoy that peace and harmony essential to the happiness of a free and enlightened people.

JOHN M'QUEEN,  
M. L. BONHAM,  
W. W. BOYCE,  
J. D. ASHMORE.

Dec. 24.  
To the Speaker of the House of Representatives.



mere material interest—"a common agency," in fact, which was to be regarded only as the result of a bargain, and be administered as a bargain, with this difference, that any party to it might withdraw from it at pleasure, without liability to restraint or punishment. They proclaimed that the national flag had been only a shop-sign, and the American eagle a mere trademark; the sign and the mark, too, of a firm which was unworthy of credit, because any member of it might abscond whenever he pleased, and take with him whatever of the assets he could lay his hands upon. Having withdrawn from this "common agency," and set up on her own account as a nation, South Carolina set about preparations to establish foreign relations and create a navy. These, however, did not go very far; for, although it seems as if the self-assertion of this little commonwealth would have led her so far as to assume at once all the style of an independent nation, it began to be but too plain that she would not long be left alone.

At this very time the people of the free states were shocked by the announcement of the intended immediate removal of seventy-eight guns of the largest calibre (10-inch columbiads) from the Alleghany Arsenal, opposite Pittsburg, in Pennsylvania, to Newport, near Galveston Island, Texas, and to Ship Island, in the Gulf of Mexico. At those places there were fortifications which had never yet been mounted; and the placing of these guns in them at this time, when they were not, and could not be garrisoned, seemed plainly to indicate a purpose that both the guns and the forts should fall into the hands of the men who were rapidly driving the whole South into open revolt. The officer in command at the arsenal and he who was to superintend the transportation of the guns were from slave states. There was an instant determination manifested in Pittsburg and the country round that the guns should not be removed; and the exhibition of feeling was so strong and so wide-spread that the order for their removal was countermanded.

This incident was a fair exponent of the course of the administration and the condition of the country. The former was vacillating and faithless, the latter distracted and torn by faction. Mr. Buchanan's weak policy encouraged the seceding faction without satisfying them, while it exasperated and humiliated all who were faithful to the republic. The seceders of South Carolina came to believe, or at least to the bold declaration of a belief, that there would be no attempt to defend the government by force of arms against destruction. Coercion of "a sovereign body" was pronounced absurd on general principles, and in the present case impossible; and, at the same time, the right of any state to break up the Union for any reason, or without any reason, and at any time, was asserted in another dogma, that "sovereign" parties to a contract are themselves the only judges whether the contract is violated and they absolved from it; a declaration which set utterly at naught the prescribed authority of the Supreme Court to decide upon the constitutionality of any state or national law, and which thus showed the radically destructive purposes of those who avowed it. The seceders also looked to the accomplishment of their purposes with impunity, by reason of the support, or at least the protection, of a powerful party—the well-disciplined rank and file of the pure Democratic party—in the free states. And these expectations were not entirely without reason. Many men still looked upon secession as a mere political movement, the last, most desperate effort of the slavery propaganda to retain its control of the national government, the culmination of the great game of bluff and brag which that party had so successfully played for so many years. This, indeed, was doubtless the original purpose of the greater number of those who took part in the secession movement. Indeed, they openly avowed among themselves that they proposed to secede, not for the purpose of destroying the Union, but to force the free states to amend the Constitution in favor of slavery.<sup>9</sup> Seeing this, and seeing, too, that without the Southern states the Democratic party would practically cease to exist, there were quasi-assurances held out privately, and even publicly in newspapers, by those who were blindly or corruptly committed to the fortunes of that party, that all in the free states who voted for other candidates than Mr. Lincoln (a large proportion, as we have seen) would support the slave states in a contest with the national government. On the other hand, the Abolitionists rejoiced at the prospective destruction of the government and extinction of the republic, which they had openly labored for fifteen years to bring about;<sup>10</sup> and the leading organ of the advanced section of the Republican party—the *New York Tribune*—admitted in terms the absolute right of secession claimed by the insurgents.<sup>1</sup> And, finally, the Southern leaders believed, or professed to their followers to believe, that any attempt of the government to maintain its authority would be followed by such an utter derangement of trade, manufactures,

and all the public relations of life in the free states, as to bring on starvation and anarchy, and thus render the government powerless for offense, if not even to defend itself against the insurgent forces. These views were in a measure justified by the deplorable condition into which, in a few weeks, commercial affairs at the North fell from a state of remarkable and soundly-based prosperity. The South owed the North a sum estimated by competent persons at three hundred millions of dollars; and, even supposing that this was one third too large, the consequences of a refusal to pay, or even a temporary withholding so vast a sum, must needs be hopeless derangement and sudden ruin. The secessionists from the beginning looked only to success, regardless of the nature of the means they used and the consequences of their conduct to others; and this sum was in a great measure withheld, for the double purpose of crippling those to whom it was due, and using it to pay the expense of war with them. Collections of debts in slave states by creditors in free states became impossible in most cases, and the consequence was wide-spread bankruptcy and ruin at the North. The banks of the South had been allowed by law to suspend specie payments, and had availed themselves of the privilege; and consequently they had been followed in this respect by most of the banks at the North. The New England mills were either closed or running on half time; and throughout the North merchants and retail dealers reduced their force of salesmen, and manufacturers their force of workmen, or the time for which they employed and paid them. Winter and want were coming rapidly upon hundreds of thousands of Northern people who had hitherto lived in comfort if not in plenty. This was sad enough, but rumor exaggerated it, and designing politicians and corrupt journalists magnified and multiplied the exaggerations of rumor. For these reasons the seceders rested in confidence that no attempt would be made at coercion (which was the name they gave to the use of the power of the government for the maintenance of the integrity of the republic), and that they would be able first to defy the authority of the national government, and then, if they chose, to usurp it.<sup>2</sup> But in the free states there was a steadily growing conviction that there would be a determined attempt to detach all the Gulf and cotton-growing states from the Union permanently, and with this conviction another, that such a severance could not be accomplished, or even attempted, peaceably. Why the North believed thus few could have told; but the belief pervaded the community as latent electricity the air. The explosion seemed impending, and men began to look the awful probability of civil war in the face. In the President no one placed any trust, and Congress seemed incapable to cope with the emergency—capable of nothing except vain babbling of compromise. Committees on the State of the Union and peace conferences of all grades, public and private, came together and poured out a flood of talk upon each other and the country, and then rose and separated, no nearer union or wisdom than they were before. Men began to doubt, and to have reason to doubt, whether there were patriotism, and virtue, and vigor enough in the land to make even a respectable attempt to save the republic from disintegration. In the midst of all this trouble, a great cabinet scandal broke forth. It was found that \$870,000 had been fraudulently abstracted from the Indian Trust Fund and acceptances substituted, to which the name of the Secretary of War (Mr. Floyd, of Virginia) were attached, and for the benefit of parties with whom he had intimate relations. The effect of this shameful discovery—made more shameful by the fact that the custodian of the bonds, the Secretary of the Interior, Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, was at this very time in North Carolina as a commissioner from his state, working for secession—was to sap still farther the confidence of the nation in its own integrity. What could be hoped of the people or the government when the President's very cabinet was thus rotten and honeycombed with corruption? The only gleam of hope was in the fact that the falsehood, the treachery, and the peculation were without exception on the part of the enemies of the republic. And so loyal men here and there began to take heart, and gird themselves up for conflict.

<sup>9</sup> Senator Iverson, of Georgia, speaking in his seat on the 5th of December, 1860, said: "We intend, Mr. President, to go out peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must; but I do not believe, with the senator from New Hampshire (Mr. Hale), that there is going to be any war. If five or eight states go out, they will necessarily draw all the other Southern states after them. That is a consequence that nothing can prevent. If five or eight states go out of this Union, I should like to see the man who would propose a declaration of war against them, or attempt to force them into obedience to the federal government at the point of the bayonet or the sword. If one state alone was to go out, unsustained by her sister states, possibly war might ensue, and there might be an attempt made to coerce her, and that would give rise to civil war; but, sir, South Carolina is not to go out alone. In my opinion, she will be sustained by all her Southern sisters. They may not all go out immediately, but they will, in the end, join South Carolina in this important movement; and we shall, in the next twelve months, have a confederacy of the Southern states, and a government inaugurated and in successful operation, which, in my opinion, will be a government of the greatest prosperity and power the world has ever seen."

The cool defiance which was thus freely given in the halls of the national capital was supported by such declarations as the following in the leading journals of the slave states:

"The Northern people have an enemy at their own doors who will do our work for us, if we are not insane enough to take their myrmidons off their hands. 'The winter of their discontent' is but beginning to dawn. They have a long, dark winter, of cold and hunger, impending over their heads; before it is over they will have millions of operatives without work and without bread."

"In all human probability, before another summer melts their ice-bound hills, blood—human blood—will have flowed in their streets. When cold and hunger begin their work, this deluded rabble will ask alms at the doors of the rich with pike and firebrand in their hands. Our Northern enemies will then find that they have business enough to attend to at their own doors, without troubling themselves about keeping forts on Southern soil. 'They have got the wolf by the ears,' and they have a fair prospect of being bit, unless we are charitable enough to take the beast off their hands. If the North can furnish bread for its paupers for the next five months, well; if not, their rulers will answer for it in blood. It was simply the want of bread that brought Louis XVI. to the guillotine; and New York, as well as Paris, can furnish her Theroigne de Mericourt, who may sing her *carmagnole* up Broadway with Seward's head upon a pike."

"Our Northern enemies are locked up with their million of operatives for the winter, and bow they are to be kept quiet no man can tell."—*Charleston Courier*.

<sup>10</sup> The commissioners sent by Mississippi to Maryland, and whom Governor Hicks, of the latter state, declined receiving, in the course of an address to the citizens of Baltimore, on the evening of December 9th, 1860, said:

"Secession is not intended to break up the present government, but to perpetuate it. We do not propose to go out by way of breaking up or destroying the Union as our fathers gave it to us, but we go out for the purpose of getting farther guarantees and security for our rights, not by a convention of all the Southern states, nor by Congressional tricks, which have failed in times past, and will fail again. But our plan is for the Southern states to withdraw from the Union for the present, to allow amendments to the Constitution to be made guaranteeing our just rights; and if the Northern states will not make those amendments, by which these rights shall be secured to us, then we must secure them the best way we can. This question of slavery must be settled now or never. The country has been agitated seriously by it for the past twenty or thirty years. It has been a festering sore upon the body politic; and many remedies having failed, we must try amputation, to bring it to a healthy state. We must have amendments to the Constitution, and if we can not get them we must set up for ourselves."

<sup>11</sup> "The abolition enterprise was started in 1831. Until 1846 we thought it was possible to kill slavery and save the Union. We then said, over the ruins of the American Church and the Union is the only way to freedom. From '46 to '61 we preached that doctrine."—*Wendell Phillips's Speech at Music Hall, Boston, July 6, 1862.*

<sup>12</sup> "Whenever any considerable section of our Union shall deliberately resolve to go out, we shall resist all coercive measures designed to keep it in."—*N. Y. Tribune, Nov. 9, 1860.*






## FORT SUMTER.

Major Anderson at Fort Moultrie.—His Character.—Weakness of his Position.—His Instructions.—He occupies Fort Sumter.—Effect of the Movement throughout the Country.—Authorities of Charleston seize the Arsenal, Custom-house, and Revenue Cutter.—Insulting Letter of the South Carolina Commissioners to President Buchanan.—Defiant Avowal of Secession Principles and Purposes in Congress.—The Government begins to assert itself.—Sagacity and Patriotism of Lieutenant General Scott and of General Wool.—Investment of Fort Sumter.—Underhand Attempt to supply and re-enforce it.—The "Star of the West" fired upon by the Rebel Batteries.—Major Anderson calls Governor Pickens to Account.—The first Flag of Truce.—Efforts of the Insurgent Leaders.—Seizure of Forts and Arsenals throughout the Gulf States.—Events in the Border States.—Formal successive Secession of the Gulf States.—Audacity of the Insurgents, mild Measures of the Government, and placid Patriotism of the People.—Seizure of Arms on their way to Georgia, and Retaliation of the Governor of Georgia.—Resignation of Secretary Thompson.—South Carolina demands the Evacuation of Fort Sumter.—Withdrawal of Senators of the seceded States from Congress.—General Dix's spirited Action and Order.—Formation of the "Confederate" Provisional Government.—Adoption of a Provisional Constitution, and Election of Officers.—Jefferson Davis, his Character and Career.—Alexander H. Stephens.—Opposition to Secession in Slave States.—Treachery of General Twiggs in Texas.—Jefferson Davis's Threat to expel the National Troops in Texas.—Mr. Lincoln declared President elect.—Plots against his Life.—Measures taken to discover and defeat them.—Mr. Lincoln's sudden Appearance at Washington.—Effect upon the Public.—Proposed Compromise Constitutional Amendments.—Inauguration of Mr. Lincoln.—His Inaugural Address.—

Its Effect upon the Country.—General Beauregard takes Command at Charleston.—Numerous Army and Navy Officers resign their Commissions and take Service with the Insurgents.—State Sovereignty their alleged Justification.—Pierre Toutant, who and what.—The "Confederate" Commissioners in Washington.—Can Fort Sumter be re-enforced?—Fort Pickens can.—The Expedition of Relief.—Batteries around Fort Sumter.—Notice: "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must."—Beauregard ordered to demand an Evacuation.—Major Anderson refuses.—Bombardment and Evacuation of the Fort.

WHILE all hearts were thus filled with anxiety and sad foreboding; while loyal men saw only that the great, long-dreaded calamity was about to fall upon the country—that the struggle for the nation's life must soon begin, and yet did not confess to themselves in what exact form that calamity must come, or conjecture where the first throes of that struggle would be felt: while even the men who were bent on the destruction of the republic, unless they could usurp the control of it in the interests of their class, were certain only of their purpose, uncertain as to the way in which they should accomplish it; while doubt and undefined dread thus brooded over the land, an almost unknown man was about to take a step in the mere exercise of ordinary prudence and the faithful performance of a soldier's duty, which decided in an hour the question whether the seceders were to accomplish their purpose without resistance, placed at once the relations of





FORT SUMTER, SEEN FROM THE REAR, AT LOW WATER.



the government and those who defied it upon a war footing, and fixed the spot where one party or the other must assert itself by force or be humiliated before the world. Robert Anderson, a major of artillery, was in garrison at Fort Moultrie as commander of the United States military post of Charleston Harbor. He had graduated with honor at West Point in 1825; he had served not only with gallantry, but with distinction, in Florida, and afterward in the Mexican war, having been severely wounded in the attack on El Molino del Rey; he was the author of the text-book of the United States army upon artillery service; and yet, so absorbed had Americans of this and the last generation been in the arts and employments of peace, so regardless of mere military merit, except in a very few eminent cases, that out of the professional circle of the army and that of his own friends and acquaintances, Major Anderson's name was rarely heard. But, wherever known, it was spoken as that of a man of bravery, sagacity, determined purpose, and unblemished honor. Upon all these points Major Anderson was now about to be tested, with the eyes of all nations upon him and the verdict of posterity before him. A native of one slave state, and connected by marriage with the people of another, it was hoped on the one side that he might betray his trust, and feared on the other that he might at least resign it. But hopes and fears alike proved vain. Thoughtless of the world and of posterity, regardless of the ties of family and friendship, he kept a single eye upon present duty, sought only to absolve himself of the responsibility which had been laid upon him, and so won the undying honors which ever fall to faith and firmness shown on great occasions.


When the secession excitement in South Carolina, and particularly in Charleston, had reached its height, but ten days before the State Convention had taken a final step, he busied himself in strengthening the defenses of Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumter to the best of his ability with the small force under his command. That force, all told, consisted of nine officers, fifty-five men (artillerists), fifteen musicians, and thirty laborers—one hundred and nine men, of whom only sixty-three were combatants, one of the officers being an assistant surgeon. With this little band, among whom all proved true, he determined to defend his flag and maintain his post to the last moment. He began to be watchful of the approaches to Fort Moultrie, which is about four miles from Charleston, upon Sullivan's Island, where, during a generation and a half of peace, a village had sprung up around it. After the 11th of December no one was admitted within the works unless he was known to some officer of the garrison. Events justified this precaution; for within a few days military organizations were set on foot in Charleston, the almost avowed object of which was the occupation of Forts Moultrie, Sumter, and Pinckney. On the 19th of this month Mr. Porcher Miles, in the South Carolina State Convention, said that members might allay any fears which they might have had on account of the forts in Charleston Harbor, because a conversation with the President had convinced him that the post would not be re-enforced, and the garrison of Fort Moultrie was "but seventy or eighty men," while Sumter was an "empty fortress which they might seize and control in a single night." The next day the Ordinance of Secession was passed; and on the 21st, as we have already seen, the Charleston newspapers, with childish precipitancy and petulance about trifles, announced occurrences in the Northern states under the heading "foreign news." Childish and petulant although this was, it showed Major Anderson very clearly the light in which the community which was equipping and drilling troops within sight of his ramparts were determined to regard him—as the officer of a power which they defied, and who held a military position upon their soil which might be made the base of operations against them. He felt the danger and the delicacy of his position. On the 24th of December he wrote a private letter in which he set forth the precarious circumstances in which he was placed: with a garrison of only sixty effective men, in an indifferent work, the walls of which were only fourteen feet high, within one hundred yards of sand-hills which commanded the position and afforded covers for sharpshooters, and with numerous houses within pistol-shot, he confessed that, "if attacked in force by any one but a simpleton, there is scarce a possibility of our being able to hold out long enough for our friends to come to our succor." General Scott, too, saw and declared that the fort could be taken from Major Anderson by five hundred men in twenty-four hours. Meanwhile volunteer troops began to pour into Charleston, and there was much discussion in regard to the policy and possibility of seizing all the national forts in the harbor; and, in fact, under the circumstances, the opportunity was too tempting to warrant a belief that it would be long resisted. As to all this Major Anderson was well informed, for intercourse between the garrison and the city was kept up as usual. Nevertheless, his duty was clear, not only from the general nature of his responsibility to the government, but from special instructions sent to him by the Secretary of War—instructions so manifestly required in the emergency, that even John B. Floyd, false to his country and false to his honor, could not refrain from giving them. They were sent to Major Anderson verbally through Assistant Adjutant General Butler, whose written memorandum was afterward made public. According to this memorandum, Major Anderson was instructed "carefully to avoid any act which would needlessly provoke aggression," and on that reason "not, without necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude; but," the order continues, "you are to hold possession of the forts in the harbor, and if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of either of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar

steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act."

Christmas day dawned upon Major Anderson under these circumstances and bound by these instructions. It may be supposed that he was not in a festive mood; but, whatever his apprehensions or his purposes, he kept them to himself, and accepted an invitation to dinner in Charleston. Had his entertainers known the already settled determination of their gentle, placid guest, he would probably never have been allowed to leave the city, certainly he would have been prevented from returning to his post. They parted for the last time as friends that night, which, indeed, was the last occasion on which he set foot in that nest of traitors. Lulled into confidence by a belief that under no circumstances would the President take any steps whatever to assert the authority of the government or protect the national honor in South Carolina, and confirmed in this belief by the manner of Major Anderson, the Charlestonians went on with their preparations, and awaited their own time for effecting their purposes. Meantime Mr. Robert W. Barnwell, Mr. J. H. Adams, and Mr. James L. Orr were sent as commissioners from the "sovereign state" of South Carolina, to "treat with the government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light-houses, and other real estate, with their appurtenances, in South Carolina, and also for an apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all other property held by the government of the United States as agent of the Confederate States, of which South Carolina was recently a member," etc., etc. It may be that this commission was appointed with the notion that it could be received by the President; it may be that some of those whom it represented could not perceive the effrontery of sending such a commission to the President of the United States, and actually believed that it would be able to open some kind of negotiation with the national government. Mayhap some citizen of this newly-hatched "sovereignty" saw in his excited imagination the commissioners returning with the deeds of Forts Sumter and Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, the arsenal and the light-houses, in their pockets, given in return for the promises to pay of the treasury of South Carolina. But fancies and visions like these, as well as those of a more modest and reasonable character, were very suddenly dispelled without the aid of the report of the commissioners; for the good people of Charleston, looking seaward on the morning of the 27th of December, saw, instead of the United States flag flying from the flag-staff of Fort Moultrie, only a cloud of smoke rolling upward; and soon the look-outs brought the news that Major Anderson had evacuated and dismantled that fortification, and had retired with his little command to Fort Sumter.



KEY OF THE FORT MOULTRIE MAGAZINE.



MAJOR ANDERSON'S CANDLESTICK.

The news caused great excitement in Charleston. The rebels saw themselves at once defied and baffled. They were thousands, and could soon make themselves tens of thousands; yet here a band of one hundred men had been placed in a position where they could assert, and, for a time at least, maintain the authority of the government, and uphold its flag in the very harbor of the chief city of the seceding state. Fort Sumter commanded the entrance to the port, and, being a very strong work, stood, as it were, sentinel over Charleston, and controlled its commercial exits and entrances. But this was not the chief reason of the turmoil in the town. The rebels were exasperated at finding that they had been outwitted, and that not only was the little garrison which they had calculated upon turning out of Fort Moultrie, civilly if they could, but forcibly if they must, placed safely beyond their reach, but that the empty fortress which they had taken for granted that they could seize and control in a single night, was effectually secured against all attempts except those of siege, bombardment, or storm by overwhelming force.

Major Anderson had kept his secret well, and done his work thoroughly. During the day, the wives and children of the troops were sent away from the fort, on the plea that, as an attack might be made upon it, their removal was necessary. Three small schooners were hired, and the few inhabitants of Sullivan's Island saw them loaded, as they thought, with beds, furniture, trunks, and other luggage of that kind. About nine o'clock in the evening, the men were ordered to hold themselves in marching order, with knapsacks packed, ready to move at a moment's notice. No one seemed to know the reason of the movement, and probably no one but Major Anderson himself and his next in command knew their destination. The little garrison was paraded, inspected, and then embarked on boats which headed for Fort Sumter. The schooners had taken, or then took, all the provisions, garrison fur-





ENTRY OF MAJOR ANDERSON'S COMMAND INTO FORT SUMTER ON CHRISTMAS NIGHT, 1860.

niture, and munitions of war which could be carried away on such short notice, and with such slender means of transportation—enough to enable four-score men to sustain and defend themselves in a strong, sea-girt fortress for a long time. What could not be carried away was destroyed. Not a keg of powder or a cartridge was left in the magazine; the small-arms and military supplies of all kinds were removed; the guns were spiked, the gun-carriages burned, and the guns thus dismounted; partly-finished additions and alterations of the work were destroyed; the flag-staff was cut down; and nothing, in fact, was left unharmed but the round shot which were too heavy to carry off, and which the spiking and dismounting of the guns had made useless. The dawn saw Major Anderson safely established with his com-

to resist, or until he received orders to yield his post. It is well for the country, as well as for his own reputation, that he was tempted into no such speculations, but did to the best of his ability the duty which lay before him. The step which he took proved of more importance to the permanent safety of the republic than any other which he could have determined upon, had he spent months in deliberation, with the astutest politicians of the country as his counselors. A devout man, and impressed with the importance of his position, he was desirous of awakening in his officers and men the same profound sensations which filled his breast. He marked the occupation of their new position with a little religious ceremony. The flag which they were there to defend as a symbol of their nationality and their government was to be raised, and Major Anderson determined that he would raise it himself, and ask the blessing of Heaven upon their endeavor. So at noon of the 27th of December, all under his command, non-combatants as well as combatants, were assembled round the flag-staff. Major Anderson, with the halyards in his hand, knelt at its foot, and the officers and men, impressed with the solemnity of the occasion, needed no orders to assume a reverential position as the chaplain stepped forth in the midst and offered up an earnest prayer—a prayer, says one who was present, which was “such an appeal for support, encouragement, and mercy as one would make who felt that ‘man’s extremity is God’s opportunity.’” After he had ceased, and the earnest Amen from manly lips had died away in the hollow casemates, the commander hauled up the flag, the band saluted it with “Hail Columbia!” the accents of supplication gave way to those of enthusiasm, and cheers broke forth from the lips of all present—cheers which proved to be not only cheers of exultation and confidence, but of defiance; for just then it happened that a boat sent down from Charleston to bring up exact reports of the condition of affairs at Moultrie and Sumter approached the latter fortress, and saw the national standard rise amid the shouts of those who then vowed in their hearts that, while in their hands, it should suffer no dishonor, and who through four weary watchful months and two dreadful days kept well their vow.

In their rage the Charlestonians denounced the President as false to his word and Major Anderson as a wanton provoker of civil war. The accusation against the President was based on his avowed determination not to re-enforce the forts, and on a declaration of four of the representatives of South Carolina—Messrs. John McQueen, M. L. Bonham, W. W. Boyce, and Lawrence M. Keitt—that it was their “strong conviction that the people of the State of South Carolina would not either attack or molest the forts in Charleston Harbor before negotiating for them, provided no re-enforcements were sent to them, and their relative military status was not disturbed. This declaration was made, and, at the President’s suggestion, put in writing on the 9th of December. This mere announcement of intention on the one part and declaration of opinion on the other, the seceders in South Carolina and in Washington, both in and out of the cabinet, chose to regard as a pledge—an obligation binding upon both parties to it. Mr. War Secretary Floyd immediately, on the 27th of December, formally asserted in the cabinet that “the solemn pledges of the government had been violated by Major Anderson,” and as formally demanded permission to withdraw the garrison from the



MAJOR ANDERSON'S QUARTERS AT FORT SUMTER.

mand in Fort Sumter, secure from immediate attack, though Fort Moultrie was occupied only by a corporal's guard, left there to complete the work of destruction. He saw what a responsibility he had assumed, and fully appreciated the delicacy and the importance of the trust committed to him. Perhaps, if he could have looked forward for three months, and foreseen all the consequences of his act during that period, he would have remained at Fort Moultrie until he was summoned to yield by a force too great for him



harbor of Charleston, as the only alternative by which to vindicate the honor of the government and prevent civil war. Yet this very Secretary of War had, on the 11th of December, two days after the declaration by the four South Carolina delegates, instructed Major Anderson to put his command into either of the forts which he deemed would make it most effective in case he should have tangible evidence of a design on the part of the South Carolinians to proceed to a hostile act, an attempt to take possession of either of the forts being especially indicated.

The effect of Major Anderson's change of position was even greater throughout the country at large than at Charleston. It flashed the gleam of arms upon the eager eyes of the people, and men saw suddenly what before they had only imagined. Those who had felt strongly, and talked earnestly of maintaining the national honor and integrity by the sword, had thought vaguely, and perhaps doubtfully, upon the mode in which this dreadful issue should be brought about. But here it was done without violence, without proclamation, at a word, and in the simplest manner. Major Anderson's movement placed the Charlestonians in the attitude of open enemies of the national government, with whom intercourse was thereafter to be upon a war footing. Unless what he had done was disavowed by the President, and he was ordered to retire from Charleston Harbor, or at least to return to Fort Moultrie, his occupation of Fort Sumter was an official declaration to the seceders that they could accomplish even the first of their purposes only by proving too strong in arms for the military force of the United States. His movement, but not himself, accomplished this. The rebels themselves were alone responsible for the grave significance of the fact; for, as commandant of the harbor, he might house his garrison in whichever of the forts he thought best, and no one, save the head of the War Department, have the right to ask a question. If the transfer of fourscore men from one fort to another meant war, it acquired that meaning only by reason of what had been done and planned in Charleston. So the cry of wrath which went up from the rebel city was answered by a voice of admiration, encouragement, and, above all, of confidence, from almost the entire country outside of South Carolina. Among the very people at the North upon whose sympathy the seceders had most surely counted—even in some of the very states at the South whose fortunes South Carolina believed with reason to be indissolubly linked with hers—the occupation of Fort Sumter was regarded as the most prudent and dignified course which could have been taken under the circumstances. It touched the national honor and awoke the national pride wherever patriotism was superior to local prejudices and class interest. It brought the conviction home to every citizen that he had a country and a government to which, although he himself was part of that government, he owed allegiance and support. The man who thus impressed a nation became the hero of the hour. Major Anderson's name and his praises were upon all lips which did not mutter treason. The most influential journals among those which had opposed the party whose success was made the occasion of the rebellion—even those in the states south of the Potomac and the Ohio—the political leaders of which were not already committed to the conspiracy against the republic, vied with their late political


opponents in approbation of the position which Major Anderson had taken, and in showing how important it was to the self-respect of the nation, to its position before the world, and to its very existence, that he should be sustained by the government at Washington. The sensitive test of the money-market indicated the general feeling, and the price of stocks went up.

The pace of treason, rapid before, was quickened by this movement. On the 27th troops were ordered out in Charleston; military aid was proffered to South Carolina by Georgia and Alabama; and Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, bent upon secession, called an extra session of the Legislature of that state. On this day, too, the rebels obtained through treachery the first vessel of their navy. The revenue cutter William Aiken was lying in Charleston Harbor, under command of Captain N. L. Coste, of the revenue service. Two weeks before he had told his second in command, Lieutenant Underwood, that he would not serve under Mr. Lincoln as President; and that, in case the expected secession of South Carolina took place, he should resign and place the cutter in command of Lieutenant Underwood. But, in spite of the passage of the Ordinance of Secession, he remained in command, and on the afternoon of the 27th he hauled down the United States revenue flag, raised the Palmetto standard of revolt, and placed his vessel as well as himself at the disposal of the insurgent authorities. His subordinate officers, true to their oaths, reported themselves for duty at Washington. This trifling incident is worthy of notice at the beginning of our sad story, as indicative of the violation of individual trust which marked this stage of the insurrection.

On the 28th the authorities of Charleston determined to assert their newly-assumed powers to the extent of their ability. They seized the custom-house, the post-office, and on the 30th the arsenal, and raised the state flag upon them, and sent an armed force to occupy Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney. The few soldiers at each of those fortifications yielded, of course,

without any resistance, and on those walls also the palmetto-tree replaced the stars and stripes.

The President having refused to withdraw the garrison from Charleston Harbor, on the 29th the Secretary of War, Mr. Floyd, resigned his office, closing his resignation with these words: "I deeply regret that I feel myself under the necessity of tendering to you my resignation as Secretary of War, because I can no longer hold it under my convictions of patriotism, nor with honor, subjected as I am to a violation of solemn pledges and plighted faith." These fair phrases sounded well at the end of such a letter; but the truth was, that, in consequence of Mr. Floyd's connection with the Indian Trust Fund fraud, for which he was afterward indicted, the President had intimated to him, through a distinguished statesman, that he deemed it improper that he should longer remain a member of the cabinet. On the twenty-ninth of December, also, the commissioners from South Carolina formally addressed the President, laid their authority before him, sent him an official copy of the Ordinance of Secession, and expressed a desire for such negotiation as would secure mutual respect, general advantage, and a future good-will and harmony; but added that, as Major Anderson, by dismantling one fort and occupying another, had made important changes in the affairs in relation to which they had come



THE PRAYER AT SUMTER, DEC. 26, 1860.





BUTLER    WOOL

McCALL   ROSECRANS   ANDERSON  
McCOOK

McDOWELL

BLENKER  
SICKELS

McCLELLAN

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ER SIGEL SPRAGUE MANSFIELD BURNSIDE BANKS FREMONT LANDER DIX From Harper's Weekly.  
PRENTISS TYLER HEINTZELMAN CURTIS STONE



to Washington, they were obliged to suspend all discussion until the movement which they referred to had been satisfactorily explained. They styled the retention of the government troops in Charleston Harbor a standing menace which rendered negotiation impossible, and urged their immediate withdrawal. Mr. Buchanan refused to receive them in an official capacity, but on the 30th replied to their letter. He denied that he, or his Secretary of War by his order, had given any pledge in regard to the garrison of Fort Moultrie, referred the commissioners to a memorandum of the

<sup>1</sup> *Correspondence between the South Carolina Commissioners and the President of the United States.*

Washington, December 21, 1860.

Sir,—We have the honor to transmit to you a copy of the full powers from the Convention of the people of South Carolina, under which we are "authorized and empowered to treat with the government of the United States for the delivery of the forts, magazines, light-houses, and other real estate, with their appurtenances, in the limits of South Carolina; and also for an apportionment of the public debt, and for a division of all other property held by the government of the United States, as agent of the Confederate States, of which South Carolina was recently a member, and generally to negotiate as to all other measures and arrangements proper to be made and adopted in the existing relation of the parties, and for the continuance of peace and amity between this commonwealth and the government at Washington."

In the execution of this trust, it is our duty to furnish you, as we now do, with an official copy of the Ordinance of Secession, by which the State of South Carolina has resumed the powers she delegated to the government of the United States, and has declared her perfect sovereignty and independence.

It would also have been our duty to have informed you that we were ready to negotiate with you upon all such questions as are necessarily raised by the adoption of this ordinance, and that we were prepared to enter upon this negotiation, with the earnest desire to avoid all unnecessary and hostile collision, and so to inaugurate our new relations as to secure mutual respect, general advantage, and a future of good-will and harmony, beneficial to all the parties concerned.

But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible. We came here the representatives of an authority which could, at any time within the past sixty days, have taken possession of the forts in Charleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we can not doubt, determined to trust to your honor rather than to its own power. Since our arrival here an officer of the United States, acting, as we are assured, not only without, but against your orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering to a most important extent the condition of affairs under which we came.

Until these circumstances are explained in a manner which relieves us of all doubt as to the spirit in which these negotiations shall be conducted, we are forced to suspend all discussion as to any arrangement by which our mutual interests may be amicably adjusted.

And, in conclusion, we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances, they are a standing menace which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment. We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

R. W. BARNWELL,  
J. H. ADAMS,  
JAS. L. ORR, } Commissioners.

To the President of the United States.

#### *The President's Reply.*

Washington City, Dec. 30, 1860.

GENTLEMEN,—I have had the honor to receive your communication of 28th inst., together with a copy of "your full powers from the Convention of the people of South Carolina," authorizing you to treat with the government of the United States on various important subjects therein mentioned, and also a copy of the ordinance, bearing date on the 20th inst., declaring that "the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other states, under the name of the United States of America, is hereby dissolved."

In answer to this communication, I have to say that my position as President of the United States was clearly defined in the message to Congress on the 3d inst. In that I stated that, "apart from the execution of the laws, so far as this may be practicable, the executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations between the federal government and South Carolina. He has been invested with no such discretion. He possesses no power to change the relations hitherto existing between them, much less to acknowledge the independence of that state. This would be to invest a mere executive officer with the power of recognizing the dissolution of the confederacy among our thirty-three sovereign states. It bears no resemblance to the recognition of a foreign *de facto* government, involving no such responsibility. Any attempt to do this would, on his part, be a naked act of usurpation. It is, therefore, my duty to submit to Congress the whole question in all its bearings."

Such is my opinion still. I could, therefore, meet you only as private gentlemen of the highest character, and was entirely willing to communicate to Congress any proposition you might have to make to that body upon the subject. Of this you were well aware. It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possess the power, as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I, therefore, deeply regret that, in your opinion, "the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible." In conclusion, you urge upon me "the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston," stating that "under present circumstances, they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible, and, as our recent experience shows, threatens speedily to bring to a bloody issue questions which ought to be settled with temperance and judgment."

The reason for this change in your position is, that since your arrival in Washington, "an officer of the United States, acting, as we (you) are assured, not only without, but against your (my) orders, has dismantled one fort and occupied another, thus altering to a most important extent the condition of affairs under which we (you) came." You also allege that you came here "the representatives of an authority which could, at any time within the past sixty days, have taken possession of the forts in Charleston Harbor, but which, upon pledges given in a manner that we (you) can not doubt, determined to trust to your (my) honor rather than to its power."

This brings me to a consideration of the nature of those alleged pledges, and in what manner they have been observed. In my message of the 3d of December last, I stated, in regard to the property of the United States in South Carolina, that it "has been purchased for a fair equivalent, by the consent of the Legislature of the state, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, etc., and over these the authority 'to exercise exclusive legislation' has been expressly granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is not believed that any attempt will be made to expel the United States from this property by force; but if in this I should prove to be mistaken, the officer in command of the forts has received orders to act strictly on the defensive. In such a contingency the responsibility for consequences would rightfully rest upon the heads of the assailants." This being the condition of the parties, on Saturday, 8th December, four of the representatives from South Carolina called upon me and requested an interview. We had an earnest conversation on the subject of these forts, and the best means of preventing a collision between the parties, for the purpose of sparing the effusion of blood. I suggested, for prudential reasons, that it would be best to put in writing what they said to me verbally. They did so accordingly, and on Monday morning, the 10th instant, three of them presented to me a paper signed by all the representatives from South Carolina, with a single exception, of which the following is a copy:

To His Excellency James Buchanan, President of the United States:

In compliance with our statement to you yesterday, we now express to you our strong convictions that neither the constituted authorities, nor any body of the people of the State of South Carolina, will either attack or molest the United States forts in the harbor of Charleston previously to the act of the Convention, and we hope and believe not until an offer has been made, through an accredited representative, to negotiate for an amicable arrangement of all matters between the state and the federal government, provided that no re-enforcements shall be sent into these forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present.

JOHN McQUEEN,  
M. L. BUSHAM,  
W. W. BOYCE,  
LAWRENCE M. KEITT.

Washington, Dec. 9, 1860.

And here I must, in justice to myself, remark, that at the time the paper was presented to me, I objected to the word "provided," as it might be construed into an agreement on my part, which I never would make. They said that nothing was farther from their intention—they did not so understand it, and I should not so consider it. It is evident they could enter into no reciprocal agreement with me on the subject. They did not profess to have authority to do this, and were acting in their individual character. I considered it as nothing more, in effect, than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen to exert their influence for the purpose expressed. The event has proven that they have faithfully kept this promise, although I have never since received a line from any one of them, or from any member of the Convention on the subject. It is well known that it was my determination, and this I freely expressed, not to re-enforce the forts in the harbor, and thus produce a collision, until they had been actually attacked, or until I had certain evidence

instructions sent by Mr. Floyd to Major Anderson, and positively refused to withdraw the troops from Charleston Harbor; adding, "Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency." To the President's letter the commissioners the next day sent a rejoinder, polite in terms but so insulting in its implications, and so arrogant and insolent in its tone, that it was returned to them with the indorsement, "This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it," and on the 5th of January they went home, having accomplished nothing.<sup>1</sup>

that they were about to be attacked. This paper I received most cordially, and considered it as a happy omen that peace might be still preserved, and that time might be thus given for reflection. This is the whole foundation for the alleged pledge.

But I acted in the same manner as I would have done had I entered into a positive and formal agreement with parties capable of contracting, although such an agreement would have been on my part, from the nature of my official duties, impossible. The world knows that I have never sent any re-enforcements to the forts in Charleston Harbor, and I have certainly never authorized any change to be made "in their relative military status." Bearing upon this subject, I refer you to an order issued by the Secretary of War, on the 11th instant, to Major Anderson, but not brought to my notice until the 21st instant. It is as follows:

*Memorandum of Verbal Instructions to Major Anderson, First Artillery, commanding Fort Moultrie, South Carolina.*

You are aware of the great anxiety of the Secretary of War that a collision of the troops with the people of this state shall be avoided, and of his studied determination to pursue a course with reference to the military force and forts in this harbor which shall guard against such a collision. He has, therefore, carefully abstained from increasing the force at this point, or taking any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind, or which would throw any doubt on the confidence he feels that South Carolina will not attempt by violence to obtain possession of the public works, or interfere with their occupancy.

But as the counsel and acts of rash and impulsive persons may possibly disappoint these expectations of the government, he deems it proper that you should be prepared with instructions to meet so unhappy a contingency. He has therefore directed me, verbally, to give you such instructions.

You are carefully to avoid every act which would needlessly tend to provoke aggression, and for that reason you are not, without necessity, to take up any position which could be construed into the assumption of a hostile attitude; but you are to hold possession of the forts in the harbor, and if attacked, you are to defend yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts; but an attack on, or attempt to take possession of either of them, will be regarded as an act of hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which you may deem most proper to increase its power of resistance. You are also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act.

Fort Moultrie, S. C., Dec. 11, 1860.

D. P. BUTLER, Assistant Adjutant General.

This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell.

JOHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.

These were the last instructions transmitted to Major Anderson before his removal to Fort Sumter, with a single exception, in regard to a particular which does not in any degree affect the present question. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Major Anderson acted upon his own responsibility, and without authority, unless, indeed, he had "tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act" on the part of South Carolina, which has not yet been alleged. Still he is a brave and honorable officer, and justice requires that he should not be condemned without a fair hearing.

Be this as it may, when I learned that Major Anderson had left Fort Moultrie and proceeded to Fort Sumter, my first promptings were to command him to return to his former position, and there to await the contingencies presented in his instructions. This would only have been done with any degree of safety to the command by the concurrence of the South Carolina authorities. But before any step could possibly have been taken in this direction, we received information that the "Palmetto flag floated out to the breeze at Castle Pinckney, and a large military force went over last night (the 27th) to Fort Moultrie." Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanations, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders, on the very next day after the night when the removal was made, seized by a military force two of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston, and have covered them under their own flag instead of that of the United States.

At this gloomy period of our history, startling events succeed each other rapidly. On the very day, the 27th instant, that possession of these two forts was taken, the Palmetto flag was raised over the federal custom-house and post-office in Charleston, and on the same day every officer of the customs—collector, naval officer, surveyor, and appraiser—resigned their offices; and this, although it was well known from the language of my message that, as an executive officer, I felt myself bound to collect the revenue at the port of Charleston under the existing laws. In the harbor of Charleston we now find three forts confronting each other, over all of which the federal flag floated only four days ago; but now, over two of them, this flag has been supplanted, and the Palmetto flag has been substituted in its stead. It is under all these circumstances that I am urged immediately to withdraw the troops from the harbor of Charleston, and am informed that without this negotiation is impossible. This I can not do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No such allusion had been made in any communication between myself and any human being. But the inference is that I am bound to withdraw the troops from the only fort remaining in the possession of the United States in the harbor of Charleston, because the officer there in command of all of the forts thought proper, without instructions, to change his position from one of them to another.

At this point of writing, I have received information by telegraph from Captain Humphreys, in command of the arsenal at Charleston, that "it has to-day (Sunday, the 30th) been taken by force of arms." It is estimated that the munitions of war belonging to this arsenal are worth half a million of dollars.

Comment is needless. After this information, I have only to add, that while it is my duty to defend Fort Sumter, as a portion of the public property of the United States, against hostile attacks, from whatever quarter they may come, by such means as I possess for this purpose, I do not perceive how such a defense can be construed into a menace against the city of Charleston. With great personal regard, I remain yours very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

To Hon. Robert W. Barnwell, James H. Adams, James L. Orr.

#### *Second Letter of the Commissioners to the President.*

Washington, D. C., Jan. 1, 1861.

Sir,—We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th December, in reply to a note addressed by us to you, on the 28th of the same month, as commissioners from South Carolina.

In reference to the declaration with which your reply commences, that your "position as President of the United States was already defined in the message to Congress of the 3d instant;" that you possess "no power to change the relations heretofore existing between South Carolina and the United States," "much less to acknowledge the independence of that state," and that consequently you could meet us only as private gentlemen of the highest character, with an entire willingness to communicate to Congress any proposition we might have to make, we deem it only necessary to say that the State of South Carolina, having, in the exercise of that great right of self-government which underlies all our political organizations, declared herself sovereign and independent, we, as her representatives, felt no special solicitude as to the character in which you might recognize us. Satisfied that the state had simply exercised her unquestionable right, we were prepared, in order to reach substantial good, to waive the formal considerations which your constitutional scruples might have prevented you from extending. We came here, therefore, expecting to be received as you did receive us, and perfectly content with that entire willingness of which you assured us, to submit any proposition to Congress which we might have to make upon the subject of the independence of the state. The willingness was ample recognition of the condition of public affairs which rendered our presence necessary. In this position, however, it is our duty, both to the state which we represent and to ourselves, to correct several important misconceptions of our letter into which you have fallen.

You say, "It was my earnest desire that such a disposition might be made of the whole subject by Congress, who alone possess the power, as to prevent the inauguration of a civil war between the parties in regard to the possession of the federal forts in the harbor of Charleston; and I therefore deeply regret that in your opinion the events of the last twenty-four hours render this impossible." We expressed no such opinion; and the language which you quote as ours is altered in its sense by the omission of a most important part of the sentence. What we did say was, "But the events of the last twenty-four hours render such an assurance impossible." Place that "assurance," as contained in our letter, in the sentence, and we are prepared to repeat it.

Again, professing to quote our language, you say, "Thus the authorities of South Carolina, without waiting or asking for any explanation, and doubtless believing, as you have expressed it, that the officer had acted not only without, but against my orders," etc. We expressed no such



From the time of Major Anderson's transfer of his command, Washington had been in a state of deplorable and even disgraceful excitement. The delegates from the states which were ripe for revolt, but which had not seceded, retained their seats in Congress, and by their open threats and secret intrigues increased the alarm of the country, and crippled the feeble and already bewildered administration. They sat in the chairs to which they were sent for the support of the Constitution of the United States and contrived its overthrow; they lived in Washington upon the pay of the republic while they plotted its destruction; they held their positions only for the purpose of insuring the success of their conspiracy—only that they might counterbalance the votes of loyal men, and keep at dead-lock all the essential functions of the government. These are no general phrases, no vague deductions. The records of treacherous conspiracy show no page more infamous than that written by Senator Yulee, of Florida, in a letter to one of his constituents, in which he revealed the counsels of his fellow-conspirators, the senators of six states, and said that they had all determined to retain their places in the councils of the nation with the deliberate purpose of keeping Mr. Buchanan's hands tied, and depriving Mr. Lincoln, on his accession to office, of the legitimate powers of government. That not the smallest item might be lacking to the sum of its shame and the perfection of its perfidy, this letter was secured a swift and free passage to its destination under the Honorable writer's senatorial frank.<sup>2</sup> While such was the direct course of secret machination, open counsel went darkly groping. In both houses the debates were vague, wordy, colloquial, and from the

opinion in reference to the belief of the people of South Carolina. The language which you have quoted was applied solely and entirely to our assurances obtained here, and based, as you well know, upon your own declaration—a declaration which, at that time, it was impossible for the authorities of South Carolina to have known. But, without following this letter into all its details, we propose only to meet the chief points of the argument.

Some weeks ago the State of South Carolina declared her intention, in the existing condition of public affairs, to secede from the United States. She called a convention of her people to put her declaration in force. The Convention met and passed the Ordinance of Secession. All this you anticipated, and your course of action was thoroughly considered in your Annual Message. You declared you had no right, and would not attempt, to coerce a seceding state, but that you were bound by your constitutional oath, and would defend the property of the United States within the borders of South Carolina if an attempt was made to take it by force. Seeing very early that this question of property was a difficult and delicate one, you manifested a desire to settle it without collision. You did not re-enforce the garrison in the harbor of Charleston. You removed a distinguished and veteran officer from the command of Fort Moultrie because he attempted to increase his supply of ammunition. You refused to send additional troops to the same garrison when applied for by the officer appointed to succeed him. You accepted the resignation of the oldest and most eminent member of your cabinet rather than allow the garrison to be strengthened. You compelled an officer stationed at Fort Sumter to return immediately to the arsenal forty muskets which he had taken to arm his men. You expressed not to one, but to many, of the most distinguished of our public characters, whose testimony will be placed upon the record whenever it is necessary, your anxiety for a peaceful termination of this controversy, and your willingness not to disturb the military status of the forts, if commissioners should be sent to the government, whose communications you promised to submit to Congress. You received and acted on assurances from the highest official authorities of South Carolina, that no attempt would be made to disturb your possession of the forts and property of the United States, if you would not disturb their existing condition until the commissioners had been sent, and the attempt to negotiate had failed. You took from the members of the House of Representatives a written memorandum that no such attempt should be made, "provided that no re-enforcements should be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain as at present." And although you attach no force to the acceptance of such a paper—although you "considered it as nothing more in effect than the promise of highly honorable gentlemen"—as an obligation on one side, without corresponding obligation on the other—it must be remembered (if we were rightly informed) that you were pledged, if you ever did send re-enforcements, to return it to those from whom you had received it, before you executed your resolution. You sent orders to your officers, commanding them strictly to follow a line of conduct in conformity with such an understanding. Besides all this, you had received formal and official notice from the Governor of South Carolina that we had been appointed commissioners, and were on our way to Washington. You knew the implied condition under which we came; our arrival was notified to you, and an hour appointed for an interview. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday, at 3 o'clock, and you appointed an interview with us at 1 the next day. Early on that day (Thursday) the news was received here of the movement of Major Anderson. That news was communicated to you immediately, and you postponed our meeting until 2½ o'clock on Friday, in order that you might consult your cabinet. On Friday we saw you, and we called upon you then to redeem your pledge. You could not deny it. With the facts we have stated, and in the face of the crowning and conclusive fact that your Secretary of War had resigned his seat in the cabinet, upon the publicly avowed ground that the action of Major Anderson had violated the pledged faith of the government, and that, unless the pledge was instantly redeemed, he was dishonored, denial was impossible; you did not deny it. You do not deny it now, but you seek to escape from its obligation on the grounds, first, that we terminated all negotiation by demanding, as a preliminary, the withdrawal of the United States troops from the harbor of Charleston; and, second, that the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanation, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States. We will examine both.

In the first place, we deny positively that we have ever in any way made any such demand. Our letter is in your possession; it will stand by this on record. In it we informed you of the objects of our mission. We say that it would have been our duty to have assured you of our readiness to commence negotiations with the most earnest and anxious desire to settle all questions between us amicably and to our mutual advantage, but that events had rendered that assurance impossible. We stated the events, and we said that until some satisfactory explanation of these events was given us, we could not proceed; and then, having made this request for explanation, we added, "And in conclusion we would urge upon you the immediate withdrawal of the troops from the harbor of Charleston. Under present circumstances they are a standing menace, which renders negotiation impossible," etc. "Under present circumstances!" What circumstances? Why, clearly the occupation of Fort Sumter and the dismantling of Fort Moultrie by Major Anderson, in the face of your pledges, and without explanation or practical disavowal. And there is nothing in the letter which would, or could, have prevented you from declining to withdraw the troops, and offering the restoration of the status to which you were pledged, if such had been your desire. It would have been wiser and better, in our opinion, to have withdrawn the troops, and this opinion we urged upon you; but we demanded nothing but such an explanation of the events of the last twenty-four hours as would restore our confidence in the spirit with which the negotiations should be conducted. In relation to this withdrawal of the troops from the harbor, we are compelled, however, to notice one passage of your letter. Referring to it, you say, "This I can not do; this I will not do. Such an idea was never thought of by me in any possible contingency. No allusion to it had ever been made in any communication between myself and any human being."

In reply to this statement, we are compelled to say, that your conversation with us left upon our minds the distinct impression that you did seriously contemplate the withdrawal of the troops from Charleston Harbor. And in support of this impression, we would add, that we have the positive assurance of gentlemen of the highest possible public reputation and the most unsullied integrity—men whose name and fame, secured by long service and patriotic achievements, place their testimony beyond cavil—that such suggestions had been made to and urged upon you by them, and had formed the subject of more than one earnest discussion with you. And it was this knowledge that induced us to urge upon you a policy which had to recommend it its own wisdom and the might of such authority. As to the second point, that the authorities of South Carolina, instead of asking explanations, and giving you the opportunity to vindicate yourself, took possession of other property of the United States, we would observe: 1. That even if this were so, it does not avail you for defense, for the opportunity for decision was afforded you before these facts occurred. We arrived in Washington on Wednesday; the news from Major Anderson reached here early on Thursday, and was immediately communicated to you. All that day men of the highest consideration—men who had striven successfully to lift you to your great office—who had been your tried and true friends through the troubles of your administration, sought you and entreated you to act—to act at once. They told you that every hour complicated your position. They only asked you to give the assurance that if the facts were so—that if the commander

purpose. Abstract points were discussed sometimes with acrimony, at others jocosely; but no decisive action was proposed for the maintenance of the authority of the government and the integrity of the republic. The small minority who were already rebels at heart and in purpose, if not in act, were defiant and overbearing; their opponents sought only to pacify and restrain them by proffered concessions; and between these two was a considerable number who waited and watched to trim their course according to the current. On the 27th, in the House Committee of Thirty-three upon the State of the Union, Mr. Adams, of Massachusetts, proposed a resolution, "That it is expedient to propose an amendment to the Constitution to the effect that no future amendments of it in regard to slavery shall be made, unless proposed by a slave state and ratified by all the states." This resolution was passed with only three dissenting voices. Coming from a representative of Massachusetts, and proposing terms which would put the question of slavery in the states absolutely and forever out of the reach of the free states, no matter how greatly in the majority, and thus removing the ground of that apprehension for the future which was made the excuse of secession, this resolution might have been the first step toward the much-sought compromise. It was regarded with favor by many delegates from slave states; and after a free conference between all the members of the committee, even Mr. Cobb, of Alabama, declared that the question at issue might now be settled. It might, indeed, had not the politicians of South Carolina, and those of other states, but of their school, been bent upon attaining their purpose, in or out of the Union, by defiance

had acted without and against your orders, and in violation of your pledges—that you would restore the status you had pledged your honor to maintain. You refused to decide. Your Secretary at War, your immediate and proper adviser in this whole matter, waited anxiously for your decision, until he felt that delay was becoming dishonor. More than twelve hours passed, and two cabinet meetings had adjourned, before you knew what the authorities of South Carolina had done; and your prompt decision at any moment of that time would have avoided the subsequent complications. But, if you had known the acts of the authorities of South Carolina, should that have prevented your keeping your faith? What was the condition of things? For the last sixty days you have had in Charleston Harbor not force enough to hold the forts against an equal enemy. Two of them were empty—one of those two the most important in the harbor. It could have been taken at any time. You ought to know better than any man that it would have been taken but for the efforts of those who put their trust in your honor. Believing that they were threatened by Fort Sumter especially, the people were with difficulty restrained from securing, without blood, the possession of this important fortress. After many and reiterated assurances, given on your behalf, which we can not believe unauthorized, they determined to forbear, and in good faith sent on their commissioners to negotiate with you. They meant you no harm—wished you no ill. They thought of you kindly, believed you true, and were willing, as far as was consistent with duty, to spare you unnecessary and hostile collision. Scarcely had these commissioners left than Major Anderson waged war. No other words will describe his action. It was not a peaceful change from one fort to another; it was a hostile act in the highest sense, and only justified in the presence of a superior enemy, and in imminent peril. He abandoned his position, spiked his guns, burned his gun-carriages, made preparations for the destruction of his post, and withdrew, under cover of the night, to a safer position. This was war. No man could have believed (without your assurance) that any officer could have taken such a step, "not only without orders, but against orders." What the state did was in simple self-defense; for this act, with all its attending circumstances, was as much war as firing a volley; and war being thus begun, until those commencing it explained their action and disavowed their intention, there was no room for delay; and even at this moment while we are writing, it is more than probable, from the tenor of your letter, that re-enforcements are hurrying on to the conflict, so that when the first gun shall be fired, there will have been on your part one continuous, consistent series of actions, commencing in a demonstration essentially warlike, supported by regular re-enforcements, and terminating in defeat or victory. And all this without the slightest provocation; for, among the many things which you have said, there is one thing you can not say—you have waited anxiously for news from the seat of war, in hopes that delay would furnish some excuse for this precipitation. But this "tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act, on the part of the authorities of South Carolina," which is the only justification of Major Anderson you are forced to admit, "has not yet been alleged." But you have decided, you have resolved to hold, by force, what you have obtained through our misplaced confidence; and by refusing to disavow the action of Major Anderson, have converted his violation of orders into a legitimate act of your executive authority. Be the issue what it may, of this we are assured, that, if Fort Moultrie has been recorded in history as a memorial of Carolina gallantry, Fort Sumter will live upon the succeeding page as an imperishable testimony of Carolina faith.

By your course you have probably rendered civil war inevitable. Be it so. If you choose to force this issue upon us, the State of South Carolina will accept it, and, relying upon Him who is the God of Justice as well as the God of Hosts, will endeavor to perform the great duty which lies before her hopefully, bravely, and thoroughly.

Our mission being one for negotiation and peace, and your note leaving us without hope of a withdrawal of the troops from Fort Sumter, or of the restoration of the *status quo* existing at the time of our arrival, and intimating, as we think, your determination to re-enforce the garrison in the harbor of Charleston, we respectfully inform you that we purpose returning to Charleston tomorrow afternoon.

We have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servants,  
R. W. BARNWELL, }  
J. H. ADAMS, } Commissioners.  
JAMES L. ORR, }

To his Excellency the President of the United States.

The following is the indorsement upon the document:

This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it. Executive Mansion, 3½ o'clock, Wednesday.

<sup>2</sup> The original of this letter was found by the correspondent of the New York Times among some papers which fell into the hands of the United States forces upon their sudden occupation of Fernandina, Florida. It is here (p. 32) reproduced in fac-simile. The resolutions to which it refers were not distinguished in any way from the rest of the rebellious resolves of the period.

WASHINGTON  
JAN 16 1861  
Joseph A. Megaw Esq  
(Sovereignty Convention)  
Tallahassee  
Florida



of the government and disruption of the republic. With these men secession was a foregone conclusion, and delay and vacillation on the part of the supporters of the government only aided the accomplishment of their designs. This was made plain on the 31st by Senator Benjamin, of Louisiana, a state which had not yet taken even the preliminary steps to secession. In a speech meant both as a threat and a valedictory, he announced to the Senate that during the next week Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida would separate from the Union; that a week after Georgia would follow them, to be followed shortly by Louisiana and Arkansas. He declared that the day of adjustment was past, and that when the members of that body parted, they would part to meet again as senators in one common council-chamber of the nation no more forever; and, announcing it as his belief that there could not be peaceable secession, he defied the attempt to subdue the revolted people to the authority of the Constitution. Couching this defiance in the phraseology adopted by the conspirators, he closed his speech with these words: "What may be the fate of this horrible contest none can foretell; but this much I will say—the fortunes of war may be adverse to our arms; you may carry desolation into our peaceful land, and with torch and fire-brand may set our cities in flames; you may even emulate the atrocities of those who in the days of our Revolution hounded on the bloodthirsty savage; you may give the protection of your advancing armies to the furious fanatics who desire nothing more than to add the horrors of servile insurrection to civil war; you may do this and more, but you never can subjugate us; you never can subjugate the free sons of the soil into vassals paying tribute to your power; you can never degrade them into a servile and inferior race—never, never, never!"

This burst of bombastic prophesying, in which, with equal reason, vindictiveness was assumed as the motive, ruthlessness as the means, and servile subjection as the end in view of those who insisted that all should submit to the Constitution which all had adopted, and all obey the laws which all had had a voice in framing, was received with an uproar of applause in the galleries, which were filled with the sympathizers with disunion, who swarmed then in Washington and for a long time afterward. The outcries and confusion were so disgraceful, that even Mr. Benjamin's friends on the floor of the chamber were ashamed, and Mr. Mason, of Virginia, moved the clearing of the galleries, and the Senate immediately adjourned. Thus the peo-

ple of the United States saw the year close upon them in turmoil, gloom, distress, and weakness, which had opened upon them united, happy, prosperous, and powerful.

With the beginning of a new year a new attitude was assumed at Washington. President Buchanan, no longer daring to stand before the country as an accomplice by default in the conspiracy against the republic, at last made some show of an attempt to preserve the existence and exert the power of the government of which he was the head. It was high time for him to do so. The purposes of the conspirators developed themselves rapidly; and it became clear that they aimed not only at secession, but at usurpation, by the occupation of the national capital, the possession of the archives, and the consequent recognition of their faction as the government of the United States, to the exclusion of the free states, except such as it should suit them to admit to a share of their stolen privileges.<sup>3</sup> And it should be always remembered that they labored constantly under the supposition, at first not entirely unfounded, that there was a large, if not a controlling party in the free states who looked with favor upon their movement, and who would give to them a moral, and perhaps a material, support. They threatened that the President elect should never be inaugurated; and some of them even went so far as to avow a belief that they would be able to reconstruct the Union in their interest, with the omission of the New England states. That they were grievously in error, all their fellow-citizens, except their Northern accomplices, knew in their inmost hearts; but few then knew how deeply that feeling was rooted, and how strongly nourished, which they supposed would wither away in the first heat of adversity; and in forming the plan of a new republic, from which New England should be excluded, they must have left out of their calculation the significant fact that New England had mostly peopled the Northern states, and had entirely given them their moral tone and intellectual character. Such, however, were their plans; and Mr. Buchanan found that it was no longer safe for him to fail to interpose such checks upon their execution as a decent regard for the duties of his high office demanded. Lieutenant General Scott was called into consultation with the cabinet, in which General John A. Dix had replaced Mr. Cobb, and Postmaster General Holt, an able, patriotic, and honorable Democrat, had been charged with the functions of the War office. Measures were taken for the military protection of the capital by the organization of

the militia of the District, and the concentration of a few regular companies of artillery; and means were sought of increasing the garrisons of the principal forts in the slave states, and particularly those in the harbor of Charleston. But for the latter object the time had long passed, and even for the former it proved to be almost too late. The steam frigate Brooklyn, just arrived at Norfolk navy yard after a three years' cruise, was almost the only national ship of any consequence manned and equipped, and within reach of the government. She was ordered not to discharge her crew, and to remain in readiness to sail with a smaller vessel at an hour's notice. The purposes of the government got wind immediately, and reached the ears of the secessionists. At Norfolk they prepared to seize the ships should they attempt to sail; at Charleston they removed the buoys, obstructed the channel, and left the light-house darkling. The enterprise was abandoned. But the defense of Washington, and the measures necessary to insure the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, went on as rapidly as possible, under the eye of Captain Charles Stone, of the Ordnance corps, to whom, at General Scott's recommendation, was committed the organization of the District militia, which, though not numerous, was thought sufficient for the emergency. A company of marines was sent to Fort Washington, fourteen miles below the capital, on the Potomac, and the

<sup>3</sup> From the Charleston Courier, Feb. 12th, 1861.

"The South might, after uniting, under a new confederacy, treat the disorganized and demoralized Northern states as insurgents, and deny them recognition. But if peaceful division ensues, the South, after taking the federal capital and archives, and being recognized by all foreign powers as the government *de facto*, can, if they see proper, recognize the Northern confederacy or confederacies, and enter into treaty stipulations with them. Were this not done, it would be difficult for the Northern states to take a place among nations, and their flag would not be respected or recognized."

Washington Day 1. 1861.

My Dear Sir

On the other side is a copy of resolution adopted at a consultation of the Senators from the seceding states in which Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Texas, Mississippi & Florida, were present. The idea of the meeting was that the states should go out at once, & provide for the early organization of a confederate government not later than 15 day. This time is allowed to enable Louisiana & Texas to participate. It seemed to be opinion that if we left here force, laws & volunteer bills might be passed, which would put our Lincoln in immediate condition for hostility—whereas if by remaining in our places until the 4<sup>th</sup> of March, it is thought we can keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied, and be able to keep the Republicans from effecting any legislation which will strengthen the hands of the incoming administration. The resolutions will be sent after delegation to the President of the Convention. I have not been able to find the mailing this morning. Hawkins is in Connecticut. I have therefore thought it best to send you the copy of the resolutions.

In haste

Joseph F. Morgan Esq

Wm. T. Morgan



volunteer military companies of Washington were paraded, inspected, and furnished with ball cartridges.

General Scott, to whom, for services in peace and war, his country owed more than to any other living man, devoted himself to meeting the military demands of a crisis which he had foreseen, and for which, if his counsels had been regarded, the government would have been fully prepared. There is no doubt of this, sad as it is to believe that all the woes which fell upon the republic might have been warded off if he had been listened to, who, at such a time, had the best right to be heard. The political sagacity and foresight which had made General Scott the great peace-maker, as well as the great captain of the republic, had not deserted him in his advancing years; and he had, as early as October 29th, 1860, addressed a memorandum to the President and the Secretary of War, in which he set forth the almost certain endeavor to destroy the Union upon the election of Mr. Lincoln; among whose supporters he was not, but whose election he could not believe would be followed by "any unconstitutional violence or breach of law." Such violence or breach he, in his integrity and love of country, regarded as the only justification of armed insurrection; but he knew the men of whom he wrote, and he did not believe that they would wait until they had either law or right on their side. In this remarkable paper he pointed out, with singular sagacity, as the event proved, that the Southern people, or those who spoke and acted for them, would seize the United States forts within

their reach even before they had seceded. He recommended the immediate garrisoning of all these forts, and particularly of Forts Moultrie, Monroe, Pickens, and M'Rea, with such a force as to make any attempt to seize them by coup-de-main impossible; and he suggested that, in case of secession, commerce should remain unrestricted, but duties be collected on imports by forces stationed in forts or ships of war. But, alas! he was obliged to admit, in this very memorandum, that for the defense of the nine great forts which he mentioned, the government had, except the small garrisons of Moultrie and Monroe, but five companies of troops within reach, and those scattered at five posts separated hundreds of miles from each other; and, sadder still, he was obliged to send his patriotic warning and his wise counsels to a President who was supremely faithless to his trust, and to a Secretary of War who was one of the most active conspirators against the very government of which he was a member.<sup>4</sup> General Wool, too, one of the ablest and most honorable soldiers of the Union, had, as early as the 6th of December, addressed General Cass, Secretary of State, a letter, in which he set forth the imminent peril of the country, the frightful proportions which a civil war, inevitable upon secession, would assume, and pointed out the way in which to avoid it, by firm, decided, prompt, and energetic measures. Among these he particularly named the immediate increase of the garrison of Fort Moultrie.<sup>5</sup> But General Wool's letter was as little heeded as the

that all dangers and difficulties will pass away without leaving a scar or painful recollection behind. The Secretary's most obedient servant,  
October 30, 1860. W. S.

#### General Wool's Letters.

Troy, December 31, 1860.

MY DEAR SIR,—South Carolina, after twenty-seven years—Mr. Rhett says thirty years—of constant and increasing efforts by her leaders to induce her to secede, has declared herself out of the Union; and this, too, without the slightest wrong or injustice done her people on the part of the government of the United States. Although she may have seized the revenue cutter, raised her treasonable Palmetto flag over the United States Arsenal, the Custom-house, Post-office, Castle Pinckney, and Fort Moultrie, she is not out of the Union, nor beyond the pale of the United States. Before she can get out of their jurisdiction or control, a reconstruction of the Constitution must be had, or civil war ensue. In the latter case, it would require no prophet to foretell the result.

It is reported that Mr. Buehann has received informally the commissioners appointed by the rebels of South Carolina to negotiate for the public property in the harbor of Charleston, and for other purposes. It is also reported that the President disapproved of the conduct of Major Anderson, who, being satisfied that he would not be able to defend Fort Moultrie with the few men under his command, wisely took possession of Fort Sumter, where he could protect himself and the country from the disgrace which might have occurred if he had remained in Fort Moultrie. Being the commander in the harbor, he had the right to occupy Fort Sumter, an act which the safety of the Union as well as his own honor demanded. It is likewise stated that apprehensions are entertained that Major Anderson will be required to abandon Fort Sumter and reoccupy Fort Moultrie. There can be no foundation for such apprehensions; for surely the President would not surrender the citadel of the harbor of Charleston to rebels. Fort Sumter commands the entrance, and in a few hours could demolish Fort Moultrie. So long as the United States keeps possession of this fort, the independence of South Carolina will only be in name, and not in fact. If, however, it should be surrendered to South Carolina, which I do not apprehend, the smothered indignation of the free states would be roused beyond control. It would not be in the power of any one to restrain it. In twenty days two hundred thousand men would be in readiness to take vengeance on all who would betray the Union into the hands of its enemies. Be assured that I do not exaggerate the feelings of the people. They are already sufficiently excited at the attempt to dissolve the Union for no other reason than that they constitutionally exercised the most precious right conferred on them, of voting for the person whom they considered the most worthy and best qualified to fill the office of President. Fort Sumter, therefore, ought not, and, I presume, will not be delivered over to South Carolina.

I am not, however, pleading for the free states, for they are not in danger, but for the Union and the preservation of the cotton states. Those who sow the wind may expect to reap the whirlwind. The leaders of South Carolina could not have noticed that we live in an age of progress, and that all Christendom is making rapid strides in the march of civilization and freedom. If they had, they would have discovered that the announcement of every victory obtained by the hero of the nineteenth century, Garibaldi, in favor of the oppressed of Italy, did not fail to electrify every American heart with joy and gladness. "Where liberty dwells there is my country," was the declaration of the illustrious Franklin. This principle is too strongly implanted in the heart and mind of every man in the free states to be surrendered because South Carolina desires it in order to extend the area of slavery. With all christianized Europe and nearly all the civilized world opposed to slavery, are the Southern states prepared to set aside the barriers which shield and protect their institutions under the United States government? Would the separation of the South from the North give greater security to slavery than it has now under the Constitution of the Union? What security would they have for the return of runaway slaves? I apprehend none; while the number of runaways would be greatly augmented, and the difficulties of which slaveholders complain would be increased tenfold. However much individuals might condemn slavery, the free states are prepared to sustain and defend it as guaranteed by the Constitution.

In conclusion, I would avoid the bloody and desolating example of the Mexican states. I am now, and forever, in favor of the Union, its preservation, and the rigid maintenance of the rights and interests of the states, individually as well as collectively. Yours, etc., JOHN E. WOOL.

General Wool to General Cass, before the resignation of the latter.

(Private.) Troy, Dec. 6, 1860.

MY DEAR GENERAL,—Old associations and former friendship induce me to venture to address to you a few words on the state of the country. My letter is headed "private" because I am not authorized to address you officially.

I have read with pleasure the President's Message. South Carolina says she intends to leave the Union. Her representatives in Congress say she has already left the Union. It would seem that she is neither to be conciliated nor comforted. I command the Eastern Department, which includes South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi. You know me well. I have ever been a firm, decided, faithful, and devoted friend of my country. If I can aid the President to preserve the Union, I hope he will command my services. It will never do for him or you to leave Washington without every star in this Union is in its place. Therefore, no time should be lost in adopting measures to defeat those who are conspiring against the Union. Hesitancy or delay may be no less fatal to the Union than to the President or your own high standing as a statesman.

It seems to me that troops should be sent to Charleston to man the forts in that harbor. You have eight companies at Fort Monroe, Va. Three or four of these companies should be sent, without a moment's delay, to Fort Moultrie. It will save the Union and the President much trouble. It is said that to send at this time troops to that harbor would produce great excitement among the people. That is nonsense, when the people are as much excited as they can be, and the leaders are determined to execute their long-meditated purpose of separating the state from the Union. So long as you command the entrance to the city of Charleston, South Carolina can not separate herself from the Union. Do not leave the forts in the harbor in a condition to induce an attempt to take possession of them. It might easily be done at this time. If South Carolina should take them, it might, as she anticipates, induce other states to join her.

Permit me to entreat you to urge the President to send at once three or four companies of artillery to Fort Moultrie. The Union can be preserved, but it requires firm, decided, prompt, and energetic measures on the part of the President. He has only to exert the power conferred on him by the Constitution and laws of Congress, and all will be safe, and he will prevent a civil war, which never fails to call forth all the baser passions of the human heart. If a separation should take place, you may rest assured blood would flow in torrents, followed by pestilence, famine, and desolation, and Senator Sumner's irrepressible conflict will be brought to a conclusion much sooner than he could possibly have anticipated. Let me conjure you to save the Union, and thereby avoid the bloody and desolating example of the states of Mexico. A separation of the states will bring with it the desolation of the cotton states, which are unprepared for war. Their weakness will be found in the number of their slaves, with but few of the essentials to carry on war, while the free states will have all the elements and materials for war, and to a greater extent than any other people on the face of the globe.

Think of these things, my dear general, and save the country, and save the prosperous South from pestilence, famine, and desolation. Peaceable secession is not to be thought of. Even if it should take place, in three months we would have a bloody war on our hands. Very truly your friend,  
JOHN E. WOOL.

Hon. Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

#### GENERAL SCOTT'S VIEWS.

Views suggested by the imminent Danger (October 29, 1860) of a Disruption of the Union by the Secession of one or more of the Southern States.

To save time, the right of secession may be conceded, and instantly balanced by the correlative right, on the part of the federal government, against an interior state or states, to re-establish by force, if necessary, its former continuity of territory.—[Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy, last chapter.]

But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness may contrive, and there would be no hope of reuniting the fragments except by the laceration and despotism of the sword. To effect such result, the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child's play.

A smaller evil would be to allow the fragments of the great republic to form themselves into new confederacies, probably four.

All the lines of demarcation between the new Unions can not be accurately drawn in advance, but many of them approximately may. Thus, looking to natural boundaries and commercial affinities, some of the following frontiers, after many waverings and conflicts, might perhaps become acknowledged and fixed:

1. The Potomac River and the Chesapeake Bay to the Atlantic. 2. From Maryland, along the crest of the Alleghany (perhaps the Blue Ridge) range of mountains, to some point in the coast of Florida. 3. The line from say the head of the Potomac to the west or northwest, which it will be most difficult to settle. 4. The crest of the Rocky Mountains.

The southeast confederacy would, in all human probability, in less than five years after the rupture, find itself bounded by the first and second lines indicated above, the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, with its capital at say Columbia, South Carolina. The country between the second, third, and fourth of those lines would, beyond a doubt, in about the same time, constitute another confederacy, with its capital at probably Alton or Quincy, Illinois. The boundaries of the Pacific Union are the most definite of all, and the remaining states would constitute the northeast confederacy, with its capital at Albany.

It is the first thought, will be considered strange that seven slaveholding states and parts of Virginia and Florida should be placed (above) in a new confederacy with Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, etc.; but when the overwhelming weight of the great Northwest is taken in connection with the laws of trade, contiguity of territory, and the comparative indifference to free-soil doctrines on the part of Western Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, it is evident that but little, if any coercion, beyond moral force, would be needed to embrace them; and I have omitted the temptation of the unwashed public lands which would fall entire to this confederacy—no upprage (well husbanded) sufficient for many generations. As to Missouri, Arkansas, and Mississippi, they would not stand out a month. Louisiana would coalesce without much solicitation, and Alabama, with West Florida, would be conquered the first winter, from the absolute need of Pensacola for a naval depot.

If I might presume to address the South, and particularly dear Virginia—being "native here and to the manor born"—I would affectionately ask, Will not your slaves be less secure, and their labor less profitable, under the new order of things than under the old? Could you employ profitably two hundred slaves in all Nebraska, or five hundred in all New Mexico? The right, then, to take them thither would be a barren right. And is it not wise to

"Rather bear the Ills we have,  
Than fly to others that we know not of?"

The Declaration of Independence proclaims and consecrates the same maxim: "Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes." And Paley, too, lays down as a fundamental maxim of statesmanship, "Never to pursue national honor as distinct from national interest;" but adds: "This rule acknowledges that it is often necessary to assert the honor of a nation for the sake of its interests."

The excitement that threatens secession is caused by the near prospect of a Republican's election to the presidency. From a sense of propriety as a soldier, I have taken no part in the pending canvass, and, as always heretofore, mean to stay away from the polls. My sympathies, however, are with the Bell and Everett ticket. With Mr. Lincoln I have had no communication whatever, direct or indirect, and have no recollection of ever having seen his person; but can not believe any unconstitutional violence, or breach of law, is to be apprehended from his administration of the federal government.

From a knowledge of our Southern population, it is my solemn conviction that there is some danger of an early act of rashness preliminary to secession, viz., the seizure of some or all of the following posts: Forts Jackson and St. Philip, in the Mississippi, below New Orleans, both without garrisons; Fort Morgan, below Mobile, without a garrison; Forts Pickens and M'Rea, Pensacola Harbor, with an insufficient garrison for one; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, without a garrison; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston Harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison, and the latter without any; and Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, without a sufficient garrison. In my opinion, all these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any one of them, by surprise or coup-de-main, ridiculous.

With the army faithful to its allegiance, and the navy probably equally so, and with a federal executive, for the next twelve months, of firmness and moderation, which the country has a right to expect—moderation being an element of power not less than firmness—there is good reason to hope that the danger of secession may be made to pass away without one conflict of arms, one execution, or one arrest for treason.

In the mean time, it is suggested that exports should remain as free as at present; all duties, however, on imports, collected (outside of the cities\*), as such receipts would be needed for the national debt, invalid pensions, etc., and only articles contraband of war be refused admittance. But even this refusal would be unnecessary, as the foregoing views eschew the idea of invading a seceded state.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

New York, October 29, 1860.

Lieutenant General Scott's respects to the Secretary of War to say, That a copy of his "Views," etc., was dispatched to the President yesterday in great haste: but the copy intended for the Secretary, better transcribed (herewith), was not in time for the mail. General Scott would be happy if the latter could be substituted for the former.

It will be seen that the "Views" only apply to a case of secession that makes a gap in the present Union. The falling off say of Texas, or of all the Atlantic states, from the Potomac south, was not within the scope of General Scott's provisional remedies.


It is his opinion that instructions should be given at once to the commanders of the Barranens, Forts Moultrie and Monroe, to be on their guard against surprises and coups-de-main. As to regular approaches, nothing can be said or done, at this time, without volunteers.

There is one (regular) company at Boston, one here (at the Narrows), one at Pittsburg, one at Augusta, Georgia, and one at Baton Rouge—in all five companies only, within reach, to garrison or re-enforce the forts mentioned in the "Views."

General Scott is all solicitude for the safety of the Union. He is, however, not without hope

\* In forts or on board ships of war. The great aim and object of this plan was to gain time—say eight or ten months—to await expected measures of conciliation on the part of the North, and the subsidence of angry feelings in the opposite quarter.





THE STEAM-SHIP "STAR OF THE WEST."

Lieutenant General's had been, and the consequences were just what both the military patriots had foreseen and foretold. The government would now have gladly followed their counsels, but it was too late.

At Charleston, on the contrary, alacrity as well as audacity characterized all that was done. The return of the South Carolina commissioners from Washington with the announcement that the President had refused to hold any farther communication with them, gave a new stimulus to the pride and the pugnacity of the secessionists. They affected to regard this refusal as an insult, and began to lash themselves into fury, but also to take most vigorous measures against the government by which they chose to regard themselves as insulted. They hastened the repairs and the armament of Fort Moultrie, commenced the erection of batteries upon Sullivan's Island and Morris's Island, two points which commanded both the entrance to the harbor and Fort Sumter; the commander of Castle Pinckney ordered that no boat should approach the wharf-head without permission; the city was put under the protection of a military patrol, look-out boats were stationed in the outer harbor at night, and the telegraph was placed under censorship. All the citizens of Charleston liable to military duty were, without exception, called to arms. The collector of the port, appointed to his office by the United States government, announced that all vessels from and for ports outside of South Carolina must enter and clear at Charleston. The Convention passed an ordinance defining treason against the state, and declaring its punishment, which, with a misunderstanding of an old criminal lawphrase, ludicrous in itself, but horrible in the vengeful purpose indicated by it, was to be "death without benefit of the clergy."<sup>6</sup> Delegates were appointed to attend a convention of seceding states. An appeal was made by the leading newspaper of Charleston to the people of Florida, to seize the national forts at Pensacola and Key West, and the capture of the California treasure-ships bound northward through the Gulf of Mexico was recommended. This appeal was addressed to the people of a commonwealth which had not yet even gone through the form of seceding from the government which had bought and paid for the very soil on which they lived! With a similar disregard of the proprietary rights of that government, the South Carolina authorities forbade the United States sub-treasurer of Charleston to cash any more drafts from Washington. But in this respect their dishonest move received one honest counter-check, which provoked some merriment; for Governor Pickens, writing to the Secretary of the Treasury for a balance of \$3000 due upon his salary as United States minister to Russia, received in reply a draft upon the sub-treasury the payments of which he had assumed to stop.

These bold steps were met only by timidity and hesitation on the part of the government. If Fort Sumter were to be retained, it must needs be re-enforced. An attempt was therefore made to send supplies and men to Major

Anderson, but in such a shuffling way, and with such a pitiful result, that it is a shame to tell the story. A large steam-ship, the *Star of the West*, was chartered, and with a supply of commissary stores and ammunition, and two hundred and fifty artillerymen and marines, she sailed from New York on the 5th of January. But, although her destination was Charleston Harbor, she cleared for New Orleans and Havana, and she did not take the troops on board until she was far down the Bay. The attempted deceit entirely failed. The Charleston people were fully informed as to the project by some of their innumerable spies, who swarmed over the country. The vessel arrived off Charleston Bar in the middle of the night of the 9th. She there lay to of necessity; for the lights in the light-houses were all out, and the buoys removed. She put out her own lights, and awaited the dawning. As the day began to break she discovered a small steamer just inshore of her, which, on making the reciprocal discovery, steamed away for the ship channel, burning blue and red signals, and sending up rockets as she went. The *Star of the West* followed, with the national flag at her peak, until she was within about two miles of both Fort Sumter and Fort Moultrie, when a battery on Morris's Island, about half a mile off, not noticed until then, opened fire upon her. Another large United States flag was immediately run up at the fore, but still the battery continued its fire. Perhaps this surprised the officers of the vessel, for before she was headed for the harbor the troops were all sent below, so that they could not be seen, no one but the crew being allowed on deck; and it really did seem as if the government of the United States might be allowed to smuggle two hundred and fifty men into one of its own fortresses. But the well-informed seceders thought otherwise; and as to the flag of their country, they were but too glad of an opportunity for insulting it. So the fire was kept up upon the advancing steamer, which soon found herself in a very awkward position. The shot were flying over her deck and through her rigging; she had been hit once. To reach Fort Sumter, she would be obliged to pass within three quarters of a mile of Fort Moultrie, from which already an armed schooner had put off, towed by two steam-tugs. Thus cut off, hemmed in, and fired upon, without the means of returning fire, the commander of the *Star of the West* concluded that, if he persisted, there was no chance of any other event than the loss of his vessel and of many lives; and after remaining under fire for ten minutes, during which seventeen shots were fired at him from the battery, and some from Fort Moultrie, he turned his ship about and headed for New York, where he arrived on the 12th, to the great disappointment and humiliation of all true men, who were hardly less disgusted at this skulking attempt than chagrined at its failure.<sup>7</sup>

*Report of the Captain of the Star of the West.*

Steam-ship *Star of the West*, New York, Saturday, Jan. 12, 1861.

M. O. ROBERTS, ESQ.: SIR,—After leaving the wharf on the 5th inst., at 5 o'clock P.M., we proceeded down the Bay, where we have to, and took on board four officers and two hundred soldiers, with their arms, ammunition, etc., and then proceeded to sea, crossing the bar at Sandy Hook at 9 P.M. Nothing unusual took place during the passage, which was a pleasant one for this season of the year.

We arrived at Charleston Bar at 1 30 A.M. on the 9th inst., but could find no guiding marks for the Bar, as the lights were all out. We proceeded with caution, running very slow and sounding, until about 4 A.M., being then in four and a half fathoms water, when we discovered a light through the haze which at that time covered the horizon. Concluding that the lights were on Fort Sumter, after getting the bearings of it we steered to the S.W. for the main ship channel,

<sup>6</sup> The old penalty of death without benefit of clergy is now, and, from the changed condition of things, has been, of necessity, long obsolete. It had no reference to the attendance of a clergyman or minister of the Gospel upon the condemned criminal, but was a barbarous sign of the peculiar privileges of the clergy of the Roman Church, which asserted and maintained a right to try its clergy at its own tribunals. When, therefore, a man was condemned and about to be sentenced, he claimed, if he could, that he was a clergyman; and, as proof, offered to show that he could read, then an accomplishment confined to clergymen. But, as learning advanced, it became necessary to do away with this "benefit of clergy."



PIRING ON THE "STAR OF THE WEST" FROM THE SOUTH CAROLINA BATTERY ON MORRIS ISLAND, JANUARY 10, 1861.







THE FIRST FLAG OF TRUCE.

But what did Major Anderson under these circumstances? He behaved with the judgment and firmness which marked his conduct throughout his severe trial. It must be remembered that communication had been cut off between Fort Sumter and the main land, and that Major Anderson knew nothing of the intention of sending him supplies and re-enforcements. When, therefore, the *Star of the West* hove in sight of his battlements, she was to him merely a merchant steamer entering Charleston Harbor, and having no special claim on his protection. His orders were strictly to act upon the defensive; but all the little garrison of the fort were on the alert, and he himself stood, glass in hand, upon the ramparts. To his grief, but perhaps not to his surprise, he sees the first shot fired from Morris's Island, and he orders his shotted guns which bear upon that battery to be run out. A second shot, and up goes another flag at the fore. Is this a signal to him? He can not tell. Shall he fire upon the assailants? He longs to give the word; but he is not attacked; his orders justify him only in self-defense, and to fire begins the horrors of civil war. Still the steamer keeps her course, and shot after shot is fired upon her. The men at the guns begin to fret, and the captain of one begs, "Do let us give them one, sir." "Patient—be patient," was the calm reply. But the battery keeps up its fire; the steamer is hit; Fort Moultrie also opens its guns upon her. It is becoming too much even for that firm and prudent man to bear, and he is about to give the word, when, all at once, the steamer puts about, and makes way out to sea as rapidly as possible, and the puzzled commander's doubt is settled for him. But, although he was relieved from the necessity of opening fire upon the insurgents at that time, the occurrence was of so grave a nature that it could not be permitted to pass unquestioned, or repeated with impunity. Major

where we hove to, to await daylight, our lights having all been put out since 12 o'clock, to avoid being seen.

As the day began to break, we discovered a steamer just inshore of us, which, as soon as she saw us, burned one blue light and two red lights as signals, and shortly after steamed over the Bar and into the ship channel. The soldiers were now all put below, and no one allowed on deck except our own crew. As soon as there was light enough to see, we crossed the Bar and proceeded on up the channel (the outer-bar buoy having been taken away), the steamer ahead of us sending off rockets, and burning lights until after broad daylight, continuing on her course up nearly two miles ahead of us. When we arrived about two miles from Fort Moultrie, Fort Sumter being about the same distance, a masked battery on Morris's Island, where there was a red Palmetto flag flying, opened fire upon us—distance about five eighths of a mile. We had the American flag flying at our flag-staff at the time, and soon after the first shot hoisted a large American ensign at the fore. We continued on under the fire of the battery for over ten minutes, several of the shots going clear over us. One shot just passed clear of the pilot-house, another passed between the smoke-stack and walking-beams of the engine, another struck the ship just abaft the fore-rigging and stove in the planking, while another came within an ace of carrying away the rudder. At the same time there was a movement of two steamers from near Fort Moultrie, one of them towing a schooner (I presume an armed schooner), with the intention of cutting us off. Our position now became rather critical, as we had to approach Fort Moultrie to within three quarters of a mile before we could keep away for Fort Sumter. A steamer approaching us with an armed schooner in tow, and the battery on the island firing at us all the time, and having no cannon to defend ourselves from the attack of the vessels, we concluded that, to avoid certain capture or destruction, we would endeavor to get to sea. Consequently we were round and steered down the channel, the battery firing upon us until the shot fell short. As it was now strong ebb tide, and the water having fallen some three feet, we proceeded with caution, and crossed the Bar safely at 8 50 A.M., and continued on our course for this port, where we arrived this morning, after a boisterous passage. A steamer from Charleston followed us for about three hours, watching our movements. In justice to the officers and crews of each department of the ship, I must add that their behavior while under the fire of the battery reflected great credit on them.

Mr. Brewer, the New York pilot, was of very great assistance to me in helping to pilot the ship over Charleston Bar, and up and down the channel. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
JOHN M'GOWAN, Captain.

Anderson, therefore, immediately addressed a note to the governor of South Carolina, asking whether this firing upon an unarmed vessel bearing the flag of his government was authorized, and informing him that if it were not disavowed he should regard it as an act of war, and not permit any vessel to pass within range of the guns of Fort Sumter. This letter he sent with a flag of truce to Charleston. Under the circumstances, a flag of truce was perhaps proper, and even necessary, and doubtless, to a military man, the proceeding was a mere formality; but to the people there were gloomy shadows in the folds of that white, peaceful token. To send a flag of truce confessed a state of war—of civil war; it recognized the existence of a second power in the land; and then what humiliation to see an officer of the United States army obtaining audience of the governor of one of the states, and one of the least important of them too, only by virtue of a protection, a safeguard! Governor Pickens, in reply, assumed the responsibility of the firing, informed Major Anderson that attempts to re-enforce him would be regarded as hostile acts, and resisted accordingly, and left him to decide whether he would fulfill his threat as to firing upon vessels coming within range of his guns. The situation proved to be graver, and the case more complicated, than Major Anderson was prepared to meet without superior orders. Of this he informed Governor Pickens, asking permission for the passage of a messenger to Washington, which was granted.<sup>8</sup> This incident added greatly to the excitement throughout the North, where, however, no violence or even vivacity of feeling was yet displayed; but a gloomy, gnawing, fierce unrest pervaded the whole land. It was felt that the government had acted pitifully, and had been publicly caught in the act; but that Major Anderson had borne himself only as became a brave and prudent soldier. In the first sentence of his demand upon the insurgent governor, the words "the flag of my government" touched the sensitive public heart. He had been the first to assert the existence of that government among the insurgents and to support its flag, and he rose higher than before in public favor.

While the South Carolina insurgents were conducting their affairs with such promptitude, such boldness, and such success, and the government was moving with such hesitation into such miserable failure, what was the course of events in the country at large? In the slave states the self-constituted leaders of the insurrection were doing their best, by acts of usurpation without even the shadow or pretense of authority, to bring about a bloody issue.

#### Correspondence between Major Anderson and Governor Pickens.

To his Excellency the Governor of South Carolina:

SIR,—Two of your batteries fired this morning on an unarmed vessel bearing the flag of my government. As I have not been notified that war has been declared by South Carolina against the United States, I can not but think this a hostile act committed without your sanction or authority. Under that hope I refrain from opening a fire on your batteries. I have the honor, therefore, respectfully to ask whether the above-mentioned act—one which I believe without parallel in the history of our country or any other civilized government—was committed in obedience to your instructions, and notify you, if it is not disclaimed, that I regard it as an act of war, and I shall not, after reasonable time for the return of my messenger, permit any vessel to pass within the range of the guns of my fort. In order to save, as far as it is in my power, the shedding of blood, I beg you will take due notification of my decision for the good of all concerned, hoping, however, your answer may justify a farther continuance of forbearance on my part. I remain, respectfully,

ROBERT ANDERSON.

#### Governor Pickens's Reply.

Governor Pickens, after stating the position of South Carolina toward the United States, says that any attempt to send United States troops into Charleston Harbor, to re-enforce the forts, would be regarded as an act of hostility; and, in conclusion, adds that any attempt to re-enforce the troops at Fort Sumter, or to retake and resume possession of the forts within the waters of South Carolina, which Major Anderson abandoned, after spiking the cannon and doing other damage, can not but be regarded by the authorities of the state as indicative of any other purpose than the coercion of the state by the armed force of the government; special agents, therefore, have been off the Bar to warn approaching vessels, armed and unarmed, having troops to re-enforce Fort Sumter aboard, not to enter the harbor. Special orders have been given the commanders at the forts not to fire on such vessels until a shot across their bows should warn them of the prohibition of the state. Under these circumstances, the *Star of the West*, it is understood, this morning attempted to enter the harbor with troops, after having been notified she could not enter, and consequently she was fired into. This act is perfectly justified by me.

In regard to your threat about vessels in the harbor, it is only necessary for me to say, you must be the judge of your responsibility. Your position in the harbor has been tolerated by the authorities of the state; and while the act of which you complain is in perfect consistency with the rights and duties of the state, it is not perceived how far the conduct you propose to adopt can find a parallel in the history of any country, or be reconciled with any other purpose than that of your government imposing on the state the condition of a conquered province.

F. W. PICKENS.

#### Second Communication from Major Anderson.

To his Excellency Governor Pickens:

SIR,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication, and say that, under the circumstances, I have deemed it proper to refer the whole matter to my government, and intend deferring the course I indicated in my note this morning until the arrival from Washington of such instructions as I may receive.

I have the honor also to express the hope that no obstructions will be placed in the way, and that you will do me the favor of giving every facility for the departure and return of the bearer, Lieut. T. Talbot, who is directed to make the journey.

ROBERT ANDERSON.



On the 2d of January, Governor Ellis, of North Carolina, took possession of Fort Macon, at Beaufort, the forts at Wilmington, and the United States Arsenal at Fayetteville; and on the same day Fort Pulaski, near Savannah, was seized by the order of Governor Brown, of Georgia. At Mobile, the Alabama secessionists demanded and received possession of the United States Arsenal, thereby securing 1500 barrels of powder, 300,000 cartridges, besides arms and other munitions of war. They also seized upon Fort Morgan, at the entrance of Mobile Bay, and garrisoned it with two hundred Alabama militia. All these forts and arsenals fell into their hands without resistance; for so benign and peaceful was the government against which they revolted, that its very military posts were left entirely without military protection, in the mere keeping of a corporal and his guard. Of this absence of protective force, the secessionists of North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama availed themselves; this trust of the whole nation in the honor of all its constituent parts, they abused before they had even nominally dissolved the bonds which bound them to the government of the United States. Of the border states Virginia alone showed a readiness to swell the ranks of the insurgents. At Norfolk, almost within the very precincts of a great government naval station, a meeting was held on the 5th of January, at which speeches were made and resolutions passed urging resistance to "coercion and invasion"—the favorite phrases by which thoroughly disloyal men designated the maintenance of its power by the government. But this disposition was not yet general even in the eastern part of the state; and the governor, in a message to the Legislature in special session, condemned South Carolina, although he defied the United States.



GOVERNOR PICKENS.

The people of the northern tier of slave states, forming the border line between freedom and slavery, spoke out strongly for the Union, or remained in a state of quiet but anxious expectation. In Baltimore five thousand substantial citizens addressed a letter to Governor Hicks, approving his refusal to convene the Legislature of Maryland, which measure was advocated in the interests of the secessionists; and the governor replied to the commissioner from the State of Alabama, who had solicited the co-operation of Maryland, that he regarded co-operation between the slave states as an infraction of the Constitution, which he, as Governor of Maryland, swore to support. He declared that the people of that state were firm in their friendship for the Union, and would never swerve from it; that they had seen, with mortification and regret, the course taken by South Carolina; because, in their opinion, it was better to use the Union for the enforcement of their rights, than to break it up because of apprehensions that the provisions of the Constitution would be disregarded, and they would cling to it until it should actually become the instrument of destruction to their rights, and peace, and safety. There were then a few secessionists in Maryland at both extremes of the social scale; but the great bulk of the thrifty and intelligent people of the state found their feelings and their opinions expressed for them in this letter of their governor, who also spoke the convictions, at that time, of a large body of conservative men throughout the slave states. A like reply was given by the Legislature of Delaware to the commissioner from Mississippi, who approached them with like proposals. The condemnation of the course of the seceding states by the people of Delaware was prompt and unqualified. But around the Gulf seceders were more numerous, and had obtained absolute control of public affairs. In Georgia, in Florida, in Alabama, and in Mississippi, the Legislatures, or the Conventions which they had called, moved rapidly and steadily on to the business of the disruption of the republic; and in the Senate of Missouri, the Committee on Federal Relations was instructed to report a bill calling a state convention. A series of outrages upon the national military posts and property accompanied these more deliberative movements, and illustrated their spirit. In North Carolina, Forts Caswell and Johnson were taken possession of by the

militia and other persons living near them. On the 11th of January a party of Louisiana militia seized upon the United States Marine Hospital, about two miles below New Orleans, which contained over two hundred patients, all of whom who could leave their beds were turned out immediately. At Pensacola, a body of Florida and Alabama militia appeared before the gate of the navy yard, and demanded possession. The officer in command, having no force to resist the demand, yielded his post of necessity. Fort Barrancas was also taken possession of in like manner. The navy yard contained over one hundred thousand dollars worth of ordnance stores. The perpetrators of this outrage had the assurance to send word to the government, through their senators, that it was the consequence of the re-enforcement of Fort Pickens, and to propose a restoration on both sides of the *status quo ante bellum*! The claims of science, beneficently devoted to the interests of all mankind, were not recognized as a safeguard, and the United States Coast Survey schooner Dana was seized on the 15th, by order of the state authorities of Florida. The freedom of commercial intercourse was equally disregarded by the Governor of Mississippi, who planted artillery at Vicksburg, on the banks of the river, to stop, for examination, all steamers passing southward. This arbitrary interruption of the traffic of that great water highway of the continent did much to open the eyes of the people of the Western and Northwestern country to the consequences of the disruption of the Union. At Augusta, the United States Arsenal was surrendered to the militia of the place upon the demand of the Governor of Georgia.

In most of these cases the forcible seizure of the nation's property on the part of states took place before those states had gone through the formality of passing an Ordinance of Secession. But it was not long lacking, this home-made salve for wounded honor. The Mississippi Convention passed the ordinance on the 9th of January, Alabama on the 11th, Florida on the 12th, Georgia on the 19th, and, to look forward a few days, Louisiana on the 28th, and Texas on the 1st of February. In Mississippi there were fifteen dissenting voices; in Florida, only seven against sixty-two; but in Alabama there were thirty-nine nays to sixty-one yeas; and in Georgia itself, secession was openly denounced and voted against by eighty-nine of the delegates, among whom were Alexander H. Stevens and Herschel V. Johnson, the Democratic candidate for the vice-presidency at the last election, and Judge Linton Stevens, of the Supreme Court. It is important to observe how large a proportion of the people, and what eminent and influential citizens, in some of these states, were so earnestly opposed to secession that, in spite of the attempts by social exclusion, browbeating, deceit, and even actual violence, to bring about unanimity, they boldly declared themselves against it. Of the evidence that the leaders and active instigators of the insurrection would not permit that free expression of public opinion through the ballot-box which alone could have excused, though it would not have justified their acts, some should be placed directly upon the pages in which the story of this woeful time will be told with candor, and with as much good feeling as comports with justice. There is no lack of it. "It is a notable fact" (the "Southern Confederacy," of Atlanta, Georgia, says this), "that, wherever the 'Minute-men,' as they are called, have had an organization" (they were armed vigilance committees), "those counties have voted, by large majorities, for immediate secession. Those that they could not control by persuasion and coaxing, they dragooned and bullied by threats, jeers, and sneers. By this means thousands of good citizens were induced to vote the immediate secession ticket through timidity. Besides, the towns and cities have been flooded with sensation dispatches and inflammatory rumors, manufactured in Washington City for the especial occasion. To be candid, there never has been as much lying and bullying practiced, in the same length of time, since the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, as has been in the recent state campaign." The doctrine of state sovereignty, which, in the face of the solemn teachings of the Southern fathers of the republic, the Calhoun school had so long and so ceaselessly poured into the ears of Southern people, now served the purpose for which it was intended, and men submitted to a state ordinance which set at naught the Constitution, and sought to destroy the Union, as they would have obeyed a law with regard to any minor matter of daily life. Only in this manner was this insurrection made possible. But even under these circumstances the leaders of the movement did not dare to submit the Ordinance of Secession to the people for confirmation, except in one state, Texas, which, it is worth while to observe, was the only one of the states which had a sovereign independent political existence before it became merged in the Union. It is needless to notice farther the forcible appropriation of national forts, arsenals, and ships by state authority. But in one instance the exertion of "sovereign" state authority was accompanied by incidents which were marked with the character of the time. To understand this, we must turn our eyes northward, and observe what was passing this while in the loyal free and slave states.

The promptitude and vigor of the insurgents was not imitated more by the people of the loyal states than by the government with which they kept their faith. From the nature of man and man's institutions, this was to have been expected. Revolutionary and destructive forces, unless they fail miserably at the very outset, must always act more quickly and more vigorously than those which protect that which they would overturn and destroy. For an essential element of established power is a *vis inertiae*, the very disturbance of which, even for the purpose of resistance, is not only the first task, but, if accomplished, the first triumph of revolution. Established government rests upon the basis of a strong tranquillity; and revolution, which seeks to displace established government, can accomplish its purpose, even if it controls an equal body, only by adding movement to its weight, thus attaining momentum. The loyal people and the government











of the United States wished to allay disturbance and to prevent a struggle; therefore, when they did any thing, they confined themselves to mild, but, as they then thought, firm repressive measures. They did not yet see that the business before them was not one of restraint, but of extinction; that they must destroy the power they feared, or be destroyed by it. So it is even in minor matters of police. Half a dozen riotous, reckless, liquor-maddened men will give employment to twice their number of policemen, acting under the authority of law and under a sense of responsibility, and, if not put down at once by the strong hand, may peril the peace of a neighborhood. The insurgents having openly defied the government, seized its forts, its arsenals, and its armed vessels, and established themselves in force, the people of the loyal states began to think that it was almost time for them to begin to think about beginning to do something. So meetings, decorously enthusiastic, were held in New York, in Boston, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Chicago, Portland, Trenton in New Jersey, Wilmington in Delaware, and elsewhere, at which many laudable patriotic sentiments were uttered, and a sense of "the value of the Union" was strongly expressed (as if the existence of the nation and the government was a thing or an interest by itself, which was to be priced like goods or railway shares), and the administration was assured of the willingness of the people to support it against the insurgents. On the other hand, that the purposes of the loyal people might not be misapprehended, abolition demonstrations were interfered with; as at Rochester, in New York, where a meeting of abolitionists was broken up, amid cheers for the Union, General Scott, and Major Anderson; and where a banner, with the inscription "No compromise with slavery," had to be taken down. In Boston, Mr. Wendell Phillips, the apostle of abolitionism, having avowed himself, as he had often done before, "a disunion man," expressed joy at the secession of the Gulf states, and denounced the compromise spirit of Mr. Seward and Mr. Charles Francis Adams, was hissed and booed, and followed home by a great crowd of excited people, from whom he was protected by policemen. The Legislature of New York, by resolutions, denounced secession, avowed a determination to support the national government, and offered men and money to the President. In the Massachusetts Legislature like resolutions were passed, and with them a bill increasing the militia of the state. On the 15th of January Major General Sanford offered the services of the whole first division of the militia of New York, which was under his command, for the support of the authority of the government. But it is worthy of note that there was some, though very trifling, objection to this offer, and to the general's right to make it.

Thus far, however, though much had been said at the North, nothing had been done as a set-off to the activity and audacity of the insurgents at the South. When, at last, something was attempted, it was not by the government, or even by state authority. The seceders had, from the beginning of their movement, busied themselves in buying arms and munitions of war in Northern cities as well as in Europe. Muskets, sabres, powder, percussion caps, and even cannon, were shipped to them from Northern ports, where the traffic in arms was the only branch of trade not paralyzed by the political disturbances. With this traffic an officer of police, John A. Kennedy, Chief of the Metropolitan District of New York, took the responsibility of interfering. He seized and detained several cases of muskets about to be shipped to Georgia. Information of the seizure was telegraphed to the consignees, and immediately there came back a dispatch from Mr. Toombs to Fernando Wood, Mayor of New York, containing a query as to the act and a threat as to its consequences. The reply of the mayor was one of exculpation and abject submission to the insurgent demagogue, to whom he said that if he had the power he would punish Kennedy.<sup>9</sup> Georgia at once retaliated, and in a most effective manner. The governor seized and held by military possession two barks, two brigs, and a schooner, lying in the harbor of Savannah, and belonging to residents of New York, and sent on word that they would be held until the arms were released. The Governor of New York replied that the seizure had been unauthorized, and that the arms should be given up. The vessels were then re-

leased, and made sail quickly from Savannah. But there being some difficulty and delay in releasing the arms, the Governor of Georgia seized three other vessels, a ship, a bark, and a brig, all owned in New York, and detained them until the arms were placed again at the disposal of their Georgia consignees. In these relative attitudes we shall always find the parties to this struggle: on the side of the insurgents, a determination to gain their point by any means, right or wrong, at any cost, and without hesitation; and on the part of the government, a reluctance to violent measures unless driven to them by sheer necessity.

At Washington, the House of Representatives, not until ten days had gone by, passed a resolution approving of Major Anderson's change of position, and assuring the President of support in the enforcement of the laws and the preservation of the Union, but nothing more momentous was attempted. In the cabinet, Secretary Thompson, of the Interior, on learning the attempt to supply and garrison Fort Sumter, resigned his portfolio; and on the 15th of January, Colonel Hayne, a commissioner from South Carolina, and attorney general of the state, demanded the withdrawal of the troops which were in the fort. On being requested to submit the demand in writing, he sent in a proposal to buy the fort, with the declaration that "if not permitted to purchase it, South Carolina would take it by force of arms," a safe threat against a work already engirdled by batteries, and containing not quite fourscore fighting men. On the 20th of January, the senators from Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi, among whom was Jefferson Davis, withdrew from the Senate. The latter made a parting speech, not resigning, but taking leave of the senators, on the ground that, as his state had passed an Ordinance of Secession, he had no longer a right to sit in his seat. Looked upon as one of the ablest men of his party, and as a politician of determined purpose, and little scruple as to the means of attaining a political end, his retirement attracted more attention than that of any other seceding member of Congress. His speech was listened to with profound attention, and at the close of it, all the Democratic senators crowded round him and the other seceding senators, and shook hands warmly with them.<sup>10</sup> Just a week after the withdrawal of the man who was to assume so prominent a part in the rebellion, another, also to be heard of again in the annals of the period, ex-Secretary of War Floyd, was presented for indictment by the grand jury of the District of Columbia on three findings: malversation in office, complicity in the abstraction of the Indian Trust Fund Bonds, and conspiracy against the government. But he had taken himself well out of reach of grand juries and marshals, and he wisely kept so thereafter. The original members of Mr. Buchanan's cabinet, with the exception of General Cass, who retired early, and Mr. Attorney General Black, who was honorable and loyal, brought disgrace upon themselves, upon his administration, and the country; but one of its new ministers, General Dix, Secretary of the Treasury, was the first member of the government to assert its authority, in a manner which met the expectations and called forth the sympathies of the people. The revenue cutters of the United States are, of course, in the keeping of the Secretary of the Treasury, and under his orders. Among those which were exposed to the peculiar practices of the insurgents, with regard to the property of the "common agency," were the Lewis Cass, at Mobile, and the Robert McClelland, at New Orleans. General Dix had not been at the head of the Treasury Department four days when he sent a special agent to those ports to save those vessels by ordering them to New York. Having reached New Orleans, the agent delivered the secretary's order to Captain Breshwood, of the McClelland, who, after consultation with the collector of the port, flatly refused to obey it. Upon this the agent telegraphed for instructions to the secretary, who telegraphed back orders for the arrest of the captain by the lieutenant of the cutter, and his treatment as a mutineer if he offered any resistance, closing the order with the memorable words, "If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot." This dispatch was intercepted both at Mobile and New Orleans, where the insurgent leaders had already placed the telegraph under supervision, and so did not reach the agent of the Treasury Department. The

*Correspondence between Senator Toombs and Mayor Wood.*

Milledgeville, Jan. 24, 1861.

To his Honor Mayor Wood:

Is it true that any arms intended for and consigned to the State of Georgia have been seized by public authorities in New York? Your answer is important to us and to New York. Answer at once. R. TOOMBS.

To this the Mayor returned the following answer:

Hon. Robert Toombs, Milledgeville, Ga.:

In reply to your dispatch, I regret to say that arms intended for and consigned to the State of Georgia have been seized by the Police of this state, but that the city of New York should in no way be made responsible for the outrage.

As mayor, I have no authority over the Police. If I had the power, I should summarily punish the authors of this illegal and unjustifiable seizure of private property. FERNANDO WOOD.

*Speech of Jefferson Davis on leaving the Senate.*

I rise for the purpose of announcing to the Senate that I have satisfactory evidence that the State of Mississippi, by solemn ordinance in convention assembled, has declared her separation from the United States. Under these circumstances, of course, my functions terminate here. It has seemed to be proper that I should appear in the Senate and announce that fact, and to say something, though very little, upon it. The occasion does not invite me to go into the argument, and my physical condition will not permit it, yet something would seem to be necessary on the part of the state I here represent, on an occasion like this. It is known to senators who have served here that I have for many years advocated, as an essential attribute of state sovereignty, the right of a state to secede from the Union. If, therefore, I had not believed there was justifiable cause—if I had thought the state was acting without sufficient provocation—still, under my theory of government, I should have felt bound by her action. I, however, may say I think she had justifiable cause, and I approve of her acts. I conferred with the people before that act was taken, and counseled them that, if they could not remain, they should take the act. I hope none will confound this expression of opinion with the advocacy of the right of a state to remain in the Union, and disregard its constitutional obligations by nullification. Nullification and secession are indeed antagonistic principles. Nullification is the remedy which is to be sought and applied within the Union against an agent of the United States when the agent has violated constitutional obligations, and the state assumes to act for itself, and appeals to other states to support it. But when the states themselves, and the people of the states, have so acted as to convince us that they will not regard our constitutional rights, then, and then for the first time, arises the question of secession in its practical application. That great man who now reposes with his fa-

thers, who has been so often arraigned for want of fealty to the Union, advocated the doctrine of nullification because it preserved the Union. It was because of his deep-seated attachment to the Union that Mr. Calhoun advocated the doctrine of nullification, which he claimed would give peace within the limits of the Union, and not disturb it, and only be the means of bringing the agent before the proper tribunal of the states for judgment. Secession belongs to a different class of rights, and is to be justified upon the basis that the states are sovereign. The time has been, and I hope the time will come again, when a better appreciation of our Union will prevent any one denying that each state is a sovereign in its own right. Therefore I say I concur in the act of my state, and feel bound by it. It is by this confounding of nullification and secession that the name of another great man has been invoked to justify the coercion of a seceding state. The phrase "to execute the law," as used by General Jackson, was applied to a state refusing to obey the laws and still remaining in the Union. I remember well when Massachusetts was arraigned before the Senate. The record of that occasion will show that I said, if Massachusetts, in pursuing the line of steps, takes the last step which separates her from the Union, the right is hers, and I will neither vote one dollar nor one man to coerce her, but I will say to her, "God speed!" Mr. Davis then proceeded to argue that the equality spoken of in the Declaration of Independence was the equality of a class in political rights, referring to the charge against George III. for inciting insurrection as proof that it had no reference to the slaves. But we have proclaimed our independence. This is done with no hostility or any desire to injure any section of the country, nor even for our pecuniary benefit, but from the high and solid foundation of defending and protecting the rights we inherited, and transmitting them unshorn to our posterity. I know I feel no hostility to you senators here, and am sure there is not one of you, whatever may have been the sharp discussion between us, to whom I can not now say, in the presence of my God, I wish you well. And such is the feeling, I am sure, the people I represent feel toward those whom you represent. I therefore feel I but express their desire when I say I hope and they hope for those peaceful relations with you, though we must part, that may be mutually beneficial to us in the future. There will be peace if you so will it, and you may bring disaster on every part of the country if you thus will have it. And if you will have it thus, we will invoke the God of our fathers, who delivered them from the paw of the lion, to protect us from the ravages of the bear; and thus putting our trust in God, and our own firm hearts and strong arms, we will vindicate and defend the rights we claim. In the course of my long career, I have met with a great variety of men here, and there have been points of collision between us. Whatever of offense there has been to me, I leave here. I carry no hostile feelings away. Whatever of offense I have given, which has not been redressed, I am willing to say to senators in this hour of parting, I offer you my apology for any thing I may have done in the Senate; and I go thus released from obligation, remembering no injury I have received, and having discharged what I deem the duty of man, to offer the only reparation at this hour for every injury I have ever inflicted.





JEFFERSON DAVIS.

<sup>1</sup> Slavery, secession, and state sovereignty could not eradicate this love. An officer of the United States, taken prisoner after the war had lasted a year, received from a rebel officer, whose quarters he visited, the confession that he had no attachment to the confederate colors which floated above them, and that "the hardest thing about this war was to fire upon the old flag." This incident is known to the writer on private information.

<sup>2</sup> Mr. W. Hemphill Jones, the special agent of the Treasury Department, made a report to Secretary Dix, from which the following passages are taken:

New Orleans, Jan. 29, 1861.

SIR,—You are hereby directed to get the United States revenue cutter *McClelland*, now lying here, under way immediately, and proceed with her to New York, where you will await the further instructions of the Secretary of the Treasury. For my authority to make this order you are referred to the letter of the Secretary, dated the 19th inst., and handed you personally by me. Very respectfully,

WM. HEMPHILL JONES, Special Agent.

To Capt. J. G. Breshwood, commanding U. S. Revenue Cutter Robert *McClelland*.

Breshwood conferred with Collector Hatch, of New Orleans, and then returned the following answer, flatly refusing to obey the order:

U. S. Revenue Cutter Robert *McClelland*, New Orleans, January 29, 1861.

SIR,—Your letter, with one of the 19th of January from the Hon. Secretary of the Treasury, I have duly received, and in reply refuse to obey the order. I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN G. BRESHWOOD, Captain.

To Wm. Hemphill Jones, Esq., Special Agent.

Believing that Captain Breshwood would not have ventured upon this most positive act of insubordination and disobedience of his own volition, I waited upon the collector at the custom-house, and had with him a full and free conversation upon the whole subject. In the course of it, Mr. Hatch admitted to me that he had caused the cutter to be brought to the city of New Orleans by an order of his own, dated January 15, so that she might be secured to the State of Louisiana, although at that time the state had not only not seceded, but the Convention had not met, and, in fact, did not meet until eight days afterward. This, I must confess, seemed to me a singular confession for one who at that very time had sworn to do his duty faithfully as an officer of the United States; and, on intimating as much to Mr. Hatch, he excused himself on the ground that in these revolutions all other things must give way to the force of circumstances. Mr. Hatch likewise informed me that the officers of the cutter had long since determined to abandon their allegiance to the United States, and cast their fortunes with the independent State of Louisiana. In order to test the correctness of this statement, I addressed another communication to Captain Breshwood, of the following tenor:

New Orleans, January 29, 1861.

SIR,—By your note of this date I am informed that you refuse to obey the orders of the Honorable Secretary of the Treasury. As, on accepting your commission, you took and subscribed an oath faithfully to discharge your duties to the government, and, as you well know, the law has placed the revenue cutters and their officers under the entire control of the Secretary of the Treasury, I request you to advise me whether you consider yourself at this time an officer in the service of the United States. Very respectfully,

WM. HEMPHILL JONES, Special Agent.

To Captain Breshwood.

cutters were thus lost to the government; but the publication of the intercepted order, a few days afterward, sent an awakening thrill through the public heart in the loyal states, which, after the dull oppression caused by the course of affairs at Washington thus far, was worth ten times the value of the vessels. Dear as his country's flag is to every true-hearted man, it is dearest of all to the citizen of the United States; for it is not only the symbol of his nationality, but the standard under which that nationality was achieved, beneath whose folds the fathers of the Revolution fought, and suffered, and died; and besides, it is the only outward and visible sign with which he, having no hereditary master, can connect his idea of patriotism, to which he can be loyal; it is the representative to him of the government of which he forms a part, of the eternal principles of liberty, and justice, and Divine benevolence upon which that government is founded, and of the noble land of which he ever thinks with love and pride. What the crown, the king, and the flag together are to another man, the flag alone is to the citizen of the republic. It is the rainbow of hope and promise in his sky, and his heart leaps up when he beholds it.<sup>1</sup> So, when Secretary Dix's order was made public, there was an outcry of joy all over the land; it was felt that the honor of the flag had at last found a defender in the government. A second impulse was given to the popular feeling which first broke forth when Major Anderson entered Fort Sumter, and which was to receive its highest exaltation when he was forced to leave it. The shameful fact must needs be recorded here, that both these revenue cutters were purposely brought within the power of the authorities of Alabama and Louisiana, before their secession, by the collectors of Mobile and New Orleans, who were the sworn officers and business agents of the government of the United States.<sup>2</sup> About the same time the Mint and the Sub-treasury of New Orleans, with all the public money they contained, together with private deposits, were seized by the secessionists of that city.

The six Gulf states and South Carolina having now passed Ordinances of Secession, and seized all the national forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, and ships within their reach, a convention of their representatives was held at Montgomery, the capital of Alabama, for the purpose of forming a joint provisional government, or "common agency," to take the place of that from which they had withdrawn themselves and whatever was within their reach. Texas passed its Ordinance of Secession on the 1st of February, and on the 4th the Convention of the seceding states organized itself, with Howell Cobb, only a few months before Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, as president. In four days they had named themselves "The Confederate States of America," adopted a Constitution, and formed a provisional government, of which

Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, was president, and Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, vice-president.

To this letter I never received any reply. I then repaired again on board the cutter, and asked for the order of the collector bringing her to New Orleans. The original was placed in my possession, of which the following is a copy. And here it may be proper to observe that the order is written and signed by the collector himself:

Custom-house, New Orleans, Collector's Office, Jan. 15, 1861.

SIR,—You are hereby directed to proceed forthwith under sail to this city, and anchor the vessel under your command opposite the United States Marine Hospital, above Algiers. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. H. HATCH, Collector.

To Captain J. G. Breshwood, United States Revenue Cutter *McClelland*, Southwest Pass, La.

Defeated at New Orleans, Mr. Jones then took his way to Mobile, to look after the *Lewis Cass*. Her captain (Morrison) could not be found, but Mr. Jones discovered in the cabin the following letter, which explains the surrender of that vessel:

State of Alabama, Collector's Office, Mobile, January 30, 1861.

SIR,—In obedience to an ordinance recently adopted by a convention of the people of Alabama, I have to require you to surrender into my hands, for the use of the state, the revenue cutter *Lewis Cass*, now under your command, together with her armaments, properties, and provisions on board the same. I am instructed also to notify you that you have the option to continue in command of the said revenue cutter, under the authority of the State of Alabama, in the exercise of the same duties that you have hitherto rendered to the United States, and at the same compensation, reporting to this office and to the governor of the state. In surrendering the vessel to the state, you will furnish me with a detailed inventory of its armaments, provisions, and properties of every description. You will receive special instructions from this office in regard to the duties you will be required to perform. I await your immediate reply. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. SANFORD, Collector.

To J. J. Morrison, Esq., Captain Revenue Cutter *Lewis Cass*, Mobile, Ala.

Upon Captain Breshwood's refusal to obey the order of the Secretary of the Treasury, the following telegraphic correspondence ensued:

New Orleans, Jan. 29, 1861.

Hon. J. A. Dix, Secretary of the Treasury: Capt. Breshwood has refused positively, in writing, to obey any instructions of the department. In this I am sure he is sustained by the collector, and believe acts by his advice. What must I do?

W. H. JONES, Special Agent.

To this dispatch Secretary Dix immediately returned the following answer, before published: Treasury Department, Jan. 29, 1861.

W. Hemphill Jones, New Orleans:

Tell Lieut. Caldwell to arrest Capt. Breshwood, assume command of the cutter, and obey the order through you. If Capt. Breshwood, after arrest, undertakes to interfere with the command of the cutter, tell Lieut. Caldwell to consider him as a mutineer, and treat him accordingly. If any one attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot.

JOHN A. DIX, Secretary of the Treasury.



Probably no better choice of men for president and vice-president of the rebellious confederacy could have been made if as many months as there were days had been spent in the selection. Jefferson Davis was not a statesman, not even a high-toned politician; but he was a cool, astute, adroit political manager. He was not a man of either great military capacity or acquirement; but he was a good soldier, and a daring, determined commander. His temperament fitted him for such a bad eminence as that to which he had been raised, and it seemed as if his whole life had been but a training to fit him for its functions. Born in Kentucky in 1808, he had been brought up in Mississippi, of which state his father, a planter and a Revolutionary officer, became a resident while it was yet mere territory of the United States. He was thus familiar from his earliest youth with the men of the Southwest, where were gathered the most desperate, lawless, loose-lived of the citizens of the republic. During his youth, and long after he had entered vigorous manhood, New Orleans was the social sink of the Union, and Vicksburg but a by-way to the bottomless pit. Toward that corner of the Union, swept down by the resistless current of commerce, emigration, and adventure flowing between the banks of three mighty rivers, tended all the scum and sediment of an ever-moving population, to seethe and fret, in a vitiated tropical atmosphere, into moral pestilence. Parents in the well-ordered, well-instructed, God-fearing commonwealths of the North and East, whose sons went thither upon commercial ventures, saw not even in rapidly-accumulated wealth a recompense for the contamination of the very few years that sufficed to acquire it; and, parting with them, almost gave them up as lost. There both life and fortune were held by precarious tenure. There gambling was the general occupation, and bloody assault the social distinction of a "gentleman." There drunkenness, in a greater or less degree, was regarded as the normal condition of any creature who had intelligence above the brute; though a lapse into sobriety, when palliated by the temptations of great gain, was looked upon as venial. There a dialect of ingenious and elaborate blasphemy, half-savage slang, and abominable filth was made tolerably intelligible to strangers, who were accustomed only to the ordinary phraseology of the English race, by the occasional introduction of words of which necessity and the idioms of our language compelled the use. There statute law and common law were rarely enforced, except against an oppressed and degraded race; but the judgments of Lynch courts were pronounced with incorruptible austerity, and executed with inexorable certainty and swiftness. Such was the general tone of society in Mississippi and the surrounding country during the first thirty or forty years of this century; but above this general level, yet descending occasionally to it and resting upon it, was a small class of planters, who, with a very few professional men, and merchants of the more honorable sort, possessed all the little moral worth and intellectual culture of the region; and to this Mr. Davis belonged. But in such a community—a community whose moral sense was blunted by the presence of a class whom every member of every other class might oppress with impunity—even the men whose motives were just and whose tastes more or less refined, were obliged to maintain their position by a certain conformity to the social habits, and a certain assumption of the defiant bearing, of the men around them. Few men can live from early youth to mature manhood among desperadoes without acquiring something of their desperation—at least a familiarity with desperate issues. Among such a people Jefferson Davis passed his life until he went in 1824 as a cadet to West Point. Thence he graduated with honor in 1828, and was, at his own request, assigned immediately to active service with Colonel Zachary Taylor, afterward general and president, but then engaged in frontier warfare at the West. On the rough and adventurous battle-field of the borders, the future insurgent leader so quickly distinguished himself that upon the formation of a new regiment of cavalry he obtained in it his commission as first lieutenant, in which position he did good service against the Indians, and, it is said, made a warm friend of the well-known chief Black Hawk while he was held a prisoner of war. After seven years of active frontier service Mr. Davis resigned his commission, and in 1835 became a cotton-planter in Mississippi, diversifying the dull routine of Southern agricultural life with political studies. When the Democratic party nominated Mr. Polk for president, Mr. Davis canvassed, or "stumped" the state on his behalf, was made presidential elector to vote for him, and in 1845 was elected a member of the House of Representatives, where he soon proved himself in debate an active and energetic supporter of the measures of his party. He took his place in the front rank of the extreme advocates of slavery and state sovereignty. Upon the breaking out of the Mexican war he was elected colonel of a Mississippi rifle regiment, and resigned his seat in Congress for a post of honor in the field. Here he again distinguished himself by his coolness and determination, and at the battle of Buena Vista rendered such efficient service at the head of his regiment, where he remained throughout the day, though badly wounded, that General Taylor praised his conduct highly in his dispatches. His term of service having expired, he returned home, but was met on his way by a commission as brigadier general of volunteers, sent to him by President Polk. Almost any other man would have at once accepted such an honor. But here was an opportunity for an exhibition of a sort of perverse, pertinacious consistency in pushing the doctrine of state sovereignty to the last extreme, and of giving a civil rebuff to the government at Washington. Colonel Davis had been commissioned as a Mississippi volunteer; and, although he was in the service of the United States, under command of a general in the regular army of the United States, and paid by the United States, he was yet not to be insulted as a Mississippian by being made a general of brigade by the President of the United States; and so he declined the commission, on the ground that its bestowal was an infraction—well meant and pardonable, perhaps, but still

an infraction—of the sovereignty of the "republic" of Mississippi!—a poor, struggling, debt-repudiating commonwealth, created by an act of Congress of the United States, and sparsely peopled by such emigrants as could best be spared from the older commonwealths of the same great nation. But still, ridiculous as it was, Mr. Davis made his point.

One of Mississippi's senatorial chairs at Washington being casually vacant in 1847, Mr. Davis was appointed by the governor of the state to fill it; and this he did so much to the satisfaction of his constituents that he was twice re-elected to the same position. In the Senate-chamber he attained the reputation of a ready, dexterous, and fearless debater, and a clear-headed, energetic man of business. His views of the superiority of state authority to that of the central government grew stronger as he grew older. It was in the nature of the man that they should. His notions of state responsibility for pecuniary obligation were brought into unpleasant notoriety during his senatorship by the position which he took in regard to the repudiation of her bonds by Mississippi. This he defended, and his sneer at "the crocodile tears which had been shed over ruined creditors" excited sorrow at home and indignation abroad.<sup>3</sup> In 1851 he resigned his seat in the Senate to be nominated Governor of Mississippi as the representative of the party in that state which held his principles; but, having been defeated by Henry S. Foote, the candidate of the Union party, he retired into private life for a year. In 1852 he electioneered for Mr. Pierce, the successful presidential candidate of the Democratic party, who acknowledged his services and his capacity by calling him into his cabinet as Secretary of War. In his new position he showed great activity and energy. He added to the coast defenses, improved the manufacture of arms and ammunition, and introduced the French light infantry tactics—wrongly styled Hardee's—into the army. Leaving the cabinet when Mr. Buchanan entered the White House, he returned to the Senate-chamber, where he remained until the Ordinance of Secession was passed by Mississippi, when, his doctrines of state sovereignty having accomplished the purpose for which they were devised, in compliance with them, he withdrew.

Mr. Davis owes his position purely to intellectual ability and to tenacity of purpose. He is not, like Toombs, a boaster and a bully of the fire-eating school; but he has a cool and almost serene audacity, which accomplishes his ends at least as effectually as noisier methods, and in a manner much better suited to his taste and his temperament. His nature is not rich, his soul not magnanimous, or his mind either strong or subtle. He influences men neither by convincing nor by winning them. His talent is that of clear perception; his power, that of nervous energy; and these are directed by an inflexible will. While other men pause over their scruples, and endeavor to reconcile their purpose and their conscience, he strikes directly at success. Devoid alike of enthusiasm and of sentiment, he yet knows the exaltation of entire commitment to a great purpose. His body is spare; his brain large; his face attenuated and purely intellectual in expression; his manner placid and precise, but decided. He could not have aroused the storm of insurrection, but he is just the man to guide its destructive energies.

In his character and his career, the man who was elected to the second place in the insurgent provisional government is very unlike him who holds the first. Alexander H. Stephens was born in Georgia in 1812, of parents in very humble life. Deprived, alike by the poverty of his family and the polity of his state, of the means of obtaining that grammar-school education which no child in the free states need ever be without, his career might have been obscure (it could not have been dishonorable or mean) had not the quickness of his parts attracted the attention of observant friends, who kindly supported him at school and at college, and during the first struggles of a professional career. He was admitted to the bar, and soon fully justified the judgment of his benefactors. It was not many years before he was able to gratify that love of home which distinguishes the English race no less in America than in Great Britain, and repurchased the small plantation of two hundred and fifty acres on which he was born, and which had necessarily been sold on his father's death. The possessor of such a freehold as Mr. Stephens's father had owned, in almost any other country than the slave states of America, would not have been without the means of sending his boy to school; but there, the children of men who, without capital either in money or in slaves, till so comparatively small a tract, wander about barefooted and bareheaded, and are given up to low associations. From 1837 to 1842 Mr. Stephens was a member of the Georgia Legislature, and in 1848 he was elected to the House of Representatives as a candidate of the old Whig party; but when that party, shaken to its already undermined foundation by the early throes of the convulsion which was to upheave the nation, fell into ruin, he took refuge in the Union wing of Southern Democracy. Of feeble frame, wasted by disease, and with a voice like the shrill pipe of an adolescent lad, which, indeed, he almost seemed to be, he yet soon attained distinction in Congress as a sound thinker, a skillful and eloquent debater, and a clear-headed, hard-working committee-man. His character, both as a politician and a man, is above reproach: the purity of his motives has never been impeached by friend or foe. It was as a lawyer, a legislator, and an orator that he won his reputation. He has no executive ability, or power to lead men into action. The east of his mind is deliberative and argumentative. As we have already seen, he resisted secession to the very last; but when his state, or the majority of its residents, passed an Ordinance of Secession, he submitted; and, bound hand and foot by the doctrine of state sovereignty, was delivered over into the hands of the very faction whom he had so ably and so courageously opposed. They

<sup>3</sup> See his letter to the *Washington Union*, and the just animadversions upon it in the *London Times* of July 13th, 1849.





ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS.

*Constitution of the Confederate States.*

The Preamble reads as follows:

"We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent states of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, invoking the favor of Almighty God, do hereby, in behalf of these states, ordain and establish this Constitution for the provisional government of the same, to continue one year from the inauguration of the President, or until a permanent constitution or confederation between the said states shall be put in operation, whichever shall first occur."

The seventh section, first article, is as follows:

"The importation of African negroes from any foreign country other than the slaveholding states of the United States is hereby forbidden, and Congress is required to pass such laws as shall effectually prevent the same."

Article second: "Congress shall also have power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any state not a member of this confederacy."

Article fourth of the third clause of the second section says:

"A slave in one state escaping to another shall be delivered up, on the claim of the party to whom said slave may belong, by the executive authority of the state in which such slave may be found; and in case of any abduction or forcible rescue, full compensation, including the value of the slave, and all costs and expenses, shall be made to the party by the state in which such abduction or rescue shall take place."

INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF JEFFERSON DAVIS.

Gentlemen of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, Friends and Fellow-Citizens: Called to the difficult and responsible station of chief executive of the provisional government which you have instituted, I approach the discharge of the duties assigned me with an humble distrust of my abilities, but with a sustaining confidence in the wisdom of those who are to guide and aid me in the administration of public affairs, and an abiding faith in the virtue and patriotism of the people. Looking forward to the speedy establishment of a permanent government to take the place of this, and which, by its greater moral and physical power, will be better able to combat with the many difficulties which arise from the conflicting interests of separate nations, I enter upon the duties of the office to which I have been chosen with the hope that the beginning of our career as a confederacy may not be obstructed by hostile opposition to our enjoyment of the separate existence and independence which we have asserted, and which, with the blessing of Providence, we intend to maintain.

Our present condition, achieved in a manner unprecedented in the history of nations, illustrates the American idea that governments rest upon the consent of the governed, and that it is the right of the people to alter and abolish governments whenever they become destructive to the ends for which they were established. The declared compact of the Union, from which we have withdrawn, was to establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity; and when, in the judgment of the sovereign states now composing this confederacy, it has been perverted from the purposes for which it was ordained, and ceased to answer the ends for which it was established, a peaceful appeal to the ballot-box declared that, so far as they were concerned, the

made him vice-president, and he did not feel at liberty to resist their will. By the election of these two men, the insurgent leaders appealed directly to both classes of the people whose fortunes they had taken into their hands. The election of Jefferson Davis satisfied entirely the fire-eaters and uncompromising secessionists; and that of Mr. Stephens attracted to the new government the men of moderate views, who were still attached to the Union. Each man, too, was put into his proper place: the former where his varied experience of life, his military knowledge, and his executive ability would be called into play; the latter into a nominally executive office of all but the highest rank, but where his duties were really to preside over the deliberations of a legislative body. Soon after his elevation to this office he delivered a speech which was even more remarkable than that in which he endeavored to stay the movement toward secession, and to which there will be occasion to refer hereafter. Could reason, sanctioned by the character and upborne by the influence of a blameless and beloved man, have checked the madness of secession, Mr. Stephens's first effort would have checked it; but that proving impossible, he lent the same mental gifts and the same personal beauty of character to the support and adornment of a cause which he had not at heart.

With regard to a Constitution, the labors of the Convention were light and short: they adopted the Constitution of the United States with a very few variations. Of these, two only—the admission of absolute state sovereignty, involving the formation of the new government by states and not by the whole people, and the recognition of slavery as normal throughout the confederation—were the only radical differences between the new Constitution and that from which its framers had revolted.\* And as to the last, it worked no practical change, because the absolute inviolability of slavery, as of every other local institution not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, was secured by that instrument itself. Thus their very organic law became a witness forever against those men who had undertaken the destruction of that which the vice-president of their confederation himself called "the most beneficent government the world ever saw." It showed that the reason of their rebellion was, not that they were in danger of losing any political right or personal privilege, not that they were in danger of becoming slaves, or even that their slaves were in danger of becoming free men, but merely that the interest of slavery had ceased to be dominant in the republic. Unanimity of feeling and unity of action marked the proceedings of this Convention, and of the government which was formed by it, though not of the people of whose destinies it had assumed control. But the government none the less exhibited immediately that promptness and decision which had marked the movements of the insurgent leaders from the very first. On the 18th of February Jefferson Davis was inaugurated provisional president;†

government created by that compact should cease to exist. In this they merely asserted the right which the Declaration of Independence of 1776 defined to be inalienable. Of the time and occasion of its exercise they, as sovereigns, were the final judges, each for itself. The impartial, enlightened verdict of mankind will vindicate the rectitude of our conduct, and He who knows the hearts of men will judge of the sincerity with which we labored to preserve the government of our fathers in its spirit.

The right solemnly proclaimed at the birth of the states, and which has been affirmed and reaffirmed in the Bills of Rights of the states subsequently admitted into the Union of 1789, undeniably recognizes in the people the power to resume the authority delegated for the purposes of government. Thus the sovereign states here represented proceeded to form this confederacy; and it is by the abuse of language that their act has been denominated revolution. They formed a new alliance, but within each state its government has remained. The rights of person and property have not been disturbed. The agent through whom they communicated with foreign nations is changed, but this does not necessarily interrupt their international relations. Sustained by the consciousness that the transition from the former Union to the present confederacy has not proceeded from a disregard, on our part, of our just obligations, or any failure to perform every constitutional duty, moved by no interest or passion to invade the rights of others, anxious to cultivate peace and commerce with all nations, if we may not hope to avoid war, we may at least expect that posterity will acquit us of having needlessly engaged in it. Doubly justified by the absence of wrong on our part, and by wanton aggression on the part of others, there can be no cause to doubt that the courage and patriotism of the people of the Confederate States will be found equal to any measures of defense which soon their security may require.

An agricultural people, whose chief interest is the export of a commodity required in every manufacturing country, our true policy is peace, and the freest trade which our necessities will permit. It is alike our interest, and that of all those to whom we would sell and from whom we would buy, that there should be the fewest practicable restrictions upon the interchange of commodities. There can be but little rivalry between ours and any manufacturing or navigating community, such as the Northeastern states of the American Union. It must follow, therefore, that mutual interest would invite good-will and kind offices. If, however, passion or lust of dominion should cloud the judgment or inflame the ambition of those states, we must prepare to meet the emergency, and maintain by the final arbitrament of the sword the position which we have assumed among the nations of the earth.

We have entered upon a career of independence, and it must be inflexibly pursued through many years of controversy with our late associates of the Northern states. We have vainly endeavored to secure tranquillity and obtain respect for the rights to which we were entitled. As a necessity, not a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separation, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity of the confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us peaceably to pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will have been fulfilled. But if this be denied



and by the 20th he had formed his cabinet, in which Mr. Toombs had the Department of State, Mr. Memminger that of the Treasury, and Mr. Pope Walker that of War. Thus, in three months and two weeks from the election in which the people of these seven states had taken part, they had been hurried into secession, had been provided, by the summary process of seizure, with fifteen forts, an immense amount of arms and ammunition, large sums of money and several armed vessels, had drilled thousands of troops, had a Constitution and a provisional government bestowed upon them, which government had put its administrative machinery in working order. In fact, nearly all these things were ready at their hand; they had only, as individuals, as states, or through a "common agency," to take them. An insurrection under like favorable circumstances the world never saw before.

The insurgent government found itself, however, not only jealously regarded by some of the most important slave states, but with a large and outspoken opposition in some of the very states by which it had been formed. From the small state of Delaware little aid could have been expected, and hope of that little was entirely given up on account of that state's unqualified devotion to the republic. Maryland and Kentucky were loyal by very large majorities. The former was under loyal rule; and, although the governor of the latter (Magoffin) was a secessionist, his hands were so tied by his constituents that he could not yet give any aid to the insurgent cause. Attempts to force Tennessee into rebellion had failed; and in the eastern part of the state the whole population was devoted to the Union. Of the people of Missouri a large majority also were unwavering in their allegiance to the Constitution and the flag. Virginia was busying herself to bring about a compromise and a restoration of the power of the government by amendments to the Constitution, and to that end she made propositions to South Carolina, who spurned them in a series of resolutions, one of which was, "That the separation of South Carolina from the federal Union was final, and she has no farther interest in the Constitution of the United States." In South Carolina there appeared to be almost an entire unanimity of feeling. There were many who were still loyal, but they comparatively were so few in number that they were quite overborne and practically extinguished. Only one man of them felt that his position warranted him in speaking out his loyalty. The name of John S. Pettigru, a venerable and much-esteemed resident of Charleston, where he gracefully occupied the highest social position, will always be held in honor as the one faithful among the many faithless to the republic in that city. The rector of the Episcopal church at which he was an attendant having, after the act of secession, omitted the President of the United States from the Collect for rulers and all in authority, Mr. Pettigru rose and left the church, thus silently protesting in the face of the congregation against the omission. It is said that only the veneration in which he was held secured him impunity in this opposition to the seceding party; but it is much to be deplored that all who were like-minded with him throughout the slave states were not, like him, bold and constant in their assertion of their loyalty and their love for the republic. The course of events would thereby have been greatly changed. But in other states of the new confederacy there was not only devotion to the Union, but speech and action in its support. When, after the Louisiana Convention had passed the Ordinance of Secession, her senators, John Slidell and Judah P. Benjamin, withdrew from Congress with insult and defiance on their lips, one of her delegates to the House of Representatives, John E. Bouligny, declared in his place that he would not withdraw, and that he would live by and die for the flag under which he was born. In Frankfort, Alabama, the state in which was the capital of the rebel confederacy, a meeting was held at which not only was a resolution passed sustaining the delegates of that district in their refusal to sign the Ordinance of Secession, but it was declared that secession was "inexpedient and unnecessary," that those present were "opposed to it in any form," and that "the refusal to submit the so-called Secession Ordinance to the decision of the people was an outrage upon their rights and liberty, and manifested a spirit of assumption, unfairness, and dictatorship." And, finally, it was resolved, that if the congressional nominee of those who took part in these proceedings were elected, he should represent them "in the United States Congress, and not in the Congress of this so-called 'Southern Confederacy.'"<sup>6</sup> In Georgia itself, and in the very capital of the state, a leading journal, assuming, of course, to speak strongly in

the Southern interest, openly opposed the union of the fortunes of the state to "a confederacy of disorganizing charlatans" and "chimerical schemers;" admitted that the greatest danger to the new confederacy was threatened, not from the North, but from its own people; and warned its readers that indications were daily growing stronger that "organized, if not armed opposition to the new order of things might arise in states or parts of Southern states not vitally interested in the slavery question." Other manifestations of the same kind appeared in various quarters of the confederacy; and on the floor of Congress, in both houses, many members, chiefly from Virginia, Maryland, and Kentucky, uttered boldly their devotion to the fortunes of the republic. But in the Legislature of North Carolina, where no Ordinance of Secession had yet been passed, and not even a convention called, a most significant resolution was unanimously adopted. It was declared that if reconciliation failed, North Carolina would go with the other slave states. This was a hardly needed indication of the line of policy to be pursued by the insurgent leaders, if they would strengthen their confederation by the accession of all the slave states. So, while within their own states intimidation, intrigue, social exclusion, and all possible moral and physical forces were brought to bear with increased urgency upon those who opposed secession, a belligerent attitude was at once assumed toward the government of the United States, in order, as we shall see, to make reconciliation speedily appear impossible, that thus the movement of the halting Northern slave states toward secession might be quickened. Enticements of a peculiar kind were also spread before the people of those states. The importation of negro slaves, except from the slaveholding states in the Union, was forbidden in the Constitution, which also, in the next section, gave the Confederate Congress power to prohibit the introduction of slaves from any state not a member of the confederacy. Thus foreign prejudices were conciliated by the forbidding of the African slave-trade, and the old market was still offered to Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, for the slaves they bred; while, at the same time, the power to exclude any one of them from that market, unless they joined the confederacy, was held up in terror over them. The rebel Congress also immediately passed an act declaring the navigation of the Mississippi free. This was addressed to Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, and to the free states upon the great river and the Ohio, in the hope of detaching their interest from that of the Eastern and Middle states, and thus weakening the power of the government at Washington.

Meantime, arming, and the seizing of arms, and the betrayal of forts and armed vessels, went on almost as matters of course in the seceded states, and in some of those which had not seceded. On the 8th of February the United States Arsenal at Little Rock, containing 9000 muskets, 40 cannon, and a large supply of ammunition, was seized in the name of the people of Arkansas, who had not yet declared their separation from the Union. In Texas a more important surrender was accompanied by circumstances much more disgraceful to all concerned in it, and to the cause in the interest of which it was made. The troops in that state were under the command of Brigadier General David E. Twiggs, to whose custody were also committed the forts and all the military property of the United States in that department. General Twiggs had served creditably in Mexico, but with no particular distinction, and had attained his rank in the regular course of promotion. He was supposed to be at least a man of personal honor and integrity; but, availing himself of his position, and the trust which had been placed in him, he, not being threatened by an overwhelming force, delivered all the army posts under his command, together with all the other property in his keeping, into the hands of the rebellious authorities of Texas. Property worth over a million and a half of dollars, exclusive of the forts and public buildings, for which he was responsible as a man, aside from his military oath, was by his treachery lost to the United States. He, of course, expected his connection with the army of the United States to cease; but he was not permitted to resign, as many officers had been before him: an order for his ignominious expulsion from the army was issued immediately upon the receipt of proper information by the government at Washington. But he did not find all his subordinates ready to obey the orders by which he betrayed his trust. Captain Hill, who was in command of Fort Brown, refused to surrender that post, and made preparations to defend it; but, finally, as it appeared that it could not be held by the force under his com-

us, and the integrity of our territory and jurisdiction be assailed, it will but remain for us with firm resolve to appeal to arms, and invoke the blessing of Providence on a just cause.

As a consequence of our new condition, and with a view to meet anticipated wants, it will be necessary to provide a speedy and efficient organization of the branches of the executive department having special charge of foreign intercourse, finance, military affairs, and postal service. For purposes of defense the Confederate States may, under ordinary circumstances, rely mainly upon their militia; but it is deemed advisable, in the present condition of affairs, that there should be a well-instructed, disciplined army, more numerous than would usually be required on a peace establishment. I also suggest that, for the protection of our harbors and commerce on the high seas, a navy adapted to those objects will be required. These necessities have, doubtless, engaged the attention of Congress.

With a Constitution differing only from that of our fathers in so far as it is explanatory of their well known intent, freed from sectional conflicts, which have interfered with the pursuit of the general welfare, it is not unreasonable to expect that the states from which we have recently parted may seek to unite their fortunes to ours, under the government which we have instituted. For this your Constitution makes adequate provision, but beyond this, if I mistake not, the judgment and will of the people are, that union with the states from which they have separated is neither practicable nor desirable. To increase the power, develop the resources, and promote the happiness of the confederacy, it is requisite there should be so much homogeneity that the welfare of every portion would be the aim of the whole. Where this does not exist, antagonisms are engendered which must and should result in separation.

Actuated solely by a desire to preserve our own rights and to promote our own welfare, the separation of the Confederate States has been marked by no aggression upon others, and followed by no domestic convulsion. Our industrial pursuits have received no check, the cultivation of our fields progresses as heretofore, and even should we be involved in war there would be no considerable diminution in the production of the staples which have constituted our exports, in which the commercial world has an interest scarcely less than our own. This common interest of producer and consumer can only be intercepted by an exterior force which should obstruct its transmission to foreign markets, a course of conduct which would be detrimental to manufacturing and commercial interests abroad.

Should reason guide the action of the government from which we have separated, a policy so detrimental to the civilized world, the Northern states included, could not be dictated by even a stronger desire to inflict injury upon us; but if it be otherwise, a terrible responsibility will rest upon it, and the suffering of millions will bear testimony to the folly and wickedness of our aggressors. In the mean time there will remain to us, besides the ordinary remedies before suggested, the well-known resources for retaliation upon the commerce of an enemy.

Experience in public stations of a subordinate grade to which your kindness has conferred has taught me that care, and toil, and disappointments are the price of official elevation. You will see many errors to forgive, many deficiencies to tolerate; but you shall not find in me either want of zeal or fidelity to the cause that is to me the highest in hope and of most enduring affection. Your generosity has bestowed upon me an undeserved distinction, one which I neither sought nor desired. Upon the continuance of that sentiment, and upon your wisdom and patriotism, I rely to direct and support me in the performance of the duties required at my hands.

We have changed the constituent parts, but not the system of our government. The Constitution formed by our fathers is that of these Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the judicial construction it has received, we have a light which reveals its true meaning. Thus instructed as to the just interpretation of that instrument, and ever remembering that all offices are but trusts held for the people, and that delegated powers are to be strictly construed, I will hope, by due diligence in the performance of my duties, though I may disappoint your expectation, yet to retain, when retiring, something of the good-will and confidence which will welcome my entrance into office.

It is joyous in the midst of perilous times to look around upon a people united in heart, when one purpose of high resolve animates and actuates the whole, where the sacrifices to be made are not weighed in the balance against honor, right, liberty, and equality. Obstacles may retard, but they can not long prevent the progress of a movement sanctioned by its justice and sustained by a virtuous people. Reverently let us invoke the God of our fathers to guide and protect us in our efforts to perpetuate the principles which by His blessing they were able to vindicate, establish, and transmit to their posterity; and with a continuance of His favor ever gratefully acknowledged, we may hopefully look forward to success, to peace, to prosperity.

<sup>6</sup> Report in the *North Alabamian*, Tusculum.

<sup>7</sup> *Angusta Sentinel*.





DAVID Z. TWIGGS.

mand, he yielded it in a manner entirely honorable to himself both as a man and a soldier. The promptness and direct movement toward success which marked the rebel administration of affairs was shown in regard to the United States soldiers thus left without orders and without barracks in Texas. Mr. Davis, hardly well seated in a presidential chair hardly set up, wrote through his Secretary of War to the Texas Convention that these soldiers should be allowed a reasonable time to leave the territory of the confederacy (of which, it should be observed, Texas was not yet a member, as her Ordinance of Secession was only to go into effect on the 2d of March, after confirmation by the people); but that, should the United States government refuse to withdraw them, "all the powers of the Southern confederacy should be used to expel them."

But it was in another quarter, and under the administration of another president of the United States that Mr. Davis was first to use the powers of his confederacy to expel the troops and the flag of the United States from the borders of a seceded state. The beleaguered, but not yet completely invested fort in Charleston Harbor was still the cynosure of all eyes. Mr. Buchanan did nothing, and was plainly determined to do nothing for its relief; deeming, apparently, the nation's honor and his own abundantly satisfied if he could slink away from Washington while Major Anderson's flag was flying. Major Anderson took care that he should have that satisfaction. But a man was on his way to the capital, all unconscious that his way was sore beset, who could not be so easily contented.

On the 13th of February, in presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives, assembled in the chamber of the latter body, John C. Breckinridge, Vice-president of the United States, after opening and reading before them the certificates of election from all the states of the Union, declared that Abraham Lincoln had been duly elected President, and Hannibal Hamlin Vice-president of the United States for the term beginning

March 4th, 1861. Probably no political event ever occurred more significant and peculiar in all its circumstances. The unpracticed politician, and, till then, almost unknown man, who was thus declared the constitutionally elected chief magistrate of the republic, had been raised to that high office by a party which owed its very existence to the opposition awakened by a measure which had been brought forward by his principal opponent as his own stepping-stone to the highest position in the country. By his Kansas Bill Mr. Douglas made Mr. Lincoln President of the United States. The man also who, in the performance of his duty, declared him constitutionally elected, was his next most powerful opponent, as the candidate and representative of a faction who had predetermined to make that election the occasion of breaking in pieces the government of which they had so long had almost absolute control. If Mr. Douglas and Mr. Breckinridge met that day, it must have been as difficult for them as for two Roman augurs to look each other in the face without a smile—a smile no less rueful than subdued.

At this time Mr. Lincoln was in Springfield, Illinois, where his modest and almost humble home had become the shrine of political pilgrimage. He was beset by cabinet-makers, would-be ministers, office-seekers of a lower rank, political meddlers of all kinds, and newsmongers of all grades. Unasked advice was poured out upon him without stint; and from some quarters came importunate calls for a declaration of the policy of his coming administration. It was thought by many that if he announced a determination not to interfere with slavery, to respect the rights of local law and local custom, and to abide by the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the progress of the rebellion would be crippled, if not entirely checked. But these expectations were not well founded. For, as it afterward appeared, such a declaration would have been without effect upon the leaders of secession in the seven states which had declared themselves no longer part of the republic; and the subsequent accession to their force from the remaining slave states was brought about, as we shall see, not by any apprehensions that the new administration would seek to disturb the relations between the negro slaves and their masters, but by a determination to insist upon the extension of slavery, and to defend the preposterous principle of state sovereignty.

Mr. Lincoln issued no declaration, but preferred that his future should be conjectured from his past. He busied himself in preparation for the momentous duties which would be laid upon him in the first hour after he had sworn as President to "defend the Constitution of the United States." Meanwhile steps were taken with the desperate intention of excluding him from the presidential chair, at the cost, if necessary, of his life and the lives of many others. As the 4th of March approached, some of the most violent of the secessionists (who swarmed in all the principal cities of the North) said, menacingly, that he would never be inaugurated; and bets were offered and accepted that he would never be in power at Washington:—accepted freely; for these threats were looked upon as empty bluster, the spiteful words of men accustomed to talk without restraint, and who were now smarting under a political defeat, and irritated by a prospective loss of power and patronage. They were, in fact, entirely disregarded, because it was not supposed for a moment that people who had declared that they had no connection with the government at Washington, and no interest in it, would think of attacking a place in which they were deprived of no rights, and from which they were not threatened. As to any other mode of preventing the inauguration, none could be thought of in the free states; and the slaveholders sojourning at the North, when asked how Mr. Lincoln could be deterred from assuming the office to which he had been elected, made no definite answer. They knew more than their querists dreamed they did; and the rebellion, still regarded as a passing political turmoil by the larger part of the people at the North, had already assumed a desperate phase and a bloody purpose, almost beyond the comprehension of the peace-loving, law-abiding people against whose constitutional rights and political interests it was directed. From the beginning, the leaders and principal actors in the rebellion added to the great advantages gained by base and wide-spread treachery, that of an entire readiness, if not a foregone determination, to do, with an utter recklessness of all consequences, except their own success, that which the government and the loyal people did not suppose that they would venture to do, or even think of doing. No one save themselves suspected how remorselessly they were in earnest.

But, although such was the general misapprehension of the spirit and the purposes of the rebellion, some men were sufficiently alarmed to take measures of precaution. The chairman of a railway company, over whose road the President elect was sure to pass, was waited upon by a lady who had



traveled through much of the South on a mission of mercy, and who told him that in the course of her journeys she had seen at least twenty thousand men under arms, and that she had become convinced that there was a conspiracy to seize upon Washington and prevent Mr. Lincoln's inauguration. Listened to with incredulity at first, in spite of the respect which her character and experience demanded, her anxiety finally produced such an impression upon the gentleman that he sent a proper messenger to Lieutenant General Scott to put him upon his guard, yet was inclined to apologize for calling his attention to such vague and extravagant apprehensions. What was his surprise to learn in reply from General Scott that he had for some time been quite sure of the existence of some such conspiracy; that he had made the proper representations to President Buchanan and to others, but that he was listened to with incredulity, and was absolutely powerless. Upon this, measures were at once taken to ferret out the truth. Detectives were employed, and placed upon the line of the railway in question near Baltimore and Washington. They soon discovered that the soldier's fears, no less than the lady's, were more than justified. They found volunteer military companies drilling at various points along the road, which they soon saw were composed entirely of men of the extreme slavery-secession faction, although they professed to be strong Union men. To these companies they joined themselves in the assumed character of Southern and Southwestern men of like principles and purposes, and then learned that the object of their formation was the proffer of their services to the directors of the railway as an escort to Mr. Lincoln at some convenient point of the road, where, having secured entire control of it for a sufficient time, they would kill Mr. Lincoln, and, if necessary, the whole party which accompanied him; they being determined and prepared to destroy, at some bridge or other fit place, the whole train in which he was a passenger, should that be needful to the attainment of their object. Similar investigations set on foot in Baltimore, by other persons whose suspicions had been excited, revealed a similar conspiracy in that city. The detectives were engaged three weeks in obtaining a full revelation of the designs of the plotters there. But they discovered, and themselves became seemingly a part of, a body of men well organized with the fell purpose that if the President elect survived to enter Baltimore, he should not leave it alive. They were to mingle with the shouting crowd which would be sure to surround his carriage on his arrival, to prolong and increase the excitement, and, in the confusion, to thrust themselves forward as overzealous friends, and thus get near enough to put him surely to death with pistols and hand-grenades. In the first moments of surprise and alarm they could easily escape, and a vessel was to be ready to transport them immediately to safety within the limits of the confederacy in whose interests, if not by whose procurement, the diabolical scheme was concocted. Of course, the immediate actors in this intended slaughter were of the baser sort; but it was discovered that men of wealth, and social position, and political influence countenanced and supported it. The plot was a good one, and, owing to the informal, democratic, and over-confident habits of the country, easy of execution, had it not been detected.

Mr. Lincoln, as unsuspecting as every one of his constituents who was not fully informed, left Springfield on the 11th of February for Washington; and, after the inevitable series of congratulations and speech-makings on the route, arrived at Philadelphia on the 21st of the month. There he first learned the designs upon his life from the detective who had been principally instrumental in discovering them in Baltimore. Late in the evening of the same day a special messenger from General Scott and Mr. Seward—Mr. Seward's son—roused him from his bed with an earnest warning. Deeply impressed as Mr. Lincoln was by such monitions, received through such channels, he yet refused to abandon an engagement to be present at Independence Hall in Philadelphia on the morning of the next day—Washington's birthday—and one to meet the Legislature of Pennsylvania at Harrisburg in the afternoon; but, these fulfilled, he consented to abandon his original plan, and go immediately and privately to Washington. The day passed off without any incident worthy of remark, except that some attention was attracted by Mr. Lincoln's declaration in his speech at Independence Hall that, rather than abandon the principles of the Declaration of Independence, he would be "assassinated upon that spot." But this was regarded merely as a strong and not very happily phrased asseveration. The interview at Harrisburg with the Legislature of Pennsylvania being over, Mr. Lincoln placed himself in the hands of his friends, and retired to his hotel, assuming, by advice, an air of extreme fatigue, which his constant traveling and speaking made very natural. At about 6 o'clock in the evening he was conveyed in a close carriage to a special train, which started instantly for Philadelphia, and at the same time all the telegraph wires leading from the city were cut. With him the president of the road sent a trusty and intelligent confidential agent known as "George," whose authority was recognized by all the servants of the company, and who bore with him a large package of "dispatches," about which he seemed very anxious, and which was the alleged reason of sending the special train. At Philadelphia the party took the regular train, which they found waiting, and into which they quietly stepped just as it was starting. The detective was on the train, but "George" still considered himself in charge, and was astounded and alarmed soon after the train was under way by being accosted reproachfully by the engine-driver for not telling him that "Lincoln was on board." George instantly saw that his only way was to trust his friend, and replied, "Yes, he is on board." "Well," said the other, with a look of serious apprehension and determination, "now we have him, we must put him through." His own observation had led him to suspect the designs of the people along the road, and he felt that he carried Cæsar and his fortunes. Oddly enough, however, the man whom he supposed to

be the President elect was not he, but quite another person. The train passed swiftly through the perils prepared for the morrow, and Mr. Lincoln arrived at Washington about daybreak on the 23d of February. The telegraph wires had been united again, and George sent back the message, "The dispatches have arrived, and are safely delivered."<sup>8</sup>

Although the knowledge of this conspiracy had been confined to those who were concerned in it and those who had detected it, the fact that Maryland was the only slave state through which Mr. Lincoln was obliged to pass on his way to Washington, and the well-known riotous character of the baser part of the people of Baltimore, had made his reception in that city a subject of special interest. The Republicans of the place were counseled by the authorities to abandon their intention of receiving Mr. Lincoln with the honors due to a President elect, which they were told "would certainly produce a disturbance of the most violent and dangerous character to the President and all who were with him." They prudently followed the advice. On the evening of the 22d a Baltimore newspaper published an article calculated to produce an attack on Mr. Lincoln, who was to arrive there on the 23d, and the marshal of the city placed an unusually large body of the police under orders, to be used both as an escort and a general force of observation and restraint. When, therefore, on the day of his expected arrival at that city, it was announced that he was already in the national capital, which he had reached in privacy, in darkness, almost by flight, there was throughout the country a sensation of the liveliest surprise; surprise which was changed to shame and profound humiliation when the cause of this surreptitious entry of the seat of government was revealed. Except on the part of those who felt it their duty to sustain the successful candidature of the Republican party at all hazards, there was a universal and indignant expression of unbelief, and the affair became immediately the subject of a rueful kind of ridicule. The story was widely regarded, and especially in Baltimore and at the South, as trumped up for political effect, and the event for a time degraded Mr. Lincoln in the people's eyes. They refused to accept the alleged conspiracy against his life as any excuse for the ignominious secrecy with which he, the future chief magistrate of the country, made his way through one of its principal cities. They scouted the notion that any of their countrymen could seek to repair a political defeat by assassination. They resented the accusation brought against these Baltimore desperadoes as a national insult. The Anglo-Saxon race, they said, are not assassins; least of all are they so in the United States of America. The affair elicited on almost all sides mingled expressions of incredulity, bitterness, and ridicule. From the point of view of the people of the free states, this judgment was justified, and this feeling was correct. It may be safely said that among their native-born population the formation of such a conspiracy would have been morally impossible. But they forgot to take into account, as elements of their judgment, the debasing and brutalizing influences of slavery as an institution; they did not stop to think of the pitiless infliction of torture and death upon rebellious slaves throughout the South, and of the bloody duels and street-brawls between "gentlemen" so constantly occurring there; they forgot for the moment that the bowie-knife was strictly a slave-state weapon, and that of the bloody assaults and murders committed within their own borders by natives of the United States, the large majority were committed by men born and bred under the malign influence of the worst form of slavery.<sup>9</sup> And last, and perhaps most important omission, they had not yet even begun to conceive that the leaders of this insurrection, set on foot among a people so accustomed to scenes of blood, and in whom a spirit of arrogant domination was bred by the very constitution of their society, were determined, with the determination of the desperate, to carry their point at every hazard. It was long, indeed, before this conviction came effectually home to them.

The excitement caused by this disgraceful occurrence, however, soon gave place to profounder, if less vivid, emotions. On the 28th, the Plan of Adjustment adopted by the Peace Congress was sent to the Senate and the House, where they were followed, on the next day, by the report of the Committee of Thirty-three. It at once became apparent that they would not command the support either of Congress or the mass of the non-slaveholding people, and that, consequently, all hopes of harmony and peace which had been based upon them must be abandoned. Looking back upon these propositions, made after such long consultation among men who were practiced politicians, if not sagacious statesmen, we can but wonder at the failure which they exhibit to comprehend the revolutionary nature of the crisis. That of the Committee of Thirty-three was in the form of a brief amendment to the Constitution, which provided that no amendment should be made to that instrument which would give Congress power over the domestic institutions of any state. But as this was a mere solemn confirmation of a political right which no man denied, or ever had denied, to any or to all the states, it was therefore of no more consequence than the paper on which it was written.<sup>10</sup> The proposals of the Peace Congress were embodied in seven sections, of

<sup>8</sup> Statement of Mr. Thurlow Weed in the *Albany Evening Journal*, and private account of Mr. S. M. Felton, president of the Philadelphia and Baltimore Railway Company.

<sup>9</sup> Of the hundreds of cases which I might cite in support of this position, one in which there was no bloodshed seems to me very characteristic. A gentleman well known to me, being in the principal city of a slave state in 1861, was sitting upon the piazza of the best hotel in the place. Near him sat a man, in a dreamy, contemplative mood, having his back turned to the window of a barber's shop which opened with vertical sashes to the floor of the piazza. A light passing gust blew one of these sashes to, when instantly this man sprang up, and, drawing a revolver, fired five shots directly through the window into the barber's shop. Fortunately there were few persons in the shop, and he hit neither of them. But it is significant that he thought, of course, that the noise he heard was a pistol-shot; and, of course, that some person had attempted to shoot him "on sight;" and that, of course, he had a revolver in his pocket, which he drew, of course, and fired recklessly in the direction of the sound which startled him.

<sup>10</sup> "No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give Congress power to abolish or interfere, within any state, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or servitude by the laws of said state."





ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

which the first virtually re-established the Missouri Compromise; the second prohibited the acquirement of any territory by the United States "without the concurrence of a majority of all the senators from the states which allow involuntary servitude, and a majority of all the senators from the states which prohibit that relation;" and the third denied forever to Congress the pow-

er to regulate, abolish, or control slavery in any state or territory of the United States, or in the District of Columbia, or any other place belonging to the United States; to prohibit the bringing of slaves into the District, or the transfer of them from one part of the country to another. The remaining sections forever prohibited the slave-trade, secured a more stringent enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law, and declared that the foregoing sections should never be amended or abolished without the consent of all the states.<sup>1</sup> Except in the restoration of the line of the Missouri Compromise, this plan placed the republic, bound hand and foot, in the power of slavery. It could not but fail miserably, as it did. The Republicans were against it in a body; and, indeed, they opposed any adjustment other than that which should be effected by a Constitutional Convention of the people of the United States, which Congress had no power to convoke. It was plain that compromise was at an end, and that the government must sustain itself under existing conditions, or else be utterly destroyed.

Meantime the 4th of March came on apace; and in spite of their betting and their threatening, the secessionists on that day saw Mr. Lincoln duly invested with the office to which their own candidate in the contest had declared him constitutionally elected. The provision which General Scott had been able to make for the preservation of order within the District of Columbia, in spite of the small force at his disposal for that purpose, was sufficient to deter any attempt which evil-disposed persons, without as well as within its boundaries, were then prepared for. On the appointed day Mr. Lincoln went in procession to the Capitol, in company with President Buchanan, and, after visiting the Senate-chamber, proceeded to the east front of the

building, where, in the open air, in presence of both houses of Congress, the foreign ministers, and a vast concourse of people, he delivered his inaugural address,<sup>2</sup> and took the oath of office at the hands of Chief Justice Taney.

President Lincoln's inaugural address was scanned with even more anx-

#### *Plan of Adjustment adopted by the Peace Congress.*

SEC. 1. In all the present territory of the United States north of the parallel of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes of north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, is prohibited. In all the present territory south of that line, the status of persons held to service or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed. Nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial Legislature to hinder or prevent the taking of such persons from any of the states of this Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights arising from said relation. But the same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the federal courts, according to the course of the common law. When any Territory, north or south of said line, with such boundary as Congress may prescribe, shall contain a population equal to that required for a member of Congress, it shall, if its form of government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original states, with or without involuntary servitude, as the Constitution of such state may provide.

SEC. 2. No territory shall be required by the United States, except by discovery, and for naval and commercial stations, depôts, and transit routes, without the concurrence of a majority of all the senators from the states which allow involuntary servitude, and a majority of all the senators from the states which prohibit that relation; nor shall territory be acquired by treaty, unless the votes of a majority of the senators from each class of states hereinbefore mentioned be cast as a part of the two-third majority necessary to the ratification of such treaty.

SEC. 3. Neither the Constitution nor any amendment thereto shall be construed to give Congress power to regulate, abolish, or control, within any state or territory of the United States, the relation established or recognized by the laws thereof touching persons bound to labor or involuntary service in the District of Columbia, without the consent of Maryland, and without the consent of the owners, or making the owners who do not consent just compensation; nor the power to interfere with or prohibit representatives and others from bringing with them to the city of Washington, retaining, and taking away persons so bound to labor or service; nor the power to interfere with or abolish involuntary service in places under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States within those states and territories where the same is established or recognized; nor the power to prohibit the removal or transportation of persons held to labor or involuntary service in any state or territory of the United States to any other state or territory thereof where it is established or recognized by law or usage; and the right, during transportation by sea or river, of touching at ports, shores, and landings, and of landing in case of distress, but not for sale or traffic, shall exist; nor shall Congress have power to authorize any higher rate of taxation on persons held to labor or service than on land. The bringing into the District of Columbia of persons held to labor or service for sale, or placing them in depôts to be afterward transferred to other places for sale as merchandise, is prohibited, and the right of transit through any state or territory against its dissent is prohibited.

SEC. 4. The third paragraph of the second section of the fourth Article of the Constitution shall not be construed to prevent any of the states, by appropriate legislation, and through the action of their judicial and ministerial officers, from enforcing the delivery of fugitives from labor to the person to whom such service or labor is due.

SEC. 5. The foreign slave-trade is hereby forever prohibited; and it shall be the duty of Congress to pass laws to prevent the importation of slaves, coolies, or persons held to service or labor, into the United States and the Territories from places beyond the limits thereof.

SEC. 6. The first, third, and fifth sections, together with this section six of these amendments, and the third paragraph of the second section of the first Article of the Constitution, and the third paragraph of the second section of the fourth Article thereof, shall not be amended or abolished without the consent of all the states.

SEC. 7. Congress shall provide by law that the United States shall pay to the owner the full value of his fugitives from labor, in all cases where the marshal, or other officer whose duty it was to arrest such fugitive, was prevented from so doing by violence or intimidation from mobs or riotous assemblages, or when, after arrest, such fugitive was rescued by like violence or intimidation, and the owner thereby prevented and obstructed in the pursuit of his remedy for the recovery of such fugitive. Congress shall provide by law for securing to the citizens of each state the privileges and immunities of the several states.

#### *Inaugural Address of President Lincoln.*

##### *Fellow-citizens of the United States:*

In compliance with a custom as old as the government itself, I appear before you to address you briefly, and to take, in your presence, the oath prescribed by the Constitution of the United States to be taken by the President before he enters on the execution of his office.

I do not consider it necessary, at present, for me to discuss those matters of administration about which there is no special anxiety or excitement. Apprehension seems to exist among the people of the Southern states that, by the accession of a Republican administration, their property, and their peace and personal security, are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed, and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the public speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists." I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so. Those who nominated and elected me did so with the full knowledge that I had made this, and made many similar declarations, and had never recanted them. And, more than this, they placed in the platform, for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution which I now read:

"Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend; and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any state or territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes."

I now reiterate these sentiments; and, in doing so, I only press upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the now incoming administration. I add, too,



iety than the message with which Mr. Buchanan, months before, had so astonished and dissatisfied all men, except the seceders at home and abroad. Mr. Lincoln, on the contrary, satisfied all but the same unconditional secessionists, whom no duly qualified President of the United States could content, except at the cost of treachery. That he expressly disavowed the intention of interfering with slavery, or any other local institution, in the states where it then existed, and denied his right of such interference; that he declared that the Fugitive Slave Law, like all other constitutional laws, should be enforced; that he avowed respect for the constitutional rights of all parts of the Union, and the intention to pursue a peaceful course in his administration—this was really of no moment; for he also declared that no state, upon its own mere motion, could lawfully go out of the Union; that Ordinances of Secession were void; that resistance to the authority of the United States was insurrection; and that his official power should be used to “hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government.” To the leaders of the secession party, and their active, determined supporters,

that all the protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the states when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause, as cheerfully to one section as to another.

There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives from service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions:

“No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.”

It is scarcely questioned that this provision was intended by those who made it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the intention of the lawgiver is the law.

All members of Congress swear their support to the whole Constitution—to this provision as well as any other. To the proposition, then, that slaves whose cases come within the terms of this clause “shall be delivered up,” their oaths are unanimous. Now, if they would make the effort in good temper, could they not, with nearly equal unanimity, frame and pass a law by means of which to keep good that unanimous oath?

There is some difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced by national or by state authority; but surely that difference is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered, it can be of but little consequence to him or to others by which authority it is done; and should any one, in any case, be content that this oath shall go unkept on a merely unsubstantial controversy as to how it shall be kept?

Again, in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of liberty known in the civilized and humane jurisprudence to be introduced, so that a free man be not, in any case, surrendered as a slave? And might it not be well, at the same time, to provide by law for the enforcement of that clause in the Constitution which guarantees that “the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states?”

I take the official oath to-day with no mental reservations, and with no purpose to construe the Constitution or laws by any hypocritical rules; and while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will be much safer for all, both in official and private stations, to conform to and abide by all those acts which stand unrepealed, than to violate any of them, trusting to find impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional.

It is seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a president under our national Constitution. During that period fifteen different and very distinguished citizens have in succession administered the executive branch of the government. They have conducted it through many perils, and generally with great success. Yet, with all this scope for precedent, I now enter upon the same task, for the brief constitutional term of four years, under great and peculiar difficulties.

A disruption of the federal Union, heretofore only menaced, is now formidably attempted. I hold that in the contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the union of these states is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of our national Constitution, and the Union will endure forever, it being impossible to destroy it except by some action not provided for in the instrument itself.

Again, if the United States be not a government proper, but an association of states in the nature of a contract merely, can it, as a contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who made it? One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so to speak; but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it? Descending from these general principles, we find the proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself.

The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued in the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was farther matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen states expressly pledged and engaged that it should be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778; and, finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution was to form a more perfect Union. But if the destruction of the Union by one, or by a part only of the states, be lawfully possible, the Union is less than before, the Constitution having lost the vital element of perpetuity.

It follows from these views that no state, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are legally void; and that acts of violence within any state or states against the authority of the United States are insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances.

I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken, and, to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union shall be faithfully executed in all the states. Doing this, which I deem to be only a simple duty on my part, I shall perfectly perform it, so far as is practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people, shall withhold that requisition, or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary.

I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself. In doing this, there need be no bloodshed or violence, and there shall be none unless it is forced upon the national authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what may be necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere. Where hostility to the United States shall be so great and so universal as to prevent competent resident citizens from holding the federal offices, there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people that object. While the strict legal right may exist of the government to enforce the exercise of these offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego for the time the uses of such offices. The mails, unless repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the Union. So far as possible, the people everywhere shall have that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm thought and reflection.

The course here indicated will be followed, unless current events and experience shall show a modification or change to be proper; and in every case and exigency my best discretion will be exercised according to the circumstances actually existing, and with a view and hope of a peaceful solution of the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal sympathies and affections.

That there are persons, in one section or another, who seek to destroy the Union at all events, and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will neither affirm nor deny. But if there be such, I need address no word to them.

To those, however, who really love the Union, may I not speak, before entering upon so grave a matter as the destruction of our national fabric, with all its benefits, its memories, and its hopes? Would it not be well to ascertain why we do it? Will you hazard so desperate a step, while my portion of the ills you fly from have no real existence? Will you, while the certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you fly from? Will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake? All profess to be content in the Union if all constitutional rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right, plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied? I think not. Happily the human mind is so constituted that no party can reach to the nakedness of doing this.

Think, if you can, of a single instance in which a plainly-written provision of the Constitution has ever been denied. If, by the mere force of numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly-written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of view, justify revolution: it certainly would, if such right were a vital one. But such is not our case.

All the vital rights of minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to them by affirmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions, in the Constitution, that controversies never arise concerning them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question which may occur in practical administration. No foresight can anti-

this message was a summons to submission, with the alternative of war. It was susceptible of no other construction. And yet so strangely did a large part, it would seem the greater part, of the loyal people throughout the country mistake the temper and the deliberate purpose of those who were directing the secession movement, that they regarded the address as significant of a peaceful restoration of the Union. This was especially the case with those members of the Democratic party in whom party considerations had not entirely extinguished love of country, and a reverence for the Constitution and the laws. Those who spoke for these men cast aside party considerations at once, and sustained the President in the position which he had taken. They fondly supposed that the members of their party at the South would do the same. How much they overrated the influence of patriotism and a devotion to the republic among the leading slaveholders, how incorrectly they estimated the relative value of slavery and the existence of the republic in the eyes of those men, the sequel sadly showed.

President Lincoln's address made little change in the course of events

pate, nor any document of reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible questions. Shall fugitives from labor be surrendered by national or by state authorities? The Constitution does not expressly say. Must Congress protect slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. From questions of this class spring all our constitutional controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and minorities.

If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority must, or the government must cease. There is no alternative for continuing the government but acquiescence on the one side or the other. If a minority in such a case will secede rather than acquiesce, they make a precedent which in turn will ruin and divide them, for a minority of their own will secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be controlled by such a minority. For instance, why not my portion of a new confederacy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to secede from it? All who cherish disunion sentiments are now being educated to the exact temper of doing this. Is there such perfect identity of interests among the states to compose a new Union as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed secession? Plainly, the central idea of secession is the essence of anarchy.

A majority held in restraint by constitutional check and limitation, and always changing easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a majority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible. So that, rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism in some form is all that is left.

I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case upon the parties to a suit, as to the object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other departments of the government; and while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than could the evils of a different practice.

At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon the vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made, as in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own masters, unless having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.

Nor is there in this view any assault upon the court or the judges. It is a duty from which they may not shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them; and it is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions to political purposes. One section of our country believes slavery is right, and ought to be extended, while the other believes it is wrong, and ought not to be extended; and this is the only substantial dispute; and the fugitive slave clause of the Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the foreign slave-trade, are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people imperfectly supports the law itself. The great body of the people abide by the dry legal obligation in both cases, and a few break over in each. This, I think, can not be perfectly cured, and it would be worse in both cases after the separation of the sections than before. The foreign slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately revived, without restriction, in one section, while fugitive slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be surrendered at all by the other.

Physically speaking, we can not separate—we can not remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence and beyond the reach of each other, but the different parts of our country can not do this. They can not not remain face to face; and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you can not fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides, and no gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you.

This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it. I can not be ignorant of the fact that many worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of having the national Constitution amended. While I make no recommendation of amendment, I fully recognize the full authority of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of the modes prescribed in the instrument itself, and I should, under existing circumstances, favor, rather than oppose, a fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it.

I will venture to add that to me the convention mode seems preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take or reject propositions originated by others not especially chosen for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they would wish either to accept or refuse. I understand that a proposed amendment to the Constitution (which amendment, however, I have not seen) has passed Congress, to the effect that the federal government shall never interfere with the domestic institutions of states, including that of persons held to service. To avoid misconception of what I have said, I depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments, so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being made express and irrevocable.

The chief magistrate derives all his authority from the people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix the terms for the separation of the states. The people themselves, also, can do this if they choose, but the executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to administer the present government as it came to his hands, and to transmit it unimpaired by him to his successor. Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In our present differences, is either party without faith of being in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of nations, with his eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American people. By the frame of the government under which we live, this same people have wisely given their public servants but little power for mischief, and have, with equal wisdom, provided for the return of that little to their own hands at very short intervals. While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the government in the short space of four years.

My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by taking time. If there be an object to hurry any of you, in hot haste, to a step which you would never take deliberately, that object will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and on the sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while the new administration will have no immediate power, if it would, to change either. If it were admitted that you who are dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute, there is still no single reason for precipitate action. Intelligence, patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulties. In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the government, while I shall have the most solemn one to “preserve, protect, and defend” it. I am loth to close. We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.



toward the point to which they were now surely tending, but that little was a quickening of their progress and an increase of their force. Its plump denial of the right of secession, and its avowal of a determination to possess the national mints, arsenals, and military posts, put those in authority in the states which had passed Ordinances of Secession, and appropriated the property of the republic to their own use, upon their mettle; while its peaceful professions did nothing to mitigate to the advocates of state sovereignty, in the slave states which had not seceded, its assertion of the supreme and absolute authority of the central government in all national affairs. In the free states, and in the slave states still under loyal control, it made the idea of an armed struggle for the support of the government more familiar; and, by awakening the generous glow of patriotism, it softened and sundered the rigid bonds by which the Democratic party, the only well-organized and well-disciplined body in the country, had been for more than a generation so strongly bound together.

At the South the leaders allowed the people little time for such superfluous business as the consideration of a speech which merely showed that there was no ground of apprehension that their interests would suffer under the new administration of the United States government. They drove them sharply up to the work of rebellion. Military preparation and hostile action against the government had gone on vigorously under state authority during the three months preceding Mr. Lincoln's inauguration; and hardly had that event taken place when the confederate president ordered General Beauregard to Charleston to take command of the forces which had been assembled, and the works which had been erected there, for the investment of Fort Sumter. On the 9th of March the confederate Congress passed an act for the establishment and organization of an army. On the 14th the Legislature of Florida passed an act defining treason, and declaring that, in the event of a collision between the troops of the United States and those of Florida, the holding office under the government of the former by any resident of the latter should be punished with death! Supplies were cut off from the Gulf fleet and from Fort Pickens—an important post, the preservation of which to the government will form an interesting episode in the early part of our narrative. The various states under control of the confederate government ratified the Constitution adopted at Montgomery, and were called upon to furnish their quota of troops for the defense of the insurgent cause. The whole number called for was less than twenty thousand, and these, from a population of five millions, an unusually large proportion of whom were shifting adventurers or local desperadoes, and accustomed to the use of arms upon each other, were soon forthcoming. In certain places the young men of the more respectable and cultivated classes also formed themselves into military companies, and volunteered their services in the insurgent army. The South seemed to be animated with a lively and wide-spread enthusiasm for the confederate cause. For those whose hearts were in it were outspoken, active, and self-asserting; while those who preserved their allegiance to the old Constitution, their loyalty to the old flag, and their love for the republic, were, with comparatively few exceptions, silent and reserved. To officer the troops mustered under this levy there were more than enough of men well qualified. From the beginning of the commotion it was manifest that many officers of the United States army, professionally educated, and supported during their education by the republic, would, at the bidding of state politicians, disown the flag which they had sworn to defend, and turn their swords against the mother who had cherished them. The event surpassed anticipation. As state after state passed the Ordinance of Secession, officers of the army and navy, West Point cadets, and midshipmen, resigned in rapid succession, under the convenient plea that they were bound to follow the fortunes of their "sovereign" state. So overwhelmed were their minds by this shallow doctrine, or by the deep purpose which it was used to veil, that they did not see that under it their allegiance shifted with their residence, and could be moved about the country from one "sovereignty" to another as easily as a peddler moves his pack. Not one in five of them was born and bred in the state to whose fortunes he chose to regard himself as bound; and some of them, as we shall see, were (like thousands, if not tens of thousands, of the men they were to lead to battle against the flag of the republic) natives of free states. So mildly did the government of the United States use its powers, even in this extremity, that the resignations of these, its sworn defenders, who deserted it in the hour of its peril, were accepted, and they were allowed to retire with nominal honor. In this manner more than one hundred of the officers of the army and navy threw up their commissions, and offered their swords to the insurgent cause before the 4th of March. Let us, however, though we can not justify or even excuse this sad and shameful defection, consider fairly all the circumstances which palliated it. With few exceptions, all these officers had been imbued from their boyhood with the doctrine of state sovereignty. They had heard it insisted upon by the politicians of their part of the country, in the one-sided domestic discussions of the public assembly and the social circle—the very politicians upon whose recommendation they were appointed to their cadetships and their midshipmen's berths. For John C. Calhoun and the men of his school, who had obtained, partly by intrigue and partly by arrogation, the almost absolute control of the politics of the slave states, astutely seeing that the power of those states as units was a far more formidable weapon to wield against the advance of freedom than the power of the people of those states in mass, made the adoption of this dogma a sine-qua-non to political preferment. That the interest of slavery must either control the republic or destroy it was


for thirty years as a religion and an aggressive policy to them, and this monster of state sovereignty was both the fetich of their worship and the bugbear of their threats. When men brought up under such teaching saw the government at Washington pass into the hands of a party which they styled "Abolitionist"—when they saw their own states secede from the Union—when the voice of their elders, the spur of ambition, the hopes of social distinction, and the blandishments of women, all incited them to espouse the cause of the insurgents—and when to all this was added the consciousness that, if they fought under the flag of the republic, they must meet their brothers and their friends in battle, what wonder that so many of them, yielding to all these influences, resigned their commissions, often soothing their consciences, at first, with the self-assurance that they would not take up arms either under the old flag or the new one! Nay, considering how men are influenced by interest, by association, and by antagonism, is it not somewhat surprising that so many of them remained faithful to the flag which, if the doctrines taught by modern politicians of their part of the country were true, was the mere sign of "a common agency?" The greater part of the guilt of their defection must be laid upon the shoulders of the men who for so many years had labored to debase the patriotism and pervert the judgment of the people of the South. To the men of the free states, on the contrary, loyalty to the republic, one and indivisible, was a sentiment, almost an instinct. They were not taught it any more than they were taught to breathe or to see; they debated it no more than they questioned the certain action of the great laws of nature. They imbibed it with their mother's milk, and it became a part of their very being. They had no peculiar abnormal institution to bias their judgments and debase their sentiments, and both their reason and their feelings united in their patriotism. They knew that their states had local rights which they prized; and they loved those states as a man loves his home, and his neighborhood, and his native town, and whatever is nearest to him; but they looked upon all these only as parts of one great whole. They gloried in the great republic; in its wise and humane principles of government, in its power, its wealth, its beneficent institutions, and its marvelous progress; they rejoiced in the prosperity of all parts of it; and their desire to wipe out the blot of slavery, which was one of the causes of the great rebellion, was due to a generous assumption of responsibility in regard to its existence which in no wise belonged to them. As to their country, they looked upon themselves only as citizens of the great American republic; and they inwardly smiled with pity upon men who went about introducing each other as "of South Carolina" and "of Virginia." It was easier for most of these men to stand by their colors than it was for some of those to abandon them.

Prominent among those who resigned their commissions before the breaking out of hostilities was Major Pierre Gustave Toutant, called Beauregard,



GENERAL BEAUREGARD.





Cummings's Point.

Iron-clad Battery

Battery from which the "Star of the West" was fired upon.

Sand Battery, connected by covered gallery with

MORRIS ISLAND, AS SEEN FROM FORT SUMTER.

whom the confederate president placed in command at Charleston, with the rank of brigadier general in the provisional confederate army. This officer, the son of a Louisiana planter, was born near New Orleans in 1819. As his name indicates, he is of French descent, his grandfather having been a French Royalist refugee. The present writer bought at a book-stall, and has now in his possession, a copy of a History of the Life of Louis XVI. of France, with its terrible events and tragic ending, by a French writer, which was printed in Hamburg in 1802, nine years after that weak, but thoroughly good-hearted monarch died by the guillotine. Upon the portrait frontispiece of this volume is written, in a French hand of the last century, "Pierre Toutant à été heureux jusque à '93"<sup>3</sup>—touching evidence of a mistaken fidelity to the cause of aristocratic oppression, which events have shown has descended with the blood and the name of the exiled Royalist. In 1834, Pierre Toutant, the grandson, whose mother was an Italian woman, left his father's plantation for the Military Academy at West Point. That plantation, it is said, was called Beauregard, and the young cadet, introduced as Pierre Toutant de Beauregard, was mistakenly called by the latter name, which, being a territorial designation, gratified his vanity, and he retained it. He passed through his cadetship with much credit, graduated in 1838, and received his second lieutenant's commission in the First Artillery. Soon transferred to the Engineers, in which corps he was made first lieutenant before the expiration of his second year of service, he accompanied the small column of troops at the head of which General Scott, with a daring as much greater than of Cortez as the superiority of his enemy in arts and arms to that of the half savage and nearly overawed foe encountered by the Spanish conqueror, undertook to penetrate Mexico from its shores to its capital.<sup>4</sup> In this expedition he distinguished himself by gallantry and professional skill. At Contreras and Cherubusco he won a captain's brevet, and a major's at Chapultepec. In the final assault upon the city of Mexico he was wounded at the Belen Gate, and, with Lieutenants Gustavus W. Smith and George B. McClellan—of whom, also, we are to hear anon—received the honor of a special mention in General Scott's dispatches. Camp stories are told of his quick penetration and excellent judgment, and also of his somewhat notable self-reliance; and, although these are probably highly colored, if not exaggerated, there can be no doubt of the more than ordinary capacity and acquirements of Beauregard. At the close of the Mexican war his services were rewarded by the appointment of chief engineer for the building of the Mint and the Custom-house at New Orleans, and also of the important fortifications on the Mississippi below that city. Just before the outbreak of the insurrection, Major Beauregard was appointed by President Buchanan to the important and honorable post of superintendent of the Military Academy at which he received his education. He went to West Point, and nominally entered upon the duties of his new position. But he had been in authority less than a week when an order arrived superseding him. The traditions of West Point are that he spoke and acted as became a loyal citizen and soldier, and especially that he dissuaded the Louisiana cadets from resigning their commissions. But the Secretary of War *ad interim*, Mr. Postmaster Holt, distrusted him because of his Louisiana birth, and unwisely, it would seem, put him in disgrace. At all events, the temptation to a States Rights man to soothe his wounded vanity by yielding to the demands of his "sovereignty" to enter its service proved too tempting for him to resist, and he resigned his commission in the United States army. But it is more than probable that, sooner or later, in any case, he would have taken this step, influenced thereto by the associations of all his life, and by the prominent part taken in the conspiracy for the destruction of the republic by his brother-in-law, ex-Senator John Slidell, of New Orleans. Having arrived at Charleston within a few days of the inauguration of President Lincoln, General Beauregard found much already done toward the investment of Fort Sumter by the active zeal of the insurgents of South Carolina. Not only had Fort Moultrie, Castle Pinckney, and Fort Johnson been strengthened, but batteries had been erected at various points which either commanded the water-girdled ramparts from which the flag of the republic still floated, or the approaches by which succor could be carried to its defenders. To the completion and increase of these works, which were already so large as to require six hundred men for their garrisons, General Beauregard immediately devoted all his energy and engineering skill. But we must turn our eyes from Charleston to Washington, where maimed negotiations were halting toward the inevitable issue of civil war.

The provisional government at Montgomery had been in power but a few days when it appointed Mr. John Forsyth, former minister of the United States to Mexico; Mr. Martin J. Crawford, late United States senator from Georgia; and Mr. A. B. Rodman, an ex-Governor of Louisiana, as its commissioners to the government at Washington, for the purpose of opening negotiations upon all questions growing out of the revolutionary movement, which their appointment assumed to have been complete. The cabinet which President Lincoln had formed for the administration of the government to which these commissioners were accredited consisted, first, of William H. Seward, whom all the world, including himself, had expected to be president, if the Republican party were victorious, and who magnanimously accepted from his successful rival the appointment of Secretary of State, and thus gave his country, to the extent of his power, the advantage of his statesmanship and his experience. Next in importance at that time was the Department of War, which had been placed in the hands of Simon Cameron, late United States senator from Pennsylvania, who began life as a printer, and who had accumulated a large fortune. His reputation for integrity, however unjustly, was not without blemish; and Mr. Lincoln, when pressed, before his inauguration, to give him a cabinet office, had made objections on this ground, which his friends would seem to have satisfactorily set aside, without the ability, however, of preventing their recurrence. Mr. Gideon Welles, of Connecticut, was made Secretary of the Navy; an appointment which he owed rather to the influence of powerful friends than to any prominence as a politician or a publicist, or to any reputation as a man of affairs. He had been editor of a Hartford paper, and was a Democrat in the administrations of Van Buren and Polk. The Treasury was placed under the direction of Salmon P. Chase, a nephew of the venerated Bishop Chase, of Ohio and Illinois. A lawyer of eminence in Cincinnati, he had distinguished himself in suits which involved constitutional questions in regard to slavery, in which he always appeared against the slaveholding interest. As candidate of the Free-soil party, he had been elected to the Senate of the United States, and afterward was made Governor of Ohio, in which position his sound and wise views of finance at a critical period had done the commonwealth much service. For his Attorney General Mr. Lincoln had selected Edward Bates, a leading lawyer and politician of Missouri, who had done much service to the Re-

<sup>3</sup> "Pierre Toutant was happy until '93"—the year of Louis XVI.'s death.

<sup>4</sup> Cortez had five hundred Spanish troops, but his Tlascalcan allies were numbered by thousands, and treachery served him better than either his own or the native forces. General Scott entered the country at the head of only fifteen thousand men, and the whole force under General Taylor was less than six thousand. The Mexicans fought with skill and desperate valor. Treachery was enlisted only in the councils of their leader, Santa Anna. And General Scott and his little army bore themselves so magnanimously and so wisely, that the Mexicans invited him to remain with them at the head of affairs. Happy would it have been for them had he done so.



publican party, and not a little during the canvass which resulted in Mr. Lincoln's own election. The Department of the Interior was committed to the hands of Caleb Smith, of Indiana; and the Post-office to Montgomery Blair, of Maryland, a graduate of West Point, whose whole life had been passed in the observation, if not in the conduct of public affairs, and who was expected to take, and did take, a much more prominent part in the cabinet counsels than the office which he accepted would have made necessary. To this cabinet the confederate commissioners made their approach almost ere it was well formed. They arrived in Washington on the 5th of March; but it was not until the 12th that Messrs. Crawford and Forsyth, representing the commission, addressed a note to the Secretary of State, Mr. Seward, informing him of the character in which they presented themselves at the capital, and asking him to appoint an early day on which they might present their credentials and proceed to negotiations. Their note was couched in those smooth and formal phrases of conventional courtesy with which men of social culture and diplomatic experience can cover even the most offensive assertions and the most injurious assumptions. They claimed that the seven states which they represented had withdrawn from the Union, and formed a confederation, "in the exercise of the inherent right of every free people to change or reform their political institutions," when they knew that the inhabitants of only one of those states—Texas—ever were, in the political sense of the word, a distinct people, and that four other states of the seven—Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida—were the mere creatures of the government and people of the United States, the very soil of two of them—Florida and Louisiana—having been bought and paid for out of the United States Treasury. They claimed recognition and consideration for their government on the ground that it was "endowed with all the means of self-support," when those means consisted largely of the arms, the money, the forts, public buildings, and vessels which it had seized from the very government from whom they demanded recognition. They professed that "amity and good-will" which diplomatic agents always profess until there is an open rupture; and they declared that the people whom they claimed to represent did not wish to do any act to injure their late confederates, when they knew that their very presence in that capital, as commissioners of part of the Union to a government administered by men constitutionally elected to govern the whole, was an evidence that their "late confederates" had already received at their hands the greatest injury in their power. Mr. Seward replied to this note on the 15th by a

*Correspondence between Mr. Seward and the Confederate Commissioners.*

The following is the correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Commissioners from the Confederate States:

*Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, to Mr. Seward, opening Negotiation and stating the Case.*

Washington City, March 12, 1861.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States:

SIR,—The undersigned have been duly accredited by the government of the Confederate States of America as commissioners to the government of the United States, and in pursuance of their instructions have now the honor to acquaint you with that fact, and to make known, through you, to the President of the United States, the objects of their presence in this capital.

Seven states of the late federal Union having, in the exercise of the inherent right of every free people to change or reform their political institutions, and through conventions of their people, withdrawn from the United States and reassumed the attributes of sovereign power delegated to it, have formed a government of their own. The Confederate States constitute an independent nation *de facto* and *de jure*, and possess a government perfect in all its parts, and endowed with all the means of self-support.

With a view to a speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of this political separation, upon such terms of amity and good-will as the respective interests, geographical contiguity, and future welfare of the two nations may render necessary, the undersigned are instructed to make to the government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the government of the United States that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States earnestly desire a peaceful solution of these great questions; that it is neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand which is not founded in strictest justice, nor do any act to injure their late confederates.

The undersigned have now the honor, in obedience to the instructions of their government, to request you to appoint as early a day as possible, in order that they may present to the President of the United States the credentials which they bear and the objects of the mission with which they are charged. We are, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

JOHN FORSYTH,  
MARTIN J. CRAWFORD.

*The Reply of Mr. Seward.*

(Memorandum.)

Department of State, Washington, March 15, 1861.

Mr. John Forsyth, of the State of Alabama, and Mr. Martin J. Crawford, of the State of Georgia, on the 11th inst., through the kind offices of a distinguished senator, submitted to the Secretary of State their desire for an unofficial interview. This request was, on the 12th inst., upon exclusively public consideration, respectfully declined.

On the 13th inst., while the secretary was preoccupied, Mr. A. D. Banks, of Virginia, called at this department, and was received by the assistant secretary, to whom he delivered a sealed communication, which he had been charged by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford to present the secretary in person.

In that communication Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford inform the Secretary of State that they have been duly accredited by the government of the Confederate States of America as commissioners to the government of the United States, and they set forth the objects of their attendance at Washington. They observe that seven states of the American Union, in the exercise of a right inherent in every free people, have withdrawn, through conventions of their people, from the United States, reassumed the attributes of sovereign power, and formed a government of their own, and that those Confederate States now constitute an independent nation *de facto* and *de jure*, and possess a government perfect in all its parts, and fully endowed with all the means of self-support.

Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, in their aforesaid communication, thereupon proceeded to inform the secretary that, with a view to a speedy adjustment of all questions growing out of the political separation thus assumed, upon such terms of amity and good-will as the respective interests, geographical contiguity, and the future welfare of the supposed two nations might render necessary, they are instructed to make to the government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring this government that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States earnestly desire a peaceful solution of these great questions, and that it is neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand which is not founded in strictest justice, nor do any act to injure their late confederates.

After making these statements, Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford close their communication, as they say, in obedience to the instructions of their government, by requesting the Secretary of State to appoint as early a day as possible, in order that they may present to the President of the United States the credentials which they bear and the objects of the mission with which they are charged.

The Secretary of State frankly confesses that he understands the events which have recently occurred, and the condition of political affairs which actually exists in the heart of the Union to which his attention has thus been directed, very differently from the aspect in which they are presented by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford. He sees in them, not a rightful and accomplished revolution and an independent nation, with an established government, but rather a perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement to the inconsiderate purposes of an unjustifiable and unconstitutional aggression upon the rights and the authority vested in the federal government, and hitherto benignly exercised, as from their very nature they always must so be exercised, for the maintenance of the Union, the preservation of liberty, and the security, peace, welfare, happiness, and aggrandizement of the American people. The Secretary of State, therefore, avows to Messrs.

memorandum in which he informed them, with the utmost courtesy, that he had no authority to recognize them as diplomatic agents, or enter into correspondence with them. The events which had caused their mission to Washington he regarded, not as a rightful and accomplished revolution, but as a perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement to an unjustifiable and unconstitutional aggression upon the rights and authority vested in the federal government. The remedy for the deplorable condition of affairs then existing he expected to find, not in such irregular negotiations as those upon which they desired to enter, but in the regular and considerate action of the people whom they professed to represent, and in a constitutional convention for the amendment of the organic law of the land. In brief, plain phrase, the Secretary of State, speaking for his government, refused to not only recognize the government under which the commissioners acted, but to admit the right to establish it, and told them that they and all their constituents were then, as they had been before, citizens of the United States.

The reply of the insurgent commissioners to this memorandum is one of the curiosities of diplomatic literature. Still studiously preserving the hollow form of diplomatic courtesy, and making almost evangelical declarations of peace and good-will to men, the commissioners, in fact, took a high tone of defiance; read the Secretary and the President a presumptuous lecture upon the first principles of free government; held the innocence of the insurgent government up to the admiration of posterity; and styled the determination of the President to keep his solemn oath of office a determination "to appeal to the sword to reduce the people of the Confederate States to the will of the section or party whose president he is"—a most impudent remark, whether we consider Mr. Lincoln's constitutional position, or the distribution of the popular vote in the election which made him President, or the majorities in that by which secession was carried in any state of the confederation except South Carolina. They denied, too, that they had asked the government of the United States to recognize the independence of their confederation, but merely to adjust with them the relations springing from a manifest and accomplished revolution. In other words, they asked the government, by receiving them, to admit the very point in dispute, and they declared that the innocence, the peacefulness, and the good-will of the confederate government was to endure just so long as it was allowed to have its own way, regardless of the interests, the honor, and, in fact, the very existence of the government in defiance of which it had been set up.<sup>5</sup>

Forsyth and Crawford that he looks patiently but confidently for the cure of evils which have resulted from proceedings so unnecessary, so unwise, so unusual, and so unnatural, not to irregular negotiations, having in view new and untried relations, with agencies unknown to and acting in derogation of the Constitution and laws, but to regular and considerate action of the people of those states, in co-operation with their brethren in the other states, through the Congress of the United States, and such extraordinary conventions, if there shall be need thereof, as the federal Constitution contemplates and authorizes to be assembled.

It is, however, the purpose of the Secretary of State, on this occasion, not to invite or engage in any discussion of these subjects, but simply to set forth his reasons for declining to comply with the request of Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford.

On the 4th of March inst., the newly-elected President of the United States, in view of all the facts bearing on the present question, assumed the executive administration of the government, first delivering, in accordance with an early, honored custom, an inaugural address to the people of the United States. The Secretary of State respectfully submits a copy of this address to Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford.

A simple reference to it will be sufficient to satisfy those gentlemen that the Secretary of State, guided by the principles therein announced, is prevented altogether from admitting or assuming that the states referred to by them have, in law or in fact, withdrawn from the federal Union, or that they could do so in the manner described by Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, or in any other manner than with the consent and concert of the people of the United States, to be given through a national convention, to be assembled in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. Of course the Secretary of State can not act upon the assumption, or in any way admit that the so-called Confederate States constitute a foreign power, with whom diplomatic relations ought to be established.

Under these circumstances, the Secretary of State, whose official duties are confined, subject to the direction of the President, to the conducting of the foreign relations of the country, and do not at all embrace domestic questions, or questions arising between the several states and the federal government, is unable to comply with the request of Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford to appoint a day on which they may present the evidences of their authority and the objects of their visit to the President of the United States. On the contrary, he is obliged to state to Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford that he has no authority, nor is he at liberty to recognize them as diplomatic agents, or hold correspondence or other communication with them.

Finally, the Secretary of State would observe that, although he has supposed that he might safely and with propriety have adopted these conclusions without making any reference of the subject to the executive, yet, so strong has been his desire to practice entire directness, and to act in a spirit of perfect respect and candor toward Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford, and that portion of the Union in whose name they present themselves before him, that he has cheerfully submitted this paper to the President, who coincides generally in the views it expresses, and sanctions the secretary's decision declining official intercourse with Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford.

*Confederate Commissioners' final Letter to Secretary Seward.*

Washington, April 9, 1861.

Hon. Wm. H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, Washington:

The "memorandum" dated Department of State, Washington, March 15, 1861, has been received through the hands of Mr. J. T. Pickett, secretary to this commission, who, by the instructions of the undersigned, called for it on yesterday at the department.

In that memorandum you correctly state the purport of the official note addressed to you by the undersigned on the 12th ult. Without repeating the contents of that note in full, it is enough to say here that its object was to invite the government of the United States to a friendly consideration of the relation between the United States and the seven states lately of the federal Union, but now separated from it by the sovereign will of their people, growing out of the pregnant and undeniable fact that those people have rejected the authority of the United States, and established a government of their own. Those relations had to be friendly or hostile. The people of the old and new governments, occupying contiguous territories, had to stand to each other in the relation of good neighbors, each seeking their happiness and pursuing their national destinies in their own way, without interference with the other, or they had to be rival and hostile nations. The government of the Confederate States had no hesitation in electing its choice in this alternative. Frankly and unreserved, seeking the good of the people who had intrusted them with power, in the spirit of humanity, of the Christian civilization of the age, and of that Americanism which regards the true welfare and happiness of the people, the government of the Confederate States, among its first acts, commissioned the undersigned to approach the government of the United States with the olive-branch of peace, and to offer to adjust the great questions pending between them in the only way to be justified by the consciences and common sense of good men who had nothing but the welfare of the people of the two confederacies at heart.

Your government has not chosen to meet the undersigned in the conciliatory and peaceful spirit in which they are commissioned. Persistently wedded to those fatal theories of construction of the federal Constitution always rejected by the statesmen of the South, and adhered to by those of the administration school until they have produced their natural and often-predicted result of the destruction of the Union, under which we might have continued to live happily and gloriously together had the spirit of the ancestry who framed the common Constitution animated the hearts of all their sons, you now, with a persistence untaught and unlearned by the ruin which has been wrought, refuse to recognize the great fact presented to you of a complete and successful revolution; you close your eyes to the existence of the government founded upon it, and ignore the



Although Secretary Seward's memorandum was dated March 15th, this reply was not written until the 9th of April, the memorandum itself not having been sent to the commissioners until the 8th, with their own consent, they having been willing to await the result of negotiations still more irregular than those which they themselves had undertaken. These negotiations had reference entirely to the condition of Fort Sumter, and the course which the government meant to pursue in regard to it. This, indeed, was the material question of the day, the first great problem which the government was called upon to solve after the coming in of the new administration. On the 5th of March, President Lincoln's first full day in office, and the day on which the confederate commissioners arrived in Washington, he received through the War Department a letter from Major Anderson, giving his opinion, and that of all the officers in his command, that reinforcements could not be thrown into the fort in time to prevent its capitulation, from want of food, with less than a body of 20,000 good and well-disciplined men. After a full examination of the case thus submitted, General Scott and the army officers at Washington coincided with Major Anderson's judgment. But no such body of men was at the disposal of the government, or could be raised before the garrison at Sumter would be starved out. All that could be done, therefore, under the circumstances, was either to send provisions to the fort, if that would be allowed, or, if not, to evacuate it. But as a peaceful evacuation, unsupported and unexplained by any concurrent act of authority, would justly be regarded by the world as an admission of the incompetency of the government even to resist its own destruction, it was wisely determined to accomplish the re-enforcement of the important post of Fort Pickens, that thus it might be seen that, while the government was obliged to yield to military necessity on the one hand, it none the less asserted its power and maintained its dignity on the other. Orders were dispatched (necessarily by sea) for the transfer of troops from the frigate Sabine, then lying off Pensacola Harbor, to Fort Pickens; but the officer in command, conceiving himself bound by some such sort of armistice or agreement on the part of Mr. Buchanan's administration as was claimed to exist with regard to Major Anderson's force at Fort Moultrie, refused to disembark the troops. The news of this strange and untoward complication reached Washington at such a late period of the time allotted by circumstances for action, that Fort Pickens could not be re-enforced before the garrison at Fort Sumter would be famished. With regard to that garrison, therefore, the problem for the government was either to furnish it with supplies, or to get it out of the fort, as soon as possible, without loss of honor or virtual abdication of authority.

It was during this perplexity of the government that the confederate commissioners awaited a reply to their note to Secretary Seward. Meantime they received assurances from persons of high position, who, to use the mildest phrase, availed themselves of their advantages to act as observers and go-betweens in the interest of the rebellion (and, sad to relate, an associate judge of the Supreme Court was the chief of those who performed these ambiguous functions)—first, that Fort Sumter would be evacuated, and, next, that it would not be supplied or re-enforced without notice to the Governor of South Carolina. Seeing that thus the government would be as nearly as possible tied hand and foot by its own acts, and placed at the mercy of the

insurgents, the commissioners were quite willing to leave the Secretary of State's memorandum at the State Department, subject to such modifications as this anticipated military course of the government might compel. But when they learned on the 7th that Fort Sumter was to be provisioned and Fort Pickens re-enforced, if the government had power to do so, they sent their reply to the memorandum, and, solemnly shaking the dust from their feet, turned their backs on Washington.

The expedition for the relief of Fort Sumter was got under way with all possible dispatch; and notice was sent to Governor Pickens, of South Carolina, that a peaceable attempt would be made to provision the fort, and that if this were resisted, force would be used. The fleet was not a very imposing one, considering the important occasion of its dispatch. It consisted of but three armed vessels, three transport ships, and two steam-tugs. The last of these, the Yankee and the Uncle Ben, carried only their ordinary crews; the transports (the mail steamers Atlantic, Baltic, and Illinois) bore eight hundred men, with provisions; and of the armed ships, the steam sloop-of-war Pawnee carried ten guns and a crew of two hundred men; the Powhatan, of like grade, eleven guns and two hundred and seventy-five men; while the third was but a steam revenue cutter, the Harriet Lane, which had hastily assumed the naval colors, and which carried but five small guns and ninety-six men—the military and naval force, all told, consisting of but 1380 men and twenty-six cannon. Yet even this meagre armament was raised with difficulty under pressure of the great emergency. But not even all of these vessels left port with Charleston as their ultimate destination. The Atlantic and the Illinois, with eight hundred and fifty of the troops, were ordered to Fort Pickens; the armed steamers, the Baltic, with one hundred and sixty troops, and the steam-tugs, were instructed to rendezvous off Charleston Harbor, the commander having put to sea with scaled orders as to his farther operations. Those orders were that unarmed boats should be first sent in with provisions to Fort Sumter, and that, if these met with resistance, all means should be used to re-enforce as well as to supply it.

Nearly four months had now elapsed since Major Anderson had hastily sought the protection of this isolated strong-hold for his little band of fifty-five artillerists, nine officers, fifteen musicians, and thirty laborers. When he took up that position, it seemed to people generally as if he was absolutely unassailable, except by a fleet and by hunger. The former, it was well known, the insurgents were without; and it was supposed that the possession of it by the government would deprive them of the assistance of the latter. Fort Sumter was regarded as one of the strongest works within the limits of the republic. Built upon an artificial island in Charleston Harbor, at the cost to the nation of a million of dollars, it had all the advantages of inaccessible position, and the highest resources of engineering skill. Its pentagonal walls of brick and compact concrete were twelve feet thick at the base and eight at the parapet, which rose sixty feet from the foundation. On four of its five sides it was pierced for two tiers of guns, to which were added a third (called *en barbette*), fired from the parapet; but the fifth side, looking southward upon Charleston, was almost without defense, and weakened by the sally-ports and the docks; for the strong-holds of the republic, like its Constitution, were constructed upon the reasonable supposition that

high duties of moderation and humanity which attach to you in dealing with this great fact. Had you met these issues with the frankness and manliness with which the undersigned were instructed to present them to you and treat them, the undersigned had not now the melancholy duty to return home and tell their government and their countrymen that their earnest and ceaseless efforts in behalf of peace had been futile, and that the government of the United States meant to subjugate them by force of arms. Whatever may be the result, impartial history will record the innocence of the government of the Confederate States, and place the responsibility of the blood and mourning that may ensue upon those who have denied the great fundamental doctrine of American liberty, that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," and who have set naval and land armaments in motion to subject the people of one portion of the land to the will of another portion. That that can never be done while a freeman survives in the Confederate States to wield a weapon, the undersigned appeal to past history to prove. These military demonstrations against the people of the seceded states are certainly far from being in keeping and consistency with the theory of the Secretary of State, maintained in his memorandum, that these states are still component parts of the late American Union, as the undersigned are not aware of any constitutional power in the President of the United States to levy war without the consent of Congress upon a foreign people, much less upon any portion of the people of the United States.

The undersigned, like the Secretary of State, have no purpose to "invite or engage in discussion" of the subject on which their two governments are so irreconcilably at variance. It is this variance that has broken up the old Union, the disintegration of which has only begun. It is proper, however, to advise you that it were well to dismiss the hopes you seem to entertain that, by any of the modes indicated, the people of the Confederate States will ever be brought to submit to the authority of the government of the United States. You are dealing with delusions, too, when you seek to separate our people from our government, and to characterize the deliberate, sovereign act of the people as a "perversion of a temporary and partisan excitement." If you cherish these dreams you will be awakened from them, and find them as unreal and unsubstantial as others in which you have recently indulged. The undersigned would omit the performance of an obvious duty were they to fail to make known to the government of the United States that the people of the Confederate States have declared their independence with a full knowledge of all the responsibilities of that act, and with as firm a determination to maintain it by all the means with which Nature has endowed them as that which sustained their fathers when they threw off the authority of the British crown.

The undersigned clearly understand that you have declined to appoint a day to enable them to lay the objects of the mission with which they are charged before the President of the United States, because so to do would be to recognize the independence and separate nationality of the Confederate States. This is the vein of thought that pervades the memorandum before us. The truth of history requires that it should distinctly appear upon the record that the undersigned did not ask the government of the United States to recognize the independence of the Confederate States. They only asked audience to adjust, in a spirit of amity and peace, the new relations springing from a manifest and accomplished revolution in the government of the late federal Union. Your refusal to entertain these overtures for a peaceful solution, the active naval and military preparation of this government, and a formal notice to the commanding general of the confederate forces in the harbor of Charleston, that the President intends to provision Fort Sumter by forcible means, if necessary, are viewed by the undersigned, and can only be received by the world, as a declaration of war against the Confederate States; for the President of the United States knows that Fort Sumter can not be provisioned without the effusion of blood. The undersigned, in behalf of their government and people, accept the gage of battle thus thrown down to them; and appealing to God and the judgment of mankind for the righteousness of their cause, the people of the Confederate States will defend their liberties to the last against this flagrant and open attempt at their subjugation to sectional power.

This communication can not be properly closed without adverting to the date of your memorandum. The official note of the undersigned, of the 12th of March, was delivered to the Assistant Secretary of State on the 13th of that month, the gentleman who delivered it informing him

that the secretary of this commission would call at 12 o'clock, noon, on the next day, for an answer. At the appointed hour Mr. Pickett did call, and was informed by the Assistant Secretary of State that the engagements of the Secretary of State had prevented him from giving the note his attention. The Assistant Secretary of State then asked for the address of Messrs. Crawford and Forsyth, the members of the commission then present in this city, took note of the address on a card, and engaged to send whatever reply might be made to their lodgings. Why this was not done it is proper should be here explained. The memorandum is dated March 15, and was not delivered until April 8. Why was it withheld during the intervening twenty-three days? In the postscript to your memorandum you say it "was delayed, as was understood, with their (Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford's) consent." This is true; but it is also true that on the 15th of March Messrs. Forsyth and Crawford were assured by a person occupying a high official position in the government, and who, as they believed, was speaking by authority, that Fort Sumter would be evacuated within a very few days, and that no measure changing the existing *status* prejudicially to the Confederate States, as respects Fort Pickens, was then contemplated, and these assurances were subsequently repeated, with the addition that any contemplated change as respects Pickens would be notified to us. On the 1st of April we were again informed that there might be an attempt to supply Fort Sumter with provisions, but that Governor Pickens should have previous notice of this attempt. There was no suggestion of any re-enforcements. The undersigned did not hesitate to believe that these assurances expressed the intentions of the administration at the time, or, at all events, of prominent members of that administration. This delay was assented to for the express purpose of attaining the great end of the mission of the undersigned, to wit: a pacific solution of existing complications. The inference deducible from the date of your memorandum, that the undersigned had, of their own volition, and without cause, consented to this long hiatus in the grave duties with which they were charged, is, therefore, not consistent with a just exposition of the facts of the case. The intervening twenty-three days were employed in active unofficial efforts, the object of which was to smooth the path to a pacific solution, the distinguished personage alluded to co-operating with the undersigned; and every step of that effort is recorded in writing, and now in possession of the undersigned and of their government. It was only when all these anxious efforts for peace had been exhausted, and it became clear that Mr. Lincoln had determined to appeal to the sword to reduce the people of the Confederate States to the will of the section or party whose president he is, that the undersigned resumed the official negotiation temporarily suspended, and sent their secretary for a reply to their official note of March 12.

It is proper to add that, during these twenty-three days, two gentlemen of official distinction as high as that of the personage hitherto alluded to, aided the undersigned as intermediaries in these unofficial negotiations for peace.

The undersigned, commissioners of the Confederate States of America, having thus made answer to all they deemed material in the memorandum filed in the department on the 15th of March last, have the honor to be,

JOHN FORSYTH,  
MARTIN J. CRAWFORD,  
A. B. ROMAN.

A true copy of the original by me delivered to Mr. F. W. Seward, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States, at 8 o'clock in the evening of April 9, 1861.

Attest,  
J. T. PICKETT, Secretary, etc., etc.

Mr. Seward, in Reply to the Commissioners, acknowledges the Receipt of their Letter, but declines to Answer it.

Department of State, Washington, April 10, 1861.

Messrs. Forsyth, Crawford, and Roman, having been apprised by a memorandum which has been delivered to them that the Secretary of State is not at liberty to hold official intercourse with them, will, it is presumed, expect no notice from him of the new communication which they have addressed to him under date of the 9th inst., beyond the simple acknowledgment of the receipt thereof, which he hereby very cheerfully gives.

A true copy of the original received by the commissioners of the Confederate States, this 10th day of April, 1861. Attest,  
J. T. PICKETT, Secretary, etc., etc.





INTERIOR OF THE SULLY-FORT AT SUMTER.

there would be little occasion for defense against domestic violence. Charleston, indeed, being three miles and a half from Fort Sumter, was out of reach of any ordnance in use at the time when it was built, and, in fact, of any among its armament at the time when it was first threatened—threatened by the people whom it was built chiefly to protect. Around it, uniting haste, determination, and ingenuity, they had drawn a nearly complete circle of heavy batteries. The guns which Major Anderson had left maimed in Fort Moultrie had been unspiked; others had been added; the repairs which he had begun were nearly completed; and, strengthened with some traverses, the old fort, though not so large or so strong as Sumter, was yet a very formidable work. It mounted eleven heavy siege-pieces and several mortars, and was a little more than a mile from Sumter. At Fort Johnson—the name retained by the site of an old and long-abandoned and ruined fortification—two large sand batteries had been erected, and armed with heavy guns and mortars. These batteries were distant one mile and a quarter from Fort Sumter, and were the nearest to the city of all the guns which bore upon Major Anderson. Upon Cummings's Point, the part of Sullivan's Island nearest to Fort Sumter, and only three quarters of a mile distant, a

singular battery had been built. It was constructed of heavy yellow pine logs, and was protected from shell by a slanting roof of the same material. But over the logs was laid a mail armor of railway iron, strongly clamped and dovetailed. The port-holes were provided with doors like those of a man-of-war, and these also were covered with iron armor, and fell at the recoil of the guns, thus affording complete protection to the men who served the guns, except at the moment of aiming and firing. This battery mounted three heavy columbiads. Another battery, even more novel and curious, had been built at Charleston itself with an enterprise and mechanical ingenuity altogether unexpected. This was a floating battery, made, like that on Cummings's Point, of pine logs, and covered with a double layer of railway iron. It was a nondescript structure, not at all like either a vessel or a fort. It looked like a large shed, some hundred feet in length and twenty-five in width, and had been much laughed at while it was building. It presented no perpendicular face at the point of attack, only sloping surfaces of heavy iron. The magazine stretched along in the rear below the water-line, and was protected with layers of sand-bags, which helped to balance the weight of the four enormous siege-guns which it mounted. A floating hospital was attached to the stern of this grotesque, but, as it proved, really formidable structure. Other batteries of inferior power spotted the sandy shore within cannon or mortar range of Sumter; and all this preparation for the destruction of his post and the humiliation of his flag Major Anderson had been obliged to see going on unchecked within range of his batteries for four weary months. Strange, unprecedented, absurd, anomalous position! Sorely-trying major of artillery, found faithful in all things—faithful even to what seemed sure-coming death, and what was sure-coming surrender—while life and military honor were both to be saved by one word from your lips, Fire! which would have been answered by cheers over half a continent! Standing, not supine, not with hands tied, but vigilant, with hands free and full of arms, while your enemy dug his pits and set up his engines before your face and within your reach, affronting you each morning with some new device, which you, each morning, could have blown straight into the limbo where all such works deserve to go—will go forever

where the cause of truth, and right, and universal good-will, for which you and your worthy comrades, with patient heroism, endured so much, prevails. Your foes did not quite trust your forbearance; for yonder upon Sullivan's Island, behind that brushwood and those slopes of sand, which, even to your penetrating glass, seem but the common fringing of a barren beach, is a tremendous battery of siege-guns and mortars, of which you will see nothing and hear nothing until you see their fire and hear their roar.

Such preparation had been made in Charleston Harbor for the reduction of Fort Sumter when the news arrived that the mission of the insurgent commissioners to Washington had entirely failed, and also that an expedition for the relief of the fort was about to sail. Immediately there was bustle and excitement of a military sort—the going to and fro of aids-de-camp and orderlies, and marching. Not a little of it superfluous, we may honestly believe; but somewhat may be pardoned to the ardor of such very inexperienced aids, and orderlies, and soldiers, in virtue of their earnestness; for they were in earnest, and actually meant to fight the government of the United States, and, what was worse, believed, and not without some reason, that they could fight it and live. To man the batteries of the insurgents in



THE IRON-CLAD BATTERY ON CUMMINGS'S POINT, AS SEEN FROM FORT SUMTER.





MAP OF CHARLESTON HARBOR, SHOWING FORT SUMTER AND THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES.



Charleston Harbor a force of one thousand men would have been more than enough; but about seven thousand men were assembled there under the command of General Beauregard, and of these, four thousand were sent to the works, the remaining three thousand being held in reserve at the city.

It was on the 8th of April, 1862, that the issue was presented to the insurgents that they must allow the government to retain peaceful possession of its own fortress or expel its garrison by force. No communication was held with the insurgent administration at Montgomery; but on that day a messenger arrived from Washington to the Governor of South Carolina, informing him that provisions would be sent to Fort Sumter, and that, if they were not permitted to reach it peaceably, force would be used. Such had been the nature of the abnormal negotiations, understandings, or what not, between the representatives, authorized and unauthorized, open and secret, of the insurgents at Washington and the government, that honor, as well as policy, was thought to require the giving of this information. Upon receiving it, General Beauregard immediately communicated it by telegraph to Montgomery, where the question which it presented was considered for twenty-four hours; and on the 10th the confederate commander received an order to demand the evacuation of the fort, and, if this was refused, to commence the attack. He made the demand the next day at noon, in courteous phrase, of course, with the usual expressions of a desire to avoid the effusion of blood, and with a compliment to the constancy of Major Anderson, which came gracefully from a late companion in arms. The terms were the most honorable that could be offered. The abandonment of his post, which they were intended to grace, was promptly refused by Major Anderson as inconsistent with his sense of honor and his obligations to his government. As he bade General Beauregard's messengers farewell, he said to them that he should be starved out in a few days, unless the fort was previously brought about his ears by their fire. This casual remark, natural enough to a military man under all the circumstances, was reported at once all over the country, and seemed as strangely peaceful and superfluous, to say the least, to the multitude, as the good-natured mutual admissions of opposing counsel do to their incensed and mutually glowering clients; and it was even made the occasion of the impeachment of Major Anderson's loyalty. General Beauregard, however, although he did not so misunderstand it, yet immediately telegraphed it, with the refusal, to the confederate government, from whom he as promptly received authority to accept from Major Anderson, as an alternative of an attack, an agreement to evacuate the fort within a few days, and not to use his guns against the insurgent batteries unless they first opened fire on him. Two of General Beauregard's aids arrived at Fort Sumter about midnight of that day, the 11th, with a proposal of this alternative, and the authority to enter at once into the agreement in question. The negotiation was thus hastily pressed through that sleepless night because the relieving flotilla was known to the insurgents to be already in the offing, though he for whose relief it came was ignorant of their presence, and even of the purpose of the government; for communication with him had been cut off for four days, and the last messenger from Washington—Lieutenant Talbot, one of his own garrison—had not been allowed to return to him. In his final summons General Beauregard requested Major Anderson to communicate to his aids an open answer, which they awaited. This he did at half past two, offering to evacuate the fort on the 15th if he did not previously receive controlling instructions or supplies, and agreeing, meantime, not to open fire unless in case of hostile demonstration against the fort, or against the flag of his government. This offer, which was to go out unless he was ordered to remain, and was able to do so, and which secured him the right of defending any vessel which entered the harbor under the United States flag, was not at all what General Beauregard required; and so, at twenty minutes past three o'clock on the morning of the 12th, the aids-de-camp informed Major Anderson that fire would be opened upon him in one hour, and thereupon took final leave.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> The following is the correspondence immediately preceding the hostilities:

L. P. Walker, Secretary of War:

An authorized messenger from President Lincoln just informed Governor Pickens and myself that provisions will be sent to Fort Sumter peaceably, or otherwise by force.

Gen. G. T. Beauregard, Charleston:

If you have no doubt of the authorized character of the agent who communicated to you the intention of the Washington government to supply Fort Sumter by force, you will at once demand its evacuation, and, if this is refused, proceed in such a manner as you may determine to reduce it. Answer.

L. P. Walker, Secretary of War:

The demand will be made to-morrow at 12 o'clock.

Gen. Beauregard, Charleston:

Unless there are especial reasons connected with your own condition, it is considered proper that you should make the demand at an early hour.

L. P. Walker, Secretary of War, Montgomery:

The reasons are special for 12 o'clock.

Charleston, April 8.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Montgomery, 10th.

Charleston, April 10.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Montgomery, April 10.

L. P. WALKER, Secretary of War.

Charleston, April 10.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

Head-quarters, Provisional Army, C. S. A., Charleston, S. C., April 11, 1861—2 P.M.

SIR,—The government of the Confederate States has hitherto forbore from any hostile demonstration against Fort Sumter in the hope that the government of the United States, with a view to the amicable adjustment of all questions between the two governments, and to avert the calamities of war, would voluntarily evacuate it. There was reason at one time to believe that such would be the course pursued by the government of the United States, and under that impression my government has refrained from making any demand for the surrender of the fort.

But the Confederate States can no longer delay assuming actual possession of a fortification commanding the entrance of one of their harbors, and necessary to its defense and security.

I am ordered by the government of the Confederate States to demand the evacuation of Fort Sumter. My aids, Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee, are authorized to make such demand of you. All proper facilities will be afforded for the removal of yourself and command, together with company arms and property, and all private property, to any post in the United States which you may elect. The flag which you have upheld so long and with so much fortitude, under the most trying circumstances, may be saluted by you on taking it down.

Colonel Chesnut and Captain Lee will, for a reasonable time, await your answer. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, Brigadier General Commanding.

Major Robert Anderson, Commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C.

Head-quarters, Fort Sumter, S. C., April 11th, 1861.

GENERAL,—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication demanding the evacuation of this fort; and to say in reply thereto that it is a demand with which I regret that my sense of honor and of my obligations to my government prevent my compliance.

Thanking you for the fair, manly, and courteous terms proposed, and for the high compliment paid me, I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT ANDERSON, Major U. S. Army, Commanding.

To Brigadier General G. T. Beauregard, commanding Provisional Army, C. S. A.

Montgomery, April 11.

Gen. Beauregard, Charleston:

We do not desire needlessly to bombard Fort Sumter, if Major Anderson will state the time at which, as indicated by him, he will evacuate, and agree that, in the mean time, he will not use his guns against us, unless ours should be employed against Fort Sumter. You are thus to avoid the effusion of blood. If this or its equivalent be refused, reduce the fort as your judgment decides to be most practicable.

L. P. WALKER, Secretary of War.

Head-quarters, Provisional Army, C. S. A., Charleston, April 11, 1861, 11 P.M.

MAJOR,—In consequence of the verbal observations made by you to my aids, Messrs. Chesnut and Lee, in relation to the condition of your supplies, and that if you would in a few days be starved out if our guns did not batter you to pieces, or words to that effect, and desiring no useless effusion of blood, I communicated both the verbal observation and your written answer to my communication to my government.

If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter, and agree that, in the mean time, you will not use your guns against us unless ours shall be employed against Fort Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire upon you. Colonel

FORT JOHNSON, AS SEEN FROM FORT SUMTER.





Without a doubt this issue was expected. It at least found General Beauregard prepared to keep the appointment of his representatives with sufficient punctuality. The hour went slowly by, and the batteries were silent. Five anxious minutes more were counted, and the dark quiet of the night was yet unbroken; but hardly were another five completed when the flash and the dull roar of a mortar came from the battery on Sullivan's Island. The conscious shell went up shrieking and wailing along its fiery curve, and, lingering reluctantly before its downward plunge, burst as it fell directly over the doomed fortress. No meteor of more direful portent ever lit the sky; for this told surely of the beginning of a civil war, compared to which all civil wars before it were as squabbles in a corner—a war in which millions of men were to be engaged, and which was to scatter ruin and want, not only through the country in which it raged, but across the sea, among two of the most powerful nations of the world; which was to convert half a continent into one great battle-ground, and strew it from east to west with the graves of its citizens slaughtered to gratify the base ambition and the disappointed pride of a small factious oligarchy, who justified to themselves their attempt to destroy a government upon the monstrous assumption of the right of one man to own and use another as his property. But to the eager neophytes in war who manned the Charleston batteries, this shell was merely the signal for the beginning of a bombardment in which they expected to run some risk and to gain much glory; for they knew well their overwhelming superiority both in numbers and in weight of artillery, and they knew how wasted, worn, and weary their handful of opponents were with want of food, anxiety, and watching. They expected, too, that after a few such contests—enough to show the government and the people of the free states that they really meant rebellion, they would attain their purposes, and be in a position so to remodel the map of North America as to secure the perpetuation of negro slavery throughout the larger part of its temperate climes, and (what was the real object sought by their insurrection) the political and social predominance of the slaveholding oligarchy. So miserably had politicians been able to cause the citizens of the republic to misunderstand each other! so miserably had some of them deceived themselves! After the firing of this signal mortar, the discharge of which was fitly committed to the hands of Edmund Ruffin, a Virginian, who had grown gray during his untiring efforts to bring about the struggle which he then began, there was a short pause of preparation, and then fire was opened from the whole crescent of batteries which more than half encircled the fort; for the water battery had been towed down two days before, and anchored on the undefended side which looked toward Charleston. From this time the discharge of shot and shell against the fort was kept up without ceasing; but the fort did not reply. The insurgent artillerists could see their balls strike against its sides, splintering the parapet and the embrasures, and their bombs fall within its inclosure, and hear them explode. An hour of this firing passed, and not a shot came back. Time wore on, and the bombardment was kept up until those to whom had been committed the doubtful honor of opening it grew tired with their unaccustomed task, and yielded their places to others, and still the fort was silent. More than two hours had thus passed in this one-sided contest. What could it mean? Did Major Anderson intend to preserve the inoffensive attitude which he had maintained for months, hear without resistance the fierce attacks of the batteries which he had allowed to be constructed around him, and, trusting solely to the endurance of his walls and his men, leave to his assailants, already committed to an inglorious contest, only the contemptible business of a fierce onslaught upon men who refused to fight them? Perhaps it would have been as well had he added that shame to the meed of their two days' labor; but his duty, of course, prevented his thought of such a purpose. He was not politic, he was only prudent.

Upon the departure of General Beauregard's aids from the fort the flag was raised, the posterns closed, the sentinels withdrawn from the parapet, and orders given that the men should not leave the bomb-proofs without special orders. At half past six o'clock the shrill notes of "Peas upon a trencher," piercing the uproar of the bombardment, called the garrison, as usual, to breakfast, which they ate leisurely and calmly. Major Anderson knew that if eighty men (only enough to work nine guns properly) were to do any thing against such a fire as had been opened upon him, it could only be with the careful husbanding of their strength and nervous energy; and therefore he had reserved his fire until he could use his guns in broad daylight, and send his men to their work with the support of the best breakfast his meagre stores could furnish. He then divided his command into three reliefs, assigning officers and men as equally as possible to

each. The great inequality of the contest did not exist only in the numbers of men and the weight of metal which were opposed. The fort, though its magazines were well stored with powder, had a very small supply of cartridges; there were no scales with which to weigh powder, and only six needles with which to sew cartridge-bags; and there were neither tangent scales, nor breech sides, nor any other instrument for pointing a gun. Bread there was none; only salt pork. Under these privations, accurate firing and a long defense were equally impossible. The fire which had now been kept up for two hours and a half was much severer and more extended even than Major Anderson had looked for; for the masked battery of heavy columbiads on Sullivan's Island, the existence of which he had not suspected, enfiladed the fort, and was served with great energy and precision. It proved, too, that there was only one face of the work which was not seen in reverse (that is, open to a fire in the rear) from mortars. It was to such an attack that Major Anderson gave the order to reply soon after seven o'clock on the morning of Friday, the 12th of April. Captain Doughleday, his second in command, fired the first gun, and immediately the fort opened upon all the principal assailing batteries.

How unequal the fight was to be was not discovered in Sumter until after it had well begun; for it had been decided to use but two of the three tiers of guns with which the fort was mounted—those in the lower casemates and those upon the parapet; and the embrasures of the second tier were built up with earth, and brick, and stone. The parapet, or barbette guns, being of the heaviest calibre, capable of crushing even the armor of the iron-plated batteries, and also being, on account of their position, those only from which shells could be thrown, were most relied upon, and, for the protection of the artillerists at these, much labor had been expended since the time when an attack seemed imminent. But the vertical fire of shells from the insurgent batteries was so copious and well directed that this tier of guns had to be abandoned in the very beginning of the contest, and only two or three of them were fired surreptitiously by some of the men, whom neither danger nor command could deter from yielding to the temptation of using these formidable weapons against the enemy. But these stolen delights were merely imaginary; the hasty and careless firing of these great guns proving more dangerous to the fort and its defenders than to its assailants. One of them was not only thrown from its carriage by its own recoil, but dismounted another near it. Thus, in the very beginning, Major Anderson found himself deprived of what he relied upon as his main stay, and confined to the use of his lower tier of casemates. The rebel artillerists thus attained comparative security during almost the entire bombardment; for while they deprived the fort of the service of the only guns which could breach their walls, and, what was of more consequence, of the mortars which could have made havoc in their crowded open batteries, they themselves were able to pour a continuous shower of hursting shells upon every part of the fort which was exposed. This they did with notable skill and regularity of fire; but their direct fire was not nearly so effective. A large proportion of the solid shot missed the fort in the first hours of the bombardment, and those which were better aimed scattered themselves all over its sides, and thus did little injury of immediate importance. Two of the guns upon the parapet were hit, however—one being dismounted, and the other broken; and three of the iron cisterns over the hallways were penetrated by shot, the water pouring in floods upon the quarters below. The parade, where five large columbiads had been arranged for the purpose of throwing shells, was made absolutely untenable by the constant explosion of those dreadful missiles. It was in the midst of such a fire as this that the first relief in the fort went to their work. But they were allowed to fight alone only a very short time. No duty of the soldier is so trying as that of hearing an attack without resistance. Under such circumstances, raw troops in the field almost invariably waver, and, if the trial be continued too long, break and fly: only well disciplined veterans can bear the moral strain which such circumstances put upon them. In the present case, the whole garrison had been wrought up to a high pitch of excitement by a nearly three hours' bombardment without a shot in reply; and soon after the fort first opened fire they broke through the order of the day, and were all engaged heart and soul in the fight, with the tacit consent of their commander. Thus for the first four hours they kept up such a fire that the assailants were astonished, and believed that their watchfulness had been outwitted, and that the fort had been largely re-enforced. Soon the musicians and the workmen, functionally non-combatant, caught the infection. They joined the artillerists in working the guns, and, after a little practice as assistants, went off by themselves and brought new pieces into action. But, although every man of that small band thus did even more than his duty, and did it like a hero, it was soon apparent that they could work little harm to their multitudinous and well-protected assailants. A gun was silenced for a while in Fort Moultrie, the embrasures of which were somewhat injured, and the barracks riddled. One shot penetrated the floating battery, and wounded one man; but from the mailed side of this battery all the other shot which struck it glanced off harmlessly. The much more formidable iron-clad battery on Cummings's Point proved invulnerable to the shot of any piece which could be used against it; and, although the embrasures were hit two or three times, no serious injury was done to the guns or those who manned them. The other batteries seemed to be almost entirely unharmed. Lack of skill was not the cause of this ineffectiveness any more than lack of courage. But it proved that the calibre of the guns in the lower tier of casemates, to the use of which Major Anderson was confined, was too small to make their fire effective on iron-clad batteries, or even on such a strong piece of masonry as Fort Moultrie, at the distances at which they stood.

Four hours had passed since the besieged had opened fire, making, in

Chesnut and Captain Lee are authorized by me to enter into such an agreement with you. You are therefore requested to communicate to them an open answer. I remain, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
G. T. BEAUREGARD, Brigadier General Commanding.

Major Robert Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, Charleston Harbor, S. C.

Head-quarters, Fort Sumter, S. C., 2 30 A. M., April 12, 1861.  
GENERAL.—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your second communication of the 11th inst., by Col. Chesnut, and to state, in reply, that, cordially uniting with you in the desire to avoid the useless effusion of blood, I will, if provided with the proper and necessary means of transportation, evacuate Fort Sumter by noon on the 15th inst., should I not receive, prior to that time, controlling instructions from my government, or additional supplies; and that I will not, in the mean time, open my fire upon your forces unless compelled to do so by some hostile act against this fort, or the flag of my government, by the forces under your command, or by some portion of them, or by the perpetration of some act showing a hostile intention on your part against this fort, or the flag it bears. I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,  
ROBERT ANDERSON, Major U. S. A., Commanding.

To Brigadier General G. T. Beauregard, commanding Provisional Army, C. S. A.

Fort Sumter, S. C., April 12, 1861, 3 30 A. M.  
SIR,—By authority of Brigadier General Beauregard, commanding the provisional forces of the Confederate States, we have the honor to notify you that he will open the fire of his batteries on Fort Sumter in one hour from this time. We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,  
JAMES CHESNUT, Aid-de-camp.  
STEPHEN D. LEE, Captain C. S. Army and Aid-de-camp.


Major Robert Anderson, United States Army, commanding Fort Sumter.





A 10-INCHE GALLERY AD MOUNTED AS A MORTAR AT FORT SUMTER.





FORT MOULTRIE, AS SEEN FROM FORT SUMTER.

vain, a better fight than they could hope to make again; and now the tremendous converging fire of the assailants was beginning to tell upon the walls and parapet, and their shells made the ramparts and the parade untenable. Still the garrison were all unharmed, for they kept within the casemates as much as possible, and look-outs were stationed at commanding points, who gave warning when a shot was about to strike or a shell to burst. About twelve o'clock, through the port-holes was seen the welcome sight of armed vessels under the old flag. The fleet had arrived off the Bar. They dipped their flags in token of salutation and encouragement, and, although bombs were pouring ceaselessly into the parade of the fort, where the flag-staff stood, Sumter's flag was dipped in answer. In fact, men could not have behaved with more intrepid gallantry than was displayed by the few defenders of this fort. During the first day of the bombardment, the quarters were set on fire three times by the enemy's shells, and put out amid a storm of missiles which made the escape of any of those who thus exposed themselves to it seem almost miraculous. The fire upon one gun was so constant and so close that it was abandoned; but, ere long, fire was renewed from it, and an officer, going to the spot, found a party of laborers engaged in serving it. They had turned it upon the floating battery, and one of them was still watching the effect of the last shot, forgetting his danger in his delight, as he saw the ball take effect in the very middle of the battery.

In the afternoon the fire of the rifled guns in the iron-clad Cummings's Point battery became very accurate and severe. It was aimed at the embrasures, the masonry of which was cut out and scattered among the artillerymen at almost every shot, bruising and stunning them often, but, fortunately, killing none. They all kept at their work without respite, and had their meals served to them at their guns. Soon after midday, the number of cartridges, of which it had been possible to prepare only seven hundred, had been so much reduced, and the ability to supply them was so small, that it became necessary to abandon all the guns but six. With these, a regular but not very formidable fire was kept up until darkness fell upon the scene, when the port-holes were closed for the night, and the besieged garrison withdrew to pass the anxious hours in brief alternations of rest, work, and watching.

Thus began one of the strangest contests known to the annals of war—a contest

strange not only in the circumstances under which it was brought about, but in those under which it was carried on. For, thus far, no war had been declared, directly or by implication, between the government of the United States and the confederated insurgents at Montgomery, although an act of insurrectionary violence had been committed by the residents of Charleston in firing upon the *Star of the West*. Intercourse between all parts of the country was still nominally free, and to all the people of the seceding states actually so. The telegraph—that marvelous invention which, more than realizing the fairy gifts that dazzle and delight our wondering childhood, makes every man an enchanted prince, by bestowing upon him eyes that see and ears that hear what is passing at the farthest corners of the earth—still kept, though under supervision, all points of the country in communication. Little restraint was placed upon it in Charleston on this day; and the inhabitants of that decaying, stiff-necked sea-port, who, women as well as men, assembled on its battery-promenade to look at the bombardment, much as similar mixed companies looked in classic days upon bloodier contests in the arena, were hardly more immediate spectators of the fight than the millions of those throughout the land who, whether loyal or disloyal to the old flag which was then assailed, found their dearest interests involved in the issue of that contest. Every stage, every vicissitude of the struggle, was reported all over the land with the speed of lightning. The daily tasks and pleasures of a great nation were thrown aside, and the whole country became one vast amphitheatre, in which the combatants fought out their unequal fight with the eyes of thirty millions full upon them. Night fell upon the thrilling spectacle with the contest undecided, and sent home the spectators of both inclinations, quivering with excitement—the partisans of the rebels, however, full of hope and of defiance, those of the soldiers of the republic doubtful, depressed, and bitter; yet with their hearts full of an inspiring trouble and a noble wrath, born of a love which they had often talked about, but the sweet pangs of which few of them had ever felt before. Throughout the country on that night there was proportionately almost as little sleep as there was within Fort Sumter. The night in Charleston Harbor was dark, wet, and stormy. All through it the insurgents kept up a fire of mortars upon the fort, which provoked no reply, but accomplished the purpose of depriving the weary garrison of any except the most fitful slumber. Expecting both an attack by boats and re-enforcements from the fleet, Major Anderson posted guards at the most exposed points of the fort; but his watchfulness proved to have been unneeded. The insurgent commander saw that the reduction of the fort by bombardment was sure and speedy, and therefore wisely refrained from an assault which must needs be very bloody; and the naval forces found themselves entirely unable to move to the support of Major Anderson. Only the *Pawnee*, 10 guns, the *Harriet Lane*, 5 guns, and the transport *Baltic*, had arrived off the Bar on the 12th, the tug-boats having been detained by rough weather. Without these, the orders under which the expedition sailed could not be carried out. These were, as we have already seen, that unarmed boats should be first sent in with stores, and that, if these were fired upon, an attempt should then be made to send in both re-enforcements and supplies by force. But the *Baltic*, the only unarmed vessel, was too deep to pass the Bar; and, besides, the fort was already under fire. The naval commanders, however, upon consultation, formed a plan for the relief of Major Anderson, which was to hoist out all the boats and launches in the night, load them with the men and stores on board the *Baltic*, tow them in as far as possible; and, in the gray of the dawning, let them pull in to the fort, under cover of the guns of the *Pawnee* and the *Harriet Lane*. A good plan, though a perilous and a daring; but it was entirely frustrated by the nature of the harbor, which did the insurgents in this place such good service throughout the whole war. The *Baltic* got aground in the night, during the preparations for the disembarking of her troops and stores, and the project was necessarily abandoned. Others were formed; but, before they could be put into effect, they proved to be unavailing.

The storm subsided, and the sun rose brightly to usher in the final contest of Saturday. The bombardment was resumed by the insurgents with more vigor than they had shown before; and about nine o'clock the quarters and barracks were for the fourth time on fire. The men who were not actually engaged in serving the few guns in use tried to extinguish the flames. For a short time they worked like heroes, fighting one fire, and enduring another against which they could not fight. Here two non-combatants distinguished themselves in this their maiden battle—Mr. Hall, a musician, who, throughout the whole bombardment, won the admiration of all by his coolness, intrepidity, and energy; and Mr. Peter Hart, a sergeant in the New York Metropolitan Police Force, who visited the fort in company with Mrs. Anderson, and, on her departure, volunteered to remain there. On this occasion the orders of the commander could hardly restrain him from fruitless exposure of his life, and he afterward performed an act of signal daring. The efforts to put out the fire proved to be equally vain and perilous, for the enemy now poured in a steady fire of red-hot shot; and as fast as the flames were extinguished in one place, they broke out in another. The task was necessarily abandoned for another, yet more important and more dangerous—the protection of the magazine, and the securing enough powder to keep up the fight. Nearly a hundred barrels were taken out amid the roar of flames, the crash of falling beams, the flying of red-hot shot, and the explosion of shells, and were thrown into the sea. Meantime men were making cartridges as rapidly as possible in the magazine itself, using for that purpose blankets, sheets, and shirts, and all similar material that the fort could furnish. The supply obtainable in this manner was, however, soon exhausted; and the heat became so great from the blazing quarters and barracks that the magazine could no longer be left open with safety. The






REMOVING POWDER FROM THE MAGAZINE OF FORT SUMTER DURING THE BOMBARDMENT.

doors were, therefore, finally closed and locked, and the fight kept up only in name, by the occasional irregular discharge of a gun. The situation of the garrison, actually desperate from the beginning, was now rapidly approaching the last extremity. The main gates took fire, and were soon destroyed, leaving the fort open to assault from this quarter by overwhelming force. The chassis of the barbette guns were burned upon the gorge. The heat became so intense, and diffused itself so widely, that the shells and fixed ammunition in the upper service-magazines exploded, scattering ruin and threatening death. The fire from all the insurgent batteries increased in fury; and the continued thunder of their heavy guns, the roar of the flames inside the fort, the crash of falling masonry and timber, the bursting of the enemy's shells, and the explosion of the ammunition in the service magazines, combined to make a scene in which grandeur rivaled peril. The great extent of the fort, the small number of men within it, and the care with which they were kept inside the casemates, thus far prevented any serious casualties. But it seemed as if the garrison were to escape death by shot and shell only to meet it by suffocation. The day was warm and

sultry, the smoke did not rise freely, and the fort became so filled with it that the men could hardly see or breathe. The heat itself grew stifling, and increased to such a point that it became necessary to protect all the powder left of that which had been taken out of the great magazine—only four barrels—with wet blankets and other bedding. The men themselves were able to get breath only by lying down upon the floors of the casemates, and spreading wet cloths over their faces to exclude the smoke. An eddying gust of wind occasionally dispersed the stifling clouds, and relieved their distress for lack of air, while it revealed to their sight the terrors of their situation. About this time the flag-staff, which, though hit nine times, had thus far escaped with slight injury, was shot away near the top. The look-out cried, "The flag is down," and instantly Mr. Hall sprang out into the flaming, shot-raked parade, and brought the flag away. But the halliards were so entangled that it could not be righted and raised again. What should be done? The flag must float, for, terrible as the situation was, no one had yet spoken of surrender. A temporary staff was rigged upon the ramparts, and Police-sergeant Hart volunteered to climb it and





BOMBARDMENT OF FORT SUMTER BY THE BA





S OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES, APRIL 13, 1861.





POLICE-SERGEANT HART NAILING THE FLAG TO THE TEMPORARY FLAG-STAFF.

nail the flag fast. This he did while the enemy's batteries kept up their furious fire of shot and shell, in the face of which he accomplished his perilous undertaking, and descended the staff in safety. The enemy, determined rebels though they were, could not see unmoved this heroic defense of a fortress and a flag for which they felt that only a little while before they would have fought with no less gallantry; and at each of the now rare and irregular discharges of a single gun, they leaped upon their own ramparts and cheered Major Anderson and his men.

Under these circumstances, when the only four barrels of powder out of the magazine were practically inaccessible, when only three more cartridges remained, and they were in the guns, when the tragic interest of the day was at its height, the comic actor of the occasion entered upon the scene, and affairs took a ludicrous turn toward peace. The fall of the flag had, of course, been noticed, and it had been mistaken in one quarter at least for a sign of surrender. Soon after Mr. Hart had nailed it in its new position upon the outer wall, a man appeared at an embrasure with a handkerchief tied upon a sword, symbolic of the semi-military condition of his mind and person in

other respects, and demanded admission. It was allowed, and he scrambled in. He proved to be the Hon. Mr. Wigfall, of Texas, who had been the occasion of much laughter in the Senate-chamber, and who was now volunteer-aid to General Beauregard. In a fuss and flurry, which provoked the smiles of the smoke-grimed soldiers whom he addressed, he said that he came from that officer, and asked for Major Anderson. He had gone to the main gate to meet the flag of truce, the approach of which had been observed; and before he could be summoned, Colonel Wigfall (for such was his new title) said, "Your flag is down; you are on fire; let us quit this;" and asked to have his extemporized flag of truce displayed from the ramparts. He was shown the national flag still flying, and told that if he wished his friends to stop firing he must display the flag of truce. This he at once did, waving it out of an embrasure, which, nevertheless, was nearly hit by two or three shots. As it was his flag, and not that of the fort, a corporal was then ordered to relieve him; but the firing being still kept up, because of the national flag again floating above the fort, the corporal declined to continue his useless exposure, and leaped back into the casemate, where the



excited aid-de-camp soundly rated him for his cowardice. At this point Major Anderson came up, and the subsequent colloquy is thus reported by an eye-witness to the interview:

"Wigfall said, 'I am Colonel Wigfall, and come from General Beauregard, who wishes to stop this.' Major Anderson, rising on his toes, and coming down firmly upon his heels, replied, 'Well, sir.' 'Major Anderson,' said Wigfall, 'you have defended your flag nobly, sir. You have done all that is possible for men to do, and General Beauregard wishes to stop the fight. On what terms, Major Anderson, will you evacuate this fort?' Major Anderson's reply was, 'General Beauregard is already acquainted with my only terms.' 'Do I understand that you will evacuate upon the terms proposed the other day?' 'Yes, sir, and on those conditions only,' was the reply of the major. 'Then, sir,' said Wigfall, 'I understand, Major Anderson, that the fort is to be ours?' 'On those conditions only, I repeat.' 'Very well,' said Wigfall; 'then it is understood that you will evacuate. That is all I have to do. You military men will arrange every thing else on your own terms.' He then departed, the white flag still waving where he had placed it, and the stars and stripes waving from the flag-staff, which had become the target of the rebels."

But hardly was he half way to the shore when a more formal and numerous deputation from the staff of General Beauregard—Major Lee, Mr. Porcher Miles, ex-Senator Chesnut, and Mr. Roger A. Pryor—appeared with a flag of truce and asked admission, which, of course, was given. They also said that they came from General Beauregard. He had noticed that the flag had been down; that the fort was on fire; and he desired to know if he could render any assistance. As Major Anderson's position was the consequence of General Beauregard's own acts, this was, of course, but a delicate way of asking a surrender. The beleaguered commander was surprised, as well he might be, at this deputation from a man with whom he had a ready agreed upon general terms of evacuation, and he replied accordingly, to the great discomfiture of the members of the new deputation. These, however, after a few minutes' conference, informed Major Anderson that the extempore Texan colonel had not seen the rebel commander-in-chief for two days. They requested, however, a suspension of hostilities while they bore a written memorandum of Major Anderson's terms to General Beauregard; but, in the midst of this embarrassment, yet a third flag of truce arrived, borne by Major D. R. Jones, the insurgent general's chief of staff, offering the same terms of evacuation, with a single exception, which had been proposed before the bombardment—to wit, the departure of the whole command, with company arms and property, and all private property, and the privilege of saluting and keeping the flag—the exception being the salute to the flag. These terms Major Anderson positively refused then to accept without the salute, but consented that that point should remain open for consideration.

The salute was finally admitted by General Beauregard, who also (with equal courtesy, and regard for the condition of a fort which was about to pass into his possession) proffered assistance for the extinction of the fire, which was declined. The intrepid national commander had no alternative as to the course which he should pursue. He had not lost a man; but the fort had become untenable, and his means of defense were exhausted. Had there been time to let the walls cool so that the magazine might be opened, to blow down the parapet and build up the great gates with stones and rubbish, the defense might have been prolonged, as far as the fort itself was concerned, until the men were exhausted by a diet of sheer salt pork. But, even had these circumstances existed, the lack of cartridges and the means of making them would have made effective offensive operations impossible.

It is said that yet another and still more ludicrous incident lightened the closing scenes of this eventful day within the fort. Mr. Roger A. Pryor, of Virginia, one of the first deputation from General Beauregard (and who seems to have been one of that high (but not highest) style of Southern man who vaunts his good-breeding and his chivalry, but has not yet attained to quiet self-respect and unassuming confidence in himself, united to scrupulous regard for the feelings of others, but maintains his superiority by offensive self-assertion), appeared on this occasion loaded down with arms incisive and explosive, and bore himself in keeping with his personal appearance. Seeing upon a table what appeared to be a glass of brandy, he swallowed it, without pause or ceremony. Surgeon Crawford having caught sight of him as he was turning down the dose, approached quickly, and informed him that what he had drank as brandy was iodide of potassium, a deadly poison. Instant collapse on the part of the patient followed this announcement; but whether it was due to the poison, or only to the announcement, the Muse of History has not been informed. She records with pleasure, however, that the valiant Virginian, having been seized upon by the benevolent surgeon, was put instantly through such a course of pumping and purgation that his life was saved, to be again, in like manner, devoted to the cause which he had espoused. It may be cruel, but it is human, to suggest that the surgeon, having failed of a single loyal patient through a two days' bombardment, was determined to have one at least from the rebel side, and seized the occasion of an equally thoughtless and harmless drinking to gratify at once his professional craving and his excited patriotism.

Agitating as this day had been in Charleston Harbor, it was none the less so outside the bounds of the insurgent confederacy. Throughout the free states, and the slave states still under loyal rule, the people rose on that Saturday morning with their souls filled with the one anxiety which had prevented or disturbed their rest. The bombardment and the defense would, of course, be renewed; but would Major Anderson be able to hold out until he received the re-enforcements and supplies which lay within sight of his ramparts?

What of good or ill to the republic would this day bring forth? What of honor or dishonor to the flag? The excitement was not turbulent; it hardly ruffled the surface of society. It was a strong, deep-seated trouble; a sad and almost awful apprehension. It sank deeper and spread wider as the hourly dispatches told how the stirring fight went on. In the great centres of population and business the streets were filled by eager, anxious people, who spoke nervously upon the one great theme; and around the many bulletin-boards the crowds were so great as to impede the public passage. The announcements successively made of the feebleness of Major Anderson's resistance, of the inactivity of the fleet, of the fire, the throwing powder into the water, the explosions, the silencing of the fort, the incomprehensible display of the flag of truce at the same time with the national standard, were received with amazement, indignation, and incredulity. The southern end of the telegraph was, of course, in the hands of the insurgents; and soon these astonishing, and, as it was thought, absurd reports began to be attributed to the malicious perversion of those who sent them. The inactivity of the fleet seemed inexplicable; the story that the fort was on fire was scouted as quite incredible. Fort Sumter was believed to be an almost impregnable mass of solid masonry, as incombustible as the Rock of Gibraltar; and here it was, if the truth were told, burning like a tinder-box. Men turned away in scorn; they could not and would not believe it. And when, in the afternoon, the final dispatch came from Charleston, by way of Augusta, that the fort had surrendered; that the confederate flag floated over its walls, and that none of the garrison or confederate troops were hurt, it was thought that this was the cap-sheaf of malicious invention, and that it was only sure that the fight had gone on during the day with varying fortunes. The effect of the news, however, was to work the public mind up to a terrible pitch of excitement; and the most widely-circulated daily paper in the city of New York, having been thus far the apologist and the advocate of the secessionists, the indignation of the people was so roused against it that an attack upon its office was expected, and would



SCENE AROUND A BULLETIN-BOARD.

<sup>7</sup> See the "Engineer Journal of the Bombardment of Fort Sumter," by Capt. J. G. Foster, Corps of Engineers, U. S. A., New York, 1861.



doubtless have been made, except for the prompt and vigorous preventive measures taken by the chief of police.


Little of the next day was given wholly to religious duties, for patriotism is an element of piety, not of religion; and the two days' attack upon the national flag was the only subject which really occupied men's minds—the only topic of their conversation. To satisfy the anxiety of the public, the principal newspapers, the publication of which, with one exception, was intermitted, of course, on Sunday, issued a number on this morning; and thus commenced a custom which was continued far into the period of the ensuing war. The dispatches of the previous day proved to be substantially true, and the people found themselves forced to bear the national humiliation with such resignation as they could summon. Here and there a voice was heard denouncing Major Anderson, or at least questioning his patriotism or his determination. But these were the views only of the most headstrong and least considerate folk; the mass of the people felt that he had a right to their entire confidence. At this very time he was evacuating the fort upon terms, and in a manner, creditable alike to himself and to his opponents in the recent contest. Having packed up all company and personal property, and made preparations for saluting his flag, Major Anderson was waited upon by several officers of General Beauregard's staff, Commander Hartstein, formerly of the United States Navy, but who had preferred his state to his country, and Captain Gillis, commander of the *Pocahontas*. The steamer *Isabel*, which the confederate authorities had provided as a transport to the vessels outside the Bar, lay at the wharf behind the gorge. The old battle-torn flag, which had been displayed four months before, amid prayers apparently unheard and hopes doomed to bitter disappointment, was raised to receive the honors which showed that it had fallen without disgrace. Fifty guns were fired, and it was lowered before solemn faces and tearful eyes. But, it would seem, the outraged genius of the republic demanded that some sacrifice of blood, even innocent, should atone for this humiliation, and at the seventeenth gun an accidental explosion of fixed ammunition instantly killed one of the artillerymen, and severely wounded several others, one of them mortally. This casualty proved more fatal than the two days' bombardment to either party; for, in spite of reports long circulated to the contrary in regard to the insurgent force, there is no reasonable room for doubting the assertion that neither side lost a single man, while the wounds received were few and trifling. The salute finished, the victim to the honor of his country's flag, Private David Hough, was buried with military honors in the parade of the fort where he had done so gallantly a soldier's duty; and the garrison, in full uniform, were formed in line, and marched out to the air of "Yankee Doodle." The confederate officers present vied with each other in demonstrations of courtesy to their vanquished foes. The flag of Fort Sumter, which Major Anderson took away with him, was raised on board the *Isabel* as she put off, so that he and his command were under no flag but that of their government from the beginning to the end of the memorable series of events in which they bore so prominent a part.

Of the insurgent force in this affair little has been, and little need be said. They were in overwhelming numbers, and the fire of the fort—restricted as Major Anderson proved to be to his guns of smallest calibre—was so ineffective that their performance was little more than artillery practice. Their numbers, and their guns, and the work they did, have been thus precisely stated in an elaborate article written upon the best authority.<sup>8</sup> They had fourteen batteries in action, mounting forty-two heavy guns and mortars. From these there were thrown, during the two days, two thousand three

hundred and sixty shot and nine hundred and eighty shells. The number of men engaged in the confederate works was certainly over three thousand, and between four and five thousand were held in reserve. Of the officers who distinguished themselves—with such distinction as was possible where the officers on one side were three times as many as the men on the other, and no one was hurt—General Beauregard's report mentions Lieutenant Colonel R. S. Ripley, commanding the batteries on Sullivan's Island; Lieutenant Colonel W. G. De Saussure, commanding those on Morris's Island; Major P. F. Stevens, in command of the iron-clad battery at Cummings's Point; Captain Thomas, who commanded the British rifled cannon at this point; and Majors Whiting and Gwin, and Captain Hartstein. Colonel Wigfall comes in for a share of commendation; and let us not forget that, with all his fluster and flurry, and the absurdity of his false position in regard to the capitulation, his motive was a good one, and he showed real fortitude in passing from the shore to the fort in an open boat during a heavy fire of shot and shell. Captain Hartstein, having but to superintend the patrolling of the harbor and carrying of messages in tug-boats, gained more distinction by his courtesy and fraternal kindness after the surrender than by the duties which he had performed before.

It was not to be expected that the official representative of the vaunting and insolent politicians and planters of South Carolina would emulate the honorable consideration shown by Captain Hartstein and the officers who accompanied him to those who had so gallantly defended the flag of the republic—the flag which, not long before, they had all been sworn to uphold at peril of their lives. Governor Pickens, in a speech which he made to the people of Charleston on the evening of the evacuation, exposed without reserve the spiteful, domineering, braggart spirit in which he, and those of his constituents who had really any voice in the direction of affairs, had gone into their rebellion. Alluding to the vast majority of their fellow-citizens, whom they had been told they would find arrayed on the side of the Constitution and the laws, he said: "We have defeated their twenty millions, and we have made the proud flag of the stars and stripes, that never was lowered before to any nation on this earth, we have lowered it in humility before the palmetto and the confederate flags." The humiliation of the national flag, though under circumstances which could bring no honor of any kind to its assailants, was too pleasant a theme to be passed over with one exulting outburst; and thus again the rebellious demagogue rolled the sweet morsel under his tongue: "We have humbled the flag of the United States. I can here say to you, it is the first time in the history of this country that the stars and stripes have been humbled. It has triumphed for seventy years; but to-day, on the thirteenth day of April, it has been humbled, and humbled before the glorious little state of South Carolina." On the same occasion, and in the same bombastic strain, he spoke of the independence of his constituents as already achieved, and as having been "baptized in blood." Now the twenty millions defeated by the insurgent forces (numbering seven thousand, and having in action forty-two heavy guns and mortars) were one hundred and nine half-famished men, including musicians, laborers, and the surgeon; and the blood in which the Charlestonian independence was baptized was that of four men, slightly wounded. Governor Pickens's speech was received with vociferous applause; and so was one of more significance, made in Montgomery, the confederate capital, the day before, by Mr. Pope Walker, the insurgent Secretary of War: "No man," he said, "can tell where the war this day commenced will end; but I will prophesy that the flag which now flaunts the breeze here will float over the dome of the old Capitol at Washington before the first of May. Let

<sup>8</sup> Published in the *Charleston Mercury* of May 2d and 3d, 1861.



THE GORGE OF FORT SUMTER.



them try Southern chivalry and test the extent of Southern resources, and it may float eventually over Faneuil Hall itself."

It was upon a people thus miserably mistaking their countrymen and themselves, thus blind with fury, thus bloated with insolence and besotted with pride, thus bent upon the humiliation and final destruction of the republic in which at last they had ceased to rule, that the heroes of Fort Sumter, defeated but not dishonored, turned their backs, on Sunday, the 14th of April, 1861, and sailed northward, under the very flag which they had so nobly defended, to tell in simple, modest words the story of their struggle.<sup>9</sup>

## THE UPRISING AT THE NORTH.

Effect of the Bombardment of Fort Sumter.—War Proclamation of President Lincoln.—Response of the Free States; of the Governors of the Border Slave States.—Measures of the Rebel Government.—Seizure of the Navy Yard and Forts Barrancas and M'Rea at Pensacola.—Occupation of Fort Pickens by Lieutenant Slemmer.—Insolent Propositions for Truce, and degrading Compliance.—Re-enforcement of Fort Pickens.—Washington in danger.—The Convention of Virginia secretly passes a Provisional Ordinance of Secession, and an Ordinance uniting the State to the insurgent Confederacy.—Destruction of the Arsenal and Armory at Harper's Ferry, and its Occupation by the Insurgents.—Incomplete Destruction of the Portsmouth Navy Yard, and its Seizure.—Massachusetts leads the Van.—Reasons for her Promptness.—Attack upon a Massachusetts and a Pennsylvania Regiment in Baltimore.—March of the New York Seventh.—Communication between Washington and the North cut off.—Union Meetings.—The Flag.—Badges.—Show your Colors.—Gifts and Appropriations for the War.—A Blockade.—Rebel Privateers.—Neutral Treason.—Condition of Washington Society.—Spies.—Seizure of Telegraphic Dispatches.—Habeas Corpus practically suspended.—Commotion in Missouri.—Kentucky for the Union.—New Proclamation calling for 48,000 Men for three Years.—Military Preparations at the South.—Seat of the Rebel Government transferred to Richmond.—Nature and Purposes of the impending Conflict.

THE depression which followed the bombardment of Fort Sumter was but momentary. It did not last a single day. The rebound was instantaneous and tremendous. In spite of four months' warning, the event actually came with all the suddenness of surprise. In fact, it was absolutely necessary to the arousing of the loyal men of the republic from a state of mingled confidence and bewilderment, which had almost the seeming, and all the effect, of stupor. A keen and practiced observer, who had visited many parts of the world and many scenes of strife in the service of the most influential journal of Europe, and who had been sent to the United States to observe and report the course of events during the civil troubles, after remaining in New York two weeks, wrote, on the 20th of March, that to his eyes that city was "full of divine calm and human phlegm;" that the commercial queen of the West, in his opinion, "would do any thing rather than fight. Her desire is to eat her bread and honey and count her dollars in peace." To him, judging from what he heard as well as what he saw, the disruption of the republic was then already accomplished; for, on the one side, a representative secessionist said to him, "No concession, no compromise: nothing that can be done or suggested shall induce us to join any confederation of which the New England states are members;" and, on the other, an equally eminent Republican, of the extreme school, declared to him on the same day, "If I could bring back the Southern states by holding up my little finger, I should think it criminal to do so."<sup>10</sup> The swift agency of steam could not take the letter containing these statements to London, print it, and send it back again, before the conclusion based upon them was entirely falsified. The secessionist doubtless stood firm in his rebellious determination; but the Abolitionist had found that, whatever might be his feeling upon the subject, the people of the free states did not regard the question of negro slavery in any of its bearings as worthy to be weighed one moment in the scale with that of the maintenance of constitutional government and the perpetuity of the republic; and the divine calm of the city that would do any thing rather than fight had been swept away by an intensely human excitement which strangely united all the heat of fury to all the coolness of resolution. In all this there was no sudden gyration of opinion or change of feeling. The national sentiment of loyal men was not touched to the quick until the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The secessionists might have held conventions

and passed resolutions until the crack of doom, and it would have been regarded as of but little moment. Southern conventions had become a laughing-stock at the North on account of their wordy folly. They had been held for various ostensible objects, but chiefly for that of turning, by preamble and resolutions, the tide of commerce from New York, Boston, and Philadelphia to Norfolk and Charleston. In this they had not been successful; and the discredit which attached to them affected greatly all the preliminary steps taken in the more dangerous designs to which they were in part a cloak. In fact, much as the country had been disturbed by the outbreak at the South upon the election of Mr. Lincoln, it seemed but a continuation or expected consequence of the preceding presidential canvass. It was no new thing. It did not have a beginning; it was merely a going on. It seemed, nay, it was, the last move in the stupendous game of intimidation and braggadocio which had been played for twenty years and more. Much the same turmoil had been heard before, when the slavery propaganda had only feared defeat. What was to be expected upon its actual discomfiture? These men had talked so much about secession if a Republican were elected, that, unless they were willing to be looked upon as the merest braggarts, they must do something to back their words. Their conventions and their ordinances were mere brute thunder, harmful in effect upon the country, but harmless against its government. Their refusal to pay their Northern debts was regarded as far more injurious, and more indicative of hostile determination.

Thus thought and felt too many men throughout the country through the gloomy winter of 1860 and 1861; for even the seizure of forts and arms, and the very establishment of the insurgent government, were looked upon rather as extreme measures of intimidation than as the first steps of a desperate rebellion. The firing upon the Star of the West, strange to say, did not quite open the eyes of all of those who should have seen that it meant absolute defiance. But when, upon the announcement that Fort Sumter was to be provisioned, the insurgents bombarded the garrison out of it, then, with a sudden shock, the loyal citizens of the republic felt what secession really was. Indignation flashed through the astonished land. The whole country quivered with a new emotion. Men lived in the open air, that they might read in each other's faces, eye to eye, the noble wrath, the fixed determination, the lofty purpose that ruled the hour. Two could hardly speak together in the street above their ordinary tone without being surrounded with eager listeners. Every public place was thronged with unbidden crowds, intent upon discourse of the momentous situation. A nation of free-men, each of whom felt, at last, his own responsibility for his country's safety and honor, was pierced through brain and heart with the barbed conviction that that safety was in peril and that honor at stake. The strong barriers of party vanished as by magic, and men became so intensely absorbed in the present that, forgetful of the past, they saw each other for the first time only as fellow-citizens, with one feeling and one purpose. It was a moment of supreme grandeur in the life of the nation. Patriotism, which had been trodden under foot of politicians, which had withered in the arid soil of selfishness under the blazing sun of prosperity, which had been choked with the thorns of care, and wealth, and pleasure, struck at once its roots to the very centre of the nation's being, and in a single night blossomed into fruitfulness. That fruit was a stern resolve to sacrifice life and fortune in defense of the republic.

It was to a people who had passed through this mental experience that President Lincoln addressed a proclamation dated upon the day of the evacuation of Fort Sumter.<sup>1</sup> That was Sunday; and on Monday morning the President's appeal, distributed by telegraph, was read throughout the country. It was remarkably cool and dispassionate. It set forth that the laws of the United States had been for some time defied in the seven seceded states by combinations too powerful to be dealt with by the officers of the law; it called out 75,000 of the militia of the several states for the purpose of suppressing those combinations, and first, if not chiefly, of repossessing the forts which had been seized; it especially, and with great care in the use of words, disavowed any intention of "devastation, destruction, or interference with property in any part of the country." It commanded the insurgents to dis-

hereby, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, convene both houses of Congress. The senators and representatives are, therefore, summoned to assemble in their respective chambers at 12 o'clock, noon, on Thursday, the 4th day of July next, then and there to consider and determine such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to demand. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this 15th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

The following call on the respective state governors for troops was simultaneously issued through the War Department:

SIR,—Under the act of Congress for calling out the militia to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrection, to repel invasion, etc., approved February 28, 1795, I have the honor to request your excellency to cause to be immediately detailed from the militia of your state the quota designated in the table below, to serve as infantry or riflemen for a period of three months, unless sooner discharged. Your excellency will please communicate to me the time at about which your quota will be expected at its rendezvous, as it will be met as soon as practicable by an officer or officers to muster it into service and pay of the United States. At the same time the oath of fidelity to the United States will be administered to every officer and man. The mustering officers will be instructed to receive no man under the rank of commissioned officer who is in years apparently over 45 or under 18, or who is not in physical strength and vigor. The quota for each state is as follows:

Maine	1	Pennsylvania	16	Missouri	4
New Hampshire	1	Delaware	1	Ohio	13
Vermont	1	Tennessee	2	Indiana	6
Massachusetts	2	Maryland	4	Illinois	6
Rhode Island	1	Virginia	3	Michigan	1
Connecticut	1	North Carolina	2	Iowa	1
New York	17	Kentucky	4	Minnesota	1
New Jersey	4	Arkansas	1	Wisconsin	1

It is ordered that each regiment shall consist, on an aggregate of officers and men, of 750. The total thus to be called out is 73,391. The remainder to constitute the 75,000 men under the President's proclamation will be composed of troops in the District of Columbia.

<sup>9</sup> Major Anderson's Dispatch concerning the Bombardment and Evacuation of Fort Sumter.

Steam-ship Baltic, off Sandy Hook, April 18, 1861.

<sup>10</sup> Hon. S. Cameron, Secretary of War, Washington, D.C.:  
SIR,—Having defended Fort Sumter for thirty-four hours, until the quarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire, the gorge wall seriously injured, and the magazine surrounded by flames, and its door closed from the effects of the heat, four barrels and three cartridges of powder only being available, and no provisions but pork remaining, I accepted terms of evacuation, offered by General Beauregard, being the same offered by him on the 11th instant, prior to the commencement of hostilities, and marched out of the fort Sunday afternoon, the 14th instant, with colors flying and drums beating, bringing away company and private property, and saluting my flag with fifty guns.

ROBERT ANDERSON, Major First Artillery.

<sup>10</sup> Correspondence of the London Times, April 17th, 1861.

Proclamation of President Lincoln.

Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time past and now are opposed, and the execution thereof obstructed, in the states of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the powers vested in the marshals by law: now, therefore, I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the militia of the several states of the Union to the aggregate number of 75,000, in order to suppress said combinations and to cause the laws to be duly executed. The details for this object will be immediately communicated to the state authorities through the War Department. I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and existence of our national Union, and the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long enough endured. I deem it proper to say that the first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union; and in every event the utmost care will be observed, consistently with the objects aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of, or interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens of any part of the country; and I hereby command the persons composing the combinations aforesaid to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days from this date.

Deeming that the present condition of public affairs presents an extraordinary occasion, I do



perse within twenty days, and summoned a special session of Congress on the 4th of July. The command was a matter of form, prescribed by act of Congress; the summons, a matter of necessity. On that Monday morning, too, the flag of the republic—how dear to those who were true to it, they never knew till then—was raised by spontaneous impulse upon every staff which stood on loyal ground; and from the Lakes to the Potomac, from the shores of the Atlantic to the banks of the Mississippi, the eye could hardly turn without meeting the bright banner which symbolized in its stripes the union and the initial struggle, and in its stars the consequent growth and glory of the nation and the government which the insurgents had banded themselves together to destroy.<sup>2</sup>

The response of the free states to the proclamation was so unanimous and so instantaneous that it seemed to be by acclamation. The official responses of the several governors became almost matters of course and of form. They were dignified, calm, and resolute messages. The people in Delaware were equally prompt and hearty in their devotion to the republic; and over the vast extent of country lying north of the Potomac and the Ohio, its intelligent millions, throughout all grades of the social scale, were at once busied in preparing for the coming war, or, at least, in cheering those who were thus engaged. President Lincoln doubtless asked for 75,000 men with some fear and trembling; for, since the nation came into political existence, it had never had half that number of men under arms together. But before a day had passed it was manifest that more than twice as many were ready at his call. The proclamation, however, was not addressed to the free states only; and all those who were not under the control of the insurgent government (except California, Oregon, and Kansas, on account of their remoteness) were called upon to furnish their several quotas. From the governors of all the slave states except Delaware and Maryland there came a flat, and, in some cases, a defiant and an insolent refusal. Governor Letcher, of Virginia, was content with being decided. Governors Ellis, of North Carolina, and Magoffin, of Kentucky, added to their refusal a denunciation of the course of the government as "wicked." Governor Reector, of Arkansas, stigmatized the demand as "adding insult to injury," and talked of defense against "Northern mendacity and usurpation." Governor Harris, of Tennessee, said he had not a man for coercion, but fifty thousand for the defense of the rights of his Southern, *i. e.*, his slaveholding brothers; while Governor Jackson, of Missouri, poured out his wrath in the words "illegal, unconstitutional, revolutionary, inhuman, diabolical."<sup>3</sup> The governors

<sup>2</sup> The feeling of the time when this spontaneous display of the stars and stripes lit up the face of all the North, found a truthful and spirited expression in this fine lyric, which appeared in the *Boston Transcript*:

THE FLAG. BY HORATIO WOODMAN.  
Why flashed that flag on Monday morn  
Across the startled sky?  
Why leaped the blood to every cheek,  
The tears to every eye?  
The hero in our four months' woe,  
The symbol of our might,  
Together sunk for one brief hour,  
To rise forever bright.  
The mind of Cromwell claimed his own,  
The blood of Naseby streamed  
Through hearts unconscious of the fire,  
Till that torn banner gleamed.  
The seeds of Milton's lofty thoughts,  
All hopeless of the spring,  
Broke forth in joy, as through them glowed  
The life great poets sing.  
Old Greece was young, and Homer true,  
And Dante's burning page  
Flamed in the red along our flag,  
And kindled holy rage.  
God's Gospel cheered the sacred cause  
In stern, prophetic strain,  
Which makes His rite our covenant,  
His Psalm our deep refrain  
Oh, sad for him whose light went out  
Before this glory came,  
Who could not live to feel his kin  
To every noble name!  
And sadder still to miss the joy  
That twenty millions know  
In Human Nature's holiday  
From all that makes life low.

<sup>3</sup> REPLIES FROM THE DISLOYAL GOVERNORS TO THE REQUISITION FOR TROOPS UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION.

From Governor Letcher, of Virginia.

"I have only to say, that the militia of Virginia will not be furnished to the powers at Washington for any such use or purpose as they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern states, and a requisition made upon me for such an object—an object, in my judgment, not within the purview of the Constitution or the act of 1795—will not be complied with. You have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and having done so, we will meet it in a spirit as determined as the administration has exhibited toward the South."

From Governor Ellis, of North Carolina.

"Your dispatch is received; and, if genuine, which its extraordinary character leads me to doubt, I have to say in reply, that I regard the levy of troops made by the administration for the purpose of subjugating the states of the South as in violation of the Constitution, and a usurpation of power. I can be no party to this wicked violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North Carolina."

From Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky.

"Your dispatch is received. I say emphatically that Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states."

From Governor Harris, of Tennessee.

"Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion, but fifty thousand, if necessary, for the defense of our rights, or those of our Southern brethren."

From Governor Reector, of Arkansas.

"In answer to your requisition for troops from Arkansas, to subjugate the Southern states, I have to say that none will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to injury. The people of this commonwealth are freemen, not slaves, and will defend to the last extremity their honor, lives, and property against Northern mendacity and usurpation."

From Governor Jackson, of Missouri.

"There can be, I apprehend, no doubt that these men are intended to make war upon the seceded states. Your requisition, in my judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in its objects, inhuman and diabolical, and can not be complied with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry on such an unholty crusade."

of Delaware and Maryland (Burton and Hicks) answered with bated breath, in the form of proclamation. The former announced that he found himself without power to comply with the requisition from the Secretary of War, but he recommended the raising of a regiment, which he announced would be at liberty to offer its services to the general government. The regiment was immediately raised and mustered into service; and before the year was out, this small state had furnished two thousand more men to the armies of the Union. Governor Hicks's proclamation was little else than a public wringing of the hands and bemoaning himself over the perplexities of his situation, which indeed were great and trying; for, although Maryland was loyal by a large majority, the disloyal men were actually numerous, and made up by their activity and defiant bearing for their inferiority of numbers. Among them, too, were the greater part of the wealthy slaveholders in the state, and the people of high social position. Governor Hicks endeavored to placate his constituents by assuring them that no troops should be sent from Maryland unless for the protection of the national capital, and reminding them that a special election would soon give them an opportunity of expressing their devotion to the Union, or their desire to see it broken up.<sup>4</sup>

The first step of the confederate government to meet this condition of affairs beyond their borders was to issue a call for 32,000 more troops. The governors of the seceded states thereupon issued flaming proclamations, denouncing, exhorting, commanding, and recommending; and in one instance, that of Governor Brown, of Georgia, the command took the needless, but, therefore, none the less dishonorable form of an interdiction of payment of any debt due to a resident of an anti-slavery state, while the recommendation shrewdly suggested that these confiscated funds should be paid into the treasury of Georgia.

These were preparations for future movements. But already the government of the United States had brought an important military operation to the verge of a successful issue. This was the re-enforcement of Fort Pickens—much the strongest fortification at the very important post of Pensacola Harbor in Florida, which it in a great measure commanded. At this post was a navy yard, which was used as a naval station for Gulf cruisers, and which was therefore rich in ammunition and supplies. The bay or harbor was defended first by Fort Pickens, a large and formidable stone casemated work, which stands on the point of Santa Rosa Island, a long and narrow strip of sand which almost closes the bay, and between which and the opposite shore there is a distance of but a mile and a half. Directly opposite Fort Pickens is a water-battery known as Fort M'Rea; and about two miles farther along the shore, and within less than the same distance of Fort Pickens, is a larger work than the former, which is called the Barrancas, or Fort San Carlos. The greedy eyes of the insurgents were early turned upon these important strong-holds and store-houses; and on the 12th of January a band of about five hundred men, led by Captain V. M. Randolph, of the United States Navy, and, it is said, by one Colonel Lomax, whose commission was in the Florida militia, appeared at the gates of the navy yard, and demanded its surrender to the State of Florida, which had that day passed its Ordinance of Secession. It was on this day that the *Star of the West* returned to New York, with the marks of two rebel cannon upon her hull, after her miserable attempt to re-enforce Fort Sumter. The scene at Pensacola Navy Yard was more shameful, and incomparably more calamitous. There was no attempt at decency on the part of Lieutenants E. Farrand and F. B. Renshaw, who were there in authority; and in their presence, and, it is asserted, by the command of the latter, the flag of the republic was hauled down amid the jeers of a drunken rabble, and the yard, with all its guns, stores, and ammunition, passed at a word into the hands of the insurgents.<sup>5</sup> On the same day, Commander Armstrong, of the Navy, caused the Barrancas to be abandoned; but he had the grace to spike the guns, and remove some, at least, of the munitions. Farrand and Renshaw were treacherously false to their colors; but Armstrong's plea was inability to cope with the forces which could be brought against him. At little Fort M'Rea, however, was a man of another mould. Lieutenant Adam J. Slemmer, a young officer of artillery, distinguished thus far only by his proficiency in the scientific branches of his profession, was stationed there; and he determined at once to do all that a brave and able soldier could to save the key to the position. The garrison under his command at Fort M'Rea was very small, but he did not despair. Hastily gathering from the Barrancas and the navy

Proclamation of Governor Hicks, of Maryland.

To the People of Maryland:

The unfortunate state of affairs now existing in the country has greatly excited the people of Maryland.

In consequence of our peculiar position, it is not to be expected that the people of the state can unanimously agree upon the best mode of preserving the honor and integrity of the state, and of maintaining within her limits that peace so earnestly desired by all good citizens.

The emergency is great. The consequences of a rash step will be fearful. It is the imperative duty of every true son of Maryland to do all that can tend to arrest the threatened evil. I therefore counsel the people, in all earnestness, to withhold their hands from whatever may tend to precipitate us into the gulf of discord and ruin gaping to receive us.

I counsel the people to abstain from all heated controversy upon the subject; to avoid all things that tend to crimination and recrimination, in order that the origin of our evil day may be forgotten now by every patriot in the earnest desire to avert from us its fruit.

All powers vested in the governor of the state will be strenuously exerted to preserve the peace and maintain inviolate the honor and integrity of Maryland.

I call upon the people to obey the laws, and to aid the constituted authorities in their endeavors to preserve the fair fame of our state untarnished.

I assure the people that no troops will be sent from Maryland, unless it may be for the defense of the national capital.

It is my intention in the future, as it has been my endeavor in the past, to preserve the people of Maryland from civil war; and I invoke the assistance of every true and loyal citizen to aid me in this emergency.

The people of this state will, in a short time, have the opportunity afforded them, in a special election of members of Congress of the United States, to express their devotion to the Union, or their desire to have it broken up.

T. H. HICKS

<sup>4</sup> Report of a Select Committee to Congress, Feb. 21, 1861.






LIEUTENANT A. J. SLEMMER.



LIEUTENANT J. H. GILMAN.


yard a few troops who had proved faithful among the faithless, and joining to these some marines from the war steamer Wyandotte, then at that station, he threw himself with his little force, numbering in all but about eighty men, into Fort Pickens, where he hoped, and it proved not without reason, that he could hold out until re-enforcements should arrive. He secured himself against immediate attack from Fort M'Rea by destroying all the ammunition not locked up in the magazine, and by spiking the guns and ramming the tompons so firmly into the muzzles that they had to be bored out. All the other works were unimportant compared to Fort Pickens, which commanded every gun upon them; and although the insurgents addressed themselves vigorously to the task of strengthening the old forts, Lieutenant Slemmer, by his bold and spirited move (in which he was ably supported by Lieutenant Gilman), had foiled their main purpose utterly.

The news of these transactions flew quickly to Washington, for as yet there was no attempt at secrecy of movement, and steps were taken which resulted in a strategic defeat for the rebels. Their attention and the interest of the whole country was mainly concentrated upon Fort Sumter. As a strategical point, this fort was absolutely worthless, owing to the unimportance of the city which it defended, either as a commercial port, a centre of population, or a base of operations. The honor of the flag and humanity to the garrison were the chief, if not the only questions to be considered in regard to the situation at Charleston Harbor. But Fort Pickens was one of the keys of the Gulf of Mexico, and Washington was the capital of the republic. While, therefore, the flag of the Union was flying defiantly from Fort Sumter, the concentration round it of all the available force of the confederated insurgents was enabling the government to secure more easily the




THE HARBOR OF PENSACOLA, FLORIDA, SHOWING THE FORTS, NAVY YARD, ETC.





ONE OF THE TEN FLANK CASEMATE BATTERIES AT FORT PICKENS, FLORIDA.



THE FLAG-STAFF BASTION AT FORT PICKENS, FLORIDA.





FRONT VIEW OF FORT PICKENS, PENSACOLA, SHOWING THE BALLY-FORT AND GLACIS.

immediate safety of the two most important points. On the 24th of January the war steamer Brooklyn was dispatched from Fortress Monroe with provisions, military stores, and a company of regular artillery under the command of Captain Vodge. The frigate Macedonian, and one or two other smaller vessels, were ordered to rendezvous at Santa Rosa Island; and these, upon an emergency, could have spared some hundreds of men for the defense of the fort. It was feared that this aid would not reach Lieutenant Slemmer in time; but, pending this movement, on the 28th of January a telegraphic dispatch was received at Washington from ex-Senator Mallory, of Florida, not addressed to President Buchanan, but intended for his eye, expressing the usual formal desire for peace, and proffering assurances that no attack would be made upon the fort if the *status quo* was not disturbed. The proposition was sufficiently insolent; but it suited the expectant, temporizing policy of President Buchanan to accept it, in order that the Peace Convention, then, as we have seen, in session, might carry on, without interruption, deliberations of which it was supposed that nothing

\* Extract from Instructions addressed to the Commanders of the *Macedonian*, *Brooklyn*, and other Naval Officers in command, and to Lieutenant Slemmer, commanding at Fort Pickens, Florida.

"In consequence of the assurances received from Mr. Mallory, in a telegram of yesterday to Messrs. Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler, with a request it should be laid before the President, that Fort Pickens would not be assaulted, and an offer of such an assurance to the same effect from Colonel Chase, for the purpose of avoiding a hostile collision, upon receiving satisfactory assurances from Mr. Mallory and Colonel Chase that Fort Pickens will not be attacked, you are instructed not to land the company on board the *Brooklyn* unless said fort shall be attacked, or preparations shall be made for its attack. The provisions necessary for the supply of the fort you will land. The *Brooklyn* and the other vessels of war on the station will remain, and you will exercise the utmost vigilance, and be prepared at a moment's warning to land the company at Fort Pickens, and you and they will instantly repel any attack on the fort. The President yesterday sent a special message to Congress commending the Virginia resolutions of compromise. The commissioners of different states are to meet here on Monday, the 4th of February, and it is important that during their session a collision of arms should be avoided, unless an attack should be made, or there should be preparations made for such an attack. In either event, the *Brooklyn* and the other vessels will act promptly.

"Your right, and that of the other officers in command at Pensacola, freely to communicate with the government by special messenger, and its right, in the same manner, to communicate with yourself and them, will remain intact as the basis on which the present instruction is given."

Letter from General Scott.

The following letter from Lieutenant General Scott was published in the *Washington National Intelligencer* of October 21, 1862:

October 30, 1860, I emphatically called the attention of the President to the necessity of strong garrisons in all the forts below the principal commercial cities of the Southern states, including, by name, the forts in Pensacola Harbor. October 31, I suggested to the Secretary of War that a circular should be sent at once to such of those forts as had garrisons, to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults. [See my "Views," since printed.]

After a long confinement to my bed in New York, I came to this city (Washington) December 12. Next day I personally urged upon the Secretary of War the same views, viz., strong garrisons in Southern forts—those of Charleston and Pensacola Harbor at once; those on Mobile Bay and the Mississippi, below New Orleans, next, etc., etc. I again pointed out the organized companies and the recruits at the principal depôts available for the purpose. The Secretary did not concur in any of my views, when I begged him to procure for me an early interview with the President, that I might make one effort more to save the forts and the Union.

By appointment, the Secretary accompanied me to the President December 15, when the same topics, secessionism, etc., were again pretty fully discussed. There being at the moment (in the opinion of the President) no danger of an early secession beyond South Carolina, the President, in reply to my arguments for immediately re-enforcing Fort Moultrie, and sending a garrison to Fort Sumter, said:

"The time has not arrived for doing so; that he should wait the action of the Convention of South Carolina, in the expectation that a commission would be appointed and sent to negotiate with him and Congress respecting the secession of the state and the property of the United States held within its limits; and that if Congress should decide against the secession, then he would send a re-enforcement, and telegraph the commanding officer (Major Anderson) of Fort Moultrie to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attack."

And the Secretary, with animation, added:

"We have a vessel of war (the *Brooklyn*) held in readiness at Norfolk, and he would then send three hundred men in her from Fort Monroe to Charleston."

To which I replied, first, that so many men could not be withdrawn from that garrison, but could be taken from New York. Next, that it would then be too late, as the South Carolina commissioners would have the game in their own hands by first using and then cutting the wires; that as there was not a soldier in Fort Sumter, any handful of armed secessionists might seize and occupy it, etc., etc.

Here the remark may be permitted, that if the Secretary's three hundred men had then, or some time later, been sent to Fort Moultrie and Sumter, both would now have been in the possession of the United States, and not a battery below them could have been erected by the secessionists; consequently, the access to these forts from the sea would now (the end of March) be unobstructed and free.

The same day, December 15, I wrote the following note:

"Lieutenant General Scott begs the President to pardon him for supplying in this note what he omitted to say this morning at the interview with which he was honored by the President.

"Long prior to the Force Bill (March 2, 1833), prior to the issue of his proclamation, and in part prior to the passage of the Ordinance of Nullification, President Jackson, under the act of

could be hoped if they were disturbed by the clash of an armed collision.<sup>6</sup> For more than two months this little re-enforcement was kept back by the singular course of events which we have heretofore followed at Washington. The *Brooklyn* and her attendant vessels lay wearily off and on the coast at the mouth of Pensacola Harbor. Lieutenant Slemmer kept up good heart and strict discipline; and, on their side, the insurgents undertook to obtain possession of the fort by treachery. A letter was smuggled within the walls addressed to a sergeant, offering him two thousand dollars and a commission in the rebel army to betray the fort, and to every private who would aid him five hundred dollars. The men proved incorruptible, and the sergeant was placed under arrest. This attempt was in itself a treacherous violation of the truce (but treachery, personal bad faith, had marked the insurrection from the very beginning), and would have justified the commander of the *Brooklyn* in throwing his men into Fort Pickens. But he was relieved of the consideration of the question by the immediate receipt of orders from Washington to effect the landing.<sup>7</sup> This was on the 12th of April; and it

March 3, 1867, 'authorizing the employment of the land and naval forces,' caused re-enforcement to be sent to Fort Moultrie, and a sloop of war (the *Natchez*), with two revenue cutters, to be sent to Charleston Harbor, in order, 1, to prevent the seizure of that fort by the nullifiers; and, 2, to enforce the execution of the revenue laws. General Scott himself arrived at Charleston the day after the passage of the Ordinance of Nullification, and many of the additional companies were then en route for the same destination.

"President Jackson familiarly said at the time, 'that by the assemblage of those forces for lawful purposes he was not making war upon South Carolina; but that, if South Carolina attacked them, it would be South Carolina that made war upon the United States.'

"General Scott, who received his first instructions (oral) from the President, in the temporary absence of the Secretary of War (General Cass), remembers those expressions well.

"Saturday night, December 15, 1860."

December 28. Again, after Major Anderson had gallantly and wisely thrown his handful of men from Fort Moultrie into Fort Sumter—learning that, on demand of South Carolina, there was great danger he might be ordered by the Secretary back to the less tenable work, or out of the harbor—I wrote this note:

"Lieutenant General Scott (who has had a bad night, and can scarcely hold up his head this morning) begs to express the hope to the Secretary of War—1. That orders may not be given for the evacuation of Fort Sumter. 2. That one hundred and fifty recruits may instantly be sent from Governor's Island to re-enforce that garrison, with ample supplies of ammunition and subsistence, including fresh vegetables, as potatoes, onions, turnips; and, 3. That one or two armed vessels be sent to support the said fort.

"Lieutenant General Scott avails himself of this opportunity also to express the hope that the recommendations heretofore made by him to the Secretary of War respecting Forts Jackson, St. Philip, Morgan, and Pulaski, and particularly in respect to Forts Pickens and M'Rea, and the Pensacola Navy Yard, in connection with the last two named works, may be reconsidered by the Secretary.

"Lieutenant General Scott will farther ask the attention of the Secretary to Forts Jefferson and Taylor, which are wholly national, being of far greater value even to the most distant points of the Atlantic coast and the people on the upper waters of the Missouri, Mississippi, and Ohio Rivers than to the State of Florida. There is only a feeble company at Key West for the defence of Fort Taylor, and not a soldier in Fort Jefferson to resist a handful of filibusters or a row-boat of pirates; and the Gulf, soon after the beginning of secession or revolutionary troubles in the adjacent states, will swarm with such nuisances."

December 30, I addressed the President again as follows:

"Lieutenant General Scott begs the President of the United States to pardon the irregularity of this communication. It is Sunday, the weather is bad, and General Scott is not well enough to go to church.

"But matters of the highest national importance seem to forbid a moment's delay, and, if misdeed by zeal, he hopes for the President's forgiveness.

"Will the President permit General Scott, without reference to the War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York Harbor to re-enforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and subsistence?

"It is hoped that a sloop of war and cutter may be ordered for the same purpose as early as to-morrow.

"General Scott will wait upon the President at any moment he may be called for."

The South Carolina commissioners had already been many days in Washington, and no movement of defense (on the part of the United States) was permitted.

I will here close my notice of Fort Sumter by quoting from some of my previous reports.

It would have been easy to re-enforce this fort down to about the 12th of February. In this long delay Fort Moultrie had been rearmed and greatly strengthened in every way by the rebels. Many powerful new land-batteries (besides a formidable raft) have been constructed. Hulks, too, have been sunk in the principal channel, so as to render access to Fort Sumter from the sea impracticable without first carrying all the lower batteries of the secessionists. The difficulty of re-enforcing has thus been increased ten or twelve fold. First, the late President refused to allow any attempt to be made, because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina commissioners.

Afterward Secretary Holt and myself endeavored in vain to obtain a ship of war for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger steamer *Star of the West*. That vessel, but for the hesitation of the master, might, as is generally believed, have delivered at the fort the

\* It was not till January 4 that, by the aid of Secretary Holt (a strong and loyal man), I obtained permission to send succor to the feeble garrison of Fort Taylor, Key West, and at the same time a company—Major Arnold's, from Boston—to occupy Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island. If this company had been three days later, the fort would have been preoccupied by Floridians. It is known that the rebels had their eyes upon these powerful forts, which govern the commerce of the Mexican Gulf, as Gibraltar and Malta govern that of the Mediterranean. With Forts Jefferson and Taylor, the rebels might have purchased an early European recognition.



was decided to make the attempt that very night. Early in the evening the boats were hoisted out, volunteers selected (for, volunteers being called for, the whole ship's crew came forward), the men well armed, and boats also

men and subsistence on board. This attempt at success failing, I next verbally submitted to the late cabinet either that succor be sent by ships of war, fighting their way by the batteries (increasing in strength daily), or that Major Anderson should be left to ameliorate his condition by the muzzles of his guns—that is, enforcing supplies by bombardment and by bringing to merchant vessels, helping himself (giving orders for payment), or, finally, be allowed to evacuate the fort, which, in that case, would be inevitable.

But, before any resolution was taken, the late Secretary of the Navy making difficulties about the want of suitable war vessels, another commissioner from South Carolina arrived, causing farther delay. When this had passed away, Secretaries Holt and Toney, Captain Ward, of the Navy, and myself, with the knowledge of the President (Buchanan), settled upon the employment, under the captain (who was eager for the expedition), of three or four small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey. At that time (late in January), I have but little doubt Captain Ward would have reached Fort Sumter with all his vessels. But he was kept back by something like a *truce* or armistice (made here), embracing Charleston and Pensacola Harbors, agreed upon between the late President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, etc., and this truce lasted to the end of that administration.

That plan and all others, without a squadron of war ships and a considerable army, competent to take and hold the many formidable batteries below Fort Sumter, and before the exhaustion of its subsistence, having been pronounced, from the change of circumstances, impracticable by Major Anderson, Captain Foster (chief engineer), and all the other officers of the fort, as well as by Brigadier General Totten, Chief of the Corps of Engineers; and, concurring in that opinion, I did not hesitate to advise (March 12) that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the fort, so long gallantly held by him and his companions, immediately on procuring suitable transportation to take them to New York. His relative weakness had steadily increased in the last eighteen days.

It was not till January 3 (when the first commissioners from South Carolina withdrew) that the permission I had solicited October 31 was obtained to admonish commanders of the few Southern forts with garrisons to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults. (Major Anderson was not among the admonished, being already straitly beleaguered.)

January 3. To Lieutenant Slemmer, commanding in Pensacola Harbor:

"The general-in-chief directs that you take measures to do the utmost in your power to prevent the seizure of either of the forts in Pensacola Harbor by surprise or assault, consulting first with the commander of the navy yard, who will probably have received instructions to co-operate with you." (This order was signed by Aid-de-camp Lay.)

It was just before the surrender of the Pensacola Navy Yard (January 12) that Lieutenant Slemmer, calling upon Commodore Armstrong, obtained the aid of some thirty common seamen or laborers (but no marines), which, added to his 46 soldiers, made up his numbers to 76 men, with whom this meritorious officer has since held Fort Pickens, and performed, working night and day, an immense amount of labor in mounting guns, keeping up a strong guard, etc.

Early in January I renewed, as has been seen, my solicitations to be allowed to re-enforce Fort Pickens, but a good deal of time was lost in vacillations. First, the President "thought, if no movement is made by the United States, Fort M'Key will probably not be occupied nor Fort Pickens attacked. In case of movements by the United States, which will doubtless be made known by the wires, there will be corresponding local movements, and the attempt to re-enforce will be useless."—(Quotation from a note made by my Aid-de-camp Lay, about January 12, of the President's reply to a message from me.) Next, it was doubted whether it would be safe to send re-enforcements in an unarmed steamer, and the want, as usual, of a suitable naval vessel—the Brooklyn being long held in reserve at Norfolk for some purpose unknown to me. Finally, after I had kept a body of three hundred recruits in New York Harbor for some time—and they would have been sufficient to re-enforce temporarily Fort Pickens and to occupy Fort M'Key also—the President, about January 18, permitted that the sloop-of-war Brooklyn should take a single company, ninety men, from Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, and re-enforce Lieutenant Slemmer in Fort Pickens, but without a surplus man for the neighboring fort, M'Key.

The Brooklyn, with Captain Vodge's company alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about January 22, and on the 29th, President Buchanan, having entered into a *quasi* armistice with certain leading seceders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused Secretaries Holt and Toney to instruct, in a joint note, the commanders of the war vessels off Pensacola, and Lieutenant Slemmer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Captain Vodge's company unless that fort should be attacked.\*

[That joint note I never saw until March 25, but supposed the armistice was consequent upon the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and was understood to terminate with it.]

Hearing, however, of the most active preparations for hostilities on the part of the seceders at Pensacola, by the erection of new batteries and arming Fort M'Key—that had not a gun mounted when it was seized—during the Peace Convention and since, I brought the subject to the notice of the new administration, when this note, dated March 12, to Captain Vodge, was agreed upon, viz.: "At the first favorable moment you will land with your company, re-enforce Fort Pickens, and hold the same till further orders." This order, in duplicate, left New York by two naval vessels about the middle of March, as the mail and the wires could not be trusted, and detached officers could not be substituted, for two had already been arrested and paroled by the authorities of Pensacola, dispatches taken from one of them, and a third, to escape like treatment, forced to turn back when near that city. Thus those authorities have not ceased to make war upon the United States since the capture by them of the navy yard, January 12.

Respectfully submitted,

WINFIELD SCOTT.

Head-quarters of the Army, Washington, March 30, 1861.

Letter from ex-President Buchanan in Reply to General Scott.

To the Editors of the National Intelligencer:

On Wednesday last I received the *National Intelligencer* containing General Scott's address to the public. This is throughout an undisguised censure of my conduct during the last months of the administration in regard to the seven cotton states now in rebellion. From our past relations I was greatly surprised at the appearance of such a paper. In one aspect, however, it was highly gratifying. It has justified me, nay, it has rendered it absolutely necessary, that I should no longer remain silent in respect to charges which have been long vaguely circulating, but are now indorsed by the responsible name of General Scott.

I. The first and most prominent among these charges is my refusal immediately to garrison nine enumerated fortifications, scattered over six of the Southern states, according to the recommendation of General Scott in his "views" addressed to the War Department on the 29th and 30th of October, 1860; and it has even been alleged that if this had been done it might have prevented the civil war.

This refusal is attributed, without the least cause, to the influence of Governor Floyd. All my cabinet must bear me witness that I was the President myself, responsible for all the acts of the administration; and certain it is that during the last six months previous to the 29th of December, 1860, the day on which he resigned his office, after my request, he exercised less influence on the administration than any other member of the cabinet. Mr. Holt was immediately thereafter transferred from the Post-office Department to that of War; so that, from this time until the 4th of March, 1861, which was by far the most important period of the administration, he performed the duties of Secretary of War to my entire satisfaction.

But why did I not immediately garrison these nine fortifications in such a manner, to use the language of General Scott, "as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup-de-main ridiculous?" There is one answer, both easy and conclusive, even if other valid reasons did not exist. There were no available troops within reach which could be sent to these fortifications. To have attempted a military operation on a scale so extensive by any means within the President's power would have been simply absurd. Of this General Scott himself seems to have been convinced, for on the day after the date of his first "views" he addressed (on the 30th of October) supplemental views to the War Department, in which he states, "There is one (regular) company in Boston, one here (at the Narrows), one at Pittsburgh, one at Augusta, Ga., one at Baton Rouge"—in all, five companies only within reach to garrison or re-enforce the forts mentioned in the "views."

Five companies—four hundred men—to occupy and re-enforce nine fortifications in six highly-excited Southern states! The force "within reach" was so entirely inadequate that nothing more need be said on the subject. To have attempted such a military operation with so feeble a force, and the presidential election impending, would have been an invitation to collision and secession. Indeed, if the whole American army, consisting then of only 16,000 men, had been "within reach," they would have been scarcely sufficient for this purpose. Such was our want of troops that General Scott, believing, in opposition to the opinion of the committee raised in the House of Representatives, that the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln might be interrupted by military force, was only able to assemble at Washington, so late as the 4th of March, 653 men, rank and file of the army; and, to make up this number, even the sappers and miners were brought from West Point.

But why was there no greater force within reach? This question could be better answered by General Scott himself than any other person. Our small regular army, with the exception of a

\* It was known at the Navy Department that the Brooklyn, with Captain Vodge on board, would be obliged, in open sea, to stand off on Fort Pickens, and in rough weather might sometimes be fifty miles off. Indeed, if ten miles at sea, the fort might have been attacked and easily carried before the re-enforcements could have reached the beach, in open sea, where alone it could land.

brought up from the Sabine and the St. Louis. The enemy was expected to resist the landing, and was known to have stationed strong coast-guards for that purpose. After the moon had set, between ten and eleven o'clock,

few hundred men, were out of reach, on our remote frontiers, where it had been continuously stationed for years to protect the inhabitants and the emigrants on their way thither against the attacks of hostile Indians. All were insufficient, and both General Scott and myself had endeavored in vain to prevail upon Congress to raise several additional regiments for this purpose. In recommending this augmentation of the army, the general states, in his report to the War Department of November, 1857, that "it would not more than furnish the re-enforcements now greatly needed in Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Washington (T.), Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, leaving not a company for Utah." And again, in his report of November, 1858, he says:

"This want of troops to give reasonable security to our citizens in distant settlements, including emigrants on the plains, can scarcely be too strongly stated; but I will only add, that as often as we have been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in order to re-enforce another, the weakened points have been instantly attacked or threatened with formidable invasion."

These "views" of General Scott exhibit the crude notions then prevailing, even among intelligent and patriotic men, on this subject of secession. In the first sentence, the general, while stating that, "to save time, the right of secession may be conceded," yet immediately says, "this is instantly balanced by the correlative right on the part of the federal government against an *interior* state or states to re-establish, by force if necessary, its former continuity of territory." (For this he cites *Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy*, last chapter. It may be there, but I have been unable to find it.) While it is difficult to ascertain his precise meaning in this passage, he renders what he did not mean quite clear in his supplementary "views." In these he says, "It will be seen that the 'views' only apply to a case of secession that makes a gap in the present Union." The filling off say of Texas, or of all the Atlantic states from the Potomac south (the very case which has occurred), was not within the scope of General Scott's "provisional remedies;" that is to say, to establish by force, if necessary, the continuity of our territory. In his "views" he also states as follows: "But break this glorious Union by whatever line or lines that political madness may contrive, and there would be no hope of reuniting the fragments except by the laceration and despotism of the sword. To effect such result, the intestine wars of our Mexican neighbors would, in comparison with ours, sink into mere child's play." In the general's opinion, "a smaller evil (than these intestine wars) would be to allow the fragments of the great republic to form themselves into new confederacies, probably four." He then points out what ought to be the boundaries between the new unions, and at the end of each goes so far as even to indicate the cities which ought to be the capitals of the three first on this side of the Rocky Mountains, to wit, "Columbia, South Carolina;" "Alton or Quincy, Illinois;" and "Albany, New York," excluding Washington City altogether. This indication of capitals contained in the original now in my possession is curiously omitted in the version published in the *National Intelligencer*. He designates "no capital for the fourth union on the Pacific. The reader will judge what encouragement these views, proceeding from so distinguished a source, must have afforded to the secessionists of the cotton states.

I trust I have said enough, and more than enough, to convince every mind why I did not, with a force of five companies, attempt to re-enforce Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi; Fort Morgan, below Mobile; Forts Pickens and M'Key, in Pensacola Harbor; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston Harbor; and Fort Monroe, in Virginia.

These "views," both original and supplementary, were published by General Scott in the *National Intelligencer* of January 18, 1861, at the most important and critical period of the administration. Their publication at that time could do no possible good, and might do much harm. To have published them without the President's knowledge or consent was as much in violation of the sacred confidence which ought to prevail between the commanding general of the army and the commander-in-chief as it would have been for the Secretary of War to publish the same documents without his authority. What is of more importance, their publication was calculated injuriously to affect the compromise measures then pending before Congress and the country, and to encourage the secessionists in their mad and wicked attempt to shatter the Union into fragments. From the great respect which I then entertained for the general I passed it over in silence.

It is worthy of remark that, soon after the presidential election, representations of what these "views" contained, of more or less correctness, were unfortunately circulated, especially throughout the South. The editors of the *National Intelligencer*, in assigning a reason for their publication, state that both in public prints and in public speeches allusions had been made to them, and some misapprehensions of their character had got abroad.

II. and III. General Scott states that he arrived in Washington on the 12th, and, accompanied by the Secretary of War, held a conversation with the President on the 15th of December. While I have no recollection whatever of this conversation, he doubtless states correctly that I did refuse to send three hundred men to re-enforce Major Anderson at Fort Moultrie, who had not then removed to Fort Sumter. The reason for this refusal is manifest to all who recollect the history of the time. But twelve days before, in the annual message of the 3d of December, I had urged upon Congress the adoption of amendments to the Constitution of the same character with those subsequently proposed by Mr. Crittenden, called the "Crittenden Compromise." At that time high hopes were entertained throughout the country that these would be adopted. Besides, I believed, and this correctly, as the event proved, that Major Anderson was then in no danger of attack. Indeed, he and his command were then treated with marked kindness by the authorities and people of Charleston. Under these circumstances, to have sent such a force there would have been only to impair the hope of compromise, to provoke collision, and disappoint the country.

There are some details of this conversation in regard to which the general's memory must be defective. At present I shall specify only one. I could not have stated that on a future contingent occasion I would telegraph "Major Anderson, of Fort Moultrie, to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumter) against attack," because, with prudent precaution, this had already been done several days before, through a special messenger sent to Major Anderson for this very purpose. I refer to Major Buell, of the army.

The general's supplementary note of the same day, presenting to me General Jackson's conduct in 1833, during the period of nullification, as an example, requires no special notice. Even if the cases were not entirely different, I had previously determined upon a policy of my own, as will appear from my annual message. This was, at every hazard, to collect the customs at Charleston, and outside at the port, if need be, in a vessel of war. Mr. Colcock, the existing collector, as I had anticipated, resigned his office about the end of December, and immediately thereafter I nominated to the Senate, as his successor, a suitable person, prepared at any personal risk to do his duty. That body, however, throughout the entire session, declined to act on this nomination. Thus, without a collector, it was rendered impossible to collect the revenue.

IV. General Scott's statement alleges that "the Brooklyn, with Captain Vodge's company alone, left the Chesapeake for Fort Pickens about January 22, and on the 29th President Buchanan, having entered into a *quasi* armistice with certain leading seceders at Pensacola and elsewhere, caused Secretaries Holt and Toney to instruct, in a joint note, the commander of the war vessels off Pensacola, and Lieutenant Slemmer, commanding Fort Pickens, to commit no act of hostility, and not to land Captain Vodge's command unless the fort should be attacked." He afterward states, within brackets, "That joint note I never saw, but supposed the armistice was consequent upon the meeting of the Peace Convention at Washington, and was understood to terminate with it."

These statements betray a singular want of memory on the part of General Scott. It is scarcely credible that this very joint note, presented in such odious colors, was submitted to General Scott on the day it was prepared (January 29), and met his entire approbation. I would not venture to make this assertion if I did not possess conclusive evidence to prove it. On that day Secretary Holt addressed me a note, from which the following is an extract: "I have the satisfaction of saying that on submitting the paper to General Scott, he expressed himself satisfied with it, saying that there could be no objection to the arrangement in a military point of view or otherwise." This requires no comment. That the general had every reason to be satisfied with the arrangement will appear from the following statement:

A revolutionary outbreak had occurred in Florida; the troops of the United States had been expelled from Pensacola and the adjacent navy yard; and Lieutenant Slemmer, of the artillery, with his brave little command, had been forced to take refuge in Fort Pickens, where he was in imminent danger every moment of being captured by a vastly superior force. Owing to the interruption of regular communications, Secretary Holt did not receive information of these events until several days after their occurrence, and then through a letter addressed to a third person. He instantly informed the President of the fact, and re-enforcements, provisions, and military stores were dispatched by the Brooklyn to Fort Pickens without a moment's unnecessary delay. She left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of January.

Well-founded apprehensions were, however, entertained at the time of her departure that the re-enforcements, with the vessels of war at no great distance from Fort Pickens, could not arrive in time to defend it against the impending attack. In this state of suspense, and while Lieutenant Slemmer was in extreme peril, Senators Slidell, Hunter, and Bigler received a telegraphic dispatch from Senator Mallory, of Florida, dated at Pensacola on the 28th of January, with the urgent request that they should lay it before the President. This dispatch expressed an earnest desire to maintain the peace, as well as the most positive assurance that no attack would be made on Fort Pickens if the present status should be preserved.

This proposal was carefully considered, both with a view to the safety of the fort and to the unhappy effect which an actual collision, either at that or any other point, might produce on the



the Brooklyn got under way, and moved toward the shore as slowly and as silently as possible. When the soundings showed but seven fathoms of water, she hove to, and the troops were disembarked. Under command of

Peace Convention then about to assemble at Washington. The result was, that a joint dispatch was carefully prepared by the Secretaries of War and Navy accepting the proposal, with important modifications, which was transmitted by telegraph on the 29th of January to Lieutenant Slemmer and to the naval commanders near the station. It is too long for transcription; suffice it to say, it was carefully guarded at every point for the security of the fort and its free communication with Washington.

The result was highly fortunate. The *Brooklyn* had a long passage. Although she left Fortress Monroe on the 24th of January, she did not arrive at Pensacola until the 6th of February. In the mean time, Fort Pickens, with Lieutenant Slemmer (whose conduct deserves high commendation) and his brave little band, were placed, by virtue of this arrangement, in perfect security until an adequate force had arrived to defend it against any attack. The fort is still in our possession. Well might General Scott have expressed his satisfaction with this arrangement. The general was correct in the supposition that this arrangement was to expire on the termination of the Peace Convention.

V. But we now come to an important period, when dates will be essentially necessary to disentangle the statements of General Scott. The South Carolina commissioners were appointed on the 22d, and arrived in Washington on the 27th of December. The day after their arrival it was announced that Major Anderson had removed from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter. This rendered them furious. On the same day they addressed an angry letter to the President, demanding the surrender of Fort Sumter. The President answered this letter on the 30th of December with a peremptory refusal. This brought forth a reply from the commissioners on the 2d of January, 1861, of such an insulting character that the President instantly returned it to them with the following indorsement: "This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a character that he declines to receive it." From that time forward all friendly, political, and personal intercourse finally ceased between the revolutionary senators and the President, and he was severely attacked by them in the Senate, and especially by Mr. Jefferson Davis. Indeed, their intercourse had previously been of the coldest character ever since the President's anti-secession message at the commencement of the session of Congress.

Under these changed circumstances, General Scott, by note on Sunday, the 30th of December, addressed the following inquiry to the President:

"Will the President permit General Scott, without reference to the War Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two hundred and fifty recruits from New York Harbor to re-enforce Fort Sumter, together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and subsistence? It is hoped that a sloop-of-war and cutter may be ordered for the same purpose 'to-morrow.'"

The general seems not to have then known that Mr. Floyd was out of office.

Never did a request meet a more prompt compliance. It was received on Sunday evening, December 30. On Monday morning I gave instructions to the War and Navy Departments, and on Monday evening General Scott came to congratulate me that the secretaries had issued the necessary orders to the army and navy officers, and that they were in his possession. The *Brooklyn*, with troops, military stores, and provisions, was to sail forthwith from Fortress Monroe for Fort Sumter. I am, therefore, utterly at a loss to imagine why the general, in his statement, should have asserted that "the South Carolina commissioners had already been many days in Washington, and no movement of defense (on the part of the United States) was permitted." These commissioners arrived in Washington on the 27th of December; General Scott's request was made to the President on the 30th; it was complied with on the 31st, and a single day is all that represents the "many days" of the general.

Again: General Scott asserts, in the face of these facts, that the President refused to allow any attempt to be made—to re-enforce Fort Sumter—because he was holding negotiations with the South Carolina commissioners. And still again, that "afterward Secretary Holt and myself endeavored in vain to obtain a ship-of-war for the purpose, and were finally obliged to employ the passenger steamer *Star of the West*." Will it be believed that the substitution of the *Star of the West* for the powerful war steamer *Brooklyn*, of which he now complains, was by advice of General Scott himself? I have never heard that doubted until I read the statement.

At the interview already referred to between the general and myself, on the evening of Monday, the 31st of December, I suggested to him that, although I had not received the South Carolina commissioners in their official capacity, but merely as private gentlemen, yet it might be considered an improper act to send the *Brooklyn* with re-enforcements to Fort Sumter until I had received an answer from them to my letter of the preceding day; that the delay could not continue more than forty-eight hours. He promptly concurred in this suggestion as gentlemanly and proper, and the orders were not transmitted to the *Brooklyn* on that evening. My anticipations were correct, for on the morning of the 2d of January I received their insolent note, and sent it back to them. In the mean time, however, the general had become convinced, by the representations of a gentleman whom I forbear to name, that the better plan, as the Secretaries of War and the Navy informed me, to secure secrecy and success, and reach the fort, would be to send a fast side-wheel mercantile steamer from New York with the re-enforcement. Accordingly, the *Star of the West* was selected for this duty. The substitution of this mercantile steamer for the *Brooklyn*, which would have been able to defend herself in case of attack, was reluctantly yielded by me to the high military judgment of General Scott.

The change of programme required a brief space of time; but the *Star of the West* left New York for Charleston on the evening of the 5th of January. On the very day, however, when this ill-fated steamer left New York, a telegram was dispatched by General Scott to Colonel Scott to countermand her departure; but it did not reach her destination until after she had gone to sea. The reason for this countermand shall be stated in the language of Secretary Holt, to be found in a letter addressed by him to Mr. Thompson, the late Secretary of the Interior, on the 5th of March, 1861, and published in the *National Intelligencer*. Mr. Holt says:

"The countermand spoken of (by Mr. Thompson) was not more cordially sanctioned by the President than it was by General Scott and myself; not because of any dissent from the orders on the part of the President, but because of a letter received that day from Major Anderson, stating, in effect, that he regarded himself secure in his position; and yet more from intelligence which late on Saturday evening (January 5, 1861) reached the department, that a heavy battery had been erected among the sand-hills at the entrance to Charleston Harbor, which would probably destroy any unarmed vessel (and such was the *Star of the West*) which might attempt to make its way to Fort Sumter. This important information satisfied the government that there was no present necessity for sending re-enforcements, and that, when sent, they should go, not in a vessel of commerce, but of war. Hence the countermand was dispatched by telegraph to New York; but the vessel had sailed a short time before it reached the officer (Colonel Scott) to whom it was addressed."

A statement of these facts, established by dates, proves conclusively that the President was not only willing, but anxious, in the briefest period, to re-enforce Fort Sumter.

On the 4th of January, the day before the departure of the *Star of the West* from New York, as General Scott in his statement admits, succor was sent to Fort Taylor, Key West, and to Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island, which reached those points in time for their security. He nevertheless speculates on the consequences which might have followed had the re-enforcements not reached their destination in due time; and even expresses the extraordinary opinion that, with the possession of these forts, "the rebels might have purchased an early recognition."

I shall next advert to the statement that the expedition, under Captain Ward, "of three or four small steamers belonging to the Coast Survey," was kept back by something like a truce or armistice [made here], embracing Charleston and Pensacola Harbors, agreed upon between the late President and certain principal seceders of South Carolina, Florida, Louisiana, etc. And this truce lasted to "the end of the administration." Things altogether distinct in their nature are often so blended in this statement that it is difficult to separate them. Such is eminently the case in connecting the facts relative to Charleston with Pensacola.

Having already treated of the charge of having kept back re-enforcements from Pensacola, I have now to say something of the charge of having also kept them back from Charleston. Neither a truce, nor quasi truce, nor any thing like it, was ever concluded between the President and any human authority concerning Charleston. On the contrary, the South Carolina commissioners, first and last, and all the time, were informed that the President could never surrender Fort Sumter, nor deprive himself of the most entire liberty to send re-enforcements to it whenever it was believed to be in danger, or requested by Major Anderson. It is strange that General Scott was not apprised of this well-known fact. It was, then, with some astonishment that I learned from the statement of the general that he had, on the 12th of March, 1861, advised that Major Anderson should be instructed to evacuate the fort as soon as suitable transportation could be procured to carry himself and his command to New York. A military necessity for a capitulation may have existed in case there should be an attack upon the fort, or a demand for its surrender, but surely none such could have existed for its voluntary surrender and abandonment.

Probably that to which the general means to refer was not the *quasi*, but the actual truce of arms concluded at Charleston on the 11th of January, 1861, between Governor Pickens and Major Anderson, without the knowledge of the President. It was on the 9th of January that the *Star of the West*, under the American flag, was fired upon in the harbor of Charleston, by order of Governor Pickens. Immediately after this outrage, Major Anderson sent a flag to the governor, stating that he presumed the act had been unauthorized, and for that reason he had not opened fire from Fort Sumter on the adjacent batteries; but demanding its disavowal, and, if this were not sent in a reasonable time, he would consider it war, and fire on any vessel that attempted to leave the har-

Lieutenant Albert N. Smith, they pulled off with swift and steady strokes and made for a point three miles from the fort, from which it was the intention that they should march to their destination. But the surf was found to

be too rough. Two days after this occurrence, on the 11th of January, Governor Pickens had the audacity to demand of Major Anderson the surrender of the fort. In his answer of the same date the major made the following proposition: "Should your excellency deem fit, previous to a resort to arms, to refer this matter to Washington, it would afford me the sincere pleasure to depute one of my officers to accompany any messenger you may deem proper to be the bearer of your demand." This proposition was promptly accepted by the governor, and, in pursuance thereof, he sent, on his part, Hon. J. W. Wayne, the attorney general of South Carolina, to Washington, while Major Anderson deputed Lieutenant Hall, of the United States Army, to accompany him. These gentlemen arrived together in Washington on the evening of the 13th of January, when the President obtained the first knowledge of the transaction. But it will be recollected that no time intervened between the return of the *Star of the West* to New York and the arrival of the messenger bearing a copy of the truce at Washington within which it would have been possible to send re-enforcements to Fort Sumter. Both events occurred about the same time.

Thus a truce, or suspension of arms, was concluded between the parties, to continue until the question of the surrender of the fort should be decided by the President. Until this decision, Major Anderson had placed it out of his own power to ask for re-enforcements, and equally out of the power of the government to send them without a violation of public faith. This was what writers on public law denominate "a partial truce, under which hostilities are suspended only in certain places, as between a town and the army besieging it." It is possible that the President, under the laws of war, might have annulled this truce upon due notice to the opposite party; but neither General Scott nor any other person ever suggested this expedient. This would have been to cast a reflection on Major Anderson, who, beyond question, acted from the highest and purest motives. Did General Scott ever propose to violate this truce during its existence? If he did, I am not now, and never was, aware of the fact. Indeed, I think he would have been one of the last men in the world to propose such a measure.

Colonel Hayne did not deliver the letter which he bore from Governor Pickens, demanding the surrender of the fort, to the President until the 31st of January. The documents containing the reasons for this worrying delay were communicated to Congress in a special message of the 8th of February, to which I refer the reader. On the 5th of February, the Secretary of War, under the instructions of the President, gave a peremptory refusal to this demand, in an able and comprehensive letter, reviewing the whole subject, explaining and justifying the conduct of the President throughout. Its concluding sentence is both eloquent and emphatic:

"If," says Mr. Holt, "with all the multiplied proofs which exist of the President's anxiety for peace, and of the earnestness with which he has pursued it, the authorities of that state shall assault Fort Sumter, and imperil the lives of the handful of brave and loyal men shut up within its walls, and thus plunge our country into the horrors of civil war, then upon them and those they represent must rest the responsibility."

The truce was then ended, and General Scott is incorrect in stating "that it lasted to the end of that administration."

An expedition was quietly fitted out at New York, under the supervision of General Scott, to be ready for any contingency. He arranged its details, and regarded the re-enforcements thus provided for as sufficient. This was ready to sail for Fort Sumter on five hours' notice. It is of this expedition that General Scott thus speaks:

"At that time, when this (the truce) had passed away, Secretaries Holt and Toney, Captain Ward, of the Navy, and myself, with the knowledge of the President, settled upon the employment, under the captain, of three or four steamers belonging to the Coast Survey, but he was kept back by the truce."

A strange inconsistency. The truce had expired with Mr. Holt's letter to Colonel Hayne on the 5th of February, and General Scott, in his statement, says, "it would have been easy to re-enforce this fort down to about the 12th of February." Why, then, did not the re-enforcements proceed? This was simply because of communications from Major Anderson. It was most fortunate that they did not proceed, because the three or four small steamers which were to bear them would never have reached the fort, and in the attempt must have been captured or destroyed. The vast inadequacy of the force provided to accomplish the object was demonstrated by information received from Major Anderson at the War Department on the last day of the administration.

I purposely forbear at present to say more on this subject, lest I might, however unintentionally, do injustice to one or more of the parties concerned, in consequence of the brevity required by the nature of this communication. The facts relating to it, with the appropriate accompaniments, have been fully presented in a historical review, prepared a year ago, which will ere long be published. This review contains a sketch of the four last months of my administration. It is impartial; at least such is my honest conviction. That it has not yet been published has arisen solely from an apprehension, no longer entertained, that something therein might be unjustly perverted into an interference with the government in a vigorous prosecution of the war for the maintenance of the Constitution and the restoration of the Union, which was far, very far, from my intention.

After a careful retrospect, I can solemnly declare before God and my country that I can not reproach myself with any act of commission or omission since the existing troubles commenced. I have never doubted that my countrymen would yet do me justice. In my special message of the 8th of January, 1861, I presented a full and fair exposition of the alarming condition of the country, and urged Congress either to adopt measures of compromise, or, failing in this, to prepare for the last alternative. In both aspects my recommendation was disregarded. I shall close this document with a quotation of the last sentences of that message, as follows:

"In conclusion, it may be permitted me to remark that I have often warned my countrymen of the dangers which now surround us. This may be the last time I shall refer to the subject officially. I feel that my duty has been faithfully, though it may be imperfectly, performed; and, whatever the result may be, I shall carry to my grave the consciousness that I at least meant well for my country."

Your obedient servant,  
JAMES BUCHANAN.

Wheatland, near Lancaster, October 25, 1862.

#### Rejoinder of Lieutenant General Scott.

To the Editors of the National Intelligencer:

I regret to find myself in a controversy with the venerable ex-President Buchanan.

Recently (Oct. 21) you published my official report to President Lincoln, dated March 30, 1861, giving a summary of my then recent connection with our principal Southern forts, which, I am sorry to perceive, has given offense to the ex-President. That result, purely incidental, did not enter into my purpose in drawing up the paper, but, on reflection, I suppose that, under the circumstances, offense was unavoidable.

Let it be remembered that the new president had a right to demand of me—the immediate commander of the army—how it had happened that the incipient rebels had been allowed to seize several of those forts, and from the bad condition of others were likely to gain possession of them also. Primarily, the blame rested exclusively on me. Hence, to vindicate my sworn allegiance to the Union and professional conduct, the report was submitted to President Lincoln at an early day (in his administration), and recently to the world.

To that short paper ex-President Buchanan publishes a reply, of double the length, in *The Intelligencer* of the 1st instant. My rejoinder, from necessity, if not taste, will be short, for I hold the pen in a rheumatic hand, and am without aid-de-camp or amanuensis, and without a printed document and my own official papers.

Unable, in my present condition, to make an analysis of the ex-President's long reply, I avail myself of a substitute furnished by an accidental visitor, who has kindly marked the few points which he thinks may require some slight notice at my hands.

1. To account for not having garrisoned sufficiently the Southern forts named against anticipated treason and rebellion, according to my many recommendations, beginning Oct. 29, 1860, repeated the next day, and again, more earnestly, Dec. 13, 15, 28, and 30, the ex-President says, "There were no available troops within reach."

Now, although it is true that, with or without the ex-President's approbation, the Secretary of War had nearly denuded our whole eastern sea-board of troops in order to augment our forces in Texas and Utah, I nevertheless pointed out, at several of the above dates, the 600 recruits (about) which we had in the harbor of New York and at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, nearly all organized into temporary companies, and tolerably drilled and disciplined—quite equal to the purpose in question—besides the five companies of regulars near at hand, making about 1000 men.

These disposable troops would have given (say) two hundred men to the twin forts Jackson and St. Philip, below New Orleans; an equal number to Fort Morgan, below Mobile; a re-enforcement of one hundred men to Fort Pickens, Pensacola Harbor; and a garrison of the like number to the twin fort M'Rea; a garrison of one hundred men to Fort Jefferson, Tortugas Island, and the same to Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, which, like Forts Jackson, St. Philip, Morgan, and M'Rea, had not at the time a soldier—leaving about two hundred men for the twin forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston Harbor, where there were two weak companies, making less than ninety men. Fortress Monroe had already a garrison of some eight companies, one or two of which might, in the earlier period of danger, have been spared till volunteers could have been obtained, notwithstanding printed handbills were every where posted in Eastern Virginia by an eccentric character, inviting recruits to take that most important work.

Now I have nowhere said that either of those forts, even with the re-enforcement indicated, would have had a war garrison. Certainly not. My proposition was to put each in a condition





GUNBOAT "WYANDOTTE."

STORESHIP "SUPPLY."

FRIGATE "SABINE."





PORT PICKENS, FLORIDA

U. S. S. SLOOP "BROOKLYN."

GUNBOAT "CRUSADER."

"ST. LOUIS."



be so heavy that Lieutenant Smith regarded the danger from the elements as more to be feared than that from the enemy; and he therefore instantly formed the resolution of passing directly up and landing in front of the fort. It was accomplished without attack; and he had the satisfaction of seeing the gates of the fort close upon the full re-enforcement. The boats returned to the ships, and, taking off the marines from the Brooklyn, placed them safely too in Fort Pickens, and pulled back past Fort M'Rea and the Barrancas in broad daylight unharmed. It will be remembered, however, that this re-enforcement was only the result of a hasty attempt to meet the great emergency of the period immediately succeeding the seizure of the forts, the navy yard, and the arsenal by the insurgents, in the early stages of the movement for secession. The disgraceful truce had intervened. A few days after the Brooklyn had landed her artillerists, two large transports, the Atlantic and the Illinois, arrived off Santa Rosa, bringing seven hundred and fifty men, under the command of Colonel Brown, horses for a company of flying artillery, muskets, other munitions of war, and provisions. Under protection of the Sabine, of 50 guns, the Brooklyn, 14 guns, the St. Louis, 22 guns, the Water-Witch, the Wyandotte, the Crusader, and the Mohawk, of 10 guns each, to which was added afterward the Powhatan, a powerful steamer carrying 12 heavy guns, this important re-enforcement was landed—the troops in a single night; the horses, munitions of war, and provisions in the course of three days; and the 20th of April saw Fort Pickens, the most important post upon the Gulf, amply garrisoned and provisioned, and under the

as I expressly said, to guard against a surprise or *coup-de-main* (an off-hand attack, one without full preparation).

That these movements of small detachments might easily have been made in November and December, 1860, and some of them as late as the following month, can not be doubted. But the ex-President sneers at my "weak device" for saving the forts.

He forgets what the gallant Anderson did with a handful of men in Fort Sumter, and leaves out of the account what he might have done with a like handful in Fort Moultrie, even without farther augmentation of men to divide between the garrisons. Twin forts, on the opposite sides of a channel, not only give a cross-fire on the head of an attack, but the strength of each is more than doubled by the flanking fire of the other. The same remarks apply to the gallant Lieutenant Slemmer, with his handful of brave men, in Fort Pickens. With what contempt might he not have looked upon Chase or Bragg in front of him, with varying masses of from 2000 to 6000 men, if Fort Pickens and its twin fort, M'Rea, had had between them only 200 men!

I have thus shown that small garrisons would, at first, have sufficed for the other twins, Forts Jackson and St. Philip also. My object was to save to the Union, by any means at hand, all those works, until Congress could have time to organize a call for volunteers—a call which the President, for such a purpose, might no doubt have made, without any special legislation, with the full approbation of every loyal man in the Union.

2. The ex-President almost loses his amiability in having his neglect of the forts "attributed," as he says, "without the least cause, to the influence of Governor Floyd;" and he adds, "All my cabinet must bear me witness that I was the President myself, responsible for all the acts of the administration."

Now, notwithstanding this broad assumption of responsibility, I should be sorry to believe that Mr. Buchanan specially consented to the removal by Secretary Floyd of 115,000 extra muskets and rifles, with all their implements and ammunition, from Northern repositories to Southern arsenals, so that, on the breaking out of the maturing rebellion, they might be found without cost, except to the United States, in the most convenient positions for distribution among the insurgents. So, too, of the 120 or 140 pieces of heavy artillery which the same secretary ordered from Pittsburgh to Ship Island, in Lake Borgne, and Galveston, Texas, for forts not yet erected! Accidentally learning, early in March, that, under this posthumous order, the shipment of these guns had commenced, I communicated the fact to Secretary Holt (acting for Secretary Cameron) just in time to defeat the robbery.

But on this point we may hear ex-Secretary Floyd himself. At Richmond he expressly claimed the honor of defeating all my plans and solicitations respecting the forts, and received his reward—it being there universally admitted that, but for that victory over me, there could have been no rebellion!

3. Mr. Buchanan complains that I published, without permission, January 18, 1861, my views, addressed to him and the Secretary of War, October 29 and 30, 1860. But that act was caused, as I explained to him at the time, by the misrepresentations of the views in one of the earlier speeches of the same ex-secretary after his return to Virginia.

4. One of my statements, complaining of the joint countermand sent through the Secretaries of War and Navy to prevent the landing at Fort Pickens of Captain Vodge's company *unless the fort should be attacked*, is cited by the ex-President to prove a "singular want of memory" on my part; and a note from Secretary Holt is adduced to show that I had entirely approved of the joint countermand the day (Jan. 20) that it was prepared. Few persons are as little liable to make a misstatement by accident as Mr. Holt, and no one more incapable of making one by design; yet I have not the slightest recollection of any interview with him on this subject.

I do remember, however, that Mr. Holt, on some matter of business, approached my bedside about that time, when I was suffering greatly from an access of pain. Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Holt, and myself were all landmen, and could know but little of the impossibility of landing troops on an open sea-beach, with a high wind and surf. Mr. Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, with officers about him of intelligence and nautical experience, ought to have said plumply that if Vodge was not to land except in the case of attack on Fort Pickens, he might as well have remained at Fortress Monroe, as the prohibition placed the fort, so far as he was concerned, at the mercy, or (as the event showed) on the want of enterprise on the part of the rebel commander at Pensacola.

Possibly there are other parts of the reply which a superficial reader may think require comment or elucidation; and, indeed, here is another marked for me by my kind visitor.

5. The ex-President has brought together a labyrinth of dates respecting the arrival and departure of rebel commissioners, nrmtices, etc., with which, as I had no official connection, I may have made an unimportant mistake or two; but, as I have not by me the means of recovering the clew to those windings, I shall not attempt to follow him.

New York, Fifth Avenue Hotel, November 8, 1862.

#### Ex-President Buchanan's Rejoinder to General Scott.

To the Editor of the National Intelligencer:

With a few remarks I shall close the controversy with General Scott, into which I have been most reluctantly forced by his voluntary and unexpected attack. This has, nevertheless, afforded me an opportunity of correcting many unfounded reports which I had long borne in patience and in silence. In my answer, I have already furnished clear and distinct responses to all the allegations of General Scott; and in his rejoinder he has not called in question any of my statements with a single exception. Which of us is correct in this particular depends upon the question whether his recollection of an event which occurred more than eighteen months ago, or the statement of Mr. Holt, reduced to writing on the very day, is entitled to the greater credit.

The general, in the introduction of his rejoinder, assigns as an excuse for the criticism on my public conduct, that this was merely incidental to his alleged official report to President Lincoln on the condition of our fortifications, and was not primarily intended for myself. From this statement, one would conclude that he had made such a report. But where is this to be found? For it he refers to the *Intelligencer* of the 21st of October; but there I discover nothing but his letter of four points to Mr. Seward, dated on the 3d of March, 1861, advising the incoming President how to guide his administration in the face of the threatened dangers to the country. In the single introductory sentence to this letter he barely refers to his "printed views" (dated in October, 1860), which had been long before the public; but it contains nothing like an official report on the condition of the fortifications.

Whether the introduction of this letter to the public, without the consent of President Lincoln, by one of the general's friends, in a political speech during a highly excited gubernatorial canvass, had influenced him to prepare his criticism on my conduct, it is not for me to determine.

At what period did General Scott obtain the six hundred recruits to which he refers in his rejoinder? This was certainly after the date of his "views," on the 30th of October, 1860; because in these he states emphatically that the forces then at his command were, "in all, five companies only within reach to garrison or re-enforce the (nine) forts mentioned in the 'views.'"

Did he obtain these recruits in November? If so, had he visited Washington, or written and explained to me in what manner the military operation could be accomplished by the four hundred men in the five companies and the six hundred recruits, I should have given his representations all the consideration eminently due to his high military reputation.

command of an officer, Colonel Brown, to whom the firm and gallant Lieutenant Slemmer might cheerfully, both as a soldier and a patriot, yield the precedence due to his superior rank. The batteries upon the hostile shores were under the command of Colonel Bragg, who had won laurels as an officer of artillery under the command of General Taylor in Mexico.

Important as the possession of Fort Pickens was, the position of Washington awakened a far livelier and more immediate interest throughout the country. To attack and gain possession of the national capital was the first impulse which found expression among the insurgents, excited almost to frenzy by the successful bombardment of Fort Sumter and the war-proclamation of the President. To secure its safety was the first care of every patriot. The cry, Washington is in danger, flew from lip to lip over the whole land; and men went about their necessary business with the ever-present apprehension of hearing at any moment of a bloody struggle upon the very steps of the yet unfinished Capitol for its possession. These were no vague fears, excited by the sudden peril of the country; for one of the first effects of the proclamation had been to cause the passage of an Ordinance of Secession in Virginia, and thus virtually to open the way for the march of the insurgent forces directly upon Washington. In January, a resolution had been passed unanimously in the Senate of Virginia declaring that, if the sectional differences of the country could not be reconciled, honor and interest demanded that she should unite her fortunes with those of her sister slaveholding states. At the same time, however, a resolution, bringing up the question of the policy of secession, was refused to be entertained by a vote of nine-

But he informs us he did not arrive in Washington until the 12th of December. His second recommendation to garrison these forts must consequently have been made, according to his own statement, on the 13th, 15th, 28th, or 30th of December, or on more than one of these days. At this period the aspect of public affairs had greatly changed from what it was in October. Congress was now in session, and our relations with the seceding cotton states had been placed before them by the President's Message. Proceedings had been instituted by that body with a view to a compromise of the dangerous questions between the North and the South, and the highest hopes and warmest aspirations were then entertained for their success. Under these circumstances, it was the President's duty to take a broad view of the condition of the whole country, in all its relations, civil, industrial, and commercial, as well as military, giving to each its appropriate influence. It was only from such a combination that he could frame a policy calculated to preserve the peace and to consolidate the strength of the Union. Isolated recommendations proceeding from one department, without weighing well their effect upon the general policy, ought to be adopted with extreme caution.

But it seems from the rejoinder that Secretary Floyd, at Richmond, had claimed the honor of defeating General Scott's "plans and solicitations respecting the forts;" "it being there," says the general, "universally admitted that, but for that victory over me, there could have been no rebellion." This is, in plain English, that the secessionists of the cotton states, who have since brought into the field hundreds of thousands of undoubtedly brave soldiers, would have abandoned in terror their unlawful and rebellious designs, had General Scott distributed among their numerous forts 480 men in October or 1000 men in December! This requires no comment. I have never been able to obtain a copy of the speech of Mr. Floyd at Richmond to which I presume General Scott refers; but I learned, both at the time and since, from gentlemen of high respectability, that in this same speech he denounced me most bitterly for my determination to stand by and sustain the Union with all the power I possessed under the Constitution and the laws.

And here permit me to remark that it is due to General Scott, as well as myself, to deny that there is any portion of my answer which justifies the allegation that "the ex-President sneers at my 'weak device' (the words 'weak device' being marked as a quotation) for saving the forts." This mistake I must attribute to his "accidental visitor."

And in this connection I emphatically declare that the general, neither before nor after the publication of his "views" in the *National Intelligencer* of the 18th of January, 1861, without my consent, assigned any reason to me for making this publication, or ever even alluded to the subject. In this I can not be mistaken from the deep impression which the occurrence made upon my memory, for the reasons already mentioned in my answer.

I should have nothing more to add had General Scott, in his rejoinder, confined himself to the topics embraced in his original letter. He has extended them, and now for the first time, and in a sardonic and no kindly spirit, refers to the alleged stealing of public arms by Secretary Floyd, and their transportation to the South in anticipation of the rebellion. The most conclusive answer to this allegation is that, notwithstanding the boasting of Mr. Floyd at Richmond, evidently with the view of conciliating his new allies, cited by the general as his authority, no public arms were ever stolen. This fact is established by the report of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, now before me, made by Mr. Stanton, of Ohio, their chairman, on the 18th of February, 1861, and to be found in the second volume of the Reports of Committees of the House for the session of 1860-61. This report, and the testimony before the committee, establish,

1. That the Southern states received in 1860 less instead of more than the quota of arms to which they were entitled by law; and that three of them—North Carolina, Mississippi, and Kentucky—received no arms whatever, and this simply because they did not ask for them. Well may Mr. Stanton have said in the House "that there are a good deal of rumors, and speculations, and misapprehension as to the true state of facts in regard to this matter."

2. Secretary Floyd, under suspicious circumstances, on the 22d of December, 1860, and but a few days before he left the Department, had, without the knowledge of the President, ordered 113 columbiads and 1132-pounders to be transported from Pittsburgh to Ship Island and Galveston, in Mississippi and Texas. The fact was brought to the knowledge of the President by a communication from Pittsburgh; and Secretary Holt immediately thereafter countermanded the order of his predecessor; and the cannon were never sent. The promptitude with which we acted elicited a vote of thanks, dated the 4th of January, 1861, from the Select and Common Councils of that city "to the President, the Attorney General, and the acting Secretary of War" (Mr. Holt).

After this statement, how shall we account for the explicit declaration of General Scott that, "accidentally hearing early in March that under this posthumous order (that of Mr. Floyd of the 22d of December) the shipment of these guns had commenced, I communicated the fact to Secretary Holt (acting for Secretary Cameron) just in time to defeat the robbery?" And this is the same Secretary Holt who had countermanded "the posthumous order" in the previous December. And, strange to say, these guns, but for the alleged interposition of General Scott, were about to be sent so late as March from the loyal states into those over which Jefferson Davis had then for some time presided!

Had General Scott reflected for a moment, he could not have fallen into this blunder. It is quite manifest he was "without a printed document and my (his) own official papers."


3. The government had on hand in the year 1859 about 500,000 old muskets, which had been condemned "as unsuitable for public service," under the act of the 3d of March, 1825. They were of such a character that, although offered both at public and private sale for \$2 50 each, purchasers could not be obtained at that rate, except for a comparatively small number. On the 30th of November, 1859, Secretary Floyd ordered about one fifth of the whole number (105,000) to be sent from the Springfield Armory, where they had accumulated, to five Southern arsenals, "in proportion to their respective means of proper storage." This order was carried into effect by the Ordnance Bureau in the usual course of administration and without reference to the President. It is but justice to say that, from the testimony before the committee, there is no reason to suspect that Secretary Floyd issued this order from any sinister motive. Its date was months before Mr. Lincoln's nomination for the presidency, and nearly a year before his election, and while the secretary was still an avowed opponent of secession. Indeed, the testimony of Colonel Craig and Captain Maynadier, of the Ordnance, before the committee, is wholly inconsistent with any evil intention on his part.

And yet these "condemned muskets," with a few thousand ancient rifles of a calibre then no longer used, are transformed by General Scott into "115,000 extra muskets and rifles, with all their implements and ammunition." This is the first time I have heard—certainly there was nothing of the kind before the committee—that ammunition was sent with these condemned and inferior arms to their places of storage—just as though they had been intended, not for sale, but for immediate use in the field. The truth is, that it is impossible to steal arms and transport them from one depository to another without the knowledge and active participation of the officers of the Ordnance Bureau, both in Washington and at these depositories. It may be observed that Colonel Craig, the head of the Bureau at this period, was as correct an officer, and as loyal and as honest a man as exists in the country. Yours very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

Wheatland, near Lancaster, Nov. 17, 1862.





RE-ENFORCEMENT OF FORT PICKENS BY COMPANY A, FIRST ARTILLERY, ON SATURDAY MORNING, APRIL 13, 1861.





THE SECOND RE-ENFORCEMENT OF FORT PICKENS, ON APRIL 16, 1861.



ty-six to thirty-six. A state convention had assembled at Richmond on the 13th of February, and its deliberations had continued up to the time of the bombardment of Fort Sumter. A very decided majority of this body was opposed to any movement toward secession; and, except with a very small minority, there was a purpose and a hope that Virginia should yet act as a mediator between the revolted states and the government. But the members of the extreme slavery party were indefatigably active. They plied the Convention day after day with resolutions and speeches upon the "injury and oppression" which the sisterhood of slavery had suffered from the "federal government," the duty of resisting "coercion," the "sovereignty of the states," and the consequent "right of secession." They procured the appointment of a commission to catechise the President upon "the course he intended to pursue toward the seceded states."<sup>8</sup> In this body the dogma of state sovereignty again worked out those logical results so fatal to the Union; for coercion, or, in other words, the assertion and maintenance of a supreme government for the execution of the supreme law of the land, was the bugbear that disturbed all concert of action against the seceding faction; and therefore, when, even after the attack upon Fort Sumter, the President called for troops to retake it and the other military posts which had been seized, most of the very Union men in this Virginia Convention felt compelled to declare that, "if the President meant the subjugation of the South," Virginia had but one course to pursue—to make common cause with her sister slave states, and resist. And so Governor Letcher having, on the 16th of April, as we have already seen, refused to furnish Virginia's quota of the troops called for by the President, and threatened resistance,<sup>9</sup> on the 17th an Ordinance of Secession was secretly hurried through the Convention, receiving, in the excitement of the moment, a vote of eighty-eight against fifty-five. Even this, however, was but a provisional ordinance, which was to take effect only when ratified by the votes of a majority of the people of the state at a poll to be taken on the fourth Thursday of May following.<sup>10</sup> This was the first instance in which the insurgent leaders had ventured to submit an Ordinance of Secession to the votes of the people. But in this very ease they pursued their policy of precipitation and usurpation of power with a more guilty recklessness than ever before; for, in spite of this special pro-

vision in the ordinance itself, requiring a vote of the people for its establishment, another ordinance was immediately passed, adopting the Constitution of the Confederate States, and a solemn convention was entered into with commissioners from the government at Montgomery, by which Virginia became a member of the confederacy, submitted her entire military force and military operations to the control of the President of the confederacy, and made over to the insurgent government all the public property, naval stores, and munitions of war, which, in delicate phrase, she might have "acquired" from the United States.<sup>1</sup> This ordinance was passed with indecent haste on the 17th day of April, and the convention was entered into upon the 25th. True, the former was in terms dependent upon the vote to be taken in May upon the Ordinance of Secession. But as the state was meantime placed entirely in the military power of the insurgents, this provision was but the hol-lowest form of external decency. The effect of this action in Virginia was of inestimable advantage to the insurgents. It transferred their frontier from the obscure and remote line of the northern boundary of the Gulf states to the Potomac River, and placed one end of the Long Bridge, which is the southern outlet of Washington, upon hostile soil.

The temper and purposes of the people who had thus usurped control of the most important of the slave states was instantly manifested by hostile movements of the most alarming character. Hardly was the conditional Ordinance of Secession passed, when the custom-house and the post-office at Richmond were seized, and on the evening of the same day, the 18th of April, an attack was made upon Harper's Ferry. At this place, famous for the bold beauty of the scene, where the Potomac receives the waters of the Shenandoah, and pushes its way through a sharply-cut gap in the Blue Ridge, was one of the largest arsenals of the United States, to which was attached a factory of arms of corresponding magnitude. The former usually contained ninety-five thousand stand of arms; and the latter, when in full operation, turned out twenty-five thousand yearly. Here, too, at the outlet of the Shenandoah Valley, which pierces the centre of Virginia, was one of the principal stations of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, by which the great river commerce of the West passed eastward to the sea-coast; and a great and well-stored flour-mill, one of the largest in the country. Around these

<sup>8</sup> *The President's Speech to the Virginia Commissioners, Messrs. Preston, Stuart, and Randolph.*

GENTLEMEN,—As a committee of the Virginia Convention, now in session, you present me a preamble and resolution in these words:

"Whereas, in the opinion of this Convention, the uncertainty which prevails in the public mind as to the policy which the federal executive intends to pursue toward the seceded states is extremely injurious to the industrial and commercial interests of the country, tends to keep up an excitement which is unfavorable to the adjustment of the pending difficulties, and threatens a disturbance of the public peace; therefore,

"Resolved, That a committee of three delegates be appointed to wait on the President of the United States, present to him this preamble, and respectfully ask him to communicate to this Convention the policy which the federal executive intends to pursue in regard to the Confederate States."

In answer I have to say, that having, at the beginning of my official term, expressed my intended policy as plainly as I was able, it is with deep regret and mortification I now learn there is great and injurious uncertainty in the public mind as to what that policy is, and what course I intend to pursue. Not having as yet seen occasion to change, it is now my purpose to pursue the course marked out in the inaugural address. I commend a careful consideration of the whole document as the best expression I can give to my purposes. As I then and therein said, I now repeat, "The power confided in me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond what is necessary for these objects there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere." By the words "property and places belonging to the government," I chiefly allude to the military posts and property which were in possession of the government when it came into my hands. But if, as now appears to be true, in pursuit of a purpose to drive the United States authority from these places, an unprovoked assault has been made upon Fort Sumter, I shall hold myself at liberty to repossess it, if I can, like places which had been seized before the government was devolved upon me; and in any event I shall, to the best of my ability, repel force by force. In case it proves true that Fort Sumter has been assaulted, as is reported, I shall, perhaps, cause the United States mails to be withdrawn from all the states which claim to have seceded, believing that the commencement of actual war against the government justifies and possibly demands it. I scarcely need to say that I consider the military posts and property situated within the states which claim to have seceded as yet belonging to the government of the United States as much as they did before the supposed secession. Whatever else I may do for the purpose, I shall not attempt to collect the duties and imposts by any armed invasion of any part of the country; not meaning by this, however, that I may not land a force deemed necessary to relieve a fort upon the border of the country. From the fact that I have quoted a part of the inaugural address, it must not be inferred that I repudiate any other part, the whole of which I reaffirm, except so far as what I now say of the mails may be regarded as a modification.

#### *Proclamation of the Governor of Virginia.*

Whereas seven of the states formerly composing a part of the United States have, by authority of their people, solemnly resumed the powers granted by them to the United States, and have framed a constitution and organized a government for themselves, to which the people of those states are yielding willing obedience, and have so notified the President of the United States by all the formalities incident to such action, and thereby become to the United States a separate, independent, and foreign power; and whereas the Constitution of the United States has invested Congress with the sole power "to declare war," and until such declaration is made the President has no authority to call for an extraordinary force to wage offensive war against any foreign power; and whereas, on the 15th instant, the President of the United States, in plain violation of the Constitution, issued a proclamation calling for a force of seventy-five thousand men to cause the laws of the United States to be duly executed over a people who are no longer a part of the Union, and in said proclamation threatens to exert this unusual force to compel obedience to his mandates; and whereas the General Assembly of Virginia, by a majority approaching to entire unanimity, declared at its last session that the State of Virginia would consider such an exertion of force as a virtual declaration of war, to be resisted by all the power at the command of Virginia; and subsequently, the Convention now in session, representing the sovereignty of this state, has reaffirmed in substance the same policy, with almost equal unanimity; and whereas the State of Virginia deeply sympathizes with the Southern states in the wrongs they have suffered and in the position they have assumed, and having made earnest efforts peaceably to compose the differences which have severed the Union, and having failed in that attempt, through this unwarranted act on the part of the President; and it is believed that the influences which operate to produce this proclamation against the seceded states will be brought to bear upon this commonwealth if she should exercise her undoubted right to resume the powers granted by her people, and it is due to the honor of Virginia that an improper exercise of force against her people should be repelled; therefore I, John Letcher, Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia, have thought proper to order all armed volunteer regiments or companies within the state forthwith to hold themselves in readiness for immediate orders, and upon the reception of this proclamation to report to the adjutant general of the state their organization and numbers, and prepare themselves for efficient service. Such companies as are not armed and equipped will report that fact, that they may be properly supplied.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Commonwealth to be affixed, this 17th day of April, 1861, and in the eighty-fifth year of the Commonwealth.

JOHN LETCHER.

<sup>10</sup> *Ordinance of Secession passed by the Virginia Convention, April 17th, 1861.*

An Ordinance to repeal the Ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America by the State of Virginia, and to resume all the Rights and Powers granted under said Constitution:

The people of Virginia, in the ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America, adopted by them in convention, on the 25th day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, having declared that the powers granted under the said Constitution were derived from the people of the United States, and might be resumed whenever the same should be perverted to their injury and oppression, and the federal government having perverted said powers, not only to the injury of the people of Virginia, but to the oppression of the Southern slaveholding states;

Now, therefore, we, the people of Virginia, do declare and ordain, that the ordinance adopted by the people of this state in convention, on the twenty-fifth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and all acts of the General Assembly of this state ratifying or adopting amendments to said Constitution, are hereby repealed and abrogated; that the union between the State of Virginia and the other states under the Constitution aforesaid is hereby dissolved, and that the State of Virginia is in the full possession and exercise of all the rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent state. And they do farther declare that said Constitution of the United States of America is no longer binding on any of the citizens of this state.

This ordinance shall take effect and be an act of this day, when ratified by a majority of the votes of the people of this state, cast at a poll to be taken thereon, on the fourth Thursday in May next, in pursuance of a schedule hereafter to be enacted.

Done in convention, in the city of Richmond, on the seventeenth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and in the eighty-fifth year of the Commonwealth of Virginia.

A true copy.

JNO. L. EUBANK, Secretary of Convention.

#### *An Ordinance passed by the Virginia Convention for the adoption of the Constitution of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America.*

We, the delegates of the people of Virginia, in convention assembled, solemnly impressed by the perils which surround the commonwealth, and appealing to the Searcher of hearts for the rectitude of our intentions in assuming the grave responsibility of this act, do by this ordinance adopt and ratify the Constitution of the provisional government of the Confederate States of America, ordained and established at Montgomery, Alabama, on the eighth day of February, eighteen hundred and sixty-one; provided that this ordinance shall cease to have any legal operation or effect if the people of this commonwealth, upon the vote directed to be taken on the Ordinance of Secession passed by this Convention on the seventeenth day of April, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, shall reject the same.

A true copy.

JNO. L. EUBANK, Secretary.

#### *Convention between the Commonwealth of Virginia and the Confederate States of America.*

The Commonwealth of Virginia, looking to a speedy union of said commonwealth and the other slave states with the Confederate States of America, according to the provisions of the Constitution for the provisional government of said states, enters into the following temporary convention and agreement with said states, for the purpose of meeting pressing exigencies affecting the common rights, interests, and safety of said commonwealth and said confederacy.

1. Until the union of said commonwealth with said confederacy shall be perfected, and said commonwealth shall become a member of said confederacy, according to the constitutions of both powers, the whole military force and military operations, offensive and defensive, of said commonwealth, in the impending conflict with the United States, shall be under the chief control and direction of the President of said Confederate States, upon the same principles, basis, and footing as if said commonwealth were now, and during the interval, a member of said confederacy.

2. The commonwealth of Virginia will, after the consummation of the union contemplated in this convention, and her adoption of the Constitution for a permanent government of the said Confederate States, and she shall become a member of said confederacy under said permanent Constitution, if the same occur, turn over to the said Confederate States all the public property, naval stores, and munitions of war, etc., she may then be in possession of, acquired from the United States, on the same terms and in like manner as the other states of said confederacy have done in like cases.

3. Whatever expenditures of money, if any, said Commonwealth of Virginia shall make before the union, under the provisional government as above contemplated, shall be consummated, shall be met and provided for by said Confederate States.

This convention entered into and agreed to, in the city of Richmond, Virginia, on the twenty-fourth day of April, 1861, by Alexander H. Stephens, the duly authorized commissioner to act in the matter for the said Confederate States, and John Tyler, Wm. Ballard Preston, Samuel M.D. Moore, James P. Holcombe, James C. Bruce, and Lewis B. Harvie, parties duly authorized to act in like manner for said Commonwealth of Virginia, the whole subject to the approval and ratification of the proper authorities of both governments respectively.

In testimony whereof the parties aforesaid have hereto set their hands and seals, the day and year aforesaid, and at the place aforesaid, in duplicate originals.

ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, Commissioner for Confederate States.


JOHN TYLER,  
WM. BALLARD PRESTON,  
S. M'D. MOORE,  
JAMES P. HOLCOMBE,  
JAMES C. BRUCE,  
LEWIS B. HARVIE,  
Commissioners for Virginia.

Approved and ratified by the Convention of Virginia, on the 25th of April, 1861.

JOHN JANNEY, President.

JNO. L. EUBANK, Secretary.





GENERAL VIEW OF HARPER'S FERRY AND THE MARYLAND HEIGHTS.





HARPER'S FERRY, VIRGINIA.

points of attraction there had grown up a manufacturing town of between nine and ten thousand inhabitants, which was connected with the Maryland shore by a bridge nine hundred feet in length, the alternate possession and abandonment, destruction and rebuilding of which played a prominent part in the approaching war. The commanding position of the place, and the great value of the arms and the foundries there, made it one of the most important internal military posts of the United States. It was at this time held by Lieutenant Roger Jones, who had under his immediate command only a small company of about forty men. That the post was in danger the government well knew, but there were no means of re-enforcing it sufficiently; and Lieutenant Jones had received orders that, in case of an attack which could not be successfully resisted, it should be destroyed. The peril came sooner than it was expected. But the commander was watchful, and he received information, on the 17th, the very day on which the Ordinance of Secession was passed within closed doors, that preparations were making at Winchester and in the surrounding country for an attack upon him in overwhelming force. He immediately prepared the work of destruction by piling the arms in heaps and surrounding them with combustible matter, and by mining the work-shops and laying trains. He was not an hour too soon. Orders were sent down from Richmond on the morning of the 18th for the seizure of the place, and three thousand men were expected to move upon it. Owing to the suddenness

of the call, however, only two hundred and fifty infantry assembled at the rendezvous, Halls town, a small village about four miles from Harper's Ferry. To these, however, were added a squad of Fauquier County cavalry and a piece of artillery; and thus the force was more than amply strong for the purpose, even without the help of the inhabitants of the town, which it was sure to receive. About nine o'clock in the evening this force moved swiftly and silently upon the Ferry; but they were not able to surprise its little garrison. They were challenged by sentry after sentry, until they began to apprehend that more formidable preparations for resistance had been made than they were able to encounter, and concluded to send in a flag of truce to obtain information from the townspeople. But, while the flag was on its way, and the officers were in consultation during the halt, a sudden flash broke forth in the direction of the armory; it was followed by others in quick succession, accompanied by explosions like the firing of heavy artillery. The cause was instantly suspected, and the cavalry, dashing into the village, soon returned with the information that the arsenal and the work-shops were blown up and on fire, and that the government troops had retreated across the Potomac toward Hagerstown in Maryland. Lieutenant Jones had been prompt, and as thorough as circumstances permitted. Within three minutes from the time of firing the trains, the arsenal and the arms which it contained were destroyed, and the work-shops were all ablaze. But of the arms in the latter many were saved by the insurgents after they had put out the fire. Their way lit by the conflagration which they had kindled, Lieutenant Jones and his little band fled across the Potomac bridge, pursued by a threatening mob, which, however, they easily kept at bay, and, pushing on through the night, arrived, weary and footsore, at Carlisle Barracks, in Pennsylvania, the next afternoon, with the loss of only four men by desertion and straggling. Mr. Jones's faithfulness and his success won him commendation and a captaincy. But in what a situation was that country which esteemed itself fortunate in the escape of its soldiers with their lives from an important post, and the destruction of one of its most considerable arsenals and armories, filled with arms and implements which never could have been more needed!

To the loss of Harper's Ferry there was immediately added another of far more consequence, that of the great naval station at Portsmouth, which lies upon the Elizabeth River, eight miles from the noble harbor of Hampton Roads. The great capacity of this harbor, its safety, and its easy access to ships of the deepest draught, had early pointed it out as the most desirable place south of New York for the naval purposes to which it was appropriated. It was filled with the maritime and military wealth of the nation, and within its limits were the most extensive and complete array of shops, foundries, ship-yards, mills, and docks in the country; among them a dry dock of granite, built at an enormous cost, and capable of the largest vessels. Lying at the navy yard, which was at Gosport, a little suburb of the little



MARCH OF THE VIRGINIANS ON HARPER'S FERRY, 9 30 P.M., APRIL 18, 1861.





BURNING OF THE UNITED STATES ARSENAL AT HARPER'S FERRY, 10 P.M., APRIL 13, 1861.

town of Portsmouth, which, with the neighboring city of Norfolk, containing only about fourteen thousand inhabitants, were literally kept from decay and death by the business thrown into their hands by the government, were twelve vessels of war of various sizes, from the *Pennsylvania*, four-decker, of 120 guns, to the brig *Dolphin* of 4. Most of them were of large size; and although all were more or less in need of repairs, or were not quite completed, only one was unfit for service. Among them was the sloop-of-war *Cumberland*, Captain Pendergrast, which was in commission as the flag-ship of the home squadron, and the *Merrimac*, a noble steam frigate of 40 guns, which was launched at Charlestown, Massachusetts, in 1855, and which, in a voyage over the world, had won universal admiration by her union of speed, power, and weight of metal. Both the *Cumberland* and the *Merrimac* were destined to play, as antagonists, a striking part in the coming war; the latter by affording the first example of a new system of naval warfare; the former by a devotion to the flag and a stubborn resistance which threw the brightest halo of heroism over her destruction. In addition to these vessels there were in the yard nearly two thousand five hundred pieces of heavy ordnance, three hundred of which were Dahlgren guns. The quantity of small arms, ammunition, and other munitions of war in store here was immense; and at old Fort Norfolk, which was used as a magazine, were three hundred thousand pounds of powder, with shot and loaded shell in vast amount. The ships, docks, shops, naval stores, arms, and ammunition at Gosport Navy Yard and its immediate dependencies were worth, at a moderate valuation, thirty-five millions of dollars. This great prize was taken without the sacrifice of a drop of blood by the promptness and audacity of the insurgents, and lost by the cautious, good-natured scruples of the government. The place was entirely without protection. On the land-side, its space of many acres was inclosed only by a low wall, easily scaled or battered down at any point; and as to the ships, there were not on the spot seamen enough to man a single one of them. Though the station and its invaluable contents were thus exposed to attack, of which, from the very accession of President Lincoln to power there had been constant apprehension, no measures, even of prevention, were taken for its preservation. The ever-present fear of exciting animosity and provoking attack, the never-dying hope that some way, which no one could point out, would be found of maintaining the national authority, without asserting it by force, and of restoring the Union to its normal condition with the consent of all its parts, prevented any attempt to retain Portsmouth and the navy yard securely in the hands of the government. This was openly avowed by a member of President Lincoln's administration, of whose loyalty, and of the faithfulness of whose intentions, there can not be the slightest doubt. Secretary Welles, in his report to the President, submitted to Congress in the following July, says: "Any attempt to withdraw the ships, or either of them, without a crew, would, in the then sensitive and disturbed condition of the public mind, have betrayed alarm and distrust, and been likely to cause difficulty."

In this timid and hesitating policy thirty-seven priceless days were passed; and when, at last, in the words of the same officer, he became "apprehensive that action might be necessary," the action taken was of little more

effect than the inaction which it followed. Commodore M'Caulley, who was in command of the yard, was directed to use "extreme vigilance and circumspection;" but this vigilance and circumspection seem, by the terms of the order, which was dated April 10th, to have been quite as much addressed to the avoidance of offense to the disloyal as to the preservation of the nation's property and the maintenance of the authority of the government. He was directed "to put the shipping and public property in condition to be moved and placed beyond danger, but in doing this he was warned to take no steps that could give needless alarm." What a warning, to be solemnly addressed by the representative of the government of a great nation to one of its most important officers in such a crisis of its affairs! As at Charleston, so here at Portsmouth. Could the *Star of the West*, with her re-enforcements and supplies for Fort Sumter, have been promptly sent to Major Anderson, conveyed by the steam frigate *Brooklyn*, or some other sufficient naval force, with orders to demolish any battery that fired a gun upon the national flag, the revolt would almost surely have been crushed in its very birth. Strange, incomprehensible, that after the lesson in that quarter, and after the insurrection had made headway by audacity on the one side and hesitation on the other, it was not seen that the way to save Portsmouth and its dependencies was not to deal tenderly with disaffection, and avoid giving needless alarm, but to lay a frigate or two opposite the place, with orders to open fire with shot and shell upon the first attempt at violence! But matters went on in the same old timid way. At last the engines of the *Merrimac* were reported ready for use, and Commodore M'Caulley received orders from Washington to lose no time in getting her armament on board, in loading her, the *Plymouth*, the *Dolphin*, and the *German town* with the more valuable ordnance and other public property, and in putting these vessels in a position to be moved at any moment out of danger. The *Cumberland*, well manned and fully equipped, was placed in a position to command Portsmouth, the navy yard, and Norfolk; and orders were issued to repel by force all attempts to seize vessels or any other property, by whomsoever made, or under whatever pretense of authority. Thus, at the very last moment, the government took the measures it should have taken thirty days before. At the last—at the very last; for this was not done until the 17th of April, the day on which the Ordinance of Secession was passed in secret conclave at Richmond. Yet it might not have been quite too late but for another exhibition of that blind confidence on the one side, and that personal faithlessness on the other, which, in the beginning of this rebellion, brought defeat to the government and dishonorable success to the insurgents.

A large number of the officers under Commodore M'Caulley's command were from slave states—many of them from Virginia. He was betrayed into trusting the loyalty, and, what is more, the personal good faith of these men. They were good officers, and he could not believe that they would at once prove false to the country and the flag of which they were the sworn defenders; he could not insult them and degrade his own profession by acting upon the supposition that a whole body of men would remain in a service in which they had grown up only just so long as they could use their positions for the purpose of deceiving him and betraying their trust; he felt bound to believe that if they meant to abandon the old flag they would do



so at once, and openly like men, and that, like men of honor, they would sedulously avoid an ambiguous position, which made them masters of the secrets, and gave them measurable control over the affairs of a government against which, while wearing its uniform and receiving its pay, they intended to fight when the time arrived. But they were not content with leaving him to these conclusions, so natural to an officer and a gentleman. They went to him with frequent professions of loyalty upon their lips, saying at one time, "You have no Pensacola officers here, commodore; we'll never desert you; we will stand by you to the last, even to the death."<sup>2</sup> Yet these words were only uttered to lure him into fatal security, as we shall see in the sequel.

The people of Norfolk, true to the feeling which, according to their own journal, required the removal of the bodies of the Northern physicians who died while ministering to them in the time of pestilence,<sup>3</sup> were among the earliest and bitterest of the secessionists in Eastern Virginia. Their streets were filled with murmuring and threatening. They paraded their militia companies, and openly declared that if the government attempted to remove any of the ships or the munitions of war, or the commander of the yard made any preparations to defend it, they would attack it instantly. The unreasonableness of such a threat might be a just subject of remark, were it not that the men who made it were thinking and acting far outside the pale of reason. On the night of the 16th of April a band of these people seized two light-ships and sunk them in the shallowest part of the entrance to the harbor. On the next day, it will be remembered, the very day on which the secret but discreetly disseminated Ordinance of Secession was passed, the *Merrimae* was ready to go to sea; but Mr. Isherwood, the engineer-in-chief, who had been sent expressly from Washington to expedite her preparations, was surprised at receiving the order from Commodore M'Cauley not to get up steam until the day after. On that day the fires were lighted, and again the commodore spoke doubtfully about sending the vessel out, and ordered a delay of a few hours. A remonstrance from the engineer-in-chief, who directed the commodore's attention to the urgent orders of the Navy Department, and the probability that the obstructions in the channel would be increased during the night, elicited only a tardy announcement that the *Merrimae* would not go to sea that day, and an order to draw the fires; whereupon the engineer started post-haste for Washington. Commodore M'Cauley appears, by his own admission, to have allowed his junior officers to persuade him that still farther delay would be most prudent. On the very morning, the 18th, when he issued the fatal order of procrastination, all of those officers who were from slave states, with one or two honorable exceptions, resigned their commissions; the greater part of the workmen of the yard absented themselves from duty; General Taliaferro, of Virginia, arrived at Norfolk to take command of the military forces there, and Commodore M'Cauley's eyes at last were opened. But they were opened only to see his imminent peril and his utter helplessness; to see that he could not save, but only destroy; and to the work of destruction he at once addressed himself. He ordered all the guns to be spiked—an enormous task. It was but partly performed; and of the pieces which were spiked, only a few were permanently injured. The 19th passed in this and like futile efforts to destroy the property which the commodore had concluded to abandon. On the 20th the tumult outside the yard rose yet higher, and at twelve o'clock an officer was sent out bearing a flag of truce. He was taken to General Taliaferro's quarters, where a consultation was held, the result of which was renewed humiliation and disgrace to the national government. Commodore M'Cauley promised that none of the vessels should be taken from the yard, or a shot fired except in self-defense. But again he decided to destroy what he could not remove, and he gave orders—the last which he issued as commander of the yard—to scuttle all the vessels except the *Cumberland*.

Meanwhile measures were taken at Washington to supersede him in his command; but they proved to be too late. When the engineer-in-chief reported at the Navy Department the detention of the *Merrimae*, the secretary saw that the error promised to be well-nigh fatal. Captain Paulding was immediately dispatched to Portsmouth with the powerful steam frigate *Pawnee*, on which were placed one hundred marines in addition to her regular crew, and three hundred and fifty Massachusetts volunteers, under command of Colonel Wardrop, who were taken on board at Fortress Monroe. With this force Captain Paulding arrived at Portsmouth on the evening of the 20th, under instructions to take command of all the vessels at that station, to repel force by force, and prevent the ships and other property, at all hazards, from falling into the hands of the insurgents—most fitting orders, but, like all others issued by the government since the breaking out of the insurrection (except those in reference to Washington and Fort Pickens), withheld until they were of no avail; for Captain Paulding arrived at Portsmouth only in time to see the scuttled ships settling down into the water, and to witness Commodore M'Cauley's helpless condition before the now overwhelming and partly organized force of the insurgents. What might have been accomplished with the *Cumberland*, the *Pawnee*, and the troops in the latter, under such circumstances, we can not, perhaps, rightly judge. It seems, indeed, as if such a force, promptly and vigorously used against a body of men, however large, who were unprotected by works of any kind, and who had little artillery, and that not in position, would have held them completely at bay, and, if necessary, dispersed them with great slaughter, and with the destruction of the towns of Norfolk and Portsmouth. But such an exertion of the strength of the government, it seems, was not to be

put forth; and Captain Paulding used the large discretionary powers with which he was clothed only to make as thorough as possible the destruction which Commodore M'Cauley had begun. He detailed one hundred men to render the heavy ordnance unserviceable by knocking off the trunnions; but they worked for an hour with the heaviest sledges, and produced no effect. The dry dock, the pride of the station, was mined; combustibles were scattered through the scuttled ships, the ship-houses, and barracks, and trains were laid through them, so that they might all be fired at once. It was two o'clock at night before all was reported ready, when all the force, except the few who were to light the trains, took ship on the *Pawnee* and the *Cumberland*. At four o'clock the former took the latter in tow and stood down the harbor; and at half past four, a rocket from the *Pawnee* gave the signal, and in a few minutes Gosport Navy Yard was all ablaze. The conflagration was an awful one, as may be easily imagined. By its terrible splendor the country was lit up for miles around; and the roar of the flames, as they devoured the work of years and the wealth of a nation, was heard with horror far and wide. The burning of the great four-decker *Pennsylvania*, the largest ship afloat, was in itself a spectacle of destructive grandeur worthy of mention in the naval annals of the republic, of whose fate her disastrous end might, to superstitious minds, have seemed an omen, enhanced as its effect was by the solemn booming of her heavy guns, as the fire reached them, at brief intervals.

While this ruin was going on, its huge proportions and its appalling means made it seem far more destructive than it really was; for when the flames had subsided, and the excited people, to baffle whom they were lighted, rushed into the yard, and began to save what could be saved, it was found that little harm was done except to the ship-houses and to the ships, all of which that were sea-worthy might have been removed from the harbor within the forty-eight hours previous; and even of these, two, the *Plymouth* and the *Merrimae*, were afterward raised and made serviceable. But the dry dock, all the various foundries and shops, the ordnance buildings, the tools, provisions, and officers' quarters, were but little injured, and were almost immediately put in use for the manufacture of arms, shot, and shell, and all the other military and naval purposes to which such a large establishment was adapted. Fort Norfolk, with its immense stores of powder, was taken without resistance. From the whole North there went up a cry of mingled grief and wrath at this great loss. The importance of the station for the naval purposes of the government in the coming struggle, and, no less, of the James River, the control of which was by this event virtually lost as an avenue of approach to the interior, and the immense value of the ships and stores which had been destroyed or given up, were instantly appreciated by the country. But the real significance of the capture was in the enormous quantity of heavy ordnance, which was not only lost by the government, but gained by the rebels. A capture of any thing like its importance in this respect is not recorded in history. As far as regarded heavy artillery, it virtually amounted to the disarming of one side and the arming of the other; and, combined with the various seizures which have already been enumerated, it chiefly contributed to produce the result, as we shall see, of an incomparable superiority in arms, on the part of the insurgents, upon the beginning of actual hostilities. We are not left without their own testimony upon this point. Mr. Peters, a commissioner of the State of Virginia, appointed to take an inventory of the property thus abandoned by the United States and seized by the insurgents, says, in a report published in the *Richmond Enquirer* of February 4th, 1862: "I had purposed some remarks upon the vast importance to Virginia, and to the entire South, of the timely acquisition of this extensive naval dépôt, with its immense supplies of munitions of war, and to notice briefly the damaging effects of its loss to the government at Washington; but I deem it unnecessary, since the presence at almost every exposed point on the whole Southern coast, and at numerous inland intrenched camps in the several states, of heavy pieces of ordnance, with their equipments and fixed ammunition, all supplied from this establishment, fully attests the one, while the unwillingness of the enemy to attempt demonstrations at any point, from which he is obviously deterred by the knowledge of its well-fortified condition, abundantly proves the other, especially when it is considered that both he and we are wholly indebted for our means of resistance to his loss and our acquisition of the Gosport Navy Yard."<sup>4</sup>

Within forty-eight hours after Commodore M'Cauley's agreement with General Taliaferro, troops from Virginia and from Georgia, to the number of a thousand men, with fourteen pieces of rifled cannon, had been added to the force already at Portsmouth and Norfolk, and the hull of the old frigate *United States* had been sunk in the narrowest part of the entrance to the harbor, within easy range of Forts Calhoun and Monroe, which guard the approach; and thus the insurgents were placed in complete possession of this important station, where they remained unmolested many months, while they successfully planned and executed enterprises which had an important influence upon the progress of the war.

Leaving the rebels now virtually masters of the Gulf states and the eastern slopes of the Alleghanies south of the Potomac, we must look northward upon scenes not less exciting and far more encouraging to those whose interest was bound up in the fortunes of the great republic. We have seen

<sup>2</sup> See the Reply of Commodore M'Cauley to the censure of the Congressional Committee, published in the *National Intelligencer*, May 5, 1862.

<sup>3</sup> See Introduction, page 14.

<sup>4</sup> The authority for this account of the destruction of Harper's Ferry and the Portsmouth Navy Yard will be found in the *Richmond* and *New York* newspapers of the day, in the Virginia correspondence of *Harper's Weekly* of May 11th, 1861, in the Report of the Select Committee of the Senate for investigating the Facts relative to the Loss of the Navy Yard, etc., submitted by Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, April 18, 1862, and the Reply of Commodore M'Cauley to the censure of the Congressional Committee, published in the *Washington National Intelligencer*, May 5, 1862.



that among the troops vainly brought by Commodore Paulding to the defense of Portsmouth Navy Yard was part of a Massachusetts regiment, which he took on board at Fortress Monroe. This was on the 19th of April. The President's proclamation was issued only on the 15th. The presence of a regiment of citizen soldiers at a point five hundred miles from their homes in less than four days from the time when the government called for their services, is an event characteristic of the temper of the people of the North at this turning point of the existence of the Union. The President's war proclamation, and the event which called it forth, had stirred the whole North not only to the liveliest exhibition of feeling, but to prompt and vigorous action. From the Atlantic shore to the banks of the Mississippi there was a generous rivalry of effort for the triumph of the republic over those who sought its destruction. The state authorities, the town councils, the public moneyed institutions, all addressed themselves to the task of providing men and money for the great emergency. Citizens formed themselves into Union, relief, and vigilance committees. Money was subscribed on all sides with a free hand, and volunteers came forward in eager throngs. Within a fortnight of the bombardment of Fort Sumter over thirty millions of dollars had been given at the North as a free gift in aid of the war from various quarters, public and private. New York was asked for 17,000 men for three months; the Legislature authorized 30,000 for two years, and a war loan of \$3,000,000. Pennsylvania and Ohio each appropriated an equal sum. The city of New York alone voted \$1,000,000 for the same purpose, and the sum was instantly advanced by the banks. The spirit of New York was but the spirit of the country. The West was not behind the East. The state of Indiana voted a million dollars; and Maine, Vermont, and New Jersey did the same. Foremost among the vast multitude which thus sprang forward to the support of the national cause and the principles of constitutional liberty were the people of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The proclamation had found her citizens and her authorities not unprepared. The inevitable conflict had been more clearly foreseen there than in any other part of the country north of the Potomac; and it was looked for with the inflexible determination to meet it without swerving or hesitation. Aside from the patriotism, the diffused intelligence, and the hatred of slavery for which the people of Massachusetts had been distinguished from the earliest days of colonial history, there were particular reasons for their ardor and alacrity at this crisis; for the insurrection had broken out and was for a long time openly sustained only in South Carolina; and from South Carolina Massachusetts had twice received insult and outrage: first, when, on sending, in 1844, by vote of her Legislature, Judge Hoar, of her Supreme Court, as a commissioner to Charleston, to make respectful inquiry as to the reasons for imprisoning certain of her negro residents on their arrival at that port in ships, for the purpose of testing the constitutional right of such action before the Supreme Court of the United States, her representative was not even allowed to state the object of his mission, and, though accompanied by his daughter, was driven out of the city with threats of violence if he ventured to remain; next, when, in 1855, Preston Brooks, member of the House of Representatives from South Carolina, aided and abetted by his colleague, Lawrence Keitt, attacked in the Senate Chamber, and beat senseless Charles Sumner, senator from Massachusetts. These injuries had ever rankled deeply in the breasts of Massachusetts men; and now, upon this great and fit occasion, the long-smothered flames of a righteous vengeance—if righteous other than almighty vengeance can ever be—burst forth on all sides with a fury which had been for years accumulating. To confound for a moment the feeling which thus exhibited itself with personal hatred and vindictiveness would be to degrade that which was high and almost holy. It was wrath, but wrath the spring of which was not self; but country: it was no petty personal resentment of an affront offered to the citizen in his representative, but a vindication of the dignity of an ancient and honorable commonwealth; not even the mere execution of retributive justice, but the burning desire of the most intelligent and right-minded body of freemen in the world to crush forever a power which they had had peculiar reason to feel was animated by a deadly and an undying hatred to liberty and the vital principles of Christianity, and bent on waging savage and remorseless war upon them and their advocates and supporters when they opposed its perpetuation and aggrandizement. And this sentiment, hard-tempered in the flow of thoughtful years, was whetted to a keen-edged purpose by the stern spirit of the old Puritanism, the intolerance of which had not yet been quite weeded from the soil to which it had been so early transplanted, where it had taken such firm root and grown with such a hardy growth. Always earnest, always devoted to the cause of freedom, and the prosperity and glory of the republic, and thus goaded by the memory of wrongs received at the hands of the men who were now in arms for the dismemberment of the Union and the destruction of its government, Massachusetts moved more promptly to the rescue than any other state. Within eighteen hours after the receipt of orders, the sixth regiment of her militia, Colonel Edward F. Jones, was on its way, 700 strong, from its head-quarters at Lowell, to Boston. Early on the morning of the 18th of April, only three days after the President's call for troops, it passed through New York on its way to Washington, and its march along the streets of the great commercial capital was one continued scene of enthusiastic welcome, congratulation, and encouragement. Thus, on the very first occasion, the confident predictions of the partisans of slavery that the people of the Middle States, and particularly those of the city of New York, would never permit the passage over their soil of troops going southward to crush a revolt in the slave states, were falsified, and in a manner which must have added to the surprise of the prophets a now clearer and surer foresight of the nature of the revolt which they had set on foot. The Sixth Massachusetts has the honor of being the

first regiment which mustered and marched to the defense of the capital; but its promptness was so successfully emulated throughout that old commonwealth that, in less than one week from the day on which the requisition of the Secretary of War, which accompanied the proclamation, was received by telegraph, the full quota of troops assigned to the state was either in Fortress Monroe or on the way to Washington.<sup>5</sup> Thus it happened that within five days of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, Commodore Paulding could steam into Portsmouth Harbor with a regiment of Massachusetts men ready to defend the navy yard.


All the Massachusetts troops, however, were not to reach their destination so quickly or so safely. The regiment first to report for duty, and which we have seen marching through the city of New York amid the cheers of its inhabitants, was destined to meet a bloody check in Baltimore. Passing through Philadelphia, where it was received with welcome, and quickly dispatched, by railway, with God-speed, it crossed, in the night, to stormier fortune, the boundary which separated slavery from freedom, and arrived at the Baltimore station on the morning of the 19th. As, upon the expected arrival of Mr. Lincoln himself upon his way to the capital, riotous conduct was apprehended by the authorities of Baltimore, so, for like reasons, upon this occasion it was feared that the presence of Northern troops, and particularly of a part of the militia of that state which was justly regarded as the leader in the anti-slavery movement, would excite feelings of antagonism, which would break forth in violence. I have before observed that the majority of the people in Maryland, and particularly of those in Baltimore, were unswerving in their loyalty to the Constitution and the government of the republic—a condition of public feeling in a slave state, which is to be attributed less to the geographical position of this one than to the system of popular education, which, as the reader of the Introduction to this history will remember, distinguished Maryland from the other states of like social and political organization. But still the large number of slaves held there, and the close relations of the people with those of the farther South, produced a division of sentiment so strong that the governor was obliged to recognize it in the proclamation which he issued upon the President's call for troops, and the mayor of Baltimore, also, in one which he issued, earnestly invoking all the inhabitants of that city to refrain from every act leading to outbreak or violence, and to render prompt assistance to the public authorities in their efforts to preserve the peace.<sup>6</sup> And here again, as always, the partisans of aggressive slavery were active, loud-mouthed, violent, while those who owned a supreme devotion to the republic were almost without exception quiet, orderly, unassuming people, who concerned themselves about their own affairs, and gave to social intercourse and intellectual culture the time which the others devoted to political intrigue and agitation, or to the coarser diversions of low life in a great city notorious throughout the country for the almost exceptional license and lawlessness of a certain part of its inhabitants, who might almost be classed with the dangerous element in the populations of London and Paris.

Upon the arrival of the long train containing the Massachusetts regiment and some other troops, which was at about ten o'clock in the morning, a threatening crowd quickly gathered around the station. It grew apace, and was plainly bent on mischief. The troops remained in the cars; and, could an engine have been at once attached to the train, they might have passed on unmolested; but a city ordinance required that, within certain limits, the cars should be drawn through the streets by horses, which of course separated them from each other; and of this separation and slow movement the mob were quick to take advantage. Threats and curses had been heaped upon the militia from their first appearance; but words were soon accompanied by deeds. The horses were seized, impediments were thrown upon the track, and at last the cars were pelted with paving-stones. The police, though in considerable force, were either in such insufficient numbers or so lukewarm in their duty (perhaps both conditions may be assumed) that the riot met no check; but the drivers whipped up their horses—the momentum of the cars was too great for the crowd to withstand—and in this manner nine of the eleven cars occupied by the Massachusetts regiment pushed through, and escaped with their freight of quiet, unresisting soldiers. But the mob increased in activity and daring as well as in numbers; some heavy anchors near by were dragged up and thrown across the track; and the movement of the last two cars, which contained four companies, became so difficult, and their situation so dangerous, that it was determined that the men should alight and march to the Washington station. They filed out of the cars and formed amid howls of defiance and derision, mingled with cheers for the South, for Jefferson Davis, for South Carolina and Secession, and groans for Massachusetts and the President of the United States, under the name of Abe Lincoln. The colonel of the regiment was with the companies in the advance; and the officers of those thus left behind, holding a hurried consultation, devolved the command of their detachment upon Captain Albert S. Follansbee, of Lowell. He wheeled his men into column, and began the march in close order. Stones, bricks, and every missile at hand soon flew thick and fast, and men armed with pistols and muskets began to appear in the ever-increasing mob. To that which had gathered immediately around the station another now was added. A large and tumultuous crowd, headed by the insurgent flag, rushed down the street in face of the troops, shouting to them to turn back, and threatening death to every "white nigger" of them who should attempt to reach the other station. But Captain Follansbee, calling upon the police to lead the way, he and his little band kept on their march, steady and unresisting. They had

<sup>5</sup> Message of Governor Andrew to the Legislature of Massachusetts.

<sup>6</sup> Proclamation of George William Brown, mayor of Baltimore, April 17th, 1861.





FIRST BLOOD.—THE SIXTH MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT FIGHTING THEIR WAY THROUGH BALTIMORE, APRIL 19, 1861.



gone but a short distance when their progress was retarded and their lines broken by a small bridge, from which the mob had torn up the planks; but the soldiers jumped from timber to timber, and got over, though in confusion. Many of them had by this time been severely hurt, and now two were struck down and effectually put *hors de combat* by missiles, which came thicker and faster than ever. A shot was at last fired into their ranks, and Captain Follansbee, thinking that the assault had been borne long enough, ordered his men to cap their pieces and defend themselves. The order was instantly obeyed, and with deadly effect; but the fire was returned from guns and pistols as well as with paving-stones. The Mayor of Baltimore now placed himself at the head of the little column, and endeavored to restrain the rioters by a bold exertion of his authority; but the protection which the municipal power of Baltimore had often before failed to afford to its own citizens it could not extend to strangers under these strange circumstances. The mayor's efforts proved futile, his position became dangerous, and he retired baffled, though not dismayed. The mob had now become a vast surging mass of infuriated men. Its numbers were estimated at from eight to ten thousand; but it has been found that in such conjectures numbers are usually exaggerated to three times the truth, and this case was not at all likely to be an exception to the rule. Yet it may be safely assumed that the Massachusetts men, who were little more than one hundred strong (the entire body consisted of eight hundred and sixty, rank and file), were now making their way through three thousand rioters. They kept together, however, in close ranks, opposing obedience and endurance to lawlessness and fury, wheeling upon their assailants and firing only when the attack became too severe to be borne without resistance; and in this manner they fought their way, with patient valor, one mile through the raging throng to the Washington station. But they had not yet escaped the perils of Baltimore. They and the rest of the regiment which had preceded them were enabled, indeed, by the exertions of the police and by their own large and well-armed numbers, to take the Washington cars, and the train was detained for some time, in hopes that the mob would now disperse; but it still increased, and, as it dared not face the muskets of a whole regiment, it turned its energies to the destruction of the train. The crowd dashed off upon the track in such numbers that, in the words of an eyewitness, for a mile it was black with an excited, rushing mass. Great logs and telegraph-poles, which required a dozen men to move them, were now thrown upon the rails, and rocks were rolled down upon the track from the embankment. Attempts were made to tear up the rails, and a cry was raised for pickaxes and crowbars; but only one or two could be found so suddenly. The police, now in large force, went forward and removed the obstructions, and the train, under a discharge of revolvers and stones, steamed slowly after; but the mob kept ahead of the police, continuing its destructive efforts. This dreadful scene covered a space of a mile and more; and the exertions, though not the fury of the rioters, ceased only from physical exhaustion. At last the track was clear; and the citizen soldiers, who had so promptly obeyed the orders of the elected chief magistrate of the nation, were borne swiftly beyond reach of their infuriated countrymen to the defense of their common capital.

At the same time with the Massachusetts regiment, upon the same road, and with the same destination, arrived ten companies of Pennsylvania militia. They were unarmed as well as ununiformed. But their helpless condition and their civil garb failed alike to protect them against the excited passions of the mob. Incapable of any effectual defense, they remained quietly in their cars, and were there stoned unmercifully for two hours. The sides of the cars afforded them protection; but many missiles went through the windows and inflicted serious bruises. Some attempted to escape; but they were attacked furiously, and obliged either to return to the cars or seek refuge in neighboring houses. After a time, the police, aided, it is said, by George P. Kane, United States marshal of that district, and some bold and loyal citizens, succeeded in partly quieting the tumult, and the Philadelphia troops were protected from farther injury, but were obliged to abandon their journey, and return as they came to Philadelphia. Two cars of baggage and munitions, which had



GEORGE P. KANE.

been seized by the mob, were also rescued by the police.

In this deplorable and disgraceful affair, by which the pro-slavery faction of Baltimore gained the bad distinction of spilling the first blood shed in the great rebellion, at least thirty-nine men, according to the most trustworthy reports, were killed and wounded, in addition to the larger number who received unreckoned injuries more or less serious. Of the thirty-nine, eight rioters, one unoffending citizen, and two soldiers were killed outright, and three rioters and twenty-five soldiers were wounded, one of the last mortally. The three men who thus first gave up their lives in the cause of liberty and the republic were Sumner H. Needham, of Lawrence, and Addison O. Whitney and Luther C. Ladd, of Lowell. Their names will ever live in

the memory of their countrymen.<sup>7</sup> In Massachusetts their fate and that of their wounded comrades excited a profound emotion, in which grief and indignation were tempered, though not abated, by a certain pride that this noble old commonwealth had been the first to offer the blood of her citizens in the defense of the liberties of the country, as she had also been the first to make the same sacrifice in the struggle by which those liberties were won. By a strange, and, it was fondly thought, a significant coincidence, it happened that the same day of the same month saw the sacrifice on both occasions. The skirmish at Lexington in 1775 and the street-fight at Baltimore, eighty-six years afterward, both occurred on the 19th of April. A correspondence by telegraph immediately took place between the Governor of Massachusetts and the Mayor of Baltimore as to the disposition of the bodies of the dead Massachusetts soldiers and the care for the wounded. On both sides it was touching and earnest; on both it showed state pride; but only on one, the Southern, that pernicious feeling of state independence, as if the state were something outside of rather than within the republic, which not even the solemnity of the occasion could repress, and which, no less than the fear for the life of slavery, was the cause of the struggle the first blood in which had been thus ominously shed. The one put forward the passage of armed troops of another state over the soil of his own as a palliation of the onslaught, if not an excuse for it; the other, though at the head of one of the oldest and most honorable commonwealths of the Union, and the one which had originally possessed and exercised the nearest approach to sovereignty, saw in the troops which he had sent and in any state over which they passed only the citizen soldiers and the common soil of the republic.<sup>8</sup>

Not in Massachusetts alone, however, did this attack upon the Massachusetts militia incense the people. The whole North burned with fierce resentment. Had the spirit which then animated the inhabitants of the free states, and even those of Kentucky and Missouri, who did not place the interests of slavery above those of the country, continued through the war, that lack of vindictiveness in them, which was publicly noticed by more than one observer and on more than one occasion, would not have softened the asperities and prolonged the continuance of the struggle.<sup>9</sup> The very advocates of slavery and apologists of the South, who were so numerous in the North, were profoundly moved at this flagitious attempt to stay the peaceful march of citizen soldiers through one of the United States at the command of the chief magistrate of them all. The demand that Baltimore should be humbled, and, if necessary to the opening of a safe highway to Washington, destroyed, was on every lip. Men whose interests and whose family connections were not only at the South, but in South Carolina, declared that, in this respect at least, the majesty of the nation should be asserted, and old black Federal cockades, exhumed from recesses where they had long been left in oblivion, began to appear on the breasts and hats of men whose blood boiled at the outrage upon the republic, but who were the very Gallios of slavery. Those who before sneered at the story of the attempt to assassinate Mr. Lincoln now believed it; the city which was the scene of the intended crime and of that actually committed was looked upon as an offense to the nation, and the cry, Through Baltimore or over it, went up over the whole Northern country. There was reason in the demand, and honor and justice, though not charity, in the feeling. The road to Washington lay through Baltimore; the people of Maryland had not even attempted to throw off the authority of the government at the former place; and that there was any aggression in the mere passage of their fellow-citizens through their chief town upon the order of their common government could not be for a moment pretended. No semblance of a defense was set up for them, except that strong municipal pride which causes the inhabitants of one place to resent the assertion of authority over them by the armed forces of another—an excellent plea in extenuation, if it were pertinent; but in this case it was entirely from the purpose. The Massachusetts men were in Baltimore, not to assert any authority there, not for the purpose of establishing relations of any kind with its people; they were merely travelers; and it was so plain as to need no demonstration that the passions of

<sup>7</sup> This account of the Baltimore riot is based upon a published letter of Captain Follansbee, and the reports of the affair in the Baltimore newspapers, and in the correspondence of those of New York.

<sup>8</sup> CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR OF MASSACHUSETTS AND THE MAYOR OF BALTIMORE.

Governor Andrew to Mayor Brown.

I pray you cause the bodies of our Massachusetts soldiers, dead in battle, to be immediately laid out, preserved in ice, and tenderly sent forward by express to me. All expenses will be paid by this commonwealth.

JOHN A. ANDREW, Governor of Massachusetts.

Mayor Brown to Governor Andrew.

Baltimore, April 20, 1861.

The Hon. John A. Andrew, Governor of Massachusetts:

SIR,—No one deplores the sad events of yesterday in this city more deeply than myself, but they were inevitable. Our people viewed the passage of armed troops to another state through the streets as an invasion of our soil, and could not be restrained. The authorities exerted themselves to the best of their ability, but with only partial success. Governor Hicks was present, and concurs in all my views as to the proceedings now necessary for our protection. When are these scenes to cease? Are we to have a war of sections? God forbid. The bodies of the Massachusetts soldiers could not be sent out to Boston, as you requested, all communication between this city and Philadelphia by railroad, and with Boston by steamers, having ceased; but they have been placed in cemented coffins, and will be placed with proper funeral ceremonies in the mausoleum of Greenmount Cemetery, where they shall be retained until farther directions are received from you. The wounded are tenderly cared for. I appreciate your offer, but Baltimore will claim it as her right to pay all expenses incurred.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. BROWN, Mayor of Baltimore.

Governor Andrew to Mayor Brown.

To his Honor George W. Brown, Mayor of Baltimore:

DEAR SIR,—I appreciate your kind attention to our wounded and our dead, and trust that at the earliest moment the remains of our fallen will return to us. I am overwhelmed with surprise that a peaceful march of American citizens over the highway to the defense of our common capital should be deemed aggressive to Baltimoreans. Through New York the march was triumphal.

JOHN A. ANDREW, Governor of Massachusetts.

<sup>9</sup> See particularly a speech delivered by the Hon. Joseph Holt, in New York, September 8d, 1861, and the letters of the special correspondent of the London Times.



the mob which attacked them were excited, not by any feeling of municipal pride, but by sympathy with the cause the suppression of which was the object of their journey. The New England men were going to sustain a government which the rioters hated because it had fallen under New England influence. Their object clearly was the obstruction of the Northern road to the capital until it could be seized and held by the insurgent army.<sup>10</sup> In this they were foiled by circumstances and the steadiness of the Northern troops.

The Massachusetts militia had escaped to Washington, the Pennsylvanians to Philadelphia; but the rioters did not abandon their designs. They were practically masters of Baltimore. Gun-shops and other stores of arms were broken open and pillaged. Places of business were generally closed. A public meeting was called for the afternoon, and the militia of the city were placed under arms. The preservation of public order was the professed, and, indeed, the actual object of these latter measures; but so strong, and so apparently pervading was the animosity excited by the events of the day, that the municipal and state officers were obliged to seek peace and quiet, not by the assertion and maintenance of the local law and the rights of the national government, but by placing themselves at the head of the insurgents, and giving to their purposes the sanction of constituted authority. This may have been a wise policy. It is by no means certain that if they had directly opposed the turbulent stream of excited popular feeling they would not have been swept away by it, or that, by yielding to and going with it for a while, they did not acquire an influence which enabled them to divert its current. And although events took place in the disturbed city within a few weeks, and in the state within a few months, which justify the belief that the excitement in Baltimore was produced by the efforts of a comparatively small, though energetic and desperate faction, the conclusion is not therefore warranted that the course of the mayor and the governor was not the wisest (it seems certainly to have been the most politic) that could have been pursued. On the afternoon of the collision the Mayor of Baltimore sent a telegraphic dispatch, and on the next morning, by special train, a deputation of three eminent citizens, to the President, imploring him neither to order nor to permit more troops to pass through the city, and assuring him that no more could go through without fighting their way at every step. Governor Hicks, whose sincere loyalty to the Constitution and supreme devotion to the republic there is no reason to doubt, united with him in this request. The President replied instantly, and with tender consideration for the distracting position of his petitioners; and, on the suggestion of General Scott, he assured them that, although troops must continue to come from the North to Washington, they should thenceforward march round Baltimore instead of through it, that thus the people of that city might not find rebellion lying in their way, but be compelled to seek it.<sup>1</sup> But it is sad to relate, and it is a most significant evidence of the condition of excitement into which

the men of the pro-slavery faction were able to throw a city which, within a fortnight, exhibited an entire and spontaneous reaction of sentiment, that the authorities themselves took steps, before the receipt of the President's reply, to prevent the passage of troops from the North to the defense of Washington. The avenues of approach to the capital from the north and



GOVERNOR HICKS.

east available for the transportation of troops were the Northern and Central Pennsylvania and the Philadelphia and Baltimore Railways. These crossed several deep streams within the boundaries of Maryland, and, on the night of the 19th, the bridges over them were destroyed by order of the authorities of Baltimore.<sup>2</sup> They also suspended the transmission of the mails and the removal of provisions from the city, and detained military stores and equipments belonging to the government sufficient for a thousand men.<sup>3</sup>

I therefore hope and trust, and most earnestly request, that no more troops be permitted or ordered by the government to pass through the city. If they should attempt it, the responsibility for the bloodshed will not rest upon me.

With great respect, your obedient servant,  
GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.  
I have been in Baltimore since Tuesday evening, and co-operated with Mayor Brown in his untiring efforts to allay and prevent the excitement and suppress the fearful outbreak as indicated above, and I fully concur in all that is said by him in the above communication.  
Very respectfully, your obedient servant, THOS. H. HICKS, Governor of Maryland.

President Lincoln to Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown.

Washington, April 20, 1861.

Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown:  
GENTLEMEN,—Your letter, by Messrs. Bond, Dobbin, and Brune, is received. I tender you both my sincere thanks for your efforts to keep the peace in the trying situation in which you are placed. For the future, troops must be brought here, but I make no point of bringing them through Baltimore.

Without any military knowledge myself, of course I must leave details to General Scott. He hastily said this morning, in the presence of these gentlemen, "March them around Baltimore, and not through it."

I sincerely hope the general, on fuller reflection, will consider this practical and proper, and that you will not object to it.

By this collision of the people of Baltimore with the troops will be avoided, unless they go out of their way to seek it. I hope you will exert your influence to prevent this.

Now and ever I shall do all in my power for peace, consistently with the maintenance of the government. Your obedient servant,  
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The governor's agitation was not calmed, however, by the good-natured sympathy of President Lincoln and his readiness of concession. On the contrary, each day the disaffected people of Maryland became more threatening and their governor more alarmed. He now begged that no more troops should be sent not only through Baltimore, but through Maryland, while he proposed, with a strange disregard of the dignity of the government to which he claimed to be loyal, that the English ambassador at Washington should be invited to mediate between the United States and its rebellious citizens!

Executive Chamber, Annapolis, April 22, 1861.

To his Excellency A. Lincoln, President of the United States:  
SIR,—I feel it my duty most respectfully to advise you that no more troops be ordered or allowed to pass through Maryland, and that the troops now off Annapolis be sent elsewhere; and I most respectfully urge that a truce be offered by you, so that the effusion of blood may be prevented. I respectfully suggest that Lord Lyons be requested to act as mediator between the contending parties of our country.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
THOS. H. HICKS.

Proclamation of the Governor of Maryland.

Frederick, May 11, 1861.

To the People of Maryland:

A communication from the Mayor of Baltimore to the House of Delegates, published by that body yesterday, is designed to implicate me in the destruction of the railroad bridges near Baltimore on the 19th ultimo; this, too, in face of the fact that I had, in a recent official communication to the Senate, positively denied any complicity in the matter. If the mayor's communication and accompanying certificates have induced any person to doubt my true position in the premises, I respectfully ask a suspension of judgment until a sufficient time be afforded me to collect the necessary proof, and show, as I shall be able to do most conclusively, that the destruction of the bridges was a part of the conspiracy of those acting against the government, and was known and proclaimed in other parts of the state before the destruction was consummated. Whether Mayor Brown did or did not know of this part of the programme, I am unable to say. I am charitable enough to believe that he did not know it. His peculiar surroundings, and agitated condition of mind at the time referred to, may reasonably enough account for his assent to the transaction. But any person who knows my opinion of George P. Kane and Enoch L. Lowe will at once admit that I would be very slow to assent to any proposition emanating from or endorsed by them. Their introduction into my chamber at the late hour of the night to urge my consent to the perpetration of an unlawful act was not calculated to convince me of the propriety or necessity of that act. Men do not readily take counsel of their enemies. So soon as the heavy pressure upon my time shall have somewhat subsided, I will lay before the public a full refutation of this nefarious attempt to involve an innocent person in an unwarranted proceeding. Until that time I request a suspension of public opinion.

THOMAS H. HICKS.

Embargo at Baltimore.

Baltimore, April 22, 1861.

It is ordered by the Mayor and the Board of Police that no provisions of any kind be transferred

<sup>10</sup> Extract from a Message of Mayor Brown to the City Council of Baltimore, July 10th, 1861.

After recapitulating the occurrences of the 19th of April last, in which he agrees with Marshal Kane's account of the affair published on May 4, he says:

It is doing bare justice to say that the Board of Police, the Marshal of Police, and the men under his command, exerted themselves bravely, efficiently, skillfully, and in good faith, to preserve the peace and protect life. If proper notice had been given of the arrival of the troops, and of the number expected, the outbreak might have been prevented entirely; and but for the timely arrival of Marshal Kane with his force, as I have described, the bloodshed would have been great. The wounded among the troops received the best care and medical attention at the expense of the city, and the bodies of the killed were carefully and respectfully returned to their friends. The facts which I witnessed myself, and all that I have since heard, satisfied me that the attack was the result of a sudden impulse, and not of a premeditated scheme. But the effect on our citizens was for a time uncontrollable. In the intense excitement which ensued, which lasted for many days, and which was shared by men of all parties, and by our volunteer soldiers as well as citizens, it would have been impossible to convey more troops from the North through the city without a severe fight and bloodshed. Such an occurrence would have been fatal to the city; and, accordingly, to prevent it, the bridges on the Northern Central Railroad, and on the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad, were, with the consent of the governor, and by my order, with the co-operation of the Board of Police—except Mr. Charles D. Hicks, who was absent from the city—partially disabled and burned, so as to prevent the immediate approach of troops to the city, but with no purpose of hostility to the federal government. This act, with the motive which prompted it, has been reported by the Board of Police to the Legislature of the state, and approved by that body, and was also immediately communicated by me in person to the President of the United States and his cabinet.

Dispatch of Secretary Cameron to Governor Hicks.

War Department, Washington, April 18, 1861.

To his Excellency Thomas H. Hicks, Governor of Maryland:

SIR,—The President is informed that threats are made and measures taken, by unlawful combinations of misguided citizens of Maryland, to prevent by force the transit of United States troops across Maryland, on their way, pursuant to orders, for the defense of this capital. The information is from such sources, and in such shape, that the President thinks it his duty to make it known to you, so that all loyal and patriotic citizens of our state may be warned in time, and that you may be prepared to take immediate and effective measures against it.

Such an attempt could have only the most deplorable consequences; and it would be agreeable to the President, as it would be to yourself, that it should be prevented or overcome by the loyal authorities and citizens of Maryland, rather than averted by any other means.

I am very respectfully yours, etc.,

SIMON CAMERON, Secretary of War.

<sup>1</sup> CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR OF MARYLAND AND THE MAYOR OF BALTIMORE AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown to President Lincoln.

Mayor's Office, Baltimore, April 19, 1861.

To his Excellency the President of the United States:

SIR,—A collision between the citizens and the Northern troops has taken place in Baltimore, and the excitement is fearful. Send no more troops here. We will endeavor to prevent all bloodshed.

A public meeting of citizens has been called, and the troops of the state and the city have been ordered out to preserve the peace. They will be enough. Respectfully,

THOS. H. HICKS, Governor.  
GEO. WM. BROWN, Mayor.

Mayor's Office, Baltimore, April 19, 1861.

To his Excellency the President of the United States:


SIR,—This will be presented to you by the Hon. H. Lenox Bond, Geo. W. Dobbin, and John C. Brune, Esqrs., who will proceed to Washington by an express train, at my request, in order to explain fully the fearful condition of our affairs in this city. The people are exasperated to the highest degree by the passage of troops, and the citizens are universally decided in the opinion that no more troops should be ordered to come.

The authorities of the city did their best to-day to protect both strangers and citizens, and to prevent a collision, but in vain; and but for their great efforts a fearful slaughter would have occurred.

Under these circumstances, it is my solemn duty to inform you that it is not possible for more soldiers to pass through Baltimore unless they fight their way at every step.



Not only were the militia of the city and the neighborhood kept under arms, but volunteers were enlisted to the number of many thousand men, and an attack upon Fort M'Henry, a national work three miles from the city, was openly threatened. Governor Hicks was swept along with the popular torrent, and on the 22d of April he sent an official advice to the President that no more troops should be allowed to pass, not only through Baltimore, but over the boundaries of Maryland; and to this unreasonable request he added the humiliating recommendation that the President should propose a truce to the insurgents, and ask the British minister at Washington to act as a mediator between them and the government. This communication was of such an extraordinary nature that the President placed it in the hands of the Secretary of State for formal treatment. Mr. Seward, not lowering the government which he represented by a refusal in terms, administered a dignified and considerate rebuke to Governor Hicks for both his proposals, which it was unmistakably, though courteously, intimated could not even be taken into consideration. But the secretary gave just ground of complaint both to the supporters of the government and to the insurgents by telling Governor Hicks that the troops which were coming through Maryland were intended for no other service than the defense of Washington.<sup>4</sup> The men themselves, and those who sent and contributed to equip and provision them, expected that they were to be used to crush the insurrection; and when, not three months after, some of those very troops crossed into Virginia to give battle to the rebel army, the pledge of the United States cabinet minister to the Maryland governor appeared to have been either unauthorized or violated. But the commotion and turbulence of the distracted times confused so many sober minds, and deranged so many carefully-laid plans, that there was excuse for far graver discrepancies than this. The last violent demonstrations on the part of the Baltimoreans against the government were the seizure on the 24th of Relay House, a station on the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, which was held by six hundred picked men and four field-pieces, the object being to cut off the communication of Pennsylvania with Washington by that route; and, after the removal of about twenty-five hundred men, chiefly Pennsylvania militia, from Cockeysville, a village on the Baltimore and Susquehanna Railway, seventeen miles from the former place, the destruction of all the bridges except one upon that line



BURNING OF THE BRIDGE AT CANTON, MARYLAND, BY THE MOB.

within the limits of the state. Meanwhile the carriage-roads leading from Baltimore were thronged with vehicles filled with households and household goods, seeking safety in more peaceful places.

But although Massachusetts, by her promptitude, obtained the post of honor and of danger in these early days of the insurrection, the people of

from the city of Baltimore to any point or place, from this time until farther orders, without special permission.

The execution of this order is intrusted to Colonel I. R. Trimble.

The following order has been issued:

It being deemed necessary for the safety and protection of the city that no steam-boat be permitted to leave our harbor without the sanction of the city authorities, I hereby, by authority of the Mayor and Board of Police, direct that no steam-boat shall leave the harbor without my permit.

I. R. TRIMBLE, Commanding.

Secretary Seward to Governor Hicks.

Department of State, April 22, 1861.

To his Excellency Thomas H. Hicks, Governor of Maryland:

SIR,—I have had the honor to receive your communication of this morning, in which you inform me that you have felt it to be your duty to advise the President of the United States to order elsewhere the troops then off Annapolis, and also that no more may be sent through Maryland, and that you have farther suggested that Lord Lyons be requested to act as mediator between the contending parties in our country, to prevent the effusion of blood.

The President directs me to acknowledge the receipt of that communication, and to assure you that he has weighed the counsels which it contains with the respect which he habitually cherishes for the chief magistrates of the several states, and especially for yourself. He regrets, as deeply as any magistrate or citizen of the country can, that demonstrations against the safety of the United States, with very extensive preparations for the effusion of blood, have made it his duty to call out the force to which you allude.

The force now sought to be brought through Maryland is intended for nothing but the defense of this capital. The President has necessarily confided the choice of the national highway which that force shall take in coming to this city to the lieutenant general commanding the army of the United States, who, like his only predecessor, is not less distinguished for his humanity than for his loyalty, patriotism, and distinguished public service.

The President instructs me to add that the national highway thus selected by the lieutenant general has been chosen by him, upon consultation with prominent magistrates and citizens of Maryland, as the one which, while a route is absolutely necessary, is farthest removed from the populous cities of the state, and with the expectation that it would, therefore, be the least objectionable one.

The President can not but remember that there has been a time in the history of our country when a general of the American Union, with forces designed for the defense of its capital, was not unwelcome any where in the State of Maryland, and certainly not at Annapolis, then, as now, the capital of that patriotic state, and then, also, one of the capitals of the Union.


If eighty years could have obliterated all the other nobler sentiments of that age in Maryland, the President would be hopeful, nevertheless, that there is one that would forever remain there and every where. That sentiment is that no domestic contention whatever that may arise among the parties of this republic ought in any case to be referred to any foreign arbitrament, least of all to the arbitrament of a European monarchy.

I have the honor to be, with distinguished consideration, your excellency's most obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

the other loyal states were no laggards, and those of New York strove with their brethren of the East in noble emulation. The annals of these days can not be silent upon the march of the New York Seventh Regiment, "National Guard," to Washington, without passing over some of their most interesting incidents. This regiment, which for two generations had represented, more than any other body of militia, the higher social and intellectual culture of the great commercial metropolis, had early attained and steadily preserved an equal distinction in drill and in discipline. And, unlike the other regiments of the same city, its service had not been entirely confined to encountering the perils of Broadway upon parade-days, between the Battery and Union Square. It had been called into service at the time of the Astor Place Riot, on which occasion, after having distinguished itself for hours in the face of the mob by the preservation of discipline, and the patient and even good-natured endurance of injuries from showers of paving-stones, it had obeyed promptly the command to fire, and by three compact and well-delivered volleys had put an end forever to riots in New York. The imbecility of the city government, which needlessly allowed this disturbance to grow to such a terrible issue, could bring no reproach upon the body of citizen soldiers who bore the brunt of it so manfully, and ended it so effectually. At another time, when Fernando Wood, the same mayor of New York whom we have seen so ready to meet the demands of the insurgents of Georgia for their arms, and to follow their example by proposing a secession of the city from the state, forcibly resisted the execution of the Metropolitan Police Law, which secured peace and order to the city and the surrounding district by removing its police from the influence of party politics, this regiment exhibited its *esprit de corps* and its discipline by twice instantly facing about to meet the requirements of the Police Commissioners, though at the apparent loss of formal and long-prepared festivities in honor of the regiment by the citizens of Boston, to join in which it was on its march at the receipt of the order; and such was the reliance upon this body of men, that although, at the time of the second order, it was in Boston, and there were several other regiments in New York, it was summoned by telegraph from the former city. Its reputation, like its name, was national, and, in fact, had extended across the ocean. The whole division, of which this regiment formed a part, had been placed at the service of the government by its major general at a time when there was yet hope that an appeal to arms might be avoided; and now, when the seat of the national government was in hourly peril, the Seventh at once stepped forward to assume a three months' service, and to go immediately on to Washington. The announcement that it was going begat a sort of confidence in those days, when, dark and gloomy though they were, the nature, the extent, and the duration of the coming conflict was entirely unforeseen. It was felt that the presence of the regiment in Washington, in support of the handful of regular troops assembled there, would deter any attack not more formidable and thoroughly organized than the insurgents were supposed to have prepared. The excited patriotic feeling of the city concentrated for the moment upon the movements of this regiment; during the two or three days of preparation an eager throng surrounded its head-quarters, where recently-recruited members, young men of fortune and fashion, and the highest education, were drilling day and night to attain such proficiency as would admit them as privates to the ranks upon the projected expedition. It was on the 19th of April that the Seventh set out for Washington. Its departure from the armory had been delayed for some hours, and meantime the news had come on by telegraph of the attack upon the Massachusetts men in Baltimore. It flew through the city, quickening general apprehension, deepening the general gloom, and stimulating the military ardor of the departing soldiers by the spur of emulation and the hope of distinction. The whole city seemed to pour out its population upon the line of march and the point of embarkation of this specially favored corps. The ranks were full, and more than full; never upon a gala-day had they shown more muskets. The moment of departure at last arrived. Pale with suppressed excitement, the peace-bred soldiers heard the command which ordered them to begin their march toward the enemy; a thousand feet with steady tread at once responded, and the regiment moved swiftly onward. Decked in no holiday garb, but grimly panoplied in gray and steel, with its colonel marching at its head, its serried files wheeled into the great thoroughfare in which its fine discipline and soldierly bearing had so often been objects of admiring comment; and there a spectacle met the eye never seen before in this country, without a doubt never to be seen again. For the occasion gave it its peculiar character. Broadway had been before as crowded (for what is full can not be fuller), but never with a throng so animated, so admiring, so solicitous, so self-sacrificing. The great artery of New York life throbbed and palpitated throughout its length with the big emotions of the public heart. As the head of the column appeared, a shout burst forth that flashed like the fire of a *feu-de-joie* from lip to lip along the line of march, advancing before the regiment and following after, and never ceasing or dying away while a musket remained in sight. Not a cheer, or a succession of cheers, but a great cry that went up continuously to heaven, and bore up with it the unspeakable aspirations of the vast multitude. The sound fell strangely and never to be forgotten upon the ears of all within its reach, for in its tone there was a wild and plaintive yearning which they had never heard before. The Seventh began its service by a march through two miles of such a crowd, uttering ceaseless encouragement and benediction. Thus the great city gave up the flower of its young men freely to the country's cause; though, as their bayonets passed out of sight, they flashed the rays of the setting sun on many eyes all dim with unaccustomed moisture. New York saw in after times hundreds of thousands of brave men march through her streets on like errands and to bloodier business, and gave them all a hearty





THE SEVENTH REGIMENT MARCHING DOWN BROADWAY TO ENBARK FOR THE WAR.



welcome and God-speed; the Seventh itself was cheered and petted by the whole country through which it passed on its way to Washington; but this was the first, and they were felt (though perhaps partially) to be the best; and neither the men who went nor the people who sent them ever knew again the chivalrous enthusiasm of that day, the tender, solemn rapture of that parting.

It was not until six days afterward that the Guard reached Washington; but it will be well to follow them directly to their destination, for their progress thither was immediately involved with some of the many significant occurrences which throng so thickly along this eventful period. They passed swiftly upon the railway through New Jersey, a state which has the reputation of being somewhat sluggish in its sympathies, and yet its people poured out along the track in such numbers, that one member of the regiment, who gave an account of its march, said that he "did not see a rod of ground without its man from dusk till dawn, from the Hudson to the Delaware." Philadelphia welcomed their coming, but could not speed their parting. All communication by railway between that city and Baltimore was effectually cut off before they reached it on the 20th; and for many hours they trod with fretful steps the formal streets of the hospitable town, which was but to them a station on the road to Baltimore. At last, all other modes of transportation proving hopeless, a steam-boat was chartered, and they started for Washington by way, not of Baltimore, but of Annapolis, the old and drowsy capital of Maryland. In taking this step their colonel (Marshall Lefferts) followed the lead of a man whose position and peculiar talents obtained for him a singular prominence in the drama to which the events which have been thus far recounted were but a prelude.

General Butler, an eminent member of the bar, and an officer of the militia of Massachusetts, had been placed by Governor Andrew in command of the Massachusetts regiments which were sent as part of the contingent of that state, under the President's proclamation, to the relief of Washington. He was a Democrat of the strictest sect, an active and life-long supporter of the party which for years had ruled the country by its alliance with the slaveholders of the South. He had been a member of the presidential nominating convention which met at Charleston; and he had given his hearty support, during the subsequent canvass, to Mr. Breckinridge, the candidate of the extreme slavery faction. But secession had opened his never very closely shut eyes to the policy of the men who ruled that convention, and he had declared at once and with the earnestness of a whole-hearted nature for the nation against his late political associates. In this he was a representative man, and his appearance in the service of the republic against the insurgents had for them and for the country at large a very great significance. It told more unmistakably, perhaps, than any other single event which had taken place, the supreme devotion of the people of the free states to the Union. The presence of such a man at the head of a brigade of Massachusetts troops on the march to put down the slaveholders' insurrection,

was made yet the more striking by the fact that he was placed in command by Governor Andrew, who was prominent among the extreme, or, so-called, radical Republicans.

The news of the attack upon one detachment of his command flying northward, passed General Butler at Philadelphia, where he had arrived with the Eighth Massachusetts regiment. With a sagacious perception and prompt decision, which showed at the very first step that he was a leader, he saw that the consequence of the attack would be the destruction of the bridges between Philadelphia and Baltimore, and he determined to move instantly upon the latter place by way of Annapolis, occupying and holding the capital of Maryland; thus, in the words of his dispatch upon the occasion, calling the state to account for the death of Massachusetts men, his friends and neighbors. On the evening of the 20th he transported his command to Havre de Grace, upon the Susquehanna, and, seizing upon the large and powerful ferry-boat Maryland, steamed down the Chesapeake. He arrived at Annapolis on the morning of the 21st, and found there the Governor of Maryland and a body of insurgents—the one powerless in the hands of the other. The disaffected controlled the city, held the grounds of the United States Naval Academy there, and were about to seize upon the school-ship "Old Ironsides," as the superannuated frigate Constitution, the war-worn victor of many fights, had, for more than a generation, been fondly named General Butler at once called for mariners from his command, and enough stepped forward to man the old ship for the nonce. They were placed on board, and by their aid and that of the Maryland she was towed out into the stream, where her guns were shotted and trained upon the shore; but the Maryland herself, with the troops still on board, ran aground, and remained fast until the next day. Meantime the New York Seventh Regiment, which had left Philadelphia in the steamer Boston, arrived, and was placed by its colonel under the command of General Butler; the Maryland was hauled off, and both regiments landed and took possession of the grounds of the Naval Academy. Against this landing of "Northern troops" upon the soil of Maryland Governor Hicks sent General Butler a formal protest; but the latter persisted—first showing, in reply, that the necessities of his position, the health of the men under his command, and the instructions of his government, made it imperative that he should land and march quickly through Maryland to Washington, respecting private property, outraging the rights of none, but, on the contrary, using his force, if necessary, to preserve the peace of Maryland as well as the authority of the national government, and having issued strict orders as to the drill and discipline of his soldiers, and congratulations upon their saving the Constitution—and the governor could not do otherwise than submit. It is worthy of notice that the Massachusetts general administered a respectful rebuke to the Maryland governor for his "ill-advised designation" of the troops under the general's command. "They are," said he, "not Northern troops; they are a part of the whole militia of the United States, obeying the call of the President."<sup>6</sup> Thus

<sup>6</sup> Major Theodore Wintrop, in the *Atlantic Monthly* for June, 1861.

*General Butler to Governor Hicks.*

Off Annapolis, April 22, 1861.

To his Excellency Thomas H. Hicks, Governor of Maryland

In reply to the communication from you on the 21st, I had the honor to inform you of the necessities of my command, which drew me into the harbor of Annapolis. My circumstances have not changed. To that communication I have received no reply. I can not return, if I desire so to do, without being furnished with some necessary supplies, for all which the money will be paid. I desire of your excellency an immediate reply whether I have the permission of the state authorities of Maryland to land the men under my command, and of passing quickly through the state on my way to Washington, respecting private property and paying for what I receive, and outraging the rights of none—a duty which I am bound to do in obedience to the requisitions of the President of the United States.

I have received some copies of an informal correspondence between the Mayor of Baltimore and the President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and a copy of a note from your excellency, inclosing the same to Captain Blake, commandant of the Naval School. These purport to show that instructions have been issued by the War Department as to the disposition of the United States militia, differing from what I had supposed to be my duty. If these instructions have been in fact issued, it would give me great pleasure to obey them. Have I your excellency's permission, in consideration of these exigencies of the case, to land my men, to supply their wants, and to relieve them from the extreme and unhealthy confinement of a transport vessel not fitted to receive them? To convince your excellency of the good faith toward the authorities of the State of Maryland with which I am acting, and I am armed only against the disturbers of her peace and of the United States, I inclose a copy of an order issued to my command before I had the

honor of receiving the copy of your communication through Captain Blake. I trust your excellency will appreciate the necessities of my position and give me an immediate reply, which I await with anxiety.

I would do myself the honor to have a personal interview with your excellency, if you so desire. I beg leave to call your excellency's attention to what I hope I may be pardoned for deeming an ill-advised designation of the men under my command. *They are not Northern troops; they are a part of the whole militia of the United States, obeying the call of the President.*

I have the honor of being your excellency's obedient servant.

BENJ. F. BUTLER, Brigadier General in the Militia of the United States.


P.S.—It occurs to me that our landing on the grounds at the Naval Academy would be entirely proper, and in accordance with your excellency's wishes.

B. F. B.

Special Brigade Order, No. 37.

Head-quarters Second Division Massachusetts Volunteer Militia,  
on board Steamer Maryland, off Annapolis, April 22, 1861.

Colonel Munroe is charged with the execution of the following order: At 5 o'clock A.M. the troops will be paraded by company, and be drilled in the manual of arms, especially in loading at will, firing by file, and in the use of the bayonet; and these specialties will be observed in all subsequent drills in the manual. Such drill to continue until 7 o'clock, when all the arms will be stacked on the upper deck, great care being taken to instruct the men as to the mode of stacking their arms, so that a firm stack, not easily overturned, shall be made. Being obliged to drill at times with the weapons loaded, great damage may be done by the overturning of the stack and the discharge of the pieces. This is important. Indeed, an accident has already occurred in the regiment from this cause, and, although slight in its consequences, yet it warns us to increased diligence in this regard. The purpose which could only be hinted at in the orders of yesterday



REFERENCES.—1. Catholic College.—2. City Hotel.—3. Battery.—4. Capitol.—5. Midshipmen's Quarters.—6. Constitution.—7. Recitation Hall.—8. Chapel.—9. Observatory.—10. Officers' Quarters.—11. St. John's (Episcopal) College.—12. Hospital.—13. Monument—the same that was in front of the Capitol at Washington.—14. Naval Monument.

GENERAL VIEW OF ANNAPOLIS, WITH THE "CONSTITUTION" IN THE FOREGROUND.





THE MEN OF THE EIGHTH MASSACHUSETTS REGIMENT REPAIRING THE BRIDGES ON THE RAILROAD FROM ANNAPOLIS TO WASHINGTON.

sharply did this question define, and thus continuously present itself in the earlier stages of the conflict of which it was the great issue, though not the exciting cause. That cause I shall consider more particularly hereafter. But accident furnished General Butler with opportunity of showing how far from his intention was the attempt to change, or even the acquiescence in any violent attempt to change, the relation between master and slave. An insurrection of the slaves around Annapolis was at the time feared, and General Butler offered the governor the services of his troops for its suppression, or that of any other resistance to the laws of Maryland. For this offer he met with a mild though firm rebuke from his Abolitionist govern-

has been accomplished. The frigate *Constitution* has lain for a long time at this port substantially at the mercy of the armed mob, which sometimes paralyzes the otherwise loyal State of Maryland. Deeds of daring, successful contests, and glorious victories had rendered "Old Ironsides" so conspicuous in the naval history of the country, that she was fitly chosen as the school-ship in which to train the future officers of the navy to like heroic acts.

It was given to Massachusetts, and Essex County, first to man her; it was reserved for Massachusetts to have the honor to retain her for the service of the Union and the laws.

This is a sufficient triumph of right, and a sufficient triumph for us. By this the blood of our friends shed by the Baltimore mob is in so far avenged. The Eighth Regiment may hereafter cheer lustily on all proper occasions, but never without orders. The old *Constitution*, by their efforts, aided untiringly by the United States officers having her in charge, is now safely "possessed, occupied, and enjoyed" by the government of the United States, and is safe from all her foes.

We have been joined by the Seventh Regiment of New York, and together we propose peaceably, quickly, and civilly, unless opposed by some mob or other disorderly persons, to march to Washington, in obedience to the requisition of the President of the United States. If opposed, we shall march steadily forward.

My next order I hardly know how to express. I can not assume that any of the citizen soldiery of Massachusetts or New York could, under any circumstances whatever, commit any outrages upon private property in a loyal and friendly state. But, fearing that some improper person may have by stealth introduced himself among us, I deem it proper to state that any unauthorized interference with private property will be most signally punished, and full reparation therefore made to the injured party to the full extent of my power and ability. In so doing I but carry out the orders of the War Department. I should have done so without those orders.

Colonel Munroe will cause these orders to be read at the head of each company before we march.

Colonel Lefferts's command not having been originally included in this order, he will be furnished with a copy for his instruction. By order of

[Signed],

B. F. BUTLER, Brigadier General.  
WM. H. CLEMENS, Brigade Major.

State of Maryland, Executive Chamber, Annapolis, April 22, 1861.

To Brigadier General B. F. Butler:

SIR,—I am in receipt of your two communications of this date, informing me of your intention to land the men under your command at Annapolis, for the purpose of marching thence to the city of Washington. I content myself with protesting against this movement, which, in view of the excited condition of the people of this state, I can not but consider an unwise step on the part of the government. But I most earnestly urge upon you that there shall be no halt made by the troops in this city.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
General Butler to Governor Hicks.

Head-quarters Third Brigade Massachusetts Volunteer Militia, Annapolis, Maryland, April 23, 1861.  
To his Excellency Thomas H. Hicks, Governor of the State of Maryland:

I did myself the honor in my communication of yesterday, wherein I asked permission to land the portion of the militia of the United States under my command, to state that they were armed only against the disturbers of the peace of the State of Maryland and of the United States.

I have understood within the last hour that some apprehensions were entertained of an insurrection of the negro population of this neighborhood. I am anxious to convince all classes of persons that the forces under my command are not here in any way to interfere with or countenance any interference with the laws of the state. I am, therefore, ready to co-operate with your excellency in suppressing most promptly and effectively any insurrection against the laws of Maryland.

I beg, therefore, that you announce publicly that any portion of the forces under my command

or; but in turn he defended himself with entire success, on the grounds both of humanity and policy.

The difficulties in the apparently simple and easy task of landing two thousand loyal citizens of the United States, in obedience to the command of the President, upon the soil of one of those states which still acknowledged its old allegiance, having been thus overcome, there remained the not less serious task of moving across its territory. The insurgents had torn up the rails of the Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railway, of which General Butler took possession, and to the repairing of which the men of the Eighth Massachusetts at once addressed themselves. Indeed, the various capacity of this

is at your excellency's disposal, to act immediately for the preservation and quietness of the peace of this community.

And I have the honor to be your excellency's obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, General of the Third Brigade.

Correspondence between Governor Andrew and General Butler.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive Department, Council Chamber, Boston, April 25, 1861.

GENERAL,—I have received through Major Ames a dispatch transmitted from Perryville, detailing the proceedings at Annapolis from the time of your arrival off that port until the hour when Major Ames left you to return to Philadelphia. I wish to repeat the assurance of my entire satisfaction with the action you have taken, with a single exception. If I rightly understood the telegraphic dispatch, I think that your action in tendering to Governor Hicks the assistance of our Massachusetts troops to suppress a threatened servile insurrection among the hostile people of Maryland was unnecessary. I hope that the fuller dispatches, which are on their way from you, may show reasons why I should modify my opinion concerning that particular instance; but, in general, I think that the matter of servile insurrection among a community in arms against the federal Union is no longer to be regarded by our troops in a political, but solely in a military point of view, and is to be contemplated as one of the inherent weaknesses of the enemy, from the disastrous operations of which we are under no obligation of a military character to guard them, in order that they may be enabled to improve the security which our arms would afford so as to prosecute with more energy their traitorous attacks upon the federal government and capital. The mode in which such outbreaks are to be considered should depend entirely upon the loyalty or disloyalty of the community in which they occur; and in the vicinity of Annapolis, I can, on this occasion, perceive no reason of military policy why a force summoned to the defense of the federal government, at this moment of all others, should be offered to be diverted from its immediate duty to help rebels who stand with arms in their hands, obstructing its progress toward the city of Washington. I entertain no doubt that whenever we shall have an opportunity to interchange our views personally on this subject, we shall arrive at entire concordance of opinion.

Yours faithfully,

JOHN A. ANDREW.

To Brigadier General Butler.

Department of Annapolis, Head-quarters, Annapolis, May 9, 1861.

To his Excellency John A. Andrew, Governor and Commander-in-Chief:  
SIR,—I have delayed replying to your excellency's dispatch of the 25th of April in my other dispatches, because, as it involved disapprobation of an act done, couched in the kindest language, I supposed the interest of the country could not suffer in the delay; and incessant labor up to the present moment has prevented me giving full consideration to the topic. Temporary illness, which forbids bodily activity, gives me now a moment's pause.

The telegraph, with more than usual accuracy, had rightly informed your excellency that I had offered the services of the Massachusetts troops under my command to aid the authorities of Maryland in suppressing a threatened slave insurrection. Fortunately for us all, the rumor of such an outbreak was without substantial foundation. Assuming, as your excellency does in your dispatch, that I was carrying on military operations in an enemy's country, when a war *à l'outrance* was to be waged, my act might be a matter of discussion. And in that view, acting in the light of the Baltimore murderers, and the apparent hostile position of Maryland, your excellency might, without mature reflection, have come to the conclusion of disapprobation expressed in your dispatch. But the facts, especially as now aided by their results, will entirely justify my act, and re-instate me in your excellency's good opinion.

True, I landed on the soil of Maryland against the formal protest of its governor and of the corporate authorities of Annapolis, but without any armed opposition on their part, and expecting opposition only from insurgents assembled in riotous contempt of the laws of the state. Before,



fine body of men, which seemed to be largely composed of skilled artisans, was one of the noteworthy features of their march to Washington. As they had furnished mariners to work the Constitution, so now, upon call, machinists, engineers, and iron-workers stepped forward in great numbers. The rails had not only been torn up, but carried off and hid; but they were unearthed, and even traced to and taken from the bottom of the river as if by instinct. The only engine to be found had been taken to pieces and partly destroyed, and, upon inquiry for a man who could put it in running order, one of the Beverly Light Guard, recognizing in a piece of the machine his own handiwork, promptly and successfully undertook to mend what he had made, some of his companions erecting, and others working, the temporary forges which were required. Cheerfully and thoroughly they did these tasks while they were starving; for, owing to some blunder or accident, few had eaten any thing for twenty-four, and some not for thirty hours. The Seventh found this out, and in a moment their own haversacks were opened, and the hungry men were filled, and furnished for the morrow. Governor Hicks continued to protest—this time against the occupation of the railway, on the ground that by this act the members of the Legislature, which was about to meet at Annapolis, would be prevented from reaching the seat of government. But this plea General Butler extinguished by reminding the governor that he himself had objected to the landing of the troops on the ground that, as the railway was hopelessly destroyed, they could not leave the city by it, and demurely pointing out that, if the troops could not pass one way, the Legislature could not pass the other; adding, with an irony all the keener because its edge was fact, that he only sought means of transportation that he might vacate the capital, and not encumber that "beautiful city" during the session of the Legislature.<sup>8</sup>

The railway repaired, and the engines and cars sufficient for the sick, the small howitzer battery of the Seventh, and the baggage, put in running order, the march to Washington began on the morning of the 24th, and, leaving the good people of Annapolis astonished at the strictly correct behavior, the universal courtesy, and even the open-handed generosity of a body of men whom the disorganizers had led them to believe were but a well-drilled band of ruffians, the Seventh led the column toward the capital. The picture of their patriotic journey would be incomplete were the gallantry which animated them left unillustrated by a declaration made on their behalf as to some of the foes whom they had reason to believe they would encounter. As individuals they had visited residents of Maryland and Virginia, and as a body they had enjoyed the hospitality of some of the military companies of those commonwealths, where they had friends whom they in turn had welcomed and entertained at New York. These men were furious in their denunciations of the Seventh in particular, and in their threats of bloody vengeance on it; but the members of that regiment, expressing their wonder at the hostility thus manifested on occasion of their mere march to the defense of Washington, said, "If, in the performance of duty, we shall be compelled to meet our friends of the Baltimore City Guard and the Richmond Grays in hostile array, we shall receive their first fire with presented arms, but on the second we shall be compelled to defend ourselves." Thus implacably malevolent were the self-styled chivalry of the labor-loathing

slave section; and with such high-toned and truly chivalrous bearing, reminding us of the elaborate courtesy of the French Guard at Fontenoy, were they met by the simple and unpretending citizen soldiers of a commonwealth whose greatness was based on industry, and whose chief glory was in freedom. The march to Washington tried the endurance of the Seventh sorely. Begun in the morning, it was continued through the day under a blazing sun, over ground on which long stretches of hot and shifting sand were varied only by the wooden sleepers of the railway, progress over which was extraordinarily fatiguing. The railway was chosen instead of the turnpike road because it had been discovered that parties of cavalry had been posted along the latter route for the purpose of cutting off the regiment. Needful caution and the difficulties of the way made the march a very slow one; but the men kept steadily on, with an occasional halt at a station for brief rest and refreshment. All suffered greatly from fatigue and heat; and a few broke down and increased the sick-list. Night fell upon the slowly advancing column: it was the fourth which most of them had been obliged to give to service instead of to slumber, and they staggered wearily through the monotonous obstacles of their march, startled at intervals to life and braced to action by the distant dropping shot of an outlying rebel, watching vainly for their blood. In this way, scouting the country round and feeling every rod of the road, they advanced little more than one mile an hour; and, although the last stages of their progress were easy, it was not until the 25th, six days after their departure from New York, that they arrived at the capital. Before them there were only five hundred raw, undrilled men from Pennsylvania, and the Sixth Massachusetts regiment, fresh from its bloody initiation into military life at Baltimore. As they marched up the broad avenue to the White House, the roll of their drums made loyal hearts leap for joy, and sounded like the doom of treachery. But, to look forward, and to dismiss this regiment honorably from our sight, the fortunes of the war decreed that the New York Seventh should see no active service. They remained the full time for which the President's proclamation summoned them, and longer; these New York dandies worked in trenches and lay down to rest in mud; they again returned to the defense of Washington, but they never were under fire as a body. So high, however, was the reputation of the regiment for drill and discipline, that its members, even non-commissioned officers and privates, were eagerly sought as company and field-officers for newly-formed volunteer regiments, and a very large number thus entered the army and served through the war, in many cases with distinction. The composition of the corps, its reputation, the fact that it was regarded as representing the peculiarly conservative classes of the commercial metropolis of the country, and the promptness with which it volunteered to lead what was believed at the time to be the forlorn hope of the republic, have entitled it to a more prominent place in the earlier pages of this history than can be given hereafter to some bodies of men which displayed all its spirit and its patriotism, and which had ten times its numbers.

While these events were taking place near the capital, which had been so suddenly isolated from the loyal millions of the North, they were every where assembling to express, in a formal and solemn manner, their determination to support the government with their lives and their fortunes.

by letter, and at the time of landing, by personal interview, I had informed Governor Hicks that soldiers of the Union, under my command, were armed only against the insurgents and disturbers of the peace of Maryland and of the United States. I received from Governor Hicks assurances of the loyalty of the state to the Union—assurances which subsequent events have fully justified. The Mayor of Annapolis also informed me that the city authorities would in no wise oppose me, but that I was in great danger from the excited and riotous mobs of Baltimore pouring down upon me, and in numbers beyond the control of the police. I assured both the governor and the mayor that I had no fear of a Baltimore or other mob, and that, supported by the authorities of the state and city, I should repress all hostile demonstrations against the laws of Maryland and the United States, and that I would protect both myself and the city of Annapolis from any disorderly persons whatsoever. On the morning following my landing I was informed that the city of Annapolis and environs were in danger from an insurrection of the slave population, in defiance of the laws of the state. What was I to do? I had promised to put down a white mob, and to preserve and enforce the laws against that. Ought I to allow a black one any preference in a breach of the laws? I understood that I was armed against all infractions of the laws, whether by white or black, and upon that understanding I acted, certainly with promptness and efficiency. And your excellency's shadow of disapprobation, arising from a misunderstanding of the facts, has caused all the regret I have for that action. The question seemed to me to be neither military nor political, and was not to be so treated. It was simply a question of good faith and honesty of purpose. The benign effect of my course was instantly seen. The good but timid people of Annapolis, who had fled from their houses at our approach, immediately returned; business resumed its accustomed channels; quiet and order prevailed in the city; confidence took the place of distrust, friendship of enmity, brotherly kindness of sectional hate, and I believe to-day there is no city in the Union more loyal than the city of Annapolis. I think, therefore, I may safely point to the results for my justification. The vote of the neighboring county of Washington, a few days since, for its delegate to the Legislature, wherein 4000 out of 5000 votes were thrown for a delegate favorable to the Union, is among the many happy fruits of firmness of purpose, efficiency of action, and integrity of mission. I believe, indeed, that it will not require a personal interchange of views, as suggested in your dispatch, to bring our minds in accordance; a simple statement of the facts will suffice.

But I am to act hereafter, it may be, in an enemy's country, among a servile population, when the question may arise, as it has not yet arisen, as well in a moral and Christian, as in a political and military point of view, What shall I do? Will your excellency bear with me a moment while this question is discussed?

I appreciate fully your excellency's suggestion as to the inherent weakness of the rebels, arising from the preponderance of their servile population. The question, then, is, In what manner shall we take advantage of that weakness? By allowing, and of course arming, that population to rise upon the defenseless women and children of the country, carrying rapine, arson, and murder—all the horrors of San Domingo, a million times magnified, among those whom we hope to reunite with us as brethren, many of whom are already so, and all who are worth preserving will be, when this horrible madness shall have passed away or be thrashed out of them? Would your excellency advise the troops under my command to make war in person upon the defenseless women and children of any part of the Union, accompanied with brutalities too horrible to be named? You will say, "God forbid!" If we may not do so in person, shall we arm others so to do over whom we can have no restraint, exercise no control, and who, when once they have tasted blood, may turn the very arms we put in their hands against ourselves, as a part of the oppressing white race? The reading of history, so familiar to your excellency, will tell you the bitterest cause of complaint which our fathers had against Great Britain in the war of the Revolution was the arming by the British ministry of the red man with the tomahawk and the scalping-knife against the women and children of the colonies, so that the phrase, "May we not use all the means which God and Nature have put in our power to subjugate the colonies?" has passed into a legend of infamy against the leader of that ministry who used it in Parliament. Shall history teach us in vain? Could we justify ourselves to ourselves? Although, with arms in our hands, amid the savage wildness of camp and field, we may have blunted many of the finer moral sensibilities in letting loose four millions of worse than savages upon the homes and hearths of the South, can we

be justified to the Christian community of Massachusetts? Would such a course be consonant with the teachings of our holy religion? I have a very decided opinion upon the subject, and if any one desires, as I know your excellency does not, this unhappy contest to be prosecuted in that manner, some instrument other than myself must be found to carry it on. I may not discuss the political bearings of this topic. When I went from under the shadow of my roof-tree, I left all politics behind me, to be resumed only when every part of the Union is loyal to the flag, and the potency of the government through the ballot-box is established.

Passing the moral and Christian view, let us examine the subject as a military question. Is not that state already subjugated which requires the bayonets of those armed in opposition to its rulers to preserve it from the horrors of a servile war? As the least experienced of military men, I would have no doubt of the entire subjugation of a state brought to that condition. When, therefore—unless I am better advised—any community in the United States, who have met me in honorable warfare, or even in the prosecution of a rebellious war in an honorable manner, shall call upon me for protection against the nameless horrors of a servile insurrection, they shall have it, and from the moment that call is obeyed, I have no doubt we shall be friends, and not enemies.

The possibilities that dishonorable means of defense are to be taken by the rebels against the government I do not now contemplate. If, as has been done in a single instance, my men are to be attacked by poison, or, as in another, stricken down by the assassin's knife, and thus murdered, the community using such weapons may be required to be taught that it holds within its own border a more potent means for deadly purposes and indiscriminate slaughter than any which it can administer to us.

Trusting that these views may meet your excellency's approval, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. F. BUTLER.

*Correspondence between Governor Hicks and General Butler.*

Executive Chamber, Annapolis, Friday, April 23, 1861.

To Brigadier General B. F. Butler:

SIR,—Having, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution of Maryland, summoned the Legislature of the state to assemble on Friday, the 26th instant, and Annapolis being the place in which, according to law, it must assemble; and having been credibly informed that you have taken military possession of the Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railroad, I deem it my duty to protest against this step, because, without at present assigning any other reason, I am informed that such occupation of said road will prevent the members of the Legislature from reaching this city.

Very respectfully yours,

THOMAS H. HICKS.

To which General Butler replied as follows:

Head-quarters United States Militia, Annapolis, Maryland, April 23, 1861.

To his Excellency Thomas H. Hicks, Governor of Maryland:

You are credibly informed that I have taken possession of the Annapolis and Elk Ridge Railroad. It might have escaped your notice, but at the official meeting which was held between your excellency and the Mayor of Annapolis, and the committee of the government and myself, as to the landing of my troops, it was expressly stated as the reason why I should not land that my troops could not pass the railroad because the company had taken up the rails, and they were private property. It is difficult to see how it can be, that if my troops could not pass over the railroad one way, the members of the Legislature could pass the other way. I have taken possession for the purpose of preventing the execution of the threats of the mob, as officially represented to me by the Master of Transportation of the railroad in this city, "that if my troops passed over the railroad, the railroad should be destroyed."

If the government of the state had taken possession of the road in any emergency, I should have long hesitated before entering upon it; but as I had the honor to inform your excellency in regard to another insurrection against the laws of Maryland, I am here armed to maintain those laws, if your excellency desires, and the peace of the United States, against all disorderly persons whatsoever. I am endeavoring to save and not to destroy; to obtain means of transportation, so that I can vacate the capital prior to the sitting of the Legislature, and not be under the necessity of encumbering your beautiful city while the Legislature is in session.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your excellency's obedient servant,

B. F. BUTLER, Brigadier General.





THE SEVENTH REGIMENT NEW YORK STATE MILITIA HALTING FOR A REST ON THE MARCH TO ANNAPOLIS JUNCTION.

"Union Meetings," as they were called, were held at all the cities and principal towns of the free states; and at all of them there was an expression of the same fervid devotion to the cause of constitutional liberty and the republic, varied only, and not too much, in the form of words in which it was uttered. Of these meetings, that held at New York on the 20th of April deserves notice as of national consequence. The pre-eminence of the place in which it was held made it the most important, the distinction and the various political views and relations of its managers and speakers the most characteristic, and its numbers the most imposing. The city of New York was, of all places in the free states, the one in which there was the least disposition to resist any demands made in the interests of slavery. No insignificant proportion of her inhabitants was directly bound by ties of blood and intermarriage to the people of the slave states; a still larger number were closely connected with them by business relations; and within her walls, chiefly by its command of the votes of naturalized Irish emigrants, the Democratic party, the ever-faithful ally of the slave power, ruled supreme. And in an age and in a country in which commerce, trade, and labor have a social and political consideration which they never before enjoyed, the city, which was at once the great mart, treasure-house, and labor exchange of the land, had acquired an influence whose extent was limited only by the bounds of civilization, and whose power was diminished little by the effect of distance. There was no part of the country the prosperity of which was not more or less involved in her stability and welfare. The vast crops of the West moved to the sea-board upon railways and canals, and those of both West and South were borne to Europe in ships, built chiefly by her capital, which seemed to have no limit except the demands for its employment. Every trader in the country, from the merchant who sold cargoes in the quiet of a luxurious office, to the peddler who painfully bore his little stock upon his bending back, was directly or indirectly her tributary debtor. To her the agriculturist and the manufacturer looked to find at home or make abroad a market for the fruits of his labor. The harbors of the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean filled with her ships, and the expanse of the great interior seas of the North plowed by keels floated from her harbor through canals, showed her the great carrier as well as the great factor and the great negotiator of a continent. Her capital insured the goods and even the lives that her commercial enterprise sent out upon these waters. With this position of command came a corresponding responsibility. Agriculture may flourish upon any field not trodden under foot of hostile armies; but trade thrives only amid general stability, and the sails of commerce must be wafted by the gales of peace. Therefore from the first mutterings of sectional discord the efforts of New York had been to set aside the issue and still the trouble; for she knew that she must provide the bulk of the means for carrying on a war which would at once drain her coffers and cripple her clients. En-

thusiasts, men of extreme views, men of reckless purposes, stigmatized her endeavors as the fruits of a base disposition to compromise with crime and to barter the principles of humanity for the good things of this life; and during the fierce debate of years, many were the sneers at the commercial patriotism of the so-called Union-savers, whose voices were heard only in deprecation. Honest in some cases, in many others this clamor was but a manifestation of that subtle hypocrisy by which the human heart seeks even to deceive itself. Self-sacrifice, conscious, seems heroic. Nothing higher toned, more unselfish, benevolent, patriotic, than to insist on carrying out one's principles without care for consequences. Being jocosely scornful of the meanness of looking after gold and silver in preference to the misty glories of abstract philanthropy is a grand sort of humor, a pipe the music of which costs little to those among whom it finds the readiest, most untiring dancers. For there is this difference between the position of most merchants and that of most enthusiasts in philanthropy—that profound political agitation threatens the former with present pecuniary loss and prospective ruin, while to the latter it generally brings little personal inconvenience, and often increase, if not of gain, at least of influence. Therefore, under such circumstances, the ore is always called upon to sacrifice a tangible personal good in possession to the possible establishment of an abstract principle in which he has no direct interest; while the other has his triumph, gains his glory, sacrifices nothing, and, especially if he is a journalist or a man of letters, perhaps gets money by the very curiosity which he has provoked, the very solicitude which he has awakened. To the former, therefore, any grave disturbance of society is a very serious matter; it touches with inexorable finger that sensitive spot of almost every civilized man's organization, the pocket—a region in which the philanthropic agitator is often equally callous and flaccid. The penniless traveler knows that he can sing before the robber. Nor is the mercantile view of politics, whatever the motives and ends of individuals, narrow or selfish in its actual horizon. For to the great majority of any people serious political disturbance ushers in a troubled present and a cloudy future. It brings anxious days and sleepless nights; it darkens the father's brow with care, and wrings the mother's heart with sorrow; and it may pinch the whole household with the pangs of actual poverty. Without claiming, then, that the commercial scope of politics is taken from the sublimest moral plane, and, on the other hand, recognizing the existence of times when considerations of present material good must be given to the winds, it must be admitted that the merchant may justly claim that the philanthropist should respect his scruples and deal tenderly with his fears, and that the statesman should remember that there may be too great a sacrifice made for an abstraction, or even for a principle, unless national safety or honor is at stake. For such reasons New York could afford to bear the reproach of selfishness and timidity so long as the





DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY YARD AT NORFOLK



United States.


Tug Yankee.

Cumberland.


Merrimac.

DESTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES SHIPS.





THE ARSENAL, BY FIRE, BY THE UNITED STATES TROOPS, ON APRIL 20, 1861.



Pennsylvania.

THE MONITOR, BY FIRE, BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNMENT.



struggle could with any honor be avoided; but when that period was past she took her position instantly and without reserve upon the side of constitutional government, and her prompt movement now was all the more imposing from her foregone caution and reserve.

To the meeting at Union Square, where centred the main avenues of the city, it seemed as if nearly all the male adult population poured in steady streams from an early hour after noon. The vast expanse was packed close with people, and the outskirts of the crowd stretched into the tributary streets. Five platforms were set up for officers and speakers, and, these proving insufficient, the people most remote from them were addressed from the balconies and steps of houses, the windows and even the roofs of which were occupied by ladies drawn thither by the unwonted scene. Major Anderson and the other officers of Fort Sumter had arrived, bringing with them the tattered flag which they had maintained so long and defended so well, and their presence added needless fuel to the patriotic fire which fused into one glowing mass the incongruous political elements of this great gathering. For the men who took prominent parts on this occasion were the leaders of all parties; Democrats and Republicans, Old Whigs and Native Americans, the living and the dead organizations, were all represented; and as the speakers came not only from the city and the State of New York, but from the East and the West, and from the very South, the demonstration assumed a national as well as a municipal importance. The resolutions at this meeting, unlike those passed at meetings in the slave states, were neither defiant nor denunciatory. They calmly set forth the occasion of the coming war, and declared it the duty of all good citizens to uphold with their fortunes and their lives the authority of the government against acts of lawless violence, which, if longer unresisted, would inevitably end in the destruction of the institutions established by the fathers of the republic for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and involve the country in universal anarchy and confusion.<sup>9</sup> Of the many speeches made in support of these resolutions, nearly all may be passed by as of no permanent interest, though well adapted to the time and the occasion. But three of them were so characteristic of the spirit of the people, and so significant, not only in their terms, but in the sources whence they came, that without them the record of that day would be tame and incomplete.

Six months before, Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, was perhaps one of the very last men in the country, outside the ranks of the raving "fire-eaters," who would have been expected to raise his voice against any movement of the slave states, and in support of any act of a Republican president. He had been through all his manhood an active, and through much of it a leading, member of the Democratic party. For six years he had represented Mississippi as her senator in Congress. As Secretary of the Treasury, he had been one of the most influential of President Polk's cabinet ministers, and had acquired, even among his political opponents, a reputation for sagacity, knowledge of affairs, and administrative ability—three of the chiefest qualifications of a statesman. Bound up not only with the Democratic party, but in the most intimate political and personal relations with the leading men of the Gulf states, the defender of their utmost rights, the apologist of their very excesses, he was selected by President Buchanan as the fourth governor of Kansas Territory; and it is to his enduring honor that he resigned that responsible position as soon as he saw that the course marked out for him by the administration which he served was flagrantly in violation of the principles of liberty and justice. Cautious by nature, schooled by long experience, and prejudiced only in favor of the men whose insurrection was the occasion of his presence, after a brief peroration, he thus coolly exposed their pretenses and condemned their action: "The question is, Shall this Union be maintained and perpetuated, or shall it be broken and dissolved? No question so important has ever occurred in the history of our race. It involves not only the fate of this great country, but the question of free institutions throughout the world. The case of self-government is now on trial before the forum of our country and of the world. If we succeed and maintain the Union, free institutions, under the moral force of our example, will ultimately be established throughout the world; but if we fail, and our government is overthrown, popular liberty will have made its last experiment, and despotism will reign triumphant throughout the globe. Our responsibilities are fearful. We have a solemn duty to perform—we are this day making history. We are writing a book whose pages can never be erased—it is the destiny of our country and of mankind. For

more than seventy years this Union has been maintained, and it has advanced our country to a prosperity unparalleled in the history of the world. The past was great, but the future opened upon prospects beyond the power of language to describe. But where are we now? The world looks on with scorn and derision. We have, it is said, no government—a mere voluntary association of independent states—a debating society, or a moot court, without any real power to uphold the laws or maintain the Constitution. We have no country, no flag, no Union; but each state at its pleasure, upon its own mere whim or caprice, with or without cause, may secede and dissolve the Union. Secession, we are told, is a constitutional right of each state, and the Constitution has inscribed its own death-warrant upon its face. If this be so, we have indeed no government, and Europe may well speak of us with contempt and derision. This is the very question we are now to solve—have we a government, and has it power to maintain its existence? This question is not for the first time presented to the consideration of the American people. It arose in 1832, when South Carolina nullified the revenue laws of the Union, and passed her secession ordinance. In that contest I took a very active part against the doctrines of nullification and secession, and upon that question, after a struggle of three years, I was elected by Mississippi as a senator of the United States. A contest so prolonged and violent had never before been witnessed in this country. It was fought by me in every county of the state under the banner of the Union. The sentiments contained in the many speeches then made by me, and then published, are the opinions I now entertain. They are all for the Union and against secession, and they are now the opinions of thousands of Union men of the South and of Mississippi. These opinions are unchanged; and deeply as I deplore our present situation, it is my profound conviction that the welfare, security, and prosperity of the South can only be restored by the re-establishment of the Union. I see, in the permanent overthrow of the Union, the utter ruin of the South and the complete prostration of all their interests. I have devoted my life to the maintenance of all their constitutional rights, and the promotion of their happiness and welfare; but secession involves them and us in one common ruin. The recognition of such a doctrine is fatal to the existence of any government—of the Union: it is death—it is national suicide. This is the question now to be decided: Have we a Union—have we a flag—are the stars and stripes a reality or a fiction—have we a government, and can we enforce its laws, or must the whole vanish whenever any one state thinks proper to issue the despotic mandate? Is the Union indissoluble, or is it written on the sand, to be swept away by the first angry surge of state or sectional passion which may sweep over it? It was the declared object of our ancestors to found a perpetual Union. The original Articles of Confederation, by all the states, in 1778, declared the Union to be 'perpetual,' and South Carolina (with all the states) then plighted her solemn faith that 'the union of the states shall be perpetual.' And in modifying these articles by the formation of the Constitution in 1787, the declared object of that change was to make 'the Union more perfect.' But how more perfect, if the Union is indissoluble in 1787, but might at any moment be destroyed by any one state after the adoption of the Constitution? No, my countrymen, secession is not a constitutional right of any one state. It is war—it is revolution—and can only be established on the ruins of the Constitution and of the Union. We must resist and subdue it, or our government will be but an organized anarchy, to be surely succeeded, as anarchy ever has been, by military despotism. This, then, my fellow-citizens, is the last great contest for the liberties of our country and of the world. If we are defeated, the last experiment of self-government will have failed, and we will have written with our own hands the epitaph of human liberty. We will have no flag, we will have no government, no country, and no Union; we will cease to be American citizens, and the despots of Europe will rejoice in the failure of the great experiment of republican institutions. The liberties of our country and of the world will have been intrusted to our care, and we shall have dishonored the great trust and proved ourselves traitors to the freedom of our country and of mankind. This is not a sectional question; it is not a Northern or a Southern question; it is not a question which concerns our country only, but all mankind. It is this: Shall we, by a noble and united effort, sustain here republican institutions, or shall we have secession and anarchy, to be succeeded by despotism, and extinguish forever the hopes of freedom throughout the world? God grant you, my dear countrymen, courage, and energy, and perseverance to maintain successfully the great contest. You are fighting the last great decisive

*Resolutions at the Union Meeting, New York, April 20th, 1861.*

Whereas the union of the states, under the guidance of Divine Providence, has been the fruitful source of prosperity and domestic peace to the country for nearly three quarters of a century; and

Whereas the Constitution, framed by our Revolutionary fathers, contains within itself all needful provisions for the exigencies of the government, and, in the progress of events, for such amendments as are necessary to meet new exigencies; and

Whereas an armed combination has been formed to break up the Union, by throwing off the obligations of the Constitution, and has, in several of the states, carried on its criminal purpose, and, finally, by assaulting Fort Sumter, a fortress of the United States occupied by a slender but heroic garrison, and capturing it by an overwhelming force after a gallant defense, thus setting the authority of the government at defiance, and insulting the national flag; and

Whereas the government of the United States, with an earnest desire to avert the evils of civil war, has silently submitted to these aggressions and insults with a patient forbearance unparalleled in the annals of history, but has at last deemed it due to the public honor and safety to appeal to the people of the Union for the means of maintaining its authority, of enforcing the execution of the laws, and of saving our country from dismemberment and our political institutions from destruction; therefore,

*Resolved*, That the Declaration of Independence, the war of the Revolution, and the Constitution of the United States have given origin to this government, the most equal and beneficent hitherto known among men; that under its protection the wide expansion of our territory, the vast development of our wealth, our population, and our power, have built up a nation able to maintain and defend before the world the principles of liberty and justice upon which it was founded; that by every sentiment of interest, of honor, of affection and of duty, we are engaged to preserve unbroken for our generation, and to transmit to our posterity, the great heritage we have received from heroic ancestors; that to the maintenance of this sacred trust we devote whatever we possess, and whatever we can do, and in support of that government under which we are happy and proud to live, we are prepared to shed our blood and lay down our lives.

*Resolved*, That the founders of the government of the United States have provided, by the institution of the Supreme Court, a tribunal for the peaceful settlement of all questions arising under the Constitution and the laws; that it is the duty of the states to appeal to it for relief from measures which they believe unauthorized; and that attempts to throw off the obligations of the Constitution, and to obtain redress by an appeal to arms, can be considered in no other light than as levying war against the United States.

*Resolved*, That the Constitution of the United States, the basis and the safeguard of the federal Union, having been framed and ratified by the original states, and accepted by those which subsequently became parties to it, is binding upon all; and that any resumption by any one of them of the rights delegated to the federal government, without first seeking a release from its obligations through the concurrence of the common sovereignty, is unauthorized, unjust to all the others, and destructive of all social and political order.

*Resolved*, That when the authority of the federal government shall have been re-established, and peaceful obedience to the Constitution and laws prevail, we shall be ready to confer and co-operate with all loyal citizens throughout the Union, in Congress or in Convention, for the consideration of all supposed grievances, the redress of all wrongs, and the protection of every right, yielding ourselves, and expecting all others to yield, to the will of the whole people as constitutionally and lawfully expressed.

*Resolved*, That it is the duty of all good citizens, overlooking past differences of opinion, to contribute by all the means in their power to maintain the union of the states, to defend the Constitution, to preserve the national flag from insult, and uphold the authority of the government against acts of lawless violence, which, if longer unresisted, would inevitably end in breaking down all the barriers erected by our fathers for the protection of life, liberty, and property, and involve the country in universal anarchy and confusion.

*Resolved*, That a committee of twenty-five, to be nominated by the president, be appointed by this meeting to represent the citizens in the collection of funds and the transaction of such other business in aid of the movements of the government as the public interests may require.



battle for the liberties of our country and of mankind; faint not, falter not, but move onward in one great column for the maintenance of the Constitution and the Union. Remember it was a Southern man, a noble son of Kentucky, who so gloriously sustained the flag of our country at Fort Sumter, and never surrendered that flag. He brought it with him to New York, and there it is, held in the hands of Washington, in that marble column now before us representing the Father of his Country, and whose lips now open and urge us, as in his Farewell Address, to maintain the Constitution and the Union. And now, while I address you, the news comes that the city of Washington, founded by the Father of his Country and bearing his sacred name, is to be seized by the legions of disunion. Never, never must or shall this disgrace befall us. That capital must and shall be defended, if it requires every Union man in America to march to its defense. And now, then, fellow-citizens, a desperate effort is made to make this a party question—a question between Democrats and Republicans. Well, fellow-citizens, I have been a Democrat all my life, and never scratched a Democratic ticket, from Constable up to President, but say to you this is no party question. It is a question of a maintenance of the government and the perpetuation of the Union. The vessel of state is rushing upon the breakers, and, without asking who may be the commander, we must all aid in her rescue from impending disaster. When the safety of my country is involved, I will never ask who is President, nor inquire what may be the effect on parties of any particular measure. Much as I love my party, I love my country infinitely more, and must and will sustain it at all hazards. Indeed, it is due to the great occasion here frankly to declare that, notwithstanding my earnest opposition to the election of Mr. Lincoln, and my disposition most closely to scrutinize all his acts, I see thus far nothing to condemn in his efforts to maintain the Union. And now, then, my countrymen, one word more before I close. I was trained in devotion to the Union by a patriot sire, who fought the battles of liberty during the war of the Revolution. My life has been given to the support of the Union. I never conceived a thought, or wrote or uttered a word, except in its defense. And now let me say that this Union must, will, and shall be perpetuated; that not a star shall be dimmed or a stripe erased from our banner; that the integrity of the government shall be preserved, and that, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the Lakes of the North to the Gulf of Mexico, never shall be surrendered a single acre of our soil or a drop of its waters."

Conclusive, comprehensive, and untemperizing as this speech was, it lacked the fervor which animated the great body of the loyal men in those days, and which found expression in the words of others who spoke for and to that immense multitude. Among these were two who afterward gave their lives in the defense of the republic. Edward Dickinson Baker was born a British subject. A native of London, he came to the United States in his boyhood, and, going to Illinois nearly forty years before these troublous times, he grew to man's estate in and with the rising West. His mind was active and powerful; to his professional reading of the law he added an unusual cultivation of letters; and a remarkable energy of character raised him steadily to distinction. Attracted to political life, he adhered from the beginning to those principles of freedom which it is the glory of the English race on both sides of the Atlantic to have asserted and maintained consistently with the stability of society and the best conditions of human progress; the notable and unmistakable exception being those places in which the perpetuation of slavery produced its inevitable results—oligarchical rule, and a society at once controlled and disturbed by violence. Senator Baker had followed General Scott as colonel of a volunteer regiment in the Mexican war, in which he served with distinction. He lived for some years in the chaotic but rapidly self-organizing society of California, and finally settled in Oregon, from which state he took his seat as senator in 1859. Believing that, although in the states where slavery was already established it was immovable except by the action of the people of those states, the future additions to the great republic should be consecrated to free soil, free speech, and free men, he attached himself to the Republican party, and gave it the zealous and untiring support which sprung from his earnest convictions and energetic character. With this creed and this experience, and with his ardent temperament fired by the outrages at Fort Sumter, Harper's Ferry, Portsmouth Navy Yard, and Baltimore, and his sympathetic nature roused by the excitement of the community in which he found himself, he thus broke forth in burning words, thus pledged the honor which he well maintained, and the life which, ere long, all vainly he gave up:

"The majesty of the people is here to-day to sustain the majesty of the Constitution, and I come, a wanderer from the far Pacific, to record my oath along with yours of the great Empire State. The hour for conciliation has passed, the gathering for battle is at hand, and the country requires that every man shall do his duty. Fellow-citizens, what is that country? Is it the soil on which we tread? Is it the gathering of familiar faces? Is it our luxury, and pomp, and pride? Nay, more than these, is it power, and might, and majesty alone? No, our country is more, far more than all these. The country which demands our love, our courage, our devotion, our heart's blood, is more than all these. Our country is the history of our fathers—our country is the tradition of our mothers—our country is past renown—our country is present pride and power—our country is future hope and destiny—our country is greatness, glory, truth, constitutional liberty—above all, freedom forever! These are the watchwords under which we fight; and we will shout them out till the stars appear in the sky, in the stormiest hour of battle. I have said that the hour for conciliation is past. It may return; but not to-morrow, nor next week. It will return when that tattered flag is avenged. It will return when rebel traitors are taught obedience and submission. It will return when the rebellious confederates are taught that the

North, though peaceable, are not cowardly—though forbearing, are not fearful. That hour of conciliation will come back when again the ensign of the republic will stream over every rebellious fort of every confederate state. Then, as of old, the ensign of the pride and power, and dignity and majesty, and the peace of the republic will return. Young men of New York—young men of the United States—you are told this is not to be a war of aggression. In one sense that is true; in another, not. We have committed aggression upon no man. In all the broad land, in their rebel nest, in their traitors' camp, no truthful man can rise and say that he has ever been disturbed, though it be but for a single moment, in life, liberty, estate, character, or honor. The day they began this unnatural, false, wicked, rebellious warfare, their lives were more secure, their property more secure, by us—not by themselves, but by us—guarded far more securely than any people ever have had their lives and property secured from the beginning of the world. We have committed no oppression, have broken no compact, have exercised no unholy power; have been loyal, moderate, constitutional, and just. We are a majority of the Union, and we will govern our own Union, within our own Constitution, in our own way. We are all Democrats. We are all Republicans. We acknowledge the sovereignty of the people within the rule of the Constitution, and under that Constitution and beneath that flag let traitors beware. In this sense, then, young men of New York, we are not for a war of aggression. But in another sense, speaking for myself as a man who has been a soldier, and as one who is a senator, I say, in the same sense, I am for a war of aggression. I propose to do now as we did in Mexico—conquer peace. I propose to go to Washington and beyond. I do not design to remain silent, supine, inactive, nay, fearful, until they gather their battalions and advance their host upon our borders or in our midst. I would meet them upon the threshold, and there, in the very state of their power, in the very atmosphere of their treason, I propose that the people of this Union dictate to these rebels the terms of peace. It may take thirty millions; it may take three hundred millions. What then? We have it. Loyal, nobly, grandly do the merchants of New York respond to the appeals of the government. It may cost us seven thousand men. It may cost us seventy-five thousand men in battle; it may cost us seven hundred and fifty thousand men. What then? We have them. The blood of every loyal citizen of this government is dear to me. My sons, my kinsmen, the young men who have grown up beneath my eye and beneath my care, they are all dear to me; but if the country's destiny, glory, tradition, greatness, freedom, government, written constitutional government—the only hope of a free people—demand it, let them all go. I am not here now to speak timorous words of peace, but to kindle the spirit of manly, determined war. I speak in the midst of the Empire State, amid scenes of past suffering and past glory: the defenses of the Hudson above me, the battle-field of Long Island before me, and the statue of Washington in my very face—the battered and unconquered flag of Sumter waving in his hands, which I can almost now imagine trembles with the excitement of battle. And as I speak, I say my mission here to-day is to kindle the heart of New York for war—short, sudden, bold, determined, forward war. The Seventh Regiment has gone; let seventy and seven more follow. Of old, said a great historian, beneath the banner of the Cross, Europe precipitated itself upon Asia. Beneath the banner of the Constitution let the men of the Union precipitate themselves upon disloyal, rebellious confederate states. A few more words, and I have done. Let no man underrate the dangers of this controversy. Civil war, for the best of reasons upon the one side and the worst upon the other, is always dangerous to liberty, always fearful, always bloody; but, fellow-citizens, there are yet worse things than fear, than doubt and dread, and danger and blood. Dishonor is worse. Perpetual anarchy is worse. States forever commingling and forever severing are worse. Traitors and secessionists are worse. To have star after star blotted out—to have stripe after stripe obscured—to have glory after glory dimmed—to have our women weep and our men blush for shame throughout generations yet to come—that and these are infinitely worse than blood. People of New York, on the eve of battle allow me to speak as a soldier. Few of you know, as my career has been distant and obscure, but I may mention it here to-day with a generous pride, that it was once my fortune to lead your gallant New York regiment in the very shock of battle. I was their leader, and upon the bloody heights of Cerro Gordo I know well what New York can do when her blood is up. Again, once more, when we march, let us not march for revenge. As yet we have nothing to revenge. It is not much that where that tattered flag waved, guarded by seventy men against ten thousand—it is not much that starvation effected what an enemy could not compel. We have as yet something to punish, but nothing, or very little, to revenge. The President himself, a hero without knowing it—and I speak from knowledge, having known him from boyhood—the President says, 'There are wrongs to be redressed, already long enough endured;' and we march to battle and to victory because we do not choose to endure this wrong any longer. They are wrongs not merely against us; not against you, Mr. President, not against me, but against our sons and against our grandsons that surround us. They are wrongs against our ensign; they are wrongs against our Union; they are wrongs against our Constitution; they are wrongs against human hope and human freedom; and thus, if it be avenged, still, as Burke says, 'it is a wild justice at last,' and we will revenge them. While I speak, following in the wake of men so eloquent, so conservative, so eminent, so loyal, so well known—even while I speak, the object of your meeting is accomplished; upon the wings of the lightning it goes out throughout the world that New York, the very heart of a great city, with her crowded thoroughfares, her merchants, her manufacturers, her artists—that New York, by one hundred thousand of her people, declares to the country and to the world that she will sustain the



government to the last dollar in her treasury—to the last drop of your blood. The national banners leaning from ten thousand windows in your city to-day proclaim your affection and reverence for the Union. You will gather in battalions,

“Patient of toil, serene amid alarms,  
Inflexible in faith, invincible in arms;”

and as you gather, every omen of present concord and ultimate peace will surround you. The ministers of religion, the priests of literature, the historians of the past, the illustrators of the present, capital, science, art, invention, discoveries, the works of genius—all these will attend us in our march, and we will conquer. And if, from the far Pacific, a voice feeble than the feeblest murmur upon its shore may be heard to give you courage and hope in the contest, that voice is yours to-day; and if a man whose hair is gray, who is well-nigh worn out in the battle and toil of life, may pledge himself on such an occasion and in such an audience, let me say, as my last word, that when, amid sheeted fire and flame, I saw and led the hosts of New York as they charged in contest upon a foreign soil for the honor of your flag, so again, if Providence shall will it, this feeble hand shall draw a sword, never yet dishonored, not to fight for distant honor in a foreign land, but to fight for country, for home, for law, for government, for Constitution, for right, for freedom, for humanity, and in the hope that the banner of my country may advance, and wheresoever that banner waves, there glory may pursue and freedom be established.”

Few among the more intelligent and cultivated of the throng that he addressed did not respect the reputation of Ormsby McKnight Mitchell; but probably no one of them expected from the eminent mathematician and astronomer, the superintendent of the Dudley Observatory, such an impassioned and stirring appeal as he made to them, such an earnest warning, and such a demand for instant, energetic action. What he was he told himself. A native of one slave state, born of parents who were natives of another, a resident of a free state (like many of his military fellow-students and quondam brother officers who had disowned and deserted the flag of the government which had bred and fed them), loving kindred and neighbors, and honoring the commonwealth of which he was a member, he yet disavowed any allegiance except to the republic, and thus, in his speech and in himself, he was a typical man for the times and the occasion. The hearts of all that great congregation went with him as he spoke these words: “I am infinitely indebted to you for this evidence of your kindness. I know I am a stranger among you. I have been in your state but a little while; but I am with you, heart and soul, and mind and strength, and all that I have and am belongs to you and our common country, and to nothing else. I have been announced to you as a citizen of Kentucky. Once I was, because I was born there. I love my native state as you love your native state. I love my adopted state of Ohio as you love your adopted state, if such you have; but, my friends, I am not a citizen now of any state. I owe allegiance to no state, and never did, and, God helping me, I never will. I owe allegiance to the government of the United States. A poor boy, working my way with my own hands, at the age of twelve turned out to take care of myself as best I could, and beginning by earning but \$1 per month, I worked my way onward until this glorious government gave me a chance at the Military Academy at West Point. There I landed with a knapsack on my back, and, I tell you God’s truth, just a quarter of a dollar in my pocket. There I swore allegiance to the government of the United States. I did not abjure the love of my own state, nor of my adopted state, but all over that rose proudly triumphant and predominant my love for our common country. And now to-day that common country is assailed, and, alas! alas! that I am compelled to say it, it is assailed in some sense by my own countrymen. My father and my mother were from Old Virginia, and my brothers and sisters from Old Kentucky. I love them all; I love them dearly. I have my brothers and friends down in the South now, united to me by the fondest ties of love and affection. I would take them in my arms to-day with all the love that God has put into this heart; but if I found them in arms, I would be compelled to smite them down. You have found officers of the army who have been educated by the government—who have drawn their support from the government for long years—who, when called upon by their country to stand for the Constitution and for the right, have basely, ignominiously, and traitorously either resigned their commissions, or deserted to traitors, rebels, and enemies. What means all this? How can it be possible that men should act in this way? There is no question but one. If we ever had a government and Constitution, or if we ever lived under such, have we ever recognized the supremacy of right? I say, in God’s name, why not recognize it now? Why not to-day? Why not forever? Suppose those friends of ours from old Ireland—suppose he who has made himself one of us, when a war should break out against his own country, should say, ‘I can not fight against my own countrymen,’ is he a citizen of the United States? They are no countrymen longer when war breaks out. The rebels and the traitors in the South we must set aside; they are not our friends. When they come to their senses, we will receive them with open arms; but till that time, while they are trailing our glorious banner in the dust, when they scorn it, condemn it, curse it, and trample it under foot, then I must smite. In God’s name I will smite, and as long as I have strength I will do it. Oh, listen to me, listen to me! I know these men; I know their courage; I have been among them; I have been with them; I have been reared with them; they have courage; and do not you pretend to think they have not. I tell you what it is, it is no child’s play you are entering upon. They will fight, and with a determination and a power which is irresistible. Make up your mind to it. Let every man put his life in his hand, and say, ‘There is the altar of my country; there I will sacrifice my life.’ I, for one, will

lay my life down. It is not mine any longer. Lead me to the conflict. Place me where I can do my duty. There I am ready to go, I care not where it leads me. \* \* \* I am ready to fight in the ranks or out of the ranks. Having been educated in the Academy; having been in the army seven years; having served as commander of a volunteer company for ten years, and having served as an adjutant general, I feel I am ready for something. I only ask to be permitted to act; and, in God’s name, give me something to do.” The burden which Mitchell solicited was laid upon his shoulders; the sacrifice which he offered was accepted. He died in the service of the republic during the coming struggle, but, as we shall hereafter see, not before he had led its armies to victory in the very heart of the country over which, while he spoke, the rebels, whom he denounced, but whose courage and determination he so justly acknowledged, held undisputed sway. If that be eloquence which, as has been said, produces the effect desired upon those to whom it is addressed, the simple directness of this short speech was eloquence itself. It raised all who heard it to such a pitch of enthusiasm that they gave vent to their feelings in demonstrations rarely seen in public among people of the English race. Tears, sobs, outcries half suppressed, and movements showing the deepest agitation, broke forth all around. Such moments do not last; our nature could not support them; and the emotion, though not the attention, of the assembly subsided under the discourse of speakers less fervid, but perhaps equally patriotic. The presence of certain of the men who took an active part on the occasion was justly regarded as worthy of special note, for they were known to all as the industrious advocates and apologists of secession hardly more than a week before. One of these stands out from among his fellows. The reader has, perhaps, divined his name. As Saul was among the prophets, so Fernando Wood appeared among the patriots. He not only appeared, but spoke. What he said was in itself of little interest or consequence; but it is noteworthy as indicative of the influence of the times upon a man of great sagacity, and boldness, and few scruples, who sought to efface by a successful political career the published records of a criminal tribunal. He declared it to be his official duty to support the Union, the government, the laws, and the flag; as a man, he professed that he threw himself into the coming contest with all his power and all his might, that the authority of the government and the integrity of the republic might be maintained, peaceably if possible, but, if not, forcibly; he spontaneously assumed the responsibility of pledging the corporation of the city for the sum necessary to fit out a brigade of troops; and, alluding to the threats of successful invasion made by the insurgents, he proclaimed that before the confederate flag could fly over Faneuil Hall in Boston, it must be carried over the dead bodies of the citizens of New York.<sup>10</sup> Into such a well-voiced semblance of patriotism was this man startled by the sight of the

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#### Mayor Wood’s Speech.

FELLOW-CITIZENS,—The President has announced that Colonel Baker, the gentleman who has so eloquently addressed you to-day, proposes to raise a New York brigade, if the state will bear the expense of outfit; and here, as mayor of this city, so far as I have the power to speak, I pledge for the corporation that sum. When I assumed the duties of the office I have now the honor to hold, my official oath was that I would support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of New York; and I imply from that that it is not only my duty, as it is consistent with my principles and sense of right, to support the Constitution, but the Union, the government, the laws, and the flag. And, in the discharge of that duty, I care not what past political associations may be severed. I am willing to give up all past prejudices and sympathies if in conflict with the honor and interest of my country in this great crisis. I am willing to say here that I throw myself entirely into this contest with all my power and with all my might. My friends, the greatest man next to Washington that this country has ever produced—Andrew Jackson—has said that “the Union must and shall be preserved,” and in that connection he has said, and it is directly pertinent to the present contest, “the Union must and shall be preserved—peaceably if we can, but forcibly if we must.” There are those of us who have heretofore held antagonist positions to what is supposed to be the policy and the principles of this administration, who are willing to accept that noble declaration of the sacred Jackson as a resort to force upon this occasion. Why, gentlemen, what is the nature of your government? Ours is a government of opinion expressed through the laws. The laws, being made by the people through their representatives, are simply the expressions of popular sentiment; and the administrators of the laws should be maintained in the exercise of all legal authority. I have always advocated a strong executive power; because, to be efficient, it requires ample authority, and under our form of government, the agent being merely the exponent of the popular will, he should be provided with every means to maintain that will. Thus, in maintaining the government, we maintain ourselves, our inalienable rights, and the basis of free institutions. It is true that individuals retain the right of independent criticism, and at the ballot-box have an opportunity to exercise this right; yet we are all bound to abide by the result. These views are pertinent to the occasion, so far as the people of the city and state of New York are concerned. This city is a portion of the state, and this state retains its position as one of the United States of America; therefore we must stand by the government, we must obey the laws, we must respect official authority, we must respond with alacrity to the calls of patriotism, and, so long as we may have the strength, support the Constitution and the Union. In accordance, then, with these views, I have no hesitation in throwing whatever power I may possess in behalf of the pending struggle. If a military conflict is necessary, and that military authority can be exercised under the Constitution and consistently with the laws, dreadful as the alternative may be, we have no recourse except to take up arms. In times of great peril great sacrifices are required. When the human frame is upon the verge of death, every effort of skill and the most desperate experiments are resorted to to preserve life and prevent dissolution. This may be said to be an apt illustration of the present condition of the body politic. In the expression of these views, which I design to be understood as a public proclamation in favor of maintaining the authority of government as such, “peaceably if we can, but forcibly if we must,” I desire also to be understood as taking back no sentiment I have ever uttered on the political issues of the day. If the Presidential election was to be held over again to-morrow, my vote and my sentiments would be unchanged; nor am I to be regarded as contumacious or justifying mob law or violence. The people themselves have elected or established tribunals for the adjudication of offenses against the laws, and all of us are restrained and must conform thereto. Every man’s opinion is to be respected; and he who denies to a fellow-citizen the right of independent thought, violates the first principles of republicanism, and strikes a blow at the theory of our government. My friends, it has been said here to-day that your flag has been insulted. Ay! not only has your flag been insulted, but the late Secretary of War, assuming to represent the Confederate States, has said that the confederate flag shall wave over your Capitol before the first of May. And, more than that, that the confederate flag shall wave over Faneuil Hall in Boston. My friends, before that banner can fly over Faneuil Hall in Boston, it must be carried over the dead body of every citizen of New York. In behalf of you I am prepared to say here, and, through the press, to our friends of the South, that before that flag shall float over the national Capitol, every man, woman, and child would enlist for the war. Gentlemen, I have no voice, although the heart, to address you longer. Abler and more eloquent men than myself are here. I can only say, therefore, that I am with you in this contest. We know no party now. We are for maintaining the integrity of the national Union intact. We are for exhausting every power at our command in this great, high, and patriotic struggle; and I call upon every man, whatever may have been his position heretofore, whatever may be his individual sympathy now, to make one great phalanx in this struggle, that we may, in the language of the eloquent senator who preceded me, proceed to “conquer peace.” My friends, it has been already announced by the chairman that the Baltic and other vessels at the foot of Canal Street are ready to take five thousand men to-morrow to the capital of Washington. I urge a hearty response to that call, that New York may speak trumpet-tongued to the people of the South.





HON. FERNANDO WOOD.

uprising North. Ere many months had passed events took place which tested his sincerity. The excitement of the day on which he appeared in such a new character was rendered more profound by the arrival during the meeting of news by telegraph that the Seventh Regiment had been attacked and cut to pieces in Baltimore. The incident and its effect are noteworthy, as showing the disturbed and sensitive state of the public mind, consequent chiefly upon the cutting off of the capital and of Baltimore from communication with the North. The state of apprehension and suspense throughout all the region north of the Chesapeake was such that the wildest rumor obtained belief and awoke alarm. The monster meeting did not dissolve, nor did the excitement immediately subside upon the adjournment. The people clung for a time around the great centre of the day's impression; and as the shades of evening fell, and they separated toward their homes, the waves of popular emotion slowly expanded in widening circles to the remotest bounds of the great city, till in the hush of night they gradually subsided.

But it was not only upon special occasion that awakened patriotism displayed itself. The cause of the republic was ever present to men's minds, and they loved to have some symbol of it ever present to their eyes: they found that symbol in the flag. The spontaneous raising of the national standard immediately after the bombardment of Fort Sumter grandly ushered in the exhibition of the loved emblem in every possible form and upon every possible place. Flag-staffs shot up by magic from public and private buildings, places of business, and dwelling-houses, and even from the towers and spires of churches, upon some of which the advance standard of freedom, justice, human progress, and Christian civilization appeared supported by the cross that glistened on their highest pinnacles. The demand for flags was so great that in one fortnight the price of bunting rose one hundred and fifty per cent. The enthusiasm did not stop here. Tiny flags were made for badges, and worn as a decoration upon the left breast. For a long time hardly a man was seen north of the Potomac and the Ohio without one. The brilliant token of loyalty was easily adapted to the flowing lines and varying hues of woman's costume, and the fairer part of the loyal North, with the accustomed tact of the sex, moulded the humor of the hour into fashions which gave new piquancy to

their beauty, and fresh stimulus to the patriotism of their admirers. In this fancy they were at once followed, if indeed they had not been preceded, by their sisters at the South, who adopted with equal spirit and with almost equal unanimity the emblem of rebellion into their costume; so that from the great Lakes to the Gulf the entire population were decked in the same red, white, and blue, but arranged at the North as to signify devotion to, and at the South alienation from, and, in fact, hatred for, the government, which, with so much blood and toil, Washington and his compeers had so painfully established. Yet throughout the free states, and in the very midst of this outburst of patriotic feeling, the well-wishing friends, the active partisans, the very paid supporters, spies, and emissaries of the insurgents thronged unmolested, and, even when known, almost unheeded. The persecutions by which the insurgent party at the South brought about an appearance of unanimity in the insurrection will hereafter engage our attention; but it may here be appropriately said, once for all, that at the North, Southern birth and connection, and even well-known active sympathy with the revolted slaveholders, brought no man harm or even discomfort. Men from the states under control of the insurgents remained at the North in the absolute enjoyment of all their rights as citizens of the republic. The government at Washington and the people of the North regarded the resident of South Carolina and Massachusetts alike as individual members of the nation; and they remained alike undisturbed by government or people, unless there appeared good reason for believing that they were actually engaged in treasonable service against the United States. The few acts of violence by the people at the North (and they were so few and so trifling as to be almost unworthy of notice) were directed entirely against Northern men who affronted the aroused patriotism of their neighbors by an unblushing support of the cause of the insurgents. Two or three presses in New England and in Pennsylvania were attacked or threatened, and one man was tarred and feathered and ridden on a rail. To this extent only, in a time of war and most intense excitement, did the people of the free states emulate the outrages of their fellow-citizens of the slave states upon those whose political views were offensive to them—outrages committed during a period of thirty years, at intervals of a few days, in some part of the extended territory south of Mason and Dixon's line, sometimes perpetrated upon women, and often ending in the maiming and even the death of their victims. With this great difference, however, between the teacher and the taught, that these few and comparatively unimportant deviations from the respect for law and the rights of the citizen, though the fruits of such an exceptional public disturbance, were checked by the magistrates, and, in one case at least, followed by the trial, condemnation, and punishment of the offenders, and in all by reparation on the part of the county authorities; while the actors in the lynchings and mobbings in the slave states, during the peaceful period of thirty years, went about their outrageous business, as all the world well knows, with absolute impunity. But, with all this restraint in the midst of great agitation, there was a strong, and, under the circumstances, a not unreasonable determination that people in public positions, and particularly the conductors of public journals, should exhibit at least an outward loyalty to the government. Most of the newspaper offices were surmounted with flag-staffs, and upon these, with few exceptions, as upon all others similarly situated, the national colors were raised on the Monday after the bombardment of Fort Sumter. The offices at which this sign of nationality was not displayed were those of papers in New York and Philadelphia, which, during the few months preceding that event, had supported the cause of aggressive slavery. Before these offices crowds assembled, and demanded, with no threats of violence, but with good-natured determination, that they should show their colors. A few at first refused to comply with the demand, but not for many hours. Policy surely counseled them to yield so trivial a point at such a period; and perhaps fear of immediate consequences might have had some effect, though the demand was made by laughing and inoffensive throngs, which, in New York at least, were surrounded by a police force instructed to preserve order and competent to restrain violence.<sup>1</sup> A few private persons in the rural districts audaciously raised the standard of insurrection, more from a mischievous or a party spirit than with any really rebellious purpose. These flags were immediately torn down by the people of the neighborhood when they were not taken down by those who raised them; but no injury was done to the offenders. Had disaffection been more common it might have provoked a warmer resentment; but it was so insignificant that, although the people were determined that it should not be openly flaunted, its few displays were passed by as of little moment.

The leaders of the powerful faction which had obtained control of the seceded states having long preceded the government and the people of the loyal states in the work of preparation, had given at once the challenge and the first blow at Sumter. While these slept, those had worked; and now, with the people and the resources of eleven states practically under its control, and with the larger part of the military material of the republic in its possession, the government at Montgomery, upon the appearance of President Lincoln's war proclamation, had only to maintain the advantage of the initiative and proceed at once to active hostilities. To that proclamation Mr. Jefferson Davis's reply was the issuing of proposals to grant letters of marque and reprisal against the commerce of the United States.<sup>2</sup> This step

<sup>1</sup> As to the behavior of these crowds in the city of New York I speak from personal observation.

<sup>2</sup> Proclamation by Jefferson Davis.

Whereas Abraham Lincoln, the President of the United States, has, by proclamation, announced



did more to provoke the Northern people to wrath than any other which the insurgents had yet taken. In the progress of the world toward a more perfect humanity, privateering, or the subjecting of private property on the sea to capture by any person who for his own advantage chooses to undertake the business upon certain conditions, had come to be regarded as little better than legalized piracy, a relic of barbarism which should be cast aside with the license of pillaging private property upon land, than which it was regarded as even less tolerable, because the object of an army is the destruction of the military power of the enemy, and pillage, even when permitted, is but an accidental concomitant of military movements, while it is the sole purpose of the privateer. The great powers of Europe had agreed by the treaty of Paris to abolish privateering as a means of war, and to this article of that treaty the United States had offered to become a party, if those powers would agree to except all peaceful commerce from the ravages of war. But the government of Great Britain was not yet willing to sacrifice to humanity the advantages accruing from the large naval force which it kept up in the time of peace; and the government of the United States, having a small navy to protect a very large commerce and an extended sea-board, was therefore compelled, in self-preservation, to refuse its adherence to this article of the treaty. Such being the position of civilized Christendom upon this subject, and the people of the United States at the North (where only the people could truly be said to exercise a controlling influence upon the government) being thus, as ever, in advance of all others upon a question of enlarged philanthropy, the assumption by the chief of a junto of rebels of the right to license whoever would to rove the seas for the robbery and destruction of merchant vessels was looked upon as a monstrous outrage, a shameless affront to the intelligence and humanity of the age quite worthy of those who, to secure the perpetuity and the extension of slavery, had attempted the destruction of the republic on which rested the hopes of freedom for all mankind. The rebel privateers of the future were at once stigmatized by the universal voice of the free states as pirates; and, sailing under no recognized flag, such, according to the law of nations, they would have been, had they put to sea only under circumstances then existing. But events were soon to take place, both in America and Europe, which made a change in their prospective position.

Of these events the first was a proclamation, issued on the 19th of April by President Lincoln, declaring a blockade of the ports of the seceded states: the same act pronounced all privateers in the service of the rebels amenable to the laws for the prevention and punishment of piracy. The establishment of a blockade is always a matter of extended international importance, as it involves the interests of commerce, and abridges the rights of neutrals. In the present case the proclamation proved to be unusually momentous, because, according to the code established for themselves by the maritime powers of Europe, the right of blockade pertains only to belligerents, belligerent rights on one side implying the same rights on the other; and therefore, according to European dogmas, by this proclamation of blockade the government of the United States had at one word raised the insurgents to the rank of a belligerent power. It was, indeed, a matter of prime necessity to deprive the rebels of the means of replenishing their coffers by the sale of their cotton and tobacco to Europe, and to cut off their supplies of arms and munitions of war, which end might have been attained, and the international complications consequent upon an extended blockade avoided, by closing the ports of the seceded states to commerce. But the great naval and commercial power of Great Britain, acting as ever, even in foreign affairs, with a single eye to its own interests, and limiting its action only by its strength, had taken the position that, although in times of tranquillity a government may close its ports at pleasure, in time of insurrection it can only close ports in the hands of insurgents by effective blockade;<sup>3</sup> or, in other words, that while the people of a certain part of any country are obe-

the intention of invading this confederacy with an armed force, for the purpose of capturing its fortresses, and thereby subverting its independence and subjecting the free people thereof to the dominion of a foreign power; and whereas it has thus become the duty of this government to repel the threatened invasion, and to defend the rights and liberties of the people by all the means which the laws of nations and usages of civilized warfare place at its disposal;

Now, therefore, I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, do issue this my proclamation, inviting all those who may desire, by service in private armed vessels on the high seas, to aid this government in resisting so wanton and wicked an aggression, to make application for commissions or letters of marque and reprisal, to be issued under the seal of these Confederate States.

And I do further notify all persons applying for letters of marque to make a statement in writing, giving the name and a suitable description of the character, tonnage, and force of the vessel, and the name and place of residence of each owner concerned therein, and the intended number of the crew, and to sign said statement, and deliver the same to the Secretary of State or to the Collector of any port of entry of these Confederate States, to be by him transmitted to the Secretary of State.

And I do further notify all applicants aforesaid, that before any commission or letter of marque is issued to any vessel, the owner or owners thereof, and the commander for the time being, will be required to give bond to the Confederate States, with at least two responsible sureties not interested in such vessel, in the penal sum of five thousand dollars; or if such vessel be provided with more than one hundred and fifty men, then in the penal sum of ten thousand dollars, with condition that the owners, officers, and crew who shall be employed on board such commissioned vessel shall observe the laws of these Confederate States, and the instructions given to them for the regulation of their conduct, that shall satisfy all damages done contrary to the tenor thereof by such vessel during her commission, and deliver up the same when revoked by the President of the Confederate States.

And I do further specially enjoin on all persons holding offices, civil and military, under the authority of the Confederate States, that they be vigilant and zealous in discharging the duties incident thereto; and I do, moreover, solemnly exhort the good people of these Confederate States, as they love their country, as they prize the blessings of free government, as they feel the wrongs of the past, and these now threatened in an aggravated form by those whose enmity is more implacable, because unprovoked, that they exert themselves in preserving order, in promoting concord, in maintaining the authority and the efficacy of the laws, and in supporting and invigorating all the measures which may be adopted for the common defense, and by which, under the blessings of Divine Providence, we may hope for a speedy, just, and honorable peace.

In testimony whereof I have herewith set my hand, and caused the seal of the Confederate States to be affixed, this seventeenth day of April, 1861.

By the President,

(Signed),

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

R. TOOMBS, Secretary of State.

<sup>3</sup> Letter of Hon. Charles Francis Adams, United States Minister to Great Britain, to Secretary Seward, June 28, 1861.

dient to their laws and loyal to their government, that government may shut them off from commerce, but if those people should defy the law and resist the government, it can only exercise this function by a proceeding which raises them to the rank of belligerents. By this decision Great Britain, presuming on its naval strength, assumes not only to dictate, in the interests of its manufacturers and shipowners, the means by which alone other governments shall reduce their rebellious citizens to submission, but, in fact, to deprive entirely of one means those nations which do not constantly maintain a sufficient number of vessels of war to establish an effective blockade of all the ports in a rebellious quarter. In such an assumption the government of the United States could not acquiesce: the toleration of it in practice by any government would be a confession of inability to resist an intrusion upon its own sovereign functions; and, to look forward a little, at the extra session of Congress which met in July, an act was passed authorizing the President to close the ports in the seceded states at his discretion. Ports of entry are created in the United States by act of Congress; and the power of closing them, like the power of making war, belongs to Congress. But President Lincoln, in the emergency of the republic, had assumed the power of calling out the militia and commencing hostilities against the rebels; and, as far as the internal relations of government were concerned, he might, with equal certainty of indemnity, have closed the Southern ports. Had the ports been closed, although it was certainly possible that Great Britain might refuse to respect an assumption of power, or even to regard an act of Congress, which interfered with the trade of her citizens, yet it may be reasonably doubted whether, if the government of the United States had boldly asserted its sovereignty in its own affairs, and made active preparation to maintain it, the British government would have defied and insulted that sovereignty with the certain prospect of immediate war. But it was thought better to avoid this complication of difficulty; a temporizing policy again prevailed; and instead of a closing of the ports, a blockade was established. The privateering and the blockade gave to Great Britain welcome opportunity of throwing all her moral influence against the preservation of the republic, as we shall see hereafter.

Active hostilities did not immediately commence, and the attention of both parties was chiefly turned to the attitude of the border states. With a population of five and a half millions, rich, fertile, and extending in a broad belt, nearly two hundred miles wide at its narrowest part, between the insurgent slave states and the free, they held in their hands the immediate fate of the country. Had they all remained heartily and firmly faithful to the cause of the republic, the preponderance of power would have been so overwhelming, the advantage of position so great, that the rebellion would have had but a short life, and would have been strangled upon the soil which gave it birth. They did not take this position; and by their various policies (various in form, but little divergent in purpose) they swelled the proportions and prolonged the duration of the war, and brought its blood and its devastation home to their own fields and firesides. Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri were the debatable ground of the first days, and so of the whole war, of the rebellion. Both parties appreciated their importance, and both sought to secure them; the one, as usual, by a cautious, the other by a daring policy. We have already seen how Virginia, if not the most powerful, from her situation the most important of them all, was, on the first assertion of national authority, and in spite of all her previous denunciations or the course of South Carolina, at once thrown into the hands of the insurgents. North Carolina and Tennessee soon followed her. Kentucky and Missouri, distracted between the loyalty of the large majority of their people and the strong disaffection of their leading politicians, nearly all of whom were heartily in the interests of the rebel faction, wavered and temporized, and fell into civil commotion within their own borders; and Maryland was saved to the Union and from the fate of war only by the patriotism of her governor, and the sagacity and decision of his sometimes seeming opponent, but always actual co-worker, General Butler. Abandoning Virginia hopelessly to the insurgents, and passing her by until the beginning of active hostilities, I follow the immediate fortunes of the insurrection through the other five states upon the border.

The New England general who had so promptly settled the question of communication between the North and the national capital by moving directly upon Annapolis was immediately honored by being placed in command of a new military department, called the Department of Annapolis, which included the country twenty miles on each side of the railway as far as Bladensburg. He established his headquarters temporarily upon the heights commanding the seat of the state government. Whether it was a point of honor for the state Legislature not to meet in a town virtually in possession of the national authorities, or whether the members were in fear that General Butler, who had shown himself to be a man of his word, would carry out a threat which he was said to have made, that if they passed an Ordinance of Secession he would arrest the whole body, the meeting took place on the 27th of April at Frederick City, far westward of the Yankee muskets. In his message the governor opposed secession as unprovoked and unjustifiable, and advised that the state should array itself on the side of Union and peace, that thus it might act as a mediator between the insurgents and the government, and transfer the field of battle to other soil. In spite of the efforts of an active and disaffected minority, the Legislature decided, by the overwhelming vote of fifty-three to thirteen, that that body had not the right to pass an Ordinance of Secession; all efforts to bring about a convention of the people, and to place the military affairs of the state in the



hands of a Board of Safety (both of which measures were pressed by the sympathizers with the insurrection), failed; and no more disloyal measure was extorted than a strong condemnation of a war of subjugation, and a protest against the military occupation of the state.<sup>4</sup> On the 14th of May the Legislature adjourned. In the mean time troops rapidly concentrated under the command of General Butler, and on the 5th of May he advanced a force within a few miles of Baltimore, and took possession of Relay House, an im-



RELAY HOUSE.

portant railway station, which commanded both the passage southward toward Washington, and that westward toward Harper's Ferry. While here he met constant manifestations not only of a rebellious, but of a bloodthirsty and vindictive spirit. Two of his officers arrested a man who openly justified the murderous onset upon the Massachusetts regiment in Baltimore, and, according to his official statement, he found well-authenticated evidence of an attempt to poison his soldiers by persons who obtained admission to his camp in the disguise of pie-peddlers. Upon this discovery, he threatened the rebels with the swiftest and most condign punishment for such barbarity; and he who had, on the score of humanity, withstood the remonstrance of his own governor against his offer to put down a threatened insurrection of the slaves, reminded his rebellious enemies in a general order that they were teaching him a dangerous lesson, and that with a word he could mingle death in the food of their every household.<sup>5</sup> His movement toward Baltimore was the signal for a rapid departure of the rebellious Marylanders of that neighborhood westward. They went with such arms as they could command; and, at the same time, an attempt was made to send to Harper's Ferry, then in the possession of the insurgents, a steam gun, invented by a Mr. Winans, of Baltimore, who expected to effect by it an entire change in artillery warfare. But on the 10th General Butler seized this much-talked-of weapon on its passage, arrested those who accompanied it, and placed it among the less pretending, but, as it proved, more efficient batteries with which he commanded the important railway viaduct at what was known as



VIADUCT AT WASHINGTON JUNCTION.

the Washington Junction. On the 14th he entered the city of Baltimore itself with the Eighth New York Regiment, a detachment of the very Sixth Massachusetts which had been attacked three weeks before, and a battery, and, marching through the city, undisturbed by the rebellious and cheered by the loyal, encamped upon Federal Hill, a high point of ground which

*Resolution passed in the Maryland Legislature, May 10.*

Whereas the war against the Confederate States is unconstitutional and repugnant to civilization, and will result in a bloody and shameful overthrow of our institutions; and while recognizing the obligations of Maryland to the Union, we sympathize with the South in the struggle for their rights—for the sake of humanity, we are for peace and reconciliation, and solemnly protest against this war, and will take no part in it;

*Resolved*, That Maryland implores the President, in the name of God, to cease this unholy war, at least until Congress assembles; that Maryland desires and consents to the recognition of the independence of the Confederate States. The military occupation of Maryland is unconstitutional, and she protests against it, though the violent interference with the transit of Federal troops is discontinued; that the vindication of her rights be left to time and reason, and that a Convention, under existing circumstances, is inexpedient.

<sup>4</sup> General Orders, Relay House, May 8, 1861.

commanded both Baltimore and Fort M'Henry, where he fixed his headquarters. Having thus obtained quiet and absolute possession of this important city, he issued, on the same day, a proclamation, setting forth to the Baltimoreans that he was among them to sustain the laws, local as well as national; that, preferring to trust to their good faith and loyalty, he had come with little more than the guard suited to his rank; that no attempts to incite sedition or give aid and comfort to the insurgents would be permitted; and that the formation and drill of bodies of men not part of the enrolled militia of the state were forbidden. He invited the citizens to furnish rations for his command at fair prices, and promised that any outrage whatever upon person or property by those under his command should be visited with rigorous punishment. His tone was forbearing, courteous, and kind, but unmistakably firm and earnest.<sup>6</sup> At this proclamation the small minority of bitter and desperate secessionists muttered threats and treason between their teeth; but there was general acquiescence, and in some quarters outspoken approbation. The course which it marked out was followed with comparative ease; for a great change had taken place in Baltimore and its neighborhood since the attack upon the Massachusetts men. In spite of the activity, the virulence, and the audacity of the secessionists, the loyal citizens found that they were largely in the majority, and that, although the greater part of the wealthy and cultivated people, being all slaveholders and closely connected with the corresponding class in Eastern Virginia, were

*General Butler's Proclamation.*

Department of Annapolis, Federal Hill, Baltimore, May 14, 1861.

A detachment of the forces of the federal government under my command have occupied the city of Baltimore for the purpose, among other things, of enforcing respect and obedience to the laws, as well of the state—if requested thereto by the civil authorities—as of the United States laws, which are being violated within its limits by some malignant and traitorous men, and in order to testify the acceptance by the federal government of the fact that the city and all the well-intentioned portion of its inhabitants are loyal to the Union and the Constitution, and are to be so regarded and treated by all. To the end, therefore, that all misunderstanding of the purpose of the government may be prevented, and to set at rest all unfounded, false, and seditious rumors; to relieve all apprehensions, if any are felt, by the well-disposed portion of the community, and to make it thoroughly understood by all traitors, their aiders and abettors, that rebellious acts must cease, I hereby, by the authority vested in me as commander of the Department of Annapolis, of which Baltimore forms a part, do now command and make known that no loyal and well-disposed citizen will be disturbed in his lawful occupation or business, that private property will not be interfered with by the men under my command, or allowed to be interfered with by others, except in so far as it may be used to afford aid and comfort to those in rebellion against the government, whether here or elsewhere; all of which property, munitions of war, and that fitted to aid and support the rebellion, will be seized and held subject to confiscation, and, therefore, all manufacturers of arms and munitions of war are hereby requested to report to me forthwith, so that the lawfulness of their occupation may be known and understood, and all misconstruction of their doings be avoided. No transportation from the city to the rebels of articles fitted to aid and support troops in the field will be permitted, and the fact of such transportation, after the publication of this proclamation, will be taken and received as proof of illegal intention on the part of the consignors, and will render the goods liable to seizure and confiscation.

The government being ready to receive all such stores and supplies, arrangements will be made to contract for them immediately, and the owners and manufacturers of such articles of equipment and clothing, and munitions of war and provisions, are desired to keep themselves in communication with the Commissary General, in order that their workshops may be employed for loyal purposes, and the artisans of the city resume and carry on their profitable occupations.

The acting Assistant Quartermaster and Commissary of Subsistence of the United States here stationed have been instructed to proceed and furnish, at fair prices, 40,000 rations for the use of the army of the United States, and farther supplies will be drawn from the city to the full extent of its capacity, if the patriotic and loyal men choose so to furnish supplies.

All assemblages, except the ordinary police, of armed bodies of men, other than those regularly organized and commissioned by the State of Maryland, and acting under the orders of the governor thereof, for drill and other purposes, are forbidden within the department.

All officers of the militia of Maryland, having command within the limits of the department, are requested to report through their officers forthwith to the general in command, so that he may be able to know and distinguish the regularly commissioned and loyal troops of Maryland from armed bodies who may claim to be such.

The ordinary operations of the corporate government of the city of Baltimore and of the civil authorities will not be interfered with, but, on the contrary, will be aided by all the power at the command of the general, upon proper call being made, and all such authorities are cordially invited to co-operate with the general in command to carry out the purposes set forth in the proclamation, so that the city of Baltimore may be shown to the country to be, what she is in fact, patriotic and loyal to the Union, the Constitution, and the laws.


No flag, banner, ensign, or device of the so-called Confederate States, or any of them, will be permitted to be raised or shown in this department, and the exhibition of either of them by evil-disposed persons will be deemed, and taken to be evidence of, a design to afford aid and comfort to the enemies of the country. To make it more apparent that the government of the United States by far more relies upon the loyalty, patriotism, and zeal of the good citizens of Baltimore and vicinity than upon any exhibition of force calculated to intimidate them into that obedience to the laws which the government doubts not will be paid from inherent respect and love of order, the commanding general has brought to the city with him, of the many thousand troops in the immediate neighborhood, which might be at once concentrated here, scarcely more than an ordinary guard, and, until it fails him, he will continue to rely upon that loyalty and patriotism of the citizens of Maryland which have never yet been found wanting to the government in time of need. The general in command desires to greet and treat in this part of his department all the citizens thereof as friends and brothers, having a common purpose, a common loyalty, and a common country. Any infractions of the laws by the troops under his command, or any disorderly, unsoldierlike conduct, or any interference with private property, he desires to have immediately reported to him, and pledges himself that if any soldier so far forgets himself as to break those laws that he has sworn to defend and enforce, he shall be most rigorously punished.

The general believes that if the suggestions and requests contained in this proclamation are faithfully carried out by the co-operation of all good and Union-loving citizens, and peace and quiet, and certainty of future peace and quiet are thus restored, business will resume its accustomed channels, trade take the place of dullness and inactivity, efficient labor displace idleness, and Baltimore will be in fact, what she is entitled to be, in the front rank of the commercial cities of the nation.

Given at Baltimore, the day and year herein first above written.

BENJ. F. BUTLER, Brig. General Com. Department of Annapolis.  
E. G. PARKER, Lieutenant Colonel, Aid-de-Camp.





BAND-BAG BATTERY.

disaffected, a very large and influential minority even of these, including men eminent for their talents no less than from their social position, were strenuous upholders of the Constitution and the Union. In Western Maryland the national flag was raised at Frederiek City, at Hagerstown, and else-

where, with due honors, and loyal defenders thronged around it. On the 13th of May a train from Philadelphia passed through Baltimore with the flag displayed; and the same token of devotion to the undivided republic was raised upon many public and private buildings. On the morning of the

14th, the day of General Butler's arrival, a Pennsylvania regiment, in complete array, passed unmolested, and even with some tokens of welcome, over the very route which three weeks before had been the scene of bloody conflict. On this day, too, Governor Hicks issued his proclamation calling for four regiments in compliance with the requirement of the President, to serve for three months; admitting that requirement to be "in the spirit and in pursuance of the law," though setting forth, as a salve to wounded state pride, the assurance of the Secretary of War that these troops should serve "within the limits of the State of Maryland, or for the defense of the capital of the United States." From this day sedition and treason gradually, though slowly, subsided in Baltimore, and lurked in secret places. Violence was suppressed by law, not made for the occasion, though supported by a force required by circumstances. General Butler, who, by his wisdom, his tact, and his activity, had so completely foiled the plans of the violent secessionists, and sustained a loyal state which was in imminent peril of being dragooned into secession, was made a major general, and placed in command of a new military district, including Virginia and the two Carolinas, his head-quarters being at Fortress Monroe; and the Winans steam gun, from which so much had been hoped on the one side and feared on the other, being found



RAISING THE STARS AND STRIPES OVER THE CUSTOM-HOUSE AT BALTIMORE.





THE WINANS GUN.

a harmless monster after all, was fitly sent to Boston—that city so much threatened with the visitation of rebellious arms—a trophy.

At the beginning of the secession movement, hardly less loyal than Maryland, amid the commotion which followed the issuing of the President's proclamation, Tennessee and North Carolina were swiftly swept into the vortex of secession. This was partly because of the larger proportion of their slave property,<sup>7</sup> but chiefly because to them were not granted a governor like Hicks and a general like Butler. For, at the election which resulted in the choice of President Lincoln, the vote of Tennessee had been given for the conservative nominees, John Bell and Edward Everett; and although not a ballot had been cast for Lincoln, the people acquiesced in his election as the legitimate result of the canvass. But the governor, Isham G. Harris, being of the South Carolina school of politicians, at once began endeavors to carry the state into the hands of the secessionists. He called a special session of the General Assembly, avowedly upon the ground of the election of the Republican candidate, and the triumph of a party whose bond of union he declared to be uncompromising hostility to the rights and institutions of the fifteen Southern States. And here it is well to notice that of the fifteen states thus styled Southern, two, Delaware and Maryland, being north of the Potomac, belong to the Middle, and one, Missouri, to the Western geographical division of the Union. But they were slave states; and, in the mouth of slaveholders like Governor Harris, Southern thus used meant slave, even when applied to persons. To them a man born upon the iciest verge of Maine, if he came to a slave state and sustained slavery, was a Southern man; one born upon the point where Florida pushes itself almost within the tropics, if he had doubts as to the wisdom of perpetuating and diffusing negro bondage, was no Southerner, but a Yankee abolitionist. Governor Harris declared in his message to the Assembly which he had called together that these imperiled Southern rights could only be secured by the extension of a line to the Pacific, all territory south of which should be forever slave territory; by allowing slaveholders to travel and sojourn in the free states with their slaves; by the prohibition of the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and all places in slave states under national jurisdiction; and by making these provisions unchangeable, except by con-

<sup>7</sup> According to the census of 1860, Maryland had a white population of 516,128, and 87,188 slaves; Tennessee a white population of 826,823, and 275,784 slaves; and North Carolina a white population of 631,489, and 331,051 slaves.

*Address to the People of Tennessee.*

In the perilous times upon which our country is thrown, we trust it will not be deemed presumptuous or improper in us to express to our fellow-citizens our united opinion as to the duty of the state in this dire emergency.

We are threatened with a civil war, the dreadful consequences of which, if once fully inaugurated, no language can depict. In view of such consequences, we deem it the duty of every good citizen to exert his utmost powers to avert the calamities of such a war. The agitation of the slavery question, combined with party spirit and sectional animosity, has at length produced the legitimate fruit. The present is no time to discuss the events of the past. The awful presence is upon us, and the portentous future is hanging over us. There has been a collision, as is known to you, at Fort Sumter, between the forces of the seceded states and those of the national government, which resulted in the capture of the fort by the army of the Confederate States. In view of this event, and of other acts growing out of the secession of seven of the Southern States, the President has issued his proclamation calling out the militia of the states of the Union to suppress what the proclamation designates a "combination too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law."

Tennessee is called upon by the President to furnish two regiments, and the state has, through her executive, refused to comply with the call. This refusal of our state we fully approve. We commend the wisdom, the justice, and the humanity of the refusal. We unqualifiedly disapprove of secession, both as a constitutional right and as a remedy for existing evils; we equally condemn the policy of the administration in reference to the seceded states. But while we, without qualification, condemn the policy of coercion as calculated to dissolve the Union forever, and to dissolve it in the blood of our fellow-citizens, and regard it as sufficient to justify the state in refusing her aid to the government in its attempts to suppress the revolution in the seceded states, we do not think it her duty, considering her position in the Union, and in view of the great question of the peace of our distracted country, to take sides against the government. Tennessee has wronged no state of this Union. She has violated the rights of no state, north or south. She has been loyal

sent of all the slave states. Beyond these there was only one other demand to be made—that the free states should adopt slavery and make it perpetual. But all the governor's constituents did not think with him. The Legislature proved to be strongly conservative, and averse to disunion. A Convention was called, but with sufficient safeguards against the juggling or precipitation of the state into secession. At Nashville a meeting was held in January, at which it was declared by the agitators for secession that the "Constitutional Union party," whose candidate Mr. Bell was, had held the doctrine that the election of Mr. Lincoln would justify the dissolution of the Union. Mr. Bell himself, being present, rose and denied the charge, and his denial called forth cheers from all parts of the hall. At the election, on the 9th of February, of delegates to the Convention, the Union candidates were chosen by a majority of more than sixty-four thousand; and by a majority of nearly twelve thousand it was decided that there should not even be a Convention. This decision was more significant than the very majority of four hundred by which the Union delegates were elected in

Memphis, the strong-hold of the aggressive slavery party, because it showed an unwillingness on the part of the people even to entertain the question of breaking up the Union, or to expose the political fortunes of the state to the chances which they must encounter in an assemblage meeting under circumstances of great excitement, and liable to be hurried into extreme measures, and even diverted from its purpose, by reckless and designing men—a disposition which, in the consideration of after-events, it will become us to remember. The President's proclamation was received with general disfavor, and caused such a change in the current of popular feeling that the secessionists, quick to see and to use their advantage, were enabled to turn the western tide almost entirely in their favor. We have already seen Governor Harris's defiant refusal to the call for troops. He immediately summoned another special session of the Assembly on April 25th; and an address was at the same time issued to the people of the state by some of its most eminent citizens, in which secession was disapproved of and the policy of the administration condemned, a refusal of aid to the government in its attempt to suppress the rebellion justified, assistance to the enemies of the government equally deprecated, and a course of neutrality recommended which should not offend "either party," but leave to the state the grand function of peace-maker between the states of the South and the general government. Strange to say, this policy was advocated on the ground that any other would transfer the war to the soil of Tennessee, and defeat all hopes of reconciliation.<sup>8</sup> The notion that they could assume a neutral position, and play the part of mediators between the government and the rebellion, took entire possession of such of the leading men of the border states as were not at heart with the rebels at the outset. They trusted that such a course would lead them safely through the difficulties of their position, which, it must be confessed, considering the division of their love and interest between slavery and the Union, were great and perplexing. It led them only into the very disaster which they sought to avoid; and while it brought upon their soil and their people the calamities which they seemed most to dread, it prolonged for the government that attitude of timid hesitation which from the beginning had paralyzed its en-

to all where loyalty was due. She has not brought on this war by any act of hers. She has tried every means in her power to prevent it. She now stands ready to do any thing within her reach to stop it; and she ought, as we think, to decline joining either party; for, in so doing, they would at once terminate her grand mission of peace-maker between the states of the South and the general government. Nay, more; the almost inevitable result would be the transfer of the war within her own borders—the defeat of all hopes of reconciliation, and the deluging of the state with the blood of her own people.

The present duty of Tennessee is to maintain a position of independence—taking sides with the Union and the peace of the country against all assailants, whether from the North or South. Her position should be to maintain the sanctity of her soil from the hostile tread of any party.

We do not pretend to foretell the future of Tennessee in connection with the other states or in reference to the federal government; we do not pretend to be able to tell the future purposes of the President and cabinet in reference to the impending war; but, should a purpose be developed by the government of overrunning and subjugating our brethren of the seceded states, we say unequivocally that it will be the duty of the state to resist at all hazards, at any cost, and by arms, any such purpose or attempt. And, to meet any and all emergencies, she ought to be fully armed, and we would respectfully call upon the authorities of the state to proceed at once to the accomplishment of this object.

Let Tennessee, then, prepare thoroughly and efficiently for coming events. In the mean time, let her, as speedily as she can, hold a conference with her sister slaveholding states yet in the Union for the purpose of devising plans for the preservation of the peace of the land. Fellow-citizens of Tennessee, we entreat you to bring yourselves up to the magnitude of the crisis. Look in the face impending calamities. Civil war—what is it? The bloodiest and darkest pages of history answer this question. To avert this, who would not give his time, his talents, his untiring energy—his all? There may be yet time to accomplish every thing. Let us not despair. The border slave states may prevent this civil war; and why shall they not do it?

NEIL S. BROWN,	S. D. MORGAN,
RUSSELL HOUSTON,	JOHN S. BRIEN,
E. H. EWING,	ANDREW EWING,
C. JOHNSON,	JOHN H. CALLENDER,
JOHN BELL,	BAILLIE PETTON,
R. J. MELOS,	

Nashville, April 19, 1861.



ergies and developed those of the insurgents. Such neutrality was both treason and folly. It was treason, because it sought to disqualify the constitutional government of the republic, the paramount authority in all of its affairs, and practically asserted that a commonwealth into which its citizens had formed themselves by its consent upon its soil was not an integral part of it, but an independent and a sovereign power. For a mediator must be independent; a party to a cause can not decide it as a judge; and a declaration of neutrality and the interdiction of the passage of troops are alike the attributes only of absolute sovereignty, the admission of the right to which would have enabled any state of the Union, at any time and upon any issue, to defy with impunity the central authority behind the barrier of a soil declared neutral and impassable by a component part of that very authority. Such pretended neutrality, if not making war upon the United States, would amply fulfill the constitutional conditions of treason by giving aid and comfort to their enemies in the most effective manner, and would make the suppression of insurrection quite impossible. Such neutrality was folly, because it brought upon the states which adopted it the very calamities which they sought to shun. Had the border states, the people of which before the fall of Sumter professed, and even showed, a devotion to the Union, declared boldly for it, for good or ill, the war, which the vacillation of some and the assumed neutrality of others drew inevitably upon their own soil, would instantly have been transferred to that of the Gulf States, to be waged by such an overwhelming superiority of force that it would have briefly ended. An ambiguous course is always perilous; between two great destructive powers it is inevitably fatal; and the neutrality of the border states ended in such mediation as the neutral grain offers between the upper and the nether millstone. In other respects the position assumed by those who first pretended to the direction of these states was no less unreasonable and destructive. They declared secession to be unjustifiable; and yet, in the same breath, denounced the exercise of authority which sought to restrain this unjustifiable act as a coercion which they would not endure themselves or permit to be applied to others. They demanded that the government should wait, and the fate of the nation tremble in the balance, while they debated the question in a Border State Convention. They expected that, in any case, their terms should be accepted, and in this case they would remain in the Union as long as it suited their interests or their inclinations.

Governor Harris, however, advocated no half-way measures. He recommended to the Assembly the passage of an ordinance declaring Tennessee independent of the federal government, and the "reaffirming" each and every function belonging to a separate sovereignty. Thus the governor of a commonwealth, whose imperfect political individuality was the mere creature of the government and the citizens of the republic, and whose very local Constitution declared that its people had their sovereignty and their right of soil only "so far as is consistent with the Constitution of the United States," could with bare face recommend his constituents to reassume a sovereignty which they not only had never possessed, but had never pretended to possess. Such, however, was the resentment provoked by the forcible assertion of its authority by the central government that Governor Harris's recommendation was followed, and the 8th of June was appointed by the Assembly for the vote of the people upon a declaration of independence; but long before that time arrived the state had passed out of the control of the government at Washington and even of its own people. For, as in Virginia,

\* *Resolutions of a Meeting at Louisville, Kentucky, April 20th, at which the Hon. James Guthrie presided.*

*Resolved, 1.* That, as the Confederate States have, by overt acts, commenced war against the United States, without consultation with Kentucky and their sister Southern States, Kentucky reserves to herself the right to choose her own position, and that while her natural sympathies are with those who have a common interest in the protection of slavery, she still acknowledges her loyalty and fealty to the government of the United States, which she will cheerfully render until that government becomes aggressive, tyrannical, and regardless of our rights in slave property.

*2.* That the national government should be tried by its acts, and that the several states, as its peers in their appropriate spheres, will hold it to a rigid accountability, and require that its acts should be fraternal in their efforts to bring back the seceding states, and not sanguinary or coercive.

*3.* That, as we oppose the call of the President for volunteers for the purpose of coercing the seceding states, so we oppose the raising of troops in this state to co-operate with the Southern Confederacy when the acknowledged intention of the latter is to march upon the City of Washington and capture the Capitol, and when, in its march thither, it must pass through states which have not yet renounced their allegiance to the Union.

*4.* That secession is a remedy for no evil, real or imaginary, but an aggravation and complication of existing difficulties.

*5.* That the memories of the past, the interests of the present, and the solemn convictions of future duty and usefulness in the hope of mediation, prevent Kentucky from taking part with the seceding states against the general government.

*6.* That "the present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her present independent position, taking sides not with the administration, nor with the seceding states, but with the Union against them both, declaring her soil to be sacred from the hostile tread of either, and, if necessary, to make the declaration good with her strong right arm."

*7.* That, to the end Kentucky may be prepared for any contingency, "we would have her arm herself thoroughly at the earliest practicable moment," by regular legal action.

*8.* That we look to the young men of the Kentucky State Guard as the bulwarks of the safety of our commonwealth, and that we conjure them to remember that they are pledged equally to fidelity to the United States and Kentucky.

*9.* That the Union and the Constitution, being mainly the work of Southern soldiers and statesmen, in our opinion furnish a surer guaranty for "Southern Rights" than can be found under any other system of government yet devised by men.

*10. To the People of Kentucky.*

Having been elected by you as your delegates to "a Convention of the border slave states and such other slave states as have not passed Ordinances of Secession," with power to meet with delegates from other states in convention, "to consult on the critical condition of the country, and agree upon some plan of adjustment;" and having met at Frankfort, on the 27th of May, in pursuance of the act, we deem it proper to inform you, briefly, of what was done by us in the Convention.

It was a matter of regret to us that, while the call for this Convention originated in Virginia, and had, apparently, the concurrence of all the border slave states, yet there were delegates in attendance from Kentucky and Missouri only. One representative chosen by the counties of McMinn and Sevier, in Tennessee, appeared, and, although not coming with such credentials as were necessary to constitute him a delegate, he was invited to participate in our deliberations.

After a continuous session from day to day, during which the condition of the country, and the various causes that led to it, were maturely considered, it was resolved that the Convention should address an appeal to the people of the United States, and the delegates from Kentucky determined to present to you a separate address, in which views of your members should be embodied. In the discharge of this duty we now attempt to address you.

there was a league formed with the insurgents through a commissioner from them; and the whole military force of the state, and all the property and munitions of war which it had "acquired" from the United States, were turned over to the government at Montgomery. Simultaneously with the ratification of this league, an act was passed authorizing the governor to raise a force of fifty-five thousand men. This he proceeded at once to do; and, to look forward a few weeks to the consummation of this scheme, the 8th of June saw the whole state filled with the armed emissaries of the insurgent government; and, except in East Tennessee, denunciation and intimidation had done their work so thoroughly that the very people who had given a majority of more than sixty-four thousand against secession, now gave a majority of more than fifty-seven thousand for it—or seemed to give; for it was openly charged that this result had been brought about not without fraud, and the open acts of those who had obtained control of the state were such as to justify this accusation against their secret practices.

It is needless to follow closely the steps by which North Carolina trod the road of treason to the Constitution. Let the names be changed, and the story of Tennessee's defection is substantially hers also. She pursued with somewhat more celerity the same course with her sister slave state upon her western border, and by the 20th of May she had thrown herself without reserve, for better for worse, into the arms of the insurgent government. Nor would the fate of Kentucky and Missouri, in which the emissaries and the well-wishers of the rebels played the same part which they had assumed with such success in Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, be worthy of particular attention, were it not that in those states their machinations were unsuccessful. Kentucky, though of her eleven hundred thousand inhabitants more than two hundred and fifty thousand were negro slaves, and although she was bound by strong ties to Virginia, numbered among her people a large proportion of noble men who were ready to give themselves and all that they then had for the imperiled existence of the republic. It is true that the majority of her political leaders, and perhaps even of her citizens, were so far infected with the poison of state sovereignty that they condemned a policy of coercion, and declared that her duty was to maintain an independent and neutral position between the contending parties, declaring, as they did declare, "her soil to be sacred from the hostile tread of either, and, if necessary, to maintain this neutrality by arms."<sup>9</sup> But while they were thus distracted by the conflicting claims of divided duty, even the warmest partisans of state sovereignty and slavery deplored the precipitation, while the majority denounced the contumacy, and all resented the arrogance of the South Carolina politicians, by whom this distressing dilemma had been prepared. At the election on the 4th of May for delegates to the Border State Convention, the Union nominees were chosen by a majority of two to one. At the Convention itself, which was held on the 27th of the same month, only Kentucky and Missouri were represented, and an address was issued to the people of Kentucky by her delegates, headed by the venerable Mr. Crittenden, declaring that the crisis presented the grand commanding question, Union or no Union, Government or no Government, Nationality or no Nationality; that the coming war was unnecessary, and resulted from the ambition of a few rather than the wrongs done to the people; and that Kentucky would continue loyal to the Constitution, the government, and the flag of the United States, and refuse alliance with any who would destroy the Union.<sup>10</sup> On the 30th of June the election for representatives to Con-

Your state, on a deliberate consideration of her responsibilities—moral, political, and social—has determined that the proper course for her to pursue is to take no part in the controversy between the government and the seceded states but that of *mediator and intercessor*. She is unwilling to take up arms against her brethren residing either north or south of the geographical line by which they are unhappily divided into warring sections. This course was commended to her by every consideration of patriotism, and by a proper regard for her own security. It does not result from timidity; on the contrary, it could only have been adopted by a brave people—so brave that the least imputation on their courage would be branded as false by their written and traditional history.

Kentucky was right in taking this position, because, from the commencement of this deplorable controversy, her voice was for reconciliation, compromise, and peace. She had no cause of complaint against the general government, and made none. The injuries she sustained in her property from a failure to execute laws passed for its protection, in consequence of illegal interference by wicked and deluded citizens in the free states, she considered as wholly insufficient to justify a dismemberment of the Union. That she regarded as no remedy for existing evils, but an aggravation of them all. She witnessed, it is true, with deep concern, the growth of a wild and frenzied fanaticism in one section, and a reckless and defiant spirit in another, both equally threatening destruction to the country, and tried earnestly to arrest them, but in vain. We will not stop to trace the causes of the unhappy condition in which we are now placed, or to criminate either of the sections to the dishonor of the other, but can say that we believed both to have been wrong, and, in their madness and folly, to have inaugurated a war that the Christian world looks upon with amazement and sorrow, and that Liberty, Christianity, and Civilization stand appalled at the horrors to which it will give rise.

It is a proud and grand thing for Kentucky to stand up and say, as she can, truthfully, in the face of the world, "We had no hand in this thing; our skirts are clear." And, in looking at the terrorism that prevails elsewhere—beholding freedom of speech denied to American citizens, their homesteads subjected to lawless visitation, their property confiscated, and their persons liable to incarceration and search—how grandly does she not loom up, as she proclaims to the oppressed and miserable, "We offer you a refuge! Here, constitutional law, and respect for individual rights, still exist! Here is an asylum where loyalty to the name, nation, and flag of the Union predominates; and here is the only place, in this lately great republic, where true freedom remains—that freedom for which our fathers fought—the citizen being free to speak, write, or publish any thing he may wish; responsible only to the laws, and not controlled by the violence of the mob."

Is not this an attitude worthy of a great people, and do not her position and safety require her to maintain it? If she deviates from it; if she suffers herself, in a moment of excitement, to be led off by sympathy with one side or the other—to ally herself with either section—inevitable and speedy ruin must fall upon her. What reason can be urged to incline her to such a fatal step? She is still, thank God, a member of the Union, owing constitutional allegiance to it—an allegiance voluntarily given, long maintained, and from which she has derived countless benefits. Can she, by her own act, forfeit this allegiance, and by the exercise of any constitutional power sever herself from that government? In our opinion the statement of the proposition insures its rejection. It is of no more rational force than the argument of the suicide to commit self-slaughter. Secession is not a right. That the right of revolution exists is as true in states as the right of self-defense is true of individuals. It does not exist by virtue of legal enactment or constitutional provision, but is founded in the nature of things—is inalienable and indestructible, and ought to be resorted to only when all peaceable remedies fail. Revolution is an extreme remedy, finds its justification alone in an escape from intolerable oppression, and, hazzarding the consequences of failure, as success or defeat makes the movement one of rightful resistance or rebellion, it becomes the stern duty of Kentucky to look not only to the motives that might impel her to revolt, but to the probable results. She must contemplate her condition in a complex character—national and state—and see what must be her fate in the event of a separation.



gress took place, the issue presented being between Union on the one side, and States Rights on the other; when the Union delegates were elected by an overwhelming majority, the State Rights men having polled but a few more than one quarter of the ballots.

Leaving Kentucky thus firmly bound to the fortunes of the republic, though with her patriotism chilled by the affectation of a cold neutrality, we turn our eyes upon Missouri, the state whose political birth forty years before had been ushered in by the inauspicious omens of the tremendous conflict in which she was now summoned to take a part. Were it not that fanaticism, whether in a good cause or a bad, always forgets or disregards the obligations and even the teachings of the past, the people of Missouri could not for a moment have been led by the delusions of state sovereignty into the denial of a paramount allegiance to the constitutional government of the republic; for there were men still living within her borders who could remember that at the time of her admission as one of the commonwealths entitled to a voice in that government, it was at Washington, and not at St. Louis or at Jackson City, that it was decided whether her Constitution should protect the institution of negro slavery. But a population which furnished the border ruffians who undertook to decide, and who, in a struggle of four years, so nearly decided, by the bowie-knife and the revolver, the political and social future of a neighboring community, could not but include a large number of men who would hasten to serve the cause they had most at heart, in the company of the great body of its devotees, and to dignify their former violence by making it appear the first step in a great revolution. These men were not wanting to their faction or to themselves. They took the field at once with the spirit and the audacity which had marked the movements of the insurgents from the beginning; and Claiborne Jackson, governor of the state, was at their head. Governor Jackson came into office on the 4th of January; and in his inaugural message he did not hesitate at taking the extreme ground that Missouri must stand by the other slave states, whatever course they might pursue. A Convention was called; but Union delegates were elected by large majorities; and the usual commissioner from the insurgents having pleaded the cause of the rebellion before it, he was informed by resolution that Missouri refused to join her fortunes with the states represented at Montgomery. In the resolutions, which were the result of the deliberations for which the Convention was called together, it was declared unanimously that the state had no cause for dissolving her connection with the Union; but another was passed by the large majority of eighty-nine to six, recommending, as a means of avoiding civil war, the withdrawal of the federal forces from the forts where collision with the insurgents might be apprehended. Thus, indeed, might civil war have

been avoided; and so might a certain man who went down from Jerusalem to Jericho have avoided an unpleasant collision by presenting his purse to certain other men among whom he fell upon the road. To yield what is demanded, irrespective of the justice of the demand, may be at times the part of discretion; it can never be that of honor, of dignity, or of sovereign power. There was another resolution, recommending a National Convention for the amendment of the Constitution; but on the 27th of the month (it was March) the state Legislature passed a resolution that it was inexpedient to take any steps toward the National Convention, or toward the amendment of the Constitution of the Union which had been recommended by the state Convention. The stirring events of the latter half of April failed to produce in Missouri the effect which followed them in the other border states, and the excitement which they created soon passed away.

But, although the people of Missouri pronounced thus unhesitatingly, thus so decidedly, and by such large majorities for the Union, the restless and reckless men, who loved slavery more than the republic, did not cease their machinations. A secret association had already been formed for the purpose of forcing the state into the ranks of the insurrection; it numbered among its members many influential politicians; and its object, at least, if not its means, were approved by the governor himself. He began at once the organization of a State Guard, ostensibly for the purpose of keeping the peace and protecting the soil of the state against invasion—that term meaning, when so used, the presence of national troops. But the government at Washington had favored the formation of a military organization called Home Guards, composed of loyal Missourians, which, under spirited and determined leadership, soon checked the development of Governor Jackson's plans and those of his co-workers, who began their movement by seizing the United States Arsenal at Liberty, a small town in the extreme western part of the state, and distributing the arms to the malecontents in that neighborhood. The same fate threatened the more important arsenal at St. Louis; but in command there was Captain Nathaniel Lyon, of the United States Army, who had served with honor in Florida and in Mexico, and with discretion and loyalty in Kansas during her early trial. His force was very small, and the Police Commissioners of St. Louis, undertaking to make a little war upon the government, required him to confine the exercise of his authority to the grounds belonging to the United States. The city swarmed with the partisans of the rebels; the governor himself had ordered two thousand men down from Jefferson City, whose purpose could only be to seize the arms in the arsenal. This a Captain Stokes, also of the army, prevented by a daring and energetic movement. Provided by Governor

Under the national government, she has a right to the protection of thirty-three great states, and with them, thus protected, can defy the world in arms. Under it, she becomes prosperous and happy. Deprived of it, she finds herself exposed to imminent danger. She has a border front on the Ohio River of near seven hundred miles, with three powerful states on that border. She has four hundred miles on the south, by which she is separated from Tennessee by a merely conventional line. Her eastern front is on Virginia, and part of her western on Missouri, thus making her antagonistic, in the event of collision, to Virginia, which is our mother, and to Missouri, which is our daughter. Hemmed in thus on every side by powers, each one of which is equal to her own, her situation, and her sense of loyalty to the Union, imperatively demand of her to insist on the integrity of the Union, its Constitution, and government. Peace is of vital consequence to her, and can only be secured to her by preserving the Union inviolate. Kentucky has no cause of quarrel with the Constitution, and no wish to quarrel with her neighbors, but abundant reason to love both. Of the great West she was the pioneer, and became the starting-point of emigration to all around her. There is not a Western or a Southwestern state in which Kentucky families are not settled, and she is bound to all by ties of interest and brotherhood. She has ever been loyal to the government, answering to its requisitions and sharing its burdens. At the command of that government, when war was declared to protect the rights of sailors, although she had no vessels to float on the ocean, yet she offered up her blood freely in the common defense from the Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico. Again, when war, growing out of a territorial controversy, far from her own borders, was proclaimed, she was among the foremost in the fight, and Monterey and Buena Vista were made famous in history by the valor of Kentuckians. Never has she faltered in her duty to the Union.

In declining to respond to a call made by the present administration of the government, and one that we have reason to believe would not have been made if the administration had been fully advised of the circumstances by which we were surrounded, Kentucky did not put herself in factious opposition to her legitimate obligations; she did not choose to throw herself in hostile collision with the slave states of Missouri, Maryland, and Delaware, which have not succeeded on the one hand, nor the slave states which have and are in process of secession on the other, and shed the blood of brethren and kindred at the very moment when she was striving to be an apostle of peace. Nature herself revolted at the thought, and her conduct in this matter had so much of love to God, and love to man in it, that it will meet the sanction of an approving world. So far from being denounced for this action, it is every where looked upon as an act of purest patriotism, resulting from imperious necessity, and the highest instincts of self-preservation—respected by the very administration that alone could have complained of it, and will, we doubt not, be ratified by it, if not in terms, at least by its future action. That act did not take her out of the Union.

Kentucky, in so grave a matter as this, passes by mere legal technicalities and a discussion of theoretical difficulties of government, poises herself upon her right to do what the necessities of her condition imperatively demanded of her, and relies upon the good sense and magnanimity of her sister states, seeing that there is no parallel in her condition and theirs to do her justice.

In all things she is as loyal as ever to the constitutional administration of the government. She will follow the Stars and Stripes to the utmost regions of the earth, and defend them from foreign insult. She refuses allegiance with any who would destroy the Union. All she asks is permission to keep out of this unnatural strife. When called to take part in it, she believes there is more honor in the breach than in the observance of any supposed duty to perform it.

Feeling that she is clearly right in this, and has announced her intention to refrain from aggression upon others, she must protest against her soil being made the theatre of military operations by any belligerent. The war must not be transferred by the warring sections from their own to her borders. Such unfriendly action can not be viewed with indifference by Kentucky.

Having thus referred to this subject in its general aspects, we would invite your individual attention to its direct bearings upon yourselves.

It is not now a question of party politics, although it may be the interest of some to make it so. The day of mere party platforms has, we trust, gone forever. It has passed from being a mere struggle for place that may gratify personal ambition, to one for the present and future welfare of a whole people, for the safety of homes and firesides. Whatever divisions have heretofore existed should now cease. In times past, in our elections, the questions which divided men related to mere party differences, and the members of all the parties rivaled each other in their expression of devotion to the Union, and were equally clamorous for their rights, in the Union and not out of it. Now these party differences are passed away and forgotten. The direct question is Union or no Union—Government or no Government—Nationality or no Nationality. Before this grand and commanding question every thing else gives way.

All can see that such a state of things can not continue without war, and that such a war was unnecessary. It resulted from the ambition of men rather than from the wrongs done the people. There was a remedy for every thing already provided by the Constitution, which, with wise foresight, provided against the trials to which it might be subjected. There were countervailing powers to check encroachments, whether by a President or by Congress; and it so happened that at this dangerous crisis, when a sectional president had been elected, there was a majority in opposition to him in both houses of Congress, by which he could have been controlled and the people

protected. It was the duty of the opposition to have stood to their posts till the danger of encroachment had passed away. But senators and representatives, following the example of their states, vacated their seats, and placed a president who would have been in a minority at the head of a triumphant majority. It was a great wrong, for which they must answer to posterity. Kentucky remained true to herself, contending with all her might for what were considered to be the rights of the people; and although one after another of the states that should have been by her side ungenerously deserted her, leaving her almost alone in the field, yet she did not surrender her rights under the Constitution, and never will surrender them. She will appear again in the Congress of the United States, not having conceded the least item of power to the government that had not heretofore been granted, and retaining every power she had reserved. She will insist upon her constitutional rights in the Union, and not out of it.

Kentucky is grieved to think that any thing should have been done by her sister states that has made it necessary for her to assume the position she now occupies. It is not one of submission, as it has been insultingly called—it is one of the most exalted patriotism; but, if she had no higher or holier motive—if she were not earnestly for peace among her brethren, the great law of self-protection points out her course, and she has no alternative. Already one section declares that there will be no war at home, but that it shall be in Kentucky and Virginia. Already the cannon and bayonets of another section are visible on our most exposed border. Let these hostile armies meet on our soil, and it will matter but little to us which may succeed, for destruction to us will be the inevitable result. Our fields will be laid waste, our houses and cities will be burned, our people will be slain, and this godly land be rebaptized "the land of blood;" and even the institution, to preserve or control which this wretched war was undertaken, will be exterminated in the general ruin. Such is the evil that others will bring upon us, no matter which side we take, if this is to be the battle-field. But there is danger at home more appalling than any that comes from beyond. People of Kentucky, look well to it that you do not get to fighting among yourselves, for then, indeed, you will find that it is an ill fight where he that wins has the worst of it. Endeavor to be of one mind, and strive to keep the state steady in her present position. Hold fast to that sheet-anchor of republican liberty, that the will of the majority constitutionally and legally expressed must govern. You have, in the election by which this Convention was chosen, displayed a unanimity unparalleled in your history. May you be as unanimous in the future; may your majorities be so decided that a refusal to obey may be justly called factious. Trust and love one another. Avoid angry strife. Frown upon the petty ambition of demagogues who would stir up bad passions among you. Consider, as wise men, what is necessary for your own best interest, and, in humble submission, trust and look to that Almighty Being who has heretofore so signally blessed us as a nation for His guidance through the gloom and darkness of this hour.

J. J. CRITTENDEN, President.	C. A. WICKLIFFE,
JAMES GUTHRIE,	G. W. DENLAP,
R. K. WILLIAMS,	C. S. MOREHEAD,
ARCHIE DIXON,	J. F. ROBINSON,
F. M. BRISTOW,	JOHN B. HUSTON,
JOSHUA F. BELL,	ROBT. RICHARDSON.

#### Resolutions reported in the Missouri Convention.

*Resolved*, That at present there is no adequate cause to impel Missouri to dissolve her connection with the federal Union, but, on the contrary, she will labor for such an adjustment of the existing troubles as will secure peace, rights, and equality to all the states.

*Resolved*, That the people of this state are devotedly attached to the institutions of our country, and earnestly desire that by a fair and amicable adjustment the present causes of disagreement may be removed, the Union perpetuated, and peace and harmony be restored between the South and North.

*Resolved*, That the people of this state deem the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, proposed by Mr. Crittenden, with the extending of the same to Territories hereafter to be acquired, a basis of adjustment which will successfully remove the causes of difference forever from the arena of national politics.

*Resolved*, That the people of Missouri believe that the peace and quiet of the country will be promoted by a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and that this Convention urges the Legislature of this state to take steps for calling such Convention.


*Resolved*, That, in the opinion of this Convention, the employment of military force by the federal government to coerce the seceding states, or the employment of force by the seceding states to assail the government of the United States, will inevitably plunge the country into civil war, and thereby extinguish all hope of an amicable settlement of the issues now pending.

We therefore earnestly entreat the federal government, as well as the seceding states, to stay the arm of military power, and on no pretense whatever bring upon the nation the horrors of civil war.

*Resolved*, That, when the Convention adjourns, it adjourn to meet at Jefferson City on the third Monday in December.

*Resolved*, That a committee be elected, a majority of which shall have power to convene the Convention at such time and place prior to the third Monday in December as the exigencies may require.





FORTIFICATIONS THROWN UP TO PROTECT THE UNITED STATES ARSENAL AT ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI.





A CORNER SCENE IN ST. LOUIS.

Yates, of Illinois, with a requisition from the Secretary of War for ten thousand muskets, he went to St. Louis. With the assistance of Captain Lyon, he managed to deceive a tumultuous mob which surrounded the arsenal by sending off a large quantity of worthless arms in such a manner as to attract attention. They were seized by the watchful multitude; and while these were triumphing in their success, Captain Stokes got on board a steamer not only the ten thousand muskets for which he came, but eleven thousand more, with five hundred rifle carbines, as many revolvers, one hundred and ten thousand cartridges, and some cannon and accoutrements, leaving only seven thousand muskets to arm the St. Louis volunteers. He steamed safely past a battery which the secessionists had erected near St. Louis, and, arriving at Alton, Illinois, sent his valuable prize to Springfield, in that state, thus executing the first successful and important enterprise for the preservation to the government of the material of war of which it was so much in need. Success generally begets success. The organization of the Home Guard went rapidly on, and soon there were five thousand armed and equipped in the vicinity of St. Louis, under the command of Colonels Francis P. Blair and Franz Sigel, the former a brother of President Lincoln's Postmaster General, the latter a German officer who had served with great distinction in the European troubles which had succeeded the French revolution of 1848. On the outskirts of St. Louis a camp of Governor Jackson's State Guards had been established, under the command of General Frost. Captain Lyon, knowing the object with which this encampment was formed, determined to break it up; and, in spite of a specious protest of loyalty on the part of General Frost, on the 10th of May he marched upon him at the head of the full commands of Colonels Blair and Sigel, with some pieces of artillery. The secessionists took the alarm and poured out after the troops, armed with whatever weapons they could seize; and even the townsfolk went in crowds to witness the fight. The former were foiled by the military dispositions of Captain Lyon; they could not approach the camp which they would so gladly have re-enforced; and General Frost, finding himself surrounded by a force four or five times as great as his own, surrendered at discretion upon Captain Lyon's summons.<sup>2</sup> By this prompt movement a dangerous nucleus of rebellion was broken up, about seven hundred prisoners, inclusive of fifty officers, were taken, and a large quantity of small arms, artillery, and ammunition captured. In this camp, which its commanding officer, with the effrontery and duplicity which the partisans of the rebellion so constantly, and often so successfully, practised, had voluntarily declared by letter to Captain Lyon not hostile to the United States, it was found that the two main streets were named Davis and Beauregard; that a part of its occupants were in the rebel uniform; and that the command was in great

<sup>2</sup> Captain Lyon, U. S. A., to General Frost, Missouri State Guard.

Head-quarters United States Troops, St. Louis, May 10, 1861.

To General D. M. Frost:

SIR,—Your command is regarded as evidently hostile toward the government of the United States. It is, for the most part, made up of those secessionists who have openly avowed their hostility to the general government, and have been plotting at the seizure of its property and the overthrow of its authority. You are openly in communication with the so-called Southern confederacy, which is now at war with the United States, and you are receiving at your camp from the said confederacy, under its flag, large supplies of material of war, most of which is known to be the property of the United States. These extraordinary preparations plainly indicate none other than the well known purpose of the governor of this state, under whose orders you are acting, and whose purpose, recently communicated to the Legislature, has just been responded to by that body in the most unparalleled legislation, having in direct view hostilities to the general government, and co-operating with the enemy. In view of these considerations, and your failure to disperse in obedience to the proclamation of the President, and of the eminent necessity of state policy, and the welfare and obligations imposed upon me by instructions from Washington, it is my duty to demand, and I do hereby demand of you, an immediate surrender of your command, with no other conditions than that all persons surrendering under this demand shall be humanely and kindly treated. Believing myself prepared to enforce the demand, one half hour's time before doing so will be allowed for your compliance therewith.

N. LYON, Captain Second Infantry, commanding Troops.

measure armed with muskets seized by the Louisiana insurgents at Baton Rouge, and sent surreptitiously up the Mississippi!<sup>3</sup> The prisoners having refused to take the oath of allegiance, the only condition proposed for their release, on the ground that they had already taken it, and that to take it again would be to admit that they had been in rebellion, were marched under guard to the arsenal. While they were on the way, preceded and followed by detachments of the Union troops, and shut in on either side by a single file, the front ranks of the guard were pressed upon by a tumultuous crowd, which, after insulting them with the most opprobrious epithets, proceeded to blows, and at last attacked them with stones and pistols. Several of the soldiers, without orders, fired into the crowd. Fortunately, or, as the issue proved, perhaps unfortunately, no person was injured, and the soldiers who had fired were immediately placed under arrest. Quiet and order were hardly restored when the tumult broke out afresh. Encouraged by their impunity, the mob renewed their attack, now in the rear, with stones and pistols. A captain ordered his company to fire, and twenty-five persons were killed or wounded. In a popular tumult, the innocent and the imprudent are always sure to suffer with the guilty, through no fault of those in authority. On this occasion a miscellaneous crowd, including even some women and children, had followed the troops, and it is sad to relate that those who fell were mostly citizens, who, however they might have sympathized with the purposes of the rioters, had not joined them in their attack. The rage of the secessionists, and the excitement of all the people, was tremendous; throughout the night St. Louis was heaving with suppressed tumult. On the following day a large body of the Home Guard, chiefly

Germans, marched into the city from the arsenal, where they had been armed and equipped. The streets were thronged with people, through which they passed for a time unmolested. But at length hooting and hissing began, and finally a revolver was fired from the crowd. A soldier fell dead in the ranks. Firing now began from the windows of the houses, when the leading company of the Germans—not exhibiting the steadiness and self-possession of the Massachusetts militia-men under like circumstances in Baltimore—wheeled and fired down the street with fatal effect. The consternation which ensued was overwhelming; but the fury with which it was accompanied was mitigated by the discovery that of the six persons who were killed four were soldiers. The Germans, in their bewilderment, had fired into their own ranks. The excitement caused by these bloody occurrences was not confined to St. Louis. The news flew rapidly to Jackson City, and stimulated the instant passage of a Military Bill, which before was languishing through the debates. By this bill a military fund was created for the purpose of arming and equipping the militia; and all the money in the treasury, or to be received during the current year, however it had been previously appropriated, was devoted to this purpose. Every able-bodied man in the state was made subject to military duty; and, most important provision of all, this large force was placed under the orders of the governor, and required to take an oath to obey him alone.

Meantime General Harney, an army officer of more experience and vigor than discretion, had been appointed to the command of the Department of the West. He arrived at St. Louis on the 11th, in the midst of the turmoil caused by the bloody scenes of the two previous days. He issued first a curt soldier's proclamation, informing the people that he should discharge his delicate duties with decision; that he had not the power of disbanding the Home Guards, but that he would gratify the prejudices of the Missourians by putting down riotous demonstrations with the soldiers of the regular army.<sup>4</sup> On the 14th he issued another proclamation, in which he declared the Military Bill an indirect Secession Ordinance, which indeed it was, and pronounced it null and void. He pointed out to the Missourians that, whatever became of the people around the Gulf, their commonwealth must share the destiny of the republic, and that, if necessary, the whole power of the government would be used to enforce obedience to the "supreme law of the land," and to retain Missouri in the Union.<sup>5</sup> General Harney soon found

<sup>3</sup> General Harney's proclamation to the people of Missouri, May 14, 1861.

<sup>4</sup> General Harney's Proclamation to the People of the State of Missouri and the City of St. Louis.

Military Department of the West, St. Louis, May 11, 1861.

I have just returned to this post, and have assumed the military command of this department. No one can more deeply regret the deplorable state of things existing here than myself. The past can not be recalled. I can only deal with the present and the future.

I most anxiously desire to discharge the delicate and onerous duties devolved upon me so as to preserve the public peace. I shall carefully abstain from the exercise of any unnecessary powers, and from all interference with the proper functions of the public officers of the state and city. I therefore call upon the public authorities and the people to aid me in preserving the public peace.

The military force stationed in this department by the authority of the government, and now under my command, will only be used in the last resort to preserve the peace. I trust I may be spared the necessity of resorting to martial law, but the public peace must be preserved, and the lives and property of the people protected. Upon a careful review of my instructions, I find I have no authority to change the location of the "Home Guards."

To avoid all cause of irritation and excitement, if called upon to aid the local authorities in preserving the public peace, I shall, in preference, make use of the regular army.

I ask the people to pursue their peaceful avocations, and to observe the laws and orders of their local authorities, and to abstain from the excitements of public meetings and heated discussions. My appeal, I trust, may not be in vain, and I pledge the faith of a soldier to the earnest discharge of my duty.

WILLIAM S. HARNEY, Brigadier General U. S. A., commanding Dep't.

General Harney's Second Proclamation.

Military Department of the West, St. Louis, May 14, 1861.

To the People of the State of Missouri:

On my return to the duties of the command of this department, I find, greatly to my astonishment and mortification, a most extraordinary state of things existing in this state, deeply affect-





VOLUNTEERS ATTACKED IN ST. LOUIS.

himself involved in negotiations with Sterling Price, a wary and persistent man, under whose command, as major general, Governor Jackson had placed the forces enlisted under the Military Bill. On the 20th of May General Price brought General Harney to an agreement, by which the former pledged the whole of the force under his command and the whole power of the state to the preservation of order, and the latter consented to make no farther military movement in the state. This specious compromise, which tied the hands of the government and left those of the secessionists free, and, what was of more importance, recognized in effect the right of the state to make terms with the nation as to the treatment of rebellious citizens resident in Missouri, met with no favor outside the pale of the rebellion and the boundaries of Missouri, and with much opposition within the latter. Whether it was thought at Washington that General Harney had been for the first time in his life too cautious in the discharge of his duty, or that he had been overreached, did not appear in the order which, ten days after this concession, relieved him from the command of the Department of the West, and placed it in the hands of Captain, now Brigadier General Lyon. Of Arkansas, hardly a border state, it is only necessary to say that, after once refusing by her Convention to secede, she at last was carried over, on the 6th of May, to her Southern neighbors.

From the spectacle of shaken or subverted loyalty in the border states,

ing the stability of the government of the United States, as well as the governmental and other interests of Missouri itself.

As a citizen of Missouri, owing allegiance to the United States, and having interests in common with you, I feel it my duty, as well as privilege, to extend a warning voice to my fellow-citizens against the common dangers that threaten us, and to appeal to your patriotism and sense of justice to exert all your moral power to avert them.

It is with regret that I feel it my duty to call your attention to the recent act of the General Assembly of Missouri, known as the Military Bill, which is the result, no doubt, of the temporary excitement that now pervades the public mind. This bill can not be regarded in any other light than an indirect Secession Ordinance, ignoring even the forms resorted to by other states. Manifestly its most material provisions are in conflict with the Constitution and laws of the United States. To this extent it is a nullity, and can not and ought not to be upheld or regarded by the good citizens of Missouri. There are obligations and duties resting upon the people of Missouri under the Constitution and laws of the United States which are paramount, and which I trust you will carefully consider and weigh well before you will allow yourselves to be carried out of the Union, under the form of yielding obedience to this Military Bill, which is clearly in violation of your duties as citizens of the United States.

It must be apparent to every one who has taken a proper and unbiased view of the subject, that, whatever may be the termination of the unfortunate condition of things in respect to the so-called "cotton states," Missouri must share the destiny of the Union. Her geographical position—her soil, productions, and, in short, all her material interests, point to this result. We can not shut our eyes against this controlling fact. It is seen, and its force is felt throughout the nation. So important is this regarded to the great interests of the country, that I venture to express the opinion that the whole power of the government of the United States, if necessary, will be exerted to maintain Missouri in her present position in the Union. I express to you, in all frankness and sincerity, my own deliberate convictions, without assuming to speak for the government of the United States, whose authority, here and elsewhere, I shall at all times and under all circumstances endeavor faithfully to uphold.

I desire, above all things, most earnestly to invite my fellow-citizens dispassionately to consider

I turn to one yet more unpropitious to the fortunes of the republic—the condition of Washington itself. That which should have been the moral stronghold and citadel of the nation, was, by its position, the weakest, and, by its political affinities and its social condition, the most disaffected city outside of the seceded states—a place which the government had not only to protect, but to protect itself against. Among the many advantages gained by the slave states in the early days of the republic, not the least was the establishment of the seat of government on the banks of the Potomac. The Eastern and Middle States wished it to be placed on the Susquehanna; but they also much desired the passage of a bill by which the government should assume the debts of the several states contracted during and because of the War of Independence, and thus pay from the common fund an expense incurred for the common benefit. This the Southern States, the people of which owned very few of those debts, opposed. Two causes, of what proved to be a sharp contention, were removed by a compromise of these two interests. The Southern States agreed to the assumption of the debts; the Eastern and Middle States consented to the final establishment of the seat of government upon the Potomac. The price which the Southern States paid for this advantage was small in comparison with its value; for it contributed largely to the preservation of the preponderance which they soon obtained and always kept in the general government; and now that they sought to destroy the republic, and build up a great slaveholding

their true interests as well as their true relation to the government under which we live, and to which we owe so much.

In this connection, I desire to direct attention to one subject, which no doubt will be made the pretext for more or less popular excitement. I allude to the recent transactions at Camp Jackson, near St. Louis. It is not proper for me to comment upon the official conduct of my predecessor in command of this department, but it is right and proper for the people of Missouri to know that the main avenue of Camp Jackson, recently under command of General Frost, had the name of Davis, and a principal street of the same camp that of Beauregard; and that a body of men had been received into that camp by its commander which had been notoriously organized in the interests of the secessionists, the men openly wearing the dress and badge distinguishing the army of the so-called Southern Confederacy. It is also a notorious fact that a quantity of arms had been received into the camp which were unlawfully taken from the United States Arsenal at Baton Rouge, and surreptitiously passed up the river in boxes marked marble.

Upon facts like these, and having in view what occurred at Liberty, the people can draw their own inferences, and it can not be difficult for any one to arrive at a correct conclusion as to the character and ultimate purpose of that encampment. No government in the world would be entitled to respect that would tolerate for a moment such openly treasonable preparations.

It is but simple justice, however, that I should state the fact that there were many good and loyal men in the camp, who were in no manner responsible for its treasonable character.

Disclaiming, as I do, all desire or intention to interfere in any way with the prerogatives of the State of Missouri, or with the functions of its executive or other authorities, yet I regard it as my plain path of duty to express to the people in respectful, but, at the same time, decided language, that, within the field and scope of my command and authority, the "supreme law" of the land must and shall be maintained, and no subterfuges, whether in the forms of legislative acts or otherwise, can be permitted to harass or oppress the good and law-abiding people of Missouri. I shall exert my authority to protect their persons and property from violations of every kind, and I shall deem it my duty to suppress all unlawful combinations of men, whether formed under pretext of military organizations or otherwise.

WILLIAM S. HARNEY, Brigadier General United States Army, Commanding.



oligarchy upon its ruins, they expected and they found in Washington a multitude of co-workers, none the less valuable because they were always secret and generally treacherous. Washington—being without commerce, without manufactures, not even the chief city of a commonwealth or the county town of an agricultural district, not dignified by institutions of science and literature, or graced by galleries of art or places of elegant amusement—was the mere political capital of the country, the place for the transaction of the business of the nation. Thus barren of the chief interests which fill the daily life of men in the highest civilization, surrounded by slave territory and being itself slave ground, it had small attractions and many discomforts for the residents of free states. Few of them sought it except at the call of political duty, or for some advantage to be obtained only through political influence; and those few only in search of recreation or to gratify curiosity during the sessions of Congress. The duty performed, the end attained of profit or of pleasure, the visitor from the North, weary of politics in public, politics in society, and slavery in both politics and society, gladly turned his face homeward toward tranquillity and freedom. But while the residents of the most populous, the wealthiest, and the most cultivated part of the republic were thus strangers, or at most sojourners in its capital, the slave states naturally furnished it nearly the whole of its permanent population. In the appointment of clerks and subordinate officers of the government, it came gradually to pass that places at Washington were mostly given to men from the slave states, and the departments there were filled by incumbents who had received their situations at the hands of the leaders in the insurrection. The Northern and Western States furnished comparatively few men who sought subordinate public employment, except as a temporary resort, or as a step to higher position; but the lack of incentive to honorable exertion in commerce or in manufactures, in arts or in letters, in the slave states, and the concentration of land and slaves in the hands of a few, had for inevitable consequence the production of a numerous class of needy, shiftless, but well-connected men, of a certain degree and kind of social culture, who were glad to settle down at the capital as the recipients of comfortable salaries, which, by the influence of the slave power, they were able to retain through the brief and rare periods during which that power was not absolutely in the ascendant. In Washington the tone of society was given entirely by men and women who had been born and bred under the shadow of slavery; and the bankers, the lawyers, and men of minor occupations, who, for the sake of business, made it their home, soon adopted, if they did not bring with them, a creed and a conduct without which gain was difficult and social enjoyment impossible. Thus even the annual influx of members of Congress from the North came to be regarded much as the Saracens looked upon the stream of unbelieving pilgrims to

Jerusalem—something to be endured while the visitors paid tribute and suffered indignity, but which was resented and resisted when made in force and with a claim to possession. The presence of a president, a vice-president, and a cabinet, neither of whom was a slaveholder or even a Democrat, and who owed their elevation to the avowed opponents of the slave interest, was regarded by the Washingtonians, and particularly by the placemen, with mingled disgust and apprehension. They had come to think that the capital of the nation belonged to them. They trembled alike for their social ascendancy and their salaries. They scorned the new men; they hated those who would replace them; they raged at the sight of abolitionists, and, worst of all, abolitionists in power. Many of the new-comers were rustic in appearance and in manners, and the city placemen felt, or affected to themselves to feel, as the Faubourg St. Germain really felt when the *bourgeoisie* entered *salons* without buckles in their shoes, and began to ask, By what right do you misgovern France? In only one direction was there hope for them, and they looked southward for deliverance. Their feelings were shared by the whole of the ruling faction of the slave states, of which, in fact, they were but representatives. The insurgents shrieked in type (a figure less violent would not express the truth) over what they pretended to regard as the desecration of Washington. In their copious but somewhat monotonous vocabulary of abuse—a vocabulary which hardly supported their continually asserted claims to superior refinement—they compared it, since the 4th of March, to a filthy cage of unclean birds, a wallow of swine, a festering sink of iniquity. They called the members of the new administration dogs and catiffs, harpies who had come down to defile and brutalize the place; and they clamored frantically for the expulsion of the beast and the Illinois ape (these were the names which they gave to the President) from the desecrated city of Washington. Such was the cry that went up from the press in all quarters of what now in the North had received no worse name than "Secessia."<sup>6</sup> The purpose of attacking Washington, and asserting the power of the insurgent government over all the country south of Pennsylvania and the Ohio River, was undoubtedly entertained by the rebel leaders, but was necessarily abandoned on account of the dispositions of General Scott, the course of events in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, and especially the tremendous and most unexpected uprising at the North. But still the government lived in constant apprehension. From the 19th (the day of the attack on the Massachusetts men in Baltimore) to the 25th of April, no communication from North or South was received at Washington, and the loyal and the disaffected alike suffered the torture of suspense. The public buildings were guarded, barricaded, and fortified. So lively was the apprehension of a sudden raid upon Washington by a force which, though not large enough to hold, might yet sack it, and carry off the archives

<sup>6</sup> *The Capture of Washington.*—From the *Richmond Examiner* of April 23, 1861.

The capture of Washington City is perfectly within the power of Virginia and Maryland, if Virginia will only make the effort by her constituted authorities; nor is there a single moment to lose. The entire population pant for the onset; there never was half the unanimity among the people before, nor a tithe of the zeal, upon any subject, that is now manifested to take Washington, and drive from it every Black Republican who is a dweller there.

From the mountain tops and valleys to the shores of the sea, there is one wild shout of fierce resolve to capture Washington City at all and every human hazard. The filthy cage of unclean birds must and will assuredly be purified by fire. The people are determined upon it, and are clamorous for a leader to conduct them to the onslaught. That leader will assuredly arise, ay, and that right speedily.

It is not to be endured that this flight of abolition harpies shall come down from the black North for their roosts in the heart of the South, to defile and brutalize the land. They come as our enemies—they act as our most deadly foes—they promise us bloodshed and fire, and this is the only promise they have ever redeemed. The final yell for the immediate subjugation of the whole South is going up hourly from the united voices of all the North; and for the purpose of making their work sure, they have determined to hold Washington City as the point from whence to carry on their brutal warfare.

Our people can take it—if they will take it—and Scott the arch-traitor, and Lincoln the beast, combined, can not prevent it. The just indignation of an outraged and deeply injured people will teach the Illinois ape to repeat his race and retrace his journey across the borders of the free negro

states still more rapidly than he came; and Scott, the traitor, will be given an opportunity at the same time to try the difference between "Scott's tactics" and the Shanghai drill for quick movements.

Great cleansing and purification are needed and will be given to that festering sink of iniquity, that wallow of Lincoln and Scott—the desecrated City of Washington, and many indeed will be the carcasses of dogs and catiffs that will blacken the air upon the gallows before the great work is accomplished. So let it be.


From the *Richmond Whig* of May 22, 1861.

We are not enough in the secrets of our authorities to specify the day on which Jeff. Davis will dine at the White House, and Ben. McCullough take his siesta in General Sickles's gilded tent. We should dislike to produce any disappointment by naming too soon or too early a day; but it will save trouble if the gentlemen will keep themselves in readiness to dislodge at a moment's notice! If they are not smitten, however, with more than judicial blindness, they do not need this warning at our hands. They must know that the measure of their iniquities is full, and the patience of outraged freedom is exhausted. Among all the brave men from the Rio Grande to the Potomac, and stretching over into insulted, indignant, and infuriated Maryland, there is but one word on every lip—"Washington!" and one sentiment on every heart—vengeance on the tyrants who pollute the capital of the republic!

See, also, the *Richmond Enquirer*, the *New Orleans Picayune*, the *Enfauila* (Ala.) *Express*, the *Goldsborough Tribune*, and the *Raleigh Standard*, and various other slave-state newspapers of the same period.




GALLERIES UNDER THE SENATE-CHAMBER.



BREAD-OVENS UNDER THE CAPITOL.





BARRICADE IN THE TREASURY BUILDING.



THE EIGHTH MASSACHUSETTS VOLUNTEERS IN THE ROTUNDA OF THE CAPITOL.




and the treasure of the nation, that the principal passage-ways of the Treasury and the Capitol were defended by howitzers, which raked their length, and by heavy planks, which, stretched across them at short intervals about the height of a man's knee from the floor, made a charge upon the gun impossible. The iron plates cast for the dome of the Capitol were set up as breast-works between its columns, where they were supported by barrels of cement and heaped-up stone and timber. The statuary and the pictures were protected by heavy planking; and the basement of the building was used as a kitchen. But, when the communication was established, and regiments began to pour in, the public buildings were given as quarters to the troops which came to defend them; the basement of the Capitol became first a store-house and then a bakery, and the very chambers of the Senate and the House were turned into barracks. As the hopes of the loyal rose, those of the rebellious fell; and the Washington secessionists, seeing their chances of open attack upon the government diminish, turned their thoughts and their endeavors to treachery. More disheartening and perplexing circumstances than those under which President Lincoln assumed the control of government can not well be imagined. Entirely without administrative experience himself, and arriving at Washington with a cabinet, no member of which had any practical knowledge of the routine of his department, or any official acquaintance with his subordinates, pursued by an army of office-seekers, whose claims demanded at least consideration, and whose pretensions were generally great in proportion as their capacities were small, he and his ministers were obliged to make themselves familiar with the practical condition of the machine of administration, and prepare it instantly for a kind of service to which, even under the most favorable conditions, it was not too well adapted. The new administration was dependent both for information and assistance upon the subordinate officers of the old, in which the very members of the cabinet itself had proved not only politically traitorous, but personally perfidious. Nor, had the case been otherwise, would it have been prudent to chill the ardor and alienate the interests of the Democratic party by a general removal of officers appointed under its auspices. Necessity and policy therefore dictated the retention of a large proportion of the force which had been left in possession of the public offices by the retiring president. Of these, the greater number had declared that they never would hold office under a "Black Republican" administration. But with place-men the claims of personal interest are rarely waived in favor of abstract principles; and in this case, interest was seconded by the hope of serving the faction which sought the establishment of a new government in the old capital. The result was that spies swarmed not only in the city, but in the very departments. True, these men professed to be loyal, and had taken the oath of allegiance to the United States; but so had Secretaries Floyd, and Cobb, and Thompson, who betrayed the country while they formed a part of its government; so had Senator Yulee, who sat in the Senate-chamber, and wrote traitorous counsels to a brother-conspirator, while *he* and his yoke-fellows held their positions, that they might cast down the very power which they had sworn to support; so had the naval officers, whose voluntary assurances of patriotism and allegiance beguiled Commodore M'Cauley into the security which cost the country the Portsmouth Navy Yard; so had General Frost, who, from a camp flaunting the names and penetrated with the spirit of Davis and Beauregard, and defended by arms torn by the insurgents from a national arsenal, sent like, though not like trusted, assurances to Captain Lyon at St. Louis. To most of the men who had undertaken the destruction of the republic in the interests of slavery, no oath seemed binding, no obligation sacred; and so the new administration was surrounded with spies and traitors in the very capital. It knew not whom to trust. It could

not ask a question without fearing the revelation of its needs; it could not give an order or send a dispatch without risking the betrayal of its intentions. These apprehensions were fully justified; not only in these early days of the rebellion, but throughout the war, the enemies of the government received early information of its purposes. And the emissaries of the insurgents not only thus filled Washington: as I have before remarked, they pervaded the whole country. While from the states subject to the confederated government, men from the loyal states, and even Union men born on the soil, were mercilessly expelled by those in authority, when they were not hanged or shot by whomever chose to hang or shoot, at the North citizens of all parts of the republic lived as usual, undisturbed and unquestioned, and some time had passed before men who were known to be actively engaged in treasonable practices were arrested. Thus surrounded, thus mainly filled with a hostile population, with the very offices of the government swarming with spies, Washington, which its position upon the very southernmost border of doubtful loyalty would, in any case, have subjected to great and peculiar danger, became a city at once beleaguered and betrayed; and in fact, though not in name, the nation's capital was in the enemy's country. If it could have been immediately abandoned without loss of moral power and position before the world, the benefit to the country would have been great and instant; could its archives have been safely deposited elsewhere, its destruction would have saved enough treasure to rebuild it thrice in marble.

To the knowledge that agents and active sympathizers of the rebellion were spread over the land, that their communication was constant with their fellow-laborers in Washington, and to the rapidly developed fact that the rebellion was no sudden outbreak, but the result of a long-concerted scheme, is to be attributed an arbitrary order, by virtue of which officers of the government seized copies of telegraphic dispatches kept on file at the principal offices. The seizure was made simultaneously throughout the country, at 3 P.M. on the 20th of April; and it included all the dispatches which had been sent for a year. Those which betrayed purposes hostile to the government, or which related to supplies of arms purchased for the Southern rebels, were selected and sent to the capital. This measure, unwarranted by written law, was justified in the eyes of the people by the necessities of the situation. It furnished the government much valuable information; it limited somewhat the freedom of action of the rebel emissaries; and the only excitement which it caused was manifested among those who showed their loyalty by the earnestness with which they insisted that the rebels should have the full benefit of the Constitution which they had set at naught. About the same date citizens in various parts of the country were arrested simply in virtue of a Secretary of State's warrant, without process of law, and confined in Fort M'Henry at Baltimore, Fort Lafayette at New York, or Fort Warren at Boston. On the issuing of writs of *habeas corpus* on behalf of the persons thus imprisoned, the officers in command of those posts refused to produce their prisoners, by the order of the President; but a spirited officer, Major Morris, of the Artillery, in command at Fort M'Henry, had first assumed the responsibility of refusing obedience to the writ.<sup>7</sup> That the Constitution warranted the suspension of the writ of *habeas*

*Major Morris's Letter to Judge Giles, at Baltimore.*

At the date of issuing your writ, and for two weeks previous, the city in which you live and where your court has been held was entirely under the control of revolutionary authorities. Within that period United States soldiers, while committing no offense, had been perfidiously attacked and inhumanly murdered in your streets; no punishment had been awarded, and I believe no arrests had been made for these atrocious crimes; supplies of provisions intended for this garrison had been stopped; the intention to capture this fort had been boldly proclaimed; your most public thoroughfares were daily patrolled by large numbers of troops armed and clothed, at least in part, with articles stolen from the United States; and the federal flag, while waving over the federal offices, was cut down by some person wearing the uniform of a Maryland soldier. To add to the fore-



FORT M'HENRY.



corpus in time of rebellion the people well knew; and as there was doubt only whether the power to do so was vested in the President or in Congress, this important step also was taken with general acquiescence. But Chief Justice Taney, of the Supreme Court, in a case brought before him, denied the right of the President to suspend the privilege of *habeas corpus*, or to authorize its suspension by any military officer.<sup>8</sup> Against bayonets and cannon, however, supported by public opinion, the mandates even of a chief justice of the Supreme Court were powerless. The arrests went on; and the writ, having been several times disregarded, soon ceased to be issued.

Although neither the government nor the loyal people of the Union yet suspected how well matured were the plans and how fixed were the purposes of the insurgent leaders, the President now saw—what, indeed, no man of sense could fail to see—that, to cope successfully with the forces which the power at Montgomery had brought or was about to bring into the field, a larger levy was necessary than he had made, and that a longer and severer contest was impending than he had anticipated at the date of his first proclamation. He therefore, on the 3d of May, issued another, by which he called into service forty-two thousand volunteers for three years, directed the increase of the regular army by twenty-two thousand seven hundred men, and added eighteen thousand seamen to the navy.<sup>9</sup> The first proclamation called the state militia into service, and for only three months—the limit of the period for which their services could be so required; but the volunteers were to take service for three years. Such was the enthusiasm of the loyal people, and such their readiness to do battle for the republic, that volunteers poured in more rapidly than they could be organized, and it was at once apparent that within a few weeks the government would have at its disposal a body of one hundred and forty thousand men. The unanimity of the people of the free states seemed absolute; their patriotism, boundless in its self-sacrifice. Of money as well as men, more was offered than could at first be used, and more than in the raw judgment of a peace-bred people seemed to be required. The men who staid at home thought it their duty to provide in every way for the comfort of those who went into the army. Bounties were large; and the families of the volunteers were placed beyond the reach of suffering. Before the 7th of May, more than twenty-three millions of dollars had been contributed for these patriotic purposes.<sup>10</sup>

going, an assemblage elected in defiance of law, but claiming to be the legislative body of your state, and so recognized by the executive of Maryland, was debating the federal compact. If all this be not rebellion, I know not what to call it. I certainly regard it as sufficient legal cause for suspending the writ of *habeas corpus*. Besides, there were certain grounds of expediency on which I declined obeying your mandate.

1st. The writ of *habeas corpus* in the hands of an unfriendly power might depopulate this fortification, and place it at the mercy of "a Baltimore mob" in much less time than it could be done by all the appliances of modern warfare.

2d. The ferocious spirit exhibited by your community toward the United States Army would render me very averse from appearing publicly and unprotected in the city of Baltimore to defend the interests of the body to which I belong. A few days since a soldier of this command, while outside the walls, was attacked by a fiend or fiends in human shape, almost deprived of life, and left unprotected about half a mile from garrison. He was found in this situation and brought in, covered with blood. One of your evening prints was quite loose over this inhuman occurrence.

And now, sir, permit me to say, in conclusion, that no one can regret more than I this conflict between the civil and military authorities. If, in an experience of thirty-three years, you have never before known the writ of *habeas corpus* to be disobeyed, it is only because such a contingency in political affairs as the present has never before arisen. I claim to be a loyal citizen, and I hope my former conduct, both official and private, will justify this pretension.

In any condition of affairs except that of civil war I would cheerfully obey your order, and as soon as the present excitement shall pass away I will hold myself ready not only to produce the soldier, but also to appear in person to answer for my conduct; but, in the existing state of sentiment in the city of Baltimore, I think it your duty to sustain the federal military and to strengthen their hands, instead of endeavoring to strike them down. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MORRIS,

May 14.

Major Fourth United States Artillery, commanding Fort M'Henry.

#### The Merryman Habeas Corpus.

In the case of John Merryman, a secessionist arrested in Baltimore and detained a prisoner in Fort M'Henry, a writ of *habeas corpus* was issued by Judge Taney, made returnable in the United States District Court. General Cadwallader declined surrendering the prisoner till he heard from Washington, and an attachment was issued for General Cadwallader.

General Cadwallader having declined acceding to the demand for the body of Merryman until he could hear from Washington, a writ of attachment was issued against him for contempt of court. The marshal reported that, on going to Fort M'Henry to serve the writ, he was refused admittance.

Chief Justice Taney then read the following statement:

"I ordered the attachment yesterday, because upon the face of the return the detention of the prisoner was unlawful, upon two grounds:

"First. The President, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, can not suspend the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus*, nor authorize any military officer to do so.

"Second. A military officer has no right to arrest and detain a person, nor subject him to the Rules and Articles of War for an offense against the laws of the United States, except in aid of the judicial authority, and subject to its control; and if the party is arrested by the military, it is the duty of the officer to deliver him over immediately to the civil authority, to be dealt with according to law.

"I forbore yesterday to state orally the provisions of the Constitution of the United States which make these principles the fundamental law of the Union, because an oral statement might be misunderstood in some portions of it, and I shall therefore put my opinion in writing, and file it in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in the course of this week."

The judge added that the military authority was always subordinate to civil; that, under ordinary circumstances, it would be the duty of the marshal to proceed with *posse comitatus* and bring the party named in the writ into court; but, from the notoriously superior force that he would encounter, this would be impossible. He said the marshal had done all in his power to discharge his duty.

During the week he should prepare his opinion in the premises, and forward it to the President, calling upon him to perform his constitutional duty, and see that the laws be faithfully executed, and enforce the decrees of this court.

#### A Proclamation by the President of the United States.

Washington, Friday, May 3, 1861.

Whereas, existing exigencies demand immediate and adequate measures for the protection of the national Constitution and the preservation of the national Union by the suppression of the insurrectionary combinations now existing in several states for opposing the laws of the Union and obstructing the execution thereof, to which end a military force, in addition to that called forth by my proclamation of the fifteenth day of April in the present year, appears to be indispensably necessary; now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, and of the militia of the several states when called into actual service, do hereby call into the service of the United States forty-two thousand and thirty-four volunteers, to serve for a period of three years, unless sooner discharged, and to be mustered into service as infantry and cavalry. The proportions of each arm, and the details of enrollment and organization, will be made known through the Department of War; and I also direct that the regular army of the United States be increased by the addition of eight regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and one regiment of artillery, making altogether a maximum aggregate increase of 22,714 officers and enlisted men, the details of which increase will also be made known through the Department of War; and I farther direct the enlistment, for not less than one nor

This devotion to the national cause was not manifested only by the men who would be obliged to do the fighting, or to pay the expenses as well as to bear the losses of a war. The clergy and the women threw themselves with all their souls into the enthusiasm of the hour. The former preached patriotism, and taught their people, in the pulpit as well as out of it, the lesson of self-devotion which they were so ready to learn, and showed them support in the Scriptures for the cause which they were so anxious to sustain. The latter began to make lint and bandages, and garments needful for the sick; they offered themselves as nurses, each one seeing herself the consoler and the savior of at least one defender of his country, the recipient of his gallantry and his gratitude; and they demanded, with sweet clamor, the immediate defeat of General Beauregard and the speedy arrest of Mr. Jefferson Davis. Their simple enthusiasm and their unreasonable expectations, in which they were not very far in advance of the cooler and more calculating patriots of the sterner sex, should not diminish one jot the credit which is due to their devotion. No demonstration could have been more wholehearted, more encouraging, or more serviceable. In the seceded states, however, exactly the same devotion was exhibited; but its spirit was intensified and all its features heightened. There rebellion raved both in church and parlor: it inspired the prayer at the altar; it was heard in the song by the cradle. The very consecrated eup of the communion-table seemed to be drunk by men as a pledge of undying hostility; and if the sweet nourishment of infants was not curdled by the gall of bitter hatred, it was because the fair and kindred sources whence it should have flowed were closed by the dictates of an unnatural fashion, and that to serve arms and swarthy breasts was committed the tenderest office of maternity. There women not only sighed for the defeat of the armies and the destruction of the government of the republic; they longed for Mr. Lincoln's teeth, and ears, and limbs.<sup>1</sup> The inferior clergy, not content with preaching sedition at home or in the camp, exchanged the sword of the Spirit for the bowie-knife of the flesh; and bishops, rivaling the mail-clad abbots of the Dark Ages, put off the mitre and the lawn for the cocked hat and the epaulettes, and, easting aside the crossier, went out in arms as God's ministers charged with seeing that the curse was well visited upon Canaan. Although these demonstrations did much to heighten the enthusiasm of both sides, they were of little real significance on either. It can not be reasonably denied that if the clergy and the women had with like unanimity and earnestness opposed the action of

more than three years, of 18,000 seamen, in addition to the present force, for the naval service of the United States. The details of the enlistment and organization will be made known through the Department of the Navy. The call for volunteers hereby made, and the direction of the increase of the regular army, and for the enlistment of seamen hereby given, together with the plan of organization adopted for the volunteers and for the regular forces hereby authorized, will be submitted to Congress as soon as assembled.

In the mean time, I earnestly invoke the co-operation of all good citizens in the measures hereby adopted for the effectual suppression of unlawful violence, for the impartial enforcement of constitutional laws, and for the speediest possible restoration of peace and order, and with those of happiness and prosperity throughout our country.

In testimony whereof, I have herewith set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this third day of May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.

By the President.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.

#### Patriotic Contributions to May 7, 1861.

Abington, Mass.....	\$5,000	Great Falls, N. H.....	\$10,000	Ottawa, Ill.....	\$18,000
Acton, Mass.....	5,000	Greensburg, Ind.....	2,000	Palmyra, N. J.....	6,000
Albany, N. Y.....	46,000	Hamilton, Ohio.....	1,000	Paterson, N. J.....	10,000
Amesbury, Mass.....	5,000	Harrisburg, Pa.....	5,000	Pennsylvania, State..	3,500,000
Auburn, N. Y.....	4,000	Hartford, Conn.....	64,000	Philadelphia, Pa.....	330,000
Barre, Mass.....	2,000	Hoboken, N. J.....	2,000	Piquin, Ohio.....	20,000
Batavia, N. Y.....	4,000	Hornellsville, N. Y.....	1,000	Plymouth, Mass.....	2,000
Bath, Me.....	10,000	Hudson, N. Y.....	4,000	Portland, Me.....	31,000
Bedford, Mass.....	2,000	Illinois, State.....	2,000,000	Poughkeepsie, N. Y.....	10,000
Bedford, N. Y.....	1,000	Indianapolis, Ind.....	5,000	Princeton, N. J.....	2,000
Bennington, Ver.....	10,000	Indiana, State.....	1,000,000	Quincy, Mass.....	10,000
Binghamton, N. Y.....	10,000	Iowa, State.....	100,000	Rhode Island, State..	500,000
Bordentown, N. J.....	3,000	Ipswich, Mass.....	4,000	Rochester.....	69,000
Boston, Mass.....	186,000	Ithaca, N. Y.....	10,000	Rockland, Me.....	10,000
Bradford, Ver.....	2,000	Janesville, Wis.....	6,000	Sag Harbor, N. Y.....	3,000
Brintree, Mass.....	2,000	Jersey City, N. J.....	32,000	Salem, Mass.....	15,000
Bridgeport, Conn.....	31,000	Keene, N. H.....	10,000	Salisbury, Mass.....	5,000
Bridgetown, N. J.....	1,000	Kenton, Ohio.....	2,000	Sar. Springs, N. Y.....	2,000
Brooklyn, N. Y.....	75,000	Lancaster, Pa.....	5,000	Schenectady, N. Y.....	2,000
Bruswick, Me.....	1,000	Lawrence, Mass.....	5,000	Schuylkill Co., Pa.....	30,000
Buffalo, N. Y.....	110,000	Lebanon County, Pa.....	10,000	Seneca Falls, N. Y.....	3,000
Burlington, N. J.....	4,000	Lockport, N. Y.....	2,000	Shelburne, Ver.....	1,000
Burlington, Ver.....	3,000	London, Ohio.....	1,000	Southborough, Mass.....	2,000
Camden and Amboy.....	10,000	Lowell, Mass.....	8,000	Stockbridge, Mass.....	3,000
(R. R. Company.....)	10,000	Lynn, Mass.....	10,000	Stowe, Mass.....	2,000
Cannadaga, N. Y.....	7,000	Madison, Ind.....	6,000	St. Albans, Ver.....	10,000
Canton, Mass.....	5,000	Madison, Wis.....	9,000	Sutton, Mass.....	6,000
Cass County, Ind.....	6,000	Maine, State.....	1,300,000	Sycamore, Ill.....	4,000
Champlain, Mass.....	10,000	Malden, Mass.....	2,000	Syracuse, N. Y.....	34,000
Chicago, Ill.....	20,000	Marblehead, Mass.....	5,000	Taunton, Mass.....	40,000
Cincinnati.....	280,000	Marlborough, Mass.....	10,000	Toledo, Ohio.....	5,000
Circleville, Ohio.....	2,000	Marshfield, Mass.....	5,000	Troy, N. Y.....	48,000
Clinton, Ill.....	5,000	Michigan, various pls.....	50,000	Upper Sandusky, O.....	5,000
Clinton, N. Y.....	1,000	Milwaukee, Wis.....	31,000	Utica, N. Y.....	20,000
Cohasset, Mass.....	1,000	Morristown, N. J.....	3,000	Vermont, State.....	1,000,000
Concord, Mass.....	4,000	Mount Holly, N. J.....	3,000	Waltham, Mass.....	5,000
Concord, N. Y.....	10,000	Mystic, Conn.....	7,000	Warsaw, N. Y.....	3,000
Connecticut, State.....	2,000,000	Needham, Mass.....	3,000	Waterford, N. Y.....	8,000
Damariscotta, Me.....	3,000	Newark, N. J.....	136,000	Watertown, Mass.....	2,000
Detroit, Mich.....	50,000	New Brunswick, N. J.....	2,000	Watertown, N. Y.....	3,000
Dover, N. H.....	10,000	Newbury, Mass.....	3,000	Waynesville, Ohio.....	2,000
Dunkirk, N. Y.....	20,000	Newburyport, Mass.....	4,000	Webster, Mass.....	4,000
Elizabeth, N. J.....	11,000	New Haven, Conn.....	30,000	Westborough, Mass.....	8,000
Elkhart, Ind.....	8,000	New Jersey, State.....	1,000,000	W. Cambridge, Mass.....	10,000
Erie, Pa.....	25,000	New London, Conn.....	10,000	West Troy, N. Y.....	7,000
Evansville, Ind.....	15,000	Newtown, Mass.....	8,000	Weymouth, Mass.....	5,000
Full River, Mass.....	10,000	New York, City.....	2,173,000	Wilmington, Ohio.....	3,000
Flemington, N. J.....	5,000	New York, State.....	3,000,000	Wisconsin, State.....	225,000
Fond du Lac, Wis.....	4,000	N. Andover, Mass.....	3,000	Woburn, Mass.....	5,000
Galena, Ill.....	1,000	Noblesville, Ind.....	10,000	Woodbury, Conn.....	5,000
Georgetown, Mass.....	5,000	Norwich, Conn.....	13,000	Woodstock, Ver.....	1,000
Glen Falls, N. Y.....	10,000	Ohio, State.....	3,000,000	Xenia, Ohio.....	14,000
Gloucester, Mass.....	10,000	Oswego, N. Y.....	13,000	Zanesville, Ohio.....	3,000
Total.....					\$23,277,000

<sup>1</sup> Mr. William H. Russell's *Diary North and South*.



the North or of the South, much would have been effected toward the triumph of the opposing party; but so monstrous a condition of society as such a course would have revealed is unheard of in the annals of any nation. The occasions are of extremest rarity, if not altogether wanting, on which the clergy have withheld their blessings and their prayers from the cause of the people who honored their office and furnished their living, or women refused to bestow their cares and their smiles upon the men who were, or might hope to be, their husbands. This is right; it is inevitable. Especially is it woman's function to give to those she loves her sympathy and her support in time of trial. She will not, she can not question of the cause. Did she do so, mankind, divided against itself, would cease to be. Regardless of the nature of the issue, she fights, with weak, resistless weapons, her child's, her husband's, lover's battle. It is theirs, and that makes it hers. The wife of an Italian bandit or a Highland robber acts in this respect upon the same heaven-implemented impulse that filled the bosom of a Roman matron. It was

not patriotism alone that fired the heart of the bereaved Maid of Saragossa, and nerved the arm of Charlotte Corday; nor was it *against* the cause of the men of France that the world saw lifted the bloodless sword of the fanatic of Orleans, that noble monster of a heroism female though, not womanly. And thus throughout the land women, as ever, proved true women, and loyal men and rebels both found cheer and comfort.

The attitude of the government, and the spirit and unanimity of the people of the free states, astonished and alarmed, though it did not intimidate, the insurgent slaveholders. Mr. Davis hastily summoned a congress of the confederated states, and the delegates met at Montgomery on the 29th of April. His message upon the occasion is one of the most important and significant documents of the time, and one which, perhaps, more than any other, exercised a forming influence upon public opinion abroad.<sup>2</sup> To this lat-

<sup>2</sup> *Message of Jefferson Davis, April 29, 1861.*

*Gentlemen of Congress:*—It is my pleasing duty to announce to you that the Constitution framed for the establishment of a permanent government of the Confederate States of America has been ratified by the several conventions of each of those states which were referred to it to inaugurate the said government in its full proportions and upon its own substantial basis of the popular will. It only remains that elections should be held for the designation of the officers to administer it. There is every reason to believe that at no distant day other states, identical in political principles and community of interests with those which you represent, will join this confederacy, giving to its typical constellation increased splendor; to its government of free, equal, and sovereign states a wider sphere of usefulness; and to the friends of constitutional liberty a greater security for its harmonious and perpetual existence.

It was not, however, for the purpose of making this announcement that I have deemed it my duty to convoke you at an earlier day than that fixed by yourselves for your meeting. The declaration of war made against this confederacy by Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, in his proclamation, issued on the 15th day of the present month, renders it necessary, in my judgment, that you should convene at the earliest practicable moment to devise the measures necessary for the defense of the country. The occasion is, indeed, an extraordinary one. It justifies me in giving a brief review of the relations heretofore existing between us and the states which now unite in warfare against us, and a succinct statement of the events which have resulted, to the end that mankind may pass intelligent and impartial judgment on our motives and objects.

During the war waged against Great Britain by her colonies on this continent, a common danger impelled them to a close alliance, and to the formation of a confederation by the terms of which the colonies, styling themselves states, entered severally into a firm league of friendship with each other for their common defense, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever. In order to guard against any misconception of their compact, the several states made an explicit declaration in a distinct article, that each state retain its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power of jurisdiction and right which is not by this said confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled under this contract of alliance.

The war of the Revolution was successfully waged, and resulted in the treaty of peace with Great Britain in 1783, by the terms of which the several states were each by name recognized to be independent. The Articles of Confederation contained a clause whereby all alterations were prohibited, unless confirmed by the Legislatures of every state after being agreed to by the Congress; and in obedience to this provision, under the resolution of Congress of the 21st of February, 1787, the several states appointed delegates for the purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation, and reporting to Congress and the several Legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall, when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the states, render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of the government and the preservation of the Union.

It was by the delegates chosen by the several states under the resolution just quoted that the Constitution of the United States was formed in 1787, and submitted to the several states for ratification, as shown by the seventh article, which is in these words: "The ratification of the conventions of nine states shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the states so ratifying the same."

I have italicized certain words in the resolutions just made for the purpose of attracting attention to the singular and marked caution with which the states endeavored in every possible form to exclude the idea that the separate and independent sovereignty of each state was merged into one common government or nation; and the earnest desire they evinced to impress on the Constitution its true character—that of a compact between independent states—the Constitution of 1787, however, admitting the clause already recited from the Articles of Confederation, which provided in explicit terms that each state reclaimed its sovereignty and independence.

Some alarm was felt in the states, when invited to ratify the Constitution, lest this omission should be construed into an abandonment of their cherished principles, and they refused to be satisfied until amendments were added to the Constitution placing beyond any pretense of doubt the reservation by the states of their sovereign rights and powers not expressly delegated to the United States by the Constitution.

Strange, indeed, must it appear to the impartial observer, but it is none the less true, that all these carefully worded clauses proved unavailing to prevent the rise and growth in the Northern States of a political school which has persistently claimed that the government is set above and over the states; an organization created by the states, to secure the blessings of liberty and independence against foreign aggression, has been gradually perverted into a machine for their control in their domestic affairs. The creature has been exalted above its creator—the principals have been made subordinate to the agent appointed by themselves.

The people of the Southern States, whose almost exclusive occupation was agriculture, early perceived a tendency in the Northern States to render a common government subservient to their own purposes by imposing burdens on commerce as protection to their manufacturing and shipping interests. Long and angry controversies grew out of these attempts, often successful, to benefit one section of the country at the expense of the other, and the danger of disruption arising from this cause was enhanced by the fact that the Northern population was increasing, by emigration and other causes, more than the population of the South. By degrees, as the Northern States gained preponderance in the national Congress, self-interest taught their people to yield ready assent to any plausible advocacy of their right as majority to govern the minority. Without control, they learn to listen with impatience to the suggestion of any constitutional impediment to the exercise of their will; and so utterly have the principles of the Constitution been corrupted in the Northern mind, that, in the inaugural address delivered by President Lincoln in March last, he asserts a maxim which he plainly deems to be undeniable, that the theory of the Constitution requires, in all cases, that the majority shall govern. And in another memorable instance the same chief magistrate did not hesitate to liken the relations between states and the United States to those which exist between the county and the state in which it is situated, and by which it was created. This is the lamentable and fundamental error in which rests the policy that has culminated in his declaration of war against these Confederate States.

In addition to the long-continued and deep-seated resentment felt by the Southern States at the persistent abuse of the powers they had delegated to the Congress for the purpose of enriching the manufacturing and shipping classes of the North at the expense of the South, there has existed for nearly half a century another subject of discord, involving interests of such transcendent magnitude as at all times to create the apprehension in the minds of many devoted lovers of the Union that its permanence was impossible.

When the several states delegated certain powers to the United States Congress, a large portion of the laboring population were imported into the colonies by the mother country. In twelve out of the fifteen states, negro slavery existed, and the right of property existing in slaves was protected by law; this property was recognized in the Constitution, and provision was made against its loss by the escape of the slave. The increase in the number of slaves by foreign importation from Africa was also secured by a clause forbidding Congress to prohibit the slave-trade anterior to a certain date, and in no clause can there be found any delegation of power to the Congress to authorize it in any manner to legislate to the prejudice, detriment, or discouragement of the owners of that species of property, or excluding it from the protection of the government.

The climate and soil of the Northern States soon proved unpropitious to the continuance of slave labor, while the reverse being the case at the South, made unrestricted free intercourse between the two sections unfriendly. The Northern States consulted their own interests by selling their slaves to the South and prohibiting slavery between their limits. The South were willing purchasers of property suitable to their wants, and paid the price of the acquisition, without harboring a suspicion that their quiet possession was to be disturbed by those who were not only in want of constitutional authority, but by good faith as vendors, from disquieting a title emanating from themselves.

As soon, however, as the Northern States, that prohibited African slavery within their limits,

had reached a number sufficient to give their representation a controlling vote in the Congress, a persistent and organized system of hostile measures against the rights of the owners of slaves in the Southern States was inaugurated and gradually extended. A series of measures was devised and prosecuted for the purpose of rendering insecure the tenure of property in slaves. Fanatical organizations, supplied with money by voluntary subscriptions, were assiduously engaged in exciting among the slaves a spirit of discontent and revolt. Means were furnished for their escape from their owners, and agents secretly employed to entice them to abscond. The constitutional provision for their rendition to their owners was first evaded, then openly denounced as a violation of conscientious obligation and religious duty. Men were taught that it was a merit to elude, disobey, and violently oppose the execution of the laws enacted to secure the performance of the promise contained in the constitutional compact. Often owners of slaves were mobbed and even murdered in open day solely for applying to a magistrate for the arrest of a fugitive slave.

The dogmas of the voluntary organization soon obtained control of the Legislatures of many of the Northern States, and laws were passed for the punishment, by ruinous fines, and long-continued imprisonment in jails and penitentiaries, of citizens of the Southern States who should dare ask of the officers of the law for the recovery of their property. Emboldened by success, on the theatre of agitation and aggression, against the clearly expressed constitutional rights of the Congress, senators and representatives were sent to the common councils of the nation, whose chief title to this distinction consisted in the display of a spirit of ultra fanaticism, and whose business was not to promote the general welfare or insure domestic tranquillity, but to awaken the bitterest hatred against the citizens of sister states by violent denunciations of their institutions.

The transaction of public affairs was impeded by repeated efforts to usurp powers not delegated by the Constitution, for the purpose of impairing the security of property in slaves, and reducing those states which held slaves to a condition of inferiority.

Finally, a great party was organized for the purpose of obtaining the administration of the government, with the avowed object of using its power for the total exclusion of the slave states from all participation in the benefits of the public domain acquired by all the states in common, whether by conquest or purchase, surrounded them entirely by states in which slavery should be prohibited, thus rendering the property in slaves so insecure as to be comparatively worthless, and thereby annihilating in effect property worth thousands of millions of dollars. This party, thus organized, succeeded in the month of November last in the election of its candidate for the presidency of the United States.

In the mean time, under the mild and genial climate of the Southern States, and the increasing care for the well-being and comfort of the laboring classes, dictated alike by interest and humanity, the African slaves had augmented in number from about six hundred thousand, at the date of the adoption of the constitutional compact, to upward of four millions. In a moral and social condition they had been elevated from brutal savages into docile, intelligent, and civilized agricultural laborers, and supplied not only with bodily comforts, but with careful religious instruction, under the supervision of a superior race. Their labor had been so directed as not only to allow a gradual and marked amelioration of their own condition, but to convert hundreds of thousands of square miles of the wilderness into cultivated lands covered with a prosperous people. Towns and cities had sprung into existence, and it rapidly increased in wealth and population under the social system of the South. The white population of the Southern slaveholding states had augmented from about 1,250,000, at the date of the adoption of the Constitution, to more than 8,500,000 in 1860, and the productions of the South in cotton, rice, sugar, and tobacco, for the full development and continuance of which the labor of African slaves was and is indispensable, had swollen to an amount which formed nearly three fourths of the export of the whole United States, and had become absolutely necessary to the wants of civilized man.

With interests of such overwhelming magnitude imperiled, the people of the Southern States were driven by the conduct of the North to the adoption of some course of action to avoid the dangers with which they were openly menaced. With this view, the Legislatures of the several states invited the people to select delegates to conventions to be held for the purpose of determining for themselves what measures were best to be adopted to meet so alarming a crisis in their history.

Here it may be proper to observe that, from a period as early as 1798, there had existed in all of the states of the Union a party almost uninterrupted in the majority, based upon the creed that each state was, in the last resort, the sole judge as well of its wrongs as of the mode and measures of redress. Indeed, it is obvious that under the law of nations this principle is an axiom as applied to the relations of independent sovereign states, such as those which had united themselves under the constitutional compact.

The Democratic party of the United States repeated, in its successful canvass in 1836, the deduction made in numerous previous political contests, that it would faithfully abide by, and uphold the principles laid down in the Kentucky and Virginia Legislatures of 1799, and that it adopts those principles as constituting one of the main foundations of its political creed.

The principles thus emphatically announced embrace that to which I have already adverted—the right of each state to judge of and redress the wrongs of which it complains. Their principles were maintained by overwhelming majorities of the people of all the states of the Union at different elections, especially in the election of Mr. Jefferson in 1805, Mr. Madison in 1809, and Mr. Pierce in 1852. In the exercise of a right so ancient, so well established, and so necessary for self-preservation, the people of the Confederate States in their conventions determined that the wrongs which they had suffered, and the evils with which they were menaced, required that they should revoke the delegation of powers to the federal government which they had ratified in their several conventions. They consequently passed ordinances resuming all their rights as sovereign and independent states, and dissolved their connection with the other states of the Union. Having done this, they proceeded to form a new compact among themselves by new Articles of Confederation, which have been also ratified by conventions of the several states, with an approach to unanimity far exceeding that of the conventions which adopted the Constitutions of 1787. They have organized their new government in all its departments. The functions of the executive, legislative, and judicial magistrates are performed in accordance with the will of the people, as displayed not merely in a cheerful acquiescence, but in the enthusiastic support of the government thus established by themselves; and but for the interference of the government of the United States, this legitimate exercise of a people to self-government has been manifested in every possible form.

Scarce had you assembled in February last, when, prior even to the inauguration of the chief magistrate you had elected, you expressed your desire for the appointment of commissioners, and for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith.

It was my pleasure as well as my duty to co-operate with you in this work of peace. Indeed, in my address to you on taking the oath of office, and before receiving from you the communication of this resolution, I had said that "as a necessity, not as a choice, we have resorted to the remedy of separating, and henceforth our energies must be directed to the conduct of our own affairs, and the perpetuity of the confederacy which we have formed. If a just perception of mutual interest shall permit us to peaceably pursue our separate political career, my most earnest desire will then have been fulfilled."

It was in furtherance of these accordant views of the Congress and the executive that I made choice of three discreet, able, and distinguished citizens, who repaired to Washington. Aided by their cordial co-operation and that of the Secretary of State, every effort compatible with self-respect and the dignity of the confederacy was exhausted before I allowed myself to yield to the conviction that the government of the United States was determined to attempt the conquest of this people, and that our cherished hopes of peace were unobtainable.

On the arrival of our commissioners in Washington on the 5th of March, they postponed, at the suggestion of a friendly intermediary, doing more than giving informal notice of their arrival. This was done with a view to afford time to the President of the United States, who had just been inaugurated, for the discharge of other pressing official duties in the organization of his administration, before engaging his attention in the object of their mission. It was not until the 12th of the month that they officially addressed the Secretary of State, informing him of the purpose of



ter end, indeed, it was, like all the more important state papers of the insurgent leader, in a great measure directed, for he had no little skill in the lower arts of state-craft. He could mask an utterly selfish purpose behind a seeming magnanimity; pervert the truth with an air of frank simplicity; throw a veil of courtesy over the most arrogant assumption; and with a certain dignity of manner (sometimes too consciously assumed), and a pretense of wide philanthropy, appeal without a blush to those baser motives which

their arrival, and stating, in the language of their instructions, their wish to make to the government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the government of the United States that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States desired a peaceful solution of these great questions; that it was neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand which is not founded on the strictest principles of justice, nor to do any act to injure their late confederates.

To this communication no formal reply was received until the 8th of April. During the interval, the commissioners had consented to waive all questions of form, with the firm resolve to avoid war if possible. They went so far even as to hold, during that long period, unofficial intercourse through an intermediary, whose high position and character inspired the hope of success, and through whom constant assurances were received from the government of the United States of its peaceful intentions—of its determination to evacuate Fort Sumter; and farther, that no measure would be introduced changing the existing status prejudicial to the Confederate States; that in the event of any change in regard to Fort Pickens, notice would be given to the commissioners. The crooked path of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so wanting in courtesy, in candor, and directness, as was the course of the United States government toward our commissioners in Washington. For proof of this, I refer to the annexed documents, taken in connection with farther facts which I now proceed to relate.

Early in April the attention of the whole country was attracted to extraordinary preparations for an extensive military and naval expedition in New York and other Northern ports. These preparations commenced in secrecy, for an expedition whose destination was concealed, and only became known when nearly completed; and on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of April, transports and vessels of war, with troops, manitions, and military supplies, sailed from Northern ports bound southward.

Alarmed by so extraordinary a demonstration, the commissioners requested the delivery of an answer to their official communication of the 12th of March, and the reply dated on the 15th of the previous month, from which it appears that during the whole interval, while the commissioners were receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their mission, the Secretary of State and the President of the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever—to refuse even to listen to any proposals they had to make, and had profited by the delay created by their own assurances in order to prepare secretly the means for effective hostile operations. That these assurances were given has been virtually confessed by the government of the United States, by its act of sending a messenger to Charleston to give notice of its purpose to use force if opposed in its intention of supplying Fort Sumter. No more striking proof of the absence of good faith in the confidence of the government of the United States toward the confederacy can be required than is contained in the circumstances which accompanied this notice.

According to the usual course of navigation, the vessels composing the expedition, and designed for the relief of Fort Sumter, might be looked for in Charleston Harbor on the 9th of April. Yet our commissioners in Washington were detained under assurances that notice should be given of any military movement. The notice was not addressed to them, but a messenger was sent to Charleston to give notice to the Governor of South Carolina, and the notice was so given at a late hour on the 8th of April, the eve of the very day on which the fleet might be expected to arrive. That this manoeuvre failed in its purpose was not the fault of those who controlled it. A heavy tempest delayed the arrival of the expedition, and gave time to the commander of our forces at Charleston to ask and receive instructions of the government. Even then, under all the provocation incident to the contemptuous refusal to listen to our commissioners, and the treacherous course of the government of the United States, I was sincerely anxious to avoid the effusion of blood, and directed a proposal to be made to the commander of Fort Sumter, who had avowed himself to be nearly out of provisions, that we would abstain from directing our fire on Fort Sumter if he would promise to not open fire on our forces unless first attacked. This proposal was refused. The conclusion was, that the design of the United States was to place the besieging force at Charleston between the simultaneous fire of the fort and the fleet. The fort should, of course, be at once reduced. This order was executed by General Beauregard with skill and success, which were naturally to be expected from the well-known character of that gallant officer; and, although the bombardment lasted some thirty-three hours, our flag did not wave over the battered walls until after the appearance of the hostile fleet off Charleston. Fortunately, not a life was lost on our side, and we were gratified in being prepared. The necessity of a useless effusion of blood by the prudent caution of the officers who commanded the fleet, in abstaining from the evidently futile effort to enter the harbor for the relief of Major Anderson, was spared. I refer to the report of the Secretary of War, and the papers accompanying it, for farther particulars of this brilliant affair.

In this connection I can not refrain from a well-deserved tribute to the noble spirit, the eminently soldierly qualities of whose people were conspicuously displayed. The people of Charleston for months had been irritated by the spectacle of a fortress held within their principal harbor as a standing menace against their peace and independence—built in part with their own money—its custody confided with their long consent to an agent who held no power over them other than such as they had themselves delegated for their own benefit, intended to be used by that agent for their own protection against foreign attack. How it was held out with persistent tenacity as a means of offense against them by the very government which they had established for their own protection, is well known. They had beleaguered it for months, and felt entire confidence in their power to capture it, yet yielded to the requirements of discipline, curbed their impatience, submitted without complaint to the unaccustomed hardships, labors, and privations of a protracted siege, and when at length their patience was relieved by the signal for attack, and success had crowned their steady and gallant conduct, even in the very moment of triumph they evinced a chivalrous regard for the feelings of the brave but unfortunate officer who had been compelled to lower his flag. All manifestations or exultations were checked in his presence. Their commanding general, with their cordial approval and the consent of his government, refrained from imposing any terms that would wound the sensibility of the commander of the fort. He was permitted to retire with the honors of war, to salute his flag, to depart freely with all his command, and was escorted to the vessel on which he embarked with the highest marks of respect from those against whom his guns had so recently been directed. Not only does every event connected with the siege reflect the highest honor on South Carolina, but the forbearance of her people and of this government from making any harangue of a victory obtained under circumstances of such peculiar provocation attest to the fullest extent the absence of any purpose beyond securing their own tranquillity, and the sincere desire to avoid the calamities of war.

Scarcely had the President of the United States received intelligence of the failure of the scheme which he had devised for the re-enforcement of Fort Sumter, when he issued the declaration of war against this confederacy which has prompted me to convoke you. In this extraordinary production, that high functionary affects total ignorance of the existence of an independent government, which, possessing the entire and enthusiastic devotion of its people, is exercising its functions without question over seven sovereign states—over more than five millions of people—and over a territory whose area exceeds five hundred thousand square miles. He terms sovereign states “combinations too powerful to be suppressed in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law.” He calls for an army of seventy-five thousand men to act as the posse comitatus in aid of the process of the courts of justice in states where no courts exist, whose mandates and decrees are not cheerfully obeyed and respected by a willing people. He avows that the first service to be assigned to the forces which have been called out will not be to execute the processes of courts, but to capture forts and strong-holds situated within the admitted limits of this confederacy, and garrisoned by its troops, and declares that this effort is intended to maintain the perpetuity of popular government. He concludes by commanding the persons composing the “combinations” aforesaid, to wit, the five millions of inhabitants of these states, to retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days.

Apparently contradictory as are the terms of this singular document, one point was unmistakably evident. The President of the United States calls for an army of 75,000 men, whose first service was to be to capture our forts. It was a plain declaration of war which I was not at liberty to disregard, because of my knowledge that under the Constitution of the United States the President was usurping a power granted exclusively to the Congress.

He is the sole organ of communication between that country and foreign powers. The law of nations did not permit me to question the authority of the executive of a foreign nation to declare war against this confederacy. Although I might have refrained from taking active measures for our defense if the states of the Union had all imitated the action of Virginia, North Carolina, Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, by denouncing it as an unconstitutional usurpation of power to which they refuse to respond, I was not at liberty to disregard the fact that many of the states seemed quite content to submit to the exercise of the powers assumed by the President of the United States, and were actively engaged in levying troops for the purpose indicated in the proclamation. Deprived of the aid of Congress, at the moment I was under the necessity of confining

influence nations as well as individuals. What he must and could conceal, he concealed adroitly; what he would have concealed, yet must maintain, he did not excuse or even vindicate; he boldly proclaimed it good, and put his adversaries on their defense. Yet, with all this, he was not personally corrupt or false. He was but a cunning politician, thrusting aside scruples in his public which he might cherish in his private life, and directing his course by that immoral law which has too generally been the guide of ruling men in all ages and of all nations. He now told Europe—Great Britain and

my action to a cull on the states for volunteers for the common defense, in accordance with the authority you had confided to me before your adjournment.

I deemed it proper farther to issue a proclamation, inviting applications from persons disposed to aid in our defense in private armed vessels on the high seas, to the end that preparations might be made for the immediate issue of letters of marque and reprisal, which you alone, under the Constitution, have the power to grant. I entertain no doubt that you will concur with me in the opinion that, in the absence of an organized navy, it will be eminently expedient to supply their place with private armed vessels, so happily styled by the publicists of the United States the militia of the sea, and so often and justly relied on by them as an efficient and admirable instrument of defensive warfare. I earnestly recommend the immediate passage of a law authorizing me to accept the numerous proposals already received.

I can not close this review of the acts of the government of the United States without referring to a proclamation issued by their president under date of the 19th inst., in which, after declaring that an insurrection has broken out in this confederacy against the government of the United States, he announces a blockade of all the ports of these states, and threatens to punish as pirates all persons who shall molest any vessel of the United States under letters of marque issued by this government. Notwithstanding the authenticity of this proclamation, you will concur with me that it is hard to believe that it could have emanated from a President of the United States. Its announcement of a mere paper blockade is so manifestly a violation of the law of nations, that it would seem incredible that it could have been issued by authority; but, conceding this to be the case, so far as the executive is concerned, it will be difficult to satisfy the people of these states that their late confederates will sanction its declarations—will determine to ignore the usages of civilized nations, and will inaugurate a war of extermination on both sides, by treating as pirates open enemies acting under the authority of commissions issued by an organized government. If such proclamation was issued, it could only have been published under the sudden influence of passion, and we may rest assured that mankind will be spared the horrors of the conflict it seems to invite.

For the details of the administration of the different departments, I refer to the reports of the secretaries of each, which accompany this message.

The State Department has furnished the necessary instructions for those commissioners who have been sent to England, France, Russia, and Belgium, since your adjournment, to ask our recognition as a member of the family of nations, and to make with each of these powers treaties of amity and commerce. Farther steps will be taken to enter into like negotiations with the other European powers, in pursuance to resolutions passed at your last session. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed since the departure of these commissioners for the receipt of any intelligence from them.

As I deem it desirable that commissioners or other diplomatic agents should also be sent at an early period to the independent American powers south of our confederacy, with all of whom it is our interest and earnest wish to maintain the most cordial and friendly relations, I suggest the expediency of making the necessary appropriations for that purpose. Having been officially notified by the public authorities of the State of Virginia that she had withdrawn from the Union, and desired to maintain the closest political relations with us which it was possible at this time to establish, I commissioned the Honorable Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-president of the Confederate States, to represent this government at Richmond. I am happy to inform you that he has concluded a convention with the State of Virginia, by which that honored commonwealth, so long and justly distinguished among her sister states, and so dear to the hearts of thousands of her children in the Confederate States, has united her power and her fortunes with ours, and become one of us. This convention, together with the ordinance of Virginia adopting the Provisional Constitution of the confederacy, will be laid before you for your constitutional action.

I have satisfactory assurances from other of our late confederates that they are on the point of adopting similar measures; and I can not doubt that, ere you shall have been many weeks in session, the whole of the slaveholding states of the late Union will respond to the call of honor and affection, and, by uniting their fortune with ours, promote our common interests and secure our common safety. \* \* \* \*

The Secretary of War, in his report and accompanying documents, conveys full information concerning the forces, regular, volunteer, and provisional, raised and called for under the several acts of Congress—their organization and distribution; also an account of the expenditures already made, and the farther estimates for the fiscal year ending on the 18th of February, 1862, rendered necessary by recent events.

I refer to the report, also, for a full history of the occurrences in Charleston Harbor prior to, and including the bombardment and reduction of Fort Sumter, and of the measures subsequently taken for common defense on receiving the intelligence of the declaration of war against us made by the President of the United States.

There are now in the field at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski, 19,000 men, and 16,000 are now en route for Virginia. It is proposed to organize and hold in readiness for instant action, in view of the present exigencies of the country, an army of 100,000 men. If farther force be needed, the wisdom and patriotism of the Congress will be confidently appealed to for authority to call into the field additional numbers of our noble-spirited volunteers, who are constantly tendering their services far in excess of our wants.

The operations of the Navy Department have been necessarily restricted by the fact that sufficient time has not yet elapsed for the purchase or construction of more than a limited number of vessels adapted to the public service. Two vessels have been purchased and manned, the Sumter and M'Rea, and are now being prepared for sea, at New Orleans, with all possible dispatch. Contracts have also been made at that city with two different establishments for the casting of ordnance—cannon, shot, and shell—with the view to encourage the manufacture of these articles, so indispensable for our defense, at as many points within our territory as possible. I call your attention to the recommendation of the secretary for the establishment of a magazine and laboratory for the preparation of ordnance stores, and the necessary appropriation required for that purpose. Hitherto such stores have been prepared at the navy yards and no appropriation was made at your last session for this object. \* \* \* \*

In conclusion, I congratulate you on the fact that in every portion of our country there has been exhibited the most patriotic devotion to our common cause. Transportation companies have freely tendered the use of their lines for troops and supplies. The presidents of the railroads of the confederacy, in company with others who control lines of communication with states that we hope soon to greet as sisters assembled in convention in this city, have not only reduced largely the rates heretofore demanded for mail service and conveyance of troops and munitions, but have voluntarily proffered to receive their compensation at their reduced rates in the bonds of the confederacy, for the purpose of leaving all the resources of the government at its own disposal for the common defense.

Requisitions for troops have been met with such alacrity that the numbers tendering their services have in every instance greatly exceeded the demand. Men of the highest official and social position are serving as volunteers in the ranks. The gravity of age, the zeal of youth, rival each other in the desire to be foremost in the public defense; and though at no other point than the one heretofore noticed have they been stimulated by the excitement incident to actual engagement and the hope of distinction for individual deportment, they have borne, what for new troops is the most severe ordeal, patient toil, constant vigil, and all the exposure and discomfort of active service with a resolution and fortitude such as to command the approbation and justify the highest expectation of their conduct when active valor shall be required in place of steady endurance.

A people thus united and resolute can not shrink from any sacrifice which they may be called on to make, nor can there be a reasonable doubt of their final success, however long and severe may be the test of their determination to maintain their birthright of freedom and equality as a trust which it is their first duty to transmit unblemished to their posterity. A bounteous Providence cheers us with the promise of abundant crops. The fields of grain, which will, within a few weeks, be ready for the sickle, give assurance of the amplest supply of food, while the corn, cotton, and other staple productions of our soil afford abundant proof that up to this period the season has been propitious.

We feel that our cause is just and holy. We protest solemnly, in the face of mankind, that we desire peace at any sacrifice save that of honor. In independence we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no cession of any kind from the states with which we have lately confederated. All we ask is to be let alone—that those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms. This we will, we must resist, to the direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is abandoned, the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce that can not but be mutually beneficial. So long as this pretension is maintained, with a firm reliance on that Divine Power which covers with its protection the just cause, we will continue to struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self-government.

Montgomery, April 29, 1861.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.





MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA: FIRST SEAT OF THE REBEL GOVERNMENT.

France especially—that the confederate government had been established upon the substantial basis of the popular will; but he was silent as to the violent and insidious means by which that seeming popular unanimity had been brought about. He claimed for his confederacy the sympathy of the friends of constitutional liberty; when he knew that according to no meaning attached to those words was the course of his confederates other than an outrage on that liberty. He asserted that the free states had endeavored to reduce the slave states to a condition of inferiority; when he knew that, from the very construction of the republic, no state could possibly suffer from any other inferiority than that which might be the inevitable consequence of its natural resources, the number and character of its inhabitants, and the nature of its local institutions. He did not hesitate to say that the party whose candidate Mr. Lincoln was had been organized with the avowed object of excluding the slave states from all participation in the benefits of the public domain; when he knew that no man had ever proposed that the people of the slave states should have a single right of possession or enjoyment less than those of the free states in the common territory of the republic, but that the former had claimed to have a privilege there in effect peculiar to themselves. He could not conceal the fact that the insurgents were slaveholders, and the loyal men free laborers; but he covered up with cloudy words and euphemisms the other fact, that the sole grievance of the former was that the latter had refused to allow the farther propagation of slavery under the flag and the protection of the republic. He did not hesitate to say that the African slaves had been elevated from brutal savages into docile, intelligent, and civilized agricultural laborers, supplied with bodily comforts and careful religious instruction; when he knew that not one in a thousand of them had ever been in a country more savage than that into which they, and their ancestors for two generations, and sometimes for six, had been born as slaves; that their docility was a sad and sullen cowering under the lash and the revolver; their intelligence—except among those whose veins flowed mostly with white blood—not one whit above that of their race in Africa; their civilization, with like exceptions, only a compelled and stolid submission to the police of a superior people; their bodily comforts no more than such bare necessities, not including wholesome food, as enabled them to live and labor for their owners;<sup>3</sup> and their religious instruction only such a use of the allurements of heaven and the terrors of hell as could be made auxiliary to the whip of the overseer—a religious instruction from which the reading of Christ's Word, and the teaching of the one great doctrine upon which Christianity is founded, "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them," were solicitously and of necessity excluded. The wily leader told his fellow-confederates that the pro-

ductions of the South in cotton, rice, sugar, and tobacco had become necessary to the wants of civilized man, and that to the continuance of the supply the labor of African slaves was necessary; a statement utterly superfluous when made to them at any time, and entirely foreign to the emergency upon which he had called them together, but which he put forth as a threat to Europe of impending famine and misery, by which the commercial and the manufacturing classes might be driven to encourage a rebellion against a constitutional government in support of African slavery and their own interests. For already, and before a blow had been struck on the side either of the insurgents or the government, the former, as Mr. Davis told the world in this message, had sent commissioners to the British, French, Russian, and Belgian governments, to ask recognition and to make treaties. Assumption and self-assertion, pushed to the verge of absurdity, were weapons upon which the insurgent slaveholders much relied for the triumph of their cause, and in which their armory, not supplied, in this particular, by "acquirements" from the North, was inexhaustible. But men are too often taken at their own valuation; an arrogant, active, and unscrupulous pretender will for a time overbear and sweep away the claims of him who rests quietly in his consciousness of right; and so, as it appeared ere long, the presuming policy of the insurgents accomplished more than they could have expected, if not all that they desired. But it was in the closing sentences of this message that Mr. Davis assumed the position which most won for the rebels the sympathy of which they were so much in need. "In independence," he said, "we seek no conquest, no aggrandizement, no cession of any kind from the states with which we have lately confederated. All we ask is to be let alone—that those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our subjugation by force of arms. This we will, this we must resist to the direst extremity. The moment that this pretension is abandoned, the sword will drop from our grasp, and we shall be ready to enter into treaties of amity and commerce that can not but be mutually beneficial. So long as this pretension is maintained, with a firm reliance on that Divine Power which covers with its protection the just cause, we will continue to struggle for our inherent right to freedom, independence, and self-government." The picture which these words presented of an inoffensive, peaceful people seeking but to enjoy their own without detriment to others, and driven to resistance only by an attempt to deprive them of freedom and self-government, and bring them under foreign subjugation, produced a strong impression in Europe, and furnished the ill-wishers of the great republic a welcome text from which to preach against the tyrannical aggressiveness of democracy. That men who only asked to be let alone should not be awarded that small boon did indeed seem wrongful. But at the North, where this change from the insolent bravado which claimed Washington and threatened Boston was attributed to the right cause—the uprising which had so astounded the insurgents—

<sup>3</sup> In Cincinnati, the refuse of the immense lard factories is compressed into huge cakes, and this loathsome, indigestible mass is sent southward as food for slaves.



where it was known that no other subjugation was purposed than the obedience of all to the supreme law enacted by all, and that freedom, independence, and self-government were insured by the Constitution which the insurgents had defied as completely, and by the very same safeguards and provisions, as by that which they had adopted—where it was also known that a cession of territory would be an absolute demand, and the conquest of Mexico an ultimate and speedy undertaking on the part of the insurgents if they were successful—and where it was felt in men's inmost hearts that the unresisted and accomplished secession of a single state was national ruin, Mr. Davis's peaceful professions, and his airs of injured innocence, were met with merited derision, and the phrase, "All we ask is to be let alone," became the satirical by-word of the day.

Other parts of this document were of even more importance than those to which the above remarks apply, but I postpone their consideration while I recount briefly the events which took place at the South between the meeting and the adjournment of this Congress, and until I attempt to show the nature and the purposes of the impending conflict. The Congress itself devoted its attention solely to the business of resistance. Letters of marque and reprisal were authorized. Authority was also given to Mr. Davis to accept the services of volunteers without regard to the place of their enlistment. The export of cotton during the blockade, except from the sea-ports of the Confederate States and through Mexico, was forbidden under both heavy penalty and imprisonment. A bill was passed authorizing the issue of fifty millions of dollars in bonds payable in twenty years, with interest at eight per cent., or, in lieu of bonds, treasury notes for small sums, without interest, to the amount of twenty millions of dollars. These bonds were offered to planters for their cotton—a politic measure, which sought at once to recruit the treasury, and to bind the planters to the new government by the ties of interest. The payment of debts to any persons or corporations in the loyal states was prohibited, and the loan of the money to the confederate treasury was recommended; but from this scandalous enactment the slave states of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, and the District of Columbia, were shrewdly excepted, in the vain hope that the proffered bribe might buy a lukewarm patriotism.



RESIDENCE OF MR. JEFFERSON DAVIS AT MONTGOMERY, CALLED "THE WHITE HOUSE."

• Meantime the people of the seceded states were inflamed with an unquenchable military ardor. Having been taught to believe that one Southern man was a match for five Northerners, and that the Yankees (as they called the inhabitants of all the free states) would be slow to battle, even for a cause which they had at heart, the slaveholders, and the mean whites who did their bidding, looked for a sudden and an easy victory, and they thronged into the insurgent ranks to share its cheap-bought glory. The bulk of the newly-levied army was poured into Virginia, which was threatened by the forces rapidly accumulating around Washington. General Robert Lee, of Virginia, who had been one of Lieutenant General Scott's military family, and who had grieved the heart of his old chief by deserting for his state the cause of the republic, had been placed in command of the Virginia militia. To prevent confusion of state and confederate authority, on the 10th of May he was directed by the government at Montgomery to take command of all the troops in Virginia. Other officers soon superseded him; but this is the first appearance upon our scene of a man who was destined to exercise a controlling influence upon the fortunes of the war now about to open. On the 22d of May the Congress at Montgomery adjourned to meet on the 20th of July at Richmond. The former parted finally with its short-lived distinction, and the latter became in fact, if not in name, the confederate capital.

Fort Sumter had been attacked before the government had taken any steps for the suppression of the insurrection, and even before the President had issued a formal proclamation commanding the obedience of the insurgents to the constitutional authorities of the republic. In the bombardment of that strong-hold not a life had been lost or a serious wound received on the part either of the assailants or the garrison; and its evacuation was the consequence of a lack of food and a conflagration, both brought about by the means of batteries, the erection of which under his guns its commander, by orders from Washington, had made no effort to prevent. The collisions in Baltimore and St. Louis were produced by mere outbreaks of mob violence; and thus far, therefore, the war ushered in by the attack upon Fort Sumter may be regarded as not having begun. Before entering upon the details of a struggle of which the civil and the moral are far more interesting and significant than the military and the material aspects, it will be well to examine into the causes and the purposes of the conflict, and the means for its prosecution in the hands of each party at its commencement.

War, whether civil or between opposing nations, is always the fruit of aggression. It is resistance to aggression which produces collision of arms, although arms may be first taken up by the aggrieved. Civil wars, when they are not wars of races or religions, or between the partisans of rival claimants to supreme authority, or the results of two or all of these causes, are brought about by the attempts of the party in power to assert or to perpetuate the right of using that power for its own interests, regardless of the principles of justice and of the general good. Thus our ancestors fought King Charles at Naseby, at Worcester, and at Marston Moor, because he attempted to perpetuate the absolute royal prerogative which he blindly thought had come down to him unimpaired from the Tudors, and to rule English men as a father rules a family of children. He did not see that the nation had come to its majority. Thus, again, they fought King George at Bunker Hill, at Saratoga, and at Yorktown, because he and his ministers undertook to deny them—they being born on the western side of the Atlantic—their rights as Englishmen, and to tax them by the votes of a body in which they were not represented. And thus the French people swept away, in a storm of blood, the men who were banded together to rule France in the interests of an aristocratic class, and in utter disregard of the well-being of their social inferiors. In the United States there were no distinctions of race, of religion, or, properly, of rank or birth, in which might breed the germs of internal enmity. The homogeneity of the nation at the time when it came into political existence had been indeed somewhat modified during the lapse of seventy years, but so slightly that this circumstance is not to be taken into consideration in an examination of the causes of the rebellion. For not only were the Irish and German immigrants who poured into the country after the year 1816 rapidly absorbed and assimilated by the Anglo-American people, among whom in the second generation they were lost, but by those of their number who went southward and were subjected to the influences of slavery, the sentiments and prejudices which led to the rebellion were adopted with the greatest facility; and among the recently arrived Irish immigrants in the free states the slaveholders' party found its constant supporters and allies. In the first armies which moved northward to meet the forces of the republic Irishmen and Germans bore a proportion to the whole number about equal to that of their countrymen in the opposing ranks; and amid the planters whom they left behind them there were no more strenuous advocates of progressive slavery and secession than those who were of British birth.\* And it was to the Northwestern states, whither had thronged most of the German immigrants, that the insurgent planters, ere many months had passed, looked to find aid in forming a great confederacy, from which the purely English blooded Eastern states were to be excluded. Indeed, from the very beginning, this alliance, and that of the Irish-ruled city of New York, had been counted upon as main elements of strength in the attempted revolution. When to these facts there is added another, greatly significant, that among the strongest supporters and most active agents of the insurrection were a host of men born and bred in the free states, but who had political and personal interests involved in the success of the party of progressive slavery, and who served as officers in the insurgent army, in the civil affairs of the confederacy, or, still more effectively, as its emissaries at the North or in Europe, demoralizing public opinion at home and perverting it abroad; when of the regular army we find thirty officers born and bred in the free states who, in November and December of 1861, resigned their commissions and soon afterward entered the rebel service, and, on the other hand, one hundred and thirty-three officers of that army born and bred in slave states remaining true to their colors, and under sorely trying circumstances fighting the battles of the republic,<sup>5</sup> it will be seen how shallow was the pretense of the mouthpieces of the insurgent leaders that secession was the consequence of a difference between the people of the slave and free states. Some slight difference there was, but no such difference.

Still less were there opportunities for the development of that hatred which through so many centuries has shown religion and impiety walking hand in hand, inciting Mohammedan to slay Christian, Roman Catholic to burn Protestant, Church of England man to persecute Puritan, and Puritan to hang Quaker. On the contrary, a Christian faith essentially uniform pervaded the land, throughout which nearly all the known sects were harmoniously diffused. Even the slight difference in this regard between the two

\* Mr. William Henry Russell's *Diary North and South* gives foreign, unbiased, and partly unwilling support to this statement, which is known to be true by every observant and thoughtful man in the United States.

<sup>5</sup> See the extracts from the *Army Register* in "Are the West Point Graduates Loyal?" by E. C. Marshall.



sides of the Potomac which had existed in the early years of the country had passed away. A great increase of the Baptists and Methodists in the slave states had deprived the Church of England of its predominance in that quarter; while in the free states, and in New England itself, that sect had grown rapidly, and with a constantly increasing growth, from a period which dated before the War of Independence. Nor were hostile and clashing interests of a normal kind the springs of this rebellion. Various interests, truly, had various preponderance in different parts of the country; but there must be variety of interest in every nation the people of which are not so rude as to have neither commerce, manufactures, arts, nor literature, or the territory not so small as to be monotonous. But such varieties of interest and occupation, so far from producing discord and division, compensate each other, harmonize with each other, and bind together the people among whom they obtain, making of them one complex, highly-developed, self-sustaining individual, while the nation of a single interest is, like an animal of simple organization, a feeble creature of low grade. The isolation and narrowness of view consequent upon exclusive devotion to one employment causes a nation surely to remain in or relapse into a state little above a semi-barbarism. The variety of normal interests in the United States was no greater and no other than comported with the well-being and the progress of a great and powerful nation, either as a whole or in regard to its component parts. Agriculture prevailed in the South, but not more than at the Northwest; and it was a powerful interest in the Northeast, where manufactures and commerce prevailed, and where the spirit of trade, though predominant, was not more active than at New Orleans or at Chicago. The mariners and the shipwrights of the North, who lived by carrying the cotton, the sugar, and the tobacco of the Southern planter, and the grain and pork of the Western farmer, and bringing the produce of other lands within their reach, furnished also the naval force which secured them the quiet possession of their fields, and the safe transshipment of their produce. The Northern forges and furnaces, which chiefly supplied the mills, the engines, and the railways of both South and West, earned whatever the tariff brought them in excess of the cost of like manufacture from Europe by furnishing also the arms which defended them; and, in case of foreign war, the mills of Massachusetts and Rhode Island were able to provide at once a market for the raw cotton of the South, and a full and certain supply of the fabrics into which it had been converted. So that, in fact, at the time of the attempted disruption of the republic, as at that of its formation (I have before remarked the fact, but it can not too constantly be kept in mind), it exhibited a homogeneity in every respect far more nearly absolute than that of the kingdom of Great Britain—like itself a union, but a union of three distinct peoples, ancient, radically diverse, and for centuries inimical—or that of France, not to speak of the small republic of Switzerland, the larger empire of Austria, or the vast domain ruled by the autocrat of Russia. Save for one single point of difference, there was no nation in the world so homogeneous as the great republic; save for one single element of discord, not one so stably built, so strongly buttressed into unity. That point of difference, that element of discord, it is almost superfluous to say, was slavery. Yet slavery was not the cause of the rebellion.

In the introductory part of this history, it has been shown that at the adoption of the Constitution the slaveholders obtained political advantages, seen to be incidental and supposed to be temporary, to the preservation of which as slaveholders they soon began solicitously to devote themselves. It has been remarked but a few sentences above that civil wars, when not of race, religion, or dynasty, are the fruit of an attempt of men in power to keep that power in their own hands for their own selfish interests; and we shall now see that the civil war in the United States was not caused by any attack upon slavery, or by the denial of equal rights to slaveholders and free

laborers either in the government or in the territory of the republic. We shall see, on the contrary, that it was due to the determination of the former not to yield the power conferred upon them by the abnormal social institution which they had preserved; and to their unwillingness to lapse into the condition of simple citizens, having the same rights as their fellow-citizens, and no more. This equality the fathers of the republic supposed that they would, and intended that they should, assume; but they resolved to perpetuate their predominance in the councils of the nation and their oligarchical supremacy in their own commonwealths, and to use this predominance for the purpose of administering public affairs entirely in the interests of their order. Foiled in this by the attitude and the numerical strength of the people of the free states, they determined to destroy the republic, with the hope, at first, of reconstructing it in such a manner as would inevitably and forever secure their object.

The election of Mr. Lincoln put slavery in no peril. Before he became a candidate for the presidency, or had the thought of becoming one, and in the course of an address to the people of a free state, he had avowed, in clear, decided terms, that, whatever might be his feelings and opinions in regard to slavery, he did not believe that the national government had the constitutional power to disturb it where it was established, or to control the local action of the people in its regard, or to deny the slaveholders the benefit of an effective Fugitive Slave Law.<sup>6</sup> His election found the party of the slaveholders in power. The presidential chair was filled by a man who was their creature, if he was not their tool; and from it he could not be removed for four months. They commanded a majority in the Senate and in the House of Representatives. The bench of the Supreme Court was filled by judges of their appointment, and who had always ruled in their interest; and throughout the country all the executive offices were under their control. Nor, as I have shown by an examination of the votes cast at the presidential election, did the success of Mr. Lincoln indicate any sectional division of the country upon the question of the administration of the national government;<sup>7</sup> while, on the contrary, the divided vote of the slave states, in consequence of which he was elected, though a plurality of one million of the entire popular vote of the country was given for his opponents collectively, did show that in those very states there was at that time a majority of two hundred thousand voters ready to maintain the paramount importance of the Union. There was, therefore, at the time of the secession of South Carolina, not only no impending danger to the interests of the slave states, but, in the view of the great body of their people (except in South Carolina itself), no such danger threatened in the future as induced them to give their votes in favor of a candidate who represented the party of progressive slavery or disunion. But the five hundred and seventy thousand slaveholders who did so vote,<sup>8</sup> and the leaders of whom immediately set on foot secession, knew well that the social institution peculiar to their states was in no peril; they were but putting into effect a long-cherished purpose to dissolve the Union when they had ceased to rule it. We are not left to infer this purpose from the furious and frothy outpourings of their provincial presses;<sup>9</sup> it had been distinctly avowed, though in private, by their representative man, John C. Calhoun. Forty-eight years before the election of Mr. Lincoln, and eight years previous to the agitation which resulted in the Missouri Compromise, he had confessed to Commodore Charles Stewart, an honored and successful commander in the United States Navy, that the leading slaveholders united themselves with the Democratic party in the North in defiance of their tastes and preferences, and only as a means of obtaining political power; adding this memorable declaration: "When we [the slaveholders] thus cease to control this nation through a disjointed democracy, or any material obstacle in that party which shall tend to throw us out of that rule and control, we

tion or modification of that law, I would not be the man to introduce it as a new subject of agitation upon the general question of slavery.

In regard to the other question, of whether I am pledged to the admission of any more slave states into the Union, I state to you very frankly that I would be exceedingly sorry ever to be put in a position of having to pass upon that question. I should be exceedingly glad to know that there would never be another slave state admitted into the Union; but I must add that, if slavery shall be kept out of the Territories during the territorial existence of any one given Territory, and then the people shall, having a fair chance and a clear field, when they come to adopt the Constitution, do such an extraordinary thing as to adopt a slave Constitution, uninfluenced by the actual presence of the institution among them, I see no alternative, if we own the country, but to admit them into the Union.

The third interrogatory is answered by the answer to the second, it being, as I conceive, the same as the second.

The fourth one is in regard to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia. In relation to that, I have my mind very distinctly made up. I should be exceedingly glad to see slavery abolished in the District of Columbia. I believe that Congress possesses the constitutional power to abolish it. Yet, as a member of Congress, I should not, with my present views, be in favor of endeavoring to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, unless it would be upon these conditions: first, that the abolition should be gradual; second, that it should be on a vote of the majority of qualified voters in the District; and, third, that compensation should be made to unwilling owners. With these three conditions, I confess I would be exceedingly glad to see Congress abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and, in the language of Henry Clay, "sweep from our capital that foul blot upon our nation."

In regard to the fifth interrogatory, I must say here, that as to the question of the abolition of the slave-trade between the different states, I can truly answer, as I have, that I am pledged to nothing about it. It is a subject to which I have not given that mature consideration that would make me feel authorized to state a position so as to hold myself entirely bound by it. In other words, that question has never been prominently enough before me to induce me to investigate whether we really have the constitutional power to do it. I could investigate it if I had sufficient time to bring myself to a conclusion upon that subject; but I have not done so, and I say so frankly to you here and to Judge Douglas. I must say, however, that if I should be of opinion that Congress does possess the constitutional power to abolish the slave-trade among the different states, I should still not be in favor of the exercise of that power unless upon some conservative principle, as I conceive it akin to what I have said in relation to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

My answer as to whether I desire that slavery should be prohibited in all the Territories of the United States is full and explicit within itself, and can not be made clearer by any comments of mine. So I suppose, in regard to the question whether I am opposed to the acquisition of any more territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein, my answer is such that I could add nothing by way of illustration, or making myself better understood than the answer which I have placed in writing.

<sup>6</sup> Deducting from the 874,953 votes cast for Mr. Breckinridge the 276,818 which he received in the free states, we have 571,135 as his party in the slave states.

<sup>7</sup> See the extract from the Louisville (Ky.) Courier, Introduction, p. 17.

\* Remarks of Mr. Lincoln upon a Series of Questions addressed to him by Mr. Douglas during their canvass for the Senatorship of Illinois.

Question 1. I desire to know whether Lincoln to-day stands pledged, as he did in 1854, in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law?

Answer. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged in favor of the unconditional repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law.

Q. 2. I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to-day, as he did in 1854, against the admission of any more slave states into the Union, even if the people want them?

A. I do not now, nor ever did, stand pledged against the admission of any more slave states into the Union.

Q. 3. I want to know whether he stands pledged against the admission of a new state into the Union with such a Constitution as the people of that state may see fit to make?

A. I do not stand pledged against the admission of a new state into the Union with such a Constitution as the people of that state may see fit to make.

Q. 4. I want to know whether he stands to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia?

A. I do not stand to-day pledged to the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.

Q. 5. I desire him to answer whether he stands pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different states?

A. I do not stand pledged to the prohibition of the slave-trade between the different states.

Q. 6. I desire to know whether he stands pledged to prohibit slavery in all the Territories of the United States north as well as south of the Missouri Compromise line?

A. I am implicitly, if not expressly, pledged to a belief in the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in all the United States' Territories.

Q. 7. I desire him to answer whether he is opposed to the acquisition of any new territory unless slavery is first prohibited therein?

A. I am not generally opposed to honest acquisition of territory; and, in any given case, I would or would not oppose such acquisition, according as I might think such acquisition would or would not aggravate the slavery question among ourselves.

Now, my friends, it will be perceived, upon an examination of these questions and answers, that so far I have only answered that I was not pledged to this, that, or the other. The Judge has not framed his interrogatories to ask me any thing more than this, and I have answered in strict accordance with the interrogatories, and have answered truly, that I am not pledged at all upon any of the points to which I have answered. But I am not disposed to hang upon the exact form of his interrogatory. I am rather disposed to take up at least some of these questions, and state what I really think upon them.

As to the first one, in regard to the Fugitive Slave Law, I have never hesitated to say, and I do not now hesitate to say, that I think, under the Constitution of the United States, the people of the Southern States are entitled to a Congressional Fugitive Slave Law. Having said that, I have had nothing to say in regard to the existing Fugitive Slave Law farther than that I think it should have been framed so as to be free from some of the objections that pertain to it, without lessening its efficiency. And inasmuch as we are not now in an agitation in regard to an altera-



shall then resort to the dissolution of the Union."<sup>10</sup> The time and the occasion supposed by Calhoun had come. Slavery was in no peril; but a disjointed democracy had thrown the slaveholders out of control of the nation, and, true to their purpose, that which they ceased to rule they began to ruin. It was by the agitation of the question of slavery that the democracy had become disjointed. But slavery in itself was no bar to the perpetuity of the Union; for, at its formation, slaves were held in every commonwealth but one of those which, under the Constitution, passed from a confederacy into a nation. It is true that in six of the remaining twelve slavery was felt to be wrongful, and was doomed to speedy extinction by irresistible forces both moral and material; but it is no less true that among the majority of the people of the other six which retained it there was at that time a similar estimate both of its justice and its economy, and that their leading statesmen, including those who spoke for them in the formation of the Constitution, expected and desired its abolition by legislative enactment. Washington wrote of slavery, "I can only say that there is not a man living who wishes more sincerely than I do to see some plan adopted for the abolition of it; but there is only one proper and effectual mode by which this can be accomplished, and that is by legislative authority; and this, so far as my suffrage will go, shall never be wanting."<sup>11</sup> Thomas Jefferson predicted, "Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate than that these people [the negroes] are to be free."<sup>12</sup> In the debate in the Constitutional Convention on the apportionment of taxes to population, Hugh Williamson, of North Carolina, thought that "slaves should be excluded altogether [from the enumeration of taxable inhabitants], as being an encumbrance instead of increasing the ability to pay taxes."<sup>13</sup> Such being throughout the country the feeling of the people as to slavery at the time of the formation of the Constitution, it was not difficult to effect a compromise upon that subject which safely provided for the existing condition of affairs in regard to it, and which seemed to provide equally well for the future. But, as we have seen, slavery not only brought then unimagined wealth to the slaveholder; it conferred upon him political power and peculiar privileges. In virtue of his slaves, his vote was of more weight than that of his fellow-citizen of the free states; and his superiority in this regard became greater as the number of bondsmen owned by him and his neighbors increased. Slave states became oligarchies, and slaveholders a bastard kind of aristocracy. It was this power, and not his slaves, which the slaveholder saw slipping from his hands, and therefore he rebelled. For power is sweet; and when held by an intelligent and determined body of men, whether rightfully or wrongfully, whether for good or for evil, for selfish ends or for the benefit of mankind, it will not be yielded without a struggle. Most especially is this true of men whose notions of right and wrong have been perverted by the seeking after pleas in justification of the holding of an inferior race in chattel bondage. There had been compromise before, but now the slaveholders saw that no compromise which was not absolute concession would restore and preserve their lost supremacy. On the other hand, the question of slavery was just the one on which the men of the free states could no longer compromise. There the feeling that slavery was moral wrong and political ruin, though not universal, had taken such firm hold of the public mind, that any arrangement which looked toward a spread of the evil would not have endured for half a generation. The leading slaveholders were wise enough to see this; and, therefore, they refused all compromise which was not full concession of their claims in perpetuity, accompanied by the power for their enforcement. These, then, were the causes of the rebellion. First, the determination of the slaveholders to maintain their political supremacy, and not to subside

into the condition of simple citizens of the republic; second, a radical change during the two generations which had passed since the adoption of the Constitution in the attitude of the people, both of the free and the slave states, toward slavery. Among the former this change had been effected by the progress of humanity and Christian civilization, which was unchecked within their borders; among the latter, by the rank-grown lust of riches and of power, and by the perverted moral sense of the people. Slavery was thus not the cause of the rebellion, but it was its indispensable condition. There was one other: the ignorance, the social degradation, and the sordid poverty and pride of the mass of the inhabitants of the slave states, which made the development among them of jealousy, suspicion, unfounded hate, and arrogant defiance of the people of the free states, by the machinations of the leading slaveholders, not only possible, but easy.

Having seen why the faction of progressive slavery, though in the minority in every slave state except South Carolina and perhaps Georgia, brought about the secession of eleven of the thirty-three divisions of the republic, let us now examine the grounds on which the government, supported by the whole people of the free states and a large majority of those in the border slave states, resisted the movement for the dissolution of the Union. Such an inquiry would seem superfluous were it not for the peculiar circumstances which distinguish the origin of this civil war from that of any other known to history. A nation, though ranking among the four great powers of the world, might, indeed, contain the seeds of its own dissolution; the statesmen who planned its Constitution might have been, from their lack of wisdom, of foresight, or of honesty, the architects of its ruin; but that a nation which attained its political independence and its unity by a noble sacrifice of blood, and treasure, and of local interest, and the organic law of whose existence was not extorted from power by peril, but evolved from circumstance and precedent through the cautious and protracted consultation of its own best representatives, should have been deliberately constituted so that it should die at the caprice of any one or two commonwealths formed out of its people and its territory; that its Constitution was purposely so framed that it would crumble to dust at the withdrawal of one of the parties to it, and that the right so to destroy it was carefully protected by its framers, the men who had given their lives to objects which it was intended to secure and perpetuate; that this should be, is morally so monstrous, so inconsistent with all the laws and the motives of human action, that it is difficult to believe that men in their senses could base upon such an assumption a great political and social revolution. And yet it was upon this ground that their action was defended by the insurgent slaveholders. They denied that they were rebels. They claimed that they were not resisting a government and setting at naught a Constitution to which they owed allegiance. They admitted that, until they passed their Ordinances of Secession, they were bound to obey the laws of the republic, and to respect the government at Washington; but they asserted that the right of secession belonged to every state; that its just exercise depended solely upon the will of the people of the state, who alone were to be consulted in the matter; and that by the mere passage of an Ordinance of Secession they were actually and rightfully absolved from all connection with, and responsibility to the government of the Union, and themselves became a sovereign, independent nation. The government at Washington and the people who were loyal to it looked in vain for the foundation of a theory so destructive, of a claim so extraordinary. It was not to be found in the Constitution, the organic law by virtue of which the nation existed. That instrument contained no clause which could be distorted into a justification of this preposterous plea; but, on the contrary, a positive declaration that the Union, even when confined to the states which originally entered into it, should be perpetual, and a provision for the punishment of treason and the putting down of rebellion. Equally vain was the search among the records of the debates and consultations which accompanied the formation of the Constitution, and in which all the differing views of its framers were brought forward, and all the various interests of the people whom they represented were urged, and either maintained, or yielded in a spirit of compromise. Throughout those protracted discussions there was no hint from any quarter of a reserved right of secession; but, on the other hand, from all quarters, and particularly from Virginia and South Carolina, the manifestation of an anxious desire to provide for the ample maintenance of the power of the national government against that of any state which might be tempted to deny or to resist it. Mr. Randolph, of Virginia, in his plan, especially provided that Congress should "call forth the force of the Union against any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof." Mr. Pinckney, of South Carolina, moved "that the national Legislature should have authority to negative all laws of state Legislatures which they should judge to be improper;" and Mr. Madison, of Virginia, "could not but regard an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the states as absolutely necessary to a perfect system." And in the final discussion of the Constitution itself, treason having been defined in the third Article as "levying war against the United States or any of them," Mr. Morris, of Pennsylvania, objected that "in case of a contest between the United States and a particular state, the people of the latter must, according to the disjunctive terms of the clause, be traitor to one or the other authority," this view prevailed at once, and the words "or any of them" were stricken out. Thus clearly was it seen by the fathers of the republic that national government might be resisted by one or more of the states; thus unmistakably intended that in such case the authority of that government should be maintained; thus explicitly set forth that such resistance was treason and rebellion, to be put down by the whole force of the Union. The pretense of the insurgents that their secession was not resistance was too shallow to deceive the loyal people for a day. The distinction

<sup>10</sup> Extract from a Letter from Commodore Stewart to Mr. G. W. Childs, of Philadelphia.

Bordentown, May 4, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR,—Agreeably to your request, I now furnish you with the reminiscences of a conversation which passed between Mr. John C. Calhoun and myself in the latter part of December, 1812, after the declaration of war by the Congress of the United States against Great Britain on the 18th of June previous. \* \* \*

Mr. Calhoun's age, I thought, approximated my own, which was thirty-four; and being a man of the highest order of talent, and representing a state in our Union which scarce ever permitted themselves to be represented by inferior ability in the national councils, I could not have commenced my object with one more fitted for the purpose I had in view. He was also a high-minded and honorable man, kind and friendly, as well as open and confiding to those he deemed worthy. We soon formed an intimacy, and I frequently had long conversations with him on the war, the subjects relating thereto, and matters growing out of its existence—the navy being the most prominent—the gunboats, the merchants' bonds then on the tapis in Congress, and other matters of political or minor interest. One evening I struck on the divided views of our sectional interests of the war—stated to him that the opposite feelings on this subject had puzzled me exceedingly, and asked him how it was that the planting states were so strongly and so decidedly in favor of the war, while the commercial states were so much opposed to it. With this latter section of our country it seemed to me that the punishment of England, through the medium of war, ought to meet their highest approbation and call for their greatest efforts, as they were the greatest sufferers, through her instrumentality and power over our commercial affairs, since 1792, which were so arrogantly urged by plunder and impressment on the highway of nations, while the southern portion of the Union had felt but little in comparison. I observed, with great simplicity, "You in the South and Southwest are decidedly the aristocratic portion of this Union; you are so in holding persons in perpetuity in slavery; you are so in every domestic quality; you are so in every habit in your lives, living, and actions; so in habits, customs, intercourse, and manners; you neither work with your hands, heads, nor any machinery, but live and have your living, not in accordance with the will of your Creator, but by the sweat of slavery, and yet you assume all the attributes, professions, and advantages of democracy."

Mr. Calhoun replied: "I see you speak through the head of a young statesman, and from the heart of a patriot, but you lose sight of the politician and the sectional policy of the people. I admit your conclusions in respect to us Southrons. That we are essentially aristocratic I can not deny, but we can and do yield much to democracy. This is our sectional policy; we are from necessity thrown upon and solemnly wedded to that party, however it may occasionally clash with our feelings for the conservation of our interests. It is through our affiliation with that party in the Middle and Western States that we hold power; but when we cease thus to control this nation through a disjointed democracy, or any material obstacle in that party which shall tend to throw us out of that rule and control, we shall then resort to the dissolution of the Union. The compromises in the Constitution, under the circumstances, were sufficient for our fathers; but, under the altered condition of our country from that period, leave to the South no resource but dissolution; for no amendments to the Constitution could be reached through a convention of the people under their three-fourths rule." I laughed incredulously, and said, "Well, Mr. Calhoun, ere such can take place, you and I will have been so long *non est* that we can now laugh at its possibility, and leave it with complacency to our children's children, who will then have the watch on deck." \* \* \*

<sup>11</sup> Washington's letter to Robert Morris, April 12th, 1786. *Sparks' Washington*, vol. ix., p. 159.

<sup>12</sup> *Jefferson's Writings*, vol. i., p. 48.

<sup>13</sup> *Madison Papers*.



between South Carolina's nullification of a law constitutionally passed which displeased her, and her secession upon the constitutional election of a President whom she did not like, was based upon a difference too slight and formal to receive even a respectful consideration from the straightforward, practical common sense of the intelligent and patriotic masses of the free states. Both proceedings had one end and aim—to make void the constitutional sovereignty of the republic, the will of the majority of the people lawfully expressed.

Peaceful national dismemberment, however, though difficult, is possible, and sometimes justifiable. Circumstances might arise under which justice, prudence, and humanity would all demand the severance of one part of a nation from the other. Did, then, justice, prudence, and humanity, or either of them, counsel the dismemberment of the Great Republic at the bidding of the controlling faction in eleven of the thirty-four commonwealths of which it was composed?

To determine the justice of their claim, we have only to consider the nature of the government from which they proposed to absolve themselves by their own action, and the organization of the nation which they proposed to destroy. Had the power or the nation known as the United States been a confederation, there might or might not have been reason in their claim to withdraw from it merely of their own motion. But we have seen that this was not the nature of the government which was formed in 1789. The government which preceded that was a confederacy; but that confederacy proving entirely inadequate to the absolute needs of the country, it was deliberately superseded by a government or national organization which was, and was asserted and recognized to be, not a confederacy, but a Union—a Making One—of the elements of the former confederacy—a fusion of them into one republic, which, admitting, and in fact preserving, the local independence of its various commonwealths in their local affairs, had one supreme government in its national affairs—one sovereign ruler, that sovereign being the will of the majority of its united people. This union was also (as in its very nature a Union—a Making One—must be) not a transient connection for profit or pleasure, but a merging of separate individuals into one, and was, for better or worse, perpetual.

The dictates of justice are absolute, and should be obeyed whatever ruin may ensue; but prudence looks to consequences. What, then, were the inevitable results of the division sought by the secessionists? For our purpose it is necessary to consider but one of them, the partition of a territory which, from its vastness, its fertility, its means of internal communication, its geographical position, and the character of the people by which it was inhabited, was, and must have remained, the dominant power of a continent, and which was united under one benign government, a government hardly felt by those who lived under it, or who rather were the government—the division of this territory among at least three rival powers, whose clashing interests and mutual jealousy must surely produce constant war, or that hardly less ruinous and demoralizing evil, a position of armed watchfulness

\* After referring to a few points in which he argued that the Constitution of the Confederate States was an improvement upon that of the United States, Mr. Stephens continued:

"But, not to be tedious in enumerating the numerous changes for the better, allow me to allude to one other—though last, not least: the new Constitution has put at rest forever all the agitating questions relating to our peculiar institutions—African slavery as it exists among us—the proper status of the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution. Jefferson, in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the 'rock upon which the old Union would split.' He was right. What was conjecture with him is now a realized fact; but whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which that rock stood and stands may be doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old Constitution were, that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil which they knew not well how to deal with; but the general opinion of the men of that day was, that, somehow or other, in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass away. This idea, though not incorporated in the Constitution, was the prevailing idea at the time. The Constitution, it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the institution while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly used against the constitutional guarantees thus secured, because of the common sentiment of the day. Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was a sandy foundation, and the idea of a government built upon it—when the 'storm came and the wind blew, it fell!'"

"Our new government is founded upon exactly the opposite ideas; its foundations are laid, its corner-stone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition. This, our new government, is the first in the history of the world based upon this great physical, philosophical, and moral truth. This truth has been slow in the process of its development, like all other truths in the various departments of science."

"As I have stated, the truth of this principle may be slow in development, as all truths are, and ever have been, in the various branches of science. It was so with the principles announced by Galileo. It was so with Adam Smith, and his principles of political economy. It was so with Harvey, and his theory of the circulation of the blood. It is stated that not a single one of the medical profession, living at the time of the announcement of the truths made by him, admitted them. Now, they are universally acknowledged. May we not, therefore, look with confidence to the ultimate universal acknowledgment of the truths upon which our system rests? It is the first government ever instituted upon principles in strict conformity to Nature and the ordination of Providence in furnishing the materials of human society. Many governments have been founded upon the principles of certain classes; but the classes thus enslaved were of the same race, and in violation of the laws of Nature. Our system commits no such violation of Nature's laws. The negro by nature, or by the curse against Canaan, is fitted for that condition which he occupies in our system. The architect, in the construction of buildings, lays the foundation with the proper material—the granite—then comes the brick or the marble. The substratum of our society is made of the material fitted by Nature for it, and by experience we know that it is the best, not only for the superior, but for the inferior race, that it should be so. It is, indeed, in conformity with the Creator. It is not for us to inquire into the wisdom of His ordinances or to question them. For His own purposes He has made one race to differ from another, as He has made 'one star to differ from another in glory.' The great objects of humanity are best attained, when conformed to his laws and decrees, in the formation of governments as well as in all things else. Our confederacy is founded upon principles in strict conformity with these laws. This stone which was rejected by the first builders 'is become the chief stone of the corner' in our new edifice."

How unwillingly Mr. Stephens embarked in the cause of secession is shown by his speeches in the Georgia Convention. We have given (ante, p. 19-21) a full report of a speech delivered on the 14th of November. We repeat a few of the leading points. He said:

"That this government of our fathers, with all its defects, comes nearer the objects of all good governments than any other on the face of the earth, is my settled conviction. . . . Where will you go, following the sun in his circuit round the globe, to find a government that better protects the liberties of its people, and secures to them the blessings that we enjoy? I think that one of the evils that beset us is a surfeit of liberty, an exuberance of the priceless blessings for which we are ungrateful. . . . Have not we at the South as well as the North grown great and happy under its operation? Has any part of the world ever shown such rapid progress in the

development of wealth, and all the material resources of power and greatness, as the Southern states have under the general government? . . . These [the civilization and institutions of Greece and Rome] were but the fruits of their forms of government, the matrix from which their grand development sprang; and when once the institutions of a people have been destroyed, there is no earthly power that can bring back the Promethean spark to kindle them here again any more than in that ancient land of eloquence, poetry, and song. And if we shall in an evil hour rashly pull down and destroy those institutions which the patriotic band of our fathers labored so long and so hard to build up, and which have done so much for us and the world, who can venture the prediction that similar results will not ensue? Let us avoid it if we can."

The same opinions were reiterated by Mr. Stephens on the 18th of January, less than a month before he accepted the vice-presidency of the confederacy whose formation he had so persistently opposed. In this speech he says:

"I am frank to say, that if we are to secede for existing causes, without any farther effort to secure our rights under the Constitution in the Union—if a majority of this Convention has lost all hope, and look upon secession as the only remedy left—in my opinion, the sooner we secede the better. Delay can effect no good. How this Convention stands upon that question I do not know. Some claim a large majority for immediate and unconditional secession, while others think there is a majority still looking with hope to redress and conciliation. I, for one, am very desirous of having this point settled and put to rest in good feeling and harmony among ourselves by a test vote. My action hereafter shall be influenced by that vote. . . . My judgment is against secession for existing causes. I have not lost hope of securing our rights in the Union and under the Constitution; that judgment on this point is as unshaken as it was when this Convention was called. . . . I have ever believed, and do now believe, that it is in the interest of all the states to be and remain united under the Constitution of the United States, with a faithful performance by each of all its constitutional obligations; if the Union could be maintained on this basis, and on these principles, I think it would be the best for the security, the liberty, happiness, and common prosperity of all. I do farther feel confident, if Georgia would now stand firm, and unite with the border states, as they are called, in an effort to obtain a redress of those grievances on the part of some of their Northern confederates whereof they have such just cause to complain, that complete success would attend the effort, our just and reasonable demands would be granted. In this opinion I may be mistaken, but I feel almost as confident of it as I do of my existence. . . . If, however," he concludes, "on the test vote, a majority shall be against the line of policy I indicate, then, sir, upon the point of immediate secession, or a postponement to some future day between this and the 4th of March, I am clearly of the opinion that no good can come from any such delay or postponement. . . . This is my view on that point. My judgment, as is well known, is against the policy. It can not receive the sanction of my vote; but if the judgment of a majority of this Convention, embodying as it does the sovereignty of Georgia, be against mine—if a majority of her delegates in this Convention shall, by their votes, dissolve the compact of union which has connected her so long with her confederate states, and to which I have been so ardently attached, and have made such efforts to continue and perpetuate upon the principles on which it was founded, I shall bow in submission to that decision. I have looked, and do look, upon our present government as the best in the world. This, with me, is a strong conviction. I have acted upon it as a great truth. But another great truth also presents itself to my mind, and that is, that no government is a good one for any people who do not so consider it. The wisdom of all governments consists mainly in their adaptation to the habits, the tastes, the feelings, wants, and affection of the people. The best system of government for our people might be the worse for another. If, therefore, the deliberate judgment of the sovereignty of Georgia shall be pronounced that our present government is a bad one, and shall be changed to some other better suited to our people, more promotive of our peace, security, happiness, and prosperity, while my individual judgment shall be recorded against it, yet my action shall conform to the decision made. Nay, more, sir, the cause of the state shall be my cause, her destiny shall be my destiny. To her support, defense, and maintenance all that I have and am shall be pledged. And however widely we of this Convention, as well as the people of the state, may have differed, or may now differ, as to the proper line of policy to be pursued at this juncture, I trust there will be but one feeling and one sentiment here and throughout our limits after the policy shall be adopted, let that be what it may. The cause of Georgia, whether for weal or woe, must and will be the cause of us all. Her safety, rights, interests, and honor, whatever fortunes await her, must and will be cherished in all our hearts, and defended, if need be, by all our hands."

His words found their ready echo in every insurgent's breast throughout the whole disaffected region, where more than two years afterward a leading organ of public opinion still avowed the rebellion "a protest against the mistaken civilization of the age." Is it to be wondered at that, such being the declared purpose of the insurgents, and so clear being their departure from the spirit and purpose of the founders of the republic in this regard, they were forced to admit this antagonism? Every citizen of the United States, in whose breast the love of gain or the love of ease, the lust of power or the canker of party spirit had not eaten out all patriotism and all humanity, should have decided, without a second thought, that they were to be resisted to the death. Such was the decision announced by the spontaneous and almost instantaneous UPRISING AT THE NORTH.





MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, FEBRUARY 8, 1861

# THE WAR FOR THE UNION.

## CHAPTER I.

### THE UNION AND THE CONFEDERACY.

*Design of this History.*—Materials.—Secession of seven States.—Formation of the Confederacy.—Accession of Virginia, Arkansas, Tennessee, and North Carolina.—The Ordinances of Secession.—The free Population of the Union and the Confederacy.—The slave Population.—Its military Bearing.—Characteristics of the North and the South.—Towns and Cities.—The South better armed at the Outset.—Its Advantages in Position.—King Cotton.—Unanimity of the People at the South.—State Sovereignty and the Union.—The public and private Property seized by the Confederacy.—Railroad Communication at the South.—The two weak Points of the Confederacy.—Opening of Hostilities.

WE have now traced the origin and described the development of the Great Conspiracy against the Union, fortifying our statements by a copious array of documents. We have shown how, after forty years, it culminated in the Great Rebellion. We have depicted the great Uprising of the North to oppose that rebellion. Henceforth it remains for us to tell the story of the War for the Union. We are to show how a peaceful people, whose armies had for generations numbered only a few thousand men, found itself suddenly transformed into two great military nations, equipping and bringing into the field the greatest armies of modern times. We shall have to tell of many errors and not a few crimes—to speak of living men as freely as though they were dead—to narrate deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice on both sides. We shall have to tell of great victories and of great defeats—of opportunities thrown away and of disasters overcome. We shall unduly praise no man because he strove for the Right; we shall malign no man because he fought for the Wrong. We shall endeavor to anticipate the sure verdict of after ages upon events in which we have the deepest personal interest. Whether we shall in the end have to speak of a nation made stronger by the sharp trial through which it passed, or of that nation broken and shattered, the future must unfold.

The materials for our history are abundant. No war was ever before so waged in the world's eye. Many of the commanders have prepared, or propose to prepare, Commentaries upon their campaigns as minute as those of Caesar. There is not a regiment, and hardly a company, which does not contain a man capable of describing the events which he saw and a part of which he was; and, above all, the Newspaper—the Fourth Estate in our modern civilization—has sent its ablest representatives into the field to watch and describe events as they occur. The files of any one of our great newspapers will contain more and better materials for the historian of the American War than were comprised in the libraries from which Gibbon elaborated the story of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, or the dusty archives from which Motley wrought out the History of the Rise and Growth

of the Dutch Republic. From these constantly accumulating materials we propose to write the history of the War for the Union.

We may consider this war to have fairly begun on the 8th of February, 1861, when the Southern Confederacy was formally inaugurated. All that had before been done was the isolated action of disaffected individuals and local communities. From that moment these individuals and communities became formidable by the league into which they had entered, and by the farther accessions upon which they might reasonably count. The die was cast when that Confederacy was formed. All previous steps might have been retraced; now, nothing was left but to submit the question to the arbitrament of strength, and to abide the consequences. We propose to pass in rapid review over the events which resulted in the formation of the Confederacy.

South Carolina formally seceded from the Union on the 20th of December, 1860. In the Convention which gave utterance to the feeling of the state there was no dissentient voice. If in the Convention or among the people there were any who opposed the measure, they kept discreet silence. Charleston, which is to South Carolina more than Paris is to France or London to England, was jubilant upon the passage of the ordinance of secession. Every man, young or old, exulted that the Palmetto State had overthrown a great government. A few wiser men looked farther into the future. "We have," said a delegate in the Convention, "pulled down the temple that has been built for three quarters of a century. We must now clear the rubbish away and reconstruct another. We are houseless and homeless. We must shelter ourselves from storms."

A month had hardly elapsed before five other states ranged themselves by the side of South Carolina. Three of these did so almost simultaneously during the second week of January. In Mississippi an effort was made to postpone action; but this proving unavailing, all the delegates in Convention voted for the ordinance of secession on the 9th of the month. In Alabama the opposition was more decided. The ordinance of secession was passed in secret session by a vote of 61 to 39. The minority had vainly striven to have it referred to the people. One delegate affirmed that, unless this was done, the northern section of the state would not submit to the action of the Convention. The impetuous Yancey denounced the people of this section as traitors and rebels who should be forced to submit. The opposition was overawed; some of the delegates pledged their constituents to the support of the ordinance; the others held their peace. In Florida the opposition was merely nominal. A resolution affirming the right of the state to secede passed by a vote of 62 to 5. Upon the question of the adoption of the ordinance, only 7 out of 69 voted against it. In these three states



the ordinances for secession were hurried through within two or three days after the assembling of the Conventions. In Georgia the contest was sharp, and for a while the result seemed doubtful. A fortnight before the secession of South Carolina the Legislature had, by a large majority, passed resolutions declaring that the interests of the slaveholding states were identical, and that they must remain one; affirming the right of any state to secede; denying the right of the federal government to attempt to coerce a state; and pledging Georgia, in case such attempt were made, to support the seceding state. These resolutions were afterward rescinded by a close vote, but were subsequently re-enacted in substance. The Convention met on the 16th of January. A resolution declaring it to be the duty of the state to secede, and appointing a committee to frame an ordinance for that purpose, was passed only by a vote of 165 to 130. But the victory was won. The ordinance, as drawn up, was passed by 208 to 89, and was subsequently signed by all the members. How strenuously those who opposed the measure struggled against it under the able lead of Mr. Stephens, and how unwillingly he, though voting against it, finally gave it his support as a matter of necessity, has been already shown in these pages. The Convention of Louisiana met on the 24th of January, and two days afterward passed an ordinance of secession by a vote of 113 to 17.

Delegates from these six states — Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina—met at Montgomery, Alabama, on the 4th of February. The hall in which they assembled was adorned with portraits of Washington, Marion, Jackson, and Clay. There was little occasion for debate. The states which they represented had decided upon the formation of a Southern Confederacy. In four days all preliminary arrangements were completed, a Provisional Constitution, almost identical with that of the United States, framed, and Jefferson Davis elected president, and Alexander H. Stephens vice-president of the new nation. To the original six states Texas should properly be added, as her representatives appeared within a week, were admitted to seats, sanctioned all the previous proceedings of the Congress, and took part in those that followed. We have already narrated the early measures of this government. We now propose to glance briefly at the strength which was absolutely at its disposal, and that upon which it might reasonably count from accessions of states which had not yet seceded from the Union.

By the census of 1860 the entire population of the United States was thirty-one and a half millions, of whom twenty-seven and a half millions were free and four millions slaves.<sup>1</sup> The seven seceding states had a little more than two and a half millions of free persons, and a little less than that number of slaves. Leaving the slaves for the present out of view as an element of either strength or weakness, two and a half millions had thrown down the gage of battle to twenty-five millions. But the contest was not be waged against such odds. Arkansas was, in any case, sure to join the Confederacy. If war ensued, the accession of Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee might safely be reckoned upon. The result justified these anticipations.

Virginia was the first to join the Confederacy. We have already narrated the successive steps by which this was accomplished. The ordinance of secession and the ratification of the Provisional Constitution were passed on the 17th of April, subject to the decision of the people at an election to be held six weeks later; but, in the mean while, a compact had been entered into by which the state virtually became at once a member of the Confederacy. The result of the popular vote was a majority of more than a hundred thousand in favor of secession. There were, however, no returns sent in from thirty-four counties. These, with some others, finally organized themselves into the new state of Western Virginia. Virginia became virtually a member of the Confederacy on the 24th of April. In Arkansas a Conven-

tion met on the 4th of March. A small majority of the members were thought to be opposed to immediate secession. The Convention adjourned until the 6th of May without taking any decided action. During this interval an entire change had come over the popular mind, and an ordinance of secession was passed almost as soon as the Convention reassembled, with only a single dissenting vote, and within a week Arkansas became a member of the Confederacy. Tennessee was at first wholly opposed to the precipitate action of South Carolina. At the presidential election she had voted for Mr. Bell, the candidate of a party whose platform was "the Constitution, the Union, and the enforcement of the laws." But from the moment when it was apparent that the extreme Southern states would secede, the governor, Isham G. Harris, undertook to urge Tennessee to follow their example. He kept up an active correspondence with the leaders of the secession, and called the Legislature together to deliberate upon the state and the federal governments. The South, he said, should demand concessions which would never be granted. The Legislature were loth to follow the lead of the governor. It indeed passed a bill authorizing the election of delegates to a Convention, but at the same time submitting to the people the question whether they should meet. Out of 106,000 votes, the disunion candidates received only 25,000, and at the same time it was voted by a majority of 12,000 that the Convention should not be held. It seemed that the question of secession was put at rest; but the call of President Lincoln for troops produced intense excitement throughout the state. The Legislature had before declared that if any troops were sent to the South, Tennessee would resist at all hazards and to the last extremity. To the President's call the governor replied that the state would not furnish a man for the purpose of coercion, but would, if necessary, furnish fifty thousand to aid the South. The Legislature was convened, and the governor recommended the passage of an ordinance declaring Tennessee independent of the federal Union, and another adopting the Montgomery Constitution. These ordinances were passed on the 6th of May by a vote of 66 to 25, to be subject to a vote of the people on the 8th of June. On the 7th of May, a compact, entered into by commissioners, was sanctioned, by which the military power of the state was placed under the control of the President of the Confederate States. In Eastern Tennessee, out of 48,000 votes, 33,000 were against separation; but this majority was largely overbalanced by the other parts of the state, 104,913 votes in all being given for separation, and only 47,700 against it. Tennessee became formally a member of the Confederacy on the 8th of June; but her real adhesion must be dated from the 7th of May, when the Legislature sanctioned the compact placing the whole military force of the state under the control of the President of the Confederate States. North Carolina drifted more slowly, but not less surely, into the confederate vortex. Early in January the forts upon her coast had been seized by mere local authority. The governor disavowed the action, and offered to restore them to the possession of the United States upon condition that they should remain ungarrisoned. This condition was accepted by the feeble Buchanan and his treacherous cabinet. The consequence was that they were soon repossessed by the enemy, now acting under the authority of the governor. After many delays the State Convention assembled, and on the 20th of May passed ordinances for withdrawing from the Union and joining the Confederacy. On that same day, eighty-six years before, had been put forth the Mecklenberg Declaration of Independence, in virtue of which the State of North Carolina has always planned herself upon being the real founder of the United States.

The eleven states which now composed the Confederacy had a free population of five and a half millions, leaving twenty-one and a half millions in the Union. But it was confidently believed at the South, and for a time feared at the North, that Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri would go with the other slaveholding states. This would bring the population of the Confederacy up to eight millions, leaving nineteen millions to the Union. These anticipations and fears have not been realized, although the confederates have received much support from individuals of these states, and Kentucky and Missouri have been nominally admitted as members of the Confederacy, and are represented in the Congress.


But, besides the free population, the Confederate States contain three and a half millions of slaves. There was room for great difference of opinion as to the influence of this class of the population upon the military resources of the nation. The North believed that instead of adding strength it was an element of positive weakness. Not only was society so constituted that from more than three eighths of the able-bodied population not a soldier could be raised for the army or a dollar for the revenue, but they were from their very condition so hostile to their masters that a large part of the whites must remain at home to keep the blacks in subjection. In the war of 1812, it was said, a British force of less than 5000 men, so weary with long confinement on shipboard that they hardly deserved the name of an army, had marched many miles through a populous country, burned our national Capitol, and retired without meeting any serious opposition. Imagine, it was said, 5000 weary and footsore men landing somewhere on the New England coast, marching under a fierce August sun to Albany, doing what damage they pleased, and retiring unmolested. The very women, with their shovels and brooms, would have made prisoners of the whole invading force. The only explanation was that the masters were afraid of their slaves, and thought only of saving their own throats from the knives of their servants. In the slaves the British had good friends and sure means of information. Like causes would always produce like effects. The march of a Union army into the South would be the signal of a general servile uprising.

The South denied all this. They affirmed that their domestic institution gave them power as a military nation altogether beyond their mere population. In every state, they said, there must be men who govern, and if need


<sup>1</sup> In the following paragraphs the estimates have been expressed approximately in round numbers. The succeeding table presents the exact figures, according to the Census of 1860:

THE UNION.	Whites.	Free Colored.	Slaves.	Total.
California.....	376,200	3,816		380,016
Connecticut.....	451,609	8,542		460,151
Delaware.....	90,697	19,723	1,798	112,218
Illinois.....	1,704,684	7,069		1,711,753
Indiana.....	1,340,072	10,869		1,350,941
Iowa.....	673,925	1,023		674,948
Kansas.....	106,487	623		107,110
Kentucky.....	920,077	10,146	225,490	1,155,713
Maine.....	627,081	1,195		628,276
Maryland.....	516,128	83,718	87,188	687,034
Massachusetts.....	1,221,611	9,454		1,231,065
Michigan.....	742,289	6,823		749,112
Minnesota.....	171,793	229		172,022
Missouri.....	1,064,369	2,983	114,965	1,182,317
New Hampshire.....	325,622	450		326,072
New Jersey.....	647,084	24,947		672,031
New York.....	3,831,730	49,005		3,880,735
Ohio.....	2,303,374	36,225		2,339,599
Oregon.....	52,343	121		52,464
Pennsylvania.....	2,849,997	56,373		2,906,370
Rhode Island.....	170,703	3,918		174,621
Vermont.....	314,534	582		315,116
Wisconsin.....	774,392	1,481		775,873
District of Columbia.....	60,788	11,107	3,181	75,076
Territories.....	219,781	299	63	220,143
<b>TOTAL UNION.....</b>	<b>21,557,370</b>	<b>350,721</b>	<b>432,685</b>	<b>22,340,776</b>
THE CONFEDERACY.	Whites.	Free Colored.	Slaves.	Total.
Alabama.....	526,534	2,630	435,132	964,296
Arkansas.....	324,186	137	111,104	435,427
Florida.....	77,778	908	61,753	140,439
Georgia.....	591,638	3,439	462,232	1,057,309
Louisiana.....	357,642	18,638	333,010	709,290
Mississippi.....	353,969	731	436,696	791,396
North Carolina.....	631,489	30,097	331,081	992,667
South Carolina.....	291,623	9,648	402,541	703,812
Tennessee.....	826,828	7,235	275,784	1,109,847
Texas.....	421,411	339	180,682	602,432
Virginia.....	1,047,613	57,579	490,887	1,596,079
<b>TOTAL CONFEDERACY.....</b>	<b>5,450,711</b>	<b>131,401</b>	<b>3,520,902</b>	<b>9,103,014</b>





HENRICO COUNTY JAIL, RICHMOND



THE CAP




THE CITY OF





RICHMOND



REBEL PRISONS ON MAIN, NEAR TWENTY-FIFTH STREET, RICHMOND.



D, VIRGINIA.



be fight, and others who hold the place of rulers and legislators. Every where else in the civilized world these two classes merge into each other so gradually that no one can draw the line between them. With us the line is clear and palpable. Every black man knows that he is a laborer, and can be nothing more. Every white man feels that he is a ruler to-day, and may be called upon to be a soldier to-morrow. So completely under our institutions are the ordinary labors of the day performed by the slaves, that every able-bodied white man could take the field at a week's notice, and every thing would go on almost as before. Try this at the North: take three fifths of your men of military age from their farms and their workshops, and every thing would come to a stand in a month. There is no danger of an uprising of the slaves. If they were disposed to rise, they have no means of arming themselves or of acting in concert. Besides, they have no disposition to rise. They have been for generations so trained to obedience, that the women, the old men, and the boys, who can not take the field, will be amply able to keep them in subjection.

There was something of truth in both of these representations. For a short war, waged abroad, or even upon the frontiers of the country, slavery, as the event proved, undoubtedly gave great facilities for raising and equipping an army. There is probably no other nation of eight millions who could raise from nothing the armies which the Confederacy has brought into and maintained in the field. The habits of the people furnished a basis for a military organization. The population was almost entirely rural. New Orleans was indeed a great city, with 170,000 inhabitants; next, but at a wide interval, came Charleston, Richmond, Montgomery, and Mobile, each with 30,000 or 40,000; then came half a dozen cities with from 15,000 to 25,000; beyond these there was hardly a town with more than 5000. Of the rural population every man owned a gun, most of them a horse, and there were few who were not to a good degree expert in their use and management. Men living far apart, with abundant leisure, naturally seek occasions of coming together. These, in the South, were mainly afforded by the regular sessions of the courts and by militia musters. The court-houses are usually placed as nearly as possible in the centre of the county. The militia musters were held at the same place. From all the region the people thronged to court and muster. The parade of the militia was the least attraction at these gatherings; but every man was enrolled in some company, and had learned something of discipline. Rude as this militia organization was, it formed a basis for something better, and did good service when the people were summoned to actual warfare. The South, in a few months, was enabled to transform itself into a great military camp, with no serious breaking in upon the routine of its daily life.

At the North, and especially in the East, the case was different. Every man was engaged in some regular occupation. A large proportion were gathered into cities and towns. Besides New York and Philadelphia, whose population exceeded 600,000 each, there were six cities with more than 100,000, averaging 150,000; nearly a score with from 40,000 to 80,000, and fully fifty more with 10,000 each, besides towns almost without number with more than 5000, which were so closely connected with the cities that they might be considered suburban. Nearly one half of the people of the North lived in cities and large villages; nine tenths of the South lived in the country. The tendency of the free states was toward an aggregation of population; that of the South toward segregation. With few exceptions, the urban population of the North increased more rapidly than the rural; with few exceptions, the rural population of the South increased more rapidly than the urban. The consequence of this is inevitable. The man in the country may need to protect himself and his household, and so provides himself with arms; the man in a town is protected by the police, and requires no arms. The rule was, therefore, that the Southern man was armed and the Northern man was not. Our farmers, mechanics, and laborers undoubtedly furnished better materials for an army than the Southern planters and idlers, but it required more time to transform them into soldiers.

For the purpose which they had in view, the South had also the advantage in position. They contemplated only a defensive war; for their meditated capture of Washington was considered merely taking possession of what geographically and politically belonged to them. If the Union would consent to be broken up without a contest, there would be no fighting. The Union must carry the war, if there was to be war, into the confederate territory, and could reach no vital point except by long marches. The difficulties in the way of an invading army increase with every mile. The great master of war was conquered rather by the space and climate of Russia than by her arms. We had equal space to traverse, and a not less unfavorable climate to encounter before we could reach any vital point. Indeed, with the exception of the three or four ports from which her cotton was shipped, the South had no points of such vital importance that a blow reaching any one of them would have been of serious consequence. To the blockade of her ports and the consequent destruction of her commerce she could for a while submit; the more so, as she had plausible reason to believe that the great powers of the world could not suffer this to last long. Favored by climate, soil, and circumstances, the South had gained the monopoly of an article which had come to be a necessity for the world. Europe must have cotton, and she could get it only from the South. A quarter of the people of England, and a considerable part of those of every other civilized country, lived by the manufacture of cotton; without a supply of the raw material they must starve. If, therefore, in consequence of the war, this supply was cut off, the nations must somehow find a pretext for putting an end to the war. Nay, the North itself could not live without cotton. Cotton fed the manufactories of Massachusetts, and freighted the ships of New York. The woolsens from England, the wines from Germany, the silks from France,

and the teas from China, were paid for by cotton. Without cotton the industry and commerce of all nations must languish. The world would suffer more from the want of cotton than the South could from the want of an open market for it. For every negro prevented by the war and blockade from raising cotton, five white men would be doomed to idleness and consequent privation from the want of it to manufacture. "Cotton is King" passed into a proverb at the South.

The Confederacy was strong, also, in the entire unanimity of its people. Some of the states hesitated whether they should secede; but, that step once taken, there was no perceptible opposition except in Western Virginia and Eastern Tennessee. Every man felt bound to go with his state, right or wrong. The dogma of the supremacy of the states, inculcated for forty years, had become an absolute article of political faith. The federal government was only an agent created by the states, to be used or discarded at pleasure. A Southerner hardly styled himself an American; he was a Virginian or a Carolinian, a Georgian or a Mississippian. When his state seceded he must follow her fortunes. He might have sworn a thousand civil oaths to be faithful to the Constitution; he might even have taken the military oath—the *sacramentum*, the most sacred obligation known among men—so sacred, that when the founders of our faith needed a term for the obligation which bound a Christian to his Lord, they could only borrow this, and designate the supreme rites of the Church as "sacraments;" he might, like Lee and Davis, like Beauregard and Johnston, have taken this sacramental oath a hundred times, and yet it had no binding force when his state chose to absolve him from it. Many of these men sacrificed much in following their states. Lee had to abandon Arlington House, the spot next after Mount Vernon most closely associated with the memory of the Father of his Country; the two Johnstons gave up posts of honor and profit which it had cost them years to win. There were knaves like Floyd and Thompson, visionaries like Stephens and Jackson, schemers like Davis and Wise, adventurers like Maffit and Semmes; but we can not deny, what future ages will affirm, that not a few of the men who acted prominent parts upon the wrong side in this great war were moved by the sternest sense of what they deemed to be right. In violating their obligations to the Union they acted in obedience to what they deemed the higher law of state sovereignty. If men who had taken upon themselves such obligations thus violated them, it is no wonder that the mass of the people were led away. It was as much as a man's social standing was worth to refrain from joining the army. The women were even in advance of the men. No man who cared to be received in society dared be other than a secessionist. Thus the entire available force of the South was from the outset at the disposal of the confederate leaders.

The North, though vastly superior in numbers and accumulated wealth, showed at first no such unanimity. The ties between the great Democratic party of the North and the South had been so close that many believed the members of this party would yield every thing to their old associates rather than engage in a war to be waged on the platform of their political opponents. The President was not the first choice of a majority even at the North. Many hoped and more feared that he would not be sustained even at home. He was new in public affairs—was unacquainted with most of the men upon whose support he must rely. He could not know whom to trust and whom to suspect. No man ever assumed responsibilities under more trying circumstances than Abraham Lincoln. How he has discharged these responsibilities, the events which we are to relate will show.

The Confederacy, completed by the accession of the Border States, showed a united front. There was every prospect of a Union divided against itself to be opposed to it. It was apparently justified in its first arrogant measures. It could not anticipate the results shown by the great uprising at the North, which proved that love for the Union and a determination to uphold it were paramount to all party considerations. It could not foresee that Democrats would not be behind their old Republican opponents in supporting the war. The Confederacy held firm possession of almost every rood of territory which it claimed. Fortress Monroe in Virginia, Forts Pickens in Florida, Taylor on Key West, and Jefferson on the Tortugas, were all that remained to the Union within the bounds of the Confederate States. With the exception of the few hundred acres within the walls of these fortresses, a narrow strip on the Potomac, and the northwestern corner of Virginia, not a rood remained to the Union of the nearly eight hundred thousand square miles within the eleven seceding states. These four fortresses were, indeed, of inestimable value. Monroe commanded Hampton Roads, the only good harbor on the Atlantic coast south of the Delaware; had that fallen into the hands of the enemy, we should have had no place on the Southern coast for a rendezvous for our naval expeditions. Pickens commanded Pensacola, the only good harbor and naval dépôt on the Gulf of Mexico. Taylor and Jefferson commanded the throat of the Gulf; every vessel entering or leaving it must pass within sight of both. The other forts, a score in number, which had been built by the United States at a cost of ten millions of dollars, and were mounted with more than 1500 guns, had been seized by the states in which they were situated and turned over to the Confederacy. Besides these was the great arsenal at Norfolk, with 2500 great guns in store, and various other arsenals containing some hundreds of cannon, and small-arms sufficient for 150,000 men. There were also mints, hospitals, and custom-houses which had cost fully six millions; stores and supplies worth many millions, and nearly 150 light-houses along the coast from the capes of Virginia to the farther extreme of Texas. Apart from the public lands, it is safe to estimate that national property worth a hundred million dollars was seized by the Confederacy. The South, moreover, had always been a large debtor to the North. Southern merchants and planters made their purchases upon the credit of the cotton crop to be brought to market. The



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BALLOON VIEW OF THE SEAT OF WAR.






PICTORIAL MAP OF PORTIONS OF DELAWARE, MARYLAND, VIRGINIA, AND NORTH CAROLINA, WITH THE COAST LINE FROM CAPE HENRY TO FORT PICKENS.



# MAP OF THE SOUTHERN STATES, INCLUDING



# PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR.





BALLOON VIEW OF FORTRESS MONROE AND HAMPTON ROADS.



amount of the debt thus due at the time of secession has been variously estimated at from one hundred to three hundred millions of dollars. The most reliable estimate is framed on the supposition that the cotton crop was in effect mortgaged for half its value. This crop was worth three hundred millions. Southern merchants and planters, therefore, owed one hundred and fifty millions to the North. This was at once confiscated, and the debtors were ordered to pay the amount into the Confederate treasury.

If war was to be waged, it was clearly for the interest of the cotton states that it should be waged on the border. Accordingly, Virginia had hardly joined the Confederacy before the seat of government was removed from Montgomery to Richmond, which then became for a time the centre from which military operations were directed. It was admirably adapted for this purpose. It was so far inland that it could be assailed only by a force vastly superior to its defenders. It had large manufactures of arms and provisions. It was connected by a system of railways with the extreme south and southwest, which would enable the whole force of the Confederacy to be speedily concentrated for its defense. If the system of Southern railways had been constructed especially for military purposes, it could hardly have been better contrived. One line, commencing in Central Georgia, follows the general run of the coast, touches at Savannah and Charleston, then, striking into the interior, reaches Richmond. Another line, starting at New Orleans, runs northward, parallel with the Mississippi, to the neighborhood of Memphis; then, turning almost due east, traverses the very heart of the South, through Tennessee and Virginia, to Richmond. These two great trunk lines are connected by branches reaching into every portion of the Southern States, and from Richmond sending offshoots to the Potomac. Thus, if Richmond were threatened, troops and supplies could be hurried by rail from the far south and southwest. If Charleston or Mobile were threatened, forces from Virginia, Mississippi, and Tennessee could be concentrated there. If Tennessee or Georgia were menaced from Ohio or Kentucky, all the available force of the Confederacy could be dispatched by short routes to the point assailed. A careful study of the general map of the Southern states which we furnish will show that the South had a great advantage in position for carrying on a war of defense. It occupied the centre of a circle, around the circumference of which the North must move. The advantage was hardly less for an offensive movement. If our armies on the Potomac were weakened to support those in the Valley of the Mississippi, the Confederacy could speedily concentrate its armies in Virginia, and hurl them

in a mass upon Maryland and Pennsylvania. The Union had to maintain two great armies, one upon the Potomac, the other upon the Mississippi and its great affluents, which must act in a measure independently of each other, on account of the long distances which separated them, while the Confederacy could at pleasure throw its whole force upon either. Thus it happened that while the armies of the Union in the aggregate far outnumbered those of the Confederacy, the latter might be able, as they did, to confront their opponents at almost any given point with equal or superior strength.

The Confederacy thus entered into the contest with a strength altogether beyond that indicated by its population. It had, indeed, two weak points closely connected with each other. The accumulated capital of the South was mainly invested in slaves. If a Southron gained money, he invested it in negroes. The value of an ordinary field-hand had trebled in a few years in consequence of the regular demand for and high price of cotton. If the production of cotton were permanently suspended, slaves would lose their value. A long war of necessity involved this result, and the finances of the South would become embarrassed. Moreover, the character of property which attached to slaves depended upon positive law. If the federal government should pass an act of emancipation, with the power to enforce its execution, the wealth of the slaveholders would be swept away at a blow. That the government had a right to do this, if it were necessary as a war measure, was undisputed; but the public sentiment of the North was, at the outset, wholly opposed to the exercise of this right, and it was long kept in abeyance.

Thus, during the spring of 1861, the Union and the Confederacy stood fairly opposed to each other; all attempts at conciliation had failed, and the forces of each party were confronting each other. The confederate government had established itself at Richmond, and had pushed its outposts so far northward that they could see the dome of the federal Capitol across the Potomac. The national capital had been secured from the immediate danger which threatened it, but the determination to capture it was the prevailing sentiment of the Confederacy. It was commanded by the heights on the Virginia side of the Potomac, and the occupation of these by the federal forces was absolutely essential to the safety of Washington. Forces were also gathering in Western Virginia and Missouri, and were on the point of coming into collision. We turn to these three regions, so widely separated in space, where the first actual military operations commenced almost simultaneously near the close of May, 1861.<sup>1</sup>

#### THE ORDINANCES OF SECESSION.

The following are the Ordinances of Secession of the several states, arranged in the order in which they were passed. Mere formal expressions and supplementary provisions are omitted or abridged; but the essential portions, which are embraced within quotations, are copied textually. To her brief Ordinance of Secession South Carolina added an elaborate "Declaration of Causes," which will be found at length on page 23 of this History:

**SOUTH CAROLINA.**—"We, the people of the State of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared and ordained, that the ordinance adopted by us in Convention on the 23d day of May, in the year of our Lord 1788, whereby the Constitution of the United States was ratified, and also all acts and parts of acts of the General Assembly of the state ratifying amendments of the said Constitution, are hereby repealed, and the union now subsisting between South Carolina and other states, under the name of 'The United States of America,' is hereby dissolved."—Passed December 20, 1861.

**FLORIDA.**—"Whereas all hope of preserving the Union, upon terms consistent with the safety and honor of the slaveholding states, has been fully dissipated by the recent indications of the strength of the anti-slavery sentiment of the free states, *therefore be it enacted*, that it is the undoubted right of any state to withdraw from the Union when it pleases, and that Florida should now exercise this right; and 'the State of Florida hereby withdraws herself from the confederacy of states existing under the name of the United States of America, and from the existing government of the said states; and that all political connection between her and the government of the said states ought to be, and the same is hereby totally annulled, and said union of states dissolved, and the State of Florida is hereby declared a sovereign and independent nation; and that all ordinances heretofore adopted, in so far as they create or recognize said union, are rescinded; and all laws or parts of laws in force in this state, in so far as they recognize or assent to said union, be, and they are hereby repealed.'—Passed January 7, 1861.

**MISSISSIPPI.**—"The people of Mississippi, in Convention assembled, ordain," etc., "That all the laws and ordinances by which the said State of Mississippi became a member of the federal Union of the United States of America be, and the same are hereby repealed; and that all obligations on the part of the said state, or the people thereof, be withdrawn; and that the said state does hereby resume all the rights, functions, and powers which by any of the said laws and ordinances were conveyed to the government of the said United States, and is absolved from all the obligations, restraints, and duties incurred to the said federal Union, and shall henceforth be a free, sovereign, and independent state." The provision of the state Constitution requiring officers to swear to support the Constitution of the United States is annulled; and the state consents to form a union with other seceding states "upon the basis of the present Constitution of the United States, except such parts thereof as embrace other portions than such seceding states."—Passed January 9, 1861.

**ALABAMA.**—"Whereas the election of Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin to the offices of President and Vice-President of the United States by a sectional party, avowedly hostile to the domestic institutions and to the peace and security of the people of the State of Alabama, preceded by many and dangerous infractions of the Constitution of the United States by many of the states and people of the northern section, is a political wrong of so insulting and menacing a character as to justify the people of the State of Alabama in the adoption of prompt and decided measures for their future peace and security: *Therefore be it declared*, etc., that the State of Alabama now withdraws "from the Union known as 'The United States of America,' and henceforth ceases to be one of the said United States, and is, and of right ought to be, a sovereign and independent state;" and all powers heretofore delegated to the United States are "resumed and vested in the people of the State of Alabama." And as it is the wish of the State of Alabama to meet the slaveholding states of the South to form a provisional as well as permanent government, the people of these states are requested to meet by delegates at Montgomery on the 4th of February, 1861, for the purpose of securing "concerted and harmonious action in whatever measures may be deemed most desirable for our common peace and safety."—Passed January 11, 1861.

**GEORGIA.**—"We, the people of the State of Georgia, ordain," etc., "That the ordinance adopted by the people of Georgia in Convention, in the year 1788, whereby the Constitution of the United States was assented to, ratified, and adopted, and also all acts and parts of acts of the General Assembly ratifying and adopting the amendments to the said Constitution, are hereby repealed, rescinded, and abrogated; and we do farther declare and ordain that the union now subsisting between the State of Georgia and other states, under the name of 'The United States of America,' is hereby dissolved; and that the State of Georgia is in full possession and exercise of all the rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent state."—Passed January 19, 1861.

**TEXAS.**—"Whereas the federal government has failed to accomplish the purposes of the compact of union between these states, in giving protection either to the persons of our people upon an exposed frontier or to the property of our citizens; and whereas the action of the Northern states is violative of the compact between the states and the guarantees of the Constitution; and whereas the recent developments in the federal affairs make it evident that the power of the federal government is sought to be made a weapon with which to strike down the interests and property of the people of Texas and her sister slaveholding states, instead of permitting it to be, as it was intended, our shield against outrage and oppression; *therefore we the people ordain*, etc., "That the ordinance adopted by our convention of delegates on the 4th day of July, A.D. 1845, and afterward ratified by us, under which the republic of Texas was admitted into the Union with other states, and became a party to the compact styled 'The United States of America,' be, and is

hereby repealed and annulled; that all the powers which by the said compact were delegated by Texas to the federal government are resumed; that Texas is of right absolved from all restraints and obligations incurred by said compact, and is a sovereign and independent state, and that her citizens and people are absolved from all allegiance to the United States and the government thereof."—Passed February 7, 1861.

**LOUISIANA.**—"We, the people of the State of Louisiana, ordain," etc., "That the ordinance passed by us in Convention on the 23d day of November, in the year 1811, whereby the Constitution of the United States, and the amendments of said Constitution, were adopted, and all laws and ordinances by which the State of Louisiana became a member of the federal Union, be, and the same are hereby repealed and abrogated; and that the union now subsisting between Louisiana and other states, under the name of 'The United States of America,' is hereby dissolved. That the State of Louisiana hereby resumes all rights and powers heretofore delegated to the government of the United States of America, and that her citizens be absolved from all allegiance to said government, and that she is in full possession and exercise of all those rights of sovereignty which appertain to a free and independent state."—Passed January 26, 1861.


**VIRGINIA.**—"The people of Virginia, in the ratification of the Constitution of the United States of America, adopted by them in Convention on the 25th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1788, having declared that the powers granted under the said Constitution were derived from the people of the United States, and might be resumed whenever the same should be perverted to their injury and oppression; and the federal government having perverted said powers, not only to the injury of the people of Virginia, but to the oppression of the Southern slaveholding states," the people of Virginia ordain that "the ordinance adopted by the people of this state in Convention in the year of our Lord 1788, whereby the Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and all acts of the General Assembly of this state ratifying or adopting amendments to said Constitution, are hereby repealed and annulled; that the union between the State of Virginia and the other states, under the Constitution aforesaid, is hereby dissolved; and that the State of Virginia is in the full possession and exercise of all rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent state. And they do further declare that said Constitution of the United States of America is no longer binding on any of the citizens of this state."—Passed April 17, 1861.

**ARKANSAS.**—"Whereas, in addition to the well-founded causes of complaint set forth by this Convention in resolutions adopted on the 11th of March, A.D. 1861, against the sectional party now in power in Washington City, headed by Abraham Lincoln, he has, in the face of resolutions passed by this Convention, pledging the State of Arkansas to resist to the last extremity any attempt on the part of such power to coerce any state that seceded from the old Union, proclaimed to the world that war should be waged against such states until they should be compelled to submit to their rule, and large forces to accomplish this have by this same power been called out, and are now being marshaled to carry out this inhuman design; and to longer submit to such rule, or remain in the old Union of the United States, would be disgraceful and ruinous to the State of Arkansas: *Therefore we, the people of Arkansas, ordain*, etc., "That the Ordinance and Acceptance of Compact," passed by the General Assembly of the State of Arkansas on the 18th day of October, A.D. 1836 [here follows a minute description of this Compact and other acts], and all other laws, and every other law and ordinance, whereby the State of Arkansas became a member of the federal Union, be, and the same are hereby in all respects and for every other purpose herewith consistent repealed, abrogated, and fully set aside; and that the union now subsisting between the State of Arkansas and the other states, under the name of 'The United States of America,' is hereby forever dissolved." Then follows the usual declaration resuming all rights delegated to the federal government, absolving the citizens from allegiance to that government, and pronouncing Arkansas a "free and independent state."—Passed May 6, 1861.

**TENNESSEE.**—"We, the people of the State of Tennessee, waiving an expression of opinion as to the abstract doctrine of secession, but asserting the right as a free and independent people to alter, reform, or abolish our form of government in such manner as we think proper, do ordain and declare that all the laws and ordinances by which the State of Tennessee became a member of the federal Union of the United States of America are hereby abrogated and annulled, and that all obligations on our part be withdrawn therefrom, and we do hereby resume all the rights, functions, and powers which by any of the said laws and ordinances were conveyed to the government of the United States, and absolve ourselves from all the obligations, restraints, and duties incurred thereto, and do hereby become henceforth a free, sovereign, and independent state." The provisions of the Constitution of the state requiring civil and military officers to swear to support the Constitution of the United States, making citizenship of the United States a qualification for office, and recognizing the Constitution of the United States as the supreme law of the state, are abrogated and annulled.—Passed May 6, 1861.

**NORTH CAROLINA.**—"We, the people of North Carolina, ordain," etc., "That the ordinance adopted by the State of North Carolina, in the Convention of 1789, whereby the Constitution of the United States was ratified and adopted, and also all acts and parts of acts of the General Assembly ratifying and adopting amendments to the said Constitution, are hereby repealed, rescinded, and abrogated. We do further declare and ordain, that the union now subsisting between the State of North Carolina and the other states, under the title of 'The United States of America,' is hereby dissolved, and that the State of North Carolina is in the full possession and exercise of all those rights of sovereignty which belong and appertain to a free and independent state." Another ordinance was passed, ratifying the Montgomery Constitution, and declaring that "North Carolina will enter into the federal association of states upon the terms therein proposed when admitted by the Congress or any competent authority of the Confederate States."—Passed May 20, 1861.





BALLOON VIEW OF WASHINGTON, MAY, 1861.





EAST AND SEAWARD FACE OF FORTRESS MONROE.

## CHAPTER II.

## EASTERN VIRGINIA, MISSOURI, AND WESTERN VIRGINIA.

Occupation of Alexandria.—Death of Ellsworth.—Fortress Monroe.—Battle of Big Bethel.—Condition of Missouri.—General Lyon's Measures.—Battle of Booneville.—Action at Carthage.—Governor Jackson deposed, and Gamble appointed.—Battle of Wilson's Creek.—Death of Lyon.—Western Virginia.—The Mayor of Wheeling.—McClellan appointed to the Command of the Department of the Ohio.—Skirmish at Clarksburg.—McClellan's Instructions.—Grafton.—Battle of Philippi.—Union Convention at Wheeling.—Letcher's Proclamation.—Rich Mountain.—Battle of Carnick's Ford.—Wise's and Floyd's Campaigns in Western Virginia.—Battle of Carnifex Ferry.—McClellan's congratulatory Address.

THE month of April saw the insurrection extravagant in hope, prodigal in the promise of success. The success of its first move had made secession rampant. State after state had wheeled into the line. Even Virginia, that had for a time hesitated, now stood in the van of that insurgent column which looked defiance at the general government which it had paralyzed. The attitude of the Confederacy was not that of resistance, but that of aggression. It hoped to possess itself, almost without opposition, of such commanding positions as would at the outset give it a decided advantage over the federal government both in prestige and power. The capture of Washington, secretly planned by the cautious, was talked of by the indiscreet leaders of the confederates. It is possible that all which prevented the realization of this scheme was the inertness of Virginia in regard to her final decision of the question of secession. The very time of the attack was fixed upon, which was to be between the 17th and 21st of April. It was doubtless with this view that the raid had been made upon Harper's Ferry, and that to embarrass the government still farther, a very large number of officers in the army and navy had suddenly handed in their resignations. It must be remarked, however, that Governor Letcher—whatever may have been his feeling in the matter, declined to sanction the raid upon Harper's Ferry, as also that upon the government property in and near Norfolk. These events occurred or were planned before the state had fully committed itself to secession, and therefore Letcher was undecided whether to give them his official sanction. Thus the hesitancy of Virginia became the salvation of Washington, for without the hearty co-operation of that state it was impossible that Washington, already forewarned and partially forearmed, could be taken.

When it is considered that Washington was the seat of the federal government, and that no hint of aggression had as yet issued from the administration, and when, indeed, no act of war had taken place, excepting that which the insurgents had inaugurated and consummated, it is not difficult to see that the revolutionary programme, in its very earliest movements, contemplated no less than the destruction of the entire fabric of the republic. When Mr. Walker, the rebel Secretary of War, said, on the 12th of April, that before the 1st of May the confederate flag would float over the dome of the old Capitol, President Lincoln had not yet called for his first quota of troops; and when, three days afterward, he did call for seventy-five thousand men, it was for the purpose mainly of protecting the capital against the threats of its enemies—threats that were even then on the verge of execu-

tion. Such was the position of the secession leaders in this month of April, when the sun shone for their hay-making.

But the month of May reversed the picture. The hope which had well-nigh led secession to triumph, and to justify that triumph which it sought, was crushed. The North had arisen, and rushed to the defense of the capital: and in the middle of May it was seen that the time for taking the old seat of government without a desperate struggle had gone by. Yet it was declared that "the fixed and unalterable determination to capture this city is the prevailing sentiment of our people, and satisfaction gleams from the eye of every soldier whose destination is Washington."

The occupation of the "sacred soil" of Virginia soon became necessary to the safety of the national capital. It was undertaken in the latter part of May. The enthusiasm with which the loyal states had met the crisis of danger encouraged the government to push on and punish the aggression which had precipitated that crisis.

With a view of attacking, if possible, but, at any rate, of strenuously defending its position, the Confederacy held, in considerable force, the whole line from the Chesapeake to Edwards's Ferry, 25 or 30 miles above the capital. With a vigor which would have been afterward repeated with good effect, the government decided to take the offensive and to occupy Alexandria, about six miles below Washington, and on the opposite side of the Potomac. General Mansfield, with about thirteen thousand men, led this important movement. It was an impressive scene which the night preceding the attack ushered in. Vague hints had been given out of a storm about to burst forth at a moment's warning; and, in profound stillness, under a full moon, a busy preparation was being made; scouts were sent out in every direction: the men were suddenly summoned to the novel business of war, their bayonets glittering in the cold light; upon the river, steamers were being laden with troops and the machinery of strife: then the movement was made; and when the citizens of Washington awoke on the morning of the 24th of May, the ripe result was announced of operations that had been begun and consummated while they were asleep. At about daybreak the New York Seventh touched the Virginia soil, landing at the Alexandria bridge, near which they encamped. A detachment of soldiers, with some cavalry and artillery, crossed the Potomac below Georgetown, and took possession of the London and Hampshire Railroad. The Manassas Gap Railroad also, running out of Alexandria, was held by the New York Sixty-ninth, and seven hundred passengers were captured and held as hostages. Meanwhile Colonel Ellsworth, early in the morning, entered the town with his Zouaves, severed its communication with the South both by railroad and telegraph, and so completely surprised the rebel troops that a large number of them, unable to effect an escape, were captured. Thus was an important entrance into Virginia opened to the federal army without a battle. One single life was lost, that of the brave but imprudent Colonel Ellsworth, who was shot by Jackson, the landlord of a hotel, to the roof of which he had incautiously ascended to pull down a confederate flag. "Behold my trophy," said the ardent Ellsworth, as he descended from the trap-door down the stairs. "And behold mine," replied Jackson, as, springing from his hiding-place, he lodged the contents of his gun in Ellsworth's breast. But the se-





cessionist quickly paid life for life at the hands of private Brownell. Ellsworth was looked upon as a noble martyr in the North, and so was Jackson in the South.

Simultaneously with the occupation of Alexandria, the heights commanding Washington were taken possession of by the national troops preparatory to a defensive fortification of the city. A few skirmishes and accidental collisions with the enemy were the only occurrences upon which the intense popular excitement of the people fed itself until the reverse at Big Bethel. This takes us from the Potomac to the Peninsula between the James and York Rivers.

Fortress Monroe is, strictly speaking, the only fortress or fortified inclosure in the United States. It was at first constructed for the protection of Gosport Navy Yard, and at the beginning of the war it had cost the government two and a half millions of money. Its area embraces about seventy acres, and in the centre it has a magnificent parade-ground of twenty-five acres, finely shaded with live-oaks. It is a bastioned work, heptagonal in form; its walls, which are of granite, rise to the height of thirty-five feet; and about the entire work a moat extends, from seventy-five to a hundred and fifty feet wide, and faced with dressed granite. On the side facing the sea there is a water-battery of forty-two embrasures, the slope of which, covered with a green turf, affords a favorite promenade. Fortress Monroe has been the final head-quarters of all the military and naval expeditions that have been sent to the Southern coasts. So completely does its possession control the commerce of Virginia, that it almost supersedes the necessity for a blockade along the coast of that state. Governor Letcher was, at an early period, fully aware of the importance of its capture, but this was an undertaking which, like the seizure of Washington, required a stronger force than could be marshaled together previous to the secession of Virginia. The Confederacy had no navy, and the land approach to the fortress was exceedingly difficult, the only access being by means of a strip of beach not over forty rods in width. After Virginia had finally seceded, this stronghold stood in great peril, but was promptly re-enforced.

On the 22d of May, General Butler, whose decided policy in Maryland had saved that state to the Union, arrived at Fortress Monroe, and there assumed the command of a new department, the main object of which was a military occupation of the Atlantic coast.

On precisely the same day that Mansfield occupied Alexandria, Butler made a reconnoissance in force toward Hampton, a little village just north of Fortress Monroe. The confederate troops stationed there retreated as soon as they were aware of his approach, and, having made their escape across Hampton Creek into the town, attempted to burn the bridge in their rear, which they partially succeeded in doing. General Butler immediately established a camp near Hampton, and another eight miles farther west, at Newport News; in these two encampments, together with the troops inside


the fortress, Butler had in the early part of June about 12,000 men.

On the 10th of June the battle of Big Bethel was fought. The enemy had a strong position at Yorktown, about twenty-five miles from Fortress Monroe, and on the opposite side of the Peninsula. From this point southward they established outposts, which became centres whence cavalry squads were sent all over the country to compel tribute from the inhabitants, and frequent detachments were sent forth under cover of the night to harass the federal encampments and render their position untenable. The nearest of these outposts was situated at Little Bethel, a church which stood at the vertex of an equilateral triangle, each side measuring eight miles, and whose base is the line connecting Hampton and Newport News. Five miles farther, on the road to Yorktown, was the Great Bethel Church, near which the confederate Colonel Magruder was strongly intrenched, with a command of about 2000 men.

Butler determined to break up these two posts. On the 9th of June, he had his naval brigade busily engaged all day in learning the management of the flat-boats, in which a portion of his troops were to be ferried across Hampton Creek that night, to co-operate with another column moving from Newport News against Little Bethel. The expedition started secretly, under cover of the darkness, about midnight, as it was intended to reach its destination at daybreak. The force at Little Bethel was to be attacked simultaneously in front and rear by the two separate columns, and, having been routed, was to be driven toward Big Bethel and into Magruder's intrenchments. Fast upon their heels, and taking advantage of the entrance that would be opened to the fugitives, the federal forces were to rush in and take possession. In case of any failure in effecting this surprise, it was left to General Pierce's discretion whether or not he should attempt an assault upon Big Bethel.

A single misarrangement spoiled the intended surprise. Colonel Duryea's regiment was ferried across at one o'clock in the morning, and proceeded on the road to Bethel as far as to Newmarket Bridge, having crossed which it passed to the rear of the enemy, having captured his picket guard. So far all was well; but Colonel Townsend's regiment was yet to arrive from Hampton to act as support to Duryea. The roads from Hampton and from Newport News join just before Little Bethel is reached, and no sooner had Duryea's regiment passed this point of junction than the column from Newport News came up under Colonel Phelps, who left Colonel Bendix behind with a small force and a field-piece, to act as rear guard in case of an attempt being made by the enemy to cut off the retreat. But the Third New York (Colonel Townsend) was yet due. The arrival of this regiment and its junction with Bendix were a part of the programme, therefore it was expected, and its arrival promptly followed that of Bendix, who had taken position at the crossing of the roads; but, before it could emerge into plain sight, it had to ascend a slight elevation in the road. Phelps and Pierce were just in advance, and as they appeared above the rising crest alone and mounted, Bendix, in the dim light, conjectured that a cavalry force was approaching; but no cavalry were in the federal force, so that this body was assumed to belong to the enemy. They were fired upon, and ten of Townsend's men were wounded.


Pierce now ordered a retreat of the regiment. Meanwhile the firing alarmed the federal forces in advance, who also fell back. It was now broad daylight, and the mistake of the last hour was painfully evident, but it was too late to retrieve it, for already the enemy at Little Bethel had taken the alarm, and had added their strength to the already formidable position of Magruder. Pierce determined to try an assault, and sent to the fortress for re-enforcements. At first there was some promise of success; the outer line of the enemy's intrenchments was taken; but it was immediately retaken, and the bravest advances of the national troops were unavailing against the well-sheltered foe, and were repulsed with a loss of about forty men. Two of these, Major Winthrop and Lieutenant Greble, fell under circumstances worthy of distinct commemoration. Winthrop was shot by a North Caro-



ONLY ENTRANCE TO FORTRESS MONROE.



THE ADVANCE GUARD OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES CROSSING THE LONG BRIDGE OVER THE POTOMAC, MAY 24, 1861.







JOHN T. GREBLE.

lina drummer-boy while standing upon a log and brandishing his sword. He was in the act of rallying his men for a fresh encounter. Greble was working his gun within two hundred yards of a masked battery; a position which he retained until he had lost six out of eleven of his artillerymen, during which time he had with his single piece repelled a sortie on the part of the enemy with great slaughter. He was falling back himself, when his head was taken off his shoulders by a cannon ball.

This reverse, though not without its value to the federal army, aroused a storm of popular indignation in the North. But Butler held his position on the Peninsula, which was so strong that Magruder, in spite of his success at Big Bethel, soon deemed it prudent to withdraw to Yorktown.

Leaving Eastern Virginia, penetrated from the north and east by the national forces, whose advance was as nearly as possible in the form of an arc reaching from Washington to Fortress Monroe, while at Richmond, the centre of this arc, the confederates were marshaling in strength, and from thence radiating forth and seizing upon the strongest natural positions, we turn to contemporaneous events in the West.

By a vote of one hundred and thirty-five thousand against thirty thousand, Missouri had, in the presidential election of 1860, decided against the extremists of the South. In this state, as in Maryland, there were men determined that Missouri should share the fate and fortunes of the Southern confederacy, but they were few. The events which have previously been narrated in this history: the President's call for troops to aid in suppressing insurrection, and Jackson's refusal; the conflict of the Home with the State Guards; the raid of the Illinois troops upon the St. Louis Arsenal, and the capture of Camp Jackson, near that city, by Lyon; the conflict of United States troops with the mob of St. Louis; Lyon's reversal of the policy adopted by Harney—a policy which, while it crippled the general government, yet allowed Jackson and Price, whom Harney knew to be secessionists at heart, to mature the military organizations of the state for purposes of their own—all these events had been gradually establishing a line of division on the question of state sovereignty as opposed to the sovereignty of the general government. That the very idea of state sovereignty, conceived thus absolutely, was the root of secession, was not popularly understood. It was so regarded by the secession leaders, and by Lyon also, who was persistently counteracting their movements. But a large portion of the people blindly believed that a state had the right to assume at option and to maintain an attitude of independence of the general government. Some states had already done this. In the opinion of the Missourians that was an unwise proceeding, but thoroughly legitimate; that is, they justified secession as to the principle involved, though they by no means favored its adoption. Missouri, at any rate, did not want it; if South Carolina wanted it, however, she had a perfect right to it. It was this position which, seemingly so innocent, still wrought all the mischief in the border states; for it was impossible that a state could hold that position and not advance beyond it. Clearly, any opposition by force of arms to secession, on the part of the general government, must of necessity array Missouri, and all other states in a similar situation, upon the one side or the other; for, judged from the stand-point of these states, such opposition was unjust and despotic. This judgment, which was entertained by a large portion of the people of Missouri, taken in connection with the prevailing sympathy of the state for Southern institutions, was sufficient, if not to throw the state over into the confederacy, at least to array it against the national government.

Accordingly, on the 11th of June, Jackson and Price held an interview with Lyon and Blair at St. Louis, and demanded of the latter that no more United States troops should be quartered in or should pass through the state. This was an attempt on the governor's part to renew with Lyon the

compact previously made between Price and Harney. In case his requisition was complied with, he offered, on his part, to disband the State Guards; to nullify the organization of the state militia, which had been going on under the provisions of the Military Bill; to protect the rights of all the citizens of Missouri, and to repel any invasion from without. That these offers were not made in good faith is evident from the fact that it was the governor himself who had in secret organized the State Guards before the Home Guards had any existence; indeed, these latter were rendered necessary by the violence of the former directed against loyal citizens. Moreover, the governor knew that what he had offered to do it was utterly impossible for him to accomplish.

But, whether made in good faith or not, these offers could not be met by Lyon; for, even assuming Jackson to have been desirous that Missouri should be neutral—and certainly that was all which the great body of his supporters desired—yet, in the assumption by any state of a neutral attitude, there was involved the right of separation. For Missouri to demand the abandonment of the state by the United States troops was no more than for South Carolina to demand the national government to evacuate the forts in Charleston Harbor; and the same principle which led to the refusal of the one demand compelled the rejection of the other. Lyon accordingly refused compliance with the terms proposed. The very next day Governor Jackson issued from Jefferson City a proclamation to the people of Missouri, making the most of his unsuccessful attempts at compromise; representing that he himself, desirous only of peace, had proposed terms of agreement most humiliating to the state, and that even these were rejected; and, finally, calling for fifty thousand of the state militia to repel the invaders. The majority of these "invaders," it will be remembered, were loyal Missourians.

The war was now fairly inaugurated, and the next day, the 13th of June, saw Jackson, with all the available troops under his command, retreating from the capital, and Lyon on his way to the capital, having started from St. Louis with about fifteen hundred men. On the day before, Sigel, with the Second Missouri, had been dispatched toward Springfield by the South Pacific Railroad for a purpose which will hereafter become evident.

Jackson, in his retreat, had given orders for the destruction of the Moreau bridge, four miles below Jefferson City, on the Missouri, while General Price attended to the severing of telegraphic communications. The flight was executed by means of the railroad, and all the bridges, as soon as passed, were burned. As General Lyon proceeded by water, this destruction was of course utterly useless. Even the destination of the fugitive executive was concealed, though conjecture pointed to Booneville, a strong-hold of secession some fifty miles up the river. Meanwhile, in the absence of the recreant governor, General Lyon instituted a provisional government, and called upon all loyal men to rally to the support of order and legitimate authority.

Thus far there had been no hostile collision between those representing the authority of the United States and Jackson's forces. But, now that war had been unmistakably declared, Lyon did not wait for the enemy to perfect his organizations; and, although General Harney had so illy appreciated the importance of a decided policy, yet it can not be denied that the federal troops at this crisis held their opponents in the State of Missouri at a great disadvantage. A firm course from the first would have held Missouri as strongly to her allegiance as Maryland was held. That had not been done. Still, so energetic and prompt were the measures of the national government, that they elicited praise even from the lips of the enemy. "Energy and promptitude," says the Charleston Mercury of May 31, "have characterized their movements both in Maryland and St. Louis, and their success along the border has so far been complete. They have, in the West, obtained and secured the great repository of arms for that section, equipped our enemies of St. Louis, Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio, leaving the resistance-men of Missouri poorly provided, Kentucky unarmed and overawed, and Tennessee also, with a meagre provision for fighting, dependent on the cotton states for weapons of defense. In all this, the military proceedings of the North since the fall of Sumter have been eminently wise."

Missouri was favorably situated for the influx, on a large scale, of confederate troops from Kentucky and Tennessee on the east, and from Arkansas on the south; and, curiously enough, at the very moment when Jackson was so confidently offering to repel all invaders, Ben McCulloch, a noted Texan Ranger, had already crossed the southern border of the state with a force of 800 men, which rapidly increased as he moved upon Springfield. In view of this movement, General Sigel had been sent, on the 12th, in that direction, with the Second Missouri. Price was sending on other confederate forces as speedily as possible to Booneville and Lexington, and on the western border of the state Rains was mustering together still another army.

While these forces in the various parts of Missouri had not as yet been able to concentrate in any one place, it was evidently Lyon's opportunity to dispose of them in detail. For accomplishing this purpose he had inconsiderable means at his disposal. Leaving a force at Jefferson City sufficiently large to preserve order, he set out in three steamers and with about 2000 men for Booneville. This was on the 17th of June.

A few miles below the town the confederates had posted a battery on a bluff commanding the river. Instead, however, of passing this battery—which, indeed, he could hardly have effected with safety—Lyon landed his troops lower down, and marched along the road running through the bottom-land and parallel to the river. A mile and a half brought them upon the enemy's pickets, and another half mile brought them upon the enemy himself, in full force, under Colonel Marmaduke, who was posted in a lane running at right angles with the road upon which Lyon was approaching, and terminating at the river. A heavy cannonade was opened, driving the confederates to an adjacent wood. In order to draw them from this covert,





LYON'S MARCH FROM BOONEVILLE.

from which they kept up a brisk fire upon the federals, Lyon ordered a feigned retreat. The ruse was successful, and the whole force of the artillery was opened on the enemy, who turned and fled in confusion. The enemy seem to have been deficient in artillery; at least not a single cannon was fired by them during the engagement. Marmaduke's men had insisted upon fighting contrary to their colonel's judgment, who wished to retreat to some more tenable position. Jackson is said to have watched the battle from a distant hill, and, seeing the disastrous result, to have fled. Price was at home. The force of the enemy was inferior to that of the federal army making the attack, and was, besides, so indiscreetly managed, that in twenty minutes from the firing of the first shot it was in full retreat.

Every effort was now made by the state forces in Missouri to concentrate. There was no hope of their being able to effect this in the northern part of the state, but there was a chance in favor of a concentration of the forces retreating southward with those of M'Culloch in the southwest. Jackson fled from Booneville with only about five hundred men, and Captain Totten followed close upon him with a thousand. Rains was hurrying forward in order to join Jackson, pursued by Major Sturgis of the United States regular army. Rains, however, by the destruction of the bridge over the Osage at Papinsville, put a check upon the pursuit, and Sturgis was obliged to go into camp and wait for the high water to subside. Lyon, who had remained behind to get together an additional force, was soon able to join Sturgis on the Osage.

Meantime, on the 23d of June, Sigel arrived at Springfield. Price was then encamped at Neosho, a town in the southwest corner of the state, and Jackson was speedily moving southward to join him. To prevent this junction, Sigel advanced rapidly upon Neosho, which he entered without opposition on the 1st of July, and the next day learned that Price, Jackson, and Rains had already united their forces at a point just north of Carthage. Informing General Sweeny, who was at Springfield, of this fact, he received orders immediately to attack the confederate position. On the 4th of July he set out, and on the 6th came upon the enemy, posted in the open prairie. His force was greatly inferior, but he unlimbered his artillery and opened fire, to which the confederates briskly replied. A sharp artillery duel was kept up across the level prairie until two o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy's guns had all been dismounted and his ranks broken. The confederate cavalry now attempted to outflank Sigel; but the latter, sending two six-pounders to the rear, and changing front, fell steadily back to his baggage-wagons, which were laboring forward, and, having secured these, he fell slowly back to the bridge over Dry Fork Creek, where the road ran between two high bluffs. Here, at the opening, were stationed the enemy's cavalry, which, baffled in its attack on the baggage train, sought at this point to cut off the retreat. Sigel, dispatching two cannon to the right and two to the left, supported by a small portion of his force, drew the enemy out of his solid and impregnable position against these his feigned movements, and waiting patiently their approach on either side, he opened upon them a terrific cross-fire, and, at the same time, by a sudden movement in front, cleared the bridge. The cavalry were routed, and Sigel moved rapidly to Carthage, which, to his surprise, he found occupied by the enemy. The only course left was to effect a junction as quickly as possible with a Union force stationed at Mount Vernon, midway between him and Springfield. But his immediate route, which led through a forest, was disputed by a large force

of the enemy. Here there was no opportunity for the enemy's cavalry, and, though he was largely outnumbered, Sigel, by the superiority of his Minie rifles over the old-fashioned arms of his antagonists, was able to contest the ground. Here the battle lasted for over two hours, until after sunset, and, indeed, was prolonged even into the darkness, when finally the enemy retreated, and Sigel, not daring even to rest his tired army, kept up his march all night, and the next day reached Mount Vernon.

Sigel had seen service in Europe, and in this battle proved both the temper of his courage and his able strategy. His entire loss was reported at forty-four, while that of the confederates was much greater, owing to the superiority of Sigel's artillery, that of the enemy being very poor and poorly managed.

At this time all the state, except the southwest quarter, was under the control of the Union forces. North of the Missouri River hostile collisions were frequent between the state troops and the small bodies of Illinois volunteers that had been stationed at various points. Skirmishes followed one another in rapid succession, and a vast amount of property was destroyed. On the 19th of July General Pope assumed the command of Northern Missouri, having under him a force of 7000 men. Meanwhile, on the 16th, Lyon and Sturgis had reached Springfield. An expedition under Sweeny was immediately dispatched to break up a secession camp at Forsyth, fifty miles south of Springfield, just above the Arkansas border. This was accomplished without opposition.

The situation in Missouri at the latter end of July assumed a very critical aspect. General Fremont, who a month previously had returned from Europe with a large amount of arms for the government, had just been appointed to the command of the Western Department. This was no enviable position. Every thing was in disorder. Forces which ought already to be matured were only preparing to be organized; they lacked arms, and even the harnesses for the baggage trains were unprovided. The enemy, on the other hand, had already prepared himself, and was ready to strike boldly. The successes of the confederates in Virginia had wrought up to the highest pitch their hopes of a speedy and victorious close to the war. The Southern journals of this date exulted in the anticipation of the most splendid success in Missouri, and with good reason. Price, and Rains, and Jackson had united their forces, and had forced Sigel to retreat. These forces were now joined to those of M'Culloch, making an army four times as large as that under Lyon. In the southeast, General Pillow had an army at New Madrid ready to march against St. Louis.

In the face of all these unfavorable circumstances, the political movements going on in the state were of an encouraging nature. On the 22d the State Convention met, and, after a few days' earnest consultation, declared the seats of the governor and his associates in office vacant, and appointed as provisional governor Hamilton R. Gamble. An address was also prepared for the people, justifying the measures which had been taken. This address reprimanded in the most scathing terms the efforts which Governor Jackson and his lieutenant had made to carry Missouri out of the Union even previously to any interference on the part of the general government in the affairs of the state. On the same day that this document was issued, Lieutenant Governor Reynolds put forth a proclamation from New Madrid, which was meant as a preface to General Pillow's advance northward; and in two or three more days Governor Gamble issued a proclamation offering protec-





NATHANIEL LYON.

tion to all loyal citizens, and notifying the officers and troops of the Confederate States that their continuance in the state would be considered as an act of war. Certainly, so far as proclamations were concerned, the provisional government had the best of it, for, besides holding the capital, the proper and accustomed seat of the state sovereignty, they were also backed by the popular convention. But proclamations could neither disarm or discourage a confident confederate army like that which now threatened to overrun the state from the southwest.

On the 1st of August, the federal army at Springfield, under Lyon, whose principal commands were intrusted to Sweeny, Sigel, and Sturgis, encamped at Crane's Creek, two miles south of Springfield. The next day they resumed their march, and about five o'clock in the afternoon there was a slight skirmish with a small force of the enemy at Dug Springs. Having marched to Curran, twenty-six miles from Springfield, Lyon fell back again upon the latter place. His position was one of great peril. His force was inadequate to meet the enemy, and Fremont could spare no re-enforcements from St. Louis without weakening his own position, which was of greater importance; but, if he retreated, he would leave the inhabitants of Springfield unprotected, and could not, after all, save himself from a conflict, which must yet take place at some point sooner or later. Therefore he determined to make one effort to stay the progress of the enemy northward and to maintain his own position. Upon this determination followed the battle of Wilson's Creek, which, next to Bull Run, was the severest engagement of the year.

There is something sublime in the bold march of Lyon, on the night of the 9th of August, with a force of 5000 men, to Wilson's Creek, to encounter in the morning a force of more than 20,000. The enemy, meanwhile, was making elaborate arrangements for attacking him. For some time there had been considerable delay in the movements of the confederates toward Springfield, owing to a disagreement between the two leading generals, Price and McCulloch, the former advocating, and the latter opposing an immediate attack upon the federal army. This question had been settled, however, by a peremptory order from General Polk to McCulloch, commanding an immediate advance upon Springfield. Then McCulloch, seemingly determined upon a quarrel, insisted upon having the chief command, which Price conceded without dispute.

On the 9th of August the confederate army had reached a point on Wilson's Creek about nine miles south of Springfield. They had determined to attack the national forces on four sides at once, when suddenly they were aware that they themselves were assailed by two columns—one, under Lyon, in front, and another, under Sigel, on their right flank. It was the expectation of Lyon to fall upon an enemy unprepared, but in this he was disappointed, and all that he had hoped for a surprise was lost. At first the powerful batteries of Totten and Dubois told fearfully upon the enemy, and it was even doubtful whether the inferiority in numbers, and particularly in cavalry, might not be compensated for by the superiority in artillery. Against Totten's battery the enemy directed an overwhelming force, and for half an hour the contending lines surged to and fro over the disputed ground, neither force giving way to the other. On the left of the battery the enemy had gained an advantage; but, in a moment, Lyon led his horse along the line to rally the troops. The horse was killed at his side, when, mounting another, he led on his men into the thickest of the fight. On our left, the enemy, meanwhile, was pressing hard, but there Dubois's battery held him in check. On the right, the First Missouri was being forced back by an overwhelming force, when Lyon promptly ordered two regiments to its sup-

port. Patiently at the brow of the hill they waited the approach of the enemy, until only a few yards separated the combatants, when the simultaneous discharge of their Minié rifles poured forth its volume of death against the astonished and panic-stricken foe. Lyon now ordered a bayonet charge, and himself took the lead of an Iowa regiment which had lost its colonel. He fell dead, pierced in that shower of hail; but the regiments stood firm and unwavering until the enemy, again baffled, withdrew.

Major Sturgis, upon whom the command now devolved, stood doubtful whether to advance or retreat. The former seemed impossible, and, if the latter was concluded upon, there was a dreary march of twelve miles before men who since yesterday morning had not tasted water. Sigel was to have attacked the rear, but there was no token that he had entered upon the work. Once, while this suspense lasted, the federal troops were deceived by the approach of a confederate column under the Union flag, and, hoping to receive their friends, they were mowed down by the fire of the cunning enemy. But against every movement, open or treacherous, our troops stood firm, and with their artillery drove the enemy back to his own ground. After six hours of this unavailing slaughter, Major Sturgis ordered a retreat, and having done so, received tidings of Sigel's rout and withdrawal from the rear. The enemy was too severely cut up to molest the leisurely retreat of either column. In this battle, as in that at Carthage, the artillery alone saved the Union army from utter annihilation.

No sooner had Virginia, on the 17th of April, passed the Ordinance of Secession, than Governor Letcher addressed a letter to Andrew Sweeny, Mayor of Wheeling, informing him of the fact, and ordering him to seize at once upon the Custom-house of that city, the Post-office, and all public buildings and documents, in the name of the sovereign State of Virginia. The mayor promptly replied: "I have seized upon the Custom-house, the Post-office, and all public buildings and documents, in the name of Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, whose property they are." In this reply, Andrew Sweeny represented the whole northwestern portion of the state, and the attitude which it assumed toward secession.


By every natural association, Western Virginia was allied to Ohio and Pennsylvania, and therefore to Northern sentiments and institutions. Between the eastern and western portions of the Old Dominion there was little affinity; the low-lying lands of the former invited slavery, while the mountainous tracts of the latter absolutely excluded it. All along, therefore, there had been a natural disaffection between the two sections, and this had certainly not been weakened by the extraordinary exemption from taxation which, under the existing state of affairs, the East had always enjoyed. But the treason of Richmond furnished abundant occasion to the West to assert its dignity and independence. The triumph of secession upon the James naturally led to the triumph of loyalty among the mountains; and while Governor Letcher was training the state militia for service against the general government, Union meetings were held all over the western counties for the support of that government. The series of measures which resulted in the formation of the State of Western Virginia will hereafter be narrated. We have here only to do with the military events in that portion of the state. The topographical features of the region precluded it from becoming a permanent arena of warfare. McClellan's short campaign, lasting from the middle of May to the middle of July, 1861, comprises the history of secession in Western Virginia.<sup>1</sup>

On the 11th of May, the Department of the Ohio, including Ohio, Indiana, and the western portions of Pennsylvania and Virginia, was organized, and General McClellan, who had been invited by Governor Dennison, of Ohio, to abandon the presidency of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad for a brigadier generalship, was put at its head. McClellan's career as military engineer in Mexico had brought him great distinction; but the office which he was now to undertake was novel, and accompanied by many difficult trials. An army had actually to be created out of undisciplined volunteer forces. To this task he proved himself fully competent. One of the prominent objects of the department thus instituted was to guard the line of the Ohio River, but, as the policy of the general government became more aggressive and determined, this object was lost sight of in view of a bolder purpose. The campaign in Western Virginia was in no sense an invasion, and this feature distinguished it from the operations that were going on for the occupation of the eastern part of the state. Indeed, it was some time before the federal army entered Western Virginia even for the purposes of protection. Thus, for a long period, this portion of the state had to take care of itself against the secessionists. Union companies were formed every where.

<sup>1</sup> As the terms were formerly used, the Blue Ridge was the boundary between Eastern and Western Virginia. In 1850, the former contained 401,540 whites, 45,783 free colored persons, and 409,793 slaves; the latter, 492,609 whites, 8123 free colored, and 62,233 slaves. The long-standing dispute between these sections, growing mainly out of the questions of taxation and representation, were temporarily compromised by amendments to the Constitution made in 1850, by which a mixed basis for representation was adopted, giving to the West a majority in the House, and to the East a majority in the Senate. By this compromise, slaves under twelve years of age were not subjects of taxation, while upon those above that age \$1 20 was levied. The West complained that a large proportion of the property of the Eastern planters, which consisted of slaves, was either wholly or in effect free from taxation, while all of theirs was taxed; and moreover affirmed that they derived no benefit from the sums expended for internal improvements. From this time many leading men began to plan for a separation between the two sections. Mr. John S. Carlisle, in a speech at the Wheeling Convention, said: "There is no difference in opinion between the advocates of a separation of this state. If I may be allowed, I can claim some credit for my sincerity when I say that it has been an object for which I have labored at least since the year 1850. The Convention which met at Richmond in that year, and adopted our present State Constitution, clearly disclosed to my mind the utter incompatibility consistent with the interests of the people of Northwestern Virginia of remaining in connection with the eastern portion of the state." Governor Letcher, in his proclamation to the people of Northwestern Virginia, June 14, 1861, admits that these complaints were well founded. He says: "There has been a complaint among you that the eastern portion of the state has enjoyed an exemption from taxation to your prejudice. By a display of magnanimity in the vote just given, the East has, by a large majority, consented to relinquish this exemption, and is ready to share with you all the burdens of government."



THE MOUNTAIN REGION OF WESTERN VIRGINIA.





The first collision between these companies and Governor Letcher's forces occurred at Clarksburg on the 23d of May. Immediately measures were taken to organize regiments at Wheeling for the protection of loyal citizens; for no sooner had the result of the election in Western Virginia and its unanimous declaration of loyalty been made known, than the signal was given for the secessionists, whom Governor Letcher had sent in their midst, to inaugurate a reign of terror. Union men were treated with violence; bridges were burned, and valuable property destroyed. It was now high time that the general government should come to the rescue.

Before the advent of his troops into Western Virginia, McClellan issued two proclamations, one to his soldiers, and the other to the people whom they were sent to protect. The former were commanded to preserve the strictest discipline, and to remember that their duty was confined to the protection of loyal men against traitors; and the latter were assured of the honest intentions with which the movement was undertaken, and reminded of the fact that, while the secessionists had sent their armed forces beforehand to terrify and intimidate, the United States had patiently awaited the result of their election. They were moreover assured that there would be no interference with their slaves, but, on the contrary, that they should be protected even against any insurrection of the latter.

The instructions given to McClellan were to cross the Ohio, join Colonel Kelly, who was in command of the regiment at Wheeling, and, having driven out the confederate force, to advance on Harper's Ferry. His movements were hastened by the rapidity with which the secessionists were destroying bridges that would be necessary to his line of communication. The first point of approach was Grafton, which was the centre of all the railroad lines in Northwestern Virginia. Toward this point, on the morning of the 27th, Kelly moved with the First Virginia; and immediately afterward Colonel Irvine, with the Sixteenth Ohio, crossed the Ohio and followed Kelly's command. Another column, consisting of the Fourteenth Ohio, crossed at Marietta, and moved on Parkersburg. The confederates, having been informed of this advance, hastily retreated from Grafton at midnight, falling back to Philippi, where Colonel Porterfield was stationed with a small force of infantry and cavalry. Porterfield had been sent on by General Lee to recruit an army for the rebellion in Western Virginia, but his attempts proving entirely unsuccessful in that loyal section, he was obliged to write a very despondent letter to Lee, asking for re-enforcements in order to enable him even to maintain his position.

The occupation of Grafton had thus been effected without the firing of a single gun, and, on the afternoon of June 2d, there were assembled on the parade-ground of that place 3000 Union troops, under the command of Colonel Crittenden, of Indiana, to receive orders for a forced march that very night against the enemy at Philippi. At 8 o'clock they marched southward. It commenced early to rain, and rained all night; but through the wet and the mud the federal forces pushed on to their destination, which the most of them believed to be Harper's Ferry. They moved in two separate columns. One column, under Colonel Dumont, proceeded on the Northwestern Virginia Railroad to Webster, twelve miles from Philippi, and thence marched against the enemy's front. Kelly, accompanied by Colonel Lander, moved another column eastward to Thornton, from which point they marched twenty-two miles, and got in the rear of Porterfield's force. As soon as the column attacking in front was in position, the enemy's pickets commenced firing, and our artillery opened upon the surprised camp and threw it immediately into utter confusion. Had not the darkness and the storm impeded the movements of the flanking column, the entire confederate force at Philippi must have been captured; but Kelly only arrived in time to aid in the pursuit, and himself to meet with a severe wound from a stray shot after the enemy had mainly been put to flight.

But the military opposition to secession was no more decided than was the political. On the 11th of June the Union Convention met at Wheeling. Forty counties were represented, and each county delegation came forward and took the following oath: "We solemnly declare that we will support the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof, as the supreme law of the land, any thing in the ordinance of the Convention which lately met at Richmond to the contrary notwithstanding." The next day a committee of thirteen reported a Bill of Rights, repudiating all allegiance to the Southern Confederacy; resolutions were offered to maintain the rights of Western Virginia in the Union, and commanding all forces in arms against the United States to disband and return to their allegiance; and an ordinance was reported providing for the establishment of a provisional government. Frank H. Pierpont was appointed governor; and the principle set forth in his inaugural, that to the loyal people belong the government and governmental authority, was the principle that controlled the entire proceedings of the Convention.

On the 14th of June, Governor Letcher, having posted troops at Hattonsville, issued a proclamation, insisting that the majority of the state should rule the state, and calling upon Western Virginians, in the name of past friendship and historic memories, to co-operate with secession and join the Southern army. But this proclamation was as ineffectual as Porterfield's recruiting had been, although the governor offered to redress the wrongs which the western part of the state had so long suffered.

Returning to the military situation, as we find it in the latter part of June, we have McClellan personally at the head of the Union army in Western Virginia, and General Garnett commanding the confederate forces. The former had about 20,000 men, and his communications open and easy; while the confederate general had an inferior force, and, although posted in a position highly advantageous so far as fighting was concerned, was yet completely isolated from any possible basis of military operations. To have held

this position for a single day after the battle at Philippi, unless it were with a force so overwhelming as to make defeat impossible, was simply a military blunder. Yet Garnett held it even when he knew that McClellan was moving steadily on, and rapidly increasing in the number of his command. This position of the confederates was some twenty or thirty miles southward from Philippi, at Rich Mountain, a gap in the Laurel Hill Range, where the Staunton and Weston turnpike crosses it, about four or five miles from Beverly. The road which runs along its western slope was the only possible line of communication between this position and Garnett's base. This road ran through Beverly, and to hold the latter place was effectually to intercept the possibility of the enemy's retreat. Here, at Rich Mountain, Garnett had posted Colonel Pegram with 3000 men, while he himself, with about 8000, occupied Laurel Hill, fifteen or sixteen miles farther westward. The fortified position at this latter point was very strong. Having ordered General Morris to occupy Garnett's forces by a direct attack, McClellan himself, with the main body of his army, passed around by Buckhannon to the rear, that is, to the western slope of Rich Mountain. Here he divided his force into two columns, and giving one of these to Colonel Rosecrans, he sent the latter to the rear of Pegram, while he remained in front, ready to attack simultaneously. Rosecrans obtained the rear, sent a courier back to McClellan to give the signal, and went to work. The messenger missed his way, and passed into the encampment of the enemy, thus giving them full information of the movement. Meanwhile McClellan awaited the signal, and the enemy, acquainted with the peril of his position, made his way toward Laurel Hill. Garnett, also, had been warned of the danger, and, hastily leaving his intrenchments, proceeded southward, hoping to reach Beverly before McClellan; but, on his way thither, he met the fugitives of Pegram's army, and learned that Beverly was already in the possession of the Union forces. Thus all retreat to the southward was cut off. The only way of escape left him was to follow the course of the Cheat River toward the northeast until he should find some outlet into the valley of Virginia. Then followed McClellan's, or, rather, Morris's forces, in swift and unrelenting pursuit, Captain Benham leading the advance. At a bend of the Cheat River, where it winds about a bluff of fifty or sixty feet high, the enemy made a stand, and, planting a cannon on the top of the bluff, disputed the advance. It was an admirable position; but Benham led his men directly under the bluff and around to its left, where they could gain the road, and as they appeared upon his flank the enemy fled, leaving one of his guns and a number of killed and wounded. About a quarter of a mile farther on, where the stream made another turn, Garnett, with a few skirmishers, attempted to make another stand, and, while rallying his men, received a Minié ball which caused his death. This was called the battle of Carrick's Ford. In the mean time, Pegram's force, finding escape impossible, had surrendered to McClellan.

The federal success was complete. Only a small portion of the enemy escaped, and all their material fell into our hands. The immediate and natural result of this battle was the evacuation of Harper's Ferry, and the abandonment by the enemy of all Western Virginia.

In the mean time, while General McClellan was moving southward from the Ohio, along the Alleghany Ridge, and driving the enemy before him, General Wise, near the western and southern borders of the state, was gathering together another confederate army. He had just been appointed a brigadier general, with orders, first, to clear Western Virginia of federal troops and keep it clear, and, secondly, to occupy Wheeling, and disorganize the Union Legislature. In order to accomplish this in the face of McClellan's rapidly advancing army, he demanded of his government an adequate force, and was told that he must raise it himself. With the meagre nucleus of an army he advanced to Louisburg, about fifty miles south of Cheat Mountain Gap, and from this point moved in a northwesterly direction down the Kanawha Valley, his force gradually increasing, until, by the accession of Colonel Tompkins's detachment, already in the valley, it numbered full 4000 men, with a considerable cavalry force, and three or four battalions of artillery; but he was poorly supplied with ammunition, his recruits were undisciplined, and he was by a long distance removed from his base of supplies, which, besides that it might easily be cut off by the enemy, could only be reached through a portion of the state which was bitterly hostile to secession. Plainly, therefore, he must fall back to Charleston. Every conceivable advantage was in favor of the Union arms; every conceivable disadvantage frowned upon the confederates. The movements of the federal army were controlled by a single mind; its appointments were complete: the confederates had two armies, distinct in their organization and operations, and, if the most elaborate arrangements had been made to secure the possibility of their being conquered in detail, these two armies could not possibly have been more conveniently posted for that purpose than they were. The federal army had at its disposal every desirable means of communication both by land and water; the confederates had to communicate across the mountains. It is true that nowhere on the continent could be found positions of greater natural strength than those in which Garnett and Wise might fortify themselves at their leisure; but it is also true that, with equal leisure, McClellan could cut them off, and compel engagement or flight. This was pointedly illustrated in the battle at Rich Mountain, the news of which, coming like a thunderbolt upon Wise, precipitated his retreat, which stopped not short of Gauley Bridge, and in the course of which a great number of troops deserted him.

Thus ended the month of July, which in the eastern portion of the state had proved so disastrous to our arms. It was at this point that McClellan assumed command of the army of the Potomac, leaving Rosecrans to take his place in Western Virginia. Wise had handed in his resignation to the authorities at Richmond. General Floyd was ordered to re-enforce him, which



BATTLE OF HIGH MOUNTAIN, JULY 13, 1861.





he did at his own convenience; and after the two generals had come together in Greenbrier County, there was a continual hostility between them, arising, no doubt, from the supercilious airs which Floyd indulged in toward Wise; to say the least, we may be sure that no love was lost between them. Floyd hesitated to support Wise; and Wise, though more honest in the discharge of his duty, could not help laughing at the blunders of Floyd. The latter started from Whiteville with over 3000 men, which force, before it was joined to Wise's legion, dwindled down to less than half that number. Floyd appointed as chief of his staff the editor of the *Lynchburg Republican*, for his first aid-de-camp a sub-editor—intending, probably, to have his conquests duly set forth in print—and for the leader of his cavalry a farmer, whom he seriously promised that horses and men should come out of the campaign as safe and sound as they went in; and this gentle general bragged that he would in a single fortnight drive Rosecrans across the Ohio. While he planned these large results, he forgot all about his transportation, and his baggage trains passed out from Whiteville no less than three times before they were fairly on the way for White Sulphur Springs, the place of junction.

From this position, which was more secure than any other, being near to the great central route to the eastward, the confederate army, largely re-enforced, and having the means at its disposal for carrying on the campaign considerably increased, ventured to advance to Sewell Mountain, a short distance to the west, and thence to Dogwood Gap, where the road from Summersville strikes the main turnpike from Louisburg to Charleston. Thus far there had been no important engagement in the valley of the Kanawha; but on the 10th of September a battle was fought at Carnifex Ferry.

General Rosecrans, on the last day of August, had proceeded to gather up his scattered army for a brisk autumn campaign against Floyd. Leaving Reynolds to keep General Lee in check at Cheat Mountain, he had advanced southward over Kreitz and Powell Mountains to Summersville, driven back the enemy's advanced posts, and pushed on by a forced march of seventeen miles and a half toward the Gauley River. It was not until he had nearly come up with the enemy that he learned the exact position of the latter, which was on the heights overlooking Carnifex Ferry.

Here Floyd had posted himself, having left Wise at a point farther southward to guard against a rear attack from the federal force at Hawk's Nest. He had expected to find a detachment of General Cox's division here, but the latter had retreated, and, unfortunately for Floyd, had sunk the ferry-boats. Floyd pushed his men across, and then, for the first time, discovered his ludicrously awkward position, with his infantry on one side of the river and his artillery on the other; so he posted off on horseback to General Hemmingsen for an engineer to build boats. While he was in this position, Colonel Tyler, with a small Union force, attacked him, but was repulsed. No sooner had Floyd extricated himself from his difficulty, than Rosecrans suddenly came upon him from Summersville. Floyd's position was naturally one of great strength, protected in the rear both by the river and the mountain ridge, and having but one avenue of approach, which was commanded by two powerful batteries. Rosecrans's troops were exhausted by a long and weary march; it was nearly night, too, and nothing could be accomplished but a reconnaissance, yet this came as near as possible to being a battle. An attempt was made to outflank the enemy on the left, where he was driven from his breastworks to the centre, but it was too late to bring up a supporting force; and, at the same time, two unsuccessful attempts were made in front to take the enemy's batteries by assault, in which Colonel Lytle was wounded and Colonel Lowe killed. Thus the day closed, and in the morning it was discovered that the enemy had retreated, and by the destruction of the bridge over the Gauley had cut off all pursuit. The retreat was continued to Meadow Bridge, whither General Wise was invited to follow; but the latter, having secured himself in a strong position in Fayette County, declined to fall back.

General Lee, who had assumed the command of Garnett's scattered forces in the northwest, and who had a considerable force at his disposal, proceeded to take up a position between the two principal positions of Reynolds—at Elkwater and at Cheat Mountain summit—and to carry them by a simultaneous attack, advancing against Elkwater himself, and giving to General Jackson the other column. Meeting with a repulse, however, he joined Floyd at Meadow Bridge, and after having personally examined Wise's position at Camp Defiance, brought to that point the entire confederate force (which amounted to about 30,000 men), with the exception of General Jackson, who remained in the vicinity of Cheat Mountain. Here, at Sewell's Mountain, the two main armies confronted one another; but no sooner was this the case, than Rosecrans, by a sudden movement, advanced against Jackson, surprising and totally routing his forces, and then returned back as far as to Gauley River.

At this crisis, Lee, Hemmingsen, and Wise were ordered to report at Richmond, and Floyd, who was left in the chief command, went into winter quarters at Cotton Hill, opposite the mouth of the Gauley, where the latter empties into the Kanawha. From this position, about the middle of November, being attacked suddenly and unexpectedly by a division of Rosecrans's forces under General Benham, he was driven in great confusion to Raleigh, through Fayetteville, a distance of thirty miles. Benham's men were worn out by the long march through mud and rain, and were obliged to rest for the night. The next morning, when about to continue the pursuit with almost a certainty of capturing Raleigh, and with it the entire train, if not the whole force of the enemy, he was recalled by an order from General Schenck, and Floyd continued his flight without farther molestation.

A writer in the *Lynchburg Virginian* gives a full account of the flight of Floyd, which he pronounces to be "another dark shadow in the campaign

of Western Virginia." He says, "On the evening of November 11 the enemy made strong demonstrations, near Cotton Hill, of an attack on the next day, and General Floyd ordered the army to fall back three miles. Next morning it was reported that the enemy were advancing to Fayetteville, to cut off our retreat and surround our brigade. This news caused General Floyd to order a retreat, which took place about eight o'clock at night, when the brigade retreated back to Fayetteville, two and a half miles, and halted to guard the road which the enemy were expected to come in to attempt to cut off our retreat. Here the brigade remained until just daylight, without shelter, victuals, or repose, when they were ordered to continue their retreat. The brigade continued its retreat ten miles on the 13th, and halted for the night. During the whole of the retreat thus far there was a great deal of excitement, fear, and especially loss of baggage, property, and provisions; and on the night of the 11th they burned about three hundred tents, several bales of new blankets and overcoats, and a number of mess chests, camp equipages of all kinds; and flour barrels were burst, contents scattered on the ground, and all kinds of provisions wasted and scattered, all to prevent the enemy from getting them. Wagoners were compelled to take the horses from the wagons, mount them, and fly for safety, leaving about fifteen wagons in the hands of the enemy. On the morning of the 14th the brigade took up their march, and had gone but two miles, when it was reported that the enemy were near and rushing on the brigade. At this the cavalry, under command of Colonel Croghan, were ordered back to scout the country and ascertain the enemy's distance. When they had gone back two miles they met the enemy's pickets advancing, when Colonel Croghan ordered his men all to dismount, though he did not, when the pickets of the enemy fired on him, and he fell mortally wounded. His men took him up and carried him some two hundred yards to a house, when they discovered that the enemy were closing in, and the colonel told them to fly and save themselves, for he was dying. At the moment those who were with the colonel discovered that their horses had been taken by the Yankee pickets, who had rushed upon them, they turned and fled, and the whole cavalry came within five minutes of being all cut off and captured. The cavalry then all swept on in abreast until they came up with the rear of our infantry, and proclaimed that the enemy were pursuing in double-quick time. Then appeared a scene in our army indescribable, and of terrific confusion. At the word 'the enemy are pursuing,' all broke off in a wild run, some so frightened that they threw away their knapsacks and all they had, but gun and knife to defend themselves with. It required great effort upon the part of the officers, who were somewhat cool, to prevent a perfect rout. After this day the brigade continued its retreat, but with a great deal of toil and difficulty, and finally encamped here on the 24th of November. This encampment is near Peterstown, in the south edge of Monroe County, and it is expected that the brigade will winter near here."

Colonel Croghan fell into our hands mortally wounded, and died in a few hours. His body was sent by General Benham to the confederate commander, with a note hoping that he would appreciate the desire thus expressed of mitigating the horrors of war. He was a Kentuckian, the son of that George Croghan who, in 1813, with only 160 men, defended Fort Stephenson in Ohio against 1000 British regulars and Indians, and who, a quarter of a century later, received the thanks of Congress and a medal for his gallantry on that occasion, and died as inspector general of the United States army.

This pursuit of Floyd brought to an end the campaign in Western Virginia. After this there was no engagement—nothing but an unimportant though severe skirmish between a confederate force at Camp Alleghany, about twenty-five miles from Cheat Mountain summit, and a portion of Reynolds's division. Floyd was ordered with his brigade to Tennessee, and Wise's legion went to Richmond, from which place it was sent to Roanoke Island, where at the proper moment we shall find it, under the general's son, doing battle against the federal troops under General Burnside.

On the 19th of July McClellan had issued an address to his soldiers summing up the results of his campaign. He said: "You have annihilated two armies, commanded by educated and experienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain fastnesses, and fortified at their leisure. You have taken five guns, twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, one thousand prisoners, including more than forty officers. One of the second commanders of the rebels is a prisoner; the other lost his life on the field of battle. You have killed more than two hundred and fifty of the enemy, who has lost all his baggage and camp equipage. All this has been accomplished with the loss of twenty brave men killed and sixty wounded on your part. You have proved that Union men, fighting for the preservation of our government, are more than a match for our misguided and erring brothers. You have made long and arduous marches, with insufficient food, frequently exposed to the inclemency of the weather. I have not hesitated to demand this of you, feeling that I could rely upon your endurance, patriotism, and courage. In the future I may have still greater demands to make upon you, still greater sacrifices for you to offer. I have confidence in you, and I trust you have learned to confide in me. Remember that discipline and subordination are qualities of equal value with courage."

This address of McClellan seems almost prophetic. Two days before it was issued our army of the Potomac came in sight of the enemy before Manassas; two days after it was issued we met with the disaster of Bull Run. The greater demands of which McClellan spoke were to be made, the greater sacrifices offered; and we had to learn by bitter experience that "discipline and subordination are qualities of equal value with courage."

From our triumph in Western Virginia we now turn to our great defeat at Bull Run.





BULL RUN, NEAR UNION MILLS, CROSSED BY THE ORANGE AND ALEXANDRIA RAILROAD.

## CHAPTER III.

## THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

The Proclamation and Volunteers.—The opposing Armies.—Popular Impatience.—Forward to Richmond.—Determination to Advance.—McDowell's Appointment.—Forces at his Command.—Beauregard and Johnston.—The Situation at Manassas.—Beauregard's Proclamation.—Topography of the Region.—Movements of the Confederates.—The Ambush at Vienna.—Johnston and Patterson.—Treachery in the Departments.—Patterson out-generaled.—Johnston sets out to join Beauregard.—McDowell's Advance.—The Halt at Fairfax.—Outrages by the Soldiers.—McDowell's Order.—The March to Centreville.—Skirmish at Blackburn's Ford.—McDowell's First Plan of Operations.—Why abandoned.—His Second Plan.—Johnston and Beauregard at Manassas.—Their Plan of Attack.—War and Chess.—Strength of the two Armies.—The Advance upon Bull Run.—Timo lost.—Tyler in Position.—Topography of the Battle-field.—General Position of the Confederates.—The Battle of the Morning.—The Confederates repulsed.—They fall back to the Plateau.—Jackson's Stand.—Johnston and Beauregard on the Field.—Reorganization of the Confederates.—Estimate of Forces.—The Battle of the Afternoon.—The Confederate Position.—Rout of the New York Zouaves.—The Zouaves and the Black Horse Cavalry.—Keyes's Movement.—The Fight on the Hill.—The Federal Batteries disabled.—The Fight on the Ridge.—Federal Anticipations of Victory.—Confederate Re-enforcements.—The Rout.—Arrival of Jefferson Davis.—Stand of Sykes with the Regulars.—The Flight of the Federals.—The Pursuit by the Confederates.—Civilians on the Field.—At Cub Run Bridge.—Miles's Division.—Miles and Richardson.—The Halt at Centreville.—The Flight to Washington.—Reports of the Battle.—General Resumé.—Object and Means of the Expedition.—Causes of its Failure.—Burnside and Schenck.—General Note.—Authorities for the History.—Name of the Battle.—Patterson's Explanation.—List of Regiments.—The New York Zouaves.—Losses on both Sides.

THE President's proclamation of April 15, calling for 75,000 militia for three months, also summoned Congress to meet in extra session on the 4th of July. Notwithstanding the contemptuous refusal of the governors of six states, whose quotas amounted to 12,000 men, more than 80,000 promptly responded to the call. They saved the national capital from seizure; but it soon became evident that this force was wholly inadequate to the task of "suppressing the combinations and causing the laws to be duly executed." On the 3d of May another proclamation was put forth by the President calling for 42,000 volunteers for three years, and ordering an increase of 23,000 men to the regular army, and 18,000 to the navy. The nation uprose to the greatness of the occasion rather than to the smallness of the demand. In a month five men volunteered for one who had been asked. When Congress met, just two months from the date of the call, it was formally announced by the Secretary of War that there were in active service 260,000 men, of whom 153 regiments, with 165,000 men, were volunteers for three years, 25,000 regulars, and 80,000 volunteers for three months; besides these, fifty-five regiments, 50,000 strong, had been accepted, and would be in the field in twenty days; so that after the three months' men had withdrawn there would remain an army 230,000 strong. Government seemed to doubt whether this was a sufficient force. The Secretary of War said, "It will remain for Congress to determine whether the army shall at this time be in-

creased by the addition of a still larger volunteer force." The President, with a deeper but yet inadequate insight into the magnitude of the rebellion, asked that Congress, "in order to make the contest a short and decisive one, should place at the control of the government for this work at least 400,000 men."

While the administration was thus in doubt as to the adequacy of the force at its disposal for the work to be done, there was now no doubt on the part of the people. When men saw regiment after regiment hurrying to camp or parading the streets, when they heard of them pouring forward in a continuous stream which seemed to block up every approach to the capital, they were confident that the Confederacy had no power to withstand the forces arraying themselves on its borders. Great as were these forces, they were exaggerated in popular estimation. A regiment proposed to be raised was set down as accepted; one accepted was considered to be in the field; one in the field to be ready for immediate service. The people did not know, and the government dared not tell them, that there was a fearful lack of arms, munitions, and equipments—of every thing necessary to transform a crowd of men into an army. Through the villainy of Floyd, the complicity of Toucey, and the imbecility of Buchanan, the loyal states had been stripped of arms. Of the three great armories, two had fallen without opposition into the hands of the Confederates. Norfolk, with its accumulation of 2000 great guns, was theirs. Harper's Ferry, with its machinery almost uninjured, was theirs, needing only to be transported to a safe place. The Union had merely the armory at Springfield, which was then capable of turning out only 25,000 muskets a year. The private armories then in existence could furnish only a few thousand more. As far as men were concerned, government could create an army by a word; to supply the arms, without which in modern warfare there can be no army, was a work of time. A few could be furnished by importation from abroad; for the rest, not only the arms themselves, but the means of creating them, must be created. The enemy was for the time abundantly supplied. The sudden seizure of the forts and arsenals from the Chesapeake to the Rio Grande, from Virginia to Alabama, had put into his hands more weapons than he could use. Men were not wanting on either side; but while the Federal regiments stood idle in camp for want of arms, the Confederates had weapons ready for every company that could be raised. The Confederates availed themselves of this initial advantage. The ink with which the Virginia Ordinance of Secession was written was hardly dry before Richmond was chosen as the capital, where their Congress was to meet on the 20th of July, and troops from the farthest South were pushed to the northern frontiers of the Confederacy, within sight of the dome of the Federal Capitol.

The people of the North could see no sign of a corresponding activity. Their forces never moved southward far enough to lose sight of the Poto-



mac. Day by day they grew more impatient of this delay, for which they could see no good reason. Buchanan's administration had been feeble and treacherous; was not that of Lincoln treacherous and feeble? Twenty thousand men had twelve years before marched from Vera Cruz to Mexico; why could not ten times as many, under the same commander, march from Washington to Richmond or Montgomery? That commander, it was hinted rather than said, was a Southerner by birth. It was acknowledged that for more than half a century he had been true and loyal, but were not Davis and Stephens loyal, Twiggs, Lee, and Johnston faithful, and even Floyd, Cobb, and Thompson honest, until the time came when they must choose between their country and their section? Had the old treason gone out when the new administration came in?

Such were the questions which all men were asking themselves during the months of May and June, and it needed but a word, fitly or unfitly spoken, to rouse a storm of indignation against the government. That word was supplied by the *New York Tribune*, a newspaper which, from various causes, was at the moment the exponent of popular feeling. For a score of years it had, through evil report and through good report, maintained the principles of the Republican party, always earnestly, if not always wisely. That party had now, after a long and weary contest, triumphed in every free state but one. The circulation of the paper was large. It reached every hamlet in the North and West; it passed from house to house, from hand to hand, and had every week a million of readers, by a large portion of whom it was accepted as authority. At length, on the 26th of June, it contained an article headed "the Nation's War-cry," which in just thirty words gave expression to the common feeling, and form to the general demand. "Forward to Richmond!" it said. "The Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July. By that date the place must be held by the national army." Day after day these thirty electric words were repeated without change, like the Roman senator's "Carthage must be destroyed." Day after day this brief text was followed up by an elaborate discourse. Government was charged with indifference, if not treachery. The rebels were ready to fly at our approach. If the right men were in the right places, the war could be virtually ended in three months. If this was not done, it would be the fault of incompetent or treacherous leaders; politicians in or out of uniform, who did not wish the rebels routed, and in whose official statements no reliance was to be placed. If the rebellion was not thoroughly put down by spring, it would be because the nation had been betrayed by the government; it must acknowledge itself beaten, and recognize the independence of the Confederacy. And so on through every form of direct or insinuated accusation.<sup>1</sup>

The force of these appeals lay in that they were echoes of the popular feeling to which they gave form and expression. It pressed upon government with a force which could not be withstood. Members of Congress crowded upon the President and General Scott complaining of the inactivity of the army, and urging them to heed the cry, "Forward to Richmond!" The administration was in a sore strait. If the movement was attempted, there was a more than equal chance of its failure; if it was not attempted, government would lose the confidence of the country. A lost battle might be retrieved; public confidence lost could never be regained. The President, looking mainly at the political aspect of the case, was in favor of the movement. The commanding general, looking mainly at the military aspect, was opposed to it; but at last, against his judgment, gave a reluctant consent.

The movement having been determined upon, it only remained to make the best preparations possible. General Scott could not take the command in person. Age and infirmity had come upon him. For three years he had been unable to mount a horse; it was with difficulty that he could walk a few steps; he was tormented with dropsy and harassed by vertigo. Four months later he was compelled to ask to be suffered to retire from active service. The request was granted, and, full of age and honors, he was released from the command which he had so long and honorably held. Meanwhile the actual conduct of the enterprise must be intrusted to other hands. The choice fell upon General Irvin McDowell. He was in the prime of manhood; had graduated twenty-seven years before at the Military Academy with high honor; had served through the Mexican war, and was brevetted as captain for gallant and meritorious conduct in the hard-fought battle of Buena Vista. When peace came he relinquished his rank in the line, and entered the adjutant general's department. At the outbreak of the rebellion he returned to duty in the field, and was appointed brigadier general in the regular army, his commission dating from May 14, 1861. To consid-



IRVIN McDOWELL.

erable military experience he joined a personal character beyond reproach, and loyalty above suspicion. In selecting him for the command, government made the wisest choice then possible. It had yet to learn who were the generals endowed with great military genius. On the 27th of May McDowell was appointed to the command of a new military department, comprising all Virginia east of the Alleghany Mountains and west of the James River, with the exception of Fortress Monroe and its immediate vicinity. He set himself at once to the task of organizing into an army the regiments placed under his command. He took up his head-quarters at Arlington House, once the residence of the adopted son of the Father of our Country, from whom it had passed by marriage into the hands of General Lee, who had forsworn his military oath, thrown up his commission in the national army to head the insurgent forces in Virginia, and was soon to be appointed to the chief command of the entire Confederate army.

The force at the disposal of government for the execution of this enterprise was far less than was supposed. On the morning of the 27th of June, when the nation's war cry—"Forward to Richmond!"—reached Washington, there were in and around Washington 38,600 Federal troops. Of these, 15,700 were across the Potomac in Virginia, the remainder being in the District. Patterson, with about 18,000 men, was fifty miles away, near Harper's Ferry, watching an equal Confederate force in the Valley of the Shenandoah. All that was expected of him was to prevent that army from interfering with the march into Virginia. Butler at Fortress Monroe, Banks in Maryland, and McClellan in West Virginia, with some 40,000 men in all, could not directly co-operate. Of the 310,000 men whom the Secretary of War a week after announced to be at the disposal of the government, about 100,000 were in actual service. Of these, something more than 50,000 could be concentrated near the capital, from which, after leaving behind a force to garrison Washington and its defenses, McDowell must draw the army which was to advance. The 8th of July was fixed upon as the day for the commencement of the movement. But the regiments came up slowly, many of them eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and were sent forward without ever having been formed into brigades or having been seen by their commanders. Time passed on until the 15th, and yet the arrangements were far from complete; but the pressure from without was so strong, that orders were given for the advance on the following day. The force had been organized into five divisions. The First Division, under Tyler, consisted of eleven volunteer regiments, and three companies of cavalry and artillery. The Second Division, under Hunter, seven volunteer regiments, a battalion of regulars, a corps of marines, and six companies of cavalry and artillery. The Third Division, under Heintzelman, had ten volunteer regiments, and three companies of cavalry and artillery. The Fourth Division, under Runyon, had seven regiments of New Jersey volunteers. The Fifth Division, under Miles, had nine volunteer regiments, with two companies of artillery. The entire army numbered 35,000, of whom about 33,000 were volunteers. Of these one third were for three months, whose term of service was about to expire. About 1000 were regulars from a number of regiments, 500 were marines, and the remainder were cavalry and artillery. Of cavalry there were but four companies. Though falling fully 20,000 short of the number generally attributed to it, this was the largest army ever brought together under one command on this continent.

The Confederates, meanwhile, having resolved to make Virginia the seat of war, and having transferred their seat of government from Montgomery to Richmond, had pushed forward two considerable armies toward the Potomac. Beauregard's bloodless capture of Fort Sumter had made him the hero of the South, and to him was intrusted the command of the most important of these armies, that of the Potomac; while to Johnston, his superior in rank, was confided the command of the Army of the Shenandoah. The

<sup>1</sup> "THE NATION'S WAR-CRY. — Forward to Richmond! Forward to Richmond! The Rebel Congress must not be allowed to meet there on the 20th of July! BY THAT DATE THE PLACE MUST BE HELD BY THE NATIONAL ARMY!"—*Tribune*, June 26 to July 3.

"... If the rebels are not virtually whipped when the next spring opens, and if they shall meanwhile have steadily confronted our troops without losing ground, we may consider that the republic has been betrayed by the folly or incompetence of its trusted leaders, and that disunion is a fixed fact."—*The Same*, June 27.

"... The war can not much longer be conducted and held in check by politicians, whether in uniform or out. ... If the men in Washington wish to convince the public that they have really repented, and are ready to do their duty, let them see to it that the national flag floats over Richmond before the 20th of July."—*The Same*, June 27.

"The real question is this: Does General Scott (or whoever it may be) contemplate the same end, and is he animated by like impulses with the great body of the loyal, liberty-loving people of the country? ... Does he want the rebels routed, or would he have them conciliated? If the national forces shall be beaten in a fair stand-up fight—which we do not believe possible—the patriot millions will acknowledge the corn and the independence of Secession. If our side beats, the rebel leaders must abscond ... and we may just as well determine who is who in three months as in thirty."—*The Same*, July 1.

"... Forward, then, and anticipate the rebel force, which only awaits our approach to flee. Forward to Richmond, and place the national foot on the neck of the traitor who already sues for peace."—*The Same*, July 1.

"... Unfortunately, the credit to be given to declarations from the State Department is much impaired."—*The Same*, July 2.



Army of the Potomac took up a position judiciously chosen, either to threaten Washington or to defend Richmond. From Alexandria on the Potomac, just below Washington, starts the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, running southwestwardly, and forming the northern link in the great southern chain of railways. After traversing the flat Potomac region, it begins to climb the gradual slope of the outlying ranges of the great Alleghany chain. Twenty-seven miles from Alexandria it meets the Manassas Gap Railway, which, running almost due west for fifty miles, pierces the valley of the Shenandoah at Strasburg, thence turning south for a score of miles down the valley. These two roads meet on an elevated plateau. The point of union is known as Manassas Junction. From this point the railway runs southwardly, past Warrenton and Culpepper, fifty miles, to Gordonsville, where it connects with the great network of railway which, reaching every point in the South, has its focus at Richmond. From Manassas to Washington is about thirty miles; to Richmond about eighty in a direct line, but almost twice as far by the circuitous railway routes. Practically, however, it is nearer to Richmond for defensive purposes than to Washington for offensive. Before its military occupation the Junction was an insignificant place. It consisted of a low wooden dépôt, a dingy house for refreshments, and half a dozen small cottages scattered about over the bleak plain.

Beauregard, who had been ordered to the Mississippi, and was actually on his way thither when he was recalled, and ordered to take the command of the Army of the Potomac, reached Manassas early in June, and on the 5th issued a violent and mendacious proclamation addressed to the people of the region. "A reckless and unprincipled tyrant," he said, "has invaded your soil. Abraham Lincoln, regardless of all moral, legal, and constitutional restraints, has thrown his abolition hosts among you, who are murdering and imprisoning your citizens, confiscating and destroying your property, and committing other acts of violence and outrage too shocking and revolting to be enumerated. All rules of civilized warfare are abandoned, and they proclaim by their acts, if not on their banners, that their war-cry is 'Beauty and Booty.' All that is dear to man—your honor and that of your wives and daughters—your fortunes and your lives, are involved in this momentous contest." The people were summoned to rally to his camp. The neighboring planters responded to his call, partly in person, and more freely by sending their slaves, by whom, in a short time, a strong earthwork was thrown up, which was named Camp Pickett, in honor of the governor of South Carolina. The troops, thus freed from all other labor, could devote their time to military drill, and were soon brought into a state of tolerable efficiency.

The position, apart from its fortifications, was by nature a strong one. From the foot of the Blue Ridge a plain of about twenty miles in width slopes eastward down to the lowland region of the Potomac. This whole plain is broken and intricate, sparsely dotted with hamlets, plantations, and solitary houses, with patches of woodland, partly forests of considerable size, and partly of the scrubby growth of pine and oak which springs up spontaneously in the exhausted and abandoned fields of Virginia. It is intersected in every direction by streams, elsewhere denominated creeks, but in the local dialect known by the more picturesque name of "runs." Roads, which are hardly more than by-paths, traverse the plain in every direction, leading through the fields and woods to the solitary dwellings. The principal of these streams, which almost claims the rank of a river, is Bull Run. Pursuing a winding course, with a general direction from northwest to southeast, it drains a considerable tract of country, and falls into the Occoquan about twelve miles from its junction with the Potomac. It has worn a deep channel through the limestone strata, and the banks are generally steep and rocky. At intervals of a mile or two these banks are broken down so as to form fords, which are the only places where the stream can be crossed, with the exception of two bridges—one a substantial stone structure over which passes the Warrenton turnpike, the other a mere wooden bridge at Blackburn's Ford, seven miles below, on the direct road from Centreville to Manassas. A mile or so below this is the bridge by which the Orange and Alexandria Railway is carried over the Run. Three miles beyond the Run is Manassas Junction, where the Army of the Potomac had intrenched itself. The Run itself formed an admirable defensive line, eight miles long, from the Stone Bridge to the railroad. It could only be crossed by an army at the fords, and such was the nature of the approaches to these that they could be maintained against a greatly superior force. There was no necessity for fortifications, and with the exception of a strong abatis across the road at the Stone Bridge, there were no artificial defenses on the whole line. The wooded slopes of the hills furnished masks for batteries better than could be provided by art.

Beauregard, having securely intrenched himself at Manassas, pushed forward detachments toward Washington. An outpost was established at Fairfax Court House, ten miles on the road to Washington, where intrenchments were thrown up. The cavalry and light artillery made dashes to within sight of the Federal works at Arlington Heights, and could catch glimpses of the dome of the national Capitol, of which they hoped soon to have possession. One of the boldest of these dashes was made by Colonel Gregg to the north of Washington. He penetrated forty-five miles to the Potomac, and returning, on the 17th of June, when at Vienna, on the Loudon railway, he learned that a train of cars loaded with Federal soldiers was at hand. Placing two guns in ambush at a curve of the road, he awaited their approach, and as they rounded the curve poured in a well-aimed fire, which raked the cars from front to rear, killing a number of the soldiers, and scattering the rest. They then hastily pushed back without suffering any loss. With this exception, and a few unimportant rencounters between small squads of scouts, there had been no active hostilities between the two

MANASSAS JUNCTION AFTER ITS EVACUATION BY THE CONFEDERATES, FEBRUARY, 1862.





armies of the Potomac. Nor had there been any serious encounters between the forces to the north of Washington.



JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON

General Joseph E. Johnston, who had been assigned to the Army of the Shenandoah, arrived at Harper's Ferry on the 23d of May, and assumed the command. He found there nine regiments and two battalions of infantry, four companies of artillery, with sixteen guns, and about three hundred cavalry. He saw at once that the place was untenable against even an equal force. It was so completely overlooked that it was more favorable to an attacking than a defending force. Patterson, across the Potomac, was watching him, ready to cross and advance up the valley from the east, while McClellan, after his successes in West Virginia, was expected to come into the valley from the west; with these forces in his rear, he would be cut off from giving any aid in case of need to the Army of the Potomac. He therefore wished to abandon Harper's Ferry, and fall back twenty-five miles to Winchester, where all the practicable roads from the west and northwest, as well as from Manassas, meet the main route from Pennsylvania and Maryland. But the military authorities at Richmond overruled him, and directed him still to occupy Harper's Ferry. On the 13th information came that Romney, fifty miles to the northwest, had been seized by a strong body of Federal troops, who were supposed to be the vanguard of McClellan's army coming down to form a junction with Patterson, and three days later information came that Patterson had crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and was apparently advancing up the valley upon Winchester. Johnston then took the responsibility of abandoning Harper's Ferry, and threw his army by a flank movement across Patterson's presumed line of march. Patterson at once recrossed the Potomac, and Johnston, having received a dispatch from Richmond sanctioning the movement which he had already made on his own responsibility, resumed his original plan, and fell back to Winchester, where he intrenched himself strongly. Here he could oppose McClellan from the west, Patterson from the northeast, or form a junction with Beauregard at Manassas if necessary. On the 23d of June Patterson again crossed the Potomac and marched toward Winchester. Johnston slowly retired, and some skirmishing took place, with no decisive results.

McDowell's advance had now been determined upon. In making his estimates of the force necessary to accomplish the work before him, he had stipulated that Johnston should be so "taken care of" as not to be able to come to the assistance of Beauregard. This work was intrusted to General Patterson. Johnston's army had been increased by eight regiments from the far South, and about 2500 militia called out from the neighboring counties in Virginia. As it lay strongly intrenched at Winchester at the middle of July, it numbered about 18,000 of all arms. Patterson's army was of about the same strength. They were almost all volunteer regiments whose term of service was about to expire; they were dissatisfied with the treatment they had received, and would not stay one hour beyond their time. Patterson vastly overrated the strength of the enemy, and dared not attack them; he would rather lose the chance of accomplishing something brilliant, than, by hazarding his column, endanger the success of the campaign by defeat. So he was satisfied with merely watching Johnston, and endeavoring to hold him at Winchester. On the 17th of July he received a telegram from Washington that McDowell had advanced, and that on the next day Manassas Junction would probably be carried. He believed that Johnston's forces were still before him, and that he had detained them until it was too late for them to assist Beauregard. He lay all the 18th awaiting an attack, not dreaming that his skillful opponent was then, with all his available force, on the way to join the Army of the Potomac; and it was only on the 20th, at the very hour when Johnston was joining Beauregard, that Patterson learned that he had been thoroughly out-generaled. It was too late to retrieve the error, even had he been capable of making a bold movement; and so, on the 21st, while the fight at Bull Run was going on, Patterson fell

quietly back to Harper's Ferry. While the smart of the great defeat at Bull Run was yet fresh, Patterson was charged with gross negligence, if not with absolute treachery. A calmer view showed nothing to sustain these charges. A task had been imposed upon him beyond his powers, and he failed in accomplishing it. He was simply incompetent, not wantonly negligent, still less treacherous. The decision of the government, by which he was honorably discharged from service, was just and proper.

Treason, however, was rife in every department of the government at Washington. For years a system had been growing up under which the clerkships in the various departments had been mainly bestowed upon Southerners. When cabinet ministers and naval and military officers were false, it could hardly be expected that civil clerks should be true. By their means the Confederate government was fully informed of every movement made or contemplated at Washington. The most secret dispatches, and the most private documents of the government at Washington, were copied and sent to the authorities at Richmond. A military map of Eastern Virginia had been prepared by government officials. It was thought to be of such importance that it was furnished only to Federal officers of the highest rank; yet a copy of it was found on the table of a Confederate captain at Fairfax.


McDowell's advance was commenced on the morning of the 17th of July. Beauregard was notified of it from "a trusty source" in time to give orders in the evening of that day that his advanced brigades should fall back from Fairfax. He also sent an aid-de-camp to Johnston at Winchester, calling for assistance, and indicating the point to which his march should be directed. By the time that this message reached Johnston, he had received direct communications from Richmond ordering him to go to the support of Beauregard. This order was received by Johnston at Winchester at one o'clock on the morning of the 18th. To comply with this order, Johnston must either defeat or elude Patterson. He chose the latter course. Leaving his sick, nearly 1700 in number, at Winchester, with the Virginia militia, and posting a strong rear-guard to induce Patterson to believe that his whole army was still in front, he pushed his whole available force up the Valley of the Shenandoah, and thence, through Ashby's Gap in the Blue Ridge, to the line of the Manassas Railway, which brought him by noon of the 20th to Manassas Junction, where, in virtue of his superior rank, he assumed the command of the entire army. He was at Manassas before Patterson dreamed that he had left Winchester, two days' march away. All that he dared hope was that he had gained a day and a half upon Patterson, who, he presumed, would join McDowell during the 22d.

McDowell's advance set out from the camps near Washington on the afternoon of July 16, but the main body did not commence its march until daybreak on the following morning, moving in four columns by roads nearly parallel. The advance was slow, for the men were unaccustomed to marching, and were inconvenienced by carrying the loads to be borne in light marching order. The roads also had been obstructed, and ambuscades were to be expected. Fairfax Court House was reached at about noon. The works thrown up here had been deserted, and the place was seized without opposition, only a few straggling shots being fired, by which three or four men were wounded. The greater part of the men had marched only six miles, and McDowell wished to push on at once to Centreville, six miles farther, but he was told that the men were worn out, not so much by the distance marched as by the more wearying work of waiting on foot. So a halt was ordered for the day. The troops were in high spirits. They looked upon the falling back of the Confederate forces as the first step in the retreat which would not cease until Richmond was reached. "It is ardently hoped,"



ROBERT PATTERSON.





PLANS OF OPERATIONS.

This map indicates, in a general way, the operations, actual or proposed, on both sides, previous to the battle of Bull Run.—A A shows McDowell's advance to Centreville.—B Runyon's division, left in reserve near Fairfax Court House.—C C McDowell at Centreville.—D D Confederate brigades across Bull Run.—E E McDowell's first plan to turn the Confederate right.—H H McDowell's second plan to turn the Confederate left, which brought on the battle.—K K Beauregard's original plan of attacking with his right the Federals at Centreville.

wrote one newspaper correspondent, "that the rascals will make a stand at Manassas. But it is greatly feared that they will run again. If Beauregard does not give us battle at Manassas, his army will be thus thoroughly demoralized, and he is beaten past a ray of hope." The march was looked upon as a picnic excursion; the men gave themselves up to the humors of camp life. Some dressed themselves in women's clothes, and paraded the town; one fellow donned an imitation of a clerical gown and band, and with an open book in his hands stalked through the street, reading the funeral service of the President of the Southern Confederacy. Some—only a few—did not content themselves with these unmilitary displays. They set out on predatory excursions to the neighboring houses, and came back swinging their plunder upon their bayonets. Several houses were sacked and burned, though no personal injury was inflicted. McDowell repressed these outrages by a sorrowful and stern order. "It is with the deepest mortification," he said, "that the commanding general finds it necessary to reiterate his orders for the preservation of the property of the inhabitants of the district occupied by the troops under his command. It is again ordered that no one shall arrest or attempt to arrest any citizen not in arms at the time, or search, or attempt to search any house, or even to enter the same, without permission. The troops must behave themselves with as much forbearance and propriety as if they were at their own homes. They are here to fight the enemies of the country, not to judge and punish the unarmed and defenseless, however guilty they may be." The severest military penalty was threatened for any violation of this order. No more outrages were committed. The troops bivouacked under the open sky, the general and his staff, like the men, sleeping on the ground. Next morning the army resumed its march, and the whole force, with the exception of Runyon's division, which was left at Fairfax, was soon concentrated near Centreville.

Centreville is a village of a score or two of houses, straggling along a ridge at the confluence of several roads, about five miles from Bull Run. One of these roads—the Warrenton turnpike—goes almost due west, crossing the Run at the Stone Bridge. Another, going southwestward, and crossing the Run at Blackburn's Ford, goes directly to Manassas Junction, three miles beyond the stream, connecting by cross-roads with the different fords above and below. Tyler, whose division now led the advance, reached the village early on the 18th, and finding that the enemy had fallen back, pushed forward to make a reconnoissance in the direction of Blackburn's Ford, taking with him four regiments of Richardson's brigade. They found the enemy in considerable force hidden in the woods which bordered the Run. Some sharp though random firing from artillery was interchanged for several hours. The New York Twelfth was thrown into confusion; Richardson wished to charge with the other regiments, and carry the hostile position; but Tyler, who knew that it was no part of the commanding general's plan to bring on an action here, refused his consent. A reconnoissance only had been intended, and this had been made in stronger force than was desirable. The troops were accordingly withdrawn. In this skirmish the loss on each side was about equal. The Confederates lost 15 killed and 53 wounded,

several of them mortally—68 in all; the Federals lost 19 killed, 38 wounded, and 26 missing—83 in all.

McDowell could never have contemplated a march upon Richmond, with the army under his command, in face of the force directly opposed to him and of the re-enforcements which could be hurried up from Richmond and beyond. He did not even intend to assail them directly in the strong position at Manassas. His purpose was to gain their rear, and break their railway communication both with the forces at Richmond and in the Valley of the Shenandoah. The two armies of the enemy, cut off from communication with each other and with Richmond, would be forced to fall back from their position threatening the capital, leaving Manassas, the key of the direct route to the south, in his hands. To accomplish this, he proposed to make a sudden movement to the left, cross the Occoquan just below its junction with Bull Run, and strike a blow at the enemy's railroad communication in this direction. He had not, therefore, accompanied his army in its advance from Fairfax to Centreville. He had indeed expected to encounter the army at Fairfax, and was disappointed at their abandonment of that place without a struggle. The march to Centreville was intended merely as a demonstration. On the morning of the 18th he set out on a reconnoissance of the country to his left, through which he proposed to advance. He was soon convinced that the country in that direction was impracticable for the advance of his army, and was forced to abandon his first plan and form another. Coming to Centreville, he learned the results of Tyler's and Richardson's reconnoissance to Blackburn's Ford. This showed that the enemy had done wisely in falling back to the line of Bull Run, and that they were in too great force there to allow an attempt to force the passage with any reasonable hope of success; and even if the passage were forced, he would find himself in front of the strong position at Manassas, which was not to be desired. Still, something must be done, or the whole expedition would be an absolute failure; a failure without even an attempt to strike a blow. What was to be done must be done speedily. A large and the best part of his force consisted of three months' men, whose term of service was about to expire. They, at least, had had a few weeks of discipline. The three years' men were all new to military life. In a few days he would have lost ten thousand of his best troops. Every day's delay, while it would probably add to the strength of the enemy, would diminish his. The march to the left having been found impracticable, and a direct advance in front being too dangerous to be risked, the only alternative was to attempt to turn the enemy's position on the right.

From reconnoissances made and information received on the 19th, he learned that the enemy's extreme left was at the Stone Bridge, directly in his front, where the Warrenton turnpike crosses Bull Run; and that some two or three miles above was Sudley's Ford, which was unguarded, and could be reached by an almost unused forest road. The enemy apparently expected an attack some miles below; if his feeble left could be turned by surprise before he could bring up his force to sustain it, it could be forced back, the turnpike seized, and a detachment sent forward by it to cut the railroad in the rear of Manassas Junction. This movement, to be success-



ful, must be a surprise; it must be accomplished before the enemy were prepared to resist it; and, moreover, provision must be made that while a considerable part of the Federal force was thus detached to turn the Confederate left, his own left should not be turned by the enemy from below.

McDowell's final plan was based upon these considerations. The 19th and 20th of July were devoted to making the requisite arrangements. Rations for three days were prepared and distributed, and the details of the enterprise were arranged. Miles's division was to be left in reserve near Centreville: Richardson's brigade, temporarily detached from Tyler's division, and attached to that of Miles, was to make a demonstration upon Blackburn's Ford, holding the enemy there in check. The remainder of Tyler's division, composed of the brigades of Schenck, Keyes, and Sherman, was to march straight down the turnpike, threaten the Stone Bridge, and be ready to cross and advance along the turnpike as soon as the bridge was cleared of the enemy, meanwhile occupying the forces in their immediate front. The main attack was to be made by Hunter's and Heintzelman's divisions, who were to proceed by the forest road on the right to Sudley's Ford, cross the Run, and then, turning sharply down the opposite bank, force the enemy's left below the bridge, and thus clear the way for Tyler to cross. The march was to be begun at half past two on the morning of Sunday, July 21, Tyler in the advance, going straight down the turnpike to the bridge, upon which he was to open a cannonade. Hunter and Heintzelman were to follow for a couple of miles till they came to the road to the right, where they were to turn off and make their way to their crossing-place at Sudley's Ford. It was supposed that Tyler would be ready to open fire at the bridge by daybreak—a little after four o'clock—and that Hunter and Heintzelman would be across the Run at six.

The enemy, meanwhile, had not been inactive. Johnston, whom McDowell had supposed to be detained at Winchester by Patterson, had slipped off unperceived with the whole of his available force, and, preceded and accompanied by eight regiments, numbering 6000 men, had, on the preceding day, joined Beauregard at Manassas. He had left the remainder of his force behind, for the Manassas Railway was not able to transport the whole at once; but he was assured that 5000 more would be sent forward from the Piedmont Station in a few hours. Reaching Manassas, in virtue of his superior rank he assumed the command of the combined forces. He had assumed that Patterson would discover his departure from Winchester, and, hastening to join McDowell, would reach him on the 22d, giving him a decided superiority in force; but, in the mean while, if his own expected 5000 came up on the evening of the 20th, he would, for a night and a day, have the greater numbers. Beauregard, being thoroughly acquainted with the ground, and apprised of the approach of the Army of the Shenandoah, had prepared a plan of battle, to which Johnston at once gave his assent. He proposed to cross Bull Run below the Stone Bridge with the whole force of the two armies, and attack McDowell, whom he expected to find lying at Centreville, before the expected re-enforcements from Patterson should join him. The Confederate troops were posted with this view, and orders were given for carrying the movement into effect; but the 5000 from Piedmont did not come up; the order was countermanded just at daybreak; the Confederates remained at their posts on their side of Bull Run without attempting their proposed offensive movement on the Federal left. At that same moment the Federal army—two hours behind its appointed time—had fairly commenced its offensive advance upon the Confederate left. If either commander had fathomed the plans of the other, the battle would have been fought on different ground, and probably with a different result.

War has been compared to the game of chess. The parallel fails in many important particulars. In chess each piece has a fixed and absolute value, and each player may know exactly his own force and that of his opponent. He who plays most skillfully must win. In war neither commander knows the exact value of his own force, and can only conjecture that of his adversary. Above all, there is the great disturbing element of time. A movement which would insure success if made at the right instant, may be useless or fatal an hour later. This element of time modified the whole course of the battle of Bull Run, and in the end decided its result. The Confederate re-enforcements did not come up as was expected, and the order for attack was countermanded. The Federal forces made their attack some hours later than was designed, and lost the expected advantage of surprise; and, finally, when the battle hung in even balance, a Confederate re-enforcement, of which neither side could know, turned the scale.

The two armies opposed to each other at the dawn of July 21 were almost equal. McDowell had set out with 35,000, of these, Runyon's division of 5000 had been left behind to hold the communications with Washington. At Centreville, on the evening of the 20th, he had 30,000; but among these were the Pennsylvania Fourth regiment and the battery attached to the New York Eighth: their term expired on the 20th, and they insisted upon their discharge. McDowell vainly tried to induce them to stay a few days longer. They refused. They had fulfilled the letter of their enlistment; and, on the morning of the 21st, while their comrades were marching forward to battle, this recreant Pennsylvania Fourth regiment, with the battery of the New York Eighth, slunk back to the rear to the sound of the enemy's cannon. Deducting these dastards, the killed and disabled of the 18th, and the sick of the various divisions, the Federal army, on the morning of the 21st, numbered, within a few hundreds more or less, 28,000 available men. At that same time the Confederate Army of the Potomac numbered about 22,000 (by the official statement, exactly 21,833) effective men. Of the Army of the Shenandoah 6000 had already arrived, making 28,000 in all. During the battle other re-enforcements to the Confederates came up, raising the Army of the Shenandoah from 6000 to 8334, besides Hill's Virginia regi-



DAVID HUNTER

ment of 550. The entire force at the command of the Confederate general was a little less than 31,000.<sup>1</sup> What portion of either army were brought into action at each stage of the battle will appear hereafter. McDowell, after the discharge of the battery of the New York Eighth, had forty-nine guns. The Confederates had at the commencement of the action precisely the same number; another battery of four pieces was brought up by the re-enforcements, making fifty-three in all. The Confederate artillery was generally inferior in calibre and range, but as the firing was at close distance, this disadvantage was more than made up by the greater ease and rapidity with which they could be handled and discharged. The organization of the Confederate troops was decidedly superior. They had been brought together into brigades, under commanders whom they knew, while the greater portion of the Federals had been thus organized only since the march began, and were to a great extent unacquainted with their commanding officers. In cavalry the Confederates were much the stronger. They had at least twelve companies, while the Federals had but four.

The Federal divisions were set in motion by moonlight, at that stillest hour which just precedes the dawn. The time for each movement was carefully designated. Tyler, who lay in front of Centreville, was to lead the way, and go straight down the turnpike to the Stone Bridge, which he was to threaten. Hunter, who was encamped a mile or two in the rear, was to follow for two or three miles along the turnpike till he came to the forest road branching off to the right toward Sudley's Ford, where he was to cross the Run, and then turn sharply down the west bank. Heintzelman was to follow Hunter for about two miles on the forest road, then turn and cross the Run below him. All were to move at half past two. It was thought that Tyler would be in position to open fire at daybreak, a little after four; that Hunter, entering the forest road as soon as daylight enabled him to thread its tortuous course, would cross the Run at six, followed closely by Heintzelman, so that the whole force would be on the expected battle-ground in the cool of the morning. But a night movement is always liable to interruptions. These occurred at every step. Tyler occupied the turnpike two hours longer than was expected, keeping Hunter and Heintzelman so much behind their time. Then the road through the Big Forest was longer and more difficult than had been supposed, and the passage of the Run was made at nine instead of six. Three hours were thus lost when minutes were of priceless worth.

McDowell had anticipated the probability of delay, and wished to move his columns a few miles forward the preceding night; but he yielded to the wishes of some of his officers, who thought it would be more pleasant to make but a single march. For the second time within three days he threw away a victory which a more enterprising commander would have grasped. If, instead of halting at Fairfax on the 17th, after a march of only six miles, he had pushed on at once to Centreville, the battle of Bull Run would have been fought two days earlier. The Federals would have gone into action two thousand stronger and the Confederates ten thousand weaker on the

<sup>1</sup> Exactly 30,115, according to the lowest rendering of General Beauregard's official report. He may have intended to state the total number at from 600 to 2000 greater, his report being somewhat obscure on this point. See, on this subject, the note at the end of this chapter.





SAMUEL P. HEINTZELMAN.

19th than on the 21st. With 28,000 against 31,000, the battle was hardly lost on Sunday; with 30,000 against 21,000, it might have been won on Friday. So, if but one of the three hours lost on the morning of the 21st had been saved by a march on the evening of the 20th, the victory, almost within the grasp of McDowell, would not have been wrested from him by the unexpected arrival of the Confederate re-enforcements brought on by Smith. But we turn from what might have been to what was.

At six o'clock, two hours behind time, Tyler's three brigades were in front of the Stone Bridge; Hunter's two brigades were threading their way, Burnside leading, along the forest road; Heintzelman's two brigades were just turning into the forest. They had all crossed Cub Run, a narrow stream whose steep banks were spanned by a wooden bridge. They hardly noticed it in the morning twilight, but had occasion to remember it before evening. McDowell and his staff now rode up. Still apprehensive of a strong attack upon his left and rear, he ordered Howard's brigade, of Heintzelman's division, to remain in reserve, in case it should be necessary to re-enforce Miles at Centreville.

At half past six a shot from Tyler's 30-pounder announced to the other divisions that he was in position. Stationing a scout among the branches of a tall tree, which commanded a view of the opposite side of the Run, he waited for two hours until Hunter and Heintzelman, coming down on the other side, should drive back the enemy, and render it possible for him to cross to their direct support. In the mean while, to carry out his feigned attack, he sent one brigade a mile down the Run toward the next ford guarded by the enemy, upon whom he opened fire, which was vigorously returned, with little damage on either side. All this time he kept up a slow cannonade without eliciting any reply from the enemy in his front. They had beforehand ascertained that he was beyond the range of their guns, and did not care to waste ammunition and disclose their position by useless firing. At half past nine Burnside had reached the Run, crossed without opposition, followed by Porter's brigade and Heintzelman's division, and, after a brief halt for rest, pushed down the Run, and found himself confronted by the enemy on the northern slope of what was to be the battle-field of the day.

The course of Bull Run for half a mile above and below the bridge is nearly north and south. The turnpike crossing it goes almost due west from Centreville. Beyond the bridge it traverses a low wooded bottom half a mile broad, mounts a slight ascent, then sinks again down to a little hollow, by which a small brook, called Young's Branch, comes from the west, and then, making a short turn to the south, finds its way into Bull Run. The road following the valley of Young's Branch ascends for a mile by an easy slope until it gains the level of the plain about two miles from the Run. Here it is crossed by another road winding southward from Sudley's Springs. This road formed the western boundary of the battle-field. The valley of Young's Branch is shaped somewhat like a sickle, lying with its edge to the south and west. Upon that side the ground rises by a sharp ascent about a hundred feet to a plateau of an irregular oval form, containing about one hundred and fifty acres of cleared land, cut up into small fields, with here and there patches of young oaks and pines. Along the eastern and southern sides of the plateau was a dense thicket of second-growth pines, and across the upper edge of the fields a broad belt of oaks upon both sides of the Sudley road. Near the upper edge of the plateau was a house occupied by Mrs. Henry, and half a mile below another owned by a free negro named Robinson. Both were small wooden buildings densely embowered in trees, and surrounded by fences. This plateau, a mile long from east to west, and half a mile broad from north to south, was the bat-

tle-field of the afternoon, the sharpest fighting being in the oak woods, at the two houses, and in front of the pine thicket. The other side of the valley of Young's Branch slopes gently up to the north in a succession of open, undulating fields, covered with grass, and dotted over with groves and thickets. This slope was the scene of the battle in the morning.

While the Federal army was advancing to the attack, the Confederates were in the same position which they had occupied for some days along the southwestern side of Bull Run. Ewell's brigade was at Union Mills Ford, on the extreme right. The brigades of Jones, Longstreet, Bonham, and Coker were successively posted close to the Run, in front of the principal fords, up to the Stone Bridge, a distance of eight miles. Between these, but slightly in their rear, so as to be able to support either of the front brigades that might be assailed, were the brigades of Holmes, Early, Jackson, and Bee. Beauregard, sanctioned by Johnston, assuming all along that the battle would be fought on his right, had concentrated his main strength upon that wing, leaving his left at the Stone Bridge comparatively weak. The front line of brigades consisted wholly of the troops of the Army of the Potomac; those of the Army of the Shenandoah, who were wearied by their rapid march from Winchester, being placed in reserve in the rear. But the battle being fought upon the left, the main brunt fell upon the Army of the Shenandoah.

Colonel Evans, who held the extreme Confederate left at Stone Bridge, deceived by Tyler's demonstrations, notified Beauregard that a strong attack had been commenced on that flank. The Confederate commander, directing that position to be held at all hazards, sent orders that a rapid and determined attack should be made upon the Federal flank and rear at Centreville. By this movement they expected to achieve a complete victory by noon. Johnston and Beauregard then took a position on a commanding hill in the rear of the centre of the Confederate lines, where for two long hours they awaited tidings of the battle. They came at last in an unwelcome shape. The order for an advance by their right had miscarried, and it was too late to renew it. Three hours would be required to effect the movement, and minutes were beyond price, for the action opened by the Federals on the left had gone sorely against the Confederates. After giving hasty orders countermanding that for an advance of the right, dispatching aids to Manassas to hurry up the re-enforcements momentarily expected by railway, and directing the reserve regiments to hasten to the scene of action, Beauregard and Johnston galloped to their left, where the roll of musketry and the din of artillery announced that a severe conflict was going on. An hour's sharp riding brought them at noon to the plateau in the rear of the Henry and Robinson houses. They looked upon a battle to all appearance lost. We now turn to that point where the battle had been fought.

Before nine o'clock, while Hunter and Heintzelman were winding their way unseen along the forest road, Evans became convinced that the attack on his front was a feint, and suspected that an attempt was making to turn his left. He had but fifteen companies at the Bridge. Leaving four in position there, with the other eleven and two guns he marched across the fields and took up a position to check the advance of the enemy, sending word to Bee, who commanded the nearest brigade in reserve, to hurry up to the scene of action. At half past ten the head of Burnside's column came in sight of Evans, and the action was opened. Bee, a gallant South Carolinian, who had been trained at West Point, had fought under Scott in Mexico, had been twice breveted for meritorious conduct at Cerro Gordo and Chapultepec, and who in this his last action gave proof of great military capacity, brought on his brigade of four regiments and two companies, with Imboden's battery, and drew them up on the edge of the plateau; but, seeing Evans sorely pressed by Burnside, he advanced down the slope, across the turnpike, over Young's Branch, and threw himself into the action. Burnside was now overmatched, and called for aid. Sykes's eight companies of regulars hurried down from Porter's column on the right, and restored the balance. At this moment, Hunter, whose division comprised the two brigades of Porter and Burnside, was wounded, and borne from the field. The command nominally devolved upon Porter, the senior officer; but, as he was throughout the action with his own brigade, Burnside was actually in command on his part of the field. Porter's column, coming down the Sudley road, were now in striking distance, and poured in a heavy fire from the right. The Confederate line began to waver, then fell back slowly and sullenly toward the turnpike. Just then, when the fight had continued for more than an hour, a fresh column appeared over the low ridge which separated Bull Run from the Federal left. This was Sherman's brigade of Tyler's division, which had been all the morning on the opposite side waiting for an opportunity to cross and take part in the conflict.

Tyler, warned from his observatory in the tree-top of the progress of the real attack, had withdrawn his feigned assault, and had brought up his three brigades in front of the Stone Bridge. Assured that the enemy were in no condition to molest him, he had ordered Sherman's brigade to cross the Run above the bridge, and support the forces hotly engaged on the opposite side. The crossing was effected without opposition, and just before noon Sherman came upon the field. The Confederates, now attacked by Sherman on the right, pressed by Burnside and Sykes on their centre, and galled by Porter on their left, rushed broken and shattered up the slope of the plateau, and half way across it, beyond the Robinson and Henry houses. Here they met support. Jackson, who had been in reserve next behind Bee, had brought forward his five regiments, and gain the eastern edge of the plateau across which Bee's broken, though not routed force was flying. "They are beating us back," said Bee to Jackson, as they met. "Sir, we will give them the bayonet," replied Jackson. Bee, encouraged by Jackson's firm front, tried to rally his men. "Here is Jackson," he cried, "standing like a stone



wall!" The word fitted the mood of the moment. "Stonewall! Stonewall!" was passed from man to man; from that moment this became a part of the name by which the favorite Confederate leader was known. We shall have need, in describing the events of the next two years, to speak often of "Stonewall Jackson."

It was now past noon. Jackson's firm stand had gained a breathing-space for the Confederates upon the lower, or southeastern brow of the plateau. Sherman had joined the rear of Hunter and Heintzelman, who, coming down upon the upper margin of the plateau, had fairly outflanked the Confederate left. Tyler had brought over Keyes's brigade directly after Sherman's, and was menacing the lower edge of the plateau, where the Confederates were making what seemed their last stand in and in front of the pine thicket. Howard's brigade, detached in the morning from Heintzelman's division, had been ordered forward, and had secured the Run. Burnside's brigade, which had first entered into action, had exhausted its ammunition, and been withdrawn a little to the rear to replenish it, but could almost immediately be brought into action. Eighteen thousand men had now passed the Run, and as the Confederates had been driven clear away from the Stone Bridge, there was nothing but an undefended abatis of felled trees to hinder Schenck, with Tyler's remaining brigade, from crossing and adding two thousand more to the force actually engaged.

Johnston and Beauregard now came upon the plateau. The Confederate forces there consisted at this moment of Jackson's five regiments which had not yet been engaged, and the shattered remains of Bee's and Evans's commands. These in the morning had numbered about 7500 men, but fully five hundred had been killed and wounded, so that the Confederate forces on the field at that moment were about 7000. Their position was strong. The pine thicket and the clumps of trees afforded admirable shelter. Their artillery, consisting of thirteen guns, was posted so as to play upon the coming enemy, and yet so sheltered as to be itself hardly exposed. The first task of the Confederate commanders was to reorganize the broken regiments. Johnston placed himself by the colors of the Fourth Alabama, which had lost all its field-officers, and Bee's shattered companies rallied around him on the right. Beauregard, as he posted the lines on the left, where the first onset of the enemy would fall, addressed the men in sharp and decisive words. That position was of the last importance; re-enforcements were close at hand, but until these came they must hold their posts at all hazards and against any odds. Order having been restored, and the forces posted, Johnston took his station at a point from which he could overlook the whole scene in every direction, and send forward the re-enforcements to the precise point where they could be most effective, while Beauregard remained in command of the field. Just beyond a ravine which forms the southern boundary of the plateau is a commanding elevation, upon which stands a house known as the "Portico," or "the Lewis House," overlooking the course of the Run above and below, and the field of battle. Here Johnston took up his head-quarters. Re-enforcements had begun to come up, and by the time that the Federal right was fairly in position for attack, the Confederates had on the field twelve full regiments of infantry, two hundred and sixty cavalry, and twenty-two guns, in all about 9500 men, with other re-enforcements approaching. Against these, upon their left, were advancing four brigades of the Federal army, with Ricketts's, Griffin's, and Arnold's batteries, sixteen guns. The brigades were those of Porter, of Hunter's division; Franklin and Wilcox, of Heintzelman's; and Sherman's, of Tyler's. Keyes's brigade, of Tyler's division, was engaged far to the left. In all,



THOMAS J. JACKSON.

13,000 men and sixteen guns were fairly in movement against the Confederates on the plateau.

The Federal right now moved confidently down along the Sudley road upon the Confederate left, sorely galled by the fire from the artillery, which was admirably served. But they pressed on up the slope, outflanked the enemy's line, and seized upon the upper edge of the plateau. Ricketts's and Griffin's artillery led, and took up position after position. The enemy's strongest position was on a swell west of the Henry house; a little to the south was another hill which commanded this. If that could be gained and held, the whole plateau would be commanded. The two batteries were ordered here, with the New York Eleventh as their support. Of this regiment, commonly designated as Ellsworth's Zouaves, high anticipations had been formed. Men had heard fabulous stories of the achievements of the French Zouaves in Algeria and the Crimea. Ellsworth had come from the West to New York at the head of a company whom he had trained to marvelous perfection in the Zouave drill. He had speedily recruited a regiment in New York, in a great measure of the class from which the French Zouaves were supposed to have been drawn. That they were not, when in camp, very pleasant neighbors, even to their friends, was admitted; but that they would be still less so to the enemy was sure. No one doubted that in action they would stand fire; and, above all, it was thought that every man of them was sworn to avenge the slaying of Ellsworth. The Zouaves went forward with bravado enough. Some of them had thrown off their gay jackets, that they might "fight free." But when they came in sight of a Confederate regiment half hidden by a clump of pines, and at the same moment saw two mounted companies coming down upon them by a road through the woods, their courage vanished. They broke in utter confusion, and the cavalry rode straight through them, harming scarcely a man. A few of the Zouaves kept presence of mind enough to fire random shots at the horsemen, killing four, wounding one, and dispersing the whole body. But the regiment of Zouaves was scattered. Farnham, their colonel, and some of the officers, tried gallantly to stem the rout; many of the men fell in with other regiments, and did good service as skirmishers; but as a regiment it was wholly dispersed, not a few of the members heading the flight, and being among the first to bring to Washington and New York tidings of the rout, with wild stories of their own prowess on the fatal field, where they had shown themselves such arrant cowards.<sup>1</sup>

At about the same time, a little past two, Keyes's brigade of Tyler's divi-



ERASMUS D. KEYES.

<sup>1</sup> This is the whole story of the famous charge of the "Black Horse Cavalry" upon the Zouaves, with accounts of which the newspapers of the day were filled. By way of sample, we quote, with abridgments, some paragraphs of these reports. One of the lieutenants of the regiment writes:

"The Zouaves rushed out of the woods only to find themselves the target for another body of infantry beyond, while the Black Horse Cavalry were seen charging full upon them. They formed hastily in line, kneeling, semi-kneeling, and standing, that, Ellsworth fashion, they might receive their enemies with successive volleys. On came the Horse, splendidly mounted. To an early discharge from the cavalry the Zouaves made no response, although several of the men were killed, but waited patiently until the enemy were almost upon them, when, in quick succession, the three ranks fired. The shock to the rebels was great; but they rallied, and attempted a renewal of the charge, for which they paid dearly. They were completely shattered, broken up, and swept away. Not more than a hundred of them rode off, and as they went their ears were saluted with 'One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, Zouave!'" . . . . . Another Zouave says: "The Black Horse Guard came upon the Zouave regiment at a gallop, and were received by the brave firemen upon their poised bayonets, followed instantly by a volley, from which they broke and fled. They quickly returned, with their forces doubled—perhaps six or seven hundred—and again dashed, with fearful yells, upon the excited Zouaves, and the slaughter commenced. No quarter, no halting, no flinching now, marked the rapid and death-dealing blows of our men as they closed in upon the foe in their madness and desperation. Our brave fellows fell; the ranks filled up; the sabres, bowie-knives, and bayonets glistened in the sunlight; horse after horse went down; platoon after platoon disappeared—the rattle of musketry, the screams of the rebels, the shout of 'Remember Ellsworth!' from the lungs of the Zouaves, and the yells of the wounded and crushed belligerents, filled the air, and a terrible carnage succeeded. The gallant Zouaves fought to the death, and were sadly cut up; but of those hundreds of Black Horse Guards, not many left that bloody ren-counter."





A ZOUAVE AT WASHINGTON RELATING HIS EXPLOITS AT BULL RUN.

sion, which had come upon the field just at the close of the Confederate repulse in the morning, was ordered forward. Crossing the turnpike, he marched straight up the northern slope of the plateau in front of the Robinson house. The Third Connecticut and Second Maine regiments charged up the hill, crowned its summit, brushed away the enemy, and for a moment held the house and field. Their position was, however, commanded by a battery in the rear, which poured in so hot a fire that a few moments' exposure to it would have annihilated the whole line; as it was, the Maine regiment lost fifteen killed and forty wounded. Keyes withdrew below the brow of the hill, around which he skirted in search of an opportunity to charge; but the light battery of the enemy, shifting front as he changed ground, was always in his front, ready to pour in its shot whenever the head of a column should appear above the crest. This movement, lasting for more than an hour, took Keyes clear around the eastern edge of the plateau, out of sight of the battle which was raging two miles to the west.

The great struggle of the day was going on at the western end of the plateau. A Confederate battery of thirteen guns, supported by Jackson's and Bee's brigades, had been posted in a small open field five hundred yards southeast of the Henry house, just below the crest of a low elevation. From this shelter it poured in a fierce fire upon the Federal column coming down southwardly along the Sudley road. But the column pressed on until its head, now the extreme Federal right, had outflanked the batteries, which, with their supports, formed the extreme Confederate left. Five hundred yards southeast of these—a thousand from the Henry house—a hill rises fifty feet above the general level, and half as much above the ridge behind which the Confederates were posted. From this hill the Confederate left could be completely enfiladed. It was the key of the position. Whoever held that hill with artillery, held the plateau. The hill had just been seized by the batteries of Griffin and Ricketts, and the Zouaves had been ordered up as supports, while the Federal column coming from the north had passed the Henry house, and was bearing down upon the Confederate position. It was now almost three o'clock. Beauregard, informed that re-enforcements were close at hand, pushed forward his whole line to recover the plateau. Jackson advanced his "stone wall" against Ricketts and Griffin. The Zouaves, catching sight of his line and the two companies of cavalry, broke and fled ignominiously. Heintzelman ordered up the First Minnesota, the nearest regiment, to take their place. As they emerged from the wooded road down which they had come, and passed the crest of the hill, they found themselves face to face within fifty yards of a body of troops. The two lines had now become so intermingled that from position alone neither could tell friend from foe. Gorman, the colonel of the Minnesota regiment, was at a loss; Griffin was equally uncertain; some one had told them that this was another of Heintzelman's regiments. Heintzelman, apparently also in doubt, dashed between the two regiments, within pistol-shot of either. The enemy hesitated in like manner for a few moments. But the pause was brief. Each caught sight at the same moment of the colors of the other, and poured in a deadly fire. The two Federal batteries offered a conspicuous mark. A third of the cannoneers and half of the horses were shot down at the first volley, and the batteries were disabled. They had played a conspicuous part in the action of the day, and now, when they were to be most wanted,

they were useless. The only question was who should have them. Jackson dashed forward and seized the guns, trying to drag them from the field. Fresh regiments on each side were brought up; the line wavered to and fro for an hour; the guns were taken and retaken three times, but at the last remained in the hands of the Federals, who were dragging them away.

All this time a fierce battle had been going on a little to the left of this hill, along the ridge held by the Confederate forces. Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries, which would have swept the position, were thrown out of service, and, though not taken, were rendered useless. A strong Federal column was directed upon this ridge. Regiment after regiment was brought up; each, one after the other, was hurled back, some in tolerable order, some in sheer disorder. In the confused *melée* of the next hour it is impossible to trace clearly the action of each regiment along that short line of barely half a mile from the Henry house to the hill. The First Minnesota fell back; the First Michigan was brought forward and driven off. The Fourteenth New York came on in gallant style, but, coming in sight of the enemy's line, broke and ran. "I considered it," says Heintzelman, "useless to attempt to rally them. The most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards to the rear, and continue to fire high in the air, compelling those in the front to retreat." The New York Thirty-eighth tried hard to save the battery; forced back, they dragged off three of Ricketts's guns, leaving them, as they thought, out of the enemy's reach. Rallying, they advanced, and for a few moments thought themselves in possession of the field; then, without knowing how, they found themselves opposed to a superior force, swept by musketry and pierced by artillery, from which they fell back in sudden panic. "This," says their colonel, "was the last rally made by my regiment." Close by, but a little to the left, the New York Seventy-ninth charged up the ridge upon the Confederate batteries. Receiving a severe fire, they broke; rallied, and finally broke again, and fell back, leaving their colonel, Cameron, brother of the Secretary of War, dead upon the field. The New York Sixty-ninth took their place. "Now, boys, is your time," shouted Corcoran, their colonel, as they rushed into action. They held the crest for barely a quarter of an hour, and then fell back in disorder.

The advantages gained by the Confederates had been dearly won. Bee and Bartow, who had been all day long in the thickest of the fight, fell almost side by side near the Henry house; Jackson was wounded, but still kept the field; many other of the best officers had been killed or wounded in the desperate struggle. In spite of these checks, the Federal generals were still confident of victory. "The enemy was evidently disheartened and broken," says McDowell. "Every thing was in favor of our troops, and promising decisive victory," says Burnside, at four o'clock. "The prestige of success had thus far attended the efforts of our gallant but inexperienced troops," says Porter. Single regiments had been sent forward to the ridge who had been driven back overmatched; but now a determined assault was to be made by a strong column. The flags of eight regiments, though borne somewhat wearily, were pointed to the hill from which the disordered masses of the Confederates were seen, or thought to be seen, hastily retiring. But before this final and decisive charge was made upon the crest near the Henry house, which had now become the centre of the field, the whole Federal right came rushing down in utter rout, men, horses,



and caissons mingled together in the wildest confusion. The instant that this hot torrent of fugitives touched a regiment which had before seemed solid, it melted away like a snow-bank before a jet of steam. The panic spread from regiment to regiment, and in a quarter of an hour the whole Federal force was transformed from an army into a frightened crowd.

To understand whence came the blow which so suddenly shattered the Federal right, we must go back to the Lewis house, where Johnston, with the whole field before him, was watching the progress of the fight in his front and the arrival of re-enforcements from his rear. All day long he had been harassed by groundless apprehensions that Patterson was close at hand. At ten o'clock he saw a column of dust rising up in the northwest, such as might be raised by an army on the march. This may have been a cloud blown up by a gust of wind, or have been raised by McDowell's columns near Sudley's Ford; but Johnston suspected that it indicated the approach of Patterson. Again, at two o'clock, an officer galloped up from Manassas with the report that a Federal force had reached the railway, and were now close upon the position which Beauregard was so stoutly defending. Upon the heels of this unwelcome messenger came another with tidings that this force was Kirby Smith's brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah. Johnston's course was now clear. An hour or two before he had ordered Coker to bring up his brigade from the edge of Bull Run; but, learning that this position was threatened from across the stream, he had countermanded the order. It was now repeated, and Coker's brigade, four regiments strong, came upon the field. In half an hour Fisher's North Carolina, and Cash's and Kershaw's South Carolina regiments, from Bonham's brigade, came up from below, followed almost at the same moment by Kirby Smith from Manassas with half of the long-awaited re-enforcements from Piedmont. Smith had started at daylight by rail, reaching the Junction at noon with four regiments and a battery. Leaving a weak regiment at the Junction, with the other three he had hurried across the fields to the Lewis house. Early's three regiments came up from their position down the Run just after Smith.

To the twelve regiments with which Beauregard had for two hours held the field, thirteen were now added. The re-enforcements were skillfully directed. A part were sent to strengthen Beauregard's line, which had just begun to advance. Among these were Smith's division. He himself was wounded, and the command devolved upon Elzey. A part made a circuit south and west to and beyond the Sudley road, outflanking the Federal right, fell upon its flank and rear, and hurled it in wild confusion upon the column just ready to assail the Confederate line near the Henry house. In fifteen minutes all was lost. The whole Federal force was swept clear off the plateau and up the slopes beyond the Sudley road, which swarmed with crowds of flying, disorganized troops, through whom dashed riderless horses and artillery teams driven at utmost speed. Regiments which a few minutes before stood firm, melted away at a touch. Some of the officers strove by entreaties and threats to rally their commands; but they would not stand even when beyond the reach of the Confederate fire. It was not a retreat; it was a flight; a rout as complete as any battle-field ever saw. Yet three regiments standing firm for half an hour, and presenting a "stone wall" behind which their broken comrades should rally, might even then have changed the issue of the day. A decisive victory could hardly have been won, but the Confederates could have been repulsed, and the result would have been a drawn battle. The odds were indeed at the moment against the Federals, but they were less than those against which the Confederates had held their ground for hours. McDowell had upon the immediate field 13,000 men. In half an hour he could have brought up Burnside's troops, who had been out of action since noon; Keyes's regiments, which were wholly intact; and Schenck's brigade, which had not been in action, but, having cleared away the abatis, were on the point of crossing the Stone Bridge—in all 7000 men, which would have given him 20,000. To oppose these the Confederates had 19,000. They had brought up every man who would be within reach for two hours. But no orders were given to bring up the Federal re-enforcements, and scarcely an attempt to present a front to the enemy. The New York Sixty-ninth, indeed, formed for a short time into an irregular square against a body of cavalry, and repelled their charge, but it soon broke and joined in the flight. Its colonel, Corcoran, became separated from his men, and was made prisoner. He was, by special order of the Confederate government, "confined in a cell appropriated to convicted felons," as hostage for certain privateers who had been captured by the Federals and put on trial for piracy. After a year's captivity he was exchanged, and was made brigadier general, his commission dating from the day of the battle of Bull Run.

The only real opposition to the pursuit of the Confederates was made by Sykes, with his eight companies of regulars, who marched to the right straight through the crowds of flying troops, vainly attempting to rally them, threw themselves in the way of the advancing enemy, whom they held in check until the broken regiments had gained a fair start. They then slowly retired, always showing a firm front, and covering the escape of those who were fleeing toward Sudley's and the fords below. They were the last to leave the field, and the only force opposed to the enemy in this quarter.

Jefferson Davis came upon the field just after the victory had been won. The Confederate Congress had been "allowed to meet at Richmond on the 20th." On that day the President had delivered his message, and in the evening had received tidings of the impending battle. He set out by railway for Manassas next morning, at the very moment when Tyler's first gun was fired, reached the Junction at four, mounted, and rode to Johnston's headquarters at the Lewis house, and thence to the battle-field in time to



MICHAEL COBURN.

see the broken regiments of the Federals flying in the distance. He sent a glowing dispatch to Richmond. "Night," he said, "has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces were victorious. The battle was fought mainly on our left. Our force was 15,000; that of the enemy estimated at 35,000." Writing before the smoke of battle had cleared away, it is not strange that he doubled the strength of the Federals, and diminished by one third that of the Confederates.

The victors were in no condition to make a vigorous pursuit. One half of their infantry had been for hours under fire; the other half were exhausted by their rapid march and strenuous assault. A few of the freshest regiments started in pursuit, but were soon recalled; none of them went a mile. The artillery, which all day long had played an important part, were, with the exception of a few light guns, equally unavailable. The rest, from their positions, played upon the fugitives with little effect. The pursuit devolved wholly upon the cavalry. Of the dozen companies nearly all were now at hand. Stuart, whose charge had scattered the Zouaves, went upon the heels of those who were flying toward the upper fords, but the firm line of Sykes's regulars in the rear forbade any serious attack. They picked up many stragglers who had fallen out of the line of flight, but accomplished no more. Radford, with six companies—barely five hundred men—crossed the Run below the Stone Bridge, came upon the turnpike, and pressed upon the rear of the Federals. Schenck had just cleared away the abatis at the bridge, when he received intelligence of the rout, and that the army was retreating. He fell back toward Centreville, leaving the road open for the light battery of the Confederates to come on behind.

By various routes the Federal troops had now crossed the Run and gained the turnpike, along which they pressed in one confused mass. Here and there a regiment presented something like a military form, but intermingled with these was a crowd of officers, soldiers, and civilians, on foot, mounted, and in carriages. When the tidings of an impending battle reached Washington, all the idlers in the capital rushed forward to see the sight. Congressmen, newspaper correspondents, and loungers of every grade besieged the livery-stables. The man who had a horse or carriage for hire was lucky; he could let it at a war risk. All that long July day a constant stream poured out from Washington. Encouraged by the reports of the morning's success, many had ventured beyond Centreville; some had even crossed the Run. There was no one to hinder, and they went where they listed. This advancing current met the receding one. The opposing streams made a whirlpool, the vortex of which was where the road crossed the narrow bridge over Cub Run. Just below another human stream had poured in down the forest road up which Hunter and Heintzelman had marched in the morning. Behind were the Confederate cavalry, their hundreds multiplied in apprehension to thousands. An occasional sharp report, and a shot dropping here and there, showed that the pursuers had artillery—how many guns no man could know. All struggled and fought to pass the narrow bridge, beyond which lay safety. The light guns of the pursuers came within long range and opened fire. A shot struck a caisson on the bridge, over



BLENNER'S BRIGADE COVERING THE RETREAT NEAR CENTREVILLE.







THE BATTLE-FIELD OF BULL RUN.

This map shows the topography of the field, and the principal positions during the battle, Bull Run being about half a mile to the east. A A scene of the Confederate repulse in the morning. B B Confederate stand on the southern edge of the plateau. C C Burnside withdrawn from the action after the fight of the morning. D D general line of advance of the united columns of Porter, Helntzelman, and Sherman upon the Confederate right. E E Keyes's movement after the separation of his brigade from that of Sherman, of Tyler's division. H H final advance of the Confederates. K K advance of the last Confederate re-enforcements. M hill where Griffin's and Lickett's batteries were disabled. N Sykes's stand with the regulars after the rout. The figures denote the elevation above the level of Bull Run.

turned it, and blocked up the passage. The artillery horses were cut from their traces, and mounted by their drivers. Wagons loaded with ammunition, ambulances freighted with wounded, guns which had been dragged so far, were abandoned. A full third of the lost artillery was left here. The Confederate guns poured their shot into the writhing mass. Somehow the throng cleared itself; some got over the bridge; some crossed the stream above, some below. Once fairly beyond Cub Run, the fugitives found themselves in presence of Blenker's regiment, hastily drawn up in a firm line. Through this they were suffered to pass, and were beyond reach of harm. Almost twenty thousand men had been driven for miles by scarcely five hundred, and had left behind every thing but their lives. Evening had now closed in upon the rout. In the gathering darkness some squadrons of Confederate cavalry came up to Blenker's outposts. They were met by a fire, and wheeled back. For an hour or two they hovered around, and then retired across Bull Run.

Miles's division, 7000 strong, which had been left in reserve, had not been wholly inactive. Blenker's brigade was left in guard at Centreville. The brigades of Davis and Richardson marched down to Blackburn's Ford, near where the skirmish of three days before had been fought. A slow fire was opened upon the opposite bank, to which no reply was made, and no enemy was visible except at long distances until about eleven o'clock; then suddenly the opposite bank seemed full of them. They moved back and forth in a puzzling way. Now they seemed to be massing themselves as if to cross the Run in force; a small body was sent across who drove in the Fed-

eral skirmishers, but were in turn driven back by artillery. Then they appeared to be retreating—before the attack on their left, as Richardson supposed: Again the tide turned, and still larger masses were concentrated. These troops were the brigades of Jones and Longstreet, who had received the order to fall upon the Federal left, and were preparing to execute it, when it was countermanded because a similar order sent to Ewell had miscarried. The Federal commanders little knew the peril from which they had escaped. It was owing to sheer accident that they were not assailed by a threefold force, while the rest of the army was miles away, utterly beyond reach of giving them support.

So the day went on till past five o'clock, when an order came to retreat upon Centreville and endeavor to hold that position, for the attack upon the right had failed, and McDowell was retreating in utter rout. Richardson and Davis fell back, and took up a position to protect the retreating regiments from below, while Blenker guarded them in front.

The conduct of Miles, the commander of the division, had been singular all day. Several times he rode over to the posts of Davis and Richardson, changed the dispositions which they had made, countermanded the orders which they had given, and then hurried back to his quarters at Centreville. Toward evening Richardson had established his defensive line, when, returning to one of the regiments, he found that it had been entirely altered. He inquired by whose orders it had been done, and was told by Stevens, the colonel, that it was by express order of Miles. "Why the change was made," he added, "I do not know; but I have no confidence in Colonel



Miles, for he is drunk." Richardson replaced the regiment as before, and then reported to McDowell's aid that he had been interfered with all day in the disposition of his troops, and could not carry out the orders of the commanding general so long as he was under orders of a drunken man. He was directed to take the command. He began placing another regiment, when Miles met him and ordered him to form it in a different manner. Richardson replied that he should obey no more orders from him. Miles ordered him in arrest. Richardson paid no attention, and rode off. McDowell soon came up. Miles said the dispositions made were faulty, and asked to be allowed to remain in command of his division. The request was refused.

By nine o'clock the last of the fugitives from the battle-field were safely beyond the lines at Centreville. Beyond the cavalry chase, no attempt was made at pursuit from that quarter. Johnston ordered Longstreet's and Bonham's brigades to cross the Run below the bridge, and fall upon the Federals. They advanced some distance, but night coming on they were recalled, without coming near enough to be perceived by the Federal rear-guard. A brief and informal council was held, and it was resolved that Centreville should be abandoned, and the army fall back to Washington. But the routed regiments had waited for no orders. They were already far in the rear, hurrying forward in the same panic with which they had come in. They reached their camps at Vienna and Arlington before daylight the next morning. In less than six hours of darkness they had accomplished in their flight a distance which it had taken them more than forty hours to traverse in their advance. Scarcely a regiment which had been driven from the battle-field presented the slightest trace of military order. The regiments of the reserve followed on more leisurely, but long before night they were all back in front of Washington.

The Confederate loss in this battle was 378 killed, 1489 wounded, and 30 missing—1887 in all. Of these, 1262 were of the Army of the Shenandoah. As the re-enforcements brought up last were in action but a short time, the greater part of this loss—probably about 1100—fell upon Bee's and Jackson's brigades, which went into battle 6000 strong. The whole loss in the Army of the Potomac was 630. Not quite half of this army, 22,000 strong, was in action at all, and of these only Evans's half brigade of barely 1500 men, until afternoon; fully half the loss of the Army of the Potomac must have fallen upon them. Bee's brigade, 3000 strong, was the only part of the Army of the Shenandoah which took part in the bloody repulse of the morning; it was also engaged through the afternoon, and thus suffered more than Jackson's; it must have lost 700 men. Of the 4300 men which composed the commands of Bee and Evans, one man in four must have been killed or wounded.

The Federal loss is officially stated at 481 killed, 1011 wounded, and 1460 missing—3051 in all. This is probably a close approximation to the entire loss. But as all the dead were left on the field, and the greater part of those who were severely wounded fell into the hands of the enemy, their number can be given only by estimate. The estimates are certainly below the truth. The Confederate official report states that 1421 prisoners were sent to Richmond, of whom 871 were unwounded. Deducting these from the total loss, there remain 2180 killed and wounded. According to the usual ratio of casualties in battle, the Federal loss must have been about 550 killed and 1630 wounded. They lost 27 cannon, of which 10 were captured on the field, and the remainder abandoned in various stages of the pursuit—a large part of them at the crossing of Cub Run—besides 4000 muskets, 4500 sets of accoutrements, and a considerable quantity of ammunition.

We have described the battle of Bull Run in detail because it presents an epitome of the errors which marked the conduct of the Federals during the first months of the war. The conception was unwise; the plan faulty; the execution imperfect. The conception was unwise, because defeat was more than probable, and little real advantage could be gained by entire success. All that could be gained was a temporary interruption of railroad communications. When the second plan of operations was decided upon, which it was supposed would bring on a battle with an enemy presumed to be of not inferior force, strongly posted, McDowell still left one fifth of his army behind at Fairfax, more than ten miles from the battle-field, where they could be of no use. He could not expect to rout the Confederates, and either destroy their army or drive them from their strong post at Manassas. That point was to be carefully avoided in any case. If repulsed by surprise at Stone Bridge, the Confederates could at worst fall back behind the guns of Camp Pickens. The only real object sought to be gained by the battle of the 21st was to cut the railroad connection near Gainesville, ten miles in a straight line from Centreville, and thus break up the commu-

nication between the enemy's forces at Manassas and those in the Valley of Virginia. That he was not aware that this communication had already been made, and that Jackson, with half of his army, had already joined Beauregard, and that he would be followed by the other half before his detachment could by any possibility reach the road, is not to be laid to the charge of McDowell. He had every reason to suppose that Patterson was still holding Johnston in check at Winchester. But the tearing up of a few rods of railway by a force which must in any case be withdrawn at once, could only hinder, not prevent the junction of the two armies of the enemy. In the endeavor to accomplish even this McDowell divided his army, leaving one third around Centreville, hardly five miles from where he knew the centre of the main force of the enemy to be, and stretching the other over ten miles of road, with an interval between the wings so wide that either might have been crushed without the least possibility of aid from the other. Had the Confederate commanders understood the design of McDowell, their wisest course would have been to have allowed him to pass the Stone Bridge without opposition, and so separate Tyler, Hunter, and Heintzelman as widely as he pleased from Miles. Two courses would then have been open: to fall upon Miles and annihilate him; or to march up Bull Run on the precise route by which their re-enforcements actually were brought up, throw themselves between Miles and Tyler, and assail the rear of the latter. The advancing columns of the Federals would have been thus cut off by superior force from their base of supplies at Centreville. They had set out with rations for three days, and only ammunition for a single battle, with no provision for a renewal. The Federal army having been thus effectually divided by its commander, either part might have been attacked and destroyed. The Confederate generals, not dreaming that the great movement had so small a purpose, assumed that its design was to interpose between Manassas and their army lying along Bull Run. They therefore ordered the position at the Stone Bridge to be held at all hazards, and brought up their forces to repel what they presumed to be the movement upon Manassas. At the same time, as the most effective method of relieving their threatened left flank, they ordered a determined attack by their right and centre upon the rear and left flank of the Federals at Centreville. Had a successful attack been made here, as McDowell says, "our whole force would have been irretrievably cut off and destroyed." The accidental miscarriage of the order sent to Ewell was all that prevented this result.

The long withdrawal from action of Burnside's brigade is wholly inexplicable. The battle of the morning was over by noon. It had lasted less than two hours. Burnside had not suffered severely, and his men were in perfect order, and confident of victory. Their ammunition had indeed become well-nigh exhausted, and they were very properly withdrawn a little to the rear to replenish it. This was only partially accomplished at half past four, when Burnside received orders to protect the retreat. More than four hours were thrown away, while a fierce action was going on in plain sight at the distance of scarcely a mile.

Hardly less unaccountable is the long delay of Schenck's brigade at the Stone Bridge. From eight in the morning the passage was only obstructed by an abattis, and defended by four companies of infantry with two guns. This weakness could not, indeed, be known at once; but before eleven Tyler was assured that the enemy had no force in that quarter, and crossed the Run with Sherman's and Keyes's brigades. The weak guard at the bridge was swept away by noon, when Bee and Evans fell back, and very soon after Keyes marched clear above and beyond the vacant position which it had occupied. There was nothing in the way but the abattis, which could have been avoided by a slight detour on either side, or removed in a few minutes. No attempt to remove it was made for almost four hours, and then the removal was made just in time to open the road for a few Confederate guns to come down upon the rear of the flying army.

Keyes's movement also, though gallantly made, was without significance in the general result. Every step after the assault at the Robinson house took him farther and farther from the spot where he was wanted, clear out of sight of the battle, of the result of which he was ignorant until the order reached him to join in the retreat. As it was, he was almost cut off. The forces of Burnside, Schenck, and Keyes, or any one of them, at the hill, might probably have secured a victory, or, at all events, could have prevented the utter rout.

The Confederate commanders, who had held their position against great odds, threw a superior force at the decisive moment upon the decisive point, and so won a victory as decisive and complete as is recorded in the annals of war.

#### NOTE ON THE BATTLE OF BULL RUN.

SOURCES AND AUTHORITIES.—The main sources for the history of the battle of Bull Run are the reports of the commanders on both sides. The newspaper accounts, Northern and Southern, are of little value. The system of "War Correspondence," which furnishes abundant and valuable information respecting the later periods of the war, had not yet been fairly organized. The current accounts of the day abound in misapprehensions and exaggerations. In the Southern papers the number of the Federals is stated any where from 50,000 to 135,000, with from 75 to 150 guns, and regular cavalry by the thousand. The Northern papers were filled with accounts of heights stormed, intrenchments carried, and masked batteries encountered. But the battle was fought upon ground which neither side had anticipated. Until after ten o'clock in the morning there had not been a single soldier upon the plateau, and not a yard of intrenchment was thrown up, and, with the exception of the abattis at the Stone Bridge, there were no artificial defenses nearer than Camp Pickens, almost ten miles distant. Neither were there any masked batteries. The Confederate artillery was, indeed, very judiciously posted, every advantage being taken of the natural formation of the ground. Thus Imboden's battery of four guns was placed by Bee early in the day in a ravine running down the slope of the plateau in front of the Henry house, opening directly upon the road by which Porter's brigade and Heintzelman's division were advancing. Across the mouth of this ravine was a slight swell, behind the crest of which the guns were sheltered, and over which they played upon the Federal columns. When Bee and Evans were driven back, their line of retreat took them to the east of this battery, which was left wholly unsupported. For more than three hours Imboden never saw a Confederate except those belonging to his own battery. All this time he kept up a fire upon the Federal columns until his guns became so heated that it was dangerous to load them. During all this time he was fired upon by Griffin's

and Ricketts's batteries, but so well was he covered by the slight swell before him that only three men were harmed by fragments of exploding shells; and at last, when the Federal column was close upon him, by going up the ravine he carried away all his guns except one, which was disabled by the accidental breaking of the axle. This was the only semblance of a masked battery upon the field. Neither was there any hand-to-hand fighting. The battle was wholly an affair of artillery and musketry. It is doubtful whether, until the rout, there was a bayonet-thrust or a sword-cut given on either side. The misstatements of the newspapers have been reproduced and multiplied in most of the formal accounts of the battle. Thus a Colonel Estv n, who professes to have been with the Confederate army, says that Beauregard had 65,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry, including "Kirby Smith's corps of 30,000 men, which came up at the close of the action." He also a little more than doubles the Confederate loss. He brings General Scott on the battle-field, when he was never nearer it than Washington; describes the conduct of Ewell's, Holmes's, Longstreet's, and Jones's brigades, none of which were in the action; and narrates an interview on the field between Davis, Johnston, and Beauregard, at a moment when the first was half way between Richmond and Manassas, the second at the Lewis house, and only the third on the field. Estv n's book was first published in England. It is false in every possible particular. Some American writers have given accounts hardly less incorrect.—McDowell's report of the battle itself is vague and indefinite. The reports of the division, brigade, and regimental commanders are mainly devoted to the special operations of their several commands; but by comparing and collating the whole, a fair idea may be gained of the phases of the action on the Federal side.—Johnston's report is, as far as it goes, clear and intelligible. It is chiefly valuable as affording means of correcting some important misstatements in that of Beauregard.—Beauregard's report, made out more than a month after the battle, is elaborate and minute. He, however, studiously exaggerates the force of the Federals at each important moment, and as studiously understates his own. But in



most cases he unintentionally furnishes the means of correcting his misstatements; and where these are wanting, Johnston's less elaborate report supplies the deficiency.

**NAME OF THE BATTLE.**—The Confederate writers usually call the action of the 21st "the battle of Manassas," styling the skirmish of the 18th "the battle of Bull Run." But as the battle of the 21st was fought some miles from Manassas, and close by the bank of the Run, the Northern designation seems the most appropriate.—The title of the battle of "Blackburn's Ford," applied to the action of the 18th, is really incorrect. The ford near which the action took place is Mitchell's, Blackburn's being a mile or more lower down the stream. But as the reports all give the name of the ford as Blackburn's, it is hardly worth while to correct the error. It is precisely like that which has given the name of the "Battle of Bunker's Hill" to the fight on Breed's Hill. This skirmish was wholly unimportant, though at the time much was made of it. The losses on both sides are given from official sources. Beauregard says that upon "a cursory examination" of one part of the field, "sixty-four corpses" of the Federals "were found and buried." But this statement is clearly erroneous.

**PATTERSON AND JOHNSTON.**—"About one o'clock on the morning of the 18th I received from the government a telegraphic dispatch, informing me that the Northern army was advancing upon Manassas. . . . The best service which the Army of the Potomac could render was to prevent the defeat of that of the Potomac. To be able to do this, it was necessary, in the first instance, to defeat General Patterson or to elude him. The latter course was most speedy and certain, and was therefore adopted. Our sick, nearly 1700 in number, were provided for in Winchester. For the defense of that place the militia of Generals Carson and Meem seemed ample; for I thought it certain that General Patterson would follow my movement as soon as he discerned it. Evading him by the disposition made of the advance guard under Colonel Stuart, the army moved through Ashby's Gap to Piedmont, a station on the Manassas Gap Railroad. Hence the infantry were to be transported by the railway, while the cavalry and artillery were ordered to continue their march. I reached Manassas about noon on the 20th." [Here follows a list of the troops with lists, amounting to a little more than nine regiments, 6000 men, as stated by Beauregard.] "The president of the railroad company had assured me that the remaining troops" [elsewhere stated at 5000 men] "should arrive during the day. . . . I regarded the arrival of the remainder during the night as certain, and Patterson's, with the Grand Army, on the 22d as probable."—*Johnston's Report.*

Patterson, at a public dinner on the 16th of November, made a speech, explaining and vindicating his conduct. The following are the essential points, as given in the newspapers of the day. On the 12th of July he wrote to General Scott, proposing to go to Harper's Ferry and Charleston, and asking when Manassas would be attacked; he was informed that the attack would be on the 16th. On the 13th he was directed, "If not strong enough to beat the enemy early next week, make demonstrations to detain him in the valley of Winchester." He made the demonstrations, and, on the 16th, drove the enemy's pickets into the intrenchments at Winchester. Three days before he had written to General Scott, informing him that Johnston was in a position to have his strength doubled, and asked for instructions; but none came. On the 17th Scott telegraphed, "To-morrow the Junction will probably be carried." He supposed that he had detained Johnston the appointed time, and that the work of his column was done. On the 18th, at half past one in the morning, he telegraphed and asked, "Shall I attack?" but received no reply. He expected to be attacked where he was [Johnston was then on the point of setting out to join Beauregard]; and if Manassas was not to be attacked on that day, "he ought to have been ordered down forthwith to join in the battle, and the attack delayed until he came. He could have been there on the day the battle was fought, and his assistance might have produced a different result." On the 20th he heard that Johnston had marched with 35,000 Confederates and a large military force in a southeasterly direction. [This must have been at about the hour when Johnston reached Manassas, whether he had marched with a little more than 11,000 men.] He telegraphed the information to General Scott, and knew that the message was received the same day. In accordance with instructions, he came to Harper's Ferry on the 21st.—In a letter written on that day from Harper's Ferry, General Patterson states, "I could have turned Johnston's position, and have attacked him in the rear; but he had received large re-enforcements from Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia, a total force of over 35,000 Confederate troops and 5000 Virginia militia. My force is less than 20,000—nineteen regiments, whose term of service was up, or will be within a week. All refused to stay one hour over their time but four. Five regiments have gone home; two more go to-day; and three more to-morrow. To avoid being cut off, I fell back and occupied this place." At the time when Patterson with his 20,000 men was expecting to be attacked and cut off, the Confederates had near him only the Virginia militia, about 6000, and the 1700 sick at Winchester. All the others were then either at or near Manassas. Johnston had thus completely deceived Patterson both as to the number and position of his army.

**THE FORCES.**—"McDowell's army at Centreville numbered within a fraction of 30,000, with 55 pieces of artillery" [of these, six pieces, belonging to the New York Eighth, were thrown out of service, leaving 49 pieces.—*Report of Major Barry, Chief of Artillery.*] "A Pennsylvania regiment and a New York artillery company were discharged on the evening of the 20th, which, with the sick, reduced the effectives to about 28,000."—*Report of Major Barnard, Chief of Engineers.*

Beauregard, having mentioned that General Holmes had been directed to push forward his brigade from Fredericksburg, and that Hampton's legion of six companies of infantry, having arrived that morning by the cars from Richmond, was subsequently, as soon as it arrived, ordered forward," proceeds to give the following summary of his force: "The effective force of all arms of the Army of the Potomac on that eventful morning, including the garrison at Camp Pickens, did not exceed 21,833, and 29 guns. The Army of the Shenandoah ready for action on the field may be set down at 6000 men and 20 guns—that is, when the battle began; Smith's brigade and Fisher's North Carolina came up later, and made the total of the Army of the Shenandoah engaged, of all arms, 8334. Hill's Virginia regiment, 550, also arrived, but was posted as a reserve to the right flank. The brigades of General Holmes mustered 1265 bayonets, 6 guns, and a company of cavalry about 90 strong." It is not quite clear, from the foregoing statement, whether Beauregard includes Holmes's and Hampton's forces in the Army of the Potomac. We have assumed that they were included, making the entire Confederate force 31,000 effective men. If they are not included, the Confederate force would be raised to about 33,000.

A considerable part of the force on either side was not brought into actual service at any stage of the action. The battle presented three distinct periods, the precise time of which can not be given with absolute precision. As a general rule, the Confederate reports place them about half an hour earlier than those of the Federals. The exact moment is of little consequence. We give the time only by approximation. These periods are, *First*, The fight in the morning, from 10½ to 12, when the Confederates were repulsed. *Second*, The Confederate stand on the plateau from 12 to 3. *Third*, The advance of the Confederates and the rout of the Federals, from 3 to 4. The following is a statement of the forces actually engaged at each of these periods, gathered from the official reports on both sides. In all cases where actual numbers are furnished in the reports, these are given. In other cases, a "regiment" is assumed to have consisted of 750 effective men, and a "company," whether of artillery, cavalry, or infantry, of 75. Some were stronger and some weaker; but this is the average. The numbers given are those with which the regiments went into action; the losses at the several periods were so nearly equal as not materially to vary the general result.

#### 1. The Fight in the Morning.

The Confederate force actually engaged consisted of Bee's brigade ["2732 bayonets," *Beauregard*, besides officers and artillery], 3000 men, and 11 companies of Evans's, with artillery, 900 men—in all, about 3900. The Federals actually engaged consisted of Burnside's brigade, four regiments, with two companies of artillery—3200 men in all, and Sykes's eight companies of regulars, 600 strong, together making 3800 men. Porter's artillery had begun to play upon the Confederates; his infantry regiments were also coming upon the field, when the Confederates broke. Sherman's brigade just then appeared, and aided in the repulse, when the Confederates, wholly outnumbered, fell back in confusion upon the plateau.

#### 2. The Confederate Stand on the Plateau.

The Confederates, consisting of Bee's brigade, 3000 strong, and Evans's whole half brigade, 1300, fell back in confusion upon the plateau, where they met Hampton's legion, six companies, and Jackson's brigade ["2611 strong," *Beauregard*, besides artillery], about 2800—in all, about 7500 men were the forces on the plateau at the moment when Johnston and Beauregard came up. They were almost immediately followed by Smith's battalion of the Virginia Forty-ninth, and seven companies from Hunter's Virginia Eighth, ordered up from Cooke, and two additional regiments of the Army of the Shenandoah—Falkner's Second Mississippi and Fisher's North Carolina—which had just come up, 2500 men in all. The entire force which held the plateau was thus about 10,000, from which the losses must be deducted. Beauregard indeed says, after having enumerated all these regiments, "Confronting the enemy at this time my force numbered at most not more than 6500 infantry and artillery, with but thirteen pieces of artillery and two companies of cavalry. . . . The enemy's force, now bearing confidently down on our position, consisted of over 20,000 infantry, seven companies of regular cavalry, and 24 pieces of improved artillery." This is but a part of Beauregard's studious system of understating his own force, and overstating that of his opponents. The entire Federal force which crossed the Run was but 18,000; of these, at that moment, Burnside's brigade, with the exception of one regiment, was withdrawn, and Howard's brigade had not crossed the Run. These brigades numbered fully 5000, so that there remain but 13,000 Federals then "bearing down" upon the Confederate position; and these, according to Barnard, "were in a single column, strung along over several miles of road."—Johnston's report here furnishes additional means for correcting the error of Beauregard. Speaking of the time before the arrival of Fisher and Falkner, he says: "We had now

16 guns and 260 cavalry, and a little above nine regiments of the Army of the Shenandoah, and six guns and less than the strength of three regiments of that of the Potomac, engaged with about 35,000 United States troops, among whom were full 3000 men of the old regular army." Johnston here gives the Confederate force accurately, 12 regiments, equal to 9000 men, and 22 guns. He, however, more than doubles the Federal force.

#### 3. The Confederate Advance and the Federal Rout.

Beauregard says: "By this time, between half past two and three o'clock P.M., our re-enforcements, pushed forward and directed by General Johnston to the required quarter, were at hand, just as I had ordered forward to a second effort for the recovery of the disputed plateau the whole line, including my reserves, which at this crisis of the battle I felt called upon to lead in person. The attack was general, and was shared in by every regiment then in the field." After enumerating the new re-enforcements, with less particularity than is done by Johnston, whose report we follow, he says: "About the same time, at three o'clock P.M., Brigadier General E. K. Smith, with some 1700 infantry of Elzey's brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah, and Beckham's battery, came upon the field from Camp Pickens, Manassas, where they had arrived by railroad at noon." This was the last re-enforcement; and the two reports enable us to give the number of the Confederates on the field, all of whom were in action at the time of the rout. These consisted of the 6000 men of the Army of the Shenandoah originally engaged; Evans's half brigade, 1300; Hampton's legion, 400; Kirby Smith's, 1700—9400 specially enumerated; with the following regiments of infantry, of which the numbers are not stated: Fisher's North Carolina, Falkner's Mississippi, of the Army of the Shenandoah; Casb's and Kershaw's, from Bonham's brigade; Cooke's whole brigade of five regiments; and Early's brigade of three regiments—in all, twelve regiments, equal to 9000 men, making 18,400 infantry. There is some obscurity in the enumeration of the cavalry and artillery; but at least ten companies are specially mentioned as engaged, which brings the entire Confederate force actually on the plateau at the time of the rout to a little more than 19,000 men. The remaining 11,000 (or perhaps 13,000) men not actually engaged consisted of Holmes's, Ewell's, Jones's, Longstreet's, and a part of Bonham's brigades.

The Federal forces engaged, or in a position to be brought into action at the time of the rout, consisted, as stated in the text, of the 18,000 who crossed the Run, deducting Keyes's brigade of 2500, and an equal number of Burnside's brigade—5000 in all, leaving 13,000 at that moment on the field.

**THE ZOUAVES.**—"The evanescent courage of the Zouaves prompted them to fire perhaps a hundred shots, when they broke and fled, leaving the batteries open to a charge of the enemy's cavalry, which took place immediately."—*Porter's Report.* "As soon as the Zouaves came up, I led them forward against an Alabama regiment partly concealed in a clump of small pines in an old field. At the first fire they broke and fled to the rear, keeping up a desultory firing over the heads of their comrades in front; at the same moment they were charged by a company of secession cavalry on their rear, who came by a road through two strips of wood on our extreme right. The fire of the Zouaves killed four and wounded one, dispersing them. The discomfiture of this cavalry was completed by a fire from Captain Collum's company of United States cavalry, which killed and wounded several men. Colonel Farnham, with some of his officers and men, behaved gallantly, but the regiment of Zouaves, as a regiment, did not appear again on the field. Many of the men joined other regiments, and did good service as skirmishers. . . . Since the retreat more than three fourths of the Zouaves have disappeared."—*Heintzelman's Report.* "The new position [of Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries] had scarcely been occupied when a troop of the enemy's cavalry, debouching from a piece of wood close upon our right flank, charged down upon the New York Eleventh. The Zouaves, catching sight of the cavalry a few minutes before they were upon them, broke ranks to such a degree that the cavalry dashed through them without doing them much harm. The Zouaves gave them a scattering fire as they passed, which emptied five saddles and killed three horses. A few minutes afterward a regiment of the enemy's infantry presented itself in line at not more than 60 or 70 yards' distance, and delivered a volley full upon the batteries and their supports. The Eleventh and Fourteenth regiments instantly broke and fled in confusion to the rear, and refused to rally and return to the support of the batteries."—*Barry's Report.*

**THE ROUT.**—"The completeness of the rout is testified to in almost all the reports of the Federal commanders. *McDowell* says: 'This soon degenerated into disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the hill, and there maintained itself until our men could get down to and across the Warrenton turnpike. The plain was covered with the retreating troops, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon degenerated still further into a panic. . . . I gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging the men to form in line, and offer at least the appearance of organization. . . . Once on the road, and the different corps coming together in small parties, many without officers, they became intermingled, and all organization was lost. . . . In the panic [at the crossing of Cub Run] the horses hauling the caissons and ammunition were cut from their traces by persons to escape with, and in this way much confusion was caused, the panic aggravated, and the road encumbered. . . . By sundown most of our men had got beyond Centreville ridge, and it became a question whether we should or not endeavor to make a stand there. . . . The utter disorganization and demoralization of the mass of the army seemed, to all who were near enough to be consulted, to admit no alternative but to fall back. . . . On sending the officers of the staff to the different camps, they found that our decision had been anticipated by the troops, most of those who had come in from the front being already on the road to the rear, the panic with which they came in still continuing, and hurrying them along.'"

*Porter* says: "The slopes behind us were swarming with our retreating and disorganized forces, while riderless horses and artillery teams ran furiously through the flying crowd. All farther efforts were futile. The words, gestures, and threats of our officers were thrown away upon men who had lost all presence of mind, and only longed for subsistence of body. . . . The rear-guard [mainly Sykes's regulars] followed our panic-stricken troops to Centreville, resisting the attacks of the rebel cavalry and artillery, and saving them from the inevitable destruction which awaited them had not this body been interposed."

*Heintzelman* says: "Soon after the firing commenced, the Brooklyn Fourteenth broke and ran. I considered it useless to attempt to rally them. The want of discipline in these regiments was so great that the most of the men would run from fifty to several hundred yards in the rear, and continue to fire—fortunately for the braver ones—very high in the air, and compelling those in front to retreat. . . . Finding it impossible to rally any of the regiments, we commenced our retreat at about half past four P.M. There was a fine position a short distance in the rear, where I hoped to make a stand with a section of Arnold's battery and the United States cavalry, if I could rally a few regiments of infantry. In this I utterly failed, and we continued our retreat on the road we had advanced on in the morning. I sent forward my staff officers to rally some troops beyond the Run, but not a company would form. . . . Such a rout I never witnessed before. No efforts could induce a single regiment to form after the retreat had commenced."

*McClellan* says: "I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Saturday, July 27th, 1861, six days after the battle of Bull Run. I found no army to command; a mere collection of regiments, covering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. . . . The city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash of cavalry."

**THE PURSUIT.**—"Early's brigade, etc., pursued the now panic-stricken, fugitive enemy. Stuart, with his cavalry, and Beckham, had also taken up the pursuit along the road by which the enemy had come upon the field in the morning; but, soon encumbered by prisoners who thronged the way, the former was unable to attack the mass of fast-fleeing, fugitive Federalists. Withers's, Preston's, Casb's, and Kershaw's regiments, Hampton's legion, and Kemper's battery, also pursued along the Warrenton road by the Stone Bridge, the enemy having opportunely opened a way for them through the heavy abatis which my troops had made on the west side of the bridge several days before; but this pursuit was soon recalled. . . . Colonel Radford, with six companies of Virginia cavalry, was ordered to cross Bull Run, and attack the enemy from the direction of the Lewis house. In the immediate vicinity of the Suspension Bridge [over Cub Run] he charged a battery with great gallantry, took Colonel Corcoran, of the 69th New York, prisoner, and captured the colors of that regiment. . . . Lieutenant Munford also led some companies of cavalry in hot pursuit, and captured prisoners, cannon, etc., abandoned in the flight."—*Beauregard's Report.* "Stuart pressed the pursuit of the enemy's principal line of retreat, the Sudley road. Four companies of cavalry, under Radford and Munford, were ordered to cross the stream to reach the turnpike, the line of retreat of the enemy's left. Our cavalry found the roads encumbered with dead and wounded (many of whom seemed to have been thrown from wagons), arms, accoutrements, and clothing. . . . Instructions were sent to Bonham to march by the quickest route to intercept the fugitives; and to Longstreet to follow as closely as possible upon the right. Their progress was checked by the enemy's reserve, and by night at Centreville."—*Johnston's Report.*

"The order [to take up a position in front of Centreville] was executed with great difficulty, as the road was nearly choked up by retreating baggage-wagons of several divisions, and by the vast number of flying soldiers belonging to various regiments. . . . Nevertheless, I was enabled to take a position which would prevent the advance of the enemy, and protect the retreat of the army. . . . The retreat of great numbers of flying soldiers continued until nine o'clock in the evening, the great majority in wild confusion, and but few in collected bodies. Soon afterward several squadrons of the enemy's cavalry advanced along the road, and appeared before the outposts. . . . The skirmishers fired, when the enemy turned around, leaving several killed and wounded on the spot. Afterward we were several times molested from the rear by the enemy's cavalry. At about midnight, the command to leave the position and march to Centreville was given by General McDowell."—*Blenker's Report.*





GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

## CHAPTER IV.

## THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.—BALL'S BLUFF.

The new Army.—Its Organization.—General McClellan.—Difficulties in his Way.—The Material of War.—Fortifications about Washington.—Popular impression as to the early close of the War.—McClellan's Memorandum addressed to the President.—His Estimate of the Force requisite for an aggressive Campaign.—Operations during the Summer and Autumn.—Reconnaissance toward Lewinsville.—Evacuation of Munson's Hill by the Confederates.—Confederate Batteries at Matthias Point.—Blockade of the Lower Potomac.—Operations on the Upper Potomac.—Position of Forces.—Confederate Occupation of Leesburg.—McCall's Advance to Drainesville.—Ashby's Raid on Harper's Ferry.—Devens's Reconnaissance toward Leesburg.—The Battle of Ball's Bluff.—Death of Baker.—The Defeat and Slaughter of the Federals.—Cause of the Disaster.—The Confederate Army in Virginia.—Ord's Advance to Drainesville.—Object of the Movement.—McCall's Division.—The March.—The Enemy flanked.—His Retreat.—Losses.

THE battle of Bull Run had been lost. The enemy had not improved his opportunity against our panic-stricken capital; no victory gained in the war was more fruitless of benefit to the victors, and to the vanquished there could have been no success more fortunate, on the whole, than was their defeat. The battle had been a test-battle for a continent that for three generations had been nursed in peace—a test-battle both for the North and South, it is true, but, as usually happens in such a case, the former, whose strength had been broken, learned the lesson, while the latter, blinded by temporary and easily-won success, became over-confident, and saw in the Federal rout of July only a magnificent illustration of the martial superiority of Southern chivalry. Thus it happened that while the South relaxed its strength, the muscular North contracted and prepared to strike blows. The great uprising in April had brought to the capital a vast assemblage of militia; and these, not waiting for the mature results of discipline, but pushed on by the incessant clamor of people and press, had shouldered arms, to which the majority of them were unused, and marched forth of a hot summer's day to meet the defiant foe beyond Centreville, very much as the same number of men would have gone to a picnic or a fancy tournament, and with not half the regularity that would have marked an ordinary training day; and this mock army had been swept from the field, disorganized and useless. Following upon this disaster came a second uprising, which gave us, at length, an army of soldiers.

But this was the work of time, and it was also a work of great difficulty. Perhaps the chief obstacle in the way of such a military organization was required was the habitual predisposition of the people to peaceful occupations. Among the many shrewd sayings of Lord Bacon was this: that a nation devoted to the minute operations of mechanism and to lucrative commerce is the least likely, of all others, to be martially disposed. In addition to this we were a republic, and there was no distinction of classes, as between the ruling and the ruled, and thus none of that subserviency of one class to another which leads naturally to military subordination and discipline. It was an easy matter for Congress to vote and to raise half a million of men. But the manner in which recruiting was carried on introduced into this body an absolutely worthless element. Officers were appointed at the head of regiments as the reward for filling up their ranks, and the motives of deception were too powerful to be resisted; sometimes one third of a regiment which had been mustered into the army was found, upon inspection, to be unfit for active service. Here was one difficulty. But if there was a large class of "incapables" among the privates, there was a still larger class in proportion among the officers, who, for the most part, had no military knowledge whatever. This was the kind of army which displaced the armed

crowd of the summer campaign; this was the army which, at a week's notice, rushed to the protection of the capital; but it was not the kind of army that could carry on a campaign—that could stand reverses or bear success. There was not a sufficiently large force of the regular army to form a respectable nucleus about which this crude mass might be gathered and organized. The army that was needed had to be made, and it must be made out of unpromising material.


But who was to transform this half million of men into good and trustworthy soldiers? We had one general—Winfield Scott—who had been tried, and in whom the country had great confidence. But he was infirm, and had arrived at that period of life when it was beyond his power to endure the fatiguing duties that must inevitably fall upon the commander of so large an army. He himself, aware of this, although unwilling wholly to disengage himself from the struggle, suggested that another be placed at the helm, he himself retaining a general oversight of operations. For this important office he proposed General George B. McClellan.

The campaigns in West Virginia in the summer of 1861 contrasted most favorably with the operations carried on at the same time in the eastern part of the state. The topography of West Virginia presented a very great obstacle to military operations; but these difficulties existed in a greater degree for the Confederates than for ourselves, inasmuch as we had the advantage—in this case a decisive one—of having the surrounding people on our side. The attempts, therefore, which were made by Garnett and his fellow-officers to occupy this mountainous region were thwarted, without any great sacrifice except the labor involved in arduous marches, and somewhat more than the ordinary exposure that belongs of necessity to a soldier's life. However strongly the enemy might be fortified, he had always a long line of communication to protect, and, by simply cutting this line, he would always be compelled to risk the chances of battle, in which the advantages were mostly in our favor. The campaign was wisely planned in every part, and McClellan was unusually fortunate in the vigorous support given him by Rosecrans. Nor does the fact that the commander himself was not always personally present on the field of conflict at all diminish the credit due to the military skill which planned and controlled the battle. The good degree of military sagacity developed in these battles, and the rapidity with which one victory followed upon the heels of another, at a time when the whole country was impatient for activity, brought McClellan into a prominence which he enjoyed without a rival. Another quality, more characteristic of McClellan than of any other general, and one which was more than all others calculated to make him the centre of popular attraction, was his extraordinary capability of creating enthusiasm in his army. This enthusiasm was of no ordinary character, but rather a sort of inspiration, by which the troops became identified with their leader, a part and parcel of his personal ambition and destiny as well as of his military operations. It was not a simple, frank outburst of admiration, but it was personal sympathy, fervent devotion. Fortunate beyond the usual estimate put upon them were all these characteristics, and they doubtless had great weight with General Scott; but with the lieutenant general there was another consideration of at least equal importance—McClellan, having been from the first scrupulously jealous of what the Southern states deemed to be their rights, would be likely to conciliate the South, if conciliation were yet possible, and his appointment would unite the country by bringing even the pro-slavery party of the North over to the support of the war, whereas the appointment of a member of the Republican party, as it seemed to Scott, would provoke the enemy to a more determined resistance and distract our counsels at home. But there was a greater danger which was not foreseen, viz., the possibility, nay, the almost inevitable certainty of disagreement between a general and an administration representing sentiments radically opposite to his own; and the jealousies growing out of this opposition in sentiment lost us many a battle and many an opportunity of bringing the war to a speedy termination. These troubles were, however, in the background, and it will not be necessary to consider their origin and development until we come to treat of the Peninsular Campaign of 1862.

In the mean time, the difficulties which McClellan had to encounter and overcome at the outset, and before any active operations could be attempted, were very great and numerous. Some of these we have indicated in connection with the raw material which was given him to make into an army. This particular class of difficulties McClellan looked directly in the face, and it is probable that so great a number of men were never in so short a space of time organized into an efficient army. In this organization the regiment was the unit. Four regiments constituted a brigade, and three brigades a division. Each division had four batteries, three served by volunteers and one by regulars, the captain of the latter commanding the entire artillery of the division. The regulars were not distributed, but were kept together in divisions by themselves. In the constitution of this army, McClellan's intimate acquaintance with European tactics became of very great value and assistance. The result was perhaps not an equivalent to the Southern army in some important respects, for the latter entered more naturally into military organization; the officers were men accustomed to rule, the men to be ruled, and the existence of slavery in the South had always necessitated a very near approach to martial law as the ordinary status of society.

But soldiers are only the muscular basis of an army; it is the mechanical appliances of war that give an army availability and multiply its power. These appliances are of two sorts, offensive and defensive. And here again the difficulty did not consist in obtaining the raw material or a sufficient supply of money, but in elaborate construction, requiring the tedious labor of months. As Congress could vote half a million of men, so it could vote





INTERIOR OF THE UPPER BATTERY AT CHAIN BRIDGE, WASHINGTON.

half a thousand millions of dollars; but it could no more easily metamorphose money into muskets, cannon, and pontoon bridges than raw militia into soldiers. If we consider merely the amount of food necessary to five hundred thousand men, it sums up in the short space of one week to nearly three million pounds of meat and four millions of flour, besides three hundred and fifty thousand pounds of coffee and five hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds of sugar. The systematic regulation of this enormous supply presupposes arrangements the most complicate in advertisement of proposals, in shipment and transportation, and finally in distribution. Then the arrangements for equipments and munitions required still more time for their completion. The number of small arms at the disposal of the government was fearfully inadequate. These had either to be manufactured in this country or imported. The Springfield armory and that at Harper's Ferry were the principal sources of the home supply at the beginning of the war, and the latter of these had been destroyed in April. There were not enough muskets in the North to supply the 75,000 men of the President's first call. Even the Springfield armory could furnish no more than 25,000 per year. Evidently, then, new armories had to be set in operation, and those already existing enlarged, while in the mean time the most strenuous efforts were made to secure a foreign supply. Not only was the quantity of small arms necessary to carry on an extensive campaign slowly produced, but there was an equal impediment in the way of promptly furnishing heavy artillery.

The very tents of the soldiers taxed all the sail-makers of the country to the utmost extent of their working powers. Wagons, and harness, and cavalry equipments of every sort existed only in the raw material, and slowly advanced out of this primitive form under the manufacturer's busy hand. The industrial activity of the North was thoroughly aroused to meet the

sudden and pressing demand; all that could be done quickly was done. But skill is the result of experience; it does not spring up at any momentary emergency; and, therefore, all work requiring a great degree of mechanical elaboration was of slow completion; and the number of laborers fitted for such work being insufficient, others must be trained before they could be of any efficiency.

Not only must there be a vast increase of *materiel* for offensive warfare, but the disorganization of the army after its defeat at Bull Run made it necessary to surround Washington with defensive works of great strength. This was partially begun on the occasion of our first advance into Virginia and the occupation of Alexandria, when Forts Runyon and Coreoran were constructed as *têtes-de-pont* to the Long Bridge and the Aqueduct. A fortnight afterward Fort Albany was laid out, commanding the Columbia and the Aqueduct and Alexandria roads. After McClellan assumed command of the Army of the Potomac, the interval between Fort Coreoran and Fort Albany was filled by a series of works within supporting distance of each other; and strong works were built controlling the principal routes leading to Washington from the north. Thus was established the basis of an adequate fortification for the defense of the capital; but to complete the works so far as to justify any great depletion of the army in front of Washington for the purposes of an offensive campaign was the work of months.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "The theory of these defenses is that upon which the works of Torres Vedras were based—the only one admitted at the present day for defending extensive lines. It is to occupy the commanding points within range of each other by field-forts, the fire of which shall sweep all the approaches. These forts furnish the secure emplacements of artillery. They also afford cover to bodies of infantry. The works may be connected by lines of light parapets, or the ground (where practicable) may be so obstructed that the enemy's troops can not penetrate the interval without being exposed, for a considerable time, to the destructive effects of the artillery or musketry fire of the forts.

"With such a system established, the defense against a powerful attack requires that all the



INTERIOR OF FORT RUNYON.





FORT CORCORAN, ARLINGTON HEIGHTS.

In the face of all these impediments, it was the popular impression that the war would be, by great victories gained on the field, brought to completion in two or three months. Besides, there were a few who supposed that our immense and formidable preparations would intimidate the South, and obviate the very necessity of fighting. But the South was not intimidated. She herself voted 500,000 men, and brought a large proportion of that number into the field, partly by volunteering, and in great measure by conscription. Then it was apparent to every military eye that the whole strength of the two sections must meet, and that the side to yield would be that which was more rapidly exhausted. It was also evident that the preliminary preparations in the matter of organization must be thoroughly completed before a campaign could be ventured against an enemy whose force, though not equal to our own in point of numbers, had a great advantage in position, being situated at the centre of an arc along whose circumference it would be necessary for us to operate in any aggressive movement. The popular impression, however, as to the early termination of the war still remained; indeed, a shorter time elapsed before the date which had been set for a final settlement than would have sufficed for our army to learn how to build a pontoon bridge.

The season suitable for active operations previous to the winter of 1861 passed by without any important movement. In a memorandum addressed to the President early in August of that year, McClellan expressed his convictions in regard to the nature of the coming campaign in the most explicit terms. Having stated that the war differed from all others in this respect, viz., that in ordinary wars the purpose was simply to conquer a peace and make a treaty on advantageous terms, while in this it was necessary to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a nation, he proceeded to urge the necessity for an overwhelming display of physical force. Our foreign relations and financial credit, he said, demanded that the military action of the government should be prompt and irresistible. The plan of operations which he advised was the following:

The rebels having made Virginia their main field of operations, it was therefore necessary that the great conflict should take place in that state. But, to weaken the resistance at this point, movements should be made both by land and water in other directions, and especially in the West, upon the Mississippi, and, as soon as Kentucky was sufficiently cordial in her loyalty, through that state into Eastern Tennessee. These separate and co-operative movements would not require a very large force; but for the main



FORT ALBANY, NEAR ALEXANDRIA.

army—that of the Potomac—he urged a force of 273,000 men, to be supplied with the necessary engineer and pontoon trains and transportation. In direct co-operation with this force, a strong naval armament should be prepared to move against important points along the enemy's sea-coast. As an argument in favor of so large an army in the East, he suggested that the capture of Richmond was only the first step into the enemy's country; and as every successful advance lengthened our line of communications, large detachments of force would be necessary to protect that line, while the enemy, at every withdrawal, would be able to make a greater concentration of his own forces.

Undoubtedly, in his proposed distribution of forces, McClellan underrated the difficulties of the Western campaign. At least, it soon became evident

forts shall be garrisoned; that a certain amount of infantry, cavalry, and movable artillery be distributed along the lines sufficient to hold them until reserves can be brought to support; and, finally, it requires a movable force held as a reserve, which may be shifted from point to point, to meet the enemy's effort wherever it may be made, and where, aided by the works, they can repel superior numbers.

"It is evident that without fortifications a place can not be considered secure unless held by considerably greater numbers than the enemy can bring to assail it. No less an authority than Napoleon says that, aided by fortifications, 50,000 men and 3000 artillerymen can defend a capital against 300,000 men, and he asserts the necessity of fortifying all national capitals."—*General Burnard's Report*, p. 12.

that to subdue the Confederates in Kentucky and Missouri alone required a force much larger than McClellan considered necessary for an advance into East Tennessee.

This memorandum was addressed to the President, at his own request, within two weeks after the battle of Bull Run. Three months afterward, in the latter part of October, there being a strong desire on the part of the country and the President for an immediate advance of the Army of the Potomac, McClellan made another statement to the President, representing the force available for an advance movement as only about 76,000 men, while that of the enemy behind intrenched fortifications was fully 150,000. It is true there was present for duty a force of 147,000 men, but over 13,000 of these were either unarmed or unequipped. Out of the 134,000 left, 58,000 must remain to protect Washington, to guard the Potomac, and to garrison Baltimore and Annapolis, leaving only 76,000 for the aggressive movement against Richmond.

In order to an advance, McClellan thought that 35,000 men should be left to protect Washington, 13,000 to guard the Potomac, 10,000 to garrison Baltimore and Annapolis, while there should be a column of 150,000 for active operations. This would require an aggregate, present and absent, of 240,000 men. As to the force of the enemy at Manassas, McClellan was no





MUNSON'S HILL.

doubt egregiously mistaken. His information was gathered from unreliable sources, and any reports that militated against his preconceived opinions he summarily rejected. There is no good reason to believe that the enemy at Manassas numbered over 50,000 men; for even at a later period, when their ranks had been re-enforced by conscription, they were estimated at only about 80,000.

Thus so far as the main operations against Richmond were concerned. But the army was not idle during the summer. Reconnoitring parties were continually scouring the country to within a short distance of the enemy's lines. Frequently these reconnoissances resulted in skirmishes, which accustomed the soldiers to being under fire. One of the most important of those which occurred during the summer was that made by General Smith, on the 25th of September, toward Lewinsville. The general had several thousand troops in his command, and, shortly after their arrival at Lewinsville, they were attacked by a large force of the Confederates from Falls Church. The result of the sharp conflict which ensued was the retreat of the enemy and the capture of some of his stores by General Smith. Two days afterward the Confederates abandoned the fortifications on Munson's Hill, which they had held ever since the battle of Bull Run.

The enemy was active during the summer and autumn chiefly in two directions—to prevent navigation on the Lower Potomac, and to find his way across some of the fords of the Upper Potomac into Maryland; and these operations on the right and left of McClellan's army were at the same time offensive and defensive, as they not only impeded transportation on the Potomac, and threatened raids into the fertile valleys north of that river and against the important line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, but also guarded either flank of the Confederate army at Manassas. Preparations for the blockade of the Lower Potomac were commenced previous to the battle of Bull Run. The Secretary of the Navy was not uninformed of

these movements, and as early as June suggested to the War Department the necessity of occupying Matthias Point, the possession of which in force would secure the navigation of the river from the threatened interruption, and at the same time furnish a foothold on the Virginia shore for operations against the enemy's right flank. The extreme left of the Federal army, in the neighborhood of Alexandria, was not more than five or six miles above a line run directly east from Manassas Junction, which was distant twenty-five miles. From Alexandria the Potomac runs almost directly south to the mouth of Acquia Creek, a distance of thirty miles; then it runs directly east for fifteen miles, where it rounds Matthias Point—a very prominent projection northward into the stream, and almost entirely separated from the main land by Gamble's Creek. It was a point which, at that early period of the war, might easily have been held by a small detachment of troops. But no measures were taken for its occupation by General Scott. His suggestions to the War Department being unheeded, the Secretary of the Navy took the matter into his own hands with the best material at his command. At this time, it must be remembered that the government had no gun-boats or iron-clad monitors, and the engagement of batteries by wooden ships of war were serious undertakings, in which the batteries had clearly the advantage. The United States steamers the Pawnee and the Pocahontas, and a naval flotilla under Commander Ward, with several steam-boats under naval officers, constituted the Potomac squadron, whose office it was to prevent communication with that part of Virginia which belonged to the Confederacy, intercepting supplies, and protecting transports and supply-vessels in their passage up and down the river. Commander Ward having discovered, by means of a reconnoissance off Matthias Point, that the Confederate troops encamped there were about to erect a battery, on the 26th of June sent up to the Pawnee, at Acquia Creek, for two boats armed and equipped. Two small cutters' crews were dispatched from the Pawnee,



CONFEDERATE BATTERIES AT EVANSFORT.






CONFEDERATE BATTERIES AT BULL'S POINT, ON THE POTOMAC.

which, with a boat's crew from Ward's vessel—the Freeborn—made between thirty and forty men. This party effected a landing at the Point the next morning, driving in the rebel pickets. They found preparations for erecting a battery, and, under cover of the Freeborn's guns, they proceeded immediately to throw up a sand-bag breast-work, which they completed before night, when, leaving their work in order to bring guns from the vessel to mount them, they were surprised by a party of the enemy concealed in the bushes on the shore: a few of them were taken prisoners, and the rest escaped to the steamer. Commander Ward was killed in the engagement. No Confederate battery, however, was maintained on Matthias Point, it being beyond supporting distance of the main army. In a few weeks the right bank of the Potomac was lined with batteries from High Point to Matthias Point, a distance of from thirty to forty miles. After McClellan assumed the command of the Army of the Potomac, the subject was again brought to the attention of the War Department by Secretary Welles. The President was anxious that something should be done, and in this anxiety he represented the feelings of the Northern people, who deemed it a humiliation that the Confederates should be able to maintain an efficient blockade of one of our principal channels of transportation. The Navy Department threw the responsibility upon the military, and, in return, the military shifted it off upon the naval. In a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Navy on the 12th of August, General McClellan says:

"I have to-day received additional information which convinces me that it is more than probable that the enemy will, within a very short time, attempt to throw a respectable force from the mouth of Aquia Creek into Maryland. This attempt will probably be preceded by the erection of batteries at Matthias and White House Points. Such a movement on the part of the enemy, in connection with others probably designed, would place Washington in great jeopardy. I most earnestly urge that the strongest possible naval force be at once concentrated near the mouth of Aquia Creek, and that the most vigilant watch be maintained day and night, so as to render such passage of the river absolutely impossible. I recommend that the Minnesota, and any other vessels available from Hampton Roads, be at once ordered up there, and that a great quantity of coal be sent to that vicinity sufficient for several weeks' supply. At least one strong war vessel should be kept at Alexandria; and I again urge the concentration of a strong naval force in the Potomac without delay. If the Navy Department will render it absolutely impossible for the enemy to cross the river below Washington, the security of the capital will be greatly increased. I can not too earnestly urge an immediate compliance with these requests." But the measures urged in this letter only looked to the defensive, and seemed quite unsatisfactory. If there was occasion to fear that the enemy's audacious operations on the south bank of the Potomac really threatened an advance into Maryland, which might place Washington in jeopardy, this only seemed to furnish an additional argument in favor of an attempt to dislodge the enemy from his positions. From this view of the case, it was only natural that a great pressure should be brought to bear on McClellan to induce him to co-operate in such an attempt, with as strong a force as might be necessary to secure its success. Really there was no occasion to fear an advance of the enemy from the mouth of Aquia Creek into Maryland; no movement could have been more unwise on the part of the Confederates; and, if it had been made, it is far more probable that the invading column of the enemy would be put in jeopardy than the Federal capital. But there was real occasion to fear that the Potomac might be rendered impassable to Federal vessels; and yet, while McClellan recommended "the strongest possible naval force" to be stationed in the Potomac to guard against a fancied danger, no means were taken to guard against that which was really threatened. The attitude of McClellan in respect to this matter was characteristic of his general policy. So formidable did the force of the enemy seem to him, that he even feared the event of a battle in which he himself should take the defensive, thinking it a matter of doubt, in case General

Johnston should advance against him in front, flanking him at the same time by a movement across the Lower Potomac into Maryland, whether he might not be overwhelmed by such superior numbers in his front as to be unable to take care of the flanking column of the enemy, which would march triumphantly into Washington. If he was apprehensive as to the results of an attack, he was naturally far more apprehensive of the result of any movement on his own part which might bring on a general engagement. It was this latter motive which was really the ground of his disinclination to co-operate in any undertaking involving a direct assault upon the enemy's works. His idea of a campaign was that complete preparation ought to be made before any thing should be accomplished, and then to dispose of the enemy by a single decisive victory. It was now scarcely a month since the battle of Bull Run. Hardly any thing had been done as yet toward the reorganization of the army. From their previous impatience of inactivity, the people had gone over to the opposite extreme, and a rash movement now would incur a double measure of condemnation. Without any doubt, therefore, McClellan was both consistent and prudent in his determination not to tempt a general engagement at this time by a movement against the position of the enemy on the right bank of the Potomac. He should also have been firm. But so strong was the feeling of the President and the Secretary of the Navy in favor of the movement, that he vacillated, and made preparations for throwing Hooker's division across the river to carry the Confederate batteries by assault. On one occasion he promised that this force should be ready at an appointed time, and the Navy Department provided the necessary transports, and Captain Craven collected his flotilla together; but when the time came McClellan had changed his mind, and the troops were not on hand. The disappointment was aggravated by the fact that no notification was given that the troops would not be sent. The reason given for this alteration of purpose was, that the troops, according to the opinion of McClellan's engineers, could not be landed with safety. It was replied that the Navy Department would be responsible on that score, and the troops were again promised, and the disappointment was repeated. This led to some ill feeling: and Captain Craven gave up his command very unwisely, on the ground that he would be held responsible for the blockade of the Potomac. McClellan's fault was in his vacillation. He should have been steadfast in his refusal so long as the matter was left to his discretion. His position was thoroughly supported by his corps of engineers. On the 27th of September, General Barnard, chief engineer, in company with Captain Wyman, of the flotilla, made a reconnoissance of the enemy's batteries as far as to Matthias Point. In his report he says: "Batteries at High Point and Cockpit Point, and thence down to Chopawamsie, can not be prevented. We may, indeed, prevent their construction on certain points, but along here, somewhere, the enemy can establish, in spite of us, as many batteries as he chooses. What is the remedy? Favorable circumstances, not to be anticipated, nor made the basis of any calculations, might justify and render successful the attack of a particular battery. To suppose that we can capture all, and by mere attacks of this kind prevent the navigation being molested, is very much the same as to suppose that the hostile army in our own front can prevent us building and maintaining field-works to protect Arlington and Alexandria, by capturing them, one and all, as fast as they are built." In another communication on the subject of crossing troops for the purpose of destroying these batteries, he says: "The operation involves the forcing of a very strong line of defense of the enemy, and all that we would have to do if we were really opening a campaign against them there. It is true, we hope to force this line by turning it at Freestone Point [a few miles below the mouth of the Occoquan]. With reason to believe that this may be successful, it can not be denied that it involves a risk of failure. Should we, then, considering all the consequences which may be involved, enter into the operation merely to capture the Potomac batteries? I think not. Will not the Ericsson, assisted by one other gun-boat, capable of keeping alongside these batteries, so far control their fire as to keep the navigation suffi-





THE SEMINOLE AND POCAHONTAS ENGAGING THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES AT EVANSFORD

ciently free as long as we require it? Captain Wyman says yes." In the mean time conflicts were every day occurring with the batteries along the bank, but never with any decisive results, and not unfrequently resulting in serious injury to the vessels engaged. We need only refer to a single instance of these conflicts—that in which the *Seminole* and *Pocahontas* figured, early in the month of October. These two vessels on this occasion engaged the three batteries at Evansport. The action was commenced by the *Seminole*, but her fire was not returned until she came within full range of the batteries, which then opened upon her in earnest, striking her in several places. A heavy shell exploded close under the bows, throwing the water over the fore-castle deck. A ball passed through the rails over the engine hatch, another through the hammock nettings, and one struck the mizzen-mast a few feet above the deck, badly injuring it. It was evident that only iron-clad vessels could reduce fortifications of this nature; and in this case, as in all others, the attempt had to be given up. No disastrous results followed from the erection of the Confederate batteries, nor was either the War or the Navy Department responsible for their existence, they having been erected at a time when neither of these departments were in a condition to prevent it. After the Potomac flotilla left to co-operate with the Port Royal Expedition, the river was effectually closed. Whatever embarrassment this may have been to the government, a careful consideration of the subject must lead to the conclusion that the difficulty was inevitably incident to the peculiar situation of the opposing armies. But, if the responsibility must rest any where, it should be with the Navy Department, which might have sent vessels of sufficient strength to reduce the enemy's works. This, however, was not done, for the very good reason that new batteries could be built as rapidly as the old ones were destroyed. Nothing could have effectually protected the navigation of the Potomac except the military occupation of its entire right bank by our army, and this occupation, clearly inadvisable at an early period, did not, at a later epoch, harmonize with General McClellan's plan of operations. What that plan was we shall consider in its appropriate place.

We now turn to the movements of the enemy on the Upper Potomac, which led to the battle of Ball's Bluff.

While, in October, the two main armies of Virginia were facing each other at Manassas, or rather, through their advanced pickets, at Fairfax Court House, each watching the movements of the other and expecting attack, considerable activity prevailed on the upper Potomac. General Banks, who had superseded Patterson after the battle of Bull Run, had been pushing his outposts several miles up the valley from his position at Harper's Ferry. This was in great measure occasioned by the movements of the enemy, who, having consumed every thing in the vicinity of Manassas and Centreville, found it necessary to make expeditions up the river for provisions, and especially into Loudon county, in the vicinity of Leesburg, where, through the numerous fords of the Potomac, raids could be easily made into Maryland. Leesburg was about forty miles from Harper's Ferry. Between twenty and thirty miles to the north the Federal troops held a favorable position on Sugar-loaf Mountain for observing the movements of the enemy in this direction. General Stone also had an important command

at Poolesville, in the vicinity of Edwards's Ferry. Our pickets lined the river from Harper's Ferry to Washington; and to avoid this uninterrupted series of police, the enemy resorted to the most elaborate manœuvring. His force, which had been detailed to Leesburg, consisted of the brigade of General Evans, or four regiments of soldiers; but this number was supposed by the Federal commanders to be much greater, they being misled by the *ruse* to which the enemy resorted, of showing himself at various places at short intervals of time, so as to multiply the apparent number in his command. The Federal position was in every way favorable for cutting off and surrounding Evans's brigade. To the north was General Banks at Harper's Ferry, and Geary at the Sugar-loaf; directly east was Stone at Edwards's Ferry, and sixteen miles farther to the eastward was McCall, with a large force at Drainesville. A little to the eastward of Leesburg, Goose Creek empties its waters into the Potomac, and across this small stream lies the Gum Spring road leading to Manassas. McCall's position at Drainesville bore upon this line of communication. The town of Leesburg itself, in a military point of view, was of great value to either army, lying on the railroad line from Washington to Winchester, and its possession securing the crops both of the Loudon and Shenandoah valleys. It was also a good position from which to carry on an irregular aggressive campaign against Maryland. But McClellan was on his guard; every ford was strongly defended, every movement of the enemy subjected to the strictest examination, and fortifications were erected at every available point. The Confederates, not being in sufficient force to man a great number of works if they had had them, relied not upon intrenchments or fortifications, but upon making a sudden attack in some unexpected quarter. They had, therefore, but a single battery, which was situated between Leesburg and Edwards's Ferry.

At this time the Confederate General Ashby, with his cavalry, was stationed at Charlestown, in the Shenandoah Valley, whence he continued, by a series of raids, to harass our forces at Harper's Ferry, a few miles to the northwest. The Confederates having now undisputed control of the lower Potomac, through their batteries at Aquia Creek, were seeking, by the co-operation of Evans with Ashby, to obtain a similar advantage on the upper part of the river. On the 13th of October, Ashby's troops, with four companies of Evans's brigade, and two pieces of his artillery, made an unusually daring expedition to Harper's Ferry. Taking up his position on the Loudon Heights, a severe skirmish occurred between the opposing forces, and some of the store-houses and mills in the village of Harper's Ferry were fired by the shells of the enemy. Otherwise no important result was gained, and it was with great difficulty that Ashby was able to withdraw from the position which he had so boldly taken.

Evans, in the mean time, in danger of being cut off by McCall, fell back to a position on Goose Creek, still holding Leesburg. Besides the danger of an attack from the direction of Drainesville, it will be remembered that General Stone threatened Evans's force from two points on the river, viz., from Edwards's Ferry and Harrison's Island, both being about five miles from Leesburg, and the same distance from each other. At Harrison's Island Colonel Devens was stationed, with a few companies of the 15th Massachusetts. Pickets were sent out by Evans in each of these directions. This





CHARLES DEVENS.

was the situation on Saturday night, the 19th of October. The next day General Stone, having evidently the impression that the main force of the enemy was in some other quarter, and that Leesburg was defended by only two or three companies, made his arrangements to cross the river and bring on an engagement. This determination led to the battle of Ball's Bluff, which has also been called the battle of Leesburg. Considering merely the disposition of the Federal forces, and the number of men available for an attack, it seems almost impossible that the combination formed should result in a disaster so complete as that which followed, and which we must now consider.

Ball's Bluff rises to the height of thirty feet from the river's edge, directly opposite and about a hundred yards from Harrison's Island. A reconnoissance had been made a few days previously from this point by Federal scouts, accompanied by engineers, and it was found that only a few companies held Leesburg. All the arrangements for attack seem to have proceeded on the basis of this reconnoissance. On Sunday at sunset, after furiously attacking the enemy's position from Edwards's Ferry, and devoting especial attention to a battery called Fort Evans, known to be at the right, General Stone landed a few of his troops on the Virginia side, but at dusk returned them to camp. At evening Colonel Lee, with a battalion of the 20th Massachusetts, and the 20th New York, or Tammany regiment, and a section of artillery, was in position at Conrad's Ferry, between Edwards's Ferry and Harrison's Island, ready to act in support of Devens, who had been ordered to cross the river to Ball's Bluff, and, proceeding toward Leesburg, to disperse an encampment which scouts had reported as existing a mile north of the town.

Devens had not completed his crossing before sunrise Monday morning, so inadequate were the means of transportation. Not long after he had crossed, Colonel Edward Baker came upon the island with his 1st California regiment, and commenced crossing. Early in the day he reported in person to General Stone, who directed him to cross at the island and take command of all the forces on the Virginia side. In this interview, according to Stone's report, made a week after the fight, the latter had distinctly intimated to Baker the nature of the situation; he had informed him what means of transportation he might have at his disposal; he had distinctly warned him that it was impossible to support him directly by a column crossed at Edwards's Ferry on account of the battery (Fort Evans) which interposed; he advised him to make no advance except against an inferior force, and to take no more artillery across than he had infantry to protect; and distinctly, in his written orders, he left it to the brave colonel's discretion whether to advance or retire, after that he had crossed and reconnoitred. With these instructions, Colonel Baker hurried to the field.

Devens, in the mean time, had accomplished his reconnoissance. He found that the scouts had been deceived, mistaking certain openings in the woods for white tents; but he encountered a Mississippi regiment on picket duty, and had retired fighting all the way to his landing-place, where his retreat was covered by Colonel Lee. The position to which he retired was a semi-circular opening in the forest, stretching out from the bluff; and thither the enemy boldly followed him, taking a position under cover of the woods in his flank, and pouring upon his men a merciless fire. Random firing was thus continually heard by Baker's regiment as it was crossing the river. Gorman's brigade had crossed in the morning at Edwards's Ferry, on a reconnoissance toward Goose Creek, for the purpose of drawing Evans's attention from the right; still there was a sufficient force retained at the latter point to outnumber Colonel Devens, leaving out of sight the advantage of the enemy in the matter of position.

The California regiment was from seven o'clock in the morning until four in the afternoon crossing the river, and in the mean time numbers of them fell victims to the concealed fire of the enemy. At first there was no means of conveying the men across except an old water-logged scow, carrying about

forty men; but another scow, capable of holding sixty, was afterward dragged up from the canal. This leisurely proceeding plainly indicates that the Federal commanders had no conception of the number of the enemy on the other side. The reconnoissances which had been made were notably deficient; in each case a picket guard of the Confederates had been encountered, when the reconnoitring force had retired, and, beyond the number of the combatants directly met, no information had been gathered. A small cavalry force, though it would not have mended the deficiency in boats, would at least have obtained the position and numbers of the foe to be encountered, and thus have awakened the Federal officers to the peril of making an attack in the careless manner in which it was made, both in regard to transportation and the number of men detailed. General Stone reports that he sent such a force, but his order was disobeyed.


After having crossed, the men climbed up the steep banks with their artillery, consisting of five pieces; skirmishers were sent out and the line of battle formed, with the California regiment on the left, the 15th Massachusetts and the Tammany regiment on the right, and the 20th Massachusetts in the centre, making, all told, a force of 1720 men. But in the woods was a much superior force. Gorman had retired from Goose Creek without accomplishing any thing more than a temporary diversion, and thus the force of the enemy at Ball's Bluff was continually re-enforced from the main body opposite Edwards's Ferry.

Our forces were received with a volley from the enemy; then followed random firing, and then again the volley, every fire being preceded by a hideous yell. This continued for half an hour, our men being leisurely picked off, as in an ambush, while the enemy was securely covered by the woods both from our musketry and artillery. In the severity of this onslaught the Rhode Island artillerists deserted their pieces, which were immediately manned by Colonels Wistar and Cogswell, the former of whom was killed and the latter wounded. Every moment the enemy grew bolder and more desperate, our men suffering terribly from the incessant fire, and having no possible protection except that furnished by a slight elevation of the ground. But there was no wavering. For two hours the brave men stood their ground thus, every minute telling its quota of murders. Then a council of war was held. What was to be done? Evidently three courses lay before Colonel Baker, and with him was left the decision between them. One was to retreat. But that involved recrossing the river, and, with the terrible advantage now held by the enemy, this would necessitate incalculable loss. Another course which might be taken was for Baker to cut his way through the woods to Edwards's Ferry. But in that case there was a considerable force of the enemy to be encountered in front, and a powerful battery, besides the overwhelming force which would pursue them from behind; the way, moreover, led through the woods. The only other course left was to remain and await re-enforcements. But how were these to come? Even the scanty supply of boats at hand were scattered, under no command or management; indeed, re-enforcements which *had been sent* could not, on this very account, find their way to the field. There seems to have been no possible escape from the net in which our forces had been carelessly immeshed. But in this extremity Baker dreams not of surrender. It is reported (and the report is accredited by General Stone) that at this point, and just as our officers had decided to hold the field, a mounted Confederate officer came out from the covert and beckoned our forces to advance, and that Colonel Baker, seizing upon this suggestion, led his men in a charge upon the enemy's position in the woods. However it may be as regards the suggestion, it is true that the colonel did lead his men in an impetuous charge, riding himself far in the front; that, with his hand placed in his breast after his usual manner, he coolly gave orders to his men, advising them to fire lower, and encouraging them with the hope of final success; and that in a moment a sheet of flame surrounded him as with the illumination of lightning, and he fell at the head of his column, the victim of an ill-advised battle. His body was with difficulty recovered. The command devolving upon Cogswell, he resolved to cut his way out to Edwards's Ferry; but this was now impossible, as our men in broken ranks were already hastening to cross the river. Colonel Devens had deserted his command and crossed the river on horseback. The scow was soon filled with men, when it was swamped, and many of the men lost. In utter confusion, the troops rolled over each other down the bank; some, attempting to swim across, were drowned, and a greater number were shot by the enemy, who never for one moment slackened fire. There was a sufficient force on the island to prevent pursuit, and with the retreat of our forces the engagement terminated. The Federal loss was 350 killed and wounded, and 500 taken prisoners. Among the wounded was a son of Oliver Wendell Holmes.

It seems almost a miracle of negligence that, with several thousand men available for this very field, and with abundant facilities for procuring suitable transportation, so small a force of men should have been placed at the mercy of an enemy whose numbers were unknown, and that, too, without adequate means of safe retreat in case of disaster. Nor was this the whole sum of the error. Why did Gorman retire from Goose Creek? His command was not very much inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, all told, and yet he simply exchanged shots with a Mississippi regiment and withdraws. If he had held his ground, and hung upon the flanks of Evans, his co-operation with Baker might have been efficient, and the day have ended with victory instead of defeat. Whoever may have been responsible for this reverse, no blame in connection with it is to be attributed to General McClellan, who only ordered Stone to make a feint at crossing, so as to co-operate with McCall at Drainesville.


The success of the enemy led to no important results. Our most serious loss was the death of Colonel Baker. His career had been one of unusual





GENERAL STONE'S DIVISION AT EDWARDS'S FERRY, OCTOBER 20, 1861.





EDWARD D. BAKER.

brilliance. He was born in London, but his father, soon after the birth of his son, emigrated to Philadelphia, and in a few years went to the West. Edward studied law, and rose to a high degree of eminence in that profession. From his fine address, the impressiveness of his presence, and his irresistible eloquence, he became a general favorite in the West. In Illinois, California, and Oregon, he, as resident of those states successively, carried on a successful political career. In Oregon he was elected United States senator in 1859. He was one of the ablest debaters in the Senate. The most striking characteristic of the man was that a great occasion inevitably inspired him and swayed his course. In the incipency of any important movement he seemed to interpret its full meaning, and clearly to see the end from the beginning. This made him both ready and transparent in utterance; and these elements, added to the fire of eloquence that was in him, made him one of the best orators of the country. Thousands will remember, till they cease to remember any thing, his speech at the great Union Meeting in New York City when the war first broke out. Every sentence was like the full wave of a powerful sea, and carried the whole multitude on before it, swaying them and thrilling them like music. Yet there was no sentiment nor extravagant verbiage in his rhetoric. No sooner had he made that speech than he immediately began the work of recruiting a regiment for the war. He was afterward offered a higher position, even that of a major general, but he preferred to serve as colonel of his original regiment. Previous to the battle of Ball's Bluff he seems to have had a presentiment of his fate; he hurried to Washington, disposed of all his affairs, even to his own burial-place, and then returned to the field to die there doing his duty. This battle, in which one half of the men in the field were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners, and the loss of Colonel Baker, awakened throughout the country a determination that the officers concerned in the management of the affair should be held responsible.

In the mean time, directly after the engagement, orders were received from McClellan to hold the island and the Virginia shore at Edwards's Ferry

at all hazards. Re-enforcements were sent, but it was finally deemed best to withdraw entirely to the Maryland side of the river.

The Confederate army in Virginia at this time consisted of three separate armies, styled respectively the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the Valley, and the Army of the Aquia. The first of these, comprising four divisions, under Doren, Longstreet, and the two Smiths (G. W. and Kirby), was under the command of Beauregard; Jackson commanded the Army of the Valley, and Holmes that of the Aquia. The entire army, with its left threatening the upper, and its right the lower Potomac, while its centre rested on Manassas, covering the direct route to Richmond, was under the command of General Johnston. This was the position during the winter. On the 20th of December an engagement of some importance occurred near Drainesville. General Ord, following instructions from McCall, proceeded with five regiments, including Lieutenant Colonel Kane's regiment, a battery, and two squadrons of cavalry, on the Leesburg pike in the direction of Drainesville. The purpose of this movement was to drive back the enemy's pickets, which had advanced to within four or five miles of the Federal lines, with a reserve force at Drainesville, and to procure forage from the farms of disloyal citizens in the vicinity. A few miles to the east of Drainesville Difficult Creek crosses the pike. Here General J. F. Reynolds was posted with the first brigade ready to support the main column. Brigadier General Meade was also called up with the second brigade for a similar purpose. Thus McCall's entire division was involved in the general movement though General Ord's brigade was the only one directly engaged. General McCall's division, immediately after the occupation by our forces of Munson's Hill and Falls Church, had been stationed at the right of these positions, with its encampments stretching away over a beautiful tract of country toward Lewinsville, thus forming the right wing of the great Potomac division, securing the Chain Bridge, guarding against a flank movement from Leesburg, and, in connection with Banks's division on the upper Potomac, against an invasion of Maryland, or a raid upon the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The Leesburg pike, starting from Chain Bridge, passes through Lewinsville, and, ten miles farther on, through Drainesville, running nearly parallel with the railroad from Alexandria to Leesburg. This railroad beyond Falls Church was occupied by a portion of the Confederate force holding possession of Leesburg, and at Hunter's Mill, a little to the southeast of Lewinsville, intrenchments had been thrown up, with rifle-pits and batteries. Drainesville also was threatened, and this being an important position on McCall's right, it was no small part of his duty to keep it clear of the enemy. At the present time, as we have already indicated, there was a strong reserve picket of the enemy in the neighborhood of Drainesville; there was also a full brigade at Herndon's Station, about four miles south of the town, and a force of five hundred infantry and cavalry at Hunter's Mill, besides a small infantry detachment, numbering two hundred, between Drainesville and the Potomac. The position of these forces, taken in consideration with the facility with which Confederate re-enforcements might be brought up by the road from Centreville, made it necessary that General Ord's movement should be supported by the entire strength of the division. The troops of this division were from Pennsylvania. Those selected for the main column of the expedition were the third brigade, consisting of the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Twelfth regiments, to which was added a regiment of riflemen—the "Bucktails"—under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Kane. The Easton Battery, consisting of two 24-pounders and two 12-pounders, and a detachment of Colonel Bayard's cavalry, made up the entire column which started out of camp on Friday morning at six o'clock, with the cavalry and the "Bucktails" in the advance. It was a clear, frosty morning; the road was rugged, stretching through the woods, whose wintry foliage somewhat solemnized the picture. At half past ten a dispatch was sent to General McCall, acquainting him with the position of the enemy, which we have already indicated. The general mounted his horse, and, with his staff and a cavalry escort, followed in the road which Ord's brigade had taken in the



THE VILLAGE OF LEWINSVILLE, VIRGINIA.





BUILDING HUTS FOR THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

morning, arriving on the field shortly after the battle commenced. General Ord, having dispatched a foraging party to the farms of prominent secessionists between the pike and the river, moved on to Drainesville, where he waited for the Tenth, Sixth, and Twelfth to come up. Upon his arrival the Confederate cavalry picket was dispersed, and two companies of the "Buck-tails," together with the Ninth regiment, Colonel Jackson, were so disposed, in connection with the battery, as to cover the approaches to Drainesville from the south. The enemy in the mean time, with four regiments under command of General Stuart, advanced along the Centreville road, which was skirted by a dense wood on either side. Where the road debouches into an open clearing the Sumter battery was stationed, mounting six guns, and skirmishers were deployed to the left and right. In front of the enemy's battery, and five hundred yards distant, was the Easton battery; and between these two an artillery duel was kept up for half an hour. Then an attempt was made by the enemy, who advanced from the cover of the woods, to turn our left, which was repulsed by Colonel McCalmont and two or three shells from the battery, when it was given up. The Confederates were strongly flanked on the right by the Ninth and Twelfth, the former of whom met the enemy in close quarters. The front was held by the Sixth and by the Kane Rifles on opposite sides of the road, which, in its entire length, was commanded by our battery. Discovering that the enemy's guns were in a position open to an attack from their right and in the rear, General Ord detached two or three guns from the battery for this purpose, which soon poured in their enfilading fire with brilliant effect. It was this feature of the attack which most annoyed the Confederates, and finally compelled their retreat. So accurate was the fire from our battery, that every shot seemed to tell upon the enemy: one of his caissons was blown up; another was left behind; gun-carriages were broken, while the road was strewn with other evidences of destruction. The retreating columns of Stuart were pursued for a short distance, after which the entire command, having won the day, returned to camp. The Confederate loss was estimated at over two hundred and thirty, while that of the Union troops, all told, was no more than sixty-nine. This victory had no important result, but, as being the first important success achieved by the Army of the Potomac, received more attention than would otherwise have been given it, and called forth a special congratulatory letter from Secretary Cameron.

The situation in the West differed very materially from that in Virginia. In the latter, preparations were necessarily made on a gigantic scale. Here was gathered the concentrated strength of both armies—the Federal and the Confederate; and upon these, as it seemed, the final issue of the war depended. But this issue was not to be developed through impetuous and rashly-undertaken onsets, as was supposed, but very much through that stationary attitude which, by shallow critics on both sides, was sneered at as "masterly inactivity"—through the careful measuring of strength against strength in quiet, and the patient waiting for opportunity. This attitude followed as a necessity from a situation in which the advantage could rest with the assailant only on the condition of his having an available force vastly superior to that assailed. Whichever side assumed the offensive must be able to face two disadvantages—one, that of marching against a fortified position, and the other, that involved in a distant source of supplies. These disadvantages


could only be overcome by overwhelming odds. And how was this counterbalancing advantage to be gained by either side over an enemy forever watchful, and able, at least for a long time to come, to encounter re-enforcement with re-enforcement? So long as this situation remained, it was inevitable that whichever of these two armies should advance beyond a certain point, and risk an engagement with the other, must, unless there be some fatal mistake in the conduct of the defense, be beaten and driven back. If our naval force could have been made available in a direct attack upon the enemy's strong-hold, we should have needed no other advantage. But the situation did not allow any calculation of our naval resources as a direct element. It was impossible, therefore, that the conflict in Virginia should come to a decisive crisis until operations elsewhere should have brought one of the combatants to the verge of exhaustion, or at least to such an extremity as would give the other a decided advantage in the matter of available strength. Since it was morally certain that a vigorous series of campaigns in the West and along the sea-board must in the end bring the South to that point, our Army of the Potomac could afford to wait. The magnitude of that army was, in this connection, a fortunate circumstance for us; for, although it could not at first materially affect the general situation, yet, when the South should begin to be exhausted, it would enable our Western armies to aim rapid and effective blows against points disproportionately weak, or compel such a concentration of the Confederate forces as would necessitate the abandonment of important positions. The "quiet on the Potomac," therefore, did not diminish the importance of our Virginia army.

But in the West the situation, as we have said, was very different. Here what was to be done invited dispatch. We started on good vantage ground, moreover, inasmuch as we had superior facilities for the transportation of troops and supplies, and a more adequate supply of excellent arms; and the promptness of our military movements forestalled the enemy both in Missouri and Kentucky. While the Confederate generals in all their offensive operations put themselves at a distance from their supplies both of food or ammunition, we had the rivers on our side, answering both as avenues of communication and as a means of moving into the heart of the enemy's country. This made our naval resources more available in the Western campaign than they could be in Virginia. The operations of the enemy in the West always partook of the nature of an extensive raid rather than of a regular combination of forces for a sustained effort; and whenever they erected fortifications, they were soon compelled to abandon them, on account of the ease with which they were flanked and cut off from their distant base.

Our operations in the West were of course, from the first, mainly flank movements in relation to the position in Virginia. The objective point was East Tennessee. This was involved in McClellan's plan, as developed in his memorandum addressed on the 4th of August to the President. There were, as we shall see hereafter, two plans or routes by which this point might be reached. But, gained by whatever plan, East Tennessee was even then seen to be the very keystone of the Confederate arch.

The critical situation, as regards popular sentiment, in the border states of Missouri and Kentucky, demanded a prompt and adequate display of force in those states, in order to secure the passive loyalty of Southern sympathizers and the active co-operation of Unionists. The progress of events in these two states will be the subject of our next chapter.





WATER BATTERIES AT COLUMBUS.

## CHAPTER V.

## KENTUCKY AND MISSOURI.

Neutrality of Kentucky.—Her Devotion to the Union.—Governor Magoffin's Position.—Confederate Occupation of Columbus.—Grant at Paducah.—Proceedings of the Legislature.—Its Address to the People of Kentucky.—Zollicoffer's Invasion.—Buckner's Operations.—Importance of Columbus.—Jeff. Thompson.—Battle near Fredericktown.—Battle of Belmont.—Object of the Battle.—The Retreat.—Losses.—McClelland's Address.—The Situation in Central Kentucky.—Skirmish at Munfordsville.—Nelson's Operations in Eastern Kentucky.—Battle at Pikeville.—Missouri.—General Fremont's Department.—Confederate Plans.—McCulloch, Pillow, Hardee, and Thompson.—Fremont's Proclamation.—Skirmishes.—Advance of Price.—Siege of Lexington.—Mulligan's Surrender.—Price's Retreat and Fremont's Advance.—Price's Proclamation.—Zagonyi's Charge.—Fremont's Removal.—Hunter's Retreat.—Advance of Price to the Osage.—Battle of Millford.—The Confederate Retreat.—The Situation at the close of 1861.—McClellan appointed General-in-chief.—Reorganization of the Western Armies.—The new Commanders.—McClellan's Instructions.—His Plans in the West.

UNTIL the autumn of 1861, Kentucky had quite successfully maintained a perfectly neutral position as regards any active participation in the war on either side. Her governor, Beriah Magoffin, had curtly replied to the President's call for troops in April, that Kentucky would "furnish no men for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern states;" and he had also given the President to understand that no Federal troops were desired within the limits of that state. And, as no direct assistance was given to the Confederacy, and a like restriction was laid upon the Confederate forces, the general government had, as a matter of policy, respected this neutral position. Whatever may have been the secret inclination of the governor toward the Confederacy, the people of the state and its Legislature were, in the main, loyal to the Union. In the election of members of Congress, called to meet in special session on the 4th of July, 1861, every district but one elected strong Union men; and the election of members of the Legislature in August had a similar result. This disposition of the state, as soon as it became apparent to the Confederates, aroused their indignation, and it was openly proposed in the South to cut off all commercial intercourse with the Kentuckians. The New Orleans Delta of August 20th declared: "We will not pay the 'Blue Grass' country of Kentucky for its loyalty to Lincoln by opening our markets to its hemp fabrics. We must discriminate in favor of our gallant ally, Missouri, and give her the benefit of our marts in preference to either open foes or insidious neutrals. It is the clear duty of our government to declare Kentucky under blockade." This was certainly a very impolitic suggestion; for, at this very moment, the government at Washington was considering in what way it might completely cut off the Confederacy from the one sole communication now open to it from the North, viz., by the Louisville and Nashville Railroad; and it was only by reason of its reluctance to irritate the people of Kentucky that the Federal government hesitated to lay its positive embargo upon this road, by which the South was every day gaining every thing and

losing nothing. It seems strange, therefore, that at this juncture Tennessee herself should have put out her hand and shut to the door of her prison-house. This stopped the passage of cotton, rice, and turpentine to Louisville; but it also shut out from Tennessee a rich supply of grain and pork, which at this time were of the greatest value to the South.

It became immediately evident that Kentucky must take an active part in the war on one side or the other. The prevailing sentiment of the people was in favor of the Union. But the southern portion of the state was in great part secessionist, and it was the cherished plan of the Confederacy to take advantage of this by throwing a large force into the counties just across the border. Measures were taken to carry out this plan, and early in August the Confederate Congress had passed an act authorizing enlistments in Kentucky. A Federal force also was being collected together at "Camp Dick Robinson," under General Nelson, for the purpose of insuring protection to loyal citizens. This led to a correspondence between the governor and the President, the former demanding the removal of this force, and the latter refusing to comply with the demand.

When the Legislature met, on September 5th, the governor, in his message, insisted on neutrality, and recommended that a force be raised by the state for its own defense, and that all other military bodies should be disbanded. But on this same day the Legislature was notified that Confederate troops had invaded the state, occupying and fortifying strong positions at Hickman and Chalk Bluffs. The invading force, which was commanded by Leonidas Polk, also occupied Columbus, that commander giving as a reason for so doing that he was only anticipating the occupation of the place by a Federal force, which intended, if not to take direct possession of Columbus, at least to plant batteries on the Missouri side of the river so as to command the town. Thus the neutrality of Kentucky was ended forever. It is a matter of little consequence whether it was a Federal or a Confederate force which first entered the state, since the purpose of either must have regarded, not Kentucky, but the main issue of the war, which had already assumed such proportions that it overleaped all ordinary boundaries, and the geographical position of Kentucky made it absolutely necessary that the state should become the most important arena of the coming campaign. Two days after the occupation of Columbus, General Grant, accompanied by two gun-boats, took possession of Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee, and a few miles above Cairo; and extensive preparations were made by the Federal government to resist the advance northward of the Confederates.

Polk had insisted upon it as a condition of his own withdrawal that the Federal forces in the state should likewise be removed. The Legislature, however, decided that the very mention of any condition of this nature was an insult to Kentucky, and passed a resolution demanding the unconditional withdrawal of the Confederate forces. The proceedings of the Legislature





LEONIDAS POLK.

during the rest of the month were honorable both to itself and to the state. The State Guard was disarmed; a series of resolutions was passed, requesting Major Anderson to take command of the military forces in the state, and indicating the stern resolution of the people to repel the invasion upon which the Confederates had so daringly entered; and, upon the veto of these resolutions by Governor Magoffin, they were passed by the requisite vote over his veto. A bill also was passed authorizing the Military Board to borrow three million of dollars, in addition to the million authorized May 24th. Another bill was passed calling out forty thousand volunteers, and one tendering the thanks of the Legislature to Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana, for prompt and needed assistance in forwarding troops for the defense of the state. A resolution was voted demanding the resignation of Senators Breckenridge and Powell; and at the close of the session, an address, memorable for its patriotism, was issued to the people of the state. In this latter, the condition of the state is briefly summed up in the following terms:

"Every effort was made for compromise and settlement. The Federal government did not insist upon our active aid in furnishing troops, seeming content if we obeyed the laws. Those engaged in the rebellion, however, planted camps of soldiers all along our southern border, seized by military power the stock of our railroad, impudently enlisted soldiers upon our soil, made constant raids into this state, robbed us of our property, insulted our people, and seized and carried off our citizens. Thus exposed to wrongs, with no power to prevent them, some of our citizens formed camps under the Federal government for the defense and protection of the state. In this condition we found Kentucky when the Legislature met on the first Monday in September. We were assured by the President of the Confederate States that our position should be respected; but the ink was scarcely dry with which the promise was written when we were startled by the news that our soil was invaded, and towns in the southwest of our state occupied by Confederate armies. Our warnings to leave were only answered by another invasion in the southeastern portion of the state. These sudden interruptions of such magnitude, skillfully directed, show that the assault on Kentucky was preconcerted, prepared, and intended long before. Thrice have the revolutionists appealed to the ballot-box in this state, and thrice have the people expressed by overwhelming majorities their determination to stand by the Union and its government. The attempt to destroy the union of these States we believe to be a crime not only against Kentucky, but against all mankind; but up to this time we have left to others to vindicate by arms the integrity of the government. The Union is not only assailed now, but Kentucky is herself threatened with subjugation. We have no choice but action, prompt and decided. Let us show to insolent invaders that Kentucky belongs to Kentuckians, and that Kentucky's valor will vindicate her honor."

This position was fully supported by the people. In the mean time, while General Polk was invading the western portion of the state, Zollicoffer was operating in the southeast. A slight skirmish took place on the 17th of September at Barboursville; and, to give notice of his hostile approach, Zollicoffer, on the same day, telegraphed to the state authorities that the safety of Tennessee necessitated his occupation of Cumberland and the long mountains of Kentucky, and that he had accordingly taken possession.

A month afterward he met with a severe repulse at Camp Wild-cat, in Laurel County. He had nearly eight thousand men, including two regiments of cavalry, which he had determined to bring against Colonel Garrard's Kentucky regiment; but the latter was speedily re-enforced, and the entire command given to General Schoepf, who maintained his position, which was one of great natural strength, against the repeated assaults of a foe numerically superior to his own. At about the same time, General Buckner was operating on the line of the railroad between Louisville and Nashville, in the central portion of Kentucky. On the 21st of September General Anderson assumed command both of the state and national forces.

The Confederate force at Columbus—more formidable than any other in the state—was soon increased to thirteen regiments, with six field and one siege battery, and three battalions of cavalry. It had also three steamers on the river. This force was concentrated at Columbus, which was strongly fortified, as also was Hickman, twenty-five miles farther south. The strength which was massed at Columbus was not only to be feared for its bearings on the campaign in Kentucky, but from the ease with which it might exert a decisive influence upon military operations in Missouri. One of the strongest motives which led to the Confederate occupation of Kentucky was the desperate state of affairs in Missouri. Arkansas had failed to support General Price. The battle of Wilson's Creek, which had been won with so great sacrifice and against terrible odds by the Federal forces under Lyon and Sigel, had interposed a check against the advance of the combined armies of the Confederacy from which they could not readily recover. McElloch had withdrawn to Arkansas with his forces, leaving Price to continue the campaign as best he might. All eyes were turned to Columbus for a retrieval of the fortunes of the Confederacy in the West. In the early part of November it would have been very practicable for General Polk to disturb our military operations on the west of the Mississippi. It was to prevent a disturbance of this nature that the battle of Belmont was fought early in November. For three weeks Jeff. Thompson had been pushing his way up the river into Missouri. In the middle of October, from his camp in St. Francois County, he had issued one of his characteristic proclamations.


"Patriots of Washington, Jefferson, Ste. Genevieve, St. Francois, and Iron Counties!" exclaims he, "I have thrown myself into your midst to offer you an opportunity to cast off the yoke you have unwillingly worn so long. Come to me and I will assist you, and drive the invaders from your soil or die with you among your native hills. Soldiers from Iowa, Nebraska, and Illinois, go home! we want you not here, and we thirst not for your blood. We have not invaded your states; we have not polluted your hearthstones; therefore leave us, and, after we have wiped out the Hessians and Tories, we will be your friendly neighbors if we can not be your brothers!"

A few days later found him at Fredericktown, a little farther in the interior of Missouri, with a force of thirty-five hundred men. At Pilot Knob, a short distance north of this point, were three or four Federal regiments. General Grant immediately formed a combination which in two days completely routed Thompson, sending him southward at a somewhat brisker rate of speed than had marked his advance. This is the proper place to speak of this engagement, although it occurred in Missouri, because Thompson's movements so entirely depended upon co-operation from Columbus. A force of fifteen hundred men, under Colonel Plummer, of the 11th Missouri, was dispatched along the road from Jackson to Dallas, to move upon Fredericktown in such a manner as to cut off Thompson's retreat, and, co-operating with Colonel Carlin at Pilot Knob, to compel an engagement, greatly to the disadvantage of the enemy. Upon his approach, Plummer sent to Pilot Knob a messenger, with a letter, informing Carlin of his intention to attack the enemy on Monday, October 21st, and requesting co-oper-



STERLING PRICE.





PILOT KNOB, MISSOURI

ation in front. This letter was intercepted by the enemy, and Thompson fell back about a mile from Fredericktown on the Greenville road, and there awaited attack. Through the information thus gained by the enemy an important advantage had been lost; yet by the re-enforcement which Plummer might have from Pilot Knob, and the superior artillery force which was at his disposal, the chances of success were yet all on his side. Accordingly, on Monday, he advanced against the enemy, who were commanded by Thompson and Lowe, attacked them, and, after a spirited fight, in which he received very important aid from Major Schofield, of the 1st Missouri Light Artillery, he drove the enemy routed from the field. The Confederate Colonel Lowe was killed in the engagement; and of the Federal officers, Major Gavitt and Captain Hingham were killed. The pursuit was kept up with considerable vigor. To prevent any interference from Columbus with columns sent to continue this pursuit was one of the chief objects of the movement against Belmont.

Belmont is just opposite Columbus, on the western or Missouri side of the river, and at this time was held by a small Confederate force under Colonel Tappan. Columbus itself was so strongly garrisoned that it would have been useless for General Grant, with the force at his disposal, to have attempted either a siege or an assault upon that stronghold; and Belmont, being entirely commanded by the guns of Columbus, was worth nothing as a military position without the latter. The movement, then, as is also evident from written statements of General Grant previous to the battle, was of the nature of a reconnoissance, with the objects already indicated.

As soon as General Polk had any notice of our approach, he anticipated that Columbus would be directly attacked, and General Grant had taken special pains to make him think so, by sending General Smith (commanding at Paducah) with a considerable force, which marched in two columns, the one on Mayfield, and the other to within a few miles of Columbus; and, to help on the effect of this demonstration, a small detachment was ordered to Ellicott's Mills, twelve miles from Columbus, on the Kentucky side. These movements were made simply for the purpose of misleading the Confederate commander. Grant's forces, in the mean time, started from Cairo on the evening of November 6th, a great part of them being under the immediate command of General McClelland, and also landed on the Kentucky side of the river, nine miles below Cairo. In this way the enemy was entirely put off his guard as to Belmont, the point of direct approach. When, at daylight the next morning, Grant and McClelland's forces landed on the Missouri side, a short distance from Belmont, then it was that Polk's attention was for the first time turned in this direction, and he sent Pillow across from Columbus to support Tappan, still supposing, however, that Columbus was the main object of attack.

Pillow had crossed not a moment too soon; for the Federal army had

promptly formed their line of battle, and driven in the Confederate outposts and sentries, and, having left a battalion in reserve near the transports, companies were thrown out as skirmishers, and in a few minutes the general engagement ensued. Grant's whole force, with the exception of his reserve, was thrown out in skirmishing columns, which led to a useless waste of his strength; whereas, if he had known the weakness of the enemy on the field at his first arrival, he might have literally crushed him by a sudden onset with his full force, and before the arrival of re-enforcements. The Confederates were driven back to their encampment—a strong position, lumber having been felled for several hundred yards about it, and an abatis formed. General McClelland, at the onset, attempted to outflank the enemy's right wing, and cut off re-enforcements from Columbus. Here the struggle was continued with great severity for half an hour; but Beethoven's battery kept him back, and the attempt failed. Not so, however, in the centre. Here the attack was so vigorous that the enemy's line was almost immediately broken and the men thrown into confusion. Pillow was obliged to bring up his reserve of artillery, consisting of two batteries and a half, with which he kept the Federal army in check until he had restored communication between the two wings of his army. But his efforts to recover himself proved unavailing; for he had no sooner made his arrangements for a spirited resistance, than it was reported to him that three of his regiments and his most important battery were out of ammunition. Only one course was left him in this extremity, and that was to keep the battery in position, and to make a bayonet charge with the three otherwise defeated regiments, trusting to Polk to send him speedily the help which every moment he needed. But the commander at Columbus, still believing that his own position was in jeopardy, hesitated and held back assistance until Pillow had sent message after message, and was completely exhausted. Grant, seeing how matters stood, pushed his advantage to the utmost, and by furious and repeated onsets carried the abatis, and drove the enemy, foot by foot, and from tree to tree, pell-mell down the banks of the river, and within protection of the guns of Columbus. Pillow's division was so severely cut up that not a single company remained intact, and the whole body were crowded together in confusion.

But here the defeated enemy was re-enforced by several thousand fresh troops, and Grant was attacked in front, flank, and rear, and was in danger of being cut off from his transports. To prevent this, he retreated, the Confederates all the time charging upon his ranks, until he came up with his reserve, when he collected his forces together, and, ordering up fresh regiments and artillery from his reserve, recommenced the contest. Throwing his forces with great fury against General Cheatham's division, which was leisurely approaching, he broke the ranks of the latter, and, advancing his batteries close to the banks of the river, opened a murderous fire upon Pil-





WILLIAM NELSON.

low's flank and upon some steamers, which, with re-enforcements, were crossing the river from Columbus. Then the heavy guns of Columbus poured in their cannonade upon the battle-field, and were answered by Federal cannon from Belmont. It soon became evident, however, that so many re-enforcements had been sent across that it would be impossible for General Grant's men, who had been engaged from half past ten in the morning until five in the afternoon, to successfully hold their ground, and a retreat was again ordered. The enemy had been re-enforced to about thirteen thousand men, a force nearly three times as large as our own, and closely followed the retreating, but really victorious army of General Grant. The latter retreated in good order, embarked upon his transports, and left a battle-field which he had certainly won, but could not hope to keep. Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing was, according to General Grant's report, one hundred and eighty-four; that of the enemy was, by their own admission, over two thousand. Yet the battle was claimed by the Confederates on the ground that Grant was unable to hold the field.

After the battle, McClelland issued the following address to his soldiers:

"Few of you had ever seen a battle. You were imperfectly disciplined, and had inferior arms; yet you marched upon a concealed enemy superior in numbers, and on ground of their own choosing. You drove them steadily for two miles of continued fighting, and forced them to seek shelter under the heavy batteries at Columbus. You drove them from their position and destroyed their camp, bringing with you, on retiring, two hundred prisoners, two field-pieces, and a large amount of other property. Re-enforced from Columbus, they formed in large numbers in your rear to cut you off, while the heavy guns of Columbus were playing upon your ranks. Fighting the same ground over again, you drove them a second time. A portion of the command, becoming separated from the rest, made a successful and well-ordered movement by another route, and returned to the river. After a day of fatiguing marches, fighting as you marched, having been nearly six hours actually engaged, you re-embarked and returned to your camp."

Turning from the western to the central portion of the state, we find military movements in progress on a very extensive scale, Louisville, on the Ohio, being the head-quarters of the Union Department. When General Anderson assumed the command of this department, September 21, General Buckner was at Bowling Green, on the railroad between Louisville and Nashville, about seventy-one miles from the latter. This was an important military position, being at the junction of two roads leading into Tennessee. Buckner had been led to believe that, if he should come to Louisville, or even to Bowling Green, with a competent force, he would receive re-enforcements by thousands; but he hardly got a regiment, and kept very close to Bowling Green, in the southern part of Kentucky, though he had made a boast that he would winter in Louisville.

In the month of November great accumulations of Federal troops were collecting together from the states north of the Ohio River; and by the 1st of December there was in Kentucky alone an army of seventy thousand men, of which twenty thousand were citizens of the state. About four thousand of these were located at "Camp Dick Robinson," in Garrard County. This vast force had nothing between it and Nashville, and therefore not-

ing between it and the virtual occupation of the State of Tennessee, except the army of Buckner, numbering thirty thousand men. No hostile collision between these two opposing forces occurred with the exception of an unimportant, though uncommonly severe skirmish at Munfordsville, on the Green River, and a few miles north of Bowling Green, on the road to Louisville. This action took place on the 17th of December, on the south bank of the river; but only a few companies were engaged, and the result had no bearings upon the general issue.

In the southeast, Zollicoffer, whom we left at Barbourville after his repulse at Camp Wild-cat, advanced, on the 10th of December, with strong force toward Somerset, compelling Schoepf, who occupied that town with a Federal division, to retire. The Confederate commander then encamped at Mill Spring, where he fortified his position, and remained until his overwhelming defeat at that place early in 1862.

General Nelson was in command of a small Federal force which he had been organizing in the eastern portion of the state, on the Virginia border. On the 2d of November he occupied Prestonburg, on the west fork of the Big Sandy. From Prestonburg he moved upon Pikeville in two columns, one of which, under Colonel Sill, was sent by a circuitous route to attack Colonel Williams in the rear, while Nelson, with the other, took the direct river route. Williams, who occupied Pikeville with about a thousand troops, made every preparation to offer a vigorous resistance. Two hundred of his men waited in ambush for General Nelson's advance (under Colonel Marshall) about twelve miles down the river from Pikeville. The Federal troops had had a very difficult march through the mud and rain, and, besides this, were living on half rations; but their resistance was successful, and the next day the Confederate force made an unconditional surrender. This short campaign of General Nelson, lasting only twenty days, drove the rebels from the eastern part of Kentucky.

Thus closed the year's campaign in Kentucky. General Anderson, on account of ill health, had resigned his command; and Sherman, his successor, for the same reason, gave way to Buell, who, with his head-quarters at Louisville, took command of the new army that was accumulating at the close of the year.

After the death of Lyon, who had given his life to wrest Missouri from the tightening grasp of the Confederacy, the burden, not only of responsibility, but of active duty in the field, rested upon Fremont, who assumed the command of the West a short time before the battle of Wilson's Creek. General John C. Fremont, a native of Georgia, of French descent, reared and educated in South Carolina, and afterward distinguished as an engineer and explorer, was appointed colonel of the United States Army in 1846, and commanded a battalion in the Mexican War. He was the first candidate of the Republican party for the presidency, but failed of being elected. At the breaking out of the war in 1861, Fremont was in Paris, but, receiving information of the events of April, he immediately purchased a large quantity of arms for the government, and returned to his native country in June. In July he received his commission as major general with the following order: "The State of Illinois, and the states and territories west of the Mississippi and on this side of the Rocky Mountains, including New Mexico, will in future constitute a separate command, to be known as the Western Department, under the command of Major General Fremont, of the United States Army, head-quarters at St. Louis." We have previously stated the



JOHN C. FREMONT.





H. M. McCULLOCH.

difficulties incident to this command, which were very much heightened by the necessities of the Eastern Department. It was under these difficulties that the hard-contested battle of Wilson's Creek had been fought. This battle, however, so severely punished the Confederate army that it did not venture any farther advance; and as forces were rapidly accumulating under the President's new call, every month's delay was favorable to our army in the West.

In the mean time, large bodies of Confederate troops were collecting in the southeastern part of the state, threatening Cairo. The western portion of Missouri had furnished a great number of recruits, which were accumulated together at points most available for a contemplated advance against Cairo and St. Louis. McCulloch, after the battle of Wilson's Creek, had returned to Arkansas, and was recruiting his wasted strength from the border counties. Pillow was at New Madrid, on the Mississippi, with an army of about thirty thousand men; while Hardee occupied Greenville, east from Cairo, on the St. Francis River, with five thousand men; and Thompson, still nearer Cairo, was collecting a large force of disloyal Missourians. With this combination of forces, the Confederate generals were confident of their ability to drive our forces north of the Missouri River before the end of August.

It was under these circumstances that Fremont issued a proclamation declaring Missouri under martial law, and ordering that all persons taken with arms in their hands within the lines of his army—lines extending from Leavenworth, by way of the posts of Jefferson City, Rolla, and Ironton, to Cape Girardeau on the Mississippi—should be tried by court-martial, and, if found guilty, should be shot; also that the property, real and personal, of all persons in the state, who should take up arms against the United States, or who should be directly proven to have taken active part with their enemies in the field, should be confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if they had any, should be declared free. This proclamation, so far as it related to slavery, was afterward modified by President Lincoln to suit the provisions of the Confiscation Act, passed by Congress August 6th, 1861.

This proclamation of Fremont called forth a counter-proclamation from Jeff. Thompson at Camp Hunter, wherein the latter most solemnly promised that for every member of the Missouri State Guard, or soldier in alliance with them, who should be put to death in pursuance of Fremont's order, he would hang, draw, and quarter a Union man in retaliation. Fremont's measure, in its main features, seemed to be necessary to restore quiet in the state. Neither life nor property were secure from violence: murders were committed by the wholesale; bridges were ruthlessly destroyed; and every where indiscriminate plunder and outrage attempted to shelter itself under the Confederate flag, and to claim privileges not even accorded to regularly organized combatants.

The month of September was for the most part a month of preparation on the Federal side. There was considerable skirmishing. Thus, during the first week of the month, Colonel Williams, with about eleven hundred national troops—Kansas and Iowa Third—was compelled to retreat from Shelbyville, in Northern Missouri, before a superior force commanded by Martin Green, a self-appointed Confederate officer. This force of Green's, however, after having been increased to about three thousand men, was in a very few days effectually dispersed by Pope, who captured his baggage and provisions. Another skirmish, in which the Third Iowa also figured, on the 12th of the month, was one of uncommon severity, five hundred Union troops having been attacked by about four thousand rebels. After the struggle had lasted for an hour, and a hundred and twenty of our men had been disabled, their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Scott, ordered a retreat.

A short time afterward, Colonel Smith's command, with four pieces of can-

non, met the enemy by another road, and, engaging them as they were about to cross the Missouri River, severely punished and routed them.

As a precaution, and in order that he might be able to use the greater portion of his army for a movement which he was planning against Price in the southwestern part of the state, Fremont, at some expense, fortified St. Louis.

In the mean time, Price, who had found an able ally in General Harris, marched northward, and joined his forces with those of the latter. As they were about to encamp, at the beginning of September, they received information that some moneys, amounting to a hundred thousand dollars, were at that very time on the point of being conveyed by a detachment of Federal troops to Lexington from Warrensburg. Although the Confederate troops were wearied with long marches when this communication was made to them, the prospect of securing so valuable a prize was an incentive not to be withstood. They marched at double-quick upon Warrensburg, but, upon their arrival there, found that they had been anticipated by the Federal troops. Their indignation was not at all mollified by certain caricatures which the German soldiers of our army had sketched on the walls in charcoal drawings, representing in a rude but vivid manner the disappointment of the Confederates in finding the money-boxes empty. After halting at Warrensburg for two days, Price moved upon Lexington, on the south bank of the Missouri River, whither the money had been conveyed. The Federal force at Lexington, consisting of about half a regiment of Home Guards, was strongly intrenched, and gave the enemy a severe repulse. Colonel Mulligan, with his Irish brigade, was sent to re-enforce Lexington. Price, too, found no difficulty in obtaining a vast number of recruits; for it was generally known that victory would bring with it the coveted gold. The Federal force had been increased to 2500 men, and the fortifications greatly extended and strengthened. On the 12th of September, scouts and advanced pickets, driven in, reported the approach of the enemy. The attack was at first concentrated upon the college, which had been strongly fortified; but the fire was so briskly answered by our troops that a retreat was ordered to Fair Ground until Price's supplies of ammunition should come up. In six days the attack was renewed. General Rains took up a position on the east and northeast of the town, while General Parsons attacked from the southwest, all the guns in front firing upon Colonel Mulligan's works at the same time. Affairs with the garrison soon began to assume a critical position, for sharpshooters had been detached which had cut them off from their supplies of water. Messengers had been sent by Mulligan to Jefferson City urging on re-enforcements, but they were captured by the enemy. So, too, small detachments of force dispatched to his assistance were cut off in detail, and defeated or captured. While matters were at this pass, a steamer came down the river bringing clothes, provisions, and ammunition; but these also fell into the hands of the enemy, who, indeed, stood in immediate need of the last two articles. At the same time, the hills north of the town were taken by Harris's and McBride's troops. Against these Colonel Mulligan made a *sortie* to drive them from the position, but his force was insufficient. This important point was protected by the Confederates by means of extensive movable breast-works constructed from hempen bales. About two o'clock of the 20th, after fifty-two hours of uninterrupted fighting, his troops and the means of defense having been entirely exhausted, Mulligan displayed the white flag, and surrendered his brave garrison as prisoners of war. Besides a great number of stands of arms, a considerable quantity of ammunition, and a vast amount of commissary stores, nine hundred thousand dollars in hard cash was also captured.

Fortunately for us, Price, for want of sufficient ammunition, was unable to follow up his victory with that decisive movement for which his success opened the way. Fremont, in alarm, hastened to Jefferson City, and hurried up his preparations to attack Price, who, upon the concentration of the



JAMES A. MULLIGAN.





THE DEFENSE OF LEXINGTON.



Union troops at Jefferson City, retired to Springfield, thus bringing himself into easy communication with Arkansas, and tempting Fremont to a distance from his source of supplies.

The Federal advance into Southwestern Missouri was made in five divisions, under Hunter, Pope, Sigel, Asboth, and McKinstry. This advance followed closely upon Price's retreat. The latter arrived at Neosho, in the southwest corner of the state, just in time to be present at the meeting of the State Legislature, and to celebrate the secession of Missouri with a salvo of one hundred guns. Here he joined McCulloch, but the meeting between the two was far from cordial.

Price's proclamation, issued at Neosho shortly afterward, indicates very forcibly the critical situation of the Confederate affairs in Missouri. "In the month of June last," he says, "I was called to the command of a handful of Missourians. . . . When peace and protection could no longer be enjoyed but at the price of honor and liberty, your chief magistrate called for fifty thousand men to drive the ruthless invaders from a soil made fruitful by your labors and consecrated by your homes; and to that call less than five thousand responded out of a male population exceeding two hundred thousand men. Some allowances are to be made on the face of the want of military organization, a supposed want of arms, the necessary retreat of the army southward, the blockade of the river, and the presence of an armed and organized foe. But nearly six months have now elapsed. The army of Missouri, organized and equipped, fought its way to the river. And where now are the fifty thousand? Had fifty thousand men flocked to our standard, with their shot-guns in their hands, there would now be no Federal hirelings in the state to pollute our soil. Where are those fifty thousand men? A few men have fought your battles. A few have dared the dangers of the field. Come to us, brave sons of the Missouri Valley. I must have fifty thousand men. I call upon you, in the name of your country, for fifty thousand men. Where are our Southern Rights friends? We must drive the oppressors from the land. I must have fifty thousand men. Numbers give strength. Numbers intimidate the foe. Numbers make our arms irresistible. Numbers command universal respect and insure confidence. We must have fifty thousand men! Come with your guns of any description that can be made to bring down a foe. If you have no arms, come

without them. We must have fifty thousand men. Give me these men, and, by the help of God, I will drive the hireling thieves and marauders from the state. Be yours the office to choose between a free country and a just government and the bondage of your children. I, at least, will never see the chains fastened upon my country. I will ask for six and a half feet of Missouri soil on which to repose, for I will not see my people enslaved. Come on, my brave fifty thousand heroes—gallant, unconquerable Southern men! We await your coming."

Fremont arrived in Springfield on the 27th of October. He had sent Sigel forward to the south of Springfield, toward Wilson's Creek, who, coming up with the rear of the enemy just as the latter was about to retreat, made a spirited attack upon him. And here it was that Major Zagonyi, commander of Fremont's body-guard, made his brilliant and ever-memorable charge, leading his men up a steep hill in the face of the most murderous fire, and driving the enemy through the town.

Just at this crisis the order came from Washington for the removal of Fremont, who was succeeded by Hunter. The latter in a few days abandoned Springfield and moved toward Rolla, thus allowing Price to recover the ground from which he had just been driven by Fremont. General Fremont had created a great degree of enthusiasm in the West, and, without any doubt, every secessionist was delighted at his removal. As he had just begun his campaign when he was superseded, it is impossible to criticise his generalship, whether favorable or unfavorable.

As soon as Hunter began to recede, Price again advanced, moving in three divisions toward Kansas, with the intention of making that his field of operations. He had under his command about 20,000 men; and on the last day of November he was at Monticello with his centre, his right wing resting on Stockton, and his left on Nevada. His plan was to reach Kansas, and then, having supplied his troops with arms, to destroy the track of the Northern Railroad, and cut off communication with St. Louis. But General Halleck, who had superseded Hunter on the 18th of November, had, ere a month was passed, completely upset Price's project by more deeply-laid strategy of his own. Instead of succeeding in cutting off St. Louis, Price found himself, at Christmas, compelled to look out for his own communications, which, so far as Northern Missouri was concerned, were entirely cut



FREMONT'S BRIDGE ACROSS THE OSAGE





SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI.

off by Halleck's operations between the Missouri and the Osage Rivers. This was accomplished by a movement of General Pope from Sedalia on the 15th of December, which cut off Price's army on the Osage from a large body of recruits then on their way to its support from the counties north of the river, and at the same time from its northern base of supplies. Price was deceived by a feint movement against Warsaw on the Osage, while Pope, after moving about eleven miles in that direction, turned suddenly into Henry County toward a point farther west, placing his force, numbering four thousand, between the main body of the enemy and the squads of recruits scattered about at different points on the north side of the river. Most of these bodies—one of which was 2200 strong, encamped six miles north of Chilhouse—were dispersed by Pope's pursuing cavalry, and returned to their homes; and at the mouth of Clear Creek, near Milford, a force of the enemy numbering over 1500 were surrounded and captured on the 18th, together with a large amount of ammunition and subsistence, and a thousand stand of arms. In these movements Pope had guarded against an attack on his flank by stationing a considerable force at Clinton to intercept any columns which Price might dispatch from Osceola. Thus cut off from supplies of men and food, the position of the enemy, at any moment open to attack, was no longer tenable, and he was forced to retreat from his camp on Sac River, in St. Clair County, to Springfield, where General Price received considerable supplies of clothing and camp equipage, and prepared to go into winter quarters. Here also he gained three or four thousand recruits. But these were of no avail against the force which Halleck was preparing to hurl against him. Therefore, in the latter part of January, when this force was concentrating at Rolla, he fell back from Springfield to Arkansas, where, from his camp on Cove Creek, he reported to self-exiled ex-Governor Jackson. He had failed to get his fifty thousand men.

The fall and winter campaign of Price in Missouri was of critical importance, yet it seems not to have been appreciated by the Confederate authorities. General Price held throughout the year, from the commencement of his operations in Missouri, an independent position, acting quite entirely on his own responsibility. He was neither supplied with men nor with the material of war. Even in the fight at Wilson's Creek, where he had so vast a superiority in point of numbers, his old rifles and his miserable artillery put him at a decided disadvantage. At that time he had McCulloch with him; but the two officers were always at variance, and after that battle he was left entirely alone. Meantime our forces were daily increasing in numbers, and threatened, in a short time, merely by numerical superiority, to drive the entire Confederate force from the state. If, after the capture of Mulligan, Price had been abundantly supplied with ammunition, he would, without any doubt, have attacked General Fremont before the latter could have had time to concentrate his army; but, when Lexington surrendered, it is said that he had only two thousand percussion-caps in his whole command. Had his situation been otherwise, it is difficult to say what might have been the result, but it is certain that he would have held important advantages over Fremont, which might have entirely reversed the actual events of the year. By reason of the deficiencies in Price's commissary and ammunition, Fremont was allowed sufficient time to concentrate his own forces and to compel the retreat of the enemy. When the indefatigable Confederate leader again advanced, he was driven back, as we have seen, before Halleck's superior strategy and an overwhelming superiority of numbers. And here, in connection with the difficulties which all along followed Price in his operations during the year, the reader will allow us again to allude to the importance of the battle fought by General Grant at Belmont, which,

although it availed nothing toward the reduction of the strong-hold of Columbus, yet entirely cut off General Polk from any possible opportunity of co-operating with the Confederate forces in Missouri. It was upon this co-operation that the prospects of Confederate success in Missouri chiefly depended. When Polk and Pillow occupied Columbus, Jeff. Thompson, at the same time, established himself on the opposite side of the river; but when the latter attempted to operate in the interior and keep up his connection with Columbus, Grant came promptly upon the field between him and his base, thus, by the engagement at Belmont, cutting off both him and Price from their most important centre of support. In this way the vast combination of forces which the Confederates had prepared in the southeastern portion of Missouri, along the line of the Mississippi, with the view of an advance against Cairo and St. Louis, was baffled. This combination had been in preparation since July. At first it assumed the most threatening aspect. Fremont, however, had kept the enemy in check by a display of naval force on the Mississippi which deceived the enemy as to his ability to defend Cairo. Then the battle of Wilson's Creek was fought, and the force of the enemy very much weakened. In a month or two they again began to hold up their heads; Columbus was occupied by Polk and Pillow; then followed the defeat of Thompson and the battle of Belmont. And thus the year closed, but not without hope to the Federal army in Missouri; for the enemy had been defeated in the western part of the state; Pope held the north securely by his small but active force; the Confederates in the southeast had lost more than they had gained, and were powerless to advance; and, finally, re-enforcements were daily bringing the Union army nearer to a position favorable for aggressive movements in the coming spring, that should forever clear the state of the Confederate armies.

The retirement of General Scott in October immediately affected the situation in the West. On the 31st of October he addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, requesting that his name might be placed on the list of army officers retired from service. For three years, he said, he had been unable to mount a horse, or even to walk without difficulty. On the afternoon of the day in which the letter was received by the secretary, the President, accompanied by his cabinet, visited the lieutenant general at his residence, and read him the official order carrying out his request, and placing him upon the list of retired officers, without any reduction of his current pay, subsistence, or allowances—this latter provision having been specially made in his behalf by Congress on the 5th of August, in anticipation of his early withdrawal from active service. The interview was an affecting one. The last great officer of the old school of military tactics thus disappeared from the stage, retaining his well-earned laurels as the veteran hero of two important wars.

An order was immediately issued by which George B. McClellan became commander-in-chief, under the President, of all the armies of the United States. Two days after assuming this command, McClellan, in a brief speech made at Philadelphia, said, "It is for the future to determine whether I shall realize the expectations and hopes that have been centred in me. The war can not last long. It may be desperate. I ask in the future forbearance, patience, and confidence. With these we can accomplish all." McClellan's mind, largely speculative, had looked inevitably upon the whole field, even when he was in command of only the Army of the Potomac. The command of all the armies in the field gave full scope for the execution of his comprehensive plans. The Department of the West had now to be entirely reorganized. The next day after McClellan was made general-in-chief, Fremont was relieved of his command,<sup>1</sup> and about the middle of November his

<sup>1</sup> It is not meant to be indicated here that Fremont was removed solely at the instigation of McClellan, nor, if that were the case, is any fault meant to be found with the order, which, under the circumstances, was perfectly justifiable. The difficulties and jealousies growing out of political differences between the prominent actors engaged in the suppression of the Southern insurrection were already becoming only too painfully evident. The three of these actors who were most prominently representative were the President and Generals McClellan and Fremont. The latter two had each of them a preconceived bias of opinion, which controlled their respective policies in regard to the conduct of the war. McClellan's sympathies determined in favor of the South and its institutions; Fremont's in exactly the opposite direction. And as in each case the bias of opinion ruled the practical policy of these men, it is fair to call the disposition in each a partisan one. The President had also his bias of opinion, which was in favor of Northern institutions; but he was no partisan, inasmuch as his conduct was regulated solely by the Constitution, his interpretation and administration of which was affected only by imperative circumstance. No domestic institution of the South was touched by his hand until it became evident that the in-

terference became either an absolute necessity, or at least an important means in order to preserve the integrity of the national government. Apart from the peculiar attitude of the border states, there was no doubt as to the expediency of striking directly at slavery as the chief support of the insurrection. In order to secure Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, the blow was postponed. It was the necessary policy of government, during the period when these states were trembling in the balance between loyalty and treason, to desist from any interference with slavery unless some greater gain could come to the nation from the opposite policy. It was during this period that Fremont had command in Missouri. Without authority, he adopted a political policy which excited the opposition of those who, though desirous that the military authority of the nation should prevail in the state, were yet determined that the constitutional rights of the state should remain inviolate. This exercise of authority was at the time both arbitrary and unwise, and could easily have been avoided. The opposition to Fremont in the border states was a sufficient reason for his removal; and when McClellan was placed at the head of the entire field, that step became necessary to prevent political jealousy and rivalry from impeding the onward movement of the war.





DON CARLOS BUELL

department was subdivided into three: first, New Mexico, which was assigned to Colonel Canby; second, the Kansas Department, the command of which was given to General Hunter, including Kansas, part of the Indian Territory, Nebraska, Colorado, and Dacotah; and, third, the Department of Missouri, under Halleck, including, besides that state, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and all of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River. The Department of the Ohio, including the portion of Kentucky not under Halleck's command, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Tennessee, was given to General Buell. The Department of West Virginia, under Rosecrans, and that of the Potomac, continued the northern lines of occupation to the Atlantic. There could hardly have been a greater change than McClellan's new position produced in the military prospect of the Western armies. New commanders took the place of the old in every important field. General Hunter, a graduate of West Point, had commanded the second division at the battle of Bull Run, and on the removal of Fremont had assumed the command in Missouri until Halleck's arrival. The latter, from California, was also a graduate of West Point, was at one time a professor in the institution, and was the author of several well-known military works. He had served with distinction in Mexico, and entered the civil war with the rank of major general. Don Carlos Buell, commander of the Ohio Department, had served in the Mexican war, where he had twice been promoted by brevet. At the beginning of the war he had received a command on the Potomac, with the rank of brigadier general.

These new commanders in the West were appointed at McClellan's suggestion, with the approval of the President. They were to act under McClellan's instructions; and what the tenor of these instructions were we gather from the letters addressed to them at this time by the general-in-chief. In regard to the Department of Missouri, the general had evidently the impression that every thing had gone wrong under Fremont's administration. In his letter to Halleck, dated November 11th, he expressed his dissatisfaction in the strongest terms. He said that Halleck would have extraordinary duties, apart from those devolving upon him as a military commander, to perform. Chaos must be reduced to order; the personnel of the staff of the department would have to be changed, and a system of reckless expenditure, and fraud perhaps unheard of before in the history of the world, would have to be reduced to the limits of an economy consistent with the interests and necessities of the state. Contracts would have to be overhauled; and it was to be very carefully considered whether the existing organization of the troops were perfectly legal. In regard to military operations, he advised that Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior points should be held in considerable strength, while the main army should be concentrated on the Mississippi. His instructions to General Buell intimated that he considered the Department of Ohio second only to his own in importance. "It is possible," he said, "that the conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is more important than that of our military operations. The military problem would be a simple one could it be entirely separated from political influences; such

In regard to the other charges made against Fremont—those made by Frank Blair, and partially reiterated in McClellan's instructions to Halleck—they were simply puerile. The expenses incident to Fremont's administration were no greater in proportion than those of any other department. His fortification of St. Louis was imperatively demanded by the condition of his own command, and the threatened advance of an enemy superior in numbers; and as to Western contracts, it is yet to be discovered that they were any more fraudulent or unsatisfactory than those made nearer Washington. The charge that Fremont was inaccessible to those seeking his presence for the purposes of business is wholly without foundation.

is not the case. Were the population among which you are to operate wholly or generally hostile, it is probable that Nashville should be your first and principal objective point. It so happens that a large majority of the inhabitants of Eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Union; it therefore seems proper that you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, while you throw the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, by Cumberland Gap, or Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the citizens of Eastern Tennessee to use, while you at the same time cut off, the railway communication between Eastern Virginia and the Mississippi." This letter was addressed to Buell on the 7th. Five days afterward he wrote again, urging an advance into Eastern Tennessee as soon as it could be made with a reasonable prospect of success. In the mean time, all the avenues by which Kentucky lay open to invasion were to be carefully guarded. Previous to McClellan's appointment there had been no carefully elaborated plan comprehending the entire field of military operations in the East and West. In the East, McClellan, upon whose army the safety of the capital so entirely depended, had been able to gather together a large army—not so large as he desired, but still large enough to secure him against successful attack—thus giving him ample opportunities for fortification and extensive organization and discipline. In the West, the Federal generals had been compelled to fight at the very outset; to fight battles, moreover, in which they had terrible odds to encounter, without hope of support or re-enforcement from the government. There was no time for preparation, nor was there an opportunity for extensive organization. There was a force barely sufficient to meet the enemy in the field, and there could be found no reserve to prepare and to organize in camps and by means of camp drills. What troops there were in the West had an organization by which they managed somehow to hold the enemy in check, whether it was a legal organization or not; but they had been reduced to a minimum, in order to supply the Army of the Potomac. But, now that the Western field had come under his own command, McClellan began to appreciate its importance and its necessities. In August he advised the smallest possible force in this field, estimating that, if Kentucky took the right position—and she did—there would be no more than 20,000 needed, together with those which could be raised in that state and Eastern Tennessee, "to secure the latter region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville." In October he had said that it was a matter of regret to him that it had not been deemed expedient by the national government to concentrate the forces of the nation in his then special field on the Potomac, but that some amends for this oversight might still be made by transferring from all the other armies their superfluous strength, thus re-enforcing his "main army." With this same end in view he recommended that *all* the cavalry and infantry arms, as fast as procured, be sent to this army; that the Western armies should be put entirely on the defensive, in order to allow him to assume the offensive; and that no more outside expeditions be attempted until he had fought the great battle in front. It was less than four days after he made these important suggestions that he was made general-in-chief. Thus placed at the head of the entire field, his estimate of the necessities of the West was materially different from what it had been when that section had been under Fremont's administration. For the first time it was discovered that a new order of things must be inaugurated in the West. "I soon found," says McClellan, "that the labor of preparation and organization had to be performed there; transportation, arms, clothing, artillery, discipline, all were wanting." Now, instead of giving the Army of the Potomac the initiative, he purposed to make the advance into East Tennessee a preliminary movement, after which his Virginia army would come in with a *coup de main*, and end the struggle. Nashville and Richmond would be captured by a simultaneous attack, and the Confederate line of defense would be thrown southward within the limits of the cotton states. From Richmond the Potomac army would advance to Charleston, where it would be met by a naval expedition; Buell would be pushed forward to Montgomery, or meet the Potomac army in Georgia; while Halleck would meet another naval expedition in New Orleans, and the occupation of the Southern sea-ports would render all farther resistance to the national government as useless as it would be desperate. The plan was brilliant and comprehensive, and showed that the general-in-chief had great powers of speculative combination. But we allude to it in this connection merely to show the importance which McClellan attached to the Western armies the moment they passed out of other hands into his own. It was a matter, therefore, for national congratulation that the West and the East had been thus included within a single command, since, within the short space of a single week, so remarkable a change had been effected, by which armies hitherto reduced in force, crippled in every appliance of war, and undervalued as to their comparative importance, were now to be made as efficient as they were worthy, and to be allotted their full share of the glories as well as the hardships of future campaigns. In the last week of October, McClellan expresses to the Secretary of War his regret that there has not been such a concentration of forces in Virginia as to allow the Army of the Potomac to enter upon an aggressive campaign before the season for such a campaign should be past. The very next week, all the armies of the West as well as of the East are placed at his disposal; but we find no longer an inclination on his part to withdraw any portion of the Western armies into Virginia. Indeed, his reason for delaying the campaign is now no longer the one given a week ago, viz., the inferiority of the Potomac army in respect of numbers, but the neglect from which the Western army has itself been suffering all along—its lack of preparation and organization. Henceforth he waits, not to fill up the ranks of the Virginia army, but to make preparations in the West.





THE DESTRUCTION OF THE NASHVILLE BY THE IRON-CLAD MONITOR MONTAUK.

## CHAPTER VI.

### NAVAL OPERATIONS.

The Blockade of Southern Ports.—Naval Superiority of the North.—The New England Fisheries.—Condition of the United States Navy at the beginning of the War.—The Proclamation of the Blockade by President Lincoln.—Vessels recalled from Service in Foreign Waters.—Blockading Squadrons.—Jefferson Davis grants Letters of Marque.—Confederate Privateers.—Fortress Monroe.—The Hatteras and Port Royal Expeditions.—Confederate Attack on Santa Rosa.—Bombardment of Fort McRae.—Hollins's Confederate Fleet on the Mississippi.

IN a war whose successful termination depended upon the exhaustion of the South, the blockade of the Southern ports constituted of necessity an important feature. Herein it was that the naval superiority of the North was chiefly available. There were undoubtedly certain disadvantages arising out of the commercial character of the Northern people. Nor were these slight in a war like that waged between the North and the South, where it was precisely the case of an elaborate network of civilization, as vulnerable as it was complex and extensive, liable to be deranged by the minutest fluctuations even of a peaceful time, and much more by the violent changes incident to a period of civil strife, pitted against a feudal status of social life, the very atmosphere of which is martial aspiration. Yet these disadvantages were more than compensated for by our power to cut the Southern States almost entirely off from all foreign supply and re-enforcement. At the first outbreak of hostilities, however, the successful blockade of a coast measuring more than three thousand miles in length seemed utterly out of the reach of the national government, and was, doubtless, not even calculated upon by the Southern leaders as a possible event, since the cotton states, dependent upon their exports for their very wealth, were financially ruined the moment the gates of the sea were closed against them. Knowing this, they would never have ventured the chances of a war on such unfavorable conditions; and, indeed, it seemed a task, requiring some miracle to be performed in order to its accomplishment, for a nation which on the 1st of January, 1861, had but a single war-steamer available for the defense of its entire Atlantic coast, to proclaim a blockade whose regulations extended over the coast of half a continent. But this aspect of the case was essentially a delusive view. The inlets and harbors of our coast were not crowded with fleets, it is true; but the essential basis of a navy consists not in ships, but in trained seamen. The basis of a substantial navy had been firmly established for the North, not only through the ordinary channels of commerce, but more especially through the extensive New England fisheries.

The first commercial link connecting America with the Old World was established by means of the fisheries off Newfoundland. Not long afterward the Cape Cod fisheries came into prominence, and formed the basis of New England commerce. As in the case of ancient Attica, New England, on account of the sterility of her soil, impelled her sons, by the pressure of necessity, to devote a great measure of their activity to fisheries and commerce. About the middle of the seventeenth century it was the habit of Virginia planters to speak of the sterility of New England and of her fisheries with ridicule; it was sometimes even hinted that the Puritans would have shown a larger wisdom in settling the Bahamas than in sticking so closely to Plymouth Rock. Strangely enough, just two centuries later we find New England, in spite of her sterility, in advance of her more fruitful

sisters of the South in all material as well as moral prosperity, and able, through her naval power, to blockade the entire Southern coast; and this naval power, which, though chiefly resident in New England, is, through her steadfast loyalty, a national possession, is due mainly to her fisheries. The only season of the year in which the fisheries can be carried on with success is that which of all others is the most tempestuous, and only the most courageous and hardy men could face its dangers and endure its hardships. It is from men trained in this school that the navies of great nations are nourished. The naval service, while it demands and exhausts hardy seamen, is incapable of producing them; and both France and England have always looked to their fisheries to supply the demand for fresh material. The great Italian cities, at the height of their commercial prosperity, acknowledged their obligation to fishermen, and at Venice there was a yearly festival established to commemorate this obligation. In view of the national importance of our fisheries, the measures relating to them, and which formed a part of the Reciprocity Treaty between the United States and Great Britain, were held to be of momentous interest. These articles of the treaty allowed the citizens of either nation, under certain specified restrictions, to carry on fisheries in the waters of the other, thus extending for each nation its field for the training of seamen.


But, notwithstanding that there were about 20,000 men directly engaged in our fisheries, besides the great number of seamen engaged in commerce available for naval use, there were still great impediments to be removed before an actual navy could grow out of the resources at hand. The naval establishment of the United States at the beginning of the war, in regard to the number of vessels and the quantity of ordnance at its disposal, was exceedingly weak. This nation had always pursued a policy in regard to foreign powers which, while securing herself against attack from abroad, made it unnecessary to maintain an army and navy establishment proportioned to her comparative power. In March, 1861, the number of vessels of all classes belonging to the navy was only ninety, of which not more than forty-two were in commission, these latter mounting between five and six hundred guns. Nearly all of those in commission were on foreign stations, the Home Squadron consisting only of twelve vessels, mounting one hundred and eighty-seven guns; and only four of these were in Northern ports, the remainder being for the most part in the Gulf of Mexico. The complement of these vessels was about 2000 men. The number of naval officers disaffected to the government was very large. In the four months from March 4th to July 4th there were on this account two hundred and fifty-nine resignations. The destruction of the Norfolk Navy Yard had been chiefly injurious on account of the large amount of ordnance sacrificed, a large quantity of which fell into the hands of the enemy. The *Cumberland*, which was the only vessel of the yard in commission, fortunately escaped.

Such was the inadequate force at the disposal of the government when the war began. But the President promptly issued his proclamation, laying an embargo on the ports of the seven states then belonging to the Confederacy. This was on the 19th of April. On the 27th he included within the limits of his proclamation the ports of Virginia and North Carolina. To carry into effect these two proclamations, Flag-officer Pendergrast, in command of the Home Squadron, was sent, with all the ships available for the



purpose, to establish non-intercourse, and to notify foreigners of the embargo, giving them fifteen days in which to complete their preparations for departure. Seventeen more vessels were put in commission, and the commanders of the navy yards in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia were directed to purchase and equip suitable steamers, in order to render the blockade as effective as possible. In the mean while vessels were continually arriving from foreign waters. The *Niagara* reached Boston from Japan on the 24th, and was immediately dispatched to Charleston Harbor. Shortly afterward she was removed to the Gulf, to intercept shipments of arms and munitions of war said to be on their way to Mobile and New Orleans. The *East India*, *Mediterranean*, *Brazil*, and *African* Squadrons were recalled, adding to the navy a force of 200 guns and 2500 men. Twelve steamers were purchased by the government, and nine more were chartered; and several small vessels which had been captured were taken into the service.

Thus, before July 4th, the blockade had been rendered so effective that foreign nations could not evade it, and were obliged to recognize its legality. The duties of the blockade were divided between two squadrons—the Atlantic Squadron, under the command of Flag-officer S. H. Stringham, and the Squadron of the Gulf, under Flag-officer Mervine: the former consisted of 22 vessels, 296 guns, and 3300 men; the latter of 21 vessels, 282 guns, and 3500 men. There were, in addition to these, the Potomac Squadron, under Commander Ward, the squadron in the Pacific, under Flag-officer John B. Montgomery, consisting of 6 vessels, 82 guns, and 1000 men, and the West India Squadron, which was assigned to Pendergrast.



THE SAVANNAH.

It was understood that transports secured on the spur of the moment could be of only temporary use, and accordingly, to secure vessels available in all weathers and for all sorts of service, the Navy Department contracted for the building of twenty-three gun-boats of about five hundred tons burden. The eight sloops-of-war which had been ordered by Congress in its previous session were being built as rapidly as the demand for vessels immediately needed would allow. Arrangements were also being made for the construction of larger and fleetier vessels, to be used not only on blockade, but also for the pursuit and destruction of privateers.


It was only through privateering that the Confederacy had the means of carrying on the war upon the seas. As soon as the President's proclamation calling out the militia was made known at the Confederate capital, Davis issued a proclamation inviting applications for letters of marque and reprisal, those applying to make a written statement, being required to give a suitable description of the character, force, and tonnage of the vessel to be employed, and the number of its proposed crew. Before receiving their commissions, all applicants were compelled to give bonds to the amount of \$5000 or \$10,000 that the laws of the Confederate States should be observed, that all damages done contrary to those laws should be satisfied, and that the commission should be surrendered when revoked by the President. Early in May this measure of President Davis was sanctioned by the Confederate Congress, and it was farther provided that prizes should be distributed among the owners, officers, and crews of the capturing vessels; but that these must first be carried into some port of the Confederacy, or of some friendly state, to be condemned by a competent tribunal. A bounty of \$20 was offered for each person on board any armed ship belonging to the United States which should be burnt, sunk, or destroyed, and one of \$25 for each person captured and brought into port.

There were two difficulties in the way of successfully carrying out this scheme. One was the blockade, which, in the first instance, impeded the egress of privateers, and after their escape prevented their return with captured vessels to Confederate ports; the other was the refusal of neutral powers to allow these armed vessels to bring prizes into any of their ports. Unless, therefore, privateers should be able to elude the blockade, both in their egress from Confederate ports and in their return to the same, the entire value of the prizes captured would be lost to the captors. It was inevitable, however, that some of these cruisers would get out to sea; and this once accomplished, it became absolutely impossible for the Federal government to maintain so effective a police as to secure our commerce against the threatened danger. There was an advantage gained by that government

even in this, inasmuch as the partial annihilation of our commerce diverted the activity and capital hitherto directed into that channel to the development of our naval resources against the Confederacy.

At the beginning of May, 1861, the Confederacy had purchased two vessels—*Sumter* and *McRae*—which were then being rapidly prepared for sea at New Orleans. The first privateer which eluded the blockade was the *Savannah*, which was also the first to be captured. This vessel was by no means a formidable one, her burden being only fifty tons, and at a little distance could not have been distinguished from an ordinary pilot-boat. She was fitted out at Charleston, where she took in a crew of twenty men, and carried an 18-pounder, mounted on a swivel amidships. She escaped on Sunday, the 2d of June, while the United States frigate *Minnesota*, on duty off Charleston, was in pursuit of a suspicious craft cruising to the southward. The next day she captured the brig *Joseph*, with a cargo of sugar, from Cuba. The same day, about 5 P.M., the brig *Perry* came in sight, and the *Savannah* gave chase, expecting to take another prize. Unfortunately for the privateer, the brig *Perry* was a United States man-of-war, and she caught a Tartar! The tables were turned; the chase was reversed, and at 11 o'clock the next morning the *Savannah*, with her officers and crew, were captured and brought to the port of New York.

A month later, the *Sumter*, mounting five guns, escaped from New Orleans, with a crew of sixty-five men and twenty marines, under the command of Raphael Semmes. This vessel was the old *Marques de la Habana*, which had been captured by the United States fleet off Vera Cruz in 1860, and taken as a prize to New Orleans. After her escape, which she effected while the *Brooklyn* was pursuing an English vessel attempting to run the blockade, the *Sumter* captured several brigs, which she carried as prizes to Cienfuegos, Cuba, where they were released by the Spanish government and sent to New York. On the 26th of July the *Sumter* was at Venezuela, having captured on her way from Cuba the *Abby Bradford*, which was sent to New Orleans with Semmes's first dispatch. After having captured and burned several valuable vessels, the *Sumter* reached Cadiz early in February, 1862. Here her career was virtually ended, as the *Tuscarora*, lying off Gibraltar, kept her under embargo, until Semmes finally, after waiting two months to effect an escape, discharged his crew and sold the ship. The career of the *Jeff. Davis*, which escaped from Charleston about the same time that the *Sumter* ran out from New Orleans, was far less fortunate than that of the latter vessel. She captured and burned a number of American vessels, but about the middle of August was wrecked near St. Augustine, Florida. In October, 1861, the *Nashville*, commanded by Lieutenant Pegram, escaped from Charleston. The next January she was at Southampton, England, which port she was ordered to quit on the 4th of February. At this time she was closely blockaded by the *Tuscarora*; but the latter was not permitted to pursue until after the expiration of twenty-four hours, which gave the privateer every chance of escape. The *Nashville* ran the blockade at Beaufort, and anchored safely in a Confederate port on the 1st of March, bringing with her \$3,000,000 worth of stores, but no arms. Just one year from her arrival at Beaufort she was destroyed by the Federal iron-clads in the Great Ogeechee River, and under the guns of Fort McAllister. The *Montauk* (Captain Worden) led in the attack. She had grounded in that part of the river known as the Seven Miles' Reach, when the fleet approached to within twelve hundred yards, and opened fire both on the ship and the battery. The *Nashville* soon caught fire, and her magazine exploded. The attempts made by the Confederacy to build up its navy in foreign ship-yards will be considered in some future chapter.



THE SUMTER.

Apart from the measures taken to secure an effective blockade, the naval arm of the service, like the military, during the year 1861 was engaged only





THE BURNING OF HAMPTON BY MAGRUDER

in detached operations. Two important expeditions were planned and carried out, having for their object the seizure of points on the Southern coast, and a diversion of the enemy's forces from Virginia, in view of a possible advance by McClellan's army in the autumn. Besides the Hatteras and Port Royal Expeditions, our occupation of Ship Island in September, and the attack made by the rebels on Santa Rosa Island in October, were the only events of interest worthy of note in the record of naval operations for the year.

Nothing of any importance occurred in General Butler's department during the month of July; but the Confederate General Magruder still had a large force on the Peninsula, which, shortly after the battle of Bull Run, signalized itself by burning the little village of Hampton. On the 7th of August Magruder had posted a force of seven thousand men, with eight pieces of artillery, on Black River, three miles from the village, with the intention of forcing an engagement upon our soldiers at Newport News or at Hampton, or at least of destroying the latter place, and thus preventing its being used by Butler's men for winter quarters. But these men already, as will presently appear, had their eye upon a sunnier clime, and would, therefore, hardly realize the injury which had been intended. The circumstances incident to the conflagration were every way disgraceful to the Confederate commander. No warning was given, and helpless non-combatants were aroused from their beds at midnight to look upon the destruction of their homes. Nothing, however, was accomplished by the enemy beyond this conflagration, as our forces were prepared to meet him, and with the chances of victory on their side.

On the 18th of August General Butler turned over his command at Fortress Monroe to General Wool, having been at the head of the department of Virginia for nearly three months. Assigned to no other post, he reported to General Wool for orders, and received quietly the command of the volunteer forces outside the fortress, viz., at Camps Butler and Hamilton, serving as a subordinate where he had, almost from the beginning of the war, been accustomed to the supreme command. But it was not long before work of great moment was intrusted to him for execution. The resources of the fortress had up to this time been used chiefly with a view to secure it from the possibility of capture; that security had now been fully gained, and henceforth Fortress Monroe was to become the centre from which the naval strength of the nation might be hurled against the trembling and almost defenseless coasts of the Southern Atlantic. In a single day the full importance of the possession of the fortress to our government flashed like an illumination upon the popular mind; it was the day when the expedition to Hatteras Inlet was brought to light as an accomplished result.

The Confederacy had not been without its serious apprehensions as to the vulnerability of its coast defenses; indeed, it was the sorest of anticipated evils, and the more the boasting in relation to heroic defenses against these daily-expected raids upon their coast, the greater their apprehension of ruin which must inevitably result from them. Within but a day or two of the

landing of our forces at Hatteras, the *Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel* gave the following reasons for immediately organizing a coast defense:

"1. Because there are many places where the enemy might commit raids and do us damage before we could organize and drive them off. Beaufort District, opposite to Savannah, has several fine ports and inlets, navigable for large vessels, wholly unprotected. This district has five black to one white inhabitant. Several inlets on our coast, which our enemies know like a book, from surveys in their possession, are equally unprotected.

"2. In two months more they will not fear our climate. By that time they might be ready to make a sudden descent and find us unprepared.

"3. A small force might eject them if ready to go at once; when, if we have to wait, a much larger one will be necessary.

"4. By organizing and drilling infantry and guerrillas at home, there will be no need to call upon the President for troops, and a feint from the enemy would not injure our Virginia operations."

Hardly had this note of alarm been sounded before the blow was struck and the danger illustrated. The point of attack was not that which would have been conjectured by the enemy; apparently no position along the coast, with the exception of cities, was better protected than Hatteras Inlet. This point was chosen by Butler himself, who both originated and planned the expedition, aided, however, in the execution of his scheme by Commodore S. H. Stringham, of the Navy. The first suggestion leading to this undertaking was furnished by a Union man who had been wrecked and detained as a prisoner at the Inlet, and who brought home the important information that through that opening in the sand-reef which lines the North Carolina coast, blockade runners were continually gaining access to the main land. This was before Butler had been relieved of his command; and when General Wool arrived at the fortress, he found that preparations were already being made, by order of General Scott, for an expedition whose object should be to block up the Inlet and reduce the forts in the vicinity. There were two of these fortifications—Forts Hatteras and Clark—which the Confederates had for the last three months been erecting upon the point north of the Inlet, one of them mounting ten and the other seven guns. These earthworks were constructed of sand, turfed over; were twenty-five feet in thickness, and contained bomb-proofs. The position of Fort Hatteras was one of great strength, being nearly surrounded by water, and accessible only by a circuitous march of five hundred yards over a neck of sand, and then over a narrow causeway commanded by two 32-pounders. Its bomb-proof sheltered four hundred men. Fort Clark, seven hundred yards farther north, was smaller, and less formidable in its armament.

General Butler volunteered to command the expedition, which started out from Hampton Roads a little after noon on Monday, August 26th, and which consisted of two frigates—the *Minnesota* and *Wabash*, the sloop-of-war *Pawnee*, and three war steamers—the *Monticello*, *Harriet Lane*, and *Quaker City*, together with two transport steamers—the *George Peabody* and the *Adelaide*, and the steam-tug *Fanny*, besides some surf-boats, and an





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old schooner which it was proposed to sink in the bulk-head. The Cumberland and the Susquehanna were expected to be on hand in time to join in the attack. Nine hundred troops made up the small military detachment of the expedition.

By two o'clock on Tuesday the fleet arrived off Hatteras, and the Monticello was dispatched to reconnoitre the position and to look out a suitable landing-place. The next morning the troops were landed two and a half miles north of the forts, under cover of the gun-boats. Upon the voyage, every thing had gone on pleasantly; but just now there was a heavy sea, and it was with great difficulty that a small portion of the force was landed, and all farther attempts at disembarkation were given up. In the mean time the fleet opened fire upon the forts, particularly upon Fort Clark. The return fire fell short, amid the contemptuous laughter of our blue-jackets. This was the first instance in the war of an assault by gun-boats, and the excitement was intense. Every soldier was promptly at his post. One of the spongers, dropping his sponge overboard, jumped over after it and recovered his place before there was time even to reprimand him for his offense. After a heavy bombardment, lasting from nine o'clock in the morning until night, Fort Clark was evacuated; the flag on Fort Hatteras also was hauled down, and our victory seemed secure. The Monticello steamed into the Inlet to within six hundred yards of the fort, when suddenly the heavy guns of the latter opened upon her with such terrible effect that she was in danger of sinking. But she escaped, though considerably injured; and the other boats reopened the attack, which was continued until dark, apparently with little effect. Things began to look despondently, and there was among the men a dim conjecture of failure; and, to complete the discouragement, the weather threatened serious work ahead. The vessels stationed near the shore to protect our troops were compelled during the night, for their own safety, to retire. The number of men landed were insufficient to resist attack, and, fortunately, no attack was made by the enemy.

On Thursday morning the assault upon Fort Hatteras was renewed, and, after a few hours of rapid firing, the white flag was displayed above the fort, and the Confederate flag-officer, Commodore Barron, offered to surrender the position to General Butler if the garrison might be permitted to retire with all the honors of war, stating, moreover, that he had in the fort seven hundred men, and fifteen hundred within call. Butler returned his compliments, and assured the Confederate commander that no terms were admissible save those of an unconditional surrender—terms which Barron was compelled to accept; and, giving himself up as prisoner, he had the additional humiliation of having to pass directly under the guns of the Wabash, which, six months before, he had himself commanded with honor.

At the very moment when the terms of capitulation were under consideration by the enemy, the Adelaide and the Harriet Lane were grounded in attempting to pass the bar, and both of them were under the guns of the fort. What if Barron, seeing his advantage, should renew the attack? It was a critical moment; but the terms were accepted, and the object of the expedition was accomplished. Instead, however, of destroying the port, as originally proposed, Butler thought it of great importance that it should be retained, and, in order to present this view of the case to General Scott, returned to Washington. The government, convinced of the wisdom of his proposition, determined to hold the place, and immediately provisioned the garrison for that purpose. The importance of this particular victory, considered alone and by itself, was no doubt extravagantly overrated by the people; but it must be remembered that it was preceded by a summer of disaster, and furnished the first glimpse of the possibilities for victory that

were involved in our naval resources; and it lifted from Butler's shoulders the heavy burden of the reverse at Great Bethel.

These events were soon followed by the occupation of Ship Island in the Mississippi Sound. The Confederates evacuated the island September 16th, and our forces, under Commander Smith, immediately took possession.

The importance of Hatteras Inlet to the government was in a very short time fully illustrated: first, by the great number of prizes taken—five schooners having been captured in a single day—and, secondly, by the opportunities offered for aggressive action in the immediate vicinity, an instance of which occurred within three weeks of the capture of Fort Hatteras, in the expedition against Fort Ocracoke, situated off an inlet of the same name, on the seaward face of Beacon Island. The expedition proceeded under the leadership of Lieutenants Maxwell and Eastman, and was a complete success, resulting in the destruction of the fort, which was deserted, and the capture of twenty-two guns. At Portsmouth, on the opposite side, there had been a camp, which the Confederate troops abandoned at the approach of the Fanny, to whom was intrusted the execution of the enterprise.

The success which attended General Butler in his descent upon the coast of North Carolina, gaining for our government not merely the key to the entire coast of that state, but also such a foothold on the main land as to furnish a nucleus for future movements in the interior as time should prepare the way for them, encouraged the Naval Department to fit out a second expedition, on a larger scale, to operate in waters farther south. The expedition, under the joint command of General Sherman and Commodore Dupont, and consisting of fifty vessels including transports, sailed from Fortress Monroe on Tuesday, the 29th of October, under sealed orders, the specific object of attack being left, in great measure, to the discretion of the officers commanding. The time that transpired between the sailing of the expedition and its arrival at its destination was a period of great suspense to the whole country—to the curiosity of the North and to the apprehension of the South. The entire uncertainty as to where the uplifted arm of the national power was to fall completely bewildered the states along the sea-board; every probable point of attack was fortified; Charleston, in particular, waited anxiously, expecting daily to see the menacing fleet across the bar of her harbor. The tenor of General Sherman's orders, of which some report in a Northern newspaper fell into the hands of the Confederates, indicating that considerable resistance might be expected on the part of the enemy, led the South to suppose that some strong point was to be assailed—Charleston, for instance, or Savannah, or New Orleans. But this was not the case. The leaders of the expedition, after careful deliberation, determined to take possession of Port Royal Harbor, on the coast of South Carolina. It was supposed that in five days the voyage would be completed; but on Friday, the 1st of November, rough weather set in, with a high southeaster, so that the fleet was dispersed and placed in a perilous situation. One of the ships had to throw a powerful battery overboard in order to save her crew, and some transports were lost. On the fourth of November the fleet arrived at Port Royal bar.

It was originally intended that the military forces should co-operate with the naval; but this, upon a consideration of the distance—which was five or six miles—over which the troops would have to be conveyed to the nearest point of landing, and by reason of a considerable loss, in the recent storm, of a greater portion of the means of disembarkment, was found to be a plan quite impossible of execution, and therefore the navy alone was involved in the engagement. The bar of Port Royal is ten miles seaward. After crossing this, the channel leads between St. Philip's Island and Hilton Head into the harbor. Upon each side of the channel, or Broad River, were situated batteries of considerable strength, viz., on Hilton Head, Fort Walker, mounting twenty-three guns; and on St. Philip's Island, Fort Beauregard, mounting fifteen guns; and at the left of the latter, a battery of four guns behind earthworks. Fort Walker was a formidable strong-hold, but those on the opposite side were less elaborate. There was no protection afforded by either of the forts from shells or bombs, as they had been hastily erected to meet a possible emergency of this nature. The Confederate forces on Hilton Head were under the command of General Drayton.

The attack, on account of unfavorable weather, was postponed until the 7th of November. The day was clear and beautiful, without a cloud, and in every way favorable to the operations of the fleet. A reconnoissance had been made three or four days previously, in which the strength and position of the batteries was ascertained. The attack was made at an early hour of the day. The transports being left in the rear, the most formidable steamers of the fleet, to the number of thirteen, with the Wabash, the flag-ship of Commodore Dupont, in the van, swept in with open ports: and all was silence until the Minnesota came directly opposite Fort Walker, when every gun of the fort fired simultaneously upon the frigate. There was no reply from the fleet. The batteries of Fort Beauregard poured in their fire, but still there was no answer. Then the second steamer in the line came within range, was fired upon from both sides at once, when, from the first three vessels, seventy-five guns delivered their terrible broadsides upon Fort Walker. From this moment the bombardment ceased not for four hours. In single file, as they had commenced, the steamers moved on until nine of them had passed out of range up toward the harbor; then they returned, describing an ellipse, and saluted Fort Beauregard. After sailing around this circle several times, another and far more successful plan was adopted—that of enfilading the batteries in either direction with our fire, while an attack was at the same time made from the front. Very soon nearly every gun was dismounted. A little after eleven the batteries on St. Philip's Island



were silenced, Fort Walker maintaining its fire only for two hours longer. The battering of the fort was terrible, the guns were scattered in every direction, surrounded by the dead and the dying. In this extremity it was determined to abandon the fort. Back of this work there was an open space of a mile, over which the defeated troops ran in a panic, subject every moment to the fire of the fleet. They found shelter in the woods, through which they made their way across the peninsula to the main land. The ground over which they fled was covered with their muskets and knapsacks.

Upon the arrival of the fleet the harbor was guarded, in addition to the fortifications, by a squadron of Confederate steamers under Commodore Tatnall; but this miniature navy was of no avail, and at the first onset was driven away. Forty-three guns were captured, and possession was taken of Hilton Head, which has since been an important centre of naval operations. Situated midway between Charleston and Savannah, and commanding easily the railroad connecting those two cities, this military position was of very great value.

Previous to the sailing of the Port Royal expedition occurred the attack on Santa Rosa Island.

The Atlantic and Gulf coasts are almost entirely walled in from the open violence of the sea by long, narrow islands or reefs of sand, between which and the main land are inclosures of water, sometimes large enough to be called bays, that find or make an outlet through the before-mentioned reefs. Santa Rosa Island is a sand-reef of this character opposite Florida, on the Gulf coast, inclosing the Pensacola Harbor, which was the finest in the Gulf. On the Gulf side there are three or four sand-ridges parallel to the coast, running along the island, and on the opposite or harbor side the ground is low and swampy, covered with a few bushes and trees. On the lower or western extremity of the island Fort Pickens is situated, directly opposite Fort McRea. The Confederate authorities were keenly alive to the importance of Fort Pickens. As early as March, 1861, a month previous to the actual commencement of hostilities, Major General Bragg, commanding the Confederate forces at Pensacola, had issued an order prohibiting all traffic or communication with the fort, which was shortly afterward strongly re-enforced, and assumed a threatening attitude, whereupon formidable preparations for its assault began to be made at Pensacola. The coast fronting Fort Pickens takes the form of a semicircle, stretching from the navy yard to Fort McRea, a distance of two and one half miles, along which was constructed an uninterrupted line of redoubts and batteries, together with a water-battery beyond Fort McRea. Bragg had over six thousand men in his command, who, inflamed by the success at Sumter, were eager to repeat it against Pickens, at that time under the command of Lieutenant Slemmer, whose conduct during these eventful days this history has recorded in the proper place. He was succeeded in command by Colonel Harvey Brown. On the 13th of June the celebrated Sixth New York Regiment, Zouaves, commanded by Colonel William Wilson, who was one of the very first to offer his services to the government on the breaking out of the war, took its departure for Santa Rosa Island, where it encamped about a mile eastward from the fort. The island at this point is three fourths of a mile in width.

As a matter of course, there was the usual jealousy and bickering between the regulars in the fort and the volunteer Zouaves. But, so far as the enemy was concerned, "Billy Wilson" was the foremost man on the island; and although the prospect of taking the fort had long been despaired of, yet it

seemed to them to be no unworthy object to break up the Zouave encampment. It was to accomplish this object that on the evening of the 8th of October a force of between twelve hundred and two thousand Confederates, transported by two steamers and a few launches, under the command of Brigadier General Anderson, effected a landing on the island four miles above the camp. Except for a short distance beyond the camp in that direction there was no guard posted, although there was every reason to apprehend an early attack, on account of the strength of Bragg's army on the other side. The camp could hardly have been less favorably situated to repel an assault. Colonel Wilson's regiment had been depleted of quite four fifths of its number, having hardly two hundred men able to take the field.

The enemy, having landed without opposition, marched down the island in three columns, one down the centre of the island, and the other two along either coast. In this order they came upon the picket-guard, which altogether consisted of seventy men variously disposed. Here the attack commenced just as the Confederates came over the back hill of the beach; but the close ranks of the attacking columns received a destructive fire from the squads of men opposed to them, and were even thrown into considerable disorder. So persistently did the pickets hold their ground, retreating only step by step, delivering all the time a continuous fire into the enemy's ranks, that all the results calculated upon through a surprise of the camp were lost, the uninterrupted firing having completely alarmed the Zouaves and brought them promptly into line. There was even time given to send a dispatch to the fort, notifying Colonel Brown of the attack. So many false alarms had been given that this was received incredulously; but the heavy volley-firing, as the engagement became more general, aroused the regulars to an appreciation of the situation. In the mean time, Colonel Wilson and Lieutenant Colonel Creighton encountered the centre column of the enemy; but only a small force was left to receive the attack of this column, the greater number of men having been detached for the purpose of preventing the flank movement which was being effected by the enemy's left column. The main portion of the Confederate force was already in the very midst of the camp, to which they were setting fire, having completely plundered it of clothing, money, and baggage. From the fort a company of about thirty men, under Major Vogdes, marched toward the left of the field, and the major, being in advance of his men, was surrounded and taken prisoner. His men, however, made objections to surrendering, and bravely stood their ground. If the enemy had not become very much dispersed for the purposes of plunder and destruction, and had not thus also given time to the federal troops to gather themselves together for an attack, matters would have assumed a much more serious aspect. Supposing, from the severity of the fire, that the force upon the island was very much larger than they had counted upon, and fearing lest they might be cut off from their transports, the Confederates soon commenced a retreat, and were closely followed by the Zouaves and the force from the fort. This force attacked them as they were re-embarking, and fired upon them with terrible effect. The Confederate loss at this point was great, particularly as the swampy ground very much impeded their operations.

The expedition, though in some measure successful, was far from being thoroughly fortunate. In the first place, it did not accomplish what with so great a force might have been reasonably expected. The darkness of the night, and the dissipation among the men consequent upon their indiscriminate plunder, led to a great deal of confusion, and many of the troops were killed by men in their own ranks. And, again, whatever punishment they inflicted upon our men in the destruction of their camp and in robbing them of their personal effects, certainly in the more serious matter of the fight, namely, the loss of life, they were much the greater sufferers.

As to the conduct of Wilson's Zouaves, it must be remembered that it was their first battle, and that very little precaution had been taken against an attack. The disparity in numbers was terribly against them, and, to complete their embarrassment, Lieutenant Colonel Creighton had, through a mistaken order at an early period in the fight, retired with his men to the fort. The bravery of the guard was almost marvelous, and it was this that saved the regiment from destruction.

Fort Pickens, surrounded by a cordon of Confederate batteries, was threatened with the fate of Sumter, beleaguered as it was by a force ten times as large as its own. Partly in retaliation for the night attack on Santa Rosa Island, and partly because some active measures must be adopted to reduce the enemy's fortifications, Colonel Brown, on the morning of the 22d of November, assisted by Flag-officer McKean, with the Niagara, Richmond, and Montgomery, commenced the bombardment of the enemy's batteries, which, as we have said, stretched in a continuous line from Fort McRea on the left to the navy yard on the right. On this line, at the right of Fort McRea, was Fort Barrancas. These forts were mounted with some of the heaviest guns in the country. There were, besides, fourteen batteries, mounting from one to four guns. Conjointly with the attack from Fort Pickens, the fire from three batteries on the island was also directed against the enemy's works. The fire was returned with great accuracy and vigor. It was hardly noon, however, when the guns of Fort McRea were all silenced but one. Pickens was originally intended to resist an attack from the sea, and not from the coast; but sand-bag traverses and similar precautions prevented any serious injury of the works. The fire of Barrancas, and that from the navy yard, was perceptibly reduced during the afternoon. The next day Colonel Brown reopened the bombardment, but, owing to the shallowness of the water, the frigates were obliged to withdraw from the contest. They could, however, have availed nothing against the rifled guns of the enemy. Fort McRea was silent all day, and in the afternoon the village of Warring-



BILLY WILSON






BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF FORT PICKENS DURING THE BOMBARDMENT, NOVEMBER 22, 1861.

ton, in the rear of the Confederate batteries, was set on fire from our shells and almost entirely destroyed. On the 1st of January, 1862, the bombardment was again opened. The firing was continued into the night, and the splendor of the illumination was visible for forty miles out at sea. At midnight the bombardment ceased. No important results were gained on either side, the casualties to either force not exceeding a dozen men killed and wounded. But it was proved that the batteries in the vicinity of Pensacola were harmless against Fort Pickens, and Bragg's mission a useless one.

The next week after the fight on Santa Rosa, our fleet lying at anchor inside the Southwest Pass of the Mississippi, and consisting of the steamers Richmond, Huntsville, Water-witch, and the two sloop-of-war Preble and Vincennes, was suddenly attacked by the Manassas, a Confederate battering-ram, under the command of Captain Hollins. The onset was made on the night of the 12th by a charge of the ram against the sides of the Richmond, knocking a hole in her timbers below water-mark, but doing only a trifling damage, though the steamer was struck with such violence as to be torn from her fastenings. The crew, however, were on their guard, and deliver-

ed a broadside into the Manassas, one of whose engines would no longer work, and by the severity of their fire compelled Hollins to haul off his ram, and to signal for support. At the given signal a new danger became imminent to our vessels, for a row of fire-ships at that moment appeared moving down the river, and threatening complete destruction to the fleet. To avoid this calamity, the fear of which was enhanced by the approach of gun-boats down the river, the Federal ships of war fell down the Pass one after another, but, unfortunately, both the Richmond and the Vincennes got aground in attempting to pass the bar. The former, however, was in a favorable position to give full effect to her heavy guns, having her broadside up the stream, and thus the entire fleet was enabled to escape.

The motive which incited the Confederates to this attack was to break up the blockade, which had ruined the prospects of the Crescent City. For this purpose several gun-boats had been constructed during the summer, and the more formidable Manassas had been built at Algiers, just opposite New Orleans, and armed with a 64-pound Dahlgren. But the long-contemplated assault resulted in little immediate damage, and accomplished absolutely nothing in its attempt to break up the blockade.



HOLLINS'S ATTACK ON THE FEDERAL FLEET IN THE SOUTHWEST PASS.





WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

## CHAPTER VII.

## THE POLICY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

Opening of the Extra Session.—The Fourth of July.—Changes in the House.—Election of Speaker.—Galusha A. Grow.—Changes in the Senate.—Former Preponderance of the South.—Want of a Leader.—William H. Seward.—Salmon P. Chase.—Stephen A. Douglas.—Henry Wilson.—John C. Breckinridge.—Jesse D. Bright.—Expulsion of Breckinridge, Bright, Polk, and Johnson.—The President's Message.—The Army and the Navy.—War Bills proposed in the Senate.—Resolution to approve the President's Acts.—The Debates.—Expulsion of Senators.—The Army Bill.—The Crittenden and Johnson Resolution.—McClelland's Resolution.—Military Laws of the Session.—Financial Measures.—The Confiscation Bill.—Receipts and Expenditures.—Foreign Relations.—Instructions to Ministers.—Privateering.—Confederate Commissioners.—British, French, and Spanish Decrees of Neutrality.—The Affair of the Trent.—Views of the British and American Governments.—First regular Session of Congress.—President's Message.—Number and Constitution of the Army.—Mr. Stanton appointed Secretary of War.—The Navy.—Receipts and Expenditures.—Plan of the Secretary of the Treasury.—Change of Views in Congress.—Peace Propositions laid aside.—War Measures.—Appropriations.—Financial Measures adopted.—Paper Money a Legal Tender.—The Argument for and against it.

IT is proposed in this and the following chapter to describe the domestic and foreign policy of the Federal government from the opening of the extra session of Congress, July 4, 1861, to the close of the first regular session, July 17, 1862.

Congress met in extra session at the call of the President on the 4th of July. That day is memorable in American history. On that day, eighty-five years before, the delegates of the thirteen United States had formally put forth the declaration claiming a place among the sovereign and independent nations of the earth. Now delegates from thirteen states (for Kentucky and Missouri were nominally represented in the Confederate Congress) were preparing to convene at Richmond to complete the destruction of the Union. Three of the five successive presidents who had borne a part in the struggle for national existence had died on the 4th of July. On that day, thirty-five years before, just half a century after the signing of the Declaration, Jefferson, its author, and Adams, its most eloquent advocate, had died. On that day, thirty years before, Monroe, the last of the Revolutionary presidents, had died. On that day, ten years before, just fifty-eight

years after the corner-stone of the original capital had been laid by the hands of Washington, the corner-stone of the edifice in which Congress was now assembled had been laid by the President. Daniel Webster delivered an oration, in which he declared that the distinctive nature of American liberty, as distinguished from that of Greece, Rome, and modern Europe, was the capacity for self-government, giving to the will of the majority, fairly expressed through its representatives, the binding force of law, and the formation of a written constitution, founded upon the will of the people. Under that corner-stone he deposited a document, written by his own hand, setting forth, in his own massive diction, that on this day the Union of the United States stood firm; the Constitution was unimpaired, and growing every day stronger in the affections of the American people, and attracting more and more the admiration of the world.<sup>1</sup>

The Thirty-seventh Congress, thus convened in extra session five months before its regular time of meeting, would hardly have been recognized by one who had known the capital in former days. In the House of Representatives 159 members answered to their names at roll-call. When all the seats claimed were filled there were 178 members of the House. In the preceding Congress, whose term had closed four months before, there were 237 representatives. Of the 66 members to which the eleven seceding states were entitled, only six appeared. Five of these were from Virginia, chosen at an election of somewhat doubtful validity, and one from Tennessee. The nineteen free states sent 149 representatives; the four border states, which still adhered to the Union, sent 23. In no preceding Congress within the memory of living men had there been so large a proportion of new members. Barely one third of the representatives had been members of the preceding Congress. Some states changed their delegation entirely; some changed a majority. From Maine every representative was a new man; of the thirty-three members from New York, only eight had held seats in the last Congress; of the five representatives from New Jersey, three were new men. Two thirds of the entire delegation in the House consisted of men who had never before held seats in Congress. This great change of persons did not, however, involve a corresponding change in parties. The elections had been held before the plans of the Secessionists had been fully developed, and so before the great uprising of the North, which for a time swept away all the old party distinctions. In the previous Congress, out of 237 representatives, 109 were Republicans, 101 Democrats, while 27, mainly from the border states, who held the balance of power, maintained a position independent of either party. It had only been after a violent contest of two months that

a Republican speaker was elected by a bare majority. In the present Congress the Republicans had 106 members, having actually lost three members; but the defection of the South gave the Republicans a majority of three to two, and there were, besides, about 30 members who, without belonging to the party, sustained the administration in its leading measures for the prosecution of the war.

Three members, Grow, of Pennsylvania, Blair, of Missouri, and Colfax, of Indiana, were prominently named as the Republican candidates for speaker. Colfax, whose chances of success stood high, and who was chosen speaker of the next Congress, peremptorily declined. He would not, by being a candidate, delay the organization of the House. The first ballot stood 71 for Grow and 40 for Blair; but, before the result was announced, Blair withdrew, asking his friends to change their votes. Most of them voted for Grow, giving him 99 votes out of 159. The remaining votes were scattered; of these, 12 were cast for Mr. Crittenden, who, having been superseded as senator from Kentucky by Mr. Breckinridge, had been chosen a member of the House. Several more were cast for other Union men, leaving the actual strength of the Opposition about 40.

Galusha A. Grow, the new speaker, though barely thirty-eight years of age, had been a member of the House for ten years. He had first taken his seat in 1850, being the youngest member. He soon gave evidence of decided ability, and was at successive sessions appointed chairman of several important committees. He ranked originally among the Democrats, but when the great disruption of parties began, he took his place in the new organization among the Republicans. In 1857 he was the candidate of that

<sup>1</sup> "If, therefore, it shall hereafter be the will of God that this structure shall fall from its base, that its foundations shall be upturned, and the deposit beneath this stone brought to the eyes of men, be it then known that on this day the Union of the United States of America stands firm, that their Constitution still exists unimpaired, and with all its original usefulness and glory, growing every day stronger and stronger in the affections of the great body of the American people, and attracting more and more the admiration of the world. And all here assembled, whether belonging to public or to private life, with hearts devoutly thankful to Almighty God for the preservation of the liberty and happiness of the country, unite in sincere and fervent prayers that this deposit, and the walls and arches, the domes and towers, the columns and entablatures, now to be erected over it, may endure forever. God save the United States of America!"



party for speaker, but was defeated by Mr. Orr, of South Carolina, the candidate of the Democratic party, who had then a majority of fully three to two.

Before the speaker had been chosen several members of the Opposition party gave significant indications of the course which they were to pursue. When the names of the members from Virginia were called, Cox, of Ohio, and Burnett, of Kentucky, objected to their reception. Some members had been sworn into the military service of the United States; Vallandigham, of Ohio, moved that they were thereby disqualified from holding seats in Congress. Of Cox and Vallandigham we shall have occasion to speak hereafter. Burnett, after strenuously opposing every measure of the government, went over to the Confederacy, was formally expelled from his seat in Congress, and was subsequently appointed, by the body claiming to be the Council of State of Kentucky, a representative in the Confederate Congress at Richmond.

The change in the Senate was as notable as that in the House. The South had long since abandoned the hope of maintaining an equality in the popular branch of Congress. The population of the North increased more rapidly than that of the South. Its majority in the House was augmented with each successive apportionment. A united North was consolidating to oppose a united South, already consolidated. In the House, also, the members from the South had long been, as a whole, inferior in character and ability to those from the North. The lawless voters of Arkansas and Mississippi, the ignorant denizens of the sand-hills of Georgia and North Carolina, had sent members of their own class. "Fire-eaters," bullies, and demagogues had found constituents in various districts of other states. That there were many men in the House of ability, culture, and education from the Southern states is true; but, as a body, they were types of a low class of Southern society.

With the Senate it was different. There the South was nearly equal in numbers to the North; and as it was united on all sectional questions, and was always in close affiliation with a large party in the North, it had always a practical majority in the Senate. The South had always sedulously cared for its representation in this body of the national Legislature. The selection of senators was not determined by mere local or personal influences. Any rude district might send an incapable representative to the House, but a whole state would rarely agree upon any one incapable man. In the choice of senators, therefore, the combined intellect and culture of each state had the predominance. Now and then, indeed, in the complication of partisan politics, an incompetent man found his way to the Senate from a Southern state. But these cases were exceptional; as a general rule, the South sent its strongest men to the Senate, and kept them there. This long service added to their prominence. Of late years, also, Southern senators had gained an influence beyond that growing out of their individual talents and services. They were a compact body. When one acted or spoke he spoke and acted as a representative of all, and practically as the representative of all the Northern men of Southern principles. So long as the South controlled the Senate it controlled the government. Without its consent no law could be passed; without its sanction no officer could be appointed to execute a law.

The domination of the South in the Senate was never more absolute than during the session which closed with the termination of Buchanan's administration. The Democratic party, Southern and Northern, had a clear majority of three to two.<sup>1</sup> This gave them the control of all the standing committees; for, according to established usage, the dominant party in the Senate assembled in caucus and settled the constitution of all the committees. They apportioned among themselves the chairmanship and the majority of every important committee. The list was formally presented to the Senate for acceptance. It had been previously agreed upon by the majority in a private caucus from which the minority were excluded. The adoption of the list thus made out was certain. The minority had only to accept it, which they usually did without opposition, for opposition would have been unavailing.

The construction of the standing committees was a matter of great importance. Except in cases where a special committee was ordered—when the senator who proposed the committee was usually appointed its chairman by courtesy—these standing committees gave shape and form to the action of the Senate. Of the twenty-two regular committees, the control of sixteen was given to the slave states. These embraced every important committee. Mason, of Virginia, was chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations;



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Hunter, of the same state, had that on Finance; Clay, of Alabama, had Commerce; Jefferson Davis had Military Affairs; Mallory, of Florida, had Naval Affairs; Bayard, of Delaware, had the Judiciary; Yulee, of Florida, the Post-office; Johnson, of Arkansas, had Public Lands; Benjamin, of Louisiana, had Public Land Claims; Brown, of Mississippi, had the District of Columbia; and to Green, of Missouri, was assigned the lead in the Committee on Territories, so long accorded to Douglas, whose recently promulgated doctrine of popular sovereignty had rendered him obnoxious to the oligarchy of the South. The six committees confided to senators from the free states had to do only with mere routine business. They were the Committees on Pensions, Patents, Public Buildings, Printing, Engrossed Bills, and Enrolled Bills. Even Bright, of Indiana, the facile tool of the South, and its mouth-piece when any communication was to be intrusted to a Northern man, was put off with the chairmanship of the Committee on Public Buildings.

The conspiracy against the Union was organized and directed in the Senate of the United States, if it did not originate there. Early in 1861, when South Carolina only had seceded, a meeting of Southern senators was convened, in which Georgia, Alabama, Louisiana, Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, and Texas were represented. Resolutions were passed in favor of the simultaneous secession of all the Southern states, and the establishment of a Southern Confederacy. The conspiring senators, however, resolved still to retain their seats until the inauguration of the new administration; for, if they left, "force, loan, and volunteer bills might be passed, which would put Mr. Lincoln in immediate condition for hostility;" whereas, if they remained in their places until the 4th of March, they "could keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied, and disable the Republicans from effecting any legislation which would strengthen the hands of the incoming administration." A committee was appointed to carry out the objects of this meeting. Its members were Jefferson Davis, then United States senator from Mississippi, chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, soon to be President of the

<sup>1</sup> The exact numbers given in the *Congressional Globe* were: Democrats, 37; Republicans, 24; Americans, 2; Vacancies, 3; in all, 66 members in a full Senate.



Southern Confederacy; Stephen R. Mallory, then United States senator from Florida, chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, soon to be Secretary of the Navy for the Confederacy; and John Slidell, a native of New York, then United States senator from Louisiana, soon to be the Confederate Envoy to the court of France.<sup>1</sup> Some of these conspirators abandoned their seats before the specified day, others retained them beyond that time; but enough remained to prevent the passage of any bills for strengthening the military or naval power of the government. Scarcely a regiment of soldiers, scarcely a vessel of war, scarcely a dollar in the treasury was at the disposal of the new administration when it came into office on the 4th of March.

The Senate which convened on the 4th of July consisted of but 47 members.<sup>2</sup> Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, was the only one who appeared from the seceding states, and he had made his way to the national capital with a price upon his head. The seceding senators embodied their full proportion of the ability, and more than their proportion of the notability of the Senate. Half of them were in their second and third terms. Their average service had already been eight years; the remaining senators averaged but four. To gain position in the Senate is usually a work of time. The new members had yet to acquire a national reputation. Of the senators now assembled thirty-one were Republicans; five others, though not belonging to that party, now supported the administration; two held an indeterminate position, but generally acted with the Opposition; the remaining nine persistently opposed every military or financial measure which implied the exercise of force for the maintenance of the Union. Of these nine four were within a few months formally expelled from the Senate for open complicity with the insurgents, and another subsequently resigned because the Senate demanded of its members an oath of fealty to the Constitution and government.

Although there were many able men in Congress, there was no one who could be considered a leader of the dominant party. That position had long been conceded to Mr. Seward. Even while in a meagre minority, he had for years exercised a personal influence greater than that of any other senator. He possessed many of the highest attributes of a statesman. He was ambitious, but in a noble way, for he was always ready to sacrifice present popularity to future renown. He never frittered away his influence or wasted his strength upon trifles. He took no part in mere Congressional skirmishing, and never condescended to reply to personal attacks. He spoke much, but only upon important subjects, and after full preparation. In every separate attribute of an orator he was excelled by some other senator. Hale could deliver a keener retort, Sumner pronounce a more scathing philippic; Douglas was a more skillful debater, Davis a more persuasive pleader. The two famous phrases, "the higher law" and "the irrepressible conflict," seem to have fallen from his lips by accident, without his imagining that they would be caught up and denounced on the one hand, and accepted on the other as symbols of a political faith.<sup>3</sup> He lacked that personal magnetism by which a leader sometimes binds the members of his party to himself. Strong men wept like children when the last chances of the election of Clay and Webster to the presidency were lost; the hold of Calhoun and Douglas upon their parties was quite as much personal as political. When Mr. Seward failed to receive the nomination, his supporters evinced no bitter regret. He was, in their view, the best exponent of the principles of the party; but if another man could secure a larger vote, they were content that he should be nominated. Mr. Seward was, however, conceded to be the foremost statesman of his time and country, the nearest representative of the great men of the last generation. That he was the representative man of his party was acknowledged, and it was a foregone conclusion with friends and foes that he would receive the nomination for the presidency. His vote on the first ballot, though not a majority, far exceeded that given for any other; but the second ballot showed that influences were at work which would prevent a majority from being concentrated upon him, and upon the third trial Mr. Lincoln was nominated. Mr. Seward then resolved to retire from public life; but, at the earnest request of his successful competitor, he consented to accept the position of Secretary of State. It was honorable to both men that such an offer should be made and accepted; but it would probably have been more for the interest of the country had he remained in his former position as leader of his party in the national Legislature.

Salmon P. Chase had risen rapidly into a leading position in the party. He had entered into public life as a Democrat, and as such had served for

one term as senator. When the great disruption took place in that party, he joined the Republicans, was twice chosen Governor of Ohio, and was a prominent candidate for the presidential nomination. He was chosen as senator for the Congress which had now convened; and had he taken his place as such, the position of leader must have fallen to him. But he had previously resigned his seat and accepted the office of Secretary of the Treasury. In this position he was to undertake heavier responsibilities than had ever before fallen to the lot of a financial minister. It is worthy of note that the four leading competitors of Mr. Lincoln for the presidential nomination accepted seats in his cabinet.<sup>4</sup>

There was one senator to whom, until within a month, men's eyes had been turned as likely to be the Congressional leader of the great Union party. Stephen A. Douglas, of Illinois, had for fifteen years been a determined opponent of the Whig or Republican party. He early foresaw the danger which threatened the Union from the controversy growing out of the agitation of the question of slavery. He perceived that there was but one principle upon which a union between free and slave states could be maintained, and that was the denial of the right of the general government to act in any way upon the permission or prohibition of slavery. It was admitted on all hands that this was true so far as the states were concerned: that South Carolina might any day abolish slavery, or Vermont establish it, within their limits, without question from any other state or from the Federal government. This principle was affirmed by the Compromise Act of 1850. The question was thus narrowed down to the Territories. Mr. Douglas maintained that the same principle should apply there also. In his view this involved the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. The emigrants to Kansas and Nebraska he considered to have the same rights in this matter which had been conceded to inhabitants of Utah and New Mexico. His doctrine on this point was finally wrought out and elaborated in his famous paper on the "Dividing Line between State and Federal Authority." This he regarded as the crowning act of his political life. "I believe it to be my mission," he said to the writer of these pages, "to settle forever the question of slavery; and I believe that it will be settled on the principles which I have here laid down." The essential points of this elaborate paper may be stated in a few words: Every distinct political community, loyal to the Constitution and the Union, is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of self-government in respect to their local concerns and internal polity, subject only to the Constitution of the United States; every Territory of the United States, when duly organized under a legal Territorial government, is a distinct political community; and slavery is a matter of local concern and internal polity; therefore the Territories, each for itself, have the sole right, under the Constitution, to legislate upon the subject of slavery. The Southern leaders would not assent to this doctrine. The nominating Convention of the Democratic party met at Charleston, April 23, 1860. The dividing line between the Northern and Southern branches of the party was then sharply run. The South demanded that the party should affirm not only that Congress should have no power to abolish slavery in the Territories, but that the Territorial Legislatures had no power to abolish slavery, or to prohibit the introduction of slaves, or to exclude slavery, or in any way to impair the right of property in slaves; and that it was the duty of the Federal government to protect slave property in the Territories. The North was willing to submit the question to the decision of the Supreme Court. More than half of the votes for President were cast for Mr. Douglas, but he lacked 50 of the 202 votes which, under the two thirds rule, were required for a nomination. The Convention broke up without making any nomination, and reassembled at Baltimore on the 18th of June. Here a schism took place, resulting in two Conventions. Mr. Douglas was nominated by one, and Mr. Breckinridge by the other. Had Douglas been nominated unanimously either at Charleston or Baltimore, his election was certain; but the disruption of these Conventions, making it sure that the vote of the South would be against him, drove hundreds of thousands of Northern Democrats over to Mr. Lincoln. An attempt to stay this popular current was made by nominating Mr. Bell as a "Union" candidate; but the nomination came too late. Mr. Lincoln received 180 electoral votes, being all from the free states except three from New Jersey. Mr. Breckinridge received 72 votes, being the whole from the strictly Southern states, together with those of Maryland and Delaware. The votes of Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, 39 in all, were cast for Mr. Bell; while Mr. Douglas received only 9 votes from Missouri and 3 from New Jersey. The popular vote, indeed, showed a very different result. For Lincoln were cast, in round numbers, 1,850,000 votes; for Douglas, 1,360,000; for Breckinridge, 840,000; and for Bell, 590,000. Douglas, therefore, retained his place in the Senate as the representative of nearly one third of the people of the United States, who, while opposed to the Republican party, were still more opposed to every scheme of secession. His first effort was to secure the passage of the Crittenden Proposition. It was not, indeed, in accordance with his own cherished views, but he was eager to accept it in order to save the Union. This last hope failing, and the line having been clearly drawn, he saw that there was no way remaining by which a loyal citizen could show his devotion to his country except by ignoring all party politics, and sustaining the flag, the Constitution, and the Union under any administration, against all assailants at home and abroad. It was noted that, when Mr. Lincoln pronounced his inaugural address on the 4th of March, Douglas was by the side of his old personal opponent, holding his hat while he spoke; and that during the festivities which followed in the evening he was assiduous in his courtesies to the wife of the President. These acts,

<sup>1</sup> For a fac-simile of the letter describing this conspiracy, written and franked by David L. Yulee, then United States senator from Florida, and chairman of the Committee on the Post-office, see this History, page 32.

<sup>2</sup> Shortly afterward two senators were admitted representing the State of Virginia, and subsequently two others representing the newly-formed state of West Virginia.

<sup>3</sup> The phrase "the higher law" occurs in a speech delivered in the Senate, March 11, 1850, upon the admission of California into the Union. The following is the context:

"It is true, indeed, that the national domain is ours. It is true it was acquired by the valor and with the wealth of the whole nation. But we hold, nevertheless, no arbitrary power over it. We hold no arbitrary authority over any thing, whether acquired lawfully or seized by usurpation. The Constitution regulates our stewardship; the Constitution devotes the domain to union, to justice, to defense, to welfare, and to liberty. But there is a higher law than the Constitution, which regulates our authority over the domain, and devotes it to the same noble purposes. The Territory is a part, and no inconsiderable part, of the common heritage of mankind, bestowed upon them by the Creator of the universe. We are his stewards, and must so discharge our trust as to secure in the highest attainable degree their happiness."

The phrase "irrepressible conflict" is found in a speech delivered at Rochester, October 25, 1858, in the following connection:

"It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces. It means that the United States must and will, sooner or later, become entirely a slaveholding nation or entirely a free-labor nation. Either the cotton and rice fields of South Carolina and the sugar plantations of Louisiana will be ultimately tilled by free labor, and Charleston and New Orleans become markets for legitimate merchandise alone, or else the rice-fields and wheat-fields of Massachusetts and New York must again be surrendered by their farmers to slave culture and to the production of slaves, and Boston and New York become once more markets for trade in the bodies and souls of men."

<sup>4</sup> The votes in the Convention on the first ballot were: for Seward, 173; Lincoln, 102; Cameron, 50; Chase, 49; Bates, 48. The remaining 48 votes were scattered among seven candidates.



which under ordinary circumstances would have been mere personal courtesies shown to a distinguished citizen of his own state, were accepted on all sides as significant indications of his political course. During the brief executive session of the Senate which followed, he took decided ground in favor of the line of policy indicated in the inaugural, accepting it, as it was intended, as a pledge that the aim of the administration was a peaceful solution of our national difficulties. But when the hostile measures of the Confederates rendered such a solution impossible, he remained firm in his resolution to uphold the Union by supporting the administration. His last public act was to dictate a letter to the chairman of the Democratic Committee of his own state, explaining and defending the course upon which he had resolved. This letter was dictated from a bed of sickness from which he was never to rise. Shortly after it was written, just one month before the meeting of the extra session of Congress, he was a corpse. He died at the age of forty-eight years, in the prime of manhood, at a moment when a career was opening before him nobler than has been presented to any American since the Father of his Country. He was more or less delirious during the closing days of his life. But his own impending death gave him no concern. The salvation of the republic was foremost in his thoughts; his last coherent words, before his farewell to his wife and his parting message to his absent children, breathed an ardent wish that the honor and safety of his country might be secured by the overthrow of her enemies.<sup>1</sup>

In the Senate the most important committee was now that on Military Affairs. Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, was appointed chairman of this committee, and was thus recognized as the leader of the dominant party in the Senate. His early life was spent on a farm. At twenty-two he learned the trade of a shoemaker, and soon after commenced business as a manufacturer of shoes. He entered warmly into politics and military affairs. At the age of forty he had already served eight years in the Legislature of Massachusetts, having twice been chosen President of the state Senate, and risen to the rank of brigadier general in the militia. In 1855 he was elected to the Senate of the United States, where he soon assumed a leading place. Earnest, fearless, and fluent, thoroughly appreciating the magnitude of the crisis, he was undoubtedly the best man for the position assigned to him. As all financial bills must originate in the House, the Committee of Ways and Means is the most important in that body. Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, was appointed chairman of that committee, involving the lead of the House.

The lead of the Opposition in the Senate was accorded to Mr. Breckinridge. He had served for four years as Vice-president of the United States, and consequently as President of the Senate. He had been nominated for the presidency, with a fair chance of success if the election could be thrown into the House of Representatives. When this scheme failed, he had been chosen senator from Kentucky in place of Mr. Crittenden, who had labored



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so earnestly to bring about a compromise. In presenting the credentials of his successor, Mr. Crittenden had said, "He succeeds to a place of great difficulty and high duties. I have no doubt that he will, and I hope that he may, occupy his seat more successfully than I have done for the good of our common country." Mr. Breckinridge had presided over the Senate with marked acceptance. His fine person, commanding address, courteous manners, and quick perception fitted him for that position. Just four months before the meeting of the extra session he had been thanked by the Senate for his conduct as its presiding officer. He had warmly supported the Crittenden Proposition. He had taken no part in the conspiracy against the Union. It cost him much to take the first steps against that Union over which he had hoped to preside. While the struggle was going on men marked his worn and haggard aspect; but, the steps once taken, he had neither the wish nor the power to retrace them. He took his seat as senator on the 4th of March in the executive session which followed the regular close of Congress. He then made a formal speech, urging the Senate to advise the President to withdraw all troops from the Confederate States, and to collect no large forces in any of the other Southern states. "The seven states which have gone out," he said, "are a protest against force in any form. From the eight Southern states which remain, making fifteen in all, there is also a protest against force." If force was used against any state which had seceded, or which might hereafter secede, he affirmed that his own state of Kentucky would "turn to her Southern sisters, with whom she was identified by geographical position, and by the ties of friendship, of intercourse, of commerce, and by common wrongs. She will unite with them to found a noble republic, and invite beneath its stainless banner such other states as know how to keep the faith of compacts, and to respect the constitutional obligations and the comity of the Confederacy." Thus, while under the sanction of his oath as senator of the United States, he avowed himself the advocate of those who had endeavored, or who should thereafter endeavor, to destroy the Union. Thus pledged to treason, he took his place as senator at the extra session. Henceforth his course was consistent. He

<sup>1</sup> The following are extracts from the last letter of Douglas:

"It seems that some of my friends are unable to comprehend the difference between arguments used in favor of an equitable compromise, with the hope of averting the horrors of war, and those urged in support of the government and flag of our country when war is being waged against the United States with the avowed purpose of producing a permanent disruption of the Union and a total destruction of its government. All hope of a compromise with the cotton states was abandoned when they assumed the position that the separation of the Union was complete and final, and that they would never consent to a reconstruction on any contingency, not even if we would present them with a blank sheet of paper, and permit them to inscribe their own terms. Still the hope was cherished that reasonable and satisfactory terms of adjustment could be agreed upon with Tennessee, North Carolina, and the border states, and that whatever terms would prove satisfactory to these loyal states would create a Union party in the cotton states which would be powerful enough at the ballot-box to destroy the revolutionary government, and bring those states back into the Union by the voice of their own people. This hope was cherished by Union men North and South, and was never abandoned until actual war was levied at Charleston, and the authoritative announcement made by the revolutionary government at Montgomery that the secession flag should be planted upon the walls of the Capitol at Washington, and a proclamation issued inviting the pirates of the world to prey upon the commerce of the United States. . . . In view of this state of facts, there was but one path of duty left to patriotic men. It was not a party question, nor a question involving partisan policy; it was a question of government or no government, country or no country; and hence it became the imperative duty of every Union man, every friend of constitutional liberty, to rally to the support of our common country, its government and flag, as the only means of checking the progress of revolution, and of preserving the union of the states. . . . I am neither the supporter of the partisan policy nor the apologist for the errors of the administration. My previous relations to them remain unchanged. But I trust the time will never come when I shall not be willing to make any needful sacrifice of personal feeling and party policy for the honor and integrity of my country. I know of no mode by which a loyal citizen may so well demonstrate his devotion to his country as by sustaining the flag, the Constitution, and the Union, under all circumstances, and under every administration, regardless of party politics, against all assailants at home and abroad. The course of Clay and Webster toward the administration of General Jackson in the days of nullification presents a noble and worthy example for all true patriots. . . . The gulf which separated party leaders in those days was quite as broad and deep as that which now separates the Democracy from the Republicans. But the moment an enemy rose in our midst, plotting the destruction of the government, the voice of party strife was hushed in patriotic silence. One of the brightest chapters in the history of our country will record the fact that, during this eventful period, the great leaders of the Opposition, sinking the partisan in the patriot, rushed to the support of the government, and became its ablest and bravest defenders against all assailants, until the conspiracy was crushed and abandoned, when they resumed their former positions as party leaders upon political issues."



opposed every measure looking to the strengthening of the Union or the weakening of the Confederacy. At the close of the session he returned to his home, threw up his office as senator, and joined the Confederates who were then invading Kentucky. They received him with open arms, and gave him a commission as brigadier general in their service. On the 4th of December, just nine months from the day when he had received the thanks of the Senate, he was formally expelled from that body without a single opposing vote.

Jesse D. Bright, of Indiana, was the only senator from a free state who took his place among the thorough opponents of the administration. He had been elected for three successive terms, and had now held his seat longer than any other member. He had always been a strict partisan. Though born in one free state and elected from another, there was no Southern man more entirely Southern than he. Other Northern members of his party sometimes hesitated to yield to the demands of their Southern colleagues—Bright never. He could be counted upon as surely as Davis or Mason. Though an indifferent speaker, he was a shrewd and dexterous party manager. He was placed on important committees, and had frequently been chosen temporary president of the Senate. He had taken no part in the great conspiracy. Facile tool as he was, that secret was not to be trusted to him. He urged his Southern colleagues to retain their places after the election of Lincoln. They did so as long as it suited their plan of preventing the passage of any bills which might strengthen the hands of the new administration. In these efforts they found a ready coadjutor in Mr. Bright. When the war finally broke out, he deliberately took the position of hostility to "the entire coercive policy of the administration." He was willing to furnish means to defend the capital then threatened by the Confederates, but would not give men or money to carry on the war against the states which had declared themselves out of the Union. During the extra session he spoke but little, for oratory was not his forte; but in his votes he followed Breckinridge like his shadow. In every division, important or unimportant, the name of Bright was sure to follow that of Breckinridge. That he misrepresented his constituents, opposed his country, and gave practical aid and comfort to the enemy was true; yet in his official capacity he only exercised his constitutional right of opposition, and furnished no grounds for parliamentary censure. But in a careless moment he had forged a weapon that could fairly be used against him.

A quarter of a century before he had a client, named Thomas Lincoln, who at length failed in business and emigrated to Texas. The connection had been a profitable one for Bright. After the annexation of Texas, Lincoln made his appearance at Washington in the character of schemer and speculator. Now he had a railroad scheme to urge upon Congress; then it was a machine for raising heavy weights which he wished to have employed in the erection of the public buildings at Washington. His last project was an alleged improvement in fire-arms. Bright was always ready to serve his old friend and client. He gave him letters of recommendation wherever they could be of use. He commended his fire-arms to Mr. Floyd, then Secretary of War, who seems to have been too busy in his treasonable projects to take any notice of it. At length, on the first of March, three weeks after the organization of the Confederate government, three weeks after Texas had formally seceded, and while the Confederate States were individually and collectively waging war against the Union, Mr. Bright wrote a letter introducing this Texan, with his improvement in fire-arms, to the President of the Confederacy.<sup>1</sup> What became of Lincoln for the next few months is unknown; but in August he was arrested in Ohio on charge of treason, and this letter was found upon him. Shortly after the meeting of Congress in December, a resolution was offered for the expulsion of Mr. Bright. He did not deny the genuineness of the letter; he had no recollection of having written it, but if Lincoln said that he wrote it he undoubtedly did so. The resolution was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, who reported that the facts were not sufficient to warrant the expulsion of Mr. Bright from the Senate. This report was not accepted, and a long debate ensued. It was contended by Mr. Bright and his friends that it was a mere note of introduction; that in addressing Jefferson Davis as "His Excellency, the President of the Confederacy of States," the writer used only the usual form of courtesy, designating the person addressed by the title which he claimed; that at the time when the letter was written there was no war, and no probability of one until after the fall of Sumter. On the other side it was urged that the letter recommending an inventor of improved fire-arms to the notice of the leader in the insurrection was an evidence of the thorough disloyalty of the writer, for such a weapon could he wanted only for hostilities against the United States; and, moreover, some months later, while the country was actually engaged in a gigantic war, he had written another letter avowing that he "had opposed, and should continue to oppose, the entire coercive policy of the government." The resolution of expulsion passed by a vote of 32 to 14. Among those who voted against it were, besides the whole remaining body of Opposition senators, several Democrats who supported the administration, and two Republicans. These last took the ground that, however objectionable might be the general course of Mr. Bright, this letter, considering the circumstances in which it was written, did not necessarily imply a treasonable intent, which was necessary to war-

rant his expulsion. If treason, in its strict sense, were the only ground for expulsion, they were correct in their view, for upon this letter no jury could ever have convicted the writer of that crime. But there may be disloyalty which, falling short of actual treason, still disqualifies a man from acting as a legislator. In this sense the senator from Indiana was disloyal; but, to warrant expulsion, this disloyalty must be evinced by overt act. He had a right to the protection of law; but if there was any act of his which brought him fairly in opposition to the strictest law, that law should have been brought to bear with all its force against him. This letter would clearly have warranted his arrest and detention in a military prison; and surely no man who might rightly have been consigned to Fort Lafayette should have been allowed to retain a seat in the Senate of the United States.

Two other senators, Polk and Johnson, from Missouri, who sat in this extra session, were likewise expelled at the subsequent one. Both had gone to their homes and taken open ground in favor of the secession of their state; both had failed to claim their seats; and both were credibly reported to have made their way to the Confederate States. The case was so clear against them that there was no voice against the resolution for their expulsion. Even Bright, Powell, and Bayard voted for it.

The organization of Congress was completed on the first day of the session. The President's Message was transmitted on the following day. It opened with a summary of the events of the four months of his administration, and a statement and defense of the policy which he had adopted. In six states the functions of the government were suspended; forts and arsenals had been seized; the Confederacy had been organized, and was invoking recognition and aid from foreign powers. The administration had to prevent, if possible, the dissolution of the Federal Union. The policy decided upon was announced in the inaugural address. It looked to the exhaustion of all peaceful measures before proceeding to stronger ones. It sought only to hold the public places not already wrested from the government, and to collect the revenue. Every thing was forborne without which it was possible to keep the government on foot. Fort Sumter was to be provisioned, in order that the authority of the nation might be visibly maintained. It was assailed and reduced in order to destroy the visible authority of the Union. The assailants began the conflict while no force, immediate or in expectancy, menaced them, and thus forced upon the country the distinct issue of immediate dissolution or blood. No choice was then left but to call out the war power of the government, and so to resist the force employed for its destruction by force for its preservation. The Message closed with an argument against the constitutional right of any state or number of states to secede. This argument, though conclusive, was useless; the time for argument had passed; the question must be decided by arms.

But the essential points of the Message were contained in four brief paragraphs.<sup>1</sup> The first touched upon the position of "armed neutrality" which a

<sup>1</sup> The following is the text of the most important portions of the Message:

#### THE ISSUE.

"The assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter was in no sense a matter of self-defense upon the part of the assailants. They well knew that the garrison in the fort could by no possibility commit aggression upon them. They knew—they were expressly notified—that the giving of bread to the few brave and hungry men of the garrison was all which would on that occasion be attempted, unless themselves, by resisting so much, should provoke more. They knew that this government desired to keep the garrison in the fort, not to assail them, but to maintain visible possession, and thus to preserve the Union from actual and immediate dissolution; and they assailed and reduced the fort for precisely the reverse object—to drive out the visible authority of the Federal Union, and thus force it to immediate dissolution. . . . Then and thereby the assailants of the government began the conflict of arms, without a gun in sight or in expectancy to return their fire, save only the few in the fort, sent to that harbor years before for their own protection, and still ready to give that protection in whatever was lawful. In this act, discarding all else, they have forced upon the country the distinct issue, 'immediate dissolution or blood.' And this issue embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy—a government of the people by the same people—can or can not maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. It presents the question whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control administration, according to organic law, in any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or on any other pretenses, or arbitrarily, without any pretense, break up their government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask, 'Is there, in all republics, this inherent and fatal weakness?' 'Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?'"

#### THE BORDER STATES.

"In the border states, so-called—in fact, the Middle States—there are those who favor a policy which they call 'armed neutrality'—that is, an arming of those states to prevent the Union forces passing one way, or the Disunion the other, over their soil. This would be disunion completed. Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an impassable wall along the line of separation; and yet not quite an impassable one, for, under the guise of neutrality, it would tie the hands of Union men, and freely pass supplies from among them to the insurrectionists, which it could not do as an open enemy. At a stroke it would take all the trouble off the hands of secession, except only what proceeds from the external blockade. It would do for the Disunionists that which of all things they most desire—feed them well, and give them disunion without a struggle of their own. It recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the Union; and while very many who have favored it are doubtless loyal citizens, it is, nevertheless, very injurious in effect."

#### CALLING OUT TROOPS.

"Recurring to the action of the government, it may be stated that at first a call was made for 75,000 militia; and, rapidly following this, a proclamation was issued for closing the ports of the insurrectionary districts by proceedings in the nature of a blockade. So far all was believed to be strictly legal. At this point the insurrectionists announced their purpose to enter upon the practice of privateering. Other calls were made for volunteers to serve for three years, unless sooner discharged, and also for large additions to the regular army and navy. These measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting then, as now, that Congress would ratify them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress."

#### SUSPENSION OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.

"Soon after the first call for militia, it was considered a duty to authorize the commanding general, in proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous to the public safety. This authority has purposely been exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and the attention of the country has been called to the proposition that one who has sworn to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' should not himself violate them. Of course, some consideration was given to the question of power and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were being resisted, and failing of execution in nearly one third of the states. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution, even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the

<sup>1</sup> Jesse D. Bright to Jefferson Davis.

"Washington, March 1, 1861.

"MY DEAR SIR,—Allow me to introduce to your acquaintance my friend Thomas B. Lincoln, of Texas. He visits your capital mainly to dispose of what he regards as a great improvement in fire-arms. I recommend him to your favorable consideration as a gentleman of the first respectability, and reliable in every respect.

"Very truly yours,

JESSE D. BRIGHT.

"To His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS, President of the Confederacy of States."



considerable part of the people of Kentucky and Missouri wished to assume. They wished their states to arm in order to prevent the Union troops from passing one way, or the Disunion troops the other way, over their soil. This project was condemned in a few brief and emphatic words.

The second important paragraph recited briefly the war measures adopted by the administration. A call had been made for 75,000 militia; the ports in the insurrectionary districts had been blockaded; farther calls had been made for volunteers for three years; and large additions had been made to the regular army and navy. It was assumed that in some or all of these measures the executive had exceeded the strict legal bounds of its authority; but they had been ventured upon under what appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, believing that they would be ratified by Congress.

The third paragraph related to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in certain cases. The facts were succinctly stated, and the opinion was expressed that in this case the executive had not gone beyond the power conferred upon it by the Constitution. But it was maintained by some that the authority to suspend this writ was vested in Congress; and to the judgment of the national Legislature the President submitted the question whether there should be any legislation upon this subject.

The fourth paragraph recommended that, in order to make the contest a short and decisive one, Congress should place at the disposal of government 400,000 men and \$400,000,000, affirming that the country could sustain the burden; that the people were ready to bear it; and that the end to be attained was worth the sacrifice.

means necessary to their execution some single law, made in such extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that practically it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to a very limited extent be violated? To state the question more directly: Are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not the official oath be broken if the government should be overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it was not believed that this question was presented. It was not believed that any law was violated. The provision of the Constitution that 'the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,' is equivalent to a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it can not be believed the framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion. No more extended argument is now offered, as an opinion, at some length, will probably be presented by the attorney general. Whether there shall be any legislation on the subject, and, if any, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress."

#### MEASURES RECOMMENDED.

"It is now recommended that you give the legal means for making this contest a short and decisive one; that you place at the control of the government, for the work, at least 400,000 men and \$400,000,000. That number of men is about one tenth of those of proper ages within the regions where, apparently, all are willing to engage; and the sum is less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the men who seem ready to devote the whole. A debt of \$600,000,000 now is a less sum per head than was the debt of our Revolution when we came out of that struggle, and the money value in the country now bears even a greater proportion to what it was then than does the population. Surely each man has as strong a motive now to preserve our liberties as each had then to establish them. A right result, at this time, will be worth more to the world than ten times the men and ten times the money. The evidence reaching us from the country leaves no doubt that the material for the work is abundant, and that it needs only the hand of legislation to give it legal sanction, and the hand of the executive to give it practical shape and efficiency. One of the greatest perplexities of the government is to avoid receiving troops faster than it can provide for them. In a word, the people will save their government, if the government itself will do its part only indifferently well."

#### THE RIGHT OF SECESSION.

"This sophism derives much, perhaps the whole, of its currency from the assumption that there is some omnipotent and sacred supremacy pertaining to a state—to each state of our Federal Union. Our states have neither more nor less power than that reserved to them in the Union by the Constitution—no one of them ever having been a state out of the Union. The original ones passed into the Union even before they cast off their British colonial dependence; and the new ones each came into the Union directly from a condition of dependence, excepting Texas. And even Texas, in its temporary independence, was never designated a state. The new ones only took the designation of states on coming into the Union, while that name was first adopted by the old ones in and by the Declaration of Independence. Therein the 'United colonies' were declared to be 'free and independent states;' but even then, the object plainly was not to declare their independence of one another or of the Union, but directly the contrary, as their mutual pledge and their mutual action before, at the time, and afterward, abundantly show. . . . No one of our states, except Texas, ever was a sovereignty; and even Texas gave up the character on coming into the Union, by which act she acknowledged the Constitution of the United States, and the laws and treaties of the United States made in pursuance of the Constitution, to be for her the supreme law of the land. The states have their status in the Union, and they have no other legal status. If they break from this, they can only do so against law and by revolution. The Union, and not themselves separately, procured their independence and their liberty. By conquest or purchase the Union gave each of them whatever of independence or liberty it has. The Union is older than any of the states, and, in fact, it created them as states."

"Again: if one state may secede, so may another; and when all shall have seceded, none is left to pay the debts. Is this quite just to creditors? Did we notify them of this sage view of ours when we borrowed their money? If we now recognize this doctrine by allowing the seceders to go in peace, it is difficult to see what we can do if others choose to go, or to extort terms upon which they will promise to remain."

"If all the states save one should assert the power to deny that one out of the Union, it is presumed the whole class of seceder politicians would at once drive the power, and denounce the act as the greatest outrage upon state rights. But suppose that precisely the same act, instead of being called 'driving the one out,' should be called 'the seceding of the others from that one,' it would be exactly what the seceders claim to do; unless, indeed, they make the point that the one, because it is a minority, may rightfully do what the others, because they are a majority, may not rightfully do."

#### FUTURE POLICY.

"Lest there be some uneasiness in the minds of candid men as to what is to be the course of the government toward the Southern states after the rebellion shall have been suppressed, the executive deems it proper to say it will be his purpose then, as ever, to be guided by the Constitution and the laws; and that he probably will have no different understanding of the powers and duties of the Federal Government relatively to the rights of the states and the people under the Constitution than that expressed in the inaugural address. He desires to preserve the government, that it may be administered for all as it was administered by the men who made it. Loyal citizens everywhere have the right to claim this of their government, and the government has no right to withhold or neglect it. It is not perceived that in giving it there is any coercion, any conquest, or any subjugation, in any just sense of those terms."

"As a private citizen the executive could not have consented that these institutions shall perish; much less could he, in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as these free people have confided to him. He felt that he had no moral right to shrink, or even to count the chances of his own life, in what might follow. In full view of his great responsibility he has so far done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views and your action may so accord with his as to assure all faithful citizens who have been disturbed in their rights of a certain and speedy restoration to them, under the Constitution and the laws. And having thus chosen our course, without guile and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear and with manly hearts."



HANNIBAL HAMLIN.

The report of the Secretary of War presented only a general abstract of the operations of that department. The President's call of April 15 for 75,000 volunteers for three months had been responded to by more than 80,000 men. The proclamation of May 3 called for 42,000 volunteers for three years. Under this call 208 regiments had been accepted, of whom 153 were in actual service, and the remainder would be in the field within twenty days. These regiments, including the three months volunteers, numbered 285,000 men; besides these, the new regiments of the regular army numbered 25,000 men, making 310,000 in all. Deducting from these the 80,000 three months volunteers whose term of service was about to expire, there would remain an available force of 230,000 men, volunteers and regulars. The secretary submitted to Congress the question whether this force should be farther increased.

The report of the Secretary of the Navy showed that under the administration of Mr. Buchanan this department had not only been neglected, but such disposition had been made of the vessels as to render the navy powerless for immediate operations against the Confederacy. Nominally our navy, on the 4th of March, consisted of 90 vessels, carrying 2415 guns. But 21 vessels, with 1069 guns, were unfinished or unseaworthy, leaving 69 vessels, with 1346 guns, at all available. Of these, 21 vessels, with 791 guns, were dismantled or laid up in ordinary, so that we had actually in commission only 42 vessels, with 555 guns. Two of these vessels were 50-gun frigates, the remainder were sloops and steamers. The steam navy comprised only 26 vessels of all classes, with 216 guns. The fleet seems to have been organized with the express design of rendering it useless in the present emergency. Nearly all of the vessels were on foreign stations. The home squadron consisted of but 12 vessels, with 187 guns, and about 2000 men; and of these only 4 small vessels, carrying 25 guns and 280 men, were in Northern ports. Of the 69 serviceable vessels, which on the 4th of March were supposed to be available, one was lost in the Pacific, another was soon seized at Pensacola, and four were burned at Norfolk; there were four more which could not be put into commission for a considerable time. Thus, when all the vessels should be recalled from foreign service, there would remain 58 vessels of the former navy, with 1021 guns. Treachery was rife among the officers of the navy. Many of those occupying the most responsible positions were faithless. Among these was Matthew F. Maury, to whom had been for years intrusted the charge of the National Observatory. Only a few months before he had protested vehemently against the action of the examining board, which had retired him from the line of promotion, continuing him in his honorable and responsible scientific position. Without note or warning, he abandoned his post and went over to the enemy. In all, between the 4th of March and the 1st of July, 259 naval officers had resigned their commissions or been dismissed. Hardly a seaman followed their example of treachery. Thus, while the United States claimed to be and was considered one of the great maritime powers, their actual naval



force was less than that of any second-rate power. So patent was the insufficiency of the navy that the late administration had recommended the building of seven steam sloops-of-war, of light draught and heavy armament. The last Congress had authorized the construction of these vessels in spite of the vehement opposition of the Southern members who still retained their seats. "If these steamers are built," said Mr. Mason, "they will be part of the naval armament of the Confederation, to be used for any military purposes that the public exigencies may require. Until we know whether the arm of the government is to be raised against the states which have seceded, by no vote of mine shall there be any addition to the naval or military service of the country." These vessels were now in course of construction at the public navy yards, and the present administration had also contracted for twenty-three gun-boats, and had made preliminary arrangements for several larger and fleetier vessels. But the building of these was a work of time, and the demands of the service were pressing. A number of steamers had been purchased or chartered, so that on the 1st of July the government had in commission 82 vessels of war, carrying 1100 guns, with 13,000 men, besides officers and marines.

Congress determined from the outset to devote itself to the work for which it had been called together. The House voted to consider only bills and resolutions concerning military and naval operations, and financial and judicial matters therewith connected. In the Senate Mr. Wilson gave notice of a series of bills: First, To confirm certain acts of the President for the suppression of insurrection and rebellion. Second, To authorize the employment of volunteers to aid in enforcing the laws and protecting public property. Third, To increase the present military establishment of the United States. Fourth, For the better organization of the military establishment. Fifth, For the organization of a volunteer militia force to be called the National Guard of the United States. Sixth, To promote the efficiency of the army. Mr. Chandler gave notice of a bill to confiscate the property of civil and military officers who should be guilty of treason or of aiding and abetting it, and disqualifying them from holding any office of trust and emolument. These bills, more or less modified, together with the financial measures originating in the House, gave shape to the proceedings of the session.

The proposition to confirm the acts of the President was presented as a joint resolution. It recited that under extraordinary exigencies the President had exercised certain powers and adopted certain measures for the preservation of the government. He had (1.) called for 75,000 volunteers. He had (2.) set on foot a blockade of the ports of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. He had (3.) blockaded the ports of Virginia and North Carolina. He had (4.) authorized the commanding general to suspend the writ of habeas corpus on the military line between Philadelphia and Washington. He had (5.) issued a proclamation calling into the service of the United States 42,000 volunteers, increasing the regular army by 22,700 men, and the navy by 18,000 seamen. He had (6.) authorized the commander of the forces in Florida to suspend the writ of habeas corpus if necessary. The resolution provided that all of these extraordinary acts should be approved, and declared as legal and valid as if they had been performed under the express authority and sanction of Congress.

After some preliminary discussion, which showed that there was among the Republicans a strong disinclination to sanction any permanent increase of the regular army, the debate was opened by Mr. Polk in opposition to the resolution. He said that Congress only has the right to make war, yet the President had, of his own motion and by his own wrong, brought on war. Secession was an accomplished fact before the close of the last Congress, yet that body had refused to pass any bills for the purpose of coercion. Provision was made by the Constitution for the enforcement of the laws when resisted by an individual or any number of individuals; but when a state or a number of states withdrew from the Union and denied the binding force of its laws, there was no provision for compelling their obedience. So the calling out of the militia was unconstitutional. Then, after seven states had seceded, the President, assuming them to be still in the Union, had ordered a blockade of their ports; and subsequently, when North Carolina and Virginia had resolved not to submit to the coercion of their sister states, he had ordered a blockade of their ports, in defiance of the provision of the Constitution that no preference should be given to the ports of one state over those of another. The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power of regulating commerce with foreign nations and between the states. The President had undertaken to regulate commerce with the seceding states. The fact of their secession does not affect the case. If this secession was legal, they are foreign states; if illegal, they are still members of the Union. In either case the Constitution had been violated. The President had also, in acknowledged violation of the law, increased the force of the army and of the navy. He had also, in suspending the writ of habeas corpus, assumed a power which the sovereign of Great Britain dared not arrogate, and, in consequence, John Merryman had, in Maryland, been seized by the mere warrant of a military officer, and been shut up in Fort McHenry.<sup>1</sup> Thus the President had usurped the military

power of the government by making war and raising armies; he had usurped the commercial power by regulating trade and commerce; he had usurped the judicial power by setting aside the writ of habeas corpus. From these general charges Mr. Polk proceeded to specific allegations of abuses committed in his own state, the general purport of which was to justify all the acts of Governor Jackson, and to condemn all those of the Federal government. He closed by declaring that no measure which had for its object the prosecution of the war should ever command his vote.

Mr. Powell, of Kentucky, followed upon the same side, recapitulating in substance the points made by Mr. Polk. "If," he added, "the people justly appreciated the liberties given them by their fathers, and intended to be secured to them by the Constitution, the officer who had committed these usurpations would be arraigned at the bar of the Senate, and be upon trial under impeachment." In reply to a definite question, he declared that he approved of the action of the governor of his state in refusing to send volunteers for the defense of the national capital.

Mr. Breckinridge followed. His speech was made on the 16th of July, at the moment when the army was setting out on its disastrous expedition to Bull Run. He recapitulated in better form the arguments of Polk and Powell; denied that one branch of the government could indemnify another for a violation of the Constitution or laws, and declared that, so far from his acts being approved, the President should be rebuked by a vote of both houses of Congress.

Mr. Bayard, of Delaware, continued the discussion. His speech was delivered on the 19th of July, while the two armies were confronting each other at Bull Run. He thought the only alternative was an assent to secession or civil war. The secession of a state was indeed a revolutionary act. If a single state should secede, restriction and coercion, not to the extent of arms, might be employed, and this, coupled with conciliation, might bring the state back. But the power to coerce a state by arms had not been given to the general government. We could only make war upon the seceding states for a breach of compact, or make peace with them, and recognize the government which they had founded. He preferred peaceful separation to civil war. Congress had indeed the power to make war; but revolutions must be treated according to their magnitude, and a revolution by eleven states could not be met by war if its object was the restoration of the Union, and its preservation as a representative republic. He was therefore in favor of an armistice and negotiations. If compromise could restore these states to the Union, he would compromise; if not, he would part with them in peace on a just and equitable settlement. If their terms were unjust they should be rejected. Passing over the war measures of the President, which he conceded had been substantially endorsed by the subsequent action of Congress in passing war bills, Mr. Bayard went on to argue at length against sanctioning the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. If that was done, the liberties of the country would be prostrated, and the rights of free citizens destroyed.

Among the supporters of the administration there was at first a wide difference of opinion in respect to this resolution. Some approved of every one of the specified acts; others objected to a part, and approved of the remainder. Mr. Trumbull would sustain or excuse all that had been done, but would not pronounce all the acts to have been legal. Mr. Sherman approved of all the acts as a matter of necessity, but would not as a senator vote that, in increasing the army and navy, and in suspending the writ of habeas corpus, the President had acted according to law. Mr. Howe would approve and sanction all these acts for the very reason that they had been done without direct sanction of law. Had there been law for them, the President would simply have done his duty and nothing more. As it was, he had taken upon himself the responsibility of saving the country without the sanction of express law, and in so doing he had acted more than well: he had acted bravely.

The debates on this resolution commenced near the beginning of the session, and were continued at intervals till the close. At first the opposition to the increase of the regular army and of the navy had been general, and amendments had been proposed providing that this increase should be only temporary. But the result of the battle of Bull Run, and the position of the Confederate forces almost in sight of the capital, convinced all Union men that a permanent addition to the army was a matter of necessity, and laws were accordingly passed sanctioning it. The theoretical objection to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus still existed in many minds, but just now this was of no practical importance, and was tacitly dropped. The proposition to approve all the other specified acts of the President was at the last moment appended as an additional section to the act which passed both houses increasing the pay of privates in the army.<sup>1</sup>

The measures proposed from time to time furnished occasion for debating every aspect of the insurrection and of the policy of the government. A resolution was offered to expel the senators from the seceding states who had not withdrawn at the last session, and whose names still appeared on

to whom this order was given reported that he was not permitted to enter the fort, and so could not serve the order. The judge said that if the general could be brought before him he should punish him by fine and imprisonment; but as it was beyond the power of the posse comitatus to enforce the order, all that he could do was to place upon record a formal report of his proceedings, and to call upon the President to perform his constitutional duty by enforcing the process of the court.

<sup>1</sup> Public Acts of the 37th Congress, chap. lxiii.—"An Act to increase the pay of the privates in the regular army and of the volunteers in the service of the United States, and for other purposes." Section 1 fixes the pay at \$13 a month. Section 2 provides that the pay shall commence from the day when they were organized and accepted by the governors of their respective states. Section 3. "All the acts, proclamations, and orders of the President of the United States, after the 4th of March, respecting the army and navy of the United States, and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers from the states, are in all respects legalized and made valid to the same intent, and with the same effect, as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States."

<sup>1</sup> This case, which was most frequently dwelt upon in the debates, derives its special importance from the action of Chief Justice Taney in relation to it. Merryman, who resided near Baltimore, was arrested on the 25th of May, by order of the military commander, on charge of holding a commission as lieutenant in a company having in their possession arms belonging to the United States, and avowing his purpose of armed hostility against the government. He was taken to Fort McHenry, then commanded by General Cadwalader. He applied to Mr. Taney, Chief Justice of the United States, for a writ of habeas corpus. This was duly issued. General Cadwalader, through one of his officers, declined to produce Mr. Merryman, and asked the court to postpone farther action until instructions could be received from the President. Judge Taney issued an order of attachment against General Cadwalader for contempt of court. The marshal



the roll of the Senate, on the ground that they had engaged in a conspiracy against the Union. Mr. Bayard opposed this. He knew of no conspiracy on the part of these senators. They claimed that states had a right to secede, and acted openly with their states. Supposing them to be wrong in their view, should senators be expelled for an error in point of law? Should they be condemned individually for the action of their states? It was sufficient to declare their seats vacant. Mr. Latham would vote for striking their names from the roll, but not for expulsion, for that implied a stain upon the personal character of the individual. He knew that at least two of these senators did not endorse the right of secession, but they did not think they should remain in the Senate of the United States after their state had seceded. The senators, ten in number, were expelled by a vote of 32 to 10. Mr. Bayard also opposed the admission of Willey and Carlisle, who claimed the seats from Virginia vacated by Mason and Hunter. By admitting them, he said, a government would be recognized for that state which was not the regular government. The term of Mr. Letcher as governor had not expired. If he was in rebellion, that did not authorize a portion of the people of Virginia to form a Legislature and to elect senators. There was no authority to create a new state out of a part of an existing one. To do so would be to abandon the whole form of our government, and recognize insurrection in a state for the purpose of overthrowing the government of that state by a very small minority of its people. The members were admitted, only five senators voting in the negative.

In advocating the approval of the acts of the President, the impetuous Baker, who was soon to seal his faith with his blood, had said, "I propose to lend the whole power of the country, arms, men, money, and place them in the hands of the President. He has asked for \$400,000,000; we propose to give him \$500,000,000. He has asked for 400,000 men; we propose to give him 500,000. If the emergency be still greater, I will cheerfully add a cipher to either of these figures. I do that as a measure of war; but I look forward to returning peace. Bayonets are sharp remedies, but they are very powerful. I believe that the Union sentiment will yet prevail in the Southern states. But it may be that, instead of finding within a year loyal states sending members to Congress and replacing their senators on this floor, we may have to reduce them to the condition of Territories, and send from Massachusetts or Illinois governors to control them. If need come, I would be willing to do it. I would risk even the stigma of being despotic and oppressive rather than risk the perpetuity of the union of these states. Fight the war through; accomplish a peace; make it so permanent that a boy may preserve it; and when you have done that, you have no more need of a standing army."

Senator Powell moved as an amendment to the Army Bill that no part of the army or navy should be used to subject or hold as a conquered province any state now or lately one of the United States, or in abolishing or interfering with slavery in any of the states. Sherman opposed the amendment as out of place, but he declared that there was no purpose in conducting the war to subjugate a state or to free a slave. Its purpose was to preserve the Union, to maintain the Constitution in all its clauses and guarantees, without change or limitation. Dixon said that if, in the progress of the war, it should turn out that either the government or slavery should be destroyed, then let slavery perish. Lane, of Kansas, affirmed that we would have stood by the compromises of the Constitution, and permitted slavery to exist where it was planted; but the struggle has been forced upon us, and he was willing that it should be followed to its logical conclusion, believing that the institution of slavery would not in any state survive the march of the Union armies. Browning, the successor of Douglas, avowed that the war was one of subjugation. Where all the authorities of a state were disloyal, and banded in treasonable confederation against the government, he was for subjugation, it mattered not whether it was called subjugation of a state or of its people. If the issue was forced upon us, he was for the government against slavery, and would vote for sweeping that last vestige of barbarism from the face of the earth.

In the House, on the 22d of July, the day after the battle of Bull Run, Mr. Crittenden offered a resolution declaring that the war had been forced upon the country by Southern Disunionists; that it was not waged by the Union for the purpose of conquest or subjugation, or for interfering with the institutions of the states, but to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and to preserve the Union, without impairing the equality and rights of the states; and that when these objects were attained, the war ought to cease. It passed with scarcely a show of opposition, only two votes being cast against it.<sup>1</sup> This resolution, in precisely the same words, was presented to the Senate by Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee. Mr. Polk proposed to amend it so as to read that "the war had been forced upon the country by the Disunionists of the Southern and Northern states." This was rejected by a vote of 33 to 4. This again brought up the question of subjugation. Mr. Trumbull disliked the use of that word in this connection. It had never been the purpose of the United States to subjugate or coerce states, but it was proposed to subjugate citizens who are standing out in defiance of the laws of the Union, and to coerce them into obedience to the laws of the Union. If the resolution meant that the war was not for this purpose, he was opposed to it. Mr. Fessenden said that the war was not carried on for



JOHN J. CRITTENDEN.

the purpose of subjugating the people of any state; but we had the definite purpose of defending the Constitution and the laws, and of putting down the revolt at any hazard, and it was for the South to say whether it was necessary to subjugate them in order to do it. If it were done, he would keep them subjugated no longer than was necessary for that purpose. Thus far it must go, and no farther.

Mr. Willey, of Virginia, said that there was a fear in his state that the design of the war was subjugation, to reduce the Old Dominion into a province. He did not believe that such was the object, and he was instructed and prepared to vote for every necessary measure and for every necessary man to carry on the war until the Constitution was vindicated and restored to its legitimate supremacy, and the Union re-established on a basis never to be overthrown. But if it was avowed that this was to be a war upon the domestic institutions of the South, and upon the rights of private property, every loyal arm on the soil of the Old Dominion would be instantly paralyzed. Pass the resolution, and vigor would be given to every loyal arm in the Old Dominion, and the friends of the Union would be multiplied by thousands.

Mr. Breckinridge would not vote for the resolution because he did not agree with the statement of facts contained in it. He believed there were errors on both sides. The present condition of affairs was owing to the refusal of the Senate to agree to any proposition of adjustment. The war was now prosecuted for objects of subjugation; and unless those states which had seceded would lay down their arms and surrender at discretion, the majority in Congress would listen to no terms of settlement.

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 30 to 5, Mr. Trumbull being the only Republican voting against it. On this question he found himself for once, though from very different reasons, voting with Breckinridge and Waldo Johnson; with Polk and Powell. This joint resolution, passing both houses of Congress almost unanimously, was accepted as an authoritative definition of the objects and limits of the war. Members on both sides had, in the heat of debate, loosely used the word subjugation; but, when it was fairly explained, it was found that by it those who supported the government meant merely bringing the revolted states under subjection to the recognized laws of the land. A small band in the Senate, most of whom were soon to take their proper place among the Confederates, refused to assent to this. In the popular branch of Congress, the Opposition members either voted for the proposition, or declined to vote at all. The two votes cast against it were from the Republican side.

In the House the debates took the same general turn as in the Senate. The same positions were taken, and enforced by similar arguments usually less elaborately presented. The attention of the House was mainly devoted to bills and resolutions pertaining to military and naval appropriations. The key-note to the predominant feeling in that body was struck by Mr. McClelland, a Democrat from Illinois, who offered a resolution that "this House hereby pledges itself to vote for any amount of money and any number of men which may be necessary to insure a speedy and effectual suppression of the rebellion, and the permanent restoration of the Federal authority every where within the limits and jurisdiction of the United States." This was adopted by a vote of 121 to 5. Taken in connection with the Crittenden resolution and the declarations embodied in the President's Message, it clearly defined the policy which all branches of the government, with rare unanimity, had at this time marked out in respect to the conduct of the war.

<sup>1</sup> "Resolved, That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the country by the Disunionists of the Southern states, now in revolt against the constitutional government and in arms around the capital; that in this national emergency Congress, banishing all feeling of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the whole country; that this war is not prosecuted upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights or established institutions of those states, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and all laws made in pursuance thereof, and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several states unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."





SALMON P. CHASE

The extra session of Congress closed on the 6th of August, having lasted only thirty-three days. In it were passed many laws of the highest importance. All the military acts and orders of the President were approved and legalized.<sup>1</sup> The President was authorized to accept the services of 500,000 volunteers for a term of not less than six months or more than three years, but to be dishanded at the close of the war.<sup>2</sup> A farther increase of eleven regiments was made to the regular army during the rebellion; the whole army to be reduced at its close to 25,000 men, unless otherwise ordered.<sup>3</sup> The pay of private soldiers, regulars and volunteers, was raised to thirteen dollars a month.<sup>4</sup> Provision was made for the increase of the navy. The secretary was authorized to hire, purchase, or contract for, and to furnish and arm, as many vessels as were necessary.<sup>5</sup> The construction of iron-clad ships and floating batteries was directed, and a committee appointed to investigate plans for such structures. From the report of this committee in favor of the "Monitor" grew up the whole class of turreted vessels which constitute the distinctive feature of our iron-clad navy.<sup>6</sup> The duties were remitted upon all arms imported by states.<sup>7</sup> Ten millions of dollars were appropriated for the purchase of arms;<sup>8</sup> and two millions for transporting arms and munitions to loyal citizens in insurgent states.<sup>9</sup> The states were indemnified for all expenses incurred by them in raising, transporting, paying, and subsisting troops.<sup>10</sup>

The entire appropriations made amounted to \$313,260,000, of which \$227,938,000 were for the army, and \$42,938,000 for the navy. To meet these expenditures recourse was had to an increase of the tariff, to direct taxes, to loans, and to the issue of treasury notes and bonds. An impost of 15 cents a pound was levied upon tea, and 4 cents upon coffee; these had hitherto been free. The duty on sugar was raised from three fourths of a

cent to 2 cents; that on silks, wines, and liquors was increased from 10 to 25 per cent.; upon most other articles the increase was about 10 per cent. A direct tax of \$20,000,000 was levied upon the states, besides a tax of 3 per cent. upon all incomes in excess of \$800 a year.<sup>1</sup> The Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to borrow \$250,000,000, issuing therefor, at discretion, bonds at 7 per cent. interest, payable in twenty years; or treasury notes of not less than \$50, at  $7\frac{3}{8}$  per cent., payable in three years; or treasury notes of \$5 and upward, payable on demand without interest; or similar notes at  $3\frac{6}{10}$  per cent., payable in one year.<sup>2</sup>

The President was also authorized, in cases where the revenue laws could not be executed at a port of entry, to remove the custom-house to any secure place in the district, on land or on shipboard; or, if necessary, to close the ports of entry in any district. He might also, by proclamation, declare any state or part of a state in insurrection, and prohibit commercial intercourse with it, or license it upon such terms as might be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.<sup>3</sup> A confiscation act was passed, providing that during the present or any future insurrection, after due proclamation by the President, all property used or intended to be used by the owner for aiding the insurrection should be lawful subject of capture and prize, and that it should be seized, confiscated, and condemned. This law specially provided that any owner of a slave, or any person having a legal claim to his services, who should require or permit such slave to take up arms against, or be in any way employed in military or naval service against the United States, should thereby forfeit all claim to him, any law of a state or of the United States to the contrary notwithstanding.<sup>4</sup>

This last provision, which met with strenuous opposition, and finally passed in the House only by a vote of 60 to 48, embodied the only direct action taken by Congress during the extra session upon the subject of slavery. The question, indeed, frequently came up incidentally in the course of debate, and members of both houses expressed their individual opinions upon it; but there was a manifest determination on the part of the administration and its supporters to take at this time no definite ground in relation to it. It will be the object of the next chapter to show how the government was subsequently forced from this position, and to set forth its whole course of action upon the question of slavery, which finally resulted in the proclamation for universal emancipation throughout the revolting states.

Congress thus placed the whole power of the nation at the disposal of the President for the suppression of the rebellion. The events of the last few months had proved that men would not be wanting, but the financial prospect gave occasion for the gravest apprehensions. The administration of Buchanan had left the treasury almost empty, and the credit of the government dubious. In December \$5,000,000 of government notes were put into market at the lowest rates of interest offered. There were offers at 24 and 36 per cent.; only half a million was bid for it as low as 12 per cent.; all above that were rejected. But the money was needed to pay the interest on public stocks, and banks and bankers took a million and a half more at that rate on condition that it should be used only for this purpose. In January \$5,000,000 more was borrowed at a little less than 11 per cent. In February \$8,000,000 of six per cent. stock was sold, averaging 90 per cent. The tariff bill of March, and the hopes of peace inspired by the President's inaugural, raised the credit of government somewhat, and Mr. Chase, now Secretary of the Treasury, was able to dispose of \$3,000,000 at 94 per cent. The attack upon Sumter brought down stocks again, and United States sixes sold at 83, while money could with difficulty be placed at 4 per cent.; \$5,000,000 in treasury notes, made receivable for customs, was at length, by great exertions, sold to banks and bankers at par, which enabled the administration to go on a few weeks. Then, at the close of May, a new loan was offered, and \$9,000,000 was secured at from 85 to 93 per cent. Just before the meeting of Congress \$5,000,000 more was borrowed for 60 days on pledge of government notes. When Congress met, Mr. Chase estimated the probable expenditures of the year at about \$320,000,000. To meet this he proposed to raise \$80,000,000 by imposts and direct taxation, and the remaining \$240,000,000 by loan. Congress passed the necessary bills, and the loan was thrown into the market. The banks of the three great commercial cities agreed to take, between August and December, \$150,000,000. This would enable the treasury to meet the demands upon it until Congress should again assemble.

Our foreign relations meanwhile were a subject of uneasiness. The Con-

<sup>1</sup> Laws of the 37th Congress, Extra Session, chap. lxiii.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., chap. xxiv. <sup>3</sup> Ibid., chap. lxiii. <sup>4</sup> Ibid., chaps. xliii., liii. <sup>5</sup> Ibid., chap. xxxviii.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., chap. i. <sup>7</sup> Ibid., chap. xl. <sup>8</sup> Ibid., chap. xxviii. <sup>9</sup> Ibid., chap. xxi.

<sup>1</sup> Laws of the 37th Congress, Extra Session, chap. xlv. <sup>2</sup> Ibid., chaps. iii., xxxi. <sup>3</sup> Ibid., chap. lx.


<sup>4</sup> Ibid., chaps. v., xlv.



federates had confidently relied upon a prompt recognition of their independence by the great powers of Europe, and upon their armed intervention, if necessary, to put an end to the blockade. They believed that in their monopoly of the production of cotton they possessed the means compelling this action. The Federal government, on the other hand, directed its ministers to urge upon the governments to which they were accredited that the present disturbances had their origin only in popular passions excited under novel circumstances, and of a transient character; that it was for the interest of the world that our political system should remain unaltered; that any advantage which any foreign nation might derive from a connection with any discontented portion of our people would be ephemeral, overbalanced by the evils which it would suffer from a disseverance of the Union, whose policy had always been, and must hereafter be, to maintain peace, liberal commerce, and cordial amity with all other nations, and to favor the establishment of well-ordered government over the whole American continent; and that any thing which should induce discord or anarchy among us would tend to disturb the existing systems of government in other parts of the world, and arrest the progress of improvement and civilization. Our ministers were especially instructed to assure the governments to which they were sent that no foreign interference would be admitted in this or in any other controversy in which the government of the United States might be engaged with any portion of the American people; that foreign intervention would oblige us to treat as enemies those who should undertake it as allies of the insurrectionary party, and all the more so if such intervention should be undertaken by a combination of several European states; that the people of the United States deemed the Union, which would then be at stake, worth all the sacrifices of a contest with the world in arms, should such a contest prove inevitable.

Our ministers were also instructed to agree to the declaration of the Paris Conference of 1856, and enter into treaties in accordance with it. This declaration set forth, on the part of all the powers entering into it, that "Privateering is and remains abolished. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under enemy's flag. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." The non-maritime powers deferred their action to that of Great Britain and France. The preliminary negotiations opened in May. On the 18th of July Lord John Russell wrote to our minister, Mr. Adams, that her majesty's ministers would advise the queen to conclude such a treaty with the United States as soon as a similar one had been agreed upon by them with the Emperor of the French, so that the two might be signed simultaneously. Ten days later, upon learning that negotiations with the French government were completed, Russell renewed his declaration, adding parenthetically that the agreement must be wholly prospective. This proviso was subsequently explained to mean that the British government would undertake nothing which "should have any bearing, direct or indirect, upon the internal differences prevailing in the United States." The reasons given for this reservation were that the Confederates had been recognized as belligerents, and so that, by the general law of nations, they might arm privateers; the Federal government had designated such privateers as pirates, and any nation which had signed a convention with the United States declaring that privateering was abolished, might be called upon to treat Confederate privateers as pirates. To accept this condition would be to sacrifice the very object for which we had consented to recede from our former refusal to agree to the declaration of the Paris Congress. We had refused to accede to the abolition of privateering on the ground that it was not our policy to maintain large armies and navies. When we went to war, it was urged, we depended on our people for defense on land, and on our ship-owners for defense on the water. England and France maintained vast fleets of public vessels to destroy the property of their enemies, which was precisely the work done by the vessels which we licensed as privateers. Why ask us to abandon our system of offense and defense while they maintained theirs? If they would make private property exempt from capture at sea by national vessels, we would consent to give up privateering. France, Russia, and the other powers of Europe were in favor of this modification of maritime law, but Great Britain would not accede to it, and the United States refused to become a party in the convention abolishing privateering. Now, in order to protect our commerce from Confederate privateers, we were disposed to accede to the treaty; but the British government insisted upon a proviso which expressly legalized Confederate privateers. To assent to this would also be to permit a foreign power to take cognizance of and adjust its relations upon internal and domestic differences assumed to exist among us. The proviso would, moreover, be unequal in its operation. Great Britain could modify her obligations to us on account of our internal difficulties, while our obligations to her would not be affected by any internal difficulties which might arise in any part of the British empire. Ireland might rise, India revolt, Canada or Australia secede from England, and our obligations to Britain would remain unchanged. The proviso was clearly inadmissible, and the negotiations were abandoned.

The Confederates had sent to Europe three commissioners, Yancey, Mann, and Rost, to endeavor to effect the recognition of their government. P. A. Rost was a judge in Louisiana, and had taken no prominent part in general politics. Dudley Mann had formerly been employed as diplomatic agent in Europe of the Federal government, and had of late years been engaged in unsuccessful efforts to open a direct trade between Virginia and Europe. William L. Yancey, of Alabama, was one of the earliest advocates of disunion. Earnest and eloquent, thoroughly sincere in his attachment to



WILLIAM L. YANCEY.

what he conceived the interests and rights of his section, and with a private character beyond reproach, no man out of the Senate of the United States had done so much to prepare the Southern mind for secession. In the presidential election of 1860 he took the lead in his state of the supporters of Mr. Breckinridge, who carried Alabama by a majority of 8000 over both Bell and Douglas. When a portion of the delegates in the Convention which passed the Ordinance of Secession declared that their constituents would not yield to it unless it was submitted to the popular vote, he denounced them as traitors and rebels who should be coerced into submission. On the 4th of May these commissioners waited upon Lord John Russell, the British Minister for Foreign Affairs, to lay before him a statement of the causes which had led to secession, and to urge the recognition of the Confederacy by Great Britain. The minister refused to communicate with them in his official capacity, but received them unofficially. Mr. Dallas, at that time our minister to Great Britain, was instructed, in case this unofficial intercourse was continued, to desist from any intercourse, official or unofficial, with the British government. The commissioners, at intervals, sent letters to the British government, but received only the briefest replies, and a final notice that no official communications would be entered into with them.

The British and French governments agreed to act together in regard to our affairs, with the expectation that all the other nations of Europe would concur in whatever measures they should adopt on the subject of recognition. They decided to recognize the Confederate States as a belligerent entitled to all the rights of war, and to maintain a strict neutrality between the contending parties. The queen's proclamation of neutrality was issued on the 13th of May. It commenced by reciting that, "Whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced between the government of the United States of America and certain states styling themselves 'the Confederate States of America;' and whereas we, being at peace with the government of the United States, have declared our royal determination to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest between the said contending parties," therefore all British subjects are warned "to abstain from violating or contravening either the laws and statutes of the realm in this behalf, or the laws of nations in relation thereto, as they will answer for the contrary at their peril." The laws of the realm in this respect are embodied in the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819. This was quoted at length. In verbose and clumsy legal phraseology,<sup>1</sup> it provides, in substance, that any British subject who,

<sup>1</sup> As an illustration of the verbosity of this act, take the following sentence, which is repeated in substance seven times: "If any natural born subject of his majesty, his heirs and successors, without the leave or license of his majesty, his heirs or successors, for that purpose first had and obtained under the sign manual of his majesty, his heirs or successors, or signified by Order in Council or by proclamation of his majesty, his heirs or successors, shall take or accept, or shall agree to take or accept any military commission, or shall otherwise enter into the military service as a commissioned or non-commissioned officer, or shall enlist or enter himself to enlist, or shall agree to enlist or to enter himself to serve as a soldier, or to be employed, or shall serve in any warlike or military operation in the service of, or for, or under, or in aid of any foreign prince, state, potentate, colony, province or part of any province or people, or of any person or persons exercising or assuming to exercise the powers of government in or over any foreign country, colony, province, or part of any province or people, either as an officer or soldier or in any other military capacity," etc., "he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon being convicted thereof, upon any information or indictment, shall be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of them, at the discretion of the court before which such offender shall be convicted."



without royal license, shall enter or engage to enter the military service of any foreign ruler or nation, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by fine and imprisonment. That no person within the British dominions shall, without royal license, equip, fit out, or arm any vessel to be employed for hostile purposes by any foreign ruler or nation; the offender to be punishable by fine and imprisonment, and the vessel, with all its appurtenances, to be seized and forfeited. That no person within the British dominions shall, without royal license, in any way augment the warlike force of any vessel of war belonging to any foreign ruler or people, under like penalty. Any person committing any of these offenses, or endeavoring to break any lawful blockade, or conveying articles contraband of war to either belligerent, is liable to the penalties prescribed in this statute, and also to those imposed by the law of nations. Any persons who commit these offenses are warned that they "do so at their peril and of their own wrong, and that they will in no wise obtain any protection from us against any liability or penal consequences, but will, on the contrary, incur our high displeasure by such misconduct." How this enactment and the proclamation based upon it was evaded will appear hereafter. This proclamation was followed by a circular to the governors of the different colonies, stating that, in order to give full effect to this principle of neutrality, her majesty had been pleased to interdict the armed ships, and also the privateers of both parties, from carrying prizes made by them into the ports or waters of the kingdom or its colonies.

The French proclamation was sharp and decisive. The Emperor, it said, "taking into consideration the state of peace which exists between France and the United States, has resolved to observe a strict neutrality in the struggle between the government of the Union and the states which propose to form a separate confederation." No vessel of war or privateer of either belligerent would be permitted to enter or stay with prizes in any French port for more than twenty-four hours, except in case of absolute necessity; no sale of prize goods would be allowed in French ports or roadsteads; every Frenchman was prohibited from accepting a commission from either party to arm vessels of war, to accept letters of marque, or to assist in any way in equipping or arming any vessel of war or privateer for either party; every Frenchman, whether residing at home or abroad, was prohibited from entering into the naval or military service of either belligerent; every Frenchman must abstain from any act in violation of French or international law which might be considered hostile to either party, and contrary to the neutrality which the Emperor had resolved to maintain. No Frenchman contravening the present enactment would have any claim to protection from his government against any acts or measures, whatever they might be, which the belligerents might exercise or decree.


The decree of the Spanish government was to the same effect, with the additional provisos that "transportation under the Spanish flag of all articles of commerce is guaranteed, except when they are directed to blockaded ports," and "the transportation of effects of war is forbidden, as well as the carrying of papers or communications for belligerents." The Portuguese decree was of the same tenor.

With the exception of the recognition of the Confederates as belligerents, the position of the European powers toward the United States during the first months of the war was not unfriendly. Some minor questions sprung up with Great Britain growing out of the blockade, but they were adjusted without much difficulty. But in November an affair occurred which threatened to involve us in actual war with Great Britain. The defeat at Bull Run, the inactivity of the Federal forces which ensued, and the increasing stringency of the blockade, which began to cause great uneasiness in Europe in relation to the supply of cotton, led the Confederate government to hope that there was a prospect of securing its recognition by Great Britain and

France, and thereby, in the end, to obtain foreign interposition in their favor. For this purpose it was determined to send commissioners of higher rank and wider reputation than those already on the ground. The choice fell upon James M. Mason, of Virginia, who was accredited to Great Britain, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, to France. Mason had been a member of the Senate of the United States since 1847, and had been for some years chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. This position gave him a kind of superintendence over the proceedings of the State Department. In 1857 he visited the East, where he was received with high honor. Upon occasion of the inauguration of the statue of Warren upon Bunker Hill, he was introduced by Mr. Winthrop as "a senator from the Old Dominion whose name is associated in more than one generation with eminent service in his native state and in the national councils." In reply he said, "I shall tell it in Old Virginia, when I return to her hallowed land, that I found the spirit of Massachusetts as buoyant, as patriotic, as completely filled with the emotions that should govern patriotism, when I visited Bunker Hill, as it was when that battle was fought." Thoroughly devoted to the dogma of state supremacy, he was yet among the last finally to resolve to abandon the Union. He retained his seat in the Senate to the close of Buchanan's administration, and during the executive session which followed Lincoln's accession; but during these months he strenuously opposed every measure looking toward strengthening the national government for the impending struggle. When his state at last seceded he went with her, and, failing to appear at the extra session, he was among the senators who were formally expelled. Slidell, though born in New York, had early taken up his residence in Louisiana. He represented that state in Congress in 1843, and was subsequently appointed minister to Mexico. He was elected to the Senate in 1853, and was a member when Louisiana seceded. His long residence in New Orleans, and the acquaintance thereby gained with the French language and character, fitted him for the position to which he was now appointed as commissioner to France.

Mason and Slidell, with their secretaries McFarland and Eustis, with several women of their families, embarked at Charleston late in October. Eluding the blockade, they reached Cardenas, in Cuba, and thence proceeded to Havana, where they were received with great consideration. Here they awaited the arrival of the British merchant-steamers Trent, plying between Southampton and the West India Islands, and carrying the British mails. They embarked on the morning of the 7th of November. The next day the Trent was intercepted by the American steamer San Jacinto, commanded by Captain Wilkes, and brought to by a shot across her bow. Boats were sent from the San Jacinto to the Trent, demanding the surrender of the commissioners and their secretaries. The commander of the Trent and the British mail agent protested against this. Mason and Slidell declared that they would not leave the Trent unless compelled to do so by force. A scene of confusion ensued. A daughter of Slidell struck one of the American officers in the face. They persisted in carrying out their orders. The commander of the Trent would not give up the men, nor would they give themselves up except to force. The force required was merely technical. It consisted in the display of strength, and the determination to use it, which would render resistance unavailing. This was at hand, and after a stormy scene of two hours' duration, the commissioners and secretaries, with their baggage, were transferred to the San Jacinto. Their families, declining to accompany them, were left on board the Trent, which pursued her voyage to England. The San Jacinto proceeded to the United States with the prisoners, who were placed in Fort Warren, near Boston.

The intelligence of the capture of these men was received with great rejoicing in the United States. The Secretary of the Navy wrote to the captain of the San Jacinto approving of his course, and in his report reiterated



JAMES M. MASON.



JOHN SLIDELL.





CHARLES WILKES

the approval, saying that "the prompt and decisive action of Captain Wilkes on this occasion merited and received the emphatic approval of the Department," and that if he exhibited a too generous forbearance in not also capturing the Trent, it might be excused, but must not constitute a precedent for similar cases in the future. In the House of Representatives a resolution was adopted at the opening of the session, tendering the thanks of Congress to Captain Wilkes "for his brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct," and resolutions were adopted requesting the President of the United States to order Mason and Slidell to be confined in cells as convicted felons, in return for the similar treatment inflicted on Colonels Corcoran and Wood, captured at Bull Run, who had been so confined by the Confederate government as hostages for the crew of a privateer who had been thus shut up on charge of piracy. In the Senate the vote of thanks was referred to the Naval Committee, and received no farther action. A fortnight afterward, in the House, Mr. Vallandigham, who before and after was among the foremost opponents of the administration, offered a resolution declaring that it was the duty of the President to maintain the stand taken by the House; but circumstances had in the mean while arisen which changed the aspect of the case, and this resolution was referred to a committee, by whom it was never called up.

In Europe the seizure of these men was looked upon in a very different light. It was considered as alike an affront to the British flag and a violation of the law of nations. Our government foresaw from the beginning that the British government would not acquiesce in this proceeding. On the 30th of November the Secretary of State wrote to Mr. Adams, our minister at London, instructing him that Captain Wilkes had acted without instructions from the government, and that therefore the subject was free from the embarrassment which would have resulted had the act been specially directed. On the same day the British foreign minister, now become Earl Russell, forwarded a dispatch to Lord Lyons, minister at Washington, expressing the belief that the officer who committed the aggression had either misconceived his instructions or had acted wholly upon his own responsibility; but, in either case, the British government could not allow such an affront to pass without full reparation, and that the only satisfactory redress would be the liberation of the four prisoners, their delivery into the hands of Lord Lyons, that they might again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which had been committed. This dispatch was to be communicated to the American government; but accompanying it was a private note to Lord Lyons, instructing him, in case a delay should be asked by the American government in order that the matter might be deliberately considered, to consent to wait ten days; but if, at the end of that time, the demands of the British government were not complied with, the minister was directed to leave Washington and repair to London with all the members and archives of the legation. This private instruction was not probably communicated to our government; but the official demand, though cautiously worded, was clearly an ultimatum of the British government, who meanwhile, by dispatching troops to Canada, and strengthening its naval force in the West Indies, made preparations looking to war. The French government agreed with the British, and M. Mercier, the French minister at Washington, was instructed to lay its opinion before the government of the United States, as one in which all neutrals were deeply concerned. The President and Secretary of State saw clearly that the demand must be complied with, or we must become involved in a war with Great Britain, and probably also with France; for, in case of war, the Confederate government would be recognized at once by Great Britain, and the two powers had agreed to act in concert.

Fortunately, the government of the United States had not committed itself in the matter, and was thus free to act in any manner without derogation from its honor and dignity. The question turned upon the provision of international law that vessels of neutrals conveying any thing contraband

of war belonging to a belligerent forfeit their character of neutrality and render themselves liable to seizure and condemnation. It has never been definitely settled what things are contraband of war. Arms, munitions of war, and soldiers are acknowledged to be so in all cases; provisions and articles which are used both in war and peace, such as materials for ship-building and coal, are considered contraband only when directly designed for the naval or military service of a belligerent. The question as to persons other than soldiers, and dispatches of the belligerent governments, has never been authoritatively settled. The decree of the Spanish government expressly forbade the carrying of papers or communications from belligerents. The orders of the Confederate government to the privateers which it authorized say that "neutral vessels conveying enemies' dispatches forfeit their neutral character, and are liable to capture and condemnation; but this rule does not apply to neutral vessels hearing dispatches from the public ministers of the enemy residing in neutral countries." The decision of our government was given in a long and elaborate dispatch from Mr. Seward, in which he maintained that ministers and their dispatches, as well as soldiers, were contraband; that Captain Wilkes had a right to search the Trent and capture these persons and their dispatches; but that all these proceedings must be conducted in a manner allowed and recognized by the law of nations. This law does not permit the captor to judge of the rights of the case; he must send the vessel which he charges to have forfeited its neutrality before a prize court for judicial examination. Captain Wilkes failed to do this, and permitted the Trent to proceed on her voyage, and by so doing effectually prevented the judicial examination which might have resulted in her release, including that of his prisoners. By this omission he vitiated the whole transaction, and for this error the British government had a right to expect the same reparation which we should have expected in a similar case. In coming to this conclusion, Mr. Seward said that he was really maintaining, not an exclusively British interest, but an old, honored, and cherished American cause. The principles were laid down in 1804 by James Madison, then Secretary of State, in instructions given to James Monroe, our minister to England. If he decided this case in favor of the American government, he must reverse its essential policy; if he maintained the principles and adhered to the policy, he must surrender the case itself. The American government could not deny the justice of the claim presented to it. The four persons held in custody would be cheerfully liberated, and Lord Lyons was requested to indicate a place and time for receiving them. It had previously been stated that Captain Wilkes had acted without the orders or knowledge of the government, which had neither meditated, nor practiced, nor approved any deliberate wrong.


The British minister accordingly dispatched a steamer to the neighborhood of Boston; Mason and Slidell, with their secretaries, were placed on board and formally delivered to the British government, and the steamer conveyed them to England.

But, while accepting the unconditional liberation of the prisoners and the accompanying explanation of the American government as the reparation which the British government had a right to demand, Earl Russell differed from Mr. Seward in his exposition of many points of international law, and in a paper equally elaborate with that of Mr. Seward proceeded to state



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wherein those differences consisted. It must be admitted that in view of positive law, so far as it is definitely settled, of the deductions fairly to be drawn in respect to other cases not specifically provided for, and of the general welfare of nations, to subserve which is the aim of international law, the general interpretation of Earl Russell must be accepted in preference to that of Mr. Seward.<sup>1</sup>

The affair of the Trent having been thus adjusted, the relations between the United States and Great Britain continued on a friendly footing. The British government, having occasion shortly after to send troops to Canada, asked permission to land them at Portland, and thence transport them by railway across the State of Maine. This was granted, and the British troops were saved from the risk and suffering of a wintry voyage up the St. Lawrence. Some few minor questions arose, but none of sufficient importance

<sup>1</sup> The following, in a gently abridged form, gives the essential points of these two elaborate papers:

Mr. Seward argues: Persons as well as property may become contraband, since the word means "contrary to proclamation, illegal, unlawful." It is agreed on all hands that persons in the naval or military service of the enemy are contrabands. Vattel says, "War allows us to cut off from the enemy all his resources, and to hinder him from sending ministers to solicit assistance;" and Sir William Scott says, "You may stop the ambassador of your enemy on his passage;" and, "Dispatches are not less clearly contraband, and the bearers or couriers who undertake to carry them fall under the same condemnation."

Earl Russell rejoins: The neutral country has a right to preserve its relations with the enemy, and you are not at liberty to conclude that any communication between them can partake in any degree of the nature of hostility against you. The interests of the neutral state may require that the intercourse of correspondence should not be altogether interdicted. That might amount to a declaration that an ambassador from an enemy shall not reside in a neutral state; for to what useful purpose could he reside there if he had no opportunities of communicating with his own government? Hence the practice of nations has allowed neutral states to receive ministers from belligerents and the means of immediate negotiations with them. Thus Sir William Scott, when England and France were at war, decided in the case of an American vessel—the *Caroline*—that the carrying of dispatches from the French minister in America to the French government was not a violation of neutrality, and that such dispatches were not contraband of war; and these principles must extend to ambassadors and agents as well as to dispatches. Mr. Seward, he says, misapprehends the quotations which he makes from Sir William Scott, whose sole object was to explain the extent and limits of the doctrine of the inviolability of ambassadors in virtue of that character. You may stop the ambassador of the enemy when on his passage, but when he has reached his destination and taken upon him the functions of his office he is entitled to peculiar privileges. He indeed says that civil functionaries, if sent for a purpose intimately connected with hostile operations, may fall under the same rule with persons whose employment is directly military. The dictum of Vattel is in these words: "You may, moreover, attack and arrest the people of the enemy wherever you have the right to exercise acts of hostility. Not merely may you lawfully refuse passage to the ministers whom the enemy sends to other sovereigns, but you may even arrest them if they undertake to pass secretly and without permission into the places of which you are master," citing, by way of example, the seizure of the French ambassador to Prussia when France being at war with England, he attempted to pass through Hanover, which was then ruled by the King of England. The rule, as laid down by Earl Russell, is that "you may stop an enemy's ambassador in any place of which you yourself are the master, or in any other place where you have a right to exercise acts of hostility. Your own territory or ships of your country are places of which you are yourself the master. The enemy's territory or the enemy's ships are places in which you have a right to exercise acts of hostility. Neutral vessels guilty of no violation of the laws of neutrality are places where you have no right to exercise acts of hostility." The doctrine that ambassadors are contraband being denied, the conclusion is "that an ambassador sent to a neutral power is inviolable on the high seas and in neutral waters while under the protection of the neutral flag."

Mr. Seward, proceeding from the point that dispatches and ambassadors are contraband, assumes that "the circumstance that the Trent was proceeding from one neutral port to another

to interrupt the harmony between the two nations. The American government tacitly withdrew its demand that the British minister should hold no intercourse, even unofficial, with the Confederate commissioners; and the British government endeavored in good faith to maintain its position of neutrality between those whom it had recognized as belligerents. It, however, declined to pass any new laws bearing upon the case, and the existing laws were so clumsily framed that the Confederates were subsequently able, by evading them, to fit out several cruisers in British ports to prey upon American commerce.

Congress convened in regular session on the 2d of December. The President's Message was devoted to a review of the condition of the country and the progress of the war. Our foreign relations had occasioned deep solic-

neutral port does not modify the right of the belligerent captor," and that consequently Captain Wilkes had the right, by the law of nations, to detain and search the Trent.

Earl Russell controverts this absolutely. He says, "It is of the very essence of the definition of contraband that the goods [or persons] should have a hostile and not a neutral destination. The articles must be taken in the actual prosecution of the voyage to an enemy's port." If indeed the real destination of the vessel be to an enemy's port, the pretense that it is to a neutral one will not protect her in conveying contraband articles; but in this case the Trent was *bond fide* on a voyage from one neutral port to another, and, therefore, had she on board articles in themselves contraband of war, she was not liable to capture. He points out at some length the injurious consequences which would result from the doctrines advocated by Mr. Seward. Thus: If, during the late war with Russia, a Russian minister to America was in an American ship bound from Hamburg to New York, the vessel might have been captured, taken to Portsmouth, and condemned; or a neutral packet, plying between Dover and Calais, with a Confederate agent on board, might be captured by a Federal cruiser and sent to New York; or a Cunard steamer, on its way from Halifax to Liverpool, with dispatches on board from Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, might be arrested by a Confederate privateer.

The essential point of Mr. Seward's dispatch is that the seizure of Mason and Slidell was vitiated only by the failure of Captain Wilkes to seize the vessel also and send her before a prize court, and that if this had been done the transaction would have been strictly legal.

Earl Russell replies to this, that, "in view of the erroneous principles asserted by Mr. Seward, and the consequences they involve, her majesty's government think it necessary to declare that they would not acquiesce in the capture of any British merchant-ship under circumstances similar to those of the Trent; and that the fact of its being brought before a prize court, though it would alter the character, would not diminish the gravity of the offense against the law of nations which would thereby be committed."

Mr. Seward closed his argument by adding: "In coming to my conclusion [to liberate the four prisoners], I have not forgotten that if the safety of this Union required the detention of the captured persons, it would be the right and duty of this government to detain them; but the effectual check and waning proportions of the existing insurrection, as well as the comparative unimportance of the captured persons themselves, when dispassionately weighed, happily forbid me from resorting to that defense."

Earl Russell replies to this: "Mr. Seward does not here assert any right founded on international law, however inconvenient or irritating to neutral nations; he entirely loses sight of the vast difference which exists between the exercise of an extreme right and the commission of an unquestionable wrong. His frankness compels me to be equally open, and to inform him that Great Britain could not have submitted to the perpetration of that wrong, however flourishing might have been the insurrection at the South, and however important the persons captured might have been. Happily, all danger of hostile collision on this subject has been avoided. It is the earnest hope of her majesty's government that similar dangers, if they should arise, may be averted by peaceful negotiations conducted in the spirit which befits the organs of two great nations."

\* Such a capture would have been in accordance with the rule quoted above in the text, laid down by the Confederate government for its privateers. According to this, a neutral vessel renders herself liable to capture and condemnation if she carries dispatches from an enemy, except in the case of those from a minister residing in a neutral state—those sent to him by his government being contraband.



tude. A nation divided at home is exposed to disrespect from abroad; one party or the other was sure to invoke foreign intervention, and other nations were likely to accept the invitation. But the disloyal citizens of the United States had met with less encouragement than they expected. Even had foreign nations been disposed to act solely for the restoration of commerce, and especially for the acquisition of cotton, they had not been convinced that this end would be attained by the destruction of the Union; they perceived that a strong nation promised more durable peace and more reliable commerce than it would when broken into fragments. But as the integrity of our country depends upon ourselves and not upon foreign nations, we should make ample provision for the maintenance of our national defenses, especially those of our sea-coast, lakes, and great rivers. A military railroad should be constructed, connecting the loyal portions of Tennessee, North Carolina, and Kentucky with the other faithful parts of the Union. To protect our commerce, the commanders of sailing vessels, especially in the Eastern seas, should be authorized to recapture prizes which had been taken by pirates, and consular courts should be empowered to adjudicate respecting such prizes. There was no reason why the independence of Hayti and Liberia should not be acknowledged. Civil justice had been suppressed in the seceding states, in which there were two hundred millions of dollars due from insurgent to loyal citizens; but there were no courts to enforce these claims. He had been urged to establish military courts to administer summary justice in such cases, wherever our armies took possession of revolted districts; but he had declined to do so because he was unwilling to go beyond the most evident necessity in the unusual exercise of his power. He urged Congress to establish temporary tribunals for this purpose. The message embodied a brief dissertation upon the subject of capital and labor. It had been assumed on one side that labor is available only in connection with capital; that nobody would work unless some capitalist induced him to do so; and the question had been mooted whether it was better that capital should hire laborers, inducing them to work of their own consent, or should buy them, forcing them to work without their consent, it being assumed in either case that the position of the laborer was one fixed for life. The President combated this whole theory. Labor, he said, was prior to and the source of capital, and there was no fixed position of laborer and capitalist. A large majority neither work for others nor have others working for them; many both work themselves and hire others to work for them, and the laborer of to-day is often the employer of to-morrow. The message contained two pregnant paragraphs bearing upon the question of slavery. These will be considered in the following chapter, in which the course of the government upon this subject will be narrated.

The army, according to the report of the Secretary of War, consisted, exclusive of 77,875 volunteers for three months, of 660,971 men. Of these, 640,637 were volunteers for three years or for the war, and 20,334 regulars. The several arms of the service, volunteers and regulars, were distributed as follows: Infantry, 568,383; Cavalry, 59,398; Artillery, 24,688; Rifles and Sharpshooters, 8395; Engineers, 107. For the ensuing year appropriations were asked for a force of 500,000 men. The cavalry force was said to be larger than was necessary, and measures would be taken for its reduction. The secretary believed that "the army now assembled on the banks of the Potomac would, under its able leader, soon make such a demonstration as would soon re-establish the authority of the government throughout all the rebellious states."

A few weeks after the meeting of Congress Mr. Cameron resigned his post as Secretary of War, and was succeeded by Edwin M. Stanton, who had been for a short time attorney general under Mr. Buchanan. Much dissatisfaction had been expressed with the administration of Mr. Cameron. It was evident, from a report of a committee of Congress, that gross frauds had been perpetrated, but it should be borne in mind that the whole department had to be created almost anew, and that its operations had to be intrusted in a great measure to untried men. The retiring secretary retained the personal confidence of the President, who nominated him minister to Russia. Subsequently the House of Representatives passed a vote censuring the late secretary for having intrusted to a Mr. Cummings the control of large sums of money, and authority to purchase military supplies without restriction, and requiring from him no guarantee for the faithful performance of his duties, and for having involved the government in a vast number of contracts with persons not legitimately engaged in business pertaining to the subject-matter of such contracts. The President at once assumed the entire responsibility of the transaction for himself and for his cabinet.

The Secretary of the Navy furnished a comprehensive statement of the strength of the navy and of its operations since July. It had blockaded the insurgent ports along a coast of nearly 3000 miles, had captured 153 vessels which had attempted to run the blockade, and had achieved signal success at Hatteras and Port Royal. The number of seamen in the service had been raised since March from 7600 to 22,000. When all the vessels pur-



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chased and building were armed and equipped, we should have 264 vessels of all classes, mounting 2557 guns. Of these, 76 vessels, with 1783 guns, belonged to the old navy; 136 vessels, with 518 guns, had been purchased, and 52 vessels, with 256 guns, had been constructed. There were in all 163 steamers of all classes, with something more than 1000 guns.

The report of the Secretary of the Treasury was anxiously looked for, as indicating the financial condition of the government and the policy to be adopted. The estimated receipts for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1862, were in round numbers \$329,000,000, of which only \$37,000,000 were from customs and other usual sources, \$20,000,000 from direct taxes, and the remaining \$272,000,000 from loans already authorized. The entire expenditures of the year were estimated at \$543,000,000, leaving \$214,000,000 to be provided for by new loans. The secretary hoped the war would be brought to a close before midsummer, in which case the amount asked for would be amply sufficient; but if it should be protracted another year on the present scale, the expenditures would be \$475,000,000, and the receipts \$96,000,000. To raise this sum it would be necessary to increase the duty on tea, sugar, and coffee; to impose a direct tax of \$20,000,000 on the loyal states, besides an income tax of \$10,000,000, and a tax of \$20,000,000 on liquors, tobacco, carriages, bank-notes, and other evidences of debt, making a direct tax in all of \$50,000,000. There would then remain \$379,000,000 to be procured by loans in some shape. The loans for the two years would then be \$655,000,000. The whole amount of the public debt on the 1st of July, 1863, would, upon this estimate, be \$900,000,000, a sum which the country could pay in twenty years as easily as it did the debt of \$127,000,000 which existed in 1816, at the close of the war with Great Britain. It was proposed to raise a part of this loan indirectly by means of a national currency. There are, said the secretary, in circulation in the loyal states \$150,000,000 of bank-notes, which is actually a loan without interest from the people to the banks. This may be transferred to the government in either of two ways. The notes may, by means of taxation upon them, be gradually withdrawn from circulation, and their place supplied by United States Notes, payable on demand. This was partially attained by the Demand Notes of the treasury; but this mode was, in his opinion, liable to some grave objections. That which he suggested was to issue to individuals and associations notes redeemable by the proposed institutions themselves, secured by a deposit of United States stocks and an adequate provision of specie, the notes to be receivable for all government dues except customs. These notes, he thought, would form the safest currency which the nation had ever enjoyed, for they would be of equal and uniform value in every part of the Union. In a short time the whole circulating medium of the country, whether notes or coin, would bear the national impress, and its amount, being easily ascertainable, would not be likely to be increased beyond the wants of business. As the wants of the government increased with the protraction of the war, both these measures and several others were substantially adopted. The Demand Notes of the treasury, or "Greenbacks," as they were usually denominated, were first issued in large quantities, and became at first the common circulating medium. The establishment of national banks, based upon deposits of United States stocks, followed later.

<sup>1</sup> The volunteers for the war were furnished from the several states and territories in the following proportions:

California.....	4,688	New Jersey.....	9,342
Connecticut.....	12,400	New York.....	100,200
Delaware.....	2,000	Ohio.....	81,205
Illinois.....	80,000	Pennsylvania.....	94,760
Indiana.....	57,332	Rhode Island.....	5,898
Iowa.....	19,800	Vermont.....	8,000
Kentucky.....	15,000	Virginia.....	12,000
Maine.....	14,239	Wisconsin.....	14,153
Maryland.....	7,000	Kansas.....	5,000
Massachusetts.....	26,760	Colorado.....	1,000
Michigan.....	28,550	Nebraska.....	2,500
Minnesota.....	4,160	Nevada.....	1,000
Missouri.....	22,130	New Mexico.....	1,000
New Hampshire.....	9,600	District of Columbia.....	1,000



It was evident from the opening of the session that a great change had taken place in the views of Congress during the four months since the close of the extra session. The strength of the insurrection had proved far greater than had been anticipated, and it was perceived that the nation was engaged in a struggle for existence which would call for its utmost energies, and demand the use of every means within its power. Hitherto the government had proceeded on the assumption that the institution of slavery, and the sovereignty of the states as recognized in the written text of the Constitution, were not to be interfered with, though individual members of Congress had declared that in case of necessity either or both of these must yield to the paramount object of maintaining the Union. This change was clearly indicated when a resolution was offered in the House reaffirming the Crittenden resolution of the previous session, which declared that the war was not waged for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the established institutions of the states, and ought to cease as soon as the supremacy of the Constitution had been vindicated. This resolution had passed by an almost unanimous vote four months previously. It was now laid on the table by a vote of 71 to 65. Fifty-three of the members who had then voted for it now voted to lay it on the table, thus in effect saying that it might, and probably would, be necessary to interfere with the civil and domestic institutions of the insurgent states. In the Senate, Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, one of the few "peace" members who remained, offered a resolution appointing ex-Presidents Fillmore and Pierce, Chief Justice Taney, Edward Everett, John J. Crittenden, and six others, commissioners to meet a like number of commissioners to be appointed by the Confederacy, to confer together for the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the Constitution; and that upon the meeting of this joint commission active hostilities should cease, and not be renewed unless the joint commission should be unable to agree, or their agreement be rejected either by Congress or the Confederacy. This resolution was laid upon the table and never called up.

The general character of the debates, and the arguments adduced, were similar to those of the last session, except that the supporters of the administration expressed themselves more firmly and decidedly upon every point. The opposition in the Senate, weakened by the expulsion of Breckinridge, Bright, Polk, and Johnson, made up in pertinacity what they lacked in numbers. In the House they were strengthened by the support of some members who had hitherto maintained a neutral position; still the administration had a large majority in both houses, and the most ample powers were conferred upon it for carrying on the war.

Until near the close of the session it was supposed that the army in service, numbering fully 700,000 men, was as large and even larger than was required. "There are," said Senator Fessenden, of Maine, at the end of March, "regiments in my own state to-day, raised and staying there, waiting to be called into the field, doing nothing, not armed, yet anxious to be in service. There are more men here on the Potomac than government knows what to do with. Half a million of men are all that we can possibly use." This opinion was general, and the enlistment of volunteers was virtually suspended. The estimates were based on an army of 500,000 volunteers for the war. Toward the close of the session, after the disastrous result of the campaign before Richmond, a law was passed authorizing the President to call out the militia of the states for not more than nine months; to cause an enrollment to be made of all citizens from eighteen to forty-five years of age; to accept the services of 100,000 volunteers to fill up existing regiments; and to receive into service, naval or military, persons of African descent; and in case such persons should be slaves of rebels, they, their wives, children, and mothers should be free.<sup>1</sup> Previous to this, the control of the army and navy was really vested in the President. He could select any naval officer of the grades of captain and commander, and appoint him to the command of a squadron, with the rank and title of "flag officer."<sup>2</sup> He was authorized and requested to dismiss from service any naval or military officer for any cause which he deemed advisable.<sup>3</sup> He might, when he deemed the public service to require it, take possession of any railroad or telegraph line, with all its appurtenances, and place all the agents and employes under military control, so that they should be considered a part of the military establishment of the United States.<sup>4</sup> It was made his duty to cause the seizure of all property of persons who should hold civil or military office under the Confederate government, and also of all other persons engaged in aiding the rebellion who should not within sixty days after public proclamation having been made return to their allegiance; personal property to be absolutely forfeited, and real estate during the lifetime of the offender. This proclamation was issued on the 25th of July, 1862. The penalty for treason was made death or imprisonment for not less than five years, with a fine of not less than \$10,000, with disqualification to hold any office under the United States. The President was also authorized to grant pardon and amnesty upon such conditions as he deemed expedient.<sup>5</sup>

Appropriations were made on what then seemed to be the most liberal scale. To meet deficiencies in the army estimates for the year ending June 30, 1862, \$209,000,000 were appropriated, besides \$30,000,000 for the deficiency of pay to volunteers in the Western Department. For the ensuing year \$538,000,000 were given.<sup>6</sup> The naval appropriation was \$43,000,000, besides special sums amounting to \$30,000,000 for building iron-clad steamers and gun-boats.<sup>7</sup> These are only the prominent items. There were, besides, large amounts appropriated for other objects directly connected with the war.

Vigorous financial measures were required to meet this great expendi-

ture. Early in the session a joint resolution was passed declaring that, in order to pay the ordinary expenses of government, including the interest on the national loans, and to provide a sinking fund, taxes should be imposed which, together with the tariff, should yield an annual revenue of not less than \$150,000,000.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with the demands of the treasury, duties of from 2 to 5 cents a pound were levied upon sugar, 5 cents on coffee, and 20 cents on tea, and an increase upon most other importations; a heavy excise was imposed upon the manufacture of distilled and fermented liquors; a tax of about three per cent. upon most articles of manufacture; licenses varying from \$5 to \$200 upon trades and professions, stamps were required upon legal and commercial documents; and a tax of three per cent. levied upon the excess over \$600 of all incomes up to \$10,000, and five per cent. upon all greater.<sup>2</sup> These, it was hoped, would produce sufficient to pay the ordinary expenses of government, including the interest on the public debt incurred and to be incurred. To meet the war expenses, recourse was had to the issue of paper money in the form of United States notes payable on demand, without interest. These were of various amounts, from one dollar upward. They were made receivable for all debts due to the United States except duties on imports, and payable for all debts due from the United States except the interest on the public debt, both of which must be paid in specie; for all other purposes they were made a legal tender. The entire amount of "greenbacks" authorized by different acts during this session and the last was \$250,000,000. These notes might, at the option of the holder, be exchanged for treasury bonds, bearing interest at the rate of six per cent., redeemable at the pleasure of the government after five years, and to be paid in twenty years. Of these the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized at his discretion to issue \$500,000,000 at par, in exchange for coin or demand notes.<sup>3</sup>

The provision making these notes payable for all government dues except interest of the public debt was, in effect, to make them payable at the pleasure of government. The proposition to make them a legal tender occasioned protracted debates, and met with strong opposition from some friends of the administration. It was urged in opposition that it was without precedent in our history; that it was unconstitutional by impairing the validity of contracts, since every contract for the payment of money was legally a contract for the payment of gold and silver coin, and that was the measure of the right of the one party and the obligation of the other. This provision divested one party of his right and released the other from his obligation. It said to one party, "Although you agreed to pay gold and silver, you shall be discharged by the payment of these notes;" and to the other, "Although you are entitled to demand gold and silver, you must be content to receive instead this paper." This would, moreover, be only the precursor of a brood of promises to pay, not one of which would be redeemed in the constitutional currency of the country. In support of the proposition it was urged that, while the states were by the Constitution prohibited from making any thing but gold and silver a legal tender, there was no such prohibition as to Congress. Congress had the power to coin money and to fix the value of it. Gold and silver had indeed been accepted as the usual measure of value, and governments, by affixing their stamps to them, gave them an extrinsic value; any other thing which governments might choose to thus stamp would answer equally as well for currency. If all governments agreed upon one thing, it would be equally valuable every where. If one fixed upon a thing, it would be valuable within the jurisdiction of that government. Congress had at different times, without question, changed the weight and alloy of gold and silver coin; that is, it had said that the man who had agreed to pay a certain number of dollars could now discharge the debt by the payment of a less quantity of gold or silver. And if it should happen that gold should become as plentiful as iron, no one doubted that government would have the power of substituting for it some other metal. If, when the public good so required, Congress had power to change the weight or alloy of gold or silver coin, or to substitute some other metal, and declare it legal tender, it had equally the power to issue paper money, and make that a legal tender. The prevailing argument for the measure, however, was the necessity of the case. Government had contracted large debts, and must contract still larger. The army must be paid and maintained. Gold and silver could not be had for this purpose, and something must be substituted. The abstract question of constitutionality must yield to the paramount law of necessity. Whether such necessity existed Congress must judge, and its judgment would be conclusive.

The first bill for this purpose, which authorized the issue of \$150,000,000 of these notes, making them a legal tender, became a law on the 25th of February. It passed in the House by a vote of 93 to 59. In the Senate a motion to strike out the legal-tender clause was rejected by a vote of 22 to 17; and the bill, with the clause, passed by 30 to 7. Of the seventeen senators who wished to strike out the provision, five voted for the bill with the provision. This bill, in effect, decided the financial policy of the government. It sanctioned the view of the Secretary of the Treasury that "government can resort to borrowing only when the issue of notes has become sufficiently large to warrant a just expectation that loans of the notes can be had from those who hold or can obtain them at rates not less advantageous than those of coin loans before the suspension of specie payments." In other words, before government could hope to borrow the large amounts which it needed, it must supply the people with the money to lend.

Of deeper interest, and of more enduring consequence than even the military and financial measures of the Federal government, was its action in respect to slavery. To set this forth will be the purpose of the following chapter.


<sup>1</sup> Laws of the 37th Congress, First Session, chap. cci. <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. i. <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. cc. <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. xv. <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. cxv., and Joint Resolution, No. 63. <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, chaps. xxxii., lxi., cxxxiii. <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, chaps. xxiii., lvii., cxiv.

<sup>1</sup> Laws of the 37th Congress, First Session, Joint Resolution, No. 6.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, chaps. ii., cxix.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, chaps. xxiii., cxlii.





THE WIGWAM AT CHICAGO, BUILT FOR THE MEETING OF THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION OF 1850.

## CHAPTER VIII.

## THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND SLAVERY.

Slavery in National Politics.—Whig and Democratic Conventions, 1840, 1844, 1848, 1852.—The Republican, American, and Democratic Conventions of 1856.—The Republican Convention of 1860.—Its Platform.—The Democratic Conventions of 1860.—Disruption of the Democratic Party.—The Union Party.—Formation of Sectional Parties.—Analysis of the Electoral and Popular Votes for President.—Principles of the Parties.—Position of Mr. Lincoln on the Question of Slavery.—His Inaugural and Messages.—Contrabands.—General Butler's Decision.—Action of the Government.—Fremont's and Hunter's Orders.—Modified by the President.—Mr. Lincoln's Letter to Horace Greeley.—His Policy defined.—The Border States.—Analysis of the Slave and Free Population.—Their Relations to Slavery.—The President's Proposition for Compensated Emancipation.—Meeting of Congress, December 2, 1861.—Anti-slavery Measures proposed.—The Debates.—Laws passed.—Abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia.—Resolution in favor of Compensated Emancipation.—Colonization Schemes.—Prohibiting Slavery in the Territories.—Freeing the Families of colored Soldiers.—The Insurrection and Confiscation Act.—The President's proposed Veto.—Hesitation of the President.—Conference with Border State Representatives.—Preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation.—The new Policy of Government.

**A**FTER the adoption of the Missouri Compromise in 1820, the subject of slavery was first introduced into national politics as a party question during the presidential canvass of 1840, when the Democratic National Convention adopted as one of the cardinal principles of the party a resolution that the government had no power to interfere with the domestic institutions of the states, and that all efforts to induce Congress to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient steps thereto, were calculated to endanger the stability and permanence of the Union. The convention of the opposition party, which had just assumed the name of Whig, put forth no formal declaration of principles, but confined itself to assailing the administration of Mr. Van Buren on the grounds of general mismanagement and corruption. Mr. Harrison was elected President, receiving the 234 electoral votes of eleven free and eight slave states; Mr. Van Buren having the 70 votes of two free and seven slave states. Of the popular vote Harrison received 1,275,000, Van Buren 1,153,000, and barely 7000 were cast for Birney, Abolition.<sup>1</sup>

In 1844, no allusion was made to slavery in the "platform" or declaration of principles of the Whig party. The Democratic National Convention merely reaffirmed the principle of the previous campaign. Mr. Polk received the 170 electoral votes of seven free and eight slave states; Mr. Clay having the 105 votes of seven free and four slave states. Of the popular vote, 1,368,000 were cast for Polk, 1,299,000 for Clay, and 62,000 for Birney, Abolition.

In the Whig Convention of 1848 a resolution was proposed affirming that, while Congress had no power to interfere with the institution of slavery within the states, it had the power, which it was its duty to exercise, to prohibit the existence or introduction of slavery into any territory possessed or

to be acquired by the United States. This resolution was laid on the table without action. The Democratic Convention again affirmed the declaration in respect to slavery; and in consequence, a convention of a portion of the party assembled and adopted a series of resolutions affirming that slavery in the states depended upon state laws which the Federal government had no power to repeal or modify; but that it was the settled policy of the nation to localize and discourage slavery, and that it was the duty of Congress to prohibit its introduction into any territory now free. This convention nominated Mr. Van Buren for President. At the election General Taylor received the 163 votes of seven free and eight slave states, Mr. Cass that of eight free and seven slave states, 127 in all. The popular vote was 1,360,000 for Taylor, 1,250,000 for Cass, and 291,000 for Van Buren.

In the Whig Convention of 1852 it was resolved that the party acquiesced in the compromise measures of 1850, including the Fugitive Slave Law, as a settlement of all the questions which they embraced, and that it would discourage all efforts to renew the agitation of these questions. The Democratic Convention again affirmed the principle set forth in former platforms, with the addition that it covered the whole subject of slavery agitation in Congress; that the party would adhere to the compromise measures, including the Fugitive Slave Law, and would resist all attempts to renew, in or out of Congress, the agitation of the question of slavery, in whatever shape, or under whatever color the attempt might be made. A "Free Democratic Convention" then assembled. It put forth a declaration explicitly affirming that Congress had no power to make a slave or establish slavery; that it was the duty of the Federal government to relieve itself from all responsibility for the existence of slavery wherever it had the constitutional power to legislate for its extinction: that there ought to be no more slave states, no slave territories, no nationalized slavery, no national legislation for the extradition of slaves; that slavery was a sin against God and a crime against man which no human enactment or usage could make right; that the Fugitive Slave Law had no binding force upon the American people, and should be repealed; that the compromise measures were inconsistent with the principles of democracy, and inadequate for the settlement of the questions of which they were claimed to be an adjustment; and that there could be no permanent settlement of the slavery question except by the separation of the general government from slavery, the exercise of all its constitutional power and influence on the side of freedom, and by leaving to the several states the whole subject of slavery, including the delivery of fugitives from service or labor. Mr. Hale was nominated for President by this convention. At the election, Mr. Pierce received the 254 electoral votes of fourteen free and thirteen slave states, General Scott the 42 votes of two free and two slave states. The Democratic majority was much smaller in the electoral college than in the popular vote. Many large states were carried by small majorities. Of the popular vote, Pierce received 1,631,000, Scott 1,386,000, Hale 155,000.

After this decisive defeat the Whig party virtually disappeared from national politics. Many of its former members, especially at the South, went over to the Democrats; more, both North and South, formed themselves into a new organization, which assumed the name of Americans; while the great majority in the free states organized themselves into a new party, under the

<sup>1</sup> In this and the following paragraphs the popular vote is given in round numbers. In South Carolina no popular vote is cast even indirectly for President, the electors being appointed by the Legislature. The vote of this state is not included in the usual statements. She voted uniformly for the Democratic candidate. We have assumed the vote of the state to be 50,000, and that 40,000 would have been cast for the Democratic candidates, and 10,000 for the opposition. In making our statements, we have added this majority of 30,000 to the numbers usually assigned to the Democratic vote. In the election of 1860 we have put this down as cast for Mr. Breckinridge.



name of Republican, which received large accessions from Democrats who were dissatisfied with the position of their party in respect to slavery.

The first Republican National Convention assembled at Philadelphia June 17, 1856, in accordance with a call addressed to the people of the United States, without distinction of party, who were opposed to the policy of the administration of Mr. Pierce, opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, to the admission of slavery into a free territory, and in favor of the admission of Kansas as a free state. The platform declared that the Federal Constitution, the rights of the states, and the union of the states should be preserved; that the existence of slavery in the territories should be prohibited by express enactments; that neither Congress nor a territorial Legislature had authority to give slavery a legal existence in any territory; and that it was "the right and duty of Congress to prohibit in the territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery." Mr. Fremont, who had been a Democrat, though he had taken no prominent part in politics, was nominated for President, and Mr. Dayton, a former Whig, for Vice-president. The American party was ingrafted upon a half secret association, whose main object was to confine all offices of trust and emolument to citizens of native birth. Its first national convention, styling itself the American National Council, met at Philadelphia on the 19th of February. Its proceedings took a wider range than was originally contemplated. The main points in the declaration which it put forth were that Americans only should rule America; that Congress should not interfere in questions appertaining to the individual states, nor any state with the affairs of another; that a continuous residence of twenty-one years should be a requisite for the naturalization of an alien; that foreign paupers and criminals should not be suffered to land on our shores; and that all laws should be enforced until repealed, or pronounced null and void by competent judicial authority. A resolution was proposed that no person should be nominated for President who was not in favor of the prohibition by Congress of slavery in any territory north of the latitude of 36° 30': this was rejected by a large majority. Mr. Fillmore, formerly a Northern Whig, and Mr. Donelson, a Southern Democrat, were nominated for President and Vice-president. A Whig Convention met, and went through the form of indorsing these nominations. Its platform deprecated the formation of sectional parties, and affirmed that public safety required the election of a President pledged to neither geographical section. The Democratic Convention met at Cincinnati on the 2d of June. It reaffirmed the doctrines respecting slavery put forth by previous conventions, adding a resolution that Congress should not interfere with slavery in the District of Columbia or in the territories, and that every territory, whenever it had the requisite population, was entitled to enter the Union as a state, with a constitution admitting or prohibiting slavery, as its people might choose. Mr. Buchanan was nominated for President, and Mr. Breckinridge for Vice-president. Mr. Buchanan received the 172 electoral votes of fourteen slave and five free states, Mr. Fremont the 114 votes of eleven free states, and Mr. Fillmore the seven votes of Maryland. Of the popular vote, Buchanan received 1,868,000, Fremont 1,341,000, Fillmore 874,000.

In 1860, the Republican Convention met at Chicago on the 16th of May. Its platform declared that each state had the exclusive right to regulate its domestic institutions according to its own judgment; that the dogma that the Constitution carried slavery into the territories was a dangerous heresy; that the normal condition of all the territory of the United States was that of freedom; reaffirming the principle advanced by the previous convention that neither Congress nor a territorial Legislature had authority to give slavery a legal existence in any territory.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Lincoln, formerly a Whig, and Mr. Hamlin, formerly a Democrat, were nominated for President and Vice-president.

The Democratic Convention met at Charleston on the 23d of April. It was resolved that no nominations should be made until a platform had been adopted. The committee appointed to prepare this document could not agree, and two platforms were presented. That framed by the majority of the committee reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform, adding, "The democracy of the United States hold these cardinal principles on the subject of slavery in the territories: first, that Congress has no power to abolish slavery in the territories; second, that the territorial Legislature has no power to abolish slavery in the territories, nor to prohibit the introduction of slaves therein, nor any power to destroy or impair the right of property in slaves by any legislation whatever." Several reports were presented from the minority of the committee. After various amendments, these at last were embodied in a series of resolutions reaffirming the Cincinnati platform, with the addition that, as differences of opinion existed in the Democratic party as to the nature and extent of the powers of a territorial Legislature over the institution of slavery in the territories, the party would abide by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the questions of constitutional law. This minority report was accepted in place of that of the majority. When

the question of the final adoption of this report came up, the resolution submitting the decision of questions of constitutional law to the Supreme Court was rejected. The platform, as adopted, simply reaffirmed that of Cincinnati. About fifty of the Southern delegates then withdrew, and the remaining members, after voting that two thirds of a full convention should be required for a nomination, proceeded to vote for a candidate for President. A full convention consisting of 803 votes, 202 were requisite for a nomination. Fifty-seven ballots were taken. The votes for Mr. Douglas varied from 145 to 152. The remaining votes were scattered; Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, and Hunter, of Virginia, leading. A few votes were cast for Dickinson, of New York, Johnson, of Tennessee, and Lane, of Oregon. One delegate voted persistently from first to last for Jefferson Davis. At the 43d ballot Douglas received 151½, Guthrie 65½, Hunter (who had before had 42 votes) 16, Dickinson 5, Lane 13, Davis 1. After that there was no essential change in the vote. It was evident that no man could secure the 202 votes required for a nomination, and the Convention, after a fruitless session of ten days, adjourned to meet at Baltimore on the 18th of June. The members of the party in the several states were urged to appoint new delegates to fill the places of those who had withdrawn. The members who had seceded from the Convention had in the mean while held a convention of their own, lasting four days. After adopting the principles of the platform which had been voted down by the majority of the delegates, they adjourned to meet at Richmond on the 11th of June. They came together merely to adjourn till the 21st, awaiting the action of the Convention at Baltimore. When that Convention assembled, an angry discussion arose upon the admission of delegates. The disputed seats were mostly awarded to claimants who were in favor of the nomination of Mr. Douglas. Many members thereupon withdrew from the Convention; among them was Caleb Cushing, the chairman. The remaining delegates then proceeded to vote for a candidate for the presidency. There were left 194 votes; of these, 181 were given to Douglas, 7½ to Breckinridge, and 5½ to Guthrie. The nomination of Douglas was then made unanimous. Mr. Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, was nominated for Vice-president. He declined the nomination, and Mr. Johnson, of Georgia, was named in his place. The members who had seceded from this Convention assembled and nominated Mr. Breckinridge for President, and Mr. Lane, of Oregon, for Vice-president. These nominations were confirmed by the delegates who had seceded at Charleston, who were now in session at Richmond.

Thus the great Democratic party, which had, with three brief intervals, administered the affairs of the nation for more than half a century, was broken up. Neither portion could hope to succeed against the vigorous and united Republican party which had sprung to life. There was but one hope left for those who deprecated the success of this party. It was certain that Douglas could not gain the vote of the South, which was essential to his election. It was equally certain that, if the bare choice lay between Lincoln and Breckinridge, the slave states would vote for the latter and the free states for the former, giving him the election. But if a third candidate were brought into the field, obnoxious to neither section, he might draw from both sides votes enough to prevent either of the others from receiving a majority in the electoral college. Then the election would devolve upon the states represented by the popular House of Congress, all the members from each state casting a single vote, and their choice being restricted to one of the three persons who had received the highest number of electoral votes. A convention of the former "American" party, now styling itself the "Constitutional Union" party, had come together at Baltimore on the 10th of May, during the interval between the breaking up of the Democratic Convention at Charleston and its reassembling at Baltimore. Four years before this party had signally failed in its attempt to thrust itself between the Republicans and the Democrats. Now there seemed a fair chance for it to mediate between the free and the slave states. Its Convention laid down a platform "recognizing no principle other than the Constitution of the country, the union of the states, and the enforcement of the laws." To the text of this declaration all parties would assent; the only question would be as to its interpretation. In order to conciliate the South without offending the North, the nomination for President was given to John Bell, a respectable Tennessee lawyer, who had served in Congress with fair credit. To give some weight to the ticket, Edward Everett was nominated for Vice-president. The Conservatives at the North saw in this nomination a possible means of preventing the election of Mr. Lincoln. If the electoral vote of New York or Pennsylvania, and one other free state, could be taken from him, the choice would devolve upon the House of Representatives, where it was certain that he could not secure a majority of the states. Accordingly, in New York and several other states, "Fusion" tickets for electors were made up, containing the names of men who favored Douglas, Bell, or Breckinridge. The understanding was that all of these electors, if chosen, should cast their votes so as to prevent the election of Lincoln. This subtle scheme was too intricate to work. Its practical result was merely to give to Lincoln one half of the electoral vote of New Jersey, which would otherwise have been cast against him. In that state the vote was very close. The "Fusion" electoral ticket was made up of one half Douglas men, and one half who favored Breckinridge or Bell. Many of the Douglas voters struck off from their ballots the names of the Breckinridge or Bell electors, so that in their place three Republicans were chosen by a small majority.

The result of the presidential election of 1860 was that Mr. Lincoln received 169 electoral votes, being the whole of those of the sixteen free states except three votes from New Jersey; Mr. Bell the 39 votes of Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee; Mr. Douglas the 9 votes of Missouri, and 3 from New Jersey—12 in all; and Mr. Breckinridge the 72 votes of the remaining eleven slave states. The popular vote, apportioning that cast on Fusion

<sup>1</sup> The following is the text of the articles in the platform relating directly to slavery:

"The maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend; and we denounce the lawless invasion by armed force of the soil of any state or territory, no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes."

"The new dogma that the Constitution, of its own force, carries slavery into any or all of the territories of the United States, is a dangerous political heresy, at variance with the explicit provisions of that instrument itself, with contemporaneous exposition, and with legislative and judicial precedent; is revolutionary in its tendency, and subversive of the peace and harmony of the country."

"The normal condition of all the territory of the United States is that of freedom. As our republican fathers, when they had abolished slavery in all our national territory, ordained that 'no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,' it becomes our duty, by legislation, whenever such legislation is necessary, to maintain this provision of the Constitution against all attempts to violate it; and we deny the authority of Congress, or of a territorial Legislature, or of any individuals, to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States."



tickets according to the best estimates of the strength of the several parties, and giving to Breckinridge a clear majority of 30,000 in South Carolina, was, for Lincoln 1,855,000, for Douglas 1,360,000, for Breckinridge 870,000, for Bell 590,000.

Thus, previous to 1856, the question of slavery did not enter fairly into the presidential election, and there was no geographical line separating the great political parties. In 1840, Harrison was elected by the votes of eleven free and eight slave states; the votes of two free and seven slave states being cast against him. In 1844, Polk was elected by seven free and eight slave states; against him were seven free and four slave states. In 1848, Taylor was elected by seven free and eight slave states; opposed to him were eight free and seven slave states. In 1852, Pierce was elected by fourteen free and thirteen slave states; against him were two free and two slave states. But in 1856, Buchanan was elected by the votes of the whole fourteen slave states and five free states, while eleven free states voted against him. And in 1860 Lincoln received the entire vote of the sixteen free states, with the exception of the half vote of New Jersey, while the whole vote of the fifteen slave states was cast against him. It is worthy of note that the first Republican candidate for the presidency was a native of a slave state, and his opponent of a free state; while the second Republican candidate was born in a slave state, and his principal opponent in a free state.

The Republican party came into power pledged by their formal declaration of principles against any interference by the general government with slavery in the states where it existed. This doctrine was avowed by all parties and sections; but the Republicans were also pledged to prevent, by the action of the general government, the introduction of slavery into the territories. The Northern Democrats, in nominating Mr. Douglas, endorsed his doctrine of popular sovereignty, that the general government had no authority to decide the question of slavery in the territories, but that it belonged exclusively to the people of each territory, acting each for itself through its lawfully appointed Legislature. The Southern Democrats affirmed that by the Constitution slavery had a legal existence in the territories; denied that Congress or a territorial Legislature had any power to annul or impair that right; and demanded that the general government should, if necessary, protect slavery in the territories. The Union party took no definite position upon the disputed question, though a majority of its members would have been content with the non-intervention doctrine of Mr. Douglas. If they had nominated him, it is probable that he would have been elected.

Mr. Lincoln, in his inaugural address, explicitly avowed his adherence to the principle that the general government could not interfere with slavery in the states. "Apprehension seems to exist," he said, "among the people of the Southern states that, by the accession of a Republican administration, their property, and their peace and personal security, are to be endangered. There never has been any reasonable cause for such an apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that 'I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.' Those who nominated and elected me did so with the full knowledge that I had made this and many similar declarations, and that I had never recanted them. And more than this, they placed in the platform for my acceptance, and as a law to themselves and to me, this clear and emphatic resolution, 'That the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the states, and especially the right of each state to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to the balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depend.' I now reiterate these sentiments." He also, in effect, pledged himself to enforce the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law. There was no question that the provision of the Constitution requiring the delivery of persons held to service or labor was intended to secure the surrender of fugitive slaves. The intention of the lawgiver was the law. There was some difference of opinion as to whether this constitutional provision should be enforced by national or state authority; but, if the slave was to be delivered up, it was of little consequence to him or others by what authority it was done. Every member of Congress had sworn to maintain this provision of the Constitution, and there could be no difficulty in framing a law by means of which to keep that oath. Such a law ought to embody adequate safeguards that no free person should be surrendered as a slave.

This emphatic declaration in favor of the maintenance of the constitutional right of each state to regulate and control slavery within its limits, presupposed, of course, that the states recognized the authority of the Constitution. If they attempted to set it aside by force and violence, they could not claim its protection. But, even after the war broke out, the President was anxious that the question of slavery should not be involved. But it soon became apparent that this was impossible. Slavery became involved from the moment when the national forces began to act in a slave state. On the 26th of May General McClellan issued an address to the people of Western Virginia assuring them that not only would the Federal troops abstain from all interference with their slaves, but that they would crush any attempt at servile insurrection. General Butler had hardly taken command at Fortress Monroe when three slaves came in, saying that they belonged to a Colonel Mallory, who had gone off to the enemy, and was about to send them to North Carolina to work on the fortifications. Butler needed laborers, and set them at work. Colonel Carey, of the Virginia Volunteers, soon presented himself, claiming to be the agent of Mallory, and demanded that the slaves should be given up. Butler refused. "Do you mean to set aside



BENJAMIN F. BUTLER

your constitutional obligations?" asked Carey. "Virginia passed an ordinance of secession two days ago," was the reply, "and claims to be a foreign country. I am under no constitutional obligations to a foreign country." "You say we can not secede, and so you can not consistently detain them." "But you say you have seceded, and so you can not consistently claim them," rejoined Butler, one of the shrewdest of Massachusetts lawyers, never at a loss for finding law to sustain any position. "You are using negroes upon your batteries. I shall detain these as contraband of war."

It would be hard to find in Puffendorf or Vattel warrant for this extension of the definition of the term "contraband." It was an epigram, but an epigram which, in the end, pledged the United States to the abolition of slavery. This was on Friday, the 24th of May. From that day "contraband" became a synonym for slave. On Sunday eight more slaves came in, on Monday sixty, and so on from day to day, in families and by squads, until in a few weeks there were nine hundred, men, women, and children, in camp. Butler informed the War Department of his proceedings. They were sanctioned, and he was directed not to seize upon any slaves, and not to surrender any who came into his lines of their own accord. Two months later he again asked for instructions. There were in his camps three hundred able-bodied slaves, liable to be used in aid of the insurrection, who might fairly be detained as contraband; but what should he do with the six hundred old or infirm men, and women, and children, the fathers and mothers, wives and children of the contrabands? They were legally property, but property which had been abandoned by its owners, like a vessel adrift upon the ocean. The United States were the salvors, but salvors who would not hold such property. It seemed to him that all ownership of them had virtually ceased, and that they had resumed their natural condition of human beings. But General McDowell had issued an order forbidding fugitive slaves from coming into or being harbored within his lines. Was this order to be enforced in all the departments? If so, who were to be considered fugitives? Was a slave a fugitive whose master had run away from him? Must the army refuse food and shelter to slaves whose masters had run away or been driven off? Moreover, it was understood that slaves who had actually labored upon rebel intrenchments should be harbored and fed; but why should this favor be shown to those who had thus wrought against us and be denied to those who had, by escaping, avoided such hostility? "In a loyal state," said Butler, in conclusion, "I would put down a servile insurrection. In a state in rebellion, I would confiscate that which was used to oppose my arms, and take all the property which constituted the wealth of that state, and furnished the means by which the war is prosecuted, besides being the cause of the war; and if it should be objected that, in so doing, human beings were brought to the free enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, such objection might not require much consideration."

To a case thus keenly put there could be but one substantial reply. The question as to fugitives in the states which adhered to the Union was not involved. There the ordinary forms of judicial procedure could be observed. But these could not be enforced in the insurrectionary states; and the rights dependent on the laws of these states must be subordinated to military exigencies, if not wholly forfeited by treason on the part of those claiming them. Meanwhile the Confiscation Act of August 6, 1861, had provided for the case of slaves actually employed by their masters in aid of the rebellion. They were to be treated like other property; the rights of their owners





STAMPEDE OF SLAVES TO FORTRESS MONROE.





FEEDING NEGRO CHILDREN AT HILTON HEAD, SOUTH CAROLINA.

were forfeited; and forfeiture of the claim of their owners was equivalent to enfranchisement. The laws under which all slaves in these states were held had been superseded by the rebellion, and the enforcement of these claims, in the case of loyal owners, would be inconvenient and injurious. The rights of these men would be best secured by receiving the fugitives and giving them employment, leaving the question of indemnifying the masters to be settled after tranquillity had been restored. Butler was therefore directed to receive all fugitives who came to him, but he must not interfere with the servants of peaceful citizens, nor encourage any to leave their masters, nor prevent the voluntary return of any.

The Confiscation Act of August 6 was the only measure of the extra session bearing directly upon the question of slavery. This related solely to the case of slaves employed by their masters in the naval or military service of the enemy. Until, subsequently, other laws were enacted, the administration was careful not to transcend the provisions of that act. On the 31st of August, General Fremont, then commanding the Western Department, issued an order extending martial law throughout the State of Missouri, confiscating the property of all persons who should take up arms against the United States, or be proved to have taken an active part with their enemies in the field, and declaring their slaves to be free men. The President directed this order to be so modified as to conform to and not to transcend the provisions of the act of Congress. In May, 1862, General Hunter, commanding the Department of the South, issued an order putting the states of Georgia, South Carolina, and Florida under martial law, declaring that, as slavery and martial law were incompatible, the slaves in those states were forever free. The President set aside this declaration. He said that it belonged to him to decide whether, as commander-in-chief, he had the right to declare the slaves in any state to be free; and if he had the right, whether and when it should be exercised. This question was wholly distinct from that of police regulations in armies or camps. These were left to the discretion of the different commanders. Thus, while Butler, at Fortress Monroe, received fugitive slaves, Dix, in another part of Virginia, and Halleck, who had succeeded Fremont in Missouri, prohibited them from entering their lines. The same general principle was involved in instructions given in October, 1861, by the Secretary of War to General Sherman, who commanded the expedition to Port Royal. He was directed to avail himself of the services of any persons, whether fugitives from labor or not, who should offer themselves, organizing them into squads or companies, as he should find advisable, but not, as a general thing, to arm them for military service. Loyal masters were to be assured that compensation would be made to them for the loss of the services of persons so employed. These measures brought into the lines a large number of women and children, who were fed by the government, and earnest attempts were made to instruct the fugitives, and to employ their labor

usefully in the cultivation of abandoned plantations. It was many months before the plan of arming the slaves was adopted.

Mr. Lincoln's cardinal idea was that he was in law and right the chief magistrate of an undivided and indivisible nation, and that it was his duty to restore the Union by bringing back the disaffected portions to the dominion of the Constitution and the laws. Every military and political measure should be directed to this end. Eighteen months after his inauguration, when ample authority had been conferred upon him by Congress, he thus defined his policy: "As to my policy I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it in the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be—the Union as it was. If there be any who would not save the Union unless they could, at the same time, save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could, at the same time, destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object is to save the Union, and not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race I do because I believe it helps to save this Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause; and I shall do more whenever I believe that doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and shall adopt new views as fast as they shall appear to be true views." In his message of December 2, 1862, he reiterated all that he had said upon this subject in his inaugural address and in his message at the special session. "Nothing now occurs," he said, "to add to or to subtract from the principles or general purposes expressed in those documents." The reference to the Confiscation Act of the special session was cautious and guarded. He had strictly adhered to its provisions. If a new law on the same subject should be proposed, its propriety would be duly considered. But he threw out a hint against hasty and inconsiderate measures. "The Union," he said, "must be preserved, and hence all indispensable means must be employed; but we should not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable."

Of hardly less importance than the vigorous prosecution of the war against the armed insurgents was the retention of the border slaveholding states. These states held peculiar relations to the two sections of the country. Slavery existed in them in law and in fact, but it was not their one great in-

<sup>1</sup> Letter to Horace Greeley, August 22, 1862.



stitution entwined with every fibre of their political, social, and domestic life. Slaveholders formed a small, and, in many parts, a numerically insignificant portion of the people. In Delaware there was but one slave to sixty free persons, and more than three fourths of these were in the least populous of the three counties, with but one fourth of the free inhabitants; in the other two counties there was only one slave to 180 free. It was fast becoming a free state. In ten years the free population had increased twenty-three per cent., and the slaves had decreased twenty-one per cent. In Maryland there was one slave to seven free. Half of the slaves were in counties with but one sixth of the free population. In Baltimore, with a population of 212,000, there were but 2500 slaves, a little more than one in a hundred. In ten years the free whites had increased twenty-four per cent., the free colored twenty, and the slaves only three and a half per cent. In Kentucky there was one slave to four whites; but half of the slaves were in counties with only a fourth of the population. The whites had in ten years increased twenty-one per cent., the slaves seven. In Missouri there was one slave to ten whites. There were a score of counties having each less than a hundred slaves. In St. Louis there were but 1500 slaves in a population of 160,000; less than one to a hundred. In ten years the whites had increased eighty per cent., the slaves thirty-two per cent. In that part of Virginia soon to be known as the State of West Virginia there was one slave to eighteen free persons. Three fourths of the slaves were in counties having only one fourth of the whites. There were whole counties with only three or four slaves. Of the fifty-one counties there were twenty each having less than a hundred slaves. In half the counties the ratio of slaves to whites was less than one to a hundred; in the most populous county it was one to 220. These Union slave states contained, in 1860, three fifths as many whites as the Confederacy, and a little less than one eighth as many slaves. Taken collectively, the population of whites to slaves was then about seven to one. But, during the first year of the war, a considerable portion of the slaves in Missouri and Kentucky had been taken South, so that now the ratio of slave to free was not more than one to ten, and of these the majority were owned by men notoriously disloyal.

There are no reliable statistics showing the number of slaveholders; but, considering that most men who owned slaves owned several, and many of them a large number, while there were considerable portions in which slavery had only a nominal existence, it may be assumed that in the border states not one citizen in fifty, and not one loyal man in a hundred, had any direct pecuniary interest in the perpetuation of slavery. It was almost universally acknowledged that the institution was injurious to the non-slaveholding citizens, and, consequently, to the general welfare of the state. It seemed, therefore, entirely feasible to detach these states from any complicity with the strictly slaveholding Confederacy. If they remained loyal, the Union would have 22,000,000 whites, and the Confederacy but 5,000,000. If they joined the secession, the Union would have 18,000,000 whites and the Confederacy 8,000,000, besides four and a quarter millions of slaves and free persons of color.<sup>1</sup>

Geographically and commercially the border states were connected as intimately with one section as with the other. The great highway of the Mississippi bound Kentucky and Missouri to New Orleans; the great lakes, and railways, and canals bound them equally to New York. If the Union was broken up, no matter to which fragment they adhered, they would be border states, and exposed to all the evils of that position. In either case they would hold one of their great avenues of communication at the mercy of a foreign power. If they went with the Confederacy they would lose the lakes; if they adhered to the Union they would lose the Mississippi. Their interest, more than that of any other section, lay in the maintenance of the Union, and few of the people had any interest in the maintenance of slavery. But the slaveholders exercised a power altogether disproportionate to their numbers. Public officers and leaders of opinion belonged almost exclusively to this class. Slavery was, moreover, a state institution, and attachment to the state took precedence over attachment to the nation, though less decidedly than in the Far South. The sentiment of the civilized world had gradually arrayed itself against slavery. This, by the law of antagonism, forced all slaveholding states into closer sympathy with each other, and so the institution of slavery formed a strong bond of union between all the states which maintained it. If the border states could be induced voluntarily to abandon slavery, this tie between them and the South would be destroyed.

To bring about the voluntary abandonment of slavery in the border states was a leading object in the policy of the President. To this end, in his message of December 2, 1862, he recommended that measures should be taken to compensate states which should undertake the gradual emancipation of their slaves. Three months later he sent in a special message recom-

mending that Congress should pass a joint resolution declaring that "the United States, in order to co-operate with any state which may adopt gradual abolition of slavery, will give to such state pecuniary aid, to be used by such state in its discretion, to compensate it for the inconvenience, public and private, produced by such change of system." This proposition, he said, set up no claim of right on the part of the general government to interfere with slavery within the states. Whether they should accept it was left to their choice; but, he argued, the leaders of the rebellion hoped that the independence of some part of the disaffected region must be acknowledged, and then that the remaining part of the slaveholding section, finding the Union destroyed, would go with the South. To deprive them of this hope would substantially end the rebellion; and any state, by initiating emancipation, would in effect declare that in no case would it ever join the Confederacy.

Congress had hardly met in December when it became evident that the legislation upon the subject of slavery would assume a new aspect. The dominant party had come to the conclusion that slavery had not only furnished the occasion for the war, but supplied the means of carrying it on, and that, in order to put it down, it would be necessary to interfere directly with the institution in the insurrectionary states. A wide difference of opinion soon developed itself as to the extent and manner of this interference. Notices of bills and resolutions upon this subject were offered, and the debates upon these served to elicit the views of the members. The prevailing feeling was embodied in a series of acts, the debates upon which occupied a considerable part of the session. We shall describe these, keeping as nearly as possible to the order of time at which they became laws by receiving the approval of the President.

Naval and military officers were prohibited, by an additional article of war, under penalty of dismissal from the service, from employing the forces under their command for the purpose of returning fugitive slaves.<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with the recommendation of the President, a joint resolution was passed, declaring that the United States ought to co-operate with any state which may adopt the gradual abolition of slavery, by giving pecuniary aid to such state.<sup>2</sup> This resolution was denounced by the extreme opposition as an unconstitutional interference with the subject of slavery in the states. In the House, Mr. Wickliffe, of Kentucky, denied that the Constitution gave Congress any power to appropriate money to carry out the purposes of the resolution. In the Senate, Mr. Saulsbury, of Delaware, said that the resolution was extraordinary in its origin, source, and object; it was mischievous in tendency and unpatriotic in design; it was an attempt to induce some states to commence the work of abolition by holding out a pecuniary bribe to them. The states had never asked Congress for aid for any such purpose, and the offer was ill-timed and indelicate. In the House, Mr. Fisher, from the same state, said that he saw in the resolution a promise of a final settlement of the question of slavery. It was an olive-branch held out by the Northern states to the border states and to the whole South. In the Senate, Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, the successor of Mr. Breckinridge, who had been expelled, wished to amend the resolution so that it should affirm that although the whole subject of slavery within the states lay beyond the jurisdiction of the general government, yet when any state should determine to emancipate its slaves, the United States would pay a reasonable price for those emancipated, and the cost of their colonization in some other country. This amendment was rejected, receiving but four votes. The resolution received a lukewarm support from a large portion of the Republican members. That Congress had a right to pass the resolution, and to make the appropriations required by it, in case any state should avail itself of its provisions, was assumed, but it appeared to most of them to have no practical value. However, if it produced no good it could do no harm, and the resolution passed in the Senate by 32 to 10, and in the House by 89 to 31. It was looked upon as a means of testing the feeling of the border states, the only ones which would, in any case, accept the offer of compensation.

A far more important act was that by which slavery was abolished in the District of Columbia.<sup>3</sup> By this act all persons held to service or labor within the district, by reason of African descent, were freed from all claim for such service or labor; and no involuntary servitude, except for crime, and after due conviction, should hereafter exist in the district. A board of commissioners was appointed, to which all loyal persons might present claims against slaves discharged by this act. These commissioners might award a sum not exceeding \$300 for each person thus discharged. These claims must be presented within ninety days from the passage of the act. No claims should be allowed for any slave brought into the district after the passage of the act, and none in any case from persons who had in any way aided or sustained the rebellion. The number of slaves in the district was about 3000. A million of dollars was appropriated for the indemnification of the owners of slaves thus freed, and \$100,000 for the colonization of such as wished to emigrate to Hayti, Liberia, or any other country beyond the limits of the United States. Other acts, closely connected with this, provided that colored persons in the district should be amenable to the same laws, and liable to the same punishments as whites;<sup>4</sup> that any slave employed by the consent of his owner in the district after the passage of the Emancipation Act should be free, and that in judicial proceedings there should be no exclusion of any witness on account of color;<sup>5</sup> that ten per cent. of the taxes received from persons of color should be set apart to maintain schools for educating their children; and a special board of trustees was appointed for these schools.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The statements in the preceding paragraphs are expressed approximately in round numbers. The following table exhibits the numerical relations of the Border States to the Union and the Confederacy, according to the census of 1860, West Virginia being included among the Border States:

BORDER STATES.	Whites.	Free Colored.	Slaves.	Total.
Delaware.....	90,697	19,723	1,798	112,218
Maryland.....	516,128	83,718	87,188	687,034
West Virginia.....	368,623	3,981	20,630	393,234
Kentucky.....	920,077	10,146	225,490	1,155,713
Missouri.....	1,064,369	2,983	114,965	1,182,317
	2,958,594	120,551	450,071	3,530,216
THE UNION.				
With Border States.....	21,925,370	354,702	453,315	22,634,010
Without Border States.....	18,966,776	234,151	3,244	18,104,794
THE CONFEDERACY.				
Without Border States.....	5,082,088	127,420	3,070,831	8,709,780
With Border States.....	8,040,682	247,971	3,520,902	12,239,996

<sup>1</sup> Laws of 37th Congress, 2d Sess., chap. xl., March 13, 1862. <sup>2</sup> Ibid., Joint Resolution, No. 26, April 10, 1862. <sup>3</sup> Ibid., chap. liv., April 16, 1862. <sup>4</sup> Ibid., chap. lxxxiii., May 21, 1862. <sup>5</sup> Ibid., chap. cl., July 12, 1862. <sup>6</sup> Ibid., chaps. lxxxiii., cli., May 21, July 11, 1862.



The main bill for emancipating the slaves in the district passed in the Senate by 29 to 14; in the House by 92 to 13. The debate in the Senate was long and earnest. Mr. Davis, of Kentucky, said that the liberation of slaves where they were numerous would cause a conflict of races which would result in the exile or extermination of one or the other. If slavery were abolished by the general government in any of the states, the moment the white inhabitants were again reorganized they would either reduce the freedmen again to slavery or expel them, or would hunt them down like beasts and exterminate them. He affirmed that slavery and the slave-trade existed by public national law, based upon the usage of the civilized world, and not by positive enactment. This general national law existed in every country wherein it was not repealed by positive enactment, so that slavery was general, and the abolition of it local. He and the entire body of senators from the border states denied the right of Congress to emancipate the slaves in the district. Government might, if public necessity required it, take and use slaves like any other property, by making due compensation to the owners; but it could take property only for the purpose of employing it in the public use; and setting slaves free was not thus employing them. In the House, Mr. Crittenden said that this was a most unwise time to adopt such a measure. It would be looked upon only as the commencement of a series of measures for the entire abolition of slavery. It would give to the rebels the strength of desperation, by inspiring them with the belief that peace would bring the spoliation of their property of all descriptions.

The President, in signing the bill, merely suggested that the time for the presentation of claims should be extended in certain cases, and expressed his gratification that the two principles of compensation and colonization were recognized and applied in the act. The scheme of colonization was for a while a favorite one with the government. An act for the collection of taxes in the insurrectionary districts provided that lands, the taxes upon which should not be paid, might be sold or leased, one quarter of the proceeds to constitute a fund to aid in the colonization of persons of African descent in Hayti, Liberia, or any other tropical country.<sup>1</sup> A provision for the "transportation, colonization, and settlement in some tropical country, beyond the limits of the United States, of persons of African descent," made free by the Confiscation Act, who should be willing to emigrate, was appended to that important law.<sup>2</sup> The President was also authorized to make an arrangement with governments having possessions in the West India Islands to receive, employ, clothe, feed, and instruct, for a period of five years, all Africans taken from slavers captured by United States vessels.<sup>3</sup> In all these schemes of colonization it was assumed that arrangements would be made with the governments of the countries by which the rights of freemen should be secured to the colonists. Negotiations were informally attempted for this purpose with Hayti and the states of Central America. A small colony was dispatched to Hayti, but the experiment proved a failure. The Central American states were wholly averse to any such colonization, and the scheme was finally abandoned.

The distinctive principle of the Republican party, as formally enunciated in its conventions of 1856 and 1860, was that slavery should be prohibited in every part of the country over which the Federal government had the right of exclusive jurisdiction. This had been partially put into effect by the law emancipating the slaves in the District of Columbia. It was carried out to completion by the passage of an act "to secure freedom to all persons within the territories of the United States." This law enacted, in brief but expressive terms, that "from and after the passage of this act there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the territories of the United States now existing, or which may be hereafter formed or acquired by the United States, otherwise than in punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."<sup>4</sup> The bill passed with little debate. There was an important distinction between these two measures. It was tacitly admitted that slavery had a legal existence in the district, and therefore loyal owners were compensated for the loss of their slaves; it was assumed that slavery had no legal existence in the territories, and there it was merely prohibited. Except as a question of principle, this act was of little importance, for there were but sixty-three slaves in all the territories out of a population of 220,000; and the climate, physical nature of the country, and the character of the emigration, rendered it certain that no large number of slaves would ever be taken thither, and that when the territories came to be admitted into the Union as states, their Constitutions would prohibit slavery.

The government was slow to accept as soldiers persons of African descent, whether free by birth or enfranchised. The organization of negro regiments was discouraged until after the failure of the campaign before Richmond. It then became evident that all the force which the Union could by any means bring into the field would be required. The last important act of the session, which defined the power of the President in calling out the militia, empowered him to "receive into the service of the United States, for any military or naval service for which they may be found competent, persons of African descent, who shall be enrolled and organized under such regulations, not inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws, as he may prescribe." It was farther enacted that "any slave of a person in rebellion, rendering any such service, shall forever thereafter be free, together with his wife, mother, and children, if they also belong to persons in rebellion. The pay of these colored troops was fixed at ten dollars a month and one ration, being only a little more than half that given to white soldiers."<sup>5</sup>

But by far the most important act relating to slavery passed during the session was that known as the Confiscation Act. The various phases which this bill went through, and the debates which ensued in relation to it, evinced that there was a wide difference of opinion among the members of the Republican party as to the manner in which slavery should be dealt with. Those who took the most extreme ground, prominent among whom were senators Hale, Sumner, Wilson, and Trumbull, wished to legalize the absolute and perpetual forfeiture of the property, including slaves, of all persons engaged in the rebellion. The Constitution expressly declares that "no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted;" but, as treason was punishable by death, the forfeiture of the life interest in the property of a condemned traitor would amount to very little. And as the persons of the rebels in the insurrectionary states could not be reached by judicial process, even this interest in their property could not be touched by attainder of treason. To reach this property absolutely was the design of a bill presented by Mr. Trumbull during the first week of the session. The bill came up for discussion on the 25th of February, when it was explained and defended by its author in a long and elaborate speech. The object of the bill, he said, was to operate upon property, and not to affect the person of the traitor, and applied only to cases where he was beyond the reach of judicial process. We had the right to take the property of our enemy and destroy it, if necessary. Again, the bill forfeited the claim of any person engaged in the rebellion to the service of any other person owing him service or labor, and declared the person free from any such claim. Congress had clearly the right to pass such a law. Government had the right to go to the farm or the work-shop, and take away and place in the army a man who by his own voluntary contract owed service to his employer. A parent had a right to the service of his son until he was twenty-one years of age; yet the government could take the son of eighteen and place him in the army. The claim of a master to the service of his slave was certainly not more sacred than that of an employer to the service of his workman, or of a parent to that of his son.

This sweeping measure for the universal confiscation of property and the general emancipation of slaves met with strenuous hostility not only from the opposition, including the members from the border states, but from some of the most earnest supporters of the administration. What would become of the loyal population of the South, asked Ten Eyck, of New Jersey, should all the slaves owned by rebels be set at liberty and allowed to roam the country at large? The policy involved in this measure, said McDougall, of California, would never secure peace, and would lead to a remorseless, relentless war, which would involve subjugation, if not extirpation. The bill, said Cowan, of Pennsylvania, proposed to strip fully 4,000,000 of whites of all their property, real, personal, and mixed, of every kind whatsoever, and reduce them to absolute poverty, and that at a time when they had in the field 400,000 men opposing us desperately. Should we, he asked, go back to the doctrine of forfeitures of the Middle Ages, and introduce feuds which centuries had not sufficed to quiet? The forfeitures of William the Conqueror sink into insignificance compared with those proposed by this bill. The act, said Browning, of Illinois, the successor of Douglas, sweeps away every thing, even the most ordinary comforts and necessities of domestic life, and reduces all to absolute poverty and nakedness. It leaves them the ownership of nothing. They may repent of their past rebellion, and return to their allegiance, but they return bankrupts and beggars, with nothing on earth to render government desirable. The effect of the bill would be to make peace and reunion an impossible thing; it would fill the hearts of the entire Southern people with despair, and nerve their arms with the energy and desperation which despair inspires.

A special feature of the bill, which excited the strongest opposition of some of the most earnest Republicans, was that it freed the slaves of all persons who had been engaged in the rebellion, by the direct action of Congress, without the intervention of any judicial process. This, it was argued, was in direct violation of the most solemn pledges of the administration, and the repeated declarations of the Republican party. Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, perhaps the most thoroughly anti-slavery state in the Union, spoke at length upon these points, quoting from speeches by senators Sumner, Fessenden, and Sherman, expressly denying the right of Congress to interfere with slavery in a state, and maintaining that the pledges made to the country when Mr. Lincoln was elected should be religiously observed. He pointed out the distinction between this bill and the Confiscation Act of the last session forfeiting the property in slaves who had been actually employed in supporting the rebellion. The bill, he said, was, in his judgment, in direct violation of plighted faith, and of the provisions, prohibitions, and enactments of the Constitution. He did not think the people of his state wished him to aid in breaking any provision of the Constitution, and he would not do so if they wished it.

It was clear that Mr. Trumbull's bill could not pass the Senate. Several amendments were offered, and these were referred to a committee of nine, of which Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire, was chairman. They reported a bill designed to harmonize the various opinions, and thus to secure the adoption of some measure which should meet the pressing emergencies of the times. This bill differed from that of Mr. Trumbull in making the confiscation of property and the forfeiture of the right to slaves a punishment for treason, to be inflicted only after the trial and conviction of the offender. It also authorized the President to grant pardon and amnesty to all persons who had been engaged in the rebellion, at such time and upon such conditions as he should deem expedient for the public welfare.

This bill met with vehement opposition from the extremes on both sides. On the one hand it was said to be too lenient, and on the other hand too se-

<sup>1</sup> Laws of the Thirty-seventh Congress, Second Session, chap. xcvi., June 7, 1862. <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. xcvi., July 17, 1862. <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. xcvi., July 17, 1862. <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. cxi., June 18, 1862. <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. cci., July 17, 1862.





JOHN P. HALE.

vere. Mr. Sumner offered a substitute, which he advocated in several elaborate orations. He denied that the slaves of rebels could be regarded as property, real or personal. Though claimed as property and recognized as chattels by local law, the Constitution knew them only as persons. Being men, they were bound to allegiance and entitled to protection. No claim on the part of their masters could supersede the right inherent in the general government to demand the services of all. By declaring the slaves free, we should take from the rebellion its main spring of activity and strength.

<sup>1</sup> Laws of the Thirty-seventh Congress, Second Session, chap. exxv., June 17, 1862.—The following is an abstract of the different sections of the bill, the title of which is, "An Act to suppress Insurrection, to punish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate the Property of Rebels, and for other Purposes."

*Section 1.* Every person who shall hereafter be convicted of the crime of treason against the United States shall suffer death, or be imprisoned for not less than five years, and fined not less than \$10,000, and his slaves, if any, shall be declared free; the fine to be levied and collected on any or all of the property, real and personal, except slaves, of which the person so convicted was the owner at the time of committing said crime, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding.

*Section 2.* If any person shall hereafter incite, assist, or engage in any rebellion against the authority of the United States, or give aid and comfort thereto, and be convicted thereof, he shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than \$10,000, or both, and his slaves, if any, be set free.

*Section 3* disqualifies all persons who shall commit these crimes from holding office under the United States.

*Section 4* provides that this act shall not affect the ease of any person guilty of treason before its passage, unless convicted under it.

*Section 5* makes it the duty of the President to cause to be seized and applied to the support of the army of the United States all the property of the following classes of persons: (1) Officers of the rebel army and navy; (2) High officers, executive, legislative, judicial, and diplomatic, of the Confederacy; (3) Similar officers of any one of the Confederate states; (4) Those who, having held offices under the United States, shall hereafter hold offices under the Confederacy; (5) Those who shall hereafter hold any office under the Confederacy or any one of the Confederate states; provided, however, that those described in the third, fourth, and fifth classes shall have accepted their appointment since the secession of their respective states, or have taken the oath of allegiance to the Confederacy; (6) Those owning property in the loyal states who shall aid the rebellion; all sales or transfers of such property to be null and void; and it shall be a writ of aid to any suit for the possession of such property that the owner belonged to any one of these six classes.

*Section 6* provides that if any person, other than those described, aiding or abetting the armed

God sometimes offered to nations as well as to individuals opportunity, which was of all things most to be desired. Never before had such an opportunity been presented. The blow which would smite the rebellion would scatter prosperity and happiness throughout the land. It would mark an epoch from barbarism to civilization. Congress, and not the President, had the supreme control over the operations of the war. By the old rights of war, freemen were made slaves; by those which he proposed, slaves were made freemen. The substitute was rejected. Mr. Trumbull opposed the bill because it made treason easy. On the other hand, amendments were proposed, striking out, one after another, every important section. These were all voted down; and the bill, as reported by the committee, passed the Senate by a vote of twenty-eight to thirteen; senators Trumbull and Sumner, notwithstanding their objections, voting for it, and several Republicans against it.

Meanwhile a bill similar to the one proposed by Mr. Sumner had passed the House. The Senate refused to accept it, adhering to its own. A committee of conference was appointed, and the House acceded to the Senate bill, with slight amendments, by a vote of eighty-two to forty-two.<sup>1</sup>

But the bill had hardly passed before it was known that the President would refuse to sanction it. He had prepared a message vetoing it. His main objections were against those parts of the first, second, seventh, and eighth sections which forfeited property beyond the life of the person attainted of treason. To obviate these objections and some others, a joint resolution was proposed limiting the class of state officers whose property was to be confiscated, and providing that real estate should be forfeited only during the life of the offender.<sup>2</sup> The President, considering this resolution to constitute a part of the bill, signed it, and it became a law.

The President was loth to change the avowed policy of the administration by exercising the great power thus placed in his hands. He clung to his favorite scheme of compensated emancipation. A week before the close of the session he sent a special message to Congress embodying the draft of an act providing that, in case any state should abolish slavery, bonds of the United States should be delivered to it of a certain sum for every slave, the whole to be paid at once if the emancipation was immediate, or in installments if it were gradual. The proposed bill was referred to committees, but no farther action was taken upon it. No border state, for whom it was especially intended, responded to the invitation.

On the same day, July 12, he requested all the members of Congress from the border states to meet him in conference. He laid before them his scheme, and urged them to favor it. If the war continued long, he said, slavery would be extinguished in those states. Much of its value had already gone, and all would soon be lost, with nothing to show for it. It would

be better to take a step which would shorten the war, and secure substantial compensation for what would otherwise be wholly lost. How much better for these states as seller, and for the nation as buyer, to sell out and buy out that without which the war never could have been, than to sink both the thing to be sold and the price of it in cutting each other's throats. He hinted at the strong pressure exerted upon him to take stringent measures in regard to slavery.

A majority of those to whom this appeal was made presented a reply, dis-

rebellion, shall not, within sixty days after public warning and proclamation by the President, cease from rebellion and return to his allegiance, his property shall be in like manner seized.

*Sections 7 and 8* prescribe the manner of proceedings by the courts in these cases.

*Section 9* enacts that all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion, escaping and taking refuge within the lines of the army, all slaves captured from or deserted by such persons, or coming in any way under control of the government, shall be considered prisoners of war, shall be forever free from servitude, and not be again held as slaves.

*Section 10* enacts that no slave, escaping from one state into another, shall be delivered up, except on oath of the claimant that the owner or master of the slave has not borne arms against the United States, or given aid and comfort to the rebellion; and prohibits all persons in the military service of the United States, under pain of dismissal, from deciding on the validity of any claim to the services of any escaped slave.

*Section 11* authorizes the President to employ as many persons of African descent as he may deem necessary and proper for the suppression of the rebellion, and to organize and use them as he may deem best for the public welfare.

*Section 12* authorizes the President to provide for the colonization, with their own consent, beyond the limits of the United States, of persons freed by this act; the consent of the governments of the countries having been first obtained, with a guarantee of the rights of freemen to the colonists.

*Section 13* authorizes the President, by proclamation, to extend pardon and amnesty to all persons who may have participated in the rebellion, at such time, on such conditions, and with such exceptions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare.

*Section 14* gives the courts of the United States authority to institute such proceedings, and to issue such orders, as may be necessary to carry this act into effect.

The joint explanatory resolution passed by both houses, which is essentially a part of this act, provides that the clause relating to state officers in section 6 "shall be so construed as not to apply to any act or acts done prior to the passage thereof, nor to include any member of a state Legislature, or judge of any state court, who has not, in accepting or entering upon his office, taken an oath to support the Constitution of the so-called Confederate states; nor shall the real estate of any offender under said act be forfeited beyond his natural life."

<sup>2</sup> Laws of the Thirty-seventh Congress, Second Session, Joint Resolution, No. 63.



senting from his opinion that the adoption of this policy would terminate the war or serve the cause of the Union. Their states were loyal, and had manifested beyond a doubt that in no case would they join the rebellion or go with the Confederacy, even if its independence was recognized. But the right of holding slaves belonged to the states. They could not see that they were called upon to make the sacrifice which was required by the proposition. They were asked to give up a valuable right, with no security for even the small compensation proposed. If, however, Congress would make the necessary appropriation of funds, and place them at the disposal of the President, to pay for the emancipated slaves and for their colonization, their states would consider the project. This reply was signed by twenty senators and representatives, most of them from Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. Another answer, signed by seven members, three of whom were from Western Virginia, was a little more favorable. They would ask their states to take the subject into consideration, adding, "We are the more emboldened to assume this position from the fact, now become history, that the leaders of the Southern rebellion have offered to abolish slavery among them as a condition to foreign intervention in favor of their independence as a nation. If they can give up slavery to destroy the Union, we can surely ask our people to consider the question of emancipation to save the Union."

The Confiscation Act was an attempt to harmonize different shades of opinion. It contained some apparent inconsistencies. The punishment for treason or rebellion, whether by death, imprisonment, fine, or the liberation of slaves, could be inflicted only after formal trial and conviction. But the property of all persons engaged in rebellion was to be seized and confiscated to public use, and their slaves, coming in any way under the control of the Federal power, were to be set free without the intervention of any judicial process. But these discrepancies were apparent rather than real. Trial, conviction, and punishment for treason were judicial acts, to be performed according to legal forms. The seizure of the property of an enemy was a military measure authorized by the laws of war. Slaves were considered in their twofold character of property and persons. As property they could be seized, but the United States could not hold them as slaves; and, consequently, when the title of their former owners was annulled, there was no other to take its place, and they reverted to their natural condition of freemen.

But, beyond this right of seizure of enemies' property, it was held that, in time of war, government had the right to employ any means not contrary to the laws and usages of civilized warfare to weaken the enemy. This power was affirmed to be inherent in the very nature of our government, even though it were not expressly granted by the Constitution. Among these rights was that of emancipating the slaves of the enemy. Some conceived that this right pertained to Congress, and should be carried into effect by express enactment; others held it to be a military right pertaining to the President in virtue of his function as commander-in-chief of the army and navy. But those who were in favor of the measure cared little by whom it was effected, so that it was effected at all. The President assumed that the power, and the responsibility for its exercise, devolved upon him.

Congress had hardly adjourned when the President was strongly urged to issue a proclamation for the universal emancipation of the slaves. He hesitated, upon grounds of expediency, to take this decisive and irrevocable step. On the 13th of September he was waited upon by a committee from various religious denominations in Chicago. They urged him to issue a proclamation of emancipation for the reasons that it would enlist the sympathy of the civilized world, would promote harmony at the North, would give new soldiers to the Union, and would be in accordance with the will of God.

Mr. Lincoln set aside the last argument by saying that very good men, claiming to represent the divine will, urged him to adopt very different measures. He thought that, if a direct revelation was to be made upon a subject so intimately connected with his own duty, it would be vouchsafed to him. But he expected no direct revelation, and could only study the physical facts of the case, and learn what was right, wise, and possible. A proclamation of emancipation might produce a good effect in Europe; it might help somewhat at the North; it might weaken the enemy by drawing off some of his laborers. But he did not think it would add available soldiers to our army. If the blacks should be armed, he feared that in a few weeks the arms would be in the hands of the enemy; besides, we had not arms enough to equip our white troops. Moreover, there were 50,000 soldiers in the Union army from the border slaveholding states, and it would be a serious matter should such a proclamation drive them over to the enemy. But



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the main objection to issuing such a proclamation at that time was that it would be useless. "What good," he asked, "would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's Bull against the comet. Would my word free the slaves, when I can not even enforce the Constitution in the rebel states?"

The state of affairs at that time afforded no reason to hope that such a proclamation would produce any good effect. The campaign on the Peninsula had disastrously failed; the Army of the Potomac had been defeated and driven back upon the capital; the Confederates, flushed with victory, had crossed the Potomac and were threatening Baltimore, and, not impossibly, Philadelphia. On the very day when this interview took place, the general-in-chief telegraphed to General McClellan that he believed the Confederates were about to march in force upon the capital. On that day they seemed more likely to be able to dictate terms than to be forced to receive them. A proclamation from the President of the United States decreeing the emancipation of the slaves in the Confederacy would then have appeared as idle as a papal Bull against the comet.

A single week wrought an entire change in the aspect of affairs. The battle of Antietam, fought on the 17th of September, had put an end to the triumphal march of the enemy. The Confederates were in full retreat. They had, indeed, got safely back across the Potomac; but it was believed that the army which had foiled McClellan at Richmond, and defeated Pope at Manassas, would be captured or annihilated. Men passed at a bound from the depths of depression to the heights of exultation. The speedy overthrow of the Confederacy was confidently anticipated. It seemed that this might be hastened by a warning proclamation, giving the insurgents the choice between prompt submission, and subjugation with the liberation of their slaves.

So judged the President of the United States; and accordingly, on the



22d of September, he issued a proclamation declaring that hereafter, as heretofore, the object of the war would be to restore the Union; that at the next meeting of Congress he should again propose a measure to compensate any slaveholding state, not then in rebellion, which should voluntarily undertake the abolition of slavery within its limits; that on the first day of January, 1863, all persons held as slaves in any state then in rebellion should be free; and that the executive government of the United States, including its military and naval force, would recognize the freedom of these slaves, and would do nothing to hinder them from acquiring the actual possession of it; that on this day he would designate the states, and parts of states, which should then be considered to be in rebellion, and to which this provision of the forthcoming proclamation should apply.

This warning proved entirely ineffectual, and, at the appointed time, the proclamation of emancipation was issued. It marked a new phase in the conduct of the war. The object was indeed unchanged, but entirely new measures were called into requisition to effect that object. Heretofore the claims of rebel masters to their slaves had been put upon the same footing as their claims to any other property. This claim might be annulled precisely like the claim to a horse. The slave coming into possession of the government became free simply because the claim of the master having lapsed, there was no other to take its place, for the United States could not assume property in slaves. Henceforth slavery in all the insurrectionary states was declared to be abolished, and all the military and naval power of the government was solemnly pledged to maintain the freedom of all slaves in these portions of the United States.<sup>1</sup>

Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, having remained loyal, were not included in this proclamation. A portion of Virginia, including the forty-eight counties soon to be known as the State of West Virginia, and seven others, subsequently recognized as the loyal state of Virginia, were also ex-

<sup>1</sup> The following is the text of the preamble and closing paragraph of the proclamation of September 22, 1862:

"I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States of America, and commander-in-chief of the army and navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare, that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States and each of the states, and the people thereof, in which states that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed.

"That it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all slave states so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which states may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the governments existing there, will be continued."

"And the Executive will in due time recommend that all citizens of the United States who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall (upon the restoration of the constitutional relation between the United States and their respective states and people, if that relation shall have been suspended or disturbed) be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves."

Attention was also called to the provisions of the acts of Congress which forbid the naval and military force from returning fugitives; which declare all slaves of persons engaged in the rebellion, who in any way come into the control of the government, to be free; and which forbid the return of fugitive slaves unless the claimant makes oath that he has not been engaged in the rebellion. The most important paragraphs of this proclamation were textually repeated in that of January 1, 1863, which we give in full:

#### "PROCLAMATION."

"Whereas, on the 22d day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a proclamation was issued by the President of the United States containing, among other things, the following, to wit:

"That on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any states or designated part of a state, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom.

"That the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states and parts of states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any state, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such state shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.

"Now, therefore, I, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred days from the day first above-mentioned, order and designate as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof respectively are this day in rebellion against the United States, the following, to wit:

"Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana (except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson, St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre Bonne, Lafourche, Ste. Marie, St. Martin, and New Orleans, including the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth City, York, Princess Anne, and Norfolk, including the cities of Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the present left precisely as if this proclamation were not issued.

"And by virtue of the power and for the purpose aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated states and parts of states are and henceforward shall be free; and that the executive government of the United States, including the military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of said persons.

"And I hereby enjoin upon the people so declared to be free to abstain from all violence, unless in necessary self-defence; and I recommend to them that, in all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable wages.

"And I further declare and make known that such persons, of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.

"And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of justice, warranted by the Constitution upon military necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God.

"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my name, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

"Done at the City of Washington this first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-seventh."

"By the President:  
WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State."

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

empt. Tennessee had all along been represented in the Federal Congress, and being in great part occupied by the national forces, was not held to be in insurrection. Thirteen parishes in Louisiana were held by our forces, and were not included in the insurrectionary districts. The number of slaves in these states and parts of states was 832,259. These remained, as before, slaves under the state laws. In the remaining slave states, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Texas, thirty-five parishes in Louisiana, and ninety-three counties in Virginia, were 3,108,197 slaves. These were all declared to be free.

During the interval between the issue of these two proclamations, and at various subsequent periods, the President and members of the cabinet expressed their views in respect to this measure and its probable influence upon the war. Mr. Seward wrote to the American minister to France<sup>1</sup> that the great problem of domestic slavery in the United States presented itself for solution when the war began. The people were intensely engaged in the difficult task of its solution. The President's message would carry the public mind still more directly and earnestly on its great work. Mr. Chase said that slavery, having come out of its shelter under state Constitutions and laws to assail the national life, must surely die. Who cared how its end came? In the rebel slave states it would come "by military order, decree, or proclamation, not to be disregarded or set aside in any event as a nullity, but maintained and executed with perfect good faith to all the enfranchised." In the loyal slave states it would come by the voluntary action of the people, aided by the free states. Meanwhile the American blacks must be called into this conflict as men, no longer as mere contrabands. We must follow the example of Andrew Jackson, who did not hesitate to oppose colored regiments to British invasion. We needed the good will of these men, and must make them our friends by showing ourselves their friends.<sup>2</sup> He had at first been averse to any interference with slavery in the states; but, as the war went on, "we put greater and greater armies into the field; but the slave population of the South was the real prop of the rebellion, raising provisions for the army while it was fighting in the field, so that they could have nearly all their laboring population in the battle-field, and they had another laboring population behind them to feed and support them. It seemed perfectly clear that we had to strike at this under-prop of the rebellion. The proclamation was the right thing in the right place."<sup>3</sup>

That the proclamation was irrevocable was firmly maintained. The President had been urged to retract it by some who considered it unconstitutional. He replied: "I think the Constitution invests the commander-in-chief with the laws of war in time of war. But, as law, the proclamation is either valid or invalid. If it is not valid it needs no retraction; if it is valid it can not be retracted any more than the dead can be brought to life."<sup>4</sup> Mr. Blair, the Postmaster General, said, "That measure, which involves both life and freedom in its results, when proclaimed was beyond revocation by either the civil or military authority of the nation. The people once slaves in the rebel states can never again be recognized as such by the United States. No judicial decision, no legislative action, state or national, can be admitted to re-enslave a people who are associated in our destinies in this war of defense to save the government, and whose manumission was deemed essential to the restoration and preservation of the Union and to its permanent peace."<sup>5</sup> Mr. Chase said, "Either the proclamation was a sham and an imposition in the face of the whole world, or else it was an effectual thing, and there are no slaves to-day in the rebel states. They are all enfranchised by the proclamation; for what says it? All the slaves are declared now and forever free, and the executive power of the nation is pledged to the maintenance of this freedom."<sup>6</sup>

It had been anticipated that this proclamation of emancipation would enlist the sympathy of the European governments upon the side of the Union. All our ministers abroad had urged the adoption of such a measure. The result failed to justify this anticipation. Mr. Dayton warned the government that it might look for efforts from portions of the foreign press to misstate the motives of the proclamation and the consequences which would follow it. Another effort in favor of recognition would be made, ostensibly on the ground of humanity, but really because emancipation would weaken the South and interfere with the production of cotton. On the other hand it was urged, especially in Great Britain, that the measure did not go far enough. Earl Russell, in a dispatch to Lord Lyons,<sup>7</sup> said that the proclamation was of a very strange nature. It professed to emancipate all slaves in places where the United States could not make emancipation a reality, but emancipate no one where the decree could be carried into effect. In some places a master could still recover his fugitive slave by process of law; in the other places, a slave, if arrested, was authorized to resist, and his resistance would be sustained by the military force of the United States. Slavery was therefore legal or illegal according to locality. There was no declaration of a principle adverse to slavery in the proclamation. It was merely a measure of war, and of a very questionable kind. The dispatch concluded by saying, "As President Lincoln has twice appealed to the judgment of mankind in his proclamation, I venture to say that I do not think it can or ought to satisfy the friends of abolition, who look for total and impartial freedom for the slave, and not for vengeance on the slave owner."

<sup>1</sup> December 1, 1862. <sup>2</sup> Letter to Loyal League, April 9, 1863. <sup>3</sup> Speech at Cincinnati, October 15, 1863. <sup>4</sup> Letter to the Springfield Convention, August 26, 1863. <sup>5</sup> Speech at Cleveland, May, 1863. <sup>6</sup> Speech at Cincinnati, October 15, 1863. <sup>7</sup> January 17, 1863.



## CHAPTER IX.

## POLICY OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT.

The Confederate Provisional Government.—Ultimate Object of the Secession Leaders.—First Session of Congress.—Military and Financial Bills.—The Slave Trade.—Second Session.—War accepted.—Privateering.—Debts to the North.—Adjournment to Richmond.—Third Session.—The President's Message.—Uprising of the South.—Wealthy Volunteers.—Hunter Secretary of State.—Judah P. Benjamin.—Men and Money voted.—Telegraph seized.—Alien and Confiscation Laws.—Number of alien Residents.—Result of the Confiscation.—Missouri received.—Last Session of the Provisional Congress.—President's Message.—The Danville Railroad.—The Permanent Government.—Constitution of the Congress.—Davis's first Message as permanent President.—Gloomy Prospects.—Too much attempted.—Conscription proposed.—Confederate Finances.—Cotton Loan.—Planters ask for Relief.—Reply of the Secretary of the Treasury.—Depreciation of the Currency.—Foreign Relations.—Lord John Russell and the Confederate Commissioners.—Yancey's Statement.—Weakened Condition of the Confederate Army.—Furloughs revoked.—The President's Conscription Message.—The first Conscription Act.—Its Provisions.—Exemptions.—Opposition in Georgia and Alabama.—The Situation in the Spring of 1862.—Delays of the Federal Armies in Virginia.—The Movement upon the Peninsula.—Panic at Richmond.—Increase of the Confederate Forces.—Lee as Commander-in-chief.—Failure of the Federal Campaign.—The Confederate Triumph and its Cost.—New Conscription Laws.—Davis and Butler.—Policy with respect to colored Soldiers.

IT is proposed in this chapter to describe the foreign and domestic policy of the Confederate government from its organization in February, 1861, down to the close of the year 1862, dwelling especially upon the conscription laws, which enabled it to bring into the field a greater proportion of its population than had ever before been done by any civilized people.

The government established at Montgomery on the 8th, and formally inaugurated on the 18th of February, 1861, was simply a compact entered into between six states claiming to be independent and equal. Florida, with 77,000 whites, had an equal vote with Georgia, having more than ten times as many. This government was only provisional, to expire, by its own limitation, in a year, unless sooner superseded. Though the compact was formed by only six states, it was certain that some, and believed that all, of the nine remaining slave states would enter into it in less than a year. Provision was made in the Constitution for the admission of new states by the vote of two thirds of each house of Congress. If all the slaveholding states joined the Confederacy, it would have possession of the mouths of the Mississippi, of both banks of its lower course for more than a thousand miles, and of one bank of each of its great affluents, the Missouri and Ohio, for three hundred miles more. This would practically give it the control of the whole valley drained by the Mississippi and its main affluents, and it was confidently expected that, as soon as the Confederacy was firmly established, the northwestern free states would unite with it, either formally by becoming members, or actually by withdrawing from the Union and forming a separate government in close affiliation with that of the South. Some even went farther in their views, and believed that, the Union being dissolved, the Middle States would follow the presumed example of those of the Northwest, and form still another government. Thus the Southern slaveholding Confederacy, even if it were joined by none of the free states, would become the preponderating power of the continent.

Provision was moreover made in the Constitution for the acquisition of new territory. This was only desired upon the southern border. The leaders of secession had for years favored the filibustering expeditions against Mexico and Central America; they had secured the annexation of Texas, and had introduced into the Democratic platforms of 1856 and 1860 resolutions directly or indirectly advocating the acquisition of Cuba. A saving clause was indeed added, that this acquisition should be made "upon terms honorable to ourselves and just to Spain;" but it was perfectly understood that Spain would give up Cuba only upon compulsion, and had formally declared that any proposition for its purchase would be considered as an insult. Although it now suited the policy of the Confederate government to deny any purpose of aggression, it is certain that ultimate accessions of territory were expected to be made from its southern neighbors. In all territory, howsoever or whencesoever acquired, slavery was to be recognized and protected. The idea of a great slaveholding confederacy, ultimately to embrace the whole tropical and semi-tropical regions of the North American continent, was predominant in the minds of many, if not all of the leaders of the secession.

So firmly was the idea of the speedy accession of the remaining slaveholding states implanted in the Southern mind, that, although the Constitution forbade the "importation of negroes of the African race from any foreign country," an exception was made in the case of "slaveholding states or territories of the United States of America;" and when the Confederacy, on the 6th of May, declared war, or, as it was phrased, recognized the existence of war with the United States, these slaveholding states were formally excepted from the declaration. And when, subsequently, laws were passed forbidding the payment of debts to citizens of the United States, ordering the expulsion or imprisonment of all alien enemies and the confiscation of their property, citizens of these states who had not actually engaged in hostilities against the Confederacy were expressly excluded from the operation of these laws. And when, still later, the illegal Sovereignty Convention in Kentucky, and the regularly deposed Governor Jackson, of Missouri, undertook to bring these states into the Confederacy, their action was promptly recognized, these states were formally received, their delegates admitted to seats in Congress, and the states were claimed as members of the Confederacy.

The action of the Confederate Congress was mainly held in secret session, and there are few means of tracing the actual course of sentiment. This, however, is of little consequence, for almost from the outset the government assumed the form of a strict military despotism, all essential functions being

centred in the President, Congress doing little more than act upon his suggestions and register his decrees. The idea was sedulously inculcated that there would be no real war; that the North dared not and could not fight, and, after a faint show of resistance, would recognize the independence of the Confederacy. But the leaders knew better. They were assured from the outset that their position must be maintained by arms if maintained at all. While talking of peace, they set at once about vigorous preparations for war. The President was directed to take charge of all military operations between the Confederacy and other powers; and on the 7th of March he was authorized to accept the services of 100,000 volunteers, to serve for twelve months unless sooner discharged, in order to "repel invasion, maintain the rightful possession of the Confederate States of America in every portion of territory belonging to each state, and to secure the public tranquillity against threatened assault." This warlike measure was adopted a full month before any attempt had been made to furnish supplies to Fort Sumter, and more than five weeks before the President of the United States had issued the call for 75,000 militia to suppress unlawful combinations and cause the laws to be duly executed.

The Congress adjourned after passing acts, none of which, with the exception of that calling for 100,000 volunteers, were of great importance. The principal ones provided for the issue of a million dollars in treasury notes to meet current expenses; authorized the appointment of commissioners to the European governments; regulated the transit of merchandise, and requested the various states to cede to the Confederacy the forts, arsenals, navy yards, and other public establishments which they had seized. The article in the Constitution prohibiting the foreign slave-trade had been adopted by the vote of four states against two, South Carolina and Florida opposing it. A bill was passed to carry this provision into effect. This was vetoed by the President on the ground that in one section of the bill provision was made to transfer slaves who had been illegally imported to the custody of foreign states or societies, upon condition of deportation and future freedom, and, in case this proposition was not accepted, the President was required to cause the negroes to be sold at auction to the highest bidder. This provision was held by Mr. Davis to be "in opposition to the policy declared in the Constitution, the prohibition of the importation of African negroes, and in derogation of its mandate to legislate for the effectuation of that object." The veto was sustained by Congress.

The government of the United States, having refused to receive Forsyth and Crawford, who announced themselves to be commissioners authorized by the Confederacy to enter upon negotiations upon all subjects growing out of the secession, gave formal notice, on the 8th of April, that provisions would be sent to Fort Sumter, peaceably if possible, otherwise by force. Thereupon ensued the bombardment and capture of that fort, the secession of other states, and other hostile measures which have already been fully detailed.


On the 12th of April the Confederate Congress was summoned to meet on the 29th, in consequence of the "declaration of hostile purposes contained in the message sent by President Lincoln to the government of South Carolina." In the mean time, the proclamation of President Lincoln of April 15, calling for 75,000 militia, and that of April 19, announcing the blockade of the Confederate ports, had been issued. The message of Mr. Davis, delivered at the opening of this session, has been cited at length in these pages.<sup>1</sup> On the 7th of May an act was passed recognizing war as existing between the Confederacy and the non-slaveholding states of the Union, and authorizing the issue of letters of marque and reprisal.<sup>2</sup> All captures and prizes made by these privateers were to be the property of the captors, and a bounty of twenty-five dollars was to be paid for every prisoner made by them and delivered into the hands of agents appointed for that purpose in Confederate ports, and a bounty of twenty dollars for each person on board of any armed vessel which should be destroyed by any privateer of equal or inferior force. But three weeks before the passage of this act the President had issued a proclamation inviting all persons to apply for letters of marque and reprisal. The military force then on foot was stated at 35,000 men, of whom 19,000 were at Charleston, Pensacola, Forts Morgan, Jackson, St. Philip, and Pulaski, and 16,000 on the way to Virginia. It was estimated that the government had control of arms and munitions to supply an army of 150,000 men. A law was passed forbidding the payment of any debt to any citizen of the non-slaveholding states, and all persons owing such debts were authorized to pay the amount in specie or its equivalent, or in treasury notes, into the public treasury, to be refunded with interest at the close of the war.

Virginia having in the mean while joined the Confederacy, it was evident that the immediate seat of hostilities would be transferred to that state,

<sup>1</sup> Ante, p. 113.

<sup>2</sup> The preamble to this act stated that, whereas the government of the United States had refused to treat with that of the Confederacy; the President of the United States had called for 75,000 men to capture forts and strong-holds belonging to the Confederate States; had announced his purpose to blockade their ports; "and whereas the State of Virginia has seceded from the Federal Union, and entered into a convention of alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Confederate States, and has adopted the provisional Constitution of the said states, and the states of Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Missouri have refused, and it is believed that the State of Delaware, and the inhabitants of the territories of Arizona and New Mexico, and the Indian Territory south of Kansas, will refuse to co-operate with the government of the United States in these acts of hostility and wanton aggression which are plainly intended to overawe, oppress, and finally subjugate the people of the Confederate States; and whereas, by the acts and means aforesaid, war exists between the Confederate States and the government of the United States and territories thereof, excepting the states and territories before mentioned; therefore it is enacted "that the President of the Confederate States is hereby authorized to use the whole land and naval force of the Confederate States to meet the war thus commenced, and to issue to private armed vessels commissions, or letters of marque and general reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, under the seal of the Confederate States, against the vessels, goods, and effects of the government of the United States, and of the citizens or inhabitants of the states and territories thereof, except the states and territories hereinbefore named."





THE FIRST CONFEDERATE CABINET.

ROBERT TOOMBS, Secretary of State.

JOHN H. REAGAN, Postmaster General.

JEFFERSON DAVIS, President.

LOUIS P. W. ADAMS, War.  
ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, Vice-President.CHARLES G. MEMMINGER, Treasury.  
STEPHEN M. MALLORY, Navy.

JUDAH P. BENJAMIN, Attorney General.





ROBERT M. T. HUNTER.

and from no point could they be so successfully conducted by the Confederates as from its capital. Accordingly, on the 22d of May the Congress adjourned to meet at Richmond on the 20th of July, and in the mean while the executive departments and the archives of the government were transferred to that city, which thus became the capital of the Confederacy.

The Congress met there at the appointed time, two days after the skirmish at Blackburn's Ford, and the day before the battle of Bull Run.

The message of President Davis announced that Alabama, Arkansas, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia had become members of the Confederacy. The enormous military preparations made by the United States, he said, was a distinct avowal that they were engaged, not with mere rioters and insurgents, but in a conflict with a great and powerful nation. They were driven to the practical acknowledgment that the ancient Union had been dissolved, they recognized the separate existence of the Confederate States by a blockade of Southern ports, and a prohibition of all intercourse with the inhabitants of the Confederacy, whom they no longer recognized as citizens of the United States, and upon whom they were waging an indiscriminate and ferocious war. In this war rapine was the rule; private houses were burnt; the crops in the fields, and every article of use or luxury remaining in the dwellings from which the owners had fled, were destroyed; even the acquisition of medicines for the sick and wounded was interdicted. These sweeping accusations were put forth, not for the information of Congress, but in order to inflame the Southern mind. They were made before a single Federal soldier had advanced a score of miles into any portion of the territory to which the Confederates, upon their own principles, had the shadow of a claim. A large portion of the inhabitants of the border slave states, he said, were opposed to the prosecution of the war, and many of them, if unrestrained by the presence of large armies, would joyfully unite with the South; hence they had been excepted in the enactments which authorized hostilities against the United States. The policy which had been secretly entertained, and was now openly avowed and acted upon by the Confederate government, would greatly extend the operations in the field. The forces hitherto raised had amply provided for the defense of

the states which originally organized the Confederacy; for, with the exception of three fortified islands, which were maintained by the preponderating naval power of the Union, its forces had been driven from every point, and now, at the expiration of five months from the organization of the government, not a single hostile foot pressed the soil of the original Confederacy. But the forces which had been sufficient to effect this would prove inadequate to repel invasion by half a million of troops now proposed by the enemy, and a large addition to the Confederate army would be necessary. The idea of any compromise or treaty which should involve the reconstruction of the Union was emphatically disavowed.

The South had, in the mean time, rushed to arms with an alacrity not less than that shown in the uprising of the North. Only 100,000 volunteers had been authorized by the law of the last session of Congress. More than this number offered themselves at once. In the Far South the question was not who should go, but who must stay. Companies were organized in every neighborhood and village, who urged their claims to acceptance. In answer to one such application, the Governor of Mississippi replied that he had but three regiments to fill, and had 150 companies to pick from. Large bounties were paid for the privilege of taking the place of an accepted volunteer. There were companies in which every private was wealthy, or the son of a wealthy man, every one having his negro servants in camp.<sup>1</sup> The report of the Secretary of War showed that early in July 194 regiments and 32 battalions had been accepted, numbering in all 210,000 men. At about the same time the Federal government had nominally in the field 230,000 men, exclusive of three months' volunteers, whose term was about to expire. The Federal Secretary of War hesitated to ask for more soldiers; the Confederate secretary recommended that Congress should call for and accept 300 regiments.

Robert Toombs resigned his post of Secretary of State, and was succeeded by Robert M. T. Hunter. It has long been a peculiarity of Virginia politics that the state is always supposed to have at least one man who is the embodiment of all political wisdom. In default of a better, the place has been at times assigned to a half-lunatic like Randolph, or an interminable declaimer like Wise. This position had somehow been accorded to Hunter, perhaps on the ground of long service; for, with a brief interval, he had been a representative or senator in Congress for nearly a quarter of a century. From 1849 onward he was chairman of the Committee of Finance in the Senate. He was chiefly noted for ponderous political platitudes to which constant repetition gave an air of profundity. In the Democratic Convention of 1860 he was named

as a candidate for the presidency; in the first dozen ballots he received, though with a wide interval, the highest vote after that cast for Douglas. In the scheme of secession as at first drawn up by Southern senators, Hunter was to have been President, and Davis commander-in-chief of the army; but the rapid march of events which followed the first movements for secession demanded a leader of a different stamp from the sluggish Virginian. In a purely military government, the post of Secretary of State, though nominally the one of first dignity in the cabinet, was of no practical importance, and the vanity of Virginia might be safely flattered by bestowing it upon her stolid favorite,<sup>2</sup> for whom it was claimed by his admirers that "he possessed in a more eminent degree the philosophical characteristics of Jefferson than any other statesman now living." The ponderous, pragmatical Virginian soon found himself out of place in the fiery revolutionary government. His fine-spun theories were brushed away like cobwebs by the fierce exigencies of the times. In a few months he was succeeded as Secretary of State by Judah P. Benjamin, of Louisiana.

Mr. Benjamin, as is indicated by his name, and still more evidently by his face, belongs to that keen and aspiring Hebrew race which for the last

<sup>1</sup> An Englishman, who thought himself fortunate in belonging to an accepted company, says that the hundred men of his company represented not less than \$20,000,000. "All of us," he writes, "wished to go forth and fight the Yankees; not that the Northerners were deemed worthy of such an honor, but there was a strong desire to get to close quarters with the enemy, and settle the question without farther delay. There was not a youth but fancied himself a match for any half dozen New Englanders. Captains of other companies begged us to give up our call, and offered magnificent compensation if we would let their companies report instead. Give up the chance of fighting the Yankees? No, indeed; we were the favored individuals, and not all the wealth of California could have bought us off in favor of others! Poor fellows! how soon the time changed. Glad would some of these hot heads have been to return home months subsequently."—*Battle-fields of the South, by an English Combatant*.

<sup>2</sup> The *Richmond Dispatch* of July 26, 1861, announces this cabinet change in terms which, while meant to be congratulatory, would have been exquisitely ironical if irony had been intended. It says: "Mr. Toombs was of a temper to prefer the active duties of a soldier, in such a crisis as the present, to the monotony of an office which, for the present, is little more than nominal. . . . Virginia's position in the Confederacy has been acknowledged by assigning to one of her statesmen the highest post in the Confederate cabinet. Mr. Hunter is so well known to the country that it would be supererogatory to dwell upon the qualities of mind and character which fit him so eminently for the post to which he has been called. It would be difficult to define an instance in which the trite phrase of speech so justly applies, 'The right man in the right place.'"



half century has wielded an influence in Christendom altogether disproportionate to its numbers. He was one of the most unscrupulous and by far the ablest member of the Louisiana bar. In 1853 he was elected to the Senate of the United States. He was soon recognized as one of the keenest debaters and the most finished orator in that assembly. As a lawyer, his main object was the acquisition of wealth; as a politician, to effect the dismemberment of the Union. When Jefferson Davis organized his first cabinet, Benjamin was appointed attorney general, a post for which he was expressly qualified by adroitness and unscrupulousness. After a while Leroy Walker, the incompetent Secretary of War, was displaced, and Benjamin was named as his successor. In this department his career was far from brilliant. The Congressional committee of inquiry attributed to his incompetency the disaster which befell the Confederate cause at Roanoke Island. But if he was out of place as head of the War Department, the astute Southern dictator had discovered that he possessed faculties too valuable to be lost; so, in face of Congressional censure, Judah P. Benjamin was appointed Secretary of State in March, 1862.

The session of the Confederate Congress which commenced on the 20th of July was short. The triumph at Bull Run, exaggerated by public report, had inspired the South with an overweening confidence of immediate success, and Congress was ready to grant more than the executive asked. The Secretary of War had asked for 300,000 men; Congress authorized the acceptance of 400,000. The issue of \$100,000,000 in treasury notes, payable in six months after the ratification of peace, and of a like amount in bonds, bearing eight per cent. interest, and payable in twenty years, was authorized, the notes to be receivable for all public dues except the export duty on cotton. A war-tax of fifty cents on the hundred dollars was imposed upon all real and personal property, including slaves; heads of families whose property amounted to less than \$500 being exempt. The President was authorized to take the control of all telegraphic lines and offices; to appoint agents wherever he chose to supervise all communications passing over the lines; no communication in cipher, or any of enigmatical or doubtful character, could be transmitted until its real purport was explained to the agent, and not then unless the person sending it was known to be trustworthy. Any person sending any dispatch relating to military operations without first submitting it to the inspection of the agent, or in any case sending a message calculated to aid the enemy, was to be punished by fine and imprisonment.

The Federal Congress had passed an act confiscating all property in the insurrectionary states which should be used in aid of the insurrection, including the enfranchisement of all slaves employed in the military or naval service of the insurgents. The Confederate Congress retaliated by passing sweeping acts ordering the banishment of all alien enemies, and the absolute confiscation of all their property of whatever kind, with the single exception of debts due them from the Confederacy, or from a state belonging to it. This confiscation act was to be retrospective, its operation applying to every right or claim of any citizen of the Union subsequent to the 21st day of May. By these acts, and the proclamations issued in accordance with them, all citizens of the non-slaveholding states of the Union, who should not at once declare their intention of becoming citizens of the Confederacy, and all subjects of neutral governments having a domicile within or carrying on business in the Union, were declared to be alien enemies. Every male of these classes above the age of fourteen years was required to leave the Confederacy within forty days. At the expiration of this period district attorneys and marshals were to make complaint against any such persons then remaining, the marshal arresting and keeping them in close custody. If the court so ordered, they were to be removed in such a way as to prevent them from acquiring any information that could be prejudicial to the Confederacy. Any alien who should return after being removed should be delivered over to the military authority, to be dealt with as a spy or prisoner of war, as the case might require. Receivers were appointed in the several districts, who were to summon before them all attorneys and counselors at law, all presidents and cashiers of banks, all administrative officers of railroads and other corporations, all agents of foreign merchants and corporations, all dealers in mercantile paper, all assignees and trustees of estates—all persons, in fine, "who were known to do business for others." To these persons a series of stringent questions was to be put, to which they were required to answer upon oath. They were required to testify whether then, or at any time after the 21st of May, they had in their possession or under their control any property in which an alien enemy had any right, title, or interest, direct or indirect. If such was the case, they were to give minute and specific information respecting it. If they had disposed of any such property or interest, they were to state when, to whom, and for what the sale had been made, and by whom the property was then held. The same provision applied to all debts due to any alien enemy. Every citizen was made a spy upon every other. Every person was to tell if he knew of any property held by or for, or any debts due to an alien enemy, describing them particularly, and giving the name and residence of the holder, debtor, trustee, or agent. The responsibility of the citizen was not limited to answering the questions actually propounded, but he was especially directed, in addition, to state every thing else that he knew "which may aid in carrying into full effect the sequestration act, and state the same as fully and particularly as if thereunto specially interrogated." If any attorney, agent, former partner, or trustee holding or controlling any property or interest in property belonging to an alien enemy failed to give information to the receiver, he was held to be guilty of a high misdemeanor, for which he was to be fined not more than \$5000, be imprisoned not more than six months, besides being liable to pay double the value of the property in question.

The number of persons directly affected by these laws was less than the framers supposed. There were residing in the Confederacy 233,000 persons born in neutral countries, of both sexes and of all ages. Of these a third were in Louisiana, another third in Texas and Virginia, leaving only a third in the eight remaining states. Of these only a few hundred came within the class of alien enemies by reason of having a residence or doing business in the Union. There were in the whole United States 4,136,069 residents of foreign birth, and of these 3,900,000 were in the Union states. There were resident in the Confederacy 98,000 natives of the border slave states. These were expressly excepted from the category of alien enemies, in accordance with the fixed policy of the government to consider these states as quasi members of the Confederacy. By the census of 1860 there were 120,000 natives of the free states, men, women, and children, resident in the eleven states which ultimately seceded. A large portion of these went to the North before the passage of these acts. Of those who remained, many gave in their adhesion to the Confederate government, leaving only a few thousands to be dealt with as alien enemies. These were unmercifully harried, but rather by self-constituted vigilance committees than by the slower legal process prescribed by the law. It is doubtful if a thousand persons were arrested and banished in the manner and by the forms prescribed in this alien act.<sup>1</sup>

Apart from its retaliatory intent, this law had a double purpose. Besides compelling the support of all the residents of the Confederacy, or at least preventing any open opposition to the government, and thus enabling it to present an apparently united front before the world, it was expected that it would bring a large amount of money into the treasury, which was now in sore need. The private debts due from the South to the North were estimated at \$200,000,000; the interest of Northern citizens in real estate, railroad and other stocks, and similar investments, could not be estimated at less than \$100,000,000 more. The whole \$300,000,000 was to be nominally swept into the Confederate treasury. But the anticipations of the framers of the law were disappointed. Private debtors saw no advantage in paying their debts into the treasury, and securing a discharge, when they could as well leave them wholly unpaid. In spite of the searching inquisition ordered, little actual property could be discovered in which alien enemies had an interest. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury nearly a year after the passage of the Confiscation Act set down the receipts, independent of loans, at \$14,000,000. A million and a half was derived from customs, ten and a half millions from the war-tax, and two millions from miscellaneous sources. The proceeds of the confiscation must be included under, and form only a part of this last head. There is no reason to believe that the net amount from confiscations exceeded half a million of dollars during the first year of the operation of the law.


An act was passed at this session to aid the disaffected citizens of Missouri in their opposition to the Federal government. This state was to be admitted to the Confederacy when the provisional Constitution had been duly ratified by the old state government under Claiborne Jackson, and, in the mean while, the President of the Confederacy was authorized to send Confederate troops to Missouri. An agreement for the accession of this state to the Confederacy was made at Richmond on the 31st of October, and ratified by an irregular meeting of the Legislature, where a quorum was obtained only by the admission of numerous proxies, on the 2d of November. Senators and representatives appointed by this body, not by the people, were sent to Richmond, where they were admitted to seats in the Confederate Congress at the next session.

Congress adjourned in September to meet on the 18th of November. At the opening only twelve members were present; but they represented six states, and the provisional Congress represented states in their collective capacity, and six states being a majority of the eleven, it was decided that these twelve members formed a quorum. The President's Message was delivered on the 19th. It gave a glowing account of the military operations in Virginia and Missouri, and defended the invasion of Kentucky; spoke in hopeful terms of the condition of the treasury; repeated the former charges against the Federal government for its manner of carrying on the war, and denounced the seizure of Mason and Slidell as a breach of international law and an insult to the British flag. The President made one suggestion, which was acted upon, and in the end became of great practical importance. For the successful prosecution of the war, it was indispensable that means should be supplied for transporting troops and military supplies. The war was to be waged mainly on the northern borders of the Confederacy, while men and supplies must be to a great extent drawn from the interior and the Far South. There were already two main systems of uninterrupted railroad communication between the northern and the southern portions. One was from Richmond along the sea-board, the other through Western Virginia to New Orleans. Besides these there was a third, complete with the exception

<sup>1</sup> The following table shows, as given in the census of 1860, the number of free persons residing in the seceding states who were born respectively in the free states, in the Union slave states, and in foreign countries:

States of the Confederacy.	Residents born in the Free States.	Residents born in the Union Slave States.	Residents born in Foreign Countries.
Alabama .....	5,930	2,955	12,352
Arkansas .....	11,049	20,298	3,741
Florida .....	2,010	375	3,309
Georgia .....	6,335	1,318	11,671
Louisiana .....	14,193	5,849	81,029
Mississippi .....	5,157	4,369	8,558
North Carolina .....	2,397	778	3,299
South Carolina .....	2,284	402	9,986
Tennessee .....	12,478	15,891	21,226
Texas .....	21,687	28,149	43,422
Virginia .....	36,757	17,744	35,058
	120,277	98,128	233,651





REUBEN DAVIS.  
LUCIUS Q. C. LAMAR.

JEFFERSON DAVIS, Senator.  
ALBERT G. BROWN, Senator.  
WILLIAM BARSSDALE.

OTHO R. SINGLETON.  
JOHN J. McRAE.

THE LAST DELEGATION FROM MISSISSIPPI IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

of an interval of forty miles between Danville, in Virginia, and Greensborough, in North Carolina. The construction of this short link would furnish a route through the interior of the Confederacy, and give access to a population and to military resources from which the government was then debarred, besides greatly increasing the safety and capacity of the transportation of troops and supplies from the farthest points. It was true that the Constitution prohibited Congress from appropriating money for internal improvements intended to facilitate commerce, but this prohibition might be obviated by considering this a military work. The mode suggested by the President was that Congress should give aid to a company organized to construct and carry on the work. The road was finally constructed directly by government, and in the end proved the salvation of the Confederacy by enabling it to transport troops rapidly between the East and the West. At more than one critical moment it practically increased by one half the offensive and defensive power of the Confederacy.

The provisional government of the Confederacy came to an end, by its

own limitation, on the 15th of February, 1862. Electors had in the meanwhile been appointed to choose a President and Vice-president for the permanent government. The choice had been declared early in November. It was a mere matter of form. No candidates were named in opposition to Davis and Stephens, who received the unanimous vote of the electors. The provisional Congress had been a mere temporary junta, appointed by the Conventions and Legislatures of the several states. It was succeeded by a permanent Congress chosen by the people. This body convened on the 18th of February. Missouri and Kentucky having been recognized as members of the Confederacy, and sent delegates to both houses, all the slaveholding states were represented except Delaware and Maryland. The Senate, when full, consisted of 26 members. Nineteen were present at the opening. The House, if full, would have consisted of 112 members.

About twenty-five of these men had been members of the Congress of the United States in 1860. Of these, Alabama sent Clay to the Confederate Senate; Curry, Pugh, and Clopton to the House. Arkansas sent Johnson to



JOHN W. H. UNDERWOOD.  
MARTIN J. CRAWFORD.ROBERT TOOMBS, Senator.  
THOMAS HARDENMAN.PETER F. LOVE.  
JOHN J. JONES.

ALFRED IVERSON, Senator.

JOSHUA HILL.

LUCIUS J. GARTRELL.  
JAMES JACKSON.


THE LAST DELEGATION FROM GEORGIA IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

the Senate. Georgia sent Hill to the Senate, and Gartrell to the House. Mississippi sent Brown to the Senate; Reuben Davis, McRae, Singleton, and Barksdale to the House. North Carolina sent Smith to the House, all her other members being new men. South Carolina sent to the House Boyce, Miles, Bonham, and McQueen, four of her seven last representatives in the Federal Congress; she also sent to the Senate Orr and Barnwell, who had formerly represented her at Washington. Besides these former members of the Federal Congress, there were about half a score of men in this Confederate Congress who had acquired some political reputation. The other members were new men, thrown up from the masses by the fierce fires of secession.

The inauguration of Jefferson Davis as permanent President of the Confederacy took place on the 22d of February, the 130th anniversary of the birthday of Washington. Three days after he sent in his message, setting forth the condition of the Confederacy. The new government began under gloomy auspices. At the East, Burnside had captured Roanoke Island, and

effected a firm lodgment in North Carolina. In the West, Grant had taken Fort Donelson; the Confederate forces, driven from Bowling Green, were evacuating Kentucky, and were in a few days to abandon Nashville, which had a few months before been named in Congress as the future capital of the Confederacy; Zollicoffer had been defeated and killed at Mill Spring; Price, driven from Missouri into Arkansas, had been defeated at Pea Ridge. Savannah was threatened by the Federal gun-boats. New Orleans, although no one then knew it, was in a few weeks to be captured by Farragut, inflicting what then seemed the one great blow to which the Confederacy was exposed. The great Federal force on the Potomac, which had been transformed from a crowd into an army, hung threatening over Virginia, and was almost ready to strike at Richmond, the heart of the Confederacy. The hope of foreign interference, upon which, in spite of protestations to the contrary, great reliance had been placed, was at an end. The maritime powers of Europe had recognized the efficiency of the blockade, and in shutting their ports to prizes had rendered useless the law for sending out privateers.





SYDENHAM MOORE,  
CLEMENT C. CLAT, Senator,  
JAMES A. STALLWORTH.

WILLIAMSON R. W. CORR,  
BENJAMIN FITZPATRICK, Senator,  
DAVID CLOFTON.

JAMES I. FECH,  
JAMES L. M. CREECH,  
GEORGE S. HIGGINS.

THE LAST DELEGATION FROM ALABAMA IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.


There was no way of turning a prize to profit. The Confederate ports were shut by the Federal blockade; neutral ports by the orders of the governments of Europe.

In face of these facts and many others of like nature, Davis frankly acknowledged what he could not deny. "Events," he said, "have demonstrated that the government had attempted more than it had the power successfully to achieve. Hence, in the effort to protect by our arms the whole territory of the Confederate States, sea-board and inland, we have been so exposed as recently to suffer great disasters." In this message the President intimated rather than declared what was necessary to enable the Confederate States to wage a successful war with their more numerous enemy. Troops must be enlisted for long terms, instead of the short ones for which they had hitherto taken the field. He hesitated even then to announce that the whole population of the South capable of bearing arms must be conscripted, and every man be made liable at any moment to be forced into the active army.

The one bright point which the President found in the general gloomy aspect of affairs was the condition of the finances of the Confederacy. "The financial system," he said, "devised by the wisdom of your predecessors, has proved adequate to supplying all the wants of the government. We have no floating debt; the credit of the government is unimpaired; the total expenditure for the year has been \$170,000,000—less than the value of the cotton crop of the year." He could hardly have foreboded, or, if he foresaw, did not care to say, that in a few months the financial question would become quite as important as the military one; that the deficit in the Confederate funds would involve as much peril and suffering as any possible disaster in the field.

At the outset the Confederate government had no lack of money for immediate purposes. The treachery of Floyd, and the seizure of forts and arsenals, had furnished arms and munitions for the first volunteers. Regiments fitted out at their own cost, or by the states, were offered to the government. The first 100,000 men were put into the field costing the Confed-





LAWRENCE M. KRITT  
WILLIAM W. BOYCE

JAMES CHESTNUT, Senator.

JOHN McQUEEN.  
JOHN D. ASHMORE.

JAMES H. HAMMOND, Senator.

MILLEDDGE L. BONHAM.  
WILLIAM PORCHER MILES.

THE LAST DELEGATION FROM SOUTH CAROLINA IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES.

eracy hardly a dollar. A brief war, if any, was anticipated, requiring no great outlay. Wanting, and, to superficial view, likely to want very little money, the credit of the Confederacy at home was good; so, when a loan of \$3,000,000 was asked, nearly double the amount was offered at or above par. The government wisely accepted the whole. At that time the Federal government could hardly borrow a less sum upon any terms. This loan was soon exhausted, and much larger amounts were required. The capital at the South seeking investment was small. For years, whenever any man had accumulated money, he invested it in lands and slaves, which were devoted to the production of cotton, which gave larger and surer returns than any other investment. The annual cotton crop of the South had been for some years worth not less than \$200,000,000 a year, almost double the value of the gold product of California and Australia. Nearly all of this was exported. As a medium of exchange, cotton was equivalent to gold; but, unless as an article of export, it was worthless. If detained in the region where produced, it was a burden and nuisance. When the government found that it must contract large loans, it endeavored to make cotton a basis for secur-

ing them. The plan was that every cotton-grower should pledge himself by formal contract to lend to the government a certain portion of the proceeds of his cotton, receiving therefor bonds payable at a long day, with heavy interest. The government was not to buy the cotton directly. The planter was to sell it, as formerly, through his agents; but the money for the portion agreed upon, instead of being paid to him, was to be sent to the government, the planter receiving in lieu treasury bonds. It was estimated that one half of the product of his cotton might thus be spared by the planter. This, if the whole year's crop were sold as usual, would give the government \$100,000,000. Agents were sent every where to urge the planters to make this conditional loan, and in a few weeks it was announced that \$50,000,000 had been pledged; but, before any considerable part of the cotton could be sold, the blockade of the Southern ports shut it out from a market. The cotton was worthless. The government would have only the agreement of the planter to loan it half the proceeds when sold; the planter merely the agreement of government to give its bonds for it when sold and the proceeds paid over to it.



Meanwhile the planters were thrown into great distress. The usual practice at the South had been to sell the crop and receive the pay a year in advance. They had received the money for this crop from Northern merchants, and had spent it. As the market was cut off, they had no means of carrying on their estates the coming year. They asked government to come to their relief. Many modes were suggested, all of which resolved into two. Some proposed that the government should purchase the whole cotton crop; others that it should advance one half of its value, payment or advance to be made, not in bonds, but in treasury notes, which had become the general circulating medium of the country. Mr. Memminger, the Secretary of the Treasury, replied to these propositions on the 17th of October. Government, he said, wanted to raise money. These suggestions proposed that it should spend money. That which was the least objectionable, because it involved the smallest outlay, proposed that government should loan \$100,000,000 on pledge of the forthcoming cotton crop, receiving only the notes of the planters. The other plan, that government should buy the whole existing crop, involved the issue of \$150,000,000, being the whole value of the cotton, less the \$50,000,000 of cotton loan pledged. But cotton, unless brought to market, was of no use to the government. In either case it would have to pay out the money which was essential to its very existence, and receive in exchange notes or produce which it did not need and could not use. To carry on the war, treasury notes to the amount of \$100,000,000 had been issued, and these had become the measure of value; if another like amount were issued no new value would be created; the effect would be that two dollars must be paid for that which could now be purchased for one. Government, being the largest buyer, would thus pay double price for its purchases, and would actually sink the whole hundred millions which it had advanced. The planters were told that they could expect no special aid from government, and they must look out for themselves, like all the rest of the community. They were advised, in the first place, to produce little cotton, but to devote themselves to the cultivation of provisions, and to make their own clothing, looking for money to loans from the banks, to be secured by factors' acceptances based on pledges of produce. Banks could manage such loans much better than government, and, besides, much less advances would be looked for from them than from government. These suggestions were accepted to a great extent. The cotton crop of 1862 was estimated at less than a quarter of that of the preceding year, and the production of food was largely increased. The cotton already gathered was left on the hands of the planters, and, some months later, a law was passed ordering it to be destroyed whenever it was about to fall into the hands of the enemy, who were advancing into the Confederate States by the coast and in the West.

At a later period, when the value of cotton had been advanced fourfold in the European markets, the policy of the Confederate government in respect to it was changed. Swift steamers were built in the British ship-yards on the Clyde and Mersey to run the blockade, taking in arms and munitions, and carrying out cotton. The Confederate government purchased cotton and shipped it, receiving returns in gold and arms. The gold was employed in Europe for the purchase of arms and munitions; the arms and munitions partly by running the blockade and partly through Mexico. Every blockade-runner was compelled to take a certain part of its cargo on government account; the remainder was at the risk and for the profit of the owners. If one trip out of three was successful, the whole adventure was profitable.

The exigencies of the treasury in the mean time compelled the issue of paper money to an amount far exceeding the utmost estimates of the secretary. In January, 1861, the whole amount of currency in circulation at the South was \$80,000,000. In January, 1863, it was \$300,000,000. The decrease in value, when once it set in, was more rapid than the increase in amount. The old story of the Sibylline books was reversed. Every fresh issue of paper made the whole amount of less value than before. In September, 1861, when the issue of Confederate notes was \$100,000,000, they were nominally equivalent to specie. Then the depreciation began. In November, specie commanded 20 per cent. premium; in April, 1862, 50 per cent.; in September, 100; at the opening of 1863, fully 300. That is, government, the largest purchaser, had to pay for its supplies four times as much in notes at the close of 1862 as it paid fifteen months before. Subsequently the depreciation became still greater. As we shall hereafter see, by the middle of 1864, in spite of stringent measures to reduce the amount of currency by imposing a tax which practically amounted to the repudiation of a large part of its old issues, Confederate notes were worth barely five cents upon a dollar.

The foreign relations of the Confederacy, when the permanent government was organized, were wholly unsatisfactory. The South had from the outset looked to the speedy recognition of the Confederacy by the European powers. Even if this were not followed by actual war between Great Britain and the United States, it was believed that it must result in measures which would greatly benefit the South. Great Britain, it was argued, must in any case have American cotton; the blockade prevented her from getting it except in small quantities and at enormous prices. She would therefore be driven, right or wrong, to refuse to regard the blockade. Her merchantmen, protected, if need were, by her fleet, would throng to Confederate ports, bringing in arms, supplies, and gold, and taking away cotton, tobacco, and rice. To effect such a recognition was the first object of Confederate diplomacy. To do this, it was necessary, in the first place, to neutralize the strong anti-slavery feeling in Great Britain, and then to convince her of the commercial advantages which would result from recognition and free trade with the South.

Yancey, Mann, and Rost, the first Confederate commissioners to Europe, sought an early interview with Lord John Russell, the British Foreign Secretary. He refused to receive them in their official capacity, but gave them an unofficial reception. They assured him that the real cause of the secession was not slavery, but the high price which the South was obliged to pay for manufactured goods, in order to protect Northern manufacturers. This, indeed, was in direct contradiction to the emphatic and really official declaration of Alexander H. Stephens, that "African slavery as it exists among us was the immediate cause of the late rupture and present revolution." It was in direct contradiction to every speech and declaration of Southern politicians and statesmen from first to last, before and after the secession. One of the first acts of the Southern Congress, the commissioners went on to say, was to reduce the duties upon imports, while the new tariff of the United States would nearly exclude British manufactures from the North. Of the \$350,000,000 annually exported from the United States, \$270,000,000 were the products of the Southern states. They had this amount to sell, and for it they wanted the manufactures of Europe, especially those of Great Britain. Russell intimated that the Confederacy would reopen the slave-trade. The commissioners denied this. The Confederate Constitution directly prohibited this trade, and there was no purpose to revive it. This interview took place on the 4th of March, 1861, and, although it was far from satisfactory to the Southern commissioners, they decided to remain in London for a while, hoping that the recognition of the Southern Confederacy would not long be delayed.

In August they addressed a formal note to the Foreign Secretary urging the recognition of the Confederacy upon the same general grounds, and complaining of the British proclamation of neutrality. The rule prohibiting prizes of either belligerent from entering British ports they declared to be a protection to the commerce and ships of the United States; for Southern ports being shut up by the blockade, and neutral ones closed by proclamation to Confederate prizes, they could only destroy any captures they might make. They then addressed themselves to the work of neutralizing the "anti-slavery sentiment so universally prevalent in England, which shrunk from the idea of forming friendly public relations with a government recognizing the slavery of a part of the human race." They declined discussing with a foreign power the question of the morality of slavery, but asserted that the Federal government was no more hostile to slavery than was the Confederate. The party in power in the Union, they said, had proposed to guarantee slavery forever in the states if the South would remain in the Union. "The object of the war, as officially announced, was not to free the slave, but to keep him in subjection to his owner, and to control his labor through the legislative channels which the Lincoln government designed to force upon the master." They therefore confidently believed "that, as far as the anti-slavery sentiment of England was concerned, it could have no sympathy with the North, and would probably become disgusted with a canting hypocrisy which would enlist those sympathies under false pretenses." The reply to this communication was that her majesty's government would not pretend to pronounce judgment upon the questions in debate between the United States and their adversaries; that it would not depart from its strictly neutral position; would not acknowledge the independence of the seceding states until the fortune of arms or the more peaceful mode of negotiation should have more clearly determined the respective positions of the two belligerents. Late in November the commissioners made one more attempt upon the British government. Under express instructions from Mr. Davis, they endeavored to show that the blockade was ineffective, and pointed out the commercial interests affected by it. The reply was sharp and decisive: "Lord Russell presents his compliments to Mr. Yancey, Mr. Rost, and Mr. Mann. He had the honor to receive their letters and inclosures of the 27th and 30th of November, but, in the present state of affairs, he must decline to enter into any official communication with them."

Mr. Yancey, having been elected to the Confederate Senate, returned to the South after the absence of a year. In giving an account of the results of his mission, he said that the Confederacy had no friends in Europe. The sentiment there was anti-slavery, and that portion of public opinion represented by the government of England was abolition. But the North, also, had no friends in Europe. The independence of the South would be recognized only when the North was forced to acknowledge it. The nations of Europe would never raise the blockade until it suited their interest, but he believed they would find it necessary to do so at an early day. Mason and Slidell had in the mean time been busy in London and Paris. Rost was sent to Spain, and Mann to Belgium; but they were unable to induce the European powers, all of whom had expressly or tacitly agreed to act in common, to recognize the Confederacy, or to depart from their position of absolute neutrality.

But the immediate difficulty which confronted the Confederacy at the organization of its permanent government was the condition of the army. The Confederate army of 1861 was composed mainly of men who had enlisted for a year, and their term of enlistment was about to expire. The time of 148 regiments would close in thirty days. Few of the men composing these regiments had re-enlisted. The rush of volunteers had ceased. Gay young men no longer contended for the honor of going to fight the Yankees. The long interval of inaction which had followed the battle of Bull Run, during which the Federal government was busy in gathering and training its recruits, had fearfully impaired the efficiency of the Confederate armies. The force which for months lay defiantly almost in sight of Washington was far less strong than was imagined. Had the Federal leaders known its real strength, they might have ventured a movement early in 1862 which would



have swept it away. Beyond this army the Confederacy had at the moment no formidable force in the field. Richmond was almost destitute of defense.

The disasters which the Confederacy experienced in the early months of 1862 awoke the government to its danger, and pointed out its sole means of salvation. Their extended line of offense and defense must be contracted, and their forces concentrated upon vital points. Above all, the army must be largely increased. Furloughs had been so freely granted that the regiments in the field had been greatly weakened. By a general order of March 24, every furlough and leave of absence was summarily revoked; every officer and man absent from duty, except on a surgeon's certificate of disability, was ordered to return at once to his command. The President, in a special message to Congress, said that the laws for raising armies should be reformed. They had been so frequently changed that it was often impossible to determine what the law actually was. There was, moreover, a conflict between state and Confederate legislation. There must be some general system for raising armies, the power for which was by the Constitution vested in Congress. This necessity was now rendered imminent by the vast preparations made by the enemy for a combined assault at numerous points. The state had a right to demand military service of every citizen, but it was not wise to place in active service the very young or the very old. Those under eighteen required instruction; those of mature age were needed to maintain order at home. These two classes constituted the reserve, to be called out and kept in the field only in an emergency. To retain this reserve intact it was necessary, in a great war like this, that all capable persons of intermediate age should pay their debt of military service to the country. He therefore recommended that a law should be passed declaring that all persons residing in the Confederate States between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five, not legally exempt, should be held in the military service; that a prompt system should be adopted for their enrollment and organization, and that all laws conflicting with this system should be repealed.

The first general conscription law of the Confederacy, framed in accordance with this recommendation, was passed on the 16th of April, 1862. It withdrew every non-exempt citizen of the prescribed age from state control, and placed him absolutely at the disposal of the President during the war. It annulled all contracts made with volunteers for short terms, holding them in service for two years additional, should the war continue so long. All twelve months' recruits below eighteen and over thirty-five years, who would otherwise have been exempted by this law, were to be retained in service for ninety days after their term expired. The President might, with the consent of the several governors, employ state officers to make the enrollment, but, if this consent was not given, the President should appoint Confederate officers for that purpose. When all the companies and regiments from any state should have been filled, the remainder of enrolled men should be held as a reserve, from whom should be drawn by lot, at intervals of not less than three months, details to keep the companies always full. This reserve, while at home, was not to receive pay or be subject to the articles of war, except that, if they refused to obey the President's call, they should be treated as deserters. Whenever the exigencies of the service required it, the President was authorized to call out the entire reserve. This law was silent as to exemptions from service. The omission was remedied by subsequent orders; and as the course of events required still larger demands upon the people, these exemptions were more and more restricted, until they finally included only members of Congress and the state Legislatures, and such officials as were absolutely essential to administer the state and national governments; certain clergymen, teachers, and physicians; a few editors and printers; and a certain number of persons absolutely required to conduct agricultural operations and oversee slaves.<sup>1</sup>

Provision was made for carrying this sweeping conscription bill into prompt execution. Camps of instruction were established, where the enrolled men were collected and drilled, and in each state there was a commander of conscripts charged with the supervision of the new levies. These were sent off in squads and companies, to be formed into regiments as government pleased. State pride was, however, fostered by putting the recruits from each state together under officers from their own states.

There were some murmurs against this law, which virtually made every white male between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five a soldier, liable to be brought into active service at a moment's notice by the mere call of the President. These murmurs were promptly suppressed every where except

in Georgia and Arkansas, where it seemed that a conflict might arise between state and Confederate authorities. Officers of the state militia had been arrested by the enrolling officers. The governor demanded their release, threatening to arrest any Confederate officer who should arrest any state officer. The Confederate authorities yielded the point; but adding, through the Secretary of War, "If you arrest any of our enrolling officers in their attempts to get men to fill up the Georgia regiments now in the face of the enemy, you will cause great mischief. I think we might as well drive out our common enemy before we make war upon each other." Brown, the irascible and pragmatic governor, was mollified by this concession to his dignity as chief magistrate of a sovereign state. He said that he was happy that the Confederate government had decided to respect the constitutional rights of the state so far as not to force her to the alternative of permitting any department of her government to be destroyed, or to defend herself by force. A local judge in Georgia pronounced the conscription law to be unconstitutional, but his decision was set aside by the Supreme Court of the state.

The disasters which compelled the Confederate government to adopt the policy of concentrating its forces in Virginia caused great excitement in the states beyond the Mississippi. Governor Rector, of Arkansas, issued an appeal to the people of that state calling them to arms, and more than insinuating that the Confederate government had deserted the state, and that the call of the President for troops from Arkansas should be disregarded, and even hinting at the formation of a new confederacy of the Southwest.<sup>1</sup> The Confederate government wisely forbore here, as in Georgia, to enter upon a controversy with one of the states. The wisdom of concentrating its force in Virginia was soon apparent, and at the next election Rector was defeated.

The conscription law was at once put into execution. Sweeping as it was, and rapidly as it was enforced, it was not an atom too sweeping, and barely in time to save the Confederacy from destruction. The Federal government, with the start in preparation of fully four months, delayed the advance of its troops upon Richmond, hesitating which line to adopt, when an advance upon either of the proposed lines could hardly have failed of success. A full month of precious time was lost before the advance was begun. Another month was wasted in the siege of Yorktown, where an army of fully 100,000 men was held in check by barely a tenth of their number. Three weeks more were taken up in the cautious advance across the Peninsula. Thus three full months, every day of which was of vital moment to the Confederacy, were lost by the Federal army before it was fairly in the neighborhood of Richmond.

For the greater part of this time the Confederate authorities well-nigh despaired of being able to defend their capital. On the 21st of April, while the Federal army was in check before Yorktown, the Confederate Congress adjourned in such haste as to show that the members were anxious to provide for their own personal safety. The newspapers were bitter in their invectives against the fugitives. One invented the euphonious word "skeddaddle" to designate their flight. Another said that the stampeding members, afraid of railroad accidents, had gone off by canal, a regiment of ladies being sent to clear the tow-path. They would escort the members to the mountains, and, leaving them under the protection of the children until McClellan would suffer them to come forth, would return to the defense of the country. But the alarm was by no means confined to Congress. The railway trains were blocked up by fugitives; the President sent his family to Raleigh; the government archives were packed up ready to be sent to Columbia, South Carolina. The state Legislature, however, passed resolutions calling upon the Confederate authorities to defend Richmond to the last extremity, and this demand was seconded by the local authorities of the capital. Fortifications were thrown up around the city, and the approaches by the James River were blocked up. Above all, time had been gained. Early in June the conscription law began to produce its effects in filling up the ranks, and by the time the Federal army was prepared to open its direct attack it found itself confronted by fully equal forces, and in a few weeks was greatly outnumbered.

The President of the Confederacy had in the mean while given a great commander to its armies. Congress had not long before passed a bill creating the office of commanding general, who should take charge of the mili-

<sup>1</sup> The various conscription laws of the Confederacy were passed in secret session, and do not appear to have been published in full. The *Richmond Examiner*, an opposition journal, of January 30, 1864, published an abstract of the Military Bill which had not long before passed the Senate, and was then under consideration in the House. In this abstract, officers of the general and state departments are placed among the exemptions. The *Richmond Sentinel*, the organ of the government, of February 17, gives an abstract of the bill as finally passed, the injunction of secrecy having been removed. The following is its abstract of exemptions:

"The tenth section provides that no person shall be exempt except the following: ministers, superintendents of deaf, dumb, and blind or insane asylums; one editor to each newspaper, and such employes as he may swear to be indispensable; the Confederate and state public printers, and the journeymen printers necessary to perform the public printing; one apothecary to each drug store, who was and has been continuously doing business as such since October 10, 1862; physicians over thirty years of age of seven years' practice, not including dentists; presidents and teachers of colleges, academies, and schools, who have not less than thirty pupils; superintendents of public hospitals established by law, and such physicians and nurses as may be indispensable for their efficient management. One agriculturist on each farm where there is no white male adult not liable to duty, employing fifteen able-bodied slaves between ten and fifty years of age, upon the following conditions: the party exempted shall give bond to deliver to the government in the next twelve months 100 pounds of bacon, or its equivalent in salt pork, at government selection, and 100 pounds of beef for each such able-bodied slave employed on said farm, at commissioners' rates. In certain cases this may be commuted in grain or other provisions. The officers and employes of railroad companies engaged in military transportation, not beyond one for each mile used in such transportation, and under certain restrictions. Also exempt mail contractors and carriers."

This abstract makes no mention of the officials of the general or state governments; but it is probable that they were exempted by other sections, for it is provided that the President may detail artisans, mechanics, or persons of scientific skill to perform indispensable services in various departments.

"By the authority and sanction of the Military Board, whose duty it is to protect the state from invasion, whose right it is to call an army into the field when the Confederate States refuse or neglect to protect the people, I call upon each and every man capable of bearing arms to prepare at once to meet the enemy. The law is that every able-bodied free white male inhabitant between the ages of eighteen and forty-five shall constitute the militia of the state. . . . All men between these ages, if physically able, may be called to the field now, the state being invaded. The state, always sovereign, is sovereign yet in her reserved rights, one of which is to defend her own soil, her own government, her own people." Arkansas, he said, had severed her connection with the United States upon the doctrine of state sovereignty, and formed an alliance with the other Confederate states. She had lavished her blood in support of the Confederacy. "She had done this because of her generous confidence that, when the evil hour came upon her, the Confederate flag would be found floating from her battlements, defying the invader, and giving succor to her people. But untoward events had placed her beyond the pale of protection. Much impaired, though still capable of resistance, she will strike a blow for liberty, and continue to be free. If left to her fate, she will carve a new destiny rather than be subjugated. It was for liberty she struck, and not for subordination to any created secondary power North or South. Her best friends are her natural allies nearest at home, who will pulsate when she bleeds, whose utmost hope is not beyond her existence. If the arteries of the Confederate heart do not permeate beyond the east bank of the Mississippi, let Southern Missourians, Arkansians, Texans, and the great West know it, and prepare for the future. Arkansas lost, abandoned, subjugated, is not Arkansas as she entered the Confederate government; nor will she remain Arkansas, a Confederate state, desolated as a wilderness. Her children, fleeing from the wrath to come, will build them a new ark, and launch it on new waters, seeking a new haven somewhere of equality, safety, and rest." This address closed with a call for 4500 volunteers from the militia of the state. If sufficient volunteers were not forthcoming, the deficiency would be supplied by draft. "Troops raised under this call," it was significantly added, "will not be transferred to Confederate service, under any circumstances, without their consent, and on no account unless a Confederate force sufficient to prevent invasion is sent into the state. These are raised exclusively for home protection. Horses, horse equipments, and arms lost by the casualties of war will be paid for by the state."—*Address of Governor Rector*, May 5, 1862.



tary movements of the war. The design of the bill was to place Joseph E. Johnston at the head of the forces of the Confederacy. The President, with whom Johnston had never been a favorite, vetoed the bill; but Johnston, in virtue of his rank as senior general, commanded in the field before Richmond. A wound received on the 2d of June disabled him for a time; and on the following day Davis appointed Lee to the nominal office of commanding general, the order providing that he should "act under the direction of the President." There had been nothing in Lee's previous career indicating that he possessed qualities beyond those of a brave and energetic subordinate. As commander of the state forces he had not been successful in Western Virginia. His sudden appointment to the chief command of the Confederate forces was considered by the opponents of the administration as a part of Mr. Davis's plan of holding every thing under his own control, by studiously keeping down every man who might by possibility become his rival. It is hardly possible that in such a crisis this could have been the motive for the promotion of Lee. It is far more probable that in him the President saw the great general. But, be this as it may, in the appointment of Lee to the chief command the Confederate forces gained as their leader one of the great masters of the art of war.

The Federal campaign in the Valley and on the Peninsula was a failure. In the early days of June Richmond was in the utmost peril. In the early days of July the Federal forces had been forced to the James River. In the early days of August the Federals were driven back from Cedar Mountain. At the close of the month, after losing the battles near the old field of Bull Run, the Army of the Potomac was driven back upon Washington. In the early days of September the Confederates were crossing the Potomac, invading Maryland, and threatening Washington.

When the Confederate Congress reassembled at Richmond on the 15th of August, the President might well offer his congratulations upon the issue of the events of the last four months. "The vast army," he said, "which threatened the capital of the Confederacy has been defeated and driven from the lines of investment." The conscription law had saved the Confederacy; but this had been done at a fearful cost. The levy embracing all between eighteen and thirty-five had been exhausted. It was necessary to extend the conscription law so as to enable the President to call into active service all persons between thirty-five and forty-five. A law was passed to this effect on the 27th of September, but the power thus conferred was not exercised until the expiration of almost a year. In July, 1863, the President called into active service all between eighteen and forty-five. Seven months later, in February, 1864, a new law was passed still farther extending the conscription, by including in it all between the ages of seventeen and fifty. The full consideration of these two last conscription laws belongs to a subsequent period of this history.

The Confederates had from the very outset employed slaves and free colored persons in a military capacity. The works before Charleston, commenced late in 1860, were mainly thrown up "by large gangs of negroes from the plantations,"<sup>1</sup> and by free negroes of Charleston, of whom 150 in a single day offered their services to the Governor of South Carolina.<sup>2</sup> In April the Lynchburg Republican proposed "three cheers for the patriotic free negroes of Lynchburg," of whom seventy had "tendered their services to the governor to act in whatever capacity may be assigned them in defense of the state." It was triumphantly announced that all the fortifications required for the harbor of Norfolk could be erected by the voluntary labor of negroes.<sup>3</sup> In June the Legislature of Tennessee passed an act authorizing the governor to "receive into the military service of the state all male free persons of color between the ages of fifteen and fifty;" and if a sufficient number did not volunteer they were to be impressed. The Southern newspapers of 1861 were full of accounts of colored volunteers. One told of a grand display, held November 23, at New Orleans, where 28,000 troops were reviewed, among whom was a "regiment composed of 1400 free colored men." The works at Manassas Junction were mainly thrown up by the slaves of the neighboring planters.<sup>4</sup> In February, 1862, the Virginia House of Delegates passed a bill ordering the enlistment of free colored persons for six months. On the 10th of March Mr. Foote declared in the Confederate Congress that, when Nashville was surrendered, 1000 or 1500 slaves had been called out and employed on the fortifications. In November, Governor Brown, of Georgia, called for slaves to complete the fortifications of Savannah; if these were not voluntarily tendered, a levy would be made upon every planter in the state of one slave out of five, which would give a working force of 15,000. Subsequent to this time still more stringent measures were taken to bring negroes into the Confederate service.

Up to the beginning of 1863 the only law passed by the Federal Congress for the employment of colored soldiers was the act of July 17, 1862, authorizing the President to employ in the naval and military service of the United States persons of African descent, and freeing the families of such persons, provided they belonged to masters in rebellion. The passage of this law aroused an intense feeling throughout the South, of which the Confederate government promptly took advantage. In his message of August 15, President Davis complains that "two at least of the generals of the United States are engaged, unchecked by their government, in exciting servile insurrection, and in arming and training slaves for warfare against their masters, citizens of the Confederacy." Threats of vengeance were then made. These took form in a proclamation issued on the 23d of December, in which it was ordered that "all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective states to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said states," and that "like

orders be executed in all cases with respect to all commissioned officers of the United States when found serving in company with said slaves in insurrection against the authorities of the different states of the Confederacy." As the laws of the Southern States inflicted the punishment of death upon all insurgent slaves, and upon all who should aid them, the intent of this proclamation was to deny to all such persons who should be captured, and also to all white officers commanding them, the character of prisoners of war, directing them to be handed over for summary execution to the civil authorities of the several states. This proclamation was subsequently modified by an act passed in May, 1863. It declared that the commissioned officers of the enemy who might be captured should not be delivered to the state authorities, but should be dealt with by the Confederate government; that every white Federal officer commanding negro or mulatto troops should be deemed guilty of inciting servile insurrection, and if captured, be put to death or otherwise punished at the discretion of the military court; that every such person should be tried by the military corps or army capturing him, but the President might commute the punishment ordered by this court; but "all negroes and mulattoes who shall be engaged in war, or taken in arms against the Confederate States, or shall give aid and comfort to the enemies of the Confederate States, shall, when captured in the Confederate States, be delivered to the authorities of the state or states in which they shall be captured, to be dealt with according to the present or future laws of such state or states." The general principle thus attempted to be established was that no person of color should be recognized as a soldier of the Federal army, and as such be entitled, when captured, to the rights of a prisoner of war, but should be held to be a malefactor, liable to the severe penalties prescribed by local law against offenders of other than pure white descent. Out of this general provision grew in the sequel many questions relating to the exchange of prisoners.

The capture of New Orleans, at the close of April, 1862, had inflicted a severe wound upon Southern feeling. This was aggravated by the rigid government instituted over the conquered city by General Butler. Two special acts of his afforded a pretext for violent measures. Upon the informal surrender of the city the Union flag had been hoisted upon the Mint. There were then no Federal troops actually occupying the city, which was, however, commanded by the Union gun-boats, and virtually in their possession. The flag was cut down by a gang of desperadoes, prominent among whom was one Mumford, a notorious character of the city. He was arrested by General Butler, tried, and executed. Many women of New Orleans, after the complete occupation of the city, made it a point studiously to insult the Federal soldiers in the public streets. Butler determined to put down these insulting demonstrations, and issued his famous "General Order No. 28," declaring that "when any female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation." By the municipal law of New Orleans, any woman of this class "plying her avocation" in the street was liable to be arrested, detained over night in the calaboose, brought before a magistrate, and fined five dollars. This was the extent of the penalty threatened by the order. It assumed that only women of that class would endeavor to attract the attention of strangers. Still, the order was most unfortunately worded. It gave occasion to the charge that the women of the captured city were abandoned to the insults, if not to the passions, of lawless and excited soldiers. The Confederate authorities were not slow to take advantage of this. The charge was rung through the length and breadth of the land, where it aroused the fiercest frenzy. It was reiterated in Europe, where the recollection of atrocities committed in captured cities by ungoverned soldiers was fresh in men's memories. They had read of the outrages of the French under Suetet, at Tarragona; of the British, under Wellington, at Badajos; and of the thousand similar cases which marked the great war of the last generation. They were reading the accounts which began slowly to transpire of the outrages committed within a few months by the British troops in India, and were prepared to believe that similar scenes were enacting in New Orleans. Every instance of punishment which circumstances rendered necessary was repeated, exaggerated, and perverted, until the public mind in the South and in Europe was prepared not merely to justify, but to demand the most severe measures of retaliation. At length, on the 23d of December, President Davis issued a proclamation declaring that General Butler should no longer be considered a public enemy, but a felon deserving capital punishment, an outlaw and common enemy of mankind; ordering that, in case he was captured, he should be hung on the spot; that the commissioned officers serving under him should also, in case of capture, be reserved for execution; and that, until the execution of Butler, no commissioned officer of the United States should be released on parole.<sup>1</sup> The actual course of General Butler, while in command of New Orleans, will be narrated in full in a subsequent chapter.

From this survey of the foreign and domestic policy of the Federal and Confederate governments down to the beginning of the year 1863, we return to the series of great military operations of the year 1862.

<sup>1</sup> "I, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America, and in their name, do pronounce and declare the said Benjamin F. Butler a felon deserving of capital punishment. I do order that he be no longer considered or treated simply as a public enemy of the Confederate States of America, but as an outlaw and common enemy of mankind, and that, in the event of his capture, the officer in command of the capturing force do cause him to be immediately executed by hanging; and I do further order that no commissioned officer of the United States taken captive shall be released on parole before exchange until the said Butler shall have met with due punishment for his crimes. . . . All commissioned officers in the command of the said Benjamin F. Butler are declared not entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers and criminals deserving death, and that they and each of them be, whenever captured, reserved for execution."—*Proclamation of Jefferson Davis, December 23, 1862.*

<sup>1</sup> Dispatch from R. R. Riordan to Perry Walker, Mobile. <sup>2</sup> Charleston Mercury, January 3, 1861. <sup>3</sup> Petersburg Express, April 23. <sup>4</sup> Beauregard's Report of the Battle of Bull Run.





CUMBERLAND GAP.

## CHAPTER X.

## EASTERN KENTUCKY. MIDDLE CREEK AND MILL SPRING.

The General Situation at the beginning of 1862.—The Necessity for immediate Action.—The President's Order of January 27th.—The Situation in Eastern Kentucky.—Humphrey Marshall in the Big Sandy.—Garfield's Brigade.—The March on Paintsville.—Retreat of Marshall.—Middle Creek.—The Battle.—Marshall retreats to Abingdon, Va.—The Course of the Cumberland.—Cumberland Gap.—Zollicoffer's Camp at Mill Spring.—General Crittenden joins Zollicoffer.—Thomas moves against the Confederate Encampment.—The Battle of Mill Spring.—Death of Zollicoffer.—Crittenden's Retreat to Gainesborough.

A NERVOUS disquiet pervaded the Southern mind at the commencement of a new year, the result, in a great measure, of the highly-wrought anticipations which had grown out of the Trent affair. It was presumed that the Federal government would decide blindly, and without regard to the claims of justice, upon the question which had been forced upon it by the unauthorized seizure of Mason and Slidell, and it was a painful surprise to the Confederates to learn that the two commissioners had been quietly and dispassionately rendered up to the British government. The extraordinary unanimity with which the people of the North supported the administration in its efforts to subdue a rebellious section of the country was a disappointment hardly less keen or more easily admitting of consolation. The South, along with its hope of foreign interference, had insanely nourished the fond expectation of what it called "a popular revulsion in the Northern people against the folly and pusillanimity of their rulers."<sup>1</sup> It also very much galled the Confederates to look back upon the closing events of the past year—the repulse at Drainesville and the reverse in Missouri. Nor was the immediate future any more hopeful. The Confederacy was prepared neither in the East nor the West to assume the offensive: in the West this policy was impossible; in the East it was perilous. There was no good reason to expect that the national army would rashly set out upon an ill-advised campaign, directly assailing the formidable strong-holds and fortifications of the Confederacy; there was no necessity compelling that army to rush desperately into any campaign of whatsoever sort and favored by whatsoever advantages; it could wait until its preparations had become so formidable as to be all but irresistible. The naval expeditions of the preceding year had inculcated a wholesome fear all along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, and this apprehension was only matched by that which the threatened movements of the national forces in the West naturally occasioned. Price was in full retreat southward, with three Union armies in his rear. McCulloch, with his daring band of Arkansas recruits, had withdrawn from the field. Kentucky was overawed. The blockade interposed an almost insuperable barrier between the Southern cities and all foreign ports. The national finances had been efficiently sustained by the entire wealth of the North, while those of the South were already betraying their fundamental weakness. Very soon, too, the twelve months' soldiers of the Confederacy would have to be discharged. It was beginning to be seen, and already it was declared by the Southern press, that it is an old and ever-proven truism, that when two sections are at war, the one which has the least means must find success in early and rapid action, for it can gain little by time, while the other finds in time the power to bring into efficient use its more

varied means. The clearest policy of the weaker section in such a conflict was to find in the rapid use of its revolutionary enthusiasm an overmatch for the slower, less spirited, but more enduring North.<sup>1</sup> The Southern people were impatient for an advance of the Confederate army of the Potomac. "We have gazed," they said, "implorely on the lion while the fox has been weaving his toils. Are we to continue hemmed in for another six months, and lack all things, or shall our armies *on to Washington*, and lack nothing?"

There was somewhat of a restless spirit at the North also, but based upon entirely different grounds, and far more reasonable in its nature and its conclusions. It was not peevishness, nor the outgrowth of a desperate spirit that would venture all at a single throw; it was rather the expression of confident hope mingled with an element of considerable anxiety—hope so far as we ourselves were concerned, anxiety in regard to the attitude of European Powers. The aristocracy of the Old World was plainly committed to the interests of the Southern slaveholder, and it needed but a single stroke of policy or a change of ministry to give the sanction of authority to the opinions held by the Second Estate both in England and France. Nine months had passed since the declaration of war, and these nine months were especially signalized by reverses to the Federal armies. Every week's delay in moving against the enemy's works enfeebled that respect for our strength as a nation which foreign nations had always entertained, and made the policy of interference, already backed by motives of selfish interest, apparently justifiable as well as natural. If it should come to the worst—if Europe should despair of an early termination of the war on account of the vacillation of our military commanders—then nothing short of national ruin, as complete and irretrievable as any upon historic record, stared us in the face. And for vacillation and hesitancy, moreover, there seemed little occasion. Hitherto the case had been different: we had, in spite of the vast resources of the nation held in reserve, been compelled to create the very means and organization through which these resources should become available and effective. But now, through unparalleled activity and determination, the great want had been measurably supplied; and although it was impossible to calculate with certainty upon success in every movement which we were prepared to make, yet it is to be remembered, and was then earnestly insisted upon, that in no war of any magnitude was it ever possible to obviate the chances of failure, whatever may have been the previous preparation. The pressing exigencies urging on an immediate movement of our

<sup>1</sup> In addition to other disparagements, the Confederate army suffered very much from disease in camp, far more than the Federal army—not only by reason of less favorable location, but also, and chiefly, through negligence. Says E. A. Pollard, in his *Southern History of the War*: "The most distressing abuses were visible in the ill-regulated hygiene of our camps. The ravages of disease among the army in Virginia were terrible. The accounts of its extent were suppressed in the newspapers of the day; and there is no doubt that thousands of our brave troops disappeared from notice without a record of their end, in the nameless graves that yet mark the camping-grounds on the lines of the Potomac and among the wild mountains of Virginia. Our camps were scourged with pneumonia and diarrhoea. The armies on the Potomac and in Western Virginia suffered greatly—those troops in Cheat Mountain and in the vicinity of the Kanawha Valley most intensely. The wet and changeable climate, the difficulty of transportation, exposure to cold and rain without tents, the necessary consequence of the frequent forward and retrograde movements, as well as the want of suitable food for either sick or well men, produced most of the sickness, and greatly aggravated it after its accession." The Southern people, when made aware of these facts, with great generosity contributed immense sums in clothing and stores for the relief of their troops. During the latter quarter of 1861, the eleven states of the Confederacy contributed in this way a million and a half in money, besides the voluntary contributions which came from Missouri and Kentucky.

<sup>1</sup> *Richmond Examiner*, Jan. 1, 1862.



armies were those belonging naturally to the situation, and not the effect of popular clamor. Never was there more patience manifested by any people where so much—nothing less, indeed, than the life of the nation—was at stake, and manifested in connection with such stirring enthusiasm and ardent patriotism as was shown by the people of the loyal states in those quiet autumn and winter months, during which they waited without a murmur or the slightest breath of suspicion against the national authority. When, therefore, General McClellan states in his report that, about the middle of January, upon recovering from a severe illness, he found that "excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the Army of the Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the administration," it is not to be understood that this anxiety was the result of any growing dissatisfaction among the people. There were currents from across the Atlantic drifting inevitably into a policy hostile to the United States, the bearings of which were more patent to the Department of State than to the nation at large. The altered policy which then became necessary was not, as has sometimes been alleged, and as General McClellan seems in this connection to indicate, the result of the change in the secretaryship of the War Department, by which Edwin M. Stanton took the place of Mr. Cameron. But for the complications rapidly being developed in the Department of State, the War Department could have prosecuted its operations according to a more leisurely policy. Whether, even under these circumstances, that would have been a wise policy, is an independent question; a necessity from without, urging an immediate movement, disposed summarily of the whole matter.

It is from this stand-point that we are to consider the important military order which his excellency the President issued from the executive mansion on the 27th of January, 1862, the substance of which was the following:

"That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces.

"That, especially,

"The army at and about Fortress Monroe,

"The Army of the Potomac,

"The Army of Western Virginia,

"The army near Munfordsville, Kentucky,

"The army and flotilla at Cairo,

"And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

"That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.


"That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order."

This was followed on the 31st by a special war order, "That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next."

The subsequent modification of this special order by the President, and the events of the Peninsular campaign, will form the leading subjects of a subsequent chapter. In the mean time we turn to the Western field, and to the events which there followed each other, in execution of the President's order, from Garfield's victories in the valley of the Big Sandy to the evacuation by the enemy of all the important strong-holds in Kentucky.

During the month of January, Eastern Kentucky was the one sole field of active military operations. The Confederate force in Kentucky at this time was distributed among the three important military positions commanding the southern part of the state and the main avenues into Tennessee, viz., Columbus, Bowling Green, and the region about Cumberland Gap. A small portion of this force, however, was located in the eastern part of the state, consisting of a few regiments of Kentucky troops under Colonel Humphrey Marshall, occupying an intrenched position at Paintville. We have previously given an account of the retreat of the Confederate force, not quite 1500 strong, under Colonel Williams, in November, from Prestonburg and Picketon into Virginia. This was the result of an attack by General Nelson, who, if he had pursued the retreating enemy, might, perhaps, have reaped important fruits from his victory by the destruction or occupation of the Virginia and East Tennessee Railroad. But this would have been a hazardous undertaking, considering the distance over which supplies would have to be transported, and the mountainous nature of the country to be traversed, added to the embarrassments which would have grown out of the hostile disposition of the inhabitants. General Nelson did not even continue the pursuit of Colonel Williams through Pound Gap, but withdrew to the central portion of the state with his forces. Immediately afterward Humphrey Marshall gathered together a brigade of Confederates at Paintville, with a battery of artillery and a few companies of cavalry.

The colonel—a man of aldermanic dimensions—had occupied a somewhat prominent position in politics, and had served in the Mexican war, having led the famous charge of the Kentucky volunteers at Buena Vista. He had been elected to Congress in 1849; was appointed commissioner to China by President Fillmore, and afterward became a leading member of the American party. He was not, however, destined to distinguish himself as a military hero in the valley of the Big Sandy, although great hopes were entertained at the South that he would make his way triumphantly to Frankfort, and establish the authority of the provisional governor Johnson in the place of the regular state government.



JAMES A. GARFIELD.

The Big Sandy, having its head waters in Virginia, forms the northwestern boundary between that state and Kentucky, emptying its waters into the Ohio. At Louisa, a small village situated some twenty-five miles southward from its mouth, West Fork joins the main stream. Following the road up this fork for twenty-five miles further, we reach Paintville. At high water the river is navigable as far as Picketon, twenty-five miles beyond, and in November General Nelson had no difficulty in transporting his supplies to that point. On the 7th of January, however, when Colonel James A. Garfield broke up his camp on Muddy Creek and advanced against the enemy, the river was low, and occasioned great difficulty in the transportation of supplies. His force at starting was about 1500, consisting of the Forty-second Ohio and the Fourteenth Kentucky, accompanied by a squadron of cavalry. On the route he was re-enforced by a battalion of Virginia cavalry, under Colonel Bolles, and 300 of the Twenty-second Kentucky, making the entire force with which he marched on Paintville about 2200 men. Another battalion of cavalry, under Colonel Wolford, together with the Fortieth Ohio, was also moving toward the same point from the west along Paint Creek. Hearing of this threatened attack, Humphrey Marshall had left his intrenchments two days before, and retired to a position among the heights at Middle Creek, a little below Prestonburg, leaving only a small force of cavalry at the mouth of Jennie's Creek, three miles west of Paintville, to act as a corps of observation and to protect his trains. Before reaching Paintville, Garfield was made aware of the situation of this cavalry force, though he had no certain knowledge of the whereabouts of the other and main portion of the enemy. Dispatching Colonel Bolles's cavalry and a company of infantry to attack the former from the north side, he himself, with a thousand men, crossed the Paint at four o'clock in the afternoon, to make an armed reconnoissance, which resulted in the discovery that the main body of the enemy had withdrawn. It was over two hours since he had sent Bolles up the creek, and now, seeing that he had a fair opportunity of securing the Confederate cavalry force, he promptly sent a messenger with orders to the colonel not to attack until he should have time himself to get in the rear and cut off the retreat. The orders, however, came too late, as the attack had already been made, and the colonel was then engaged in pursuing the enemy up the Jennie; so that when Garfield, a little later, had gained, as he supposed, the rear of the enemy, he soon discovered their cavalry equipments, which they had left in the confusion of flight, strewn the road, and indicating with certainty that the Confederates had escaped. Bolles, in the mean while, after pursuing until he came up with Marshall's infantry rear-guard, returned to Paintville, where the Federal forces encamped for the night.

The next morning the arrival of the Fortieth Ohio and Wolford's cavalry brought the number of the Federal forces up to 2400 men. On the 9th, Garfield, detaching 1100 men from his four regiments, and detaching two cavalry squadrons to move along his right up Jennie's Creek, followed the river road south to Prestonburg, the distance to this town from Paintville being twelve miles. He had been delayed a whole day at the latter place, awaiting supplies from George's Creek, a few miles below on the river, which arrived in such scanty amounts as to render it impossible to give three days rations of hard bread—and it was useless to set out with less





MAP OF KENTUCKY AND NORTHERN TENNESSEE.

than that—to more than 1500 men. It was necessary, therefore, that fully 1000 men should remain behind until the arrival of farther supplies.

Humphrey Marshall, with over 3000 men, had taken up a position among the heights on the forks of Middle Creek, two miles below Prestonburg. His force consisted of two Virginia and two Kentucky regiments, one of the latter under the command of Colonel John S. Williams, being the same which Nelson had two months ago driven out of the state through Pound Gap. Two small detachments of cavalry and a battery of four pieces guarded the approaches to a position naturally very good for defense. On the evening of the 9th Garfield's advanced column drove in the Confederate pickets, and a messenger was dispatched to Paintville with orders to move forward all the available force to participate in the morrow's conflict. As another boat-load of supplies had arrived that day from below, Lieutenant Colonel Sheldon was enabled to take about 700 men, at the head of which force he started early the next morning. The main body of Garfield's force, having slept on their arms in the rain until four o'clock A.M., moved up Abbot's Creek one mile, and crossed over to the mouth of Middle Creek, a little north of Prestonburg, arriving there at eight o'clock. Supposing the enemy to be encamped on Abbot's Creek, it was Garfield's plan to gain his rear by moving up Middle Creek, thus cutting off the retreat, while an attack was made at the same time by the cavalry upon the front. Small bodies of Marshall's cavalry were met all along the march up Middle Creek for two miles and a half, when the Federal troops were drawn up on the slope of a semicircular hill. A thousand yards farther up the stream divided into two forks, which were held by the enemy. It was now noon, and with the small force available for an attack the approach was of necessity a cautious one, the re-enforcements not having arrived. It was not wise, through an armed reconnoissance, to seek information as to the numbers and disposition of the Confederate force, as this reconnoissance would inevitably bring on a general engagement, in which the Federal troops would not only be overwhelmed by a superior force, but would labor under the additional disadvantage of being precipitated into a battle without any previous plan of operation. Besides, the enemy was so posted in his concealed position as to command the road at the head of the gorge, and also to flank it from the left-hand side. His artillery, together with


Colonel Williams's regiment, was on the right-hand side of the road at the head of the gorge, and a crescent-shaped hill on the opposite side concealed another column just behind its crest. It was Marshall's design to draw the Federal forces up the road, and then to open upon them from the front and left. Anticipating a manoeuvre of this nature, Garfield, having taken up his position on the slope of a semicircular hill on the right-hand side of the creek, dispatched twenty mounted men, who made a headlong charge up the valley, and, drawing the enemy's fire, disclosed the position above indicated. Two columns, consisting each of two companies, were sent, one along the crest to the right, behind which Colonel Trigg's Virginia regiment was stationed, and the other across the creek, to ascend the rugged crest farthest up the gorge on the left. The right column became immediately the target of the enemy's artillery, but the latter was so badly served that its shells did not explode, while the small force dispatched to the left, after climbing up the rocky ridge on their hands and knees, engaged the enemy on that side. Both columns were re-enforced. Trigg's regiment was withdrawn across the creek, and the battle raged chiefly on the left, which Garfield still farther re-enforced with one hundred and fifty men. The Confederates in the mean time had gained a commanding position on the top of the ridge, and directly in front of the Federal reserve force, on which they opened a heavy fire, that was returned with good effect. To guard against a flank movement, which was now threatened by the enemy's right, another column of one hundred and twenty men was ordered to cross at a point lower down and drive the enemy from his new position, a movement which was successfully accomplished. After some pretty severe fighting, a similar success attended the Federal column on the crest nearer the creek, the enemy being also driven from his position at that point. On account of the great disparity of the two opposing forces, the Federals were obliged to resort in many cases to an irregular mode of fighting, sheltering themselves whenever opportunity offered behind trees and rocks. They had no heavy artillery, and the cavalry, having gone in a mistaken direction, did not participate in the engagement. The battle had now continued in this desultory style for over three hours, and it was four o'clock P.M. when Sheldon came up with re-enforcements from Paintville. These had started early in the morning, and had marched fifteen miles without breakfast; but their courage, not



daunted by these unfavorable circumstances, demanded to be tested in the fight with the already checked, if not baffled foe. The enthusiasm occasioned by their arrival was unbounded, and Garfield promptly dispatched his entire reserve to the right for an attack upon the enemy's main position and the capture of his guns. Appreciating the new phase which the battle was taking, Humphrey Marshall ordered a retreat, which was continued to Abingdon, in Virginia. It was a short winter's day, and was now too dark to admit of pursuit. The sky was illuminated with the burning of the enemy's stores preparatory to his disorderly flight. The next morning, on the arrival of the cavalry, a pursuit was sustained for several miles, and some prisoners were taken. Two or three days afterward the entire command returned to Paintville.

This success, disposing of the Confederate force in Northeastern Kentucky, had an additional brilliancy imparted to it from the fact that it inaugurated a long series of victories. Humphrey Marshall's political antecedents, and the reminiscences which haunted many citizens of the North of his plump presence in Congress and in the famous American Convention, gave somewhat of piquancy to the dramatic features of this episode of his defeat. The victor, the young colonel from Ohio, was soon promoted to a brigadier, and afterward a major generalship, and in 1863 was elected to Congress from Ohio, his native state. Although not a graduate of West Point, he proved a most efficient officer in the early Western campaigns.

If we now cross the mountains crowding the southeastern portion of Kentucky, we shall find ourselves in the valley of the Cumberland River, which has its rise among these mountains, and, taking a westward direction in its zigzag course, after its two head tributaries, coming down along either side of Pine Mountain, have formed a junction at Cumberland Ford, just north of Cumberland Gap, runs through Barbourville and Williamsburg, thence northwestwardly, just leaving Somerset to the north, while it sweeps down into Tennessee, and, after a long and very winding course to the east, passes through Nashville, and then returns through a more regular channel into Western Kentucky, and empties into the Ohio at Smithland, about fifty miles above Cairo, having described a course twice the length of the Hudson. That portion of Kentucky which this river cuts off before it first enters Tennessee was held by the Confederacy, and was a very important tract of country, guarding the entrance into Tennessee from Eastern Kentucky.



FELIX ZOLLICOFFER.

The Confederate government early in the summer guarded against a Federal advance into East Tennessee by way of Cumberland Gap by sending General Felix Zollicoffer, with a force of several thousand men, to the threatened point. Occupying the mountain ranges of Southeastern Kentucky, he had made advances into the interior as far as Manchester, his operations generally taking the form of raids, having for their purpose the destruction of railroads, the dispersion of Federal encampments, and, still more frequently, the obtaining of provisions. In September a slight skirmish had occurred at Barbourville between a portion of his troops and a body of Home Guards. In October he had met with a repulse at Camp Wild-cat, near Loudon. An expedition had been planned against him by General Schoepf in November; but a Confederate brigade having been sent to his

relief from Bowling Green, the scheme was abandoned. General Alvin Schoepf, a European officer of considerable experience, now took up a position at Somerset with about 5000 available men, a few cavalry, and a single battery of artillery. Fifteen miles to the southeast of this position was that occupied by Zollicoffer, at Mill Springs, on the south bank of the Cumberland. In itself considered, the Confederate position was one of great strength. The banks of the river, rising to the height of three or four hundred feet, afford sites favorable for fortification; and Zollicoffer had not only an intrenched camp at Mill Springs, but another on the opposite bank at Beech Grove. The northern encampment was occupied by five regiments, and fortified with twelve pieces of artillery; on the southern bank there were stationed two regiments and a considerable cavalry force. Apparently of great strength, the position was really a very weak one. The surface of the ground surrounding the encampment afforded no good range for artillery against an attacking infantry force; but a still greater disadvantage was the scarcity of provisions. Wayne County was the only fruitful portion of the state from which the Confederates could draw supplies. Over a hundred and thirty miles intervened between them and Knoxville, and the Cumberland, commanded by Federal troops, afforded a precarious channel of communication. The unfavorable situation was heightened by impassable roads; and as the immediate vicinity was rapidly exhausted, the Confederate soldiers were sometimes reduced to one third rations, while their mules and horses were often without any supply whatever. About the first of January General Crittenden arrived from Knoxville and assumed command of the army, which had been already re-enforced by Carroll's brigade.




GEORGE H. THOMAS.

Nearly at the same time that Crittenden arrived at Mill Springs, General Buell detached a force from his main army, and sent it against the Confederate strong-hold in Eastern Kentucky. The force thus dispatched consisted of seven regiments and a portion of Wolford's cavalry, under the command of General George H. Thomas, who had distinguished himself both in Florida and Mexico, and had, from 1850 up to the beginning of the war, been instructor of artillery and cavalry at West Point. A native of Virginia, General Thomas was still true to his country, and had already, in August, 1861, been appointed a brigadier general of volunteers. Thomas left Lebanon on the 31st of December, and, after a march of nearly two weeks, reached Columbia, and, after a rest of four or five days, pushed on eastward to Fishing Creek, a few miles west of Somerset. It was now the 17th; the march had been over roads almost impassable, and four regiments and one of the batteries—more than one half of Thomas's column—were yet struggling along on the road from Columbia. To await these, and also to communicate with Schoepf, Thomas halted at this point, ten miles north of the enemy's camp. The Tenth Indiana, of Colonel Manson's brigade, held the advance; and from this regiment two companies were sent out as picket guard on the road to Mill Springs, taking up their position beyond the junction of that road with the one leading from Somerset to Mill Springs. In advance of these was stationed a battalion of Wolford's cavalry. The camp of the Tenth was not far in the rear. Colonel R. L. McCook, with two regiments of his brigade, the Second Minnesota and the Ninth Ohio, were encamped a mile to the right, on the Robertsport and Danville road. This disposition of Thomas's forces guarded all the approaches to his encampment, and also to Somerset. This was the situation on Friday night. During the day Schoepf had visited Thomas, and arrangements were made



for a co-operation of the two columns in the attack on Zollicoffer's camp, which was to take place on the succeeding Monday. Recent rains had swollen Fishing Creek to such an extent as to render it impossible for either of the divisions to support the other in case of an attack being made by the enemy; therefore, to supply the place of the regiments which were yet detained on the road, it was arranged that Carter's brigade should be sent from Somerset to General Thomas. This brigade consisted of the Twelfth Kentucky and two regiments of East Tennesseans. On Saturday the Fourth Kentucky arrived on the field with Wetmore's battery, which, with the regiments and Standart's battery sent from Somerset, raised Thomas's force to a complement of six regiments and three batteries, besides the small detachment of Wolford's cavalry.

In the mean time, the peculiar situation of the Confederate army on the Cumberland led to a movement which anticipated the Federal attack, and resulted in the battle of Mill Spring, otherwise known as the battle of Somerset, though it was fought at neither of these places, but midway between them, at Cross Roads. By extraordinary efforts, Crittenden, having been informed of Thomas's advance, had collected together sufficient provisions for two or three days ahead, and on Friday night had sent out a reconnoitring party, which had met and exchanged shots with the picket guard of the Tenth Indiana and then retired. Saturday night the Confederate officers met in council and determined to advance against Thomas, surprise his camp, and give him battle at early dawn on Sunday morning. There were two considerations which led to this determination. The first related to the enemy, whose two columns would be united in an attack on the Confederate camp, but might be met separately in case Crittenden should take the initiative. The second regarded the position of the Confederate army, which could easily be turned, and which therefore made it necessary that Crittenden should either make the proposed advance, or retreat, leaving the way open into East Tennessee. The Federal force, moreover, was estimated, on the basis of the reconnoissance made the previous night, at considerably less than its real value. Although there was a great deal ventured in this advance, made thus upon a mistaken estimate of the enemy's strength, it had a reasonable hope of success if the surprise could have been calculated upon as certain. This was not the case; for Thomas, fully aware of the probability of an attack, had disposed of his forces accordingly.



The Confederates marched out of camp at midnight in perfect silence, with Zollicoffer's brigade in the van, followed by Carroll's, making altogether a force of eight regiments, with six pieces of artillery. After a march of six hours, through drizzling rain and over muddy roads, the skirmishers of the Fifteenth Mississippi encountered the Federal pickets at daybreak. The captain of one of the companies on picket guard had just reported to Colonel Manson that all was quiet, when a courier arrived with tidings of the attack. The long roll was instantly beat, and a company was promptly dispatched to the support of the pickets, followed immediately by the entire regiment, which had just formed in line of battle about seventy-five yards from the picket-firing, when Zollicoffer was seen close in front with the Mississippi regiment, supported by Battle's and Stanton's. For an hour the Indiana soldiers stood against these three regiments, when half of their number were obliged to retire from their position on the right of the road. At this moment the Fourth Kentucky came up on the left, and a part of McCook's brigade on the right, making the numbers engaged at this point, on each side, nearly equal. The position now held by the Federal troops was about a thousand yards in the rear of that originally taken by the Tenth, which, by the superior numbers opposed to it, had been driven over one hill and up the slope of another. Here the battle raged most hotly, and for a time without any sensible advantage on one side or the other, until at length the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana, their ammunition being nearly exhausted, took shelter in the woods along the crest of the second hill, when the Confederates rushed forward from their cover in the woods across the field intervening between the two positions. The crest once



ROBERT L. MCCOOK.

gained, the field was theirs. Every nerve was strained to the utmost. Carroll's brigade was ordered up to support Zollicoffer, and on the Federal side McCook's two regiments were called into action. One of these, the Second Minnesota, rapidly made its way among the logs and brushwood to the left, taking the place of the Fourth Kentucky and the Tenth Indiana, and at the same time the Ninth Ohio got into position on the right of the road in the woods, where it was separated from the enemy by a corn-field. Only the road separated the two regiments. In the rapid movement of the Confederates under Zollicoffer, the latter was killed by S. S. Fry, colonel of the Fourth Kentucky; but the regiments under his command, maddened by the event, rushed furiously on till they came into an almost hand to hand encounter with McCook's brigade, the Second Minnesota and the Confederates opposed to them pushing their muskets through the same fence. For half an hour the desperate conflict continued, and still remained doubtful. The Confederates had clearly an advantage in the numbers engaged, while the Federals had a compensating advantage in position, and also in the management of artillery, for the Confederate batteries overshot McCook's brigade, while his told with fearful effect against the enemy. Suddenly the battle turned; the Confederates were driven back to their first position. In the mean while, Carter's brigade having gained the enemy's right flank, a bayonet charge was ordered along the whole line, and the retreat of the Confederates was turned into a rout. They had lost their favorite leader, and Crittenden in vain endeavored to rally them against the pursuing Federals. One or two feeble stands were made, but without effect, and before night they had been driven within their intrenchments at Beech Grove, having lost in killed and wounded 300 men, besides fifty taken prisoners. The Federal batteries were brought up, and from commanding positions on the neighboring hills opened a cannonade on the enemy's camp. Schœpf had joined Thomas, and it was intended to carry the fortifications the next morning by storm, but in the night the Confederates effected a retreat across the river. This movement was attended with great distress and a complete demoralization of the Confederate army, the scattered fragments of which were afterward collected together at Gainsborough, on the Cumberland, about thirty miles below the point at which that river enters Tennessee.

The part which Colonel McCook's brigade played in the battle of Mill Spring was prominent. The colonel, a native of Ohio, was thirty-five years of age, and was destined, in a few months, to lose his life, not on the fair field of battle, but by the hand of the assassin. He was murdered, August 6, 1862, by a company of guerrillas, in ambush near Salem, Alabama. Colonel McCook, at the beginning of the war, was placed in command of the Ninth Ohio regiment, which had reached so high a degree of discipline that McClellan pronounced it the first in the army. With this regiment he had passed through the West Virginia campaign; under Rosecrans he was given the command of the second brigade. At Philippi, Rich Mountain, and Carnifex Ferry his command was always foremost in the fight. The battle of Mill Spring was the last in which he participated. He was wounded here, but it was not long before he was again at the post of duty. For his energy and bravery in this battle he was appointed a brigadier general, but his attachment to his old regiment led him to decline the commission.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A large number of the McCook family were engaged in the civil war on the Federal side. Among them are the following: General Alexander McCook, the brother to whom Robert sent his last message; "Tell Alec and the rest that I have tried to live like a man and do my duty;" Daniel McCook, jun., adjutant general in General McCook's staff, and who was to suffer death from wounds received at Kenesaw Mountain in 1864; Edwin McCook, then a captain in Colonel Logan's Illinois regiment; Lieutenant Edward S. McCook, of the regular army; Major Anson McCook, Second Ohio; Henry McCook, captain of an Illinois regiment; Sheldon McCook, a lieutenant in the navy.





ANDREW HILL FOOTE.

## CHAPTER XI.

## FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON.

The original Plan for the Advance of the Western Armies.—The Resistance to be overcome.—Estimate of Forces in the West.—The new Plan of Operations.—The Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.—Their military Importance.—The Mississippi Flotilla.—Commodore Foote.—McClelland's Reconnoissance toward Columbus.—The Capture of Fort Henry, February 6, 1862.—Expedition up the Tennessee to Florence, Alabama.—Preparations for an Attack on Donelson.—Position of the Fort.—Disposition of the Confederate Army.—Buckner, Floyd, Johnson, and Pillow.—Floyd's Suggestion in regard to the Defense of the Fort.—Operations on Thursday, February 13; Investment of the Fort by General Grant; Assaults on the Confederate Lines.—Arrival of the Gun-boats.—Naval Attack on Friday; its ill Success.—Confederate Council of War Friday Night.—The Battle of Saturday; early Success of the Confederates; their final Repulse.—Floyd's second Council; its Deliberations.—Escape of Floyd and Pillow.—Surrender of Fort Donelson by Buckner, Sunday Morning, the 16th.—Evacuation of Bowling Green, Nashville, and Columbus.—Polk's Withdrawal to Island No. 10.

THREE times now within a period of three months had the way been laid open for an attack upon the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad; twice through Pound Gap and Virginia, and again, after the victory of Mill Spring, by way of Cumberland Gap. In neither case was the opportunity improved, because the Federal force at hand was not sufficiently large to secure a permanent possession, and because the plan of invading Tennessee through Eastern Kentucky had been given up for another, more feasible, and involving larger and more satisfactory results. It was deeply regretted by the government, and was the subject of complaint among many loyal people of the North, that the deliverance which had been promised through the original plan to the Unionists of East Tennessee had to be postponed; but any merely temporary relief would evidently have only aggravated their sufferings. The new plan of operations transferred the burden of the spring campaign in the West from the department of General Buell to that of General Halleck, and the field of activity from Eastern to Central and Western Tennessee. Originally it was proposed that Buell should advance through Cumberland Gap, and take possession of the line of communications connecting Tennessee with Richmond—a line which could be reached by a march of little more than thirty miles from the Gap—while Halleck should co-operate by the movement of a joint naval and land expedition down the Mississippi. The resistance to be overcome in this plan was very great in each department. Buell had two impediments; one was Buckner's army, now strongly fortified at Bowling Green, and the other the geography of Eastern Kentucky. Bowling Green was, in relation to Tennessee, a most important military position, situated a little to the south of the centre of Kentucky, at the head of navigation, on the Big Barren, a branch of Green River, and commanding the only two lines of railroad communication between the two states, namely, the Louisville and Nashville Road, and the branch of that route which, taking its departure five miles below Bowling Green, has its western terminus at Memphis. The Confederate army at this point must either be met in its intrenched position, or left in the rear. Though not impreguably fortified, Bowling Green was easily protected from an attack on the north, the approach in that direction being across the river; and, in order to cut off its communications with the South, it would be necessary to occupy in force each of the two railroad lines above mentioned. Whatever might have been the success of an attempt to capture it, it could not have been accomplished without great exhaustion of force; and to push

a large army into Tennessee, leaving Buckner in its rear, would have been absolutely ruinous. In Halleck's way, on the Mississippi, was Columbus—the Gibraltar of the West—thirteen miles below Cairo, and connected by railroad with Bowling Green and the South. From this point, at the beginning of the year, the Confederate line of occupation stretched westward through Bowling Green and into Virginia, where the Great Kanawha continued it on toward the eastern strong-hold of Manassas. Fort Columbus was originally a position of great natural strength. The eastern bank, on which it lay, was lined above and below by bluffs 150 feet in height; and north of the town, one of these bluffs, facing up the river, was fortified with three tiers of batteries, and mounting altogether upward of fifty guns; the other sides open to attack were also well fortified. The works on the summit of the hill cover an area of nearly four miles. To prevent the passage by the fort of gun-boats, a strong iron chain stretched across to the opposite bank. The entire armament of Columbus consisted of 140 pieces of artillery.

Still proceeding on the supposition that the plan which we have indicated, and which was the one originally proposed, was to be carried into execution, what was the amount of force on each side available for the campaign?

On the 1st of December, 1861, there were in Kentucky 70,000 Union troops, of which about 23,000 were raised in the state. These troops were under the command of General Buell, whose head-quarters were at Louisville. At that time upward of 18,000 of these troops had not yet been sworn in, and the greater portion were recently armed and undisciplined. But the work of recruiting and organization was rapidly going on, and it was to continue until Buell's command should number 100,000 men. In Missouri, at St. Louis and Cairo, Halleck was gathering another army, fully as large as that of Buell. Regiments from Illinois, under the command of General Grant, constituted the great proportion of this army. Nothing is easier than to overestimate the effective force of an army freshly recruited. Take, for instance, the combined force of Halleck and Buell at the beginning of 1862. It is set down in round numbers at 200,000 men. But from this flattering estimate made on paper we have, in the first place, to deduct between twenty to thirty per cent. for forces not yet fairly in the field. This would leave say 150,000 men in camp. Of the 150,000 a considerable proportion would be without arms and unorganized; a great number of regiments would be detached as garrisons at important points; and a still farther deduction would have to be made for those disabled by sickness, so that not more than 100,000 men could be counted upon as available for active operations in an offensive campaign. Neither Halleck nor Buell, therefore, could count upon a column of over 50,000 men each. That this estimate is not founded on conjecture will appear when we come to consider the forces engaged at the siege of Donelson. What was the force which was opposed to this by the Confederates? The two great centres about which this force gathered were, as we have already indicated, Columbus and Bowling Green, each of which was held by an army ranging from 20,000 to 30,000 strong. There were various detachments of force in Tennessee, the most important of which was Crittenden's little army, which Thomas had driven to Gainesborough. Bowling Green was the direct objective of Buell's attack, as Columbus of Halleck's. The scattered detachments in Tennessee might easily be gathered together to harass the right flank of Buell's army if he should pass across the mountains through Cumberland Gap. The forces at Columbus and Bowling Green, in their fortifications, were able to resist more than three times their own number in case of an attack made directly against them; they were so connected with each other and with their base of supplies that they would be able to stand a siege of any duration, as the Federal force would be clearly inadequate to their perfect investment; they occupied a central position, while the attack must move along the radii of an extended arc; the probabilities, therefore, in case of a direct attack, were decidedly in their favor. In the plan of operations originally proposed, such an attack was necessarily involved. This was clearly the case as regards Columbus; and no good general would ever dream of leaving so large a force as that at Bowling Green in his rear, unless his line of communication was secure against interruption. There could be no security like this in an advance through Eastern Kentucky. This advance, therefore, taken in connection with the co-operative movement of a naval and land force down the Mississippi, involved of necessity the capture both of Bowling Green and Columbus. Nothing would have better suited Albert Sidney Johnston, the Confederate general commanding in the West, than an attempt on the part of the Federal generals to reduce these two strong-holds. The attempt would certainly have resulted, if not in defeat, at least in such an exhaustion of force as would have made the Confederates masters of the situation in the entire West.

If, in relation to the above plan of operations, the Confederate position appeared to be one of extraordinary strength, it was yet, in relation to another plan, especially vulnerable; and every formidable difficulty incident to the one plan suggested some remarkable facility connected with the other. While East Tennessee was protected from invasion by Buckner's army and three ranges of mountains, West Tennessee was only protected by two small forts weakly garrisoned, one on the Cumberland River, and the other on the Tennessee. While, on the one hand, there was access only by mountain passes and over miserable roads, on the other there were two unobstructed rivers; while an advance, in the one case, left the only possible channel of communication with any source of supplies in the hands of the enemy, in the other it was not only secure against any interruption of this nature, but, on the other hand, threatened the communications of the enemy himself. The Confederate armies at Bowling Green and Columbus, which, in relation





COMMODORE FOOTE'S GUN-BOAT FLOTILLA ON THE MISSISSIPPI.


to the one plan, were impregnable towers of strength, were, in relation to the other, not simply deficient in force, but most unfortunately situated. They held advanced positions suitable as centres of offensive operations, but without a supporting force sufficient for an aggressive campaign; and while they could not be turned by a flank movement either on their right or left, they could yet be left in the rear by the movement of Halleck's entire naval and land force between them along the courses of two rivers, which, above Forts Henry and Donelson, were entirely in possession of the Federal armies. These two rivers were the Tennessee and the Cumberland.

The course of the Cumberland, from its rise among the mountains of Eastern Kentucky, and through its extensive curvature into Tennessee on its way eastward through Nashville, and then northward through Western Kentucky until it empties into the Ohio, we have already described. The head waters of the Tennessee are separated from those of the Cumberland by the Cumberland Mountains. After the Clinch and the Holston, which are the head tributaries of the Tennessee, have united just east of Knoxville, that river takes a southwesterly course, passing a little north of Chattanooga and down into Alabama, through the northwest corner of which it again returns into Tennessee, and, after traversing the entire breadth of the latter state, runs in a course nearly parallel to that of the Cumberland through Western Kentucky, and empties into the Ohio at Paducah, ten miles below the mouth of the Cumberland, having described a course of 700 miles in length. It was the existence of these two rivers which, leading into the very heart of the Confederacy, and constituting at the same time the most rapid, convenient, and secure channel of communication with the North, transformed the plan of the spring campaign in every important particular, and exchanged a very doubtful prospect for the glorious certainty of victory; and yet their importance was ignored both by the Federals and the Confederates—by the former until Buell's increasing army at Bowling Green had made an advance into Tennessee by way of Cumberland Gap a perilous undertaking, by the latter until a Federal advance by way of the Tennessee and Cumberland was a danger imminent and no longer to be averted. The peril to the Confederate armies which was involved in this advance was not wholly unforeseen, but it was not contemplated as one likely to be realized, or, if it should be realized, one which was likely to be of great magnitude. At an early period, General Polk, commanding at Columbus, had intended to occupy Paducah at the mouth of the Tennessee; but he was anticipated in this movement by General Grant, who took possession of the place with a small force, which, by accessions from Cape Girardeau, was increased to about 5000 men. Not gaining any foothold in this quarter, the Confederates had built two forts—Henry and Donelson—the former on the Tennessee, and the latter on the Cumberland, near the Tennessee border, and just north of the railroad from Bowling Green to Memphis, hoping that these strong-holds could be sufficiently strengthened before the Federal armies would be prepared to advance. Here, at this time, was the great weakness of the western half of the Confederacy, and both Commodore Foote and General Grant strongly favored an advance in this direction. The plan involving this movement was formed suddenly by General Halleck, and, as has been shown already, entirely transformed the main features of the campaign as originally proposed. Fortunately, all the preparations which had been made with the view of proceeding directly against Columbus were just as available for an advance down the Tennessee.

The most important element in this preparation was the naval fleet which had been constructing on the Mississippi. It had been begun by General Fremont, who had found it necessary in this way to supplement his insufficient force. This fleet consisted of a flotilla of twelve gun-boats at Cairo, carrying in all 126 guns, and of thirty-eight mortar-boats, which had been built at St. Louis, and then towed down to Cairo to receive their armament. Some of the gun-boats had been iron-clad, and cost \$89,000 each. The Benton, which was the most formidable, carried sixteen guns; the Mound City, Cincinnati, Louisville, Carondelet, St. Louis, Cairo, and Pittsburg, carried thirteen guns each; and the Lexington, Essex, Tyler, and Conestoga only nine. The mortar-boats were sixty feet long by twenty wide, surrounded by iron-plated bulwarks; and the mortars, weighing nearly a ton, with a charge of fifteen pounds of powder threw a shell three and a half miles. A portion of these boats were not yet ready for action. The entire fleet was under the command of Commodore A. H. Foote. This naval officer was a native of Connecticut. He had entered the navy as midshipman at the age of fifteen; and his memorable services against the pirates in the East Indies and against the slave-trade on the African coast had gained him an honorable fame. He was now fifty-five years of age. His strength of purpose, his unflinching energy in execution, and his Christian character placed his name among the noblest of American naval heroes.

Up to the very latest moment the Confederates were led in every possible way to expect an attack on Columbus by Halleck, and an advance by Buell into East Tennessee. This expectation on their part was doubtless heightened by quite extensive demonstrations against Columbus both on the river and by land, which were made by Grant and Foote in the middle of January. On the 7th of that month, Commodore Foote, with three gun-boats—the Essex, Lexington, and Tyler, made a reconnaissance down the Mississippi to within two miles of Columbus. At the same time, an expedition was organized by General Grant to operate by land in the same direction. This expedition was under McClelland's immediate command, and consisted of somewhat more than 5000 men, of which 4000 were infantry, 1000 cavalry, besides two batteries of light artillery. The men belonging to Schwartz's battery were the only soldiers in the entire command who were not from Illinois. On the 9th of January the cavalry crossed the river from Cairo to Fort Hall, on the eastern side, and guarded the approaches from Columbus,





JOHN A. MCCLERNAND.

the infantry and artillery following the next day. Reconnoissances were made in all directions, and especially toward Columbus, not discovering the enemy, though coming within a mile and a half of his defenses. On the 14th, McClernand, with his whole force, took up a position north of Blandville, and commanding the road between Columbus and Paducah by the occupation of O'Neill's and the Blandville bridge across Mayfield Creek. The next day he crossed Mayfield Creek, and at Weston's General Grant came up with him. Proceeding to Milburn, ten miles east from Columbus, the expedition, at this point, might have been looked upon by General Polk either in the light of a demonstration against Columbus, or of a movement against the railroad running southward from Columbus to Union City. In the mean time General Smith had marched several columns from Paducah to Mayfield, whence communication was established with McClernand. After making this formidable demonstration in the vicinity of Columbus, the Federal troops were suddenly, on the 21st, returned to Cairo.

Movements were also made by General Buell, after the victory at Mill Spring, which indicated an advance in force into East Tennessee. The Cumberland River was crossed at Waitsborough, and a column pushed toward Cumberland Gap, while General Buell seemed to be massing his forces mainly on his left. That these operations had the designed effect on General Johnston is apparent from his sending a considerable force to Knoxville.

Just on the eve of conflict the Confederacy began to suspect that Forts Henry and Donelson were after all to be the objective points of attack. The sudden withdrawal of Grant's forces from the vicinity of Columbus, and Buell's change of front—General Thomas, instead of going to Tennessee, having turned back to Danville, forming a junction with Nelson, and thus flanked Bowling Green on the left—these movements revealed the secret of the whole campaign. The situation, from this point of view, became a critical one. Beauregard was immediately sent from Manassas to consult with Johnston in the West. It was too late, however, to readjust the elements involved in the impending conflict. The President's order for a general advance all along the line from Manassas to Columbus had gone forth, and the blow must soon fall. No forces could be spared from the eastern half of the Confederacy to Johnston's assistance; nothing but the delay of the Federal armies could relieve him. Perhaps he depended somewhat on this delay. The Federal fleet was not yet fully prepared; only a portion of the gun-boats had been iron-plated; several of the mortar-boats were yet only partly built; the Western army, also, was only partially organized. But this hope was vain. President Lincoln was determined to strike immediately with so many of the boats as were ready, and with so much of the army as could be made available for action, thinking that the Confederates would by delay gain more in the strength of their defensive positions than the Federal army would in its power to attack. And certainly, if the Confederates had been given time to re-enforce their weak positions on the Tennessee and the Cumberland, the whole prospect of the spring campaign would have been materially altered to their advantage.

The battles of Middle Creek and Mill Spring were not directly involved in the plan of the campaign, which really commenced with the operations against Fort Henry. All the preparations having been completed, General Grant, commanding at Cairo, proceeded up the Tennessee under convoy of Foote's flotilla of gun-boats. Ten regiments, with artillery and cavalry, and with three days' rations in their haversacks, embarked at Cairo, and, preceded by the gun-boats, reached Paducah on Monday, February 2d. The


next morning the fleet moored on the east bank of the Tennessee, nine miles below Fort Henry. A reconnoissance was then made to detect the presence of batteries, if there were any, along the bank, and to draw the fire of the fort for the purpose of ascertaining its range. While engaged on this reconnoissance, the Essex was pierced by a 32-pound shot. No serious injury was done, but a warning was received in regard to the inefficiency of this boat, which, originally employed as a ferry-boat at St. Louis, had been remodeled and fitted up as a gun-boat. That night the troops, having landed from the transports, were encamped at Bailey's Ferry, between three and four miles north of the fort, having their encampment on an elevated ridge running parallel with the river. Wednesday was spent on both sides in making preparations. When the Federal troops landed at Bailey's Ferry, General Tilghman, commanding the fort, was absent at Fort Donelson, but, having received information of the Federal approach, he immediately returned. Colonel Heiman, in the mean time, had guarded the approach to Fort Henry, on the Dover road, with two pieces of artillery. The garrison of Fort Henry at this time—Tuesday night—consisted of little more than 2500 men. These, together with the force on the Dover road, made an army of 3200 men. It was palpably impossible to hold the position against a formidable attack. The situation of the fort itself was very unfavorable. Occupying a position not high enough above the river to be secure against the violence of the spring freshets, it was surrounded on all sides by elevated positions, which, once gained by the enemy, enfiladed its own defenses. One of these, on the opposite bank, Fort Heiman, was thought so important that it had been occupied by a small force, and had been partially fortified. On Wednesday morning two Tennessee regiments were added to the garrison, and the force at Fort Heiman was recalled. A sudden rise of the river made the situation still more unfavorable for the Confederates. It not being possible to hold the commanding positions to which we have alluded, the Confederate force was concentrated within its intrenched camp, abandoning the outer series of rifle-pits.

The day passed by without an attack. General Grant was waiting for his re-enforcements to come up from Cairo. Reconnoissances, however, were made by the Federals on the road to Dover, which led Tilghman to believe that the main portion of Grant's land forces was to be sent against Fort Donelson. It was this supposition alone which determined him to remain and abide the issues of a battle. But on Thursday morning he was undeceived. Grant had, the previous night, issued his order for Commodore Foote to attack the fort on Thursday at eleven o'clock. His plan of co-operation was to march one column, consisting of eleven regiments of McClernand's division, to a point between Forts Henry and Donelson, on the Dover road, and another, consisting of ten regiments, under General C. F. Smith, to Fort Heiman, on the west bank; both columns to advance simultaneously with the gun-boats.

Seven gun-boats—the Essex, Carondelet, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Conestoga, Tyler, and Lexington, participated in the engagement. Four of these were partially iron-clad, the Essex being less perfectly inclosed in plates than the rest. These four formed the first line of the advance on Thursday. At half past ten the boats got under way, and the prompt and gallant commodore repeated his instructions to his men. The other three iron-clads were to keep in line with the flag-ship Cincinnati. It was urged upon the officers and men that it was of the greatest importance that they should keep cool during the engagement, and fire with slowness and deliberation, both to prevent heating the guns and random firing, and also to avoid unnecessary waste of ammunition. Somewhat more than a mile north of the fort Panther Island is situated. Thus there were two channels of approach: the one on the east side being commanded by the guns of the fort, while the other, more shallow, was covered by the island. Obstructions which had been placed in the latter had been partially removed, and the high water enabled the boats to pass over those which remained without injury. Steaming up this passage slowly, so as to allow the troops on the two banks time to get into position, the four iron-clads finally appeared at the head of the island, with the three other boats closely following in their rear. Under cover of the island, they had entirely escaped the long-range fire from the fort. They now took up a position and opened upon the fort, the three boats in the rear firing over those in front. Neither the fort nor the gun-boats were able to use their entire armament, the former, out of seventeen guns, only manning eleven, while only the same number were used by the latter out of seventy-five. The Confederates had twelve guns commanding the river: one ten-inch columbiad, one rifled 24-pounder, two 42-pounders, and eight 32-pounders.

Before the bombardment had fairly commenced, Tilghman, becoming aware of Grant's movements on his right and left flanks—for such, in fact, were the movements of McClernand and Smith—disappointed and alarmed, immediately determined upon the retreat of the main body of his small army, before these operations, which would render escape impossible, should have been completed. There was no time to lose, and there was but a single avenue of retreat. In a few minutes the attack of the gun-boats would render the intrenched camp untenable, as fully two thirds of it was exposed to their fire. There was no chance of holding the fort against the preparations which Tilghman saw being made against it, and the only object of an engagement on his part would be to give time to his retreating columns. Accordingly, the order for their withdrawal to Fort Donelson was given, only the heavy artillery, with about seventy men, being left in Fort Henry. While this movement was being executed under Colonel Heiman, and the gun-boats were commencing their attack on the fort, McClernand's division was slowly making its way through the woods, and through the mud which was the result of a storm on the previous night. But for this impediment





FOOTE'S GUN-BOATS ASCENDING TO ATTACK FORT HENRY.





W. D. PORTER

the retreat of the Confederates would have been cut off and the investiture of the fort rendered complete.

The bombardment, however, proceeded successfully, the first shot being fired at half past twelve o'clock. There was no cessation in the firing, and every shot from the boats made its impression on the fort, upon which Foote concentrated his entire fire, leaving the movements going on in the rear to General Grant, who, as we have seen, was unavoidably behindhand. The action on both sides was carried on with great spirit. A single 80-pound shell disabled every one of the Confederates at one gun, and the bursting of another produced a similar catastrophe. Neither were the gun-boats unharmed. The Essex received a shot which penetrated her starboard boiler, and, filling the boat with steam, scalded her captain, W. D. Porter, and several of the crew, and she was compelled, disabled, to drift down the stream. The remaining gun-boats continued their fire, and steadily approached to within a thousand yards of the fort, and, after a hot engagement, lasting a

little over an hour, achieved the victory. Tilghman had held out until all but four of his guns were disabled and the walls of the fort were giving way, when he pulled down his flag and surrendered the fort. This stubborn resistance had been prolonged to allow the main body under Heiman time to effect its retreat. Sixty-two prisoners were surrendered with the fort, among whom were twelve commissioned and six non-commissioned officers. Tilghman, who had been induced to remain to keep up the courage of his men, and who surrendered with them, was a stout man, and courteous in his manners, though of a somewhat haughty air. He was a graduate of West Point. On the occasion of his capitulation he expressed to the commodore his willingness to surrender to so brave a man. Foote replied, "You do perfectly right in surrendering; but you should have blown me out of the water before I would have surrendered to you."

From the extent of the outworks of Fort Henry, it was evidently the intention of the Confederates to re-enforce it very strongly. The rapidity, however, with which the Federal commanders proceeded to attack, prevented this re-enforcement; and it was only the failure of General Grant to move his land forces with the requisite promptness that allowed the Confederates to escape. A pursuit was ordered, and the rear of the enemy overtaken, but nothing was gained except a few prisoners who had lagged behind on account of exhaustion, and several pieces of light artillery.

The capture of Fort Henry opened the Tennessee River to the Federal gun-boats up to the head of navigation at Florence, in Northern Alabama. Immediately after the surrender, Lieutenant S. L. Phelps, commanding the Conestoga, proceeded up the river, accompanied by the Tyler and Lexington. About twelve miles south of the fort the Memphis and Ohio Railroad from Bowling Green crosses the river, after which it continues southeast to McKenzie, and from this point communication is established with Columbus by a branch road running northwest through Union City. The main road is continued from McKenzie on to Memphis. The connection, therefore, between Bowling Green and both Columbus and Memphis depended on the railroad bridge across the Tennessee. This point was reached by Phelps a little after dark, and not only was the draw closed, but the machinery for turning it had been disabled. At the same moment, several Confederate transports were half a mile above the bridge, trying to escape up stream. A party was landed, and it took an hour to open the draw; then, the Tyler being left behind to destroy the railroad, the other two boats gave chase to the transports. Some of the latter were laden with military stores, and these had to be abandoned and fired; the concussion produced by the explosion of considerable quantities of gunpowder on board broke the skylights of the Conestoga, and raised the light upper deck from its fastenings. The house of a Union man living on the river bank was blown to pieces by the force of the explosion. Proceeding up the river to Cerro Gordo, in Hardin County, a Confederate steamer, which was being converted into a gun-boat,



ALABAMA LOYALISTS GREETING THE FEDERAL GUN-BOATS.



was captured the next day, and the day after two more at Eastport. Florence, at the foot of the Muscle Shoal, was the natural terminus of the expedition. Here a deputation of citizens waited on the lieutenant deprecating violence, and especially praying that their railroad bridge might not be destroyed. As there was no military motive to the destruction of the bridge, the request was granted. The expedition then returned. The most important feature connected with it was the exhibition, all along the route, of the Union sentiment of the people. Lieutenant Phelps, in his report, says: "We have met with the most gratifying proofs of loyalty every where across Tennessee, and in the portions of Mississippi and Alabama which we visited. Most affecting instances greeted us almost hourly. Men, women, and children, several times gathered in crowds of hundreds, shouted their welcome, and hailed their national flag with an enthusiasm there was no mistaking; it was genuine and heartfelt."

Forts Henry and Donelson, although miles in the rear of Columbus and Bowling Green, were the front and centre of the Confederate line. Henry had been captured. It only remained to carry the works at Donelson, and the centre was broken. Johnston held, and now knew that he held, a wretched line of defense. It stretched from Bowling Green to Columbus, 120 miles; was protected by less than 50,000 men; at its central position, which was as weak as it was accessible, there could not be brought up in time to be of use one third of that number. Time had from the first been a master element in this campaign. The President's Military Order had contemplated the value of moments. It was not an order to move simply,

or to prepare to move, but to move at once, even with an uncompleted armament. And after the movement had begun, time still controlled the chances and results. When Tilghman saw what was the disposition of the Federal forces on the forenoon of the 6th, he knew that he could not hold Fort Henry; yet, only to gain two hours and ten minutes, he risked an engagement, and lost twenty-one men killed and wounded, besides sixty prisoners. Those two hours' fighting netted him a profit of full 3000 men. The mud, which hindered Grant's troops moving on his flank, helped him to this result. And, now that Henry was captured, very much depended on the rapidity with which a blow could be struck at Donelson. Every day wasted amplified the defensive works of that fort, and brought behind them thousands more of defenders.

The gun-boats, however, had to be consulted in this matter of speed. It was thought impossible to do without them; they had taken Henry, and it was intended that they should play the most important part in taking Donelson. But Commodore Foote wanted time, the very thing which could not be spared. The Essex and the Cincinnati had been worsted on the 6th, and were in no condition to fight again. Of the iron-clads only the St. Louis and the Carondelet remained intact. It is true, the places of the two injured boats could be filled by others, but Fort Donelson was incomparably superior to Fort Henry in the resistance it would offer. More boats were needed; at least the two disabled ones ought to be repaired. While Foote protested on these grounds against an immediate attack on Donelson, Halleck and Grant insisted upon it as a military necessity. With the most rapid movement possible, much precious time would be consumed. The troops for Fort Henry had started with only three days' rations; the army must



FORT DONELSON, TENNESSEE.


be newly supplied. The prisoners, the sick, and the wounded must be attended to; new boats must be brought round from Cairo, also transports with re-enforcements; and, before the army at Fort Henry could move over from the Tennessee to the Cumberland, provision must be made for a change of base.

Tilghman had surrendered Fort Henry on Thursday; it was not until the next Wednesday, the 12th, that Grant had his entire column in motion toward Donelson, though a great portion of McClernand's division had moved the previous day. Here was a delay of six days, which, though necessary, was very costly. The distance between the two forts was twelve miles, over thickly wooded hills, broken by deep ravines, which, near the rivers, were choked with back-water. The roads were good, the weather pleasant and mild. The two main divisions of the army, McClernand's and Smith's, moved in separate columns; the strength of both, in round numbers, amounting to 20,000 men, including seventeen batteries, and from 1200 to 1500 horsemen. In the march, as in subsequent operations, McClernand kept to Smith's right. The two commands were in communication with each other early in the afternoon, within two miles of the fort. The rest of the day was occupied in manœuvring the troops into position, which was attended with slight skirmishing here and there, to test the enemy's strength and to find his line of works, a matter of great difficulty from the nature of the ground. The Confederate pickets and outstanding forces were pushed back to their defenses, and the Federal forces rested for the night on a line in general parallelism with that of the enemy. During the night batteries were posted in

the most favorable position then accessible. It was General Grant's design to make an assault the next day simultaneously with the gun-boats.

Donelson was stronger, both by nature and art, than Henry. The position was a more commanding one, and it was more strongly fortified. The course of the Cumberland from Dover, where Fort Donelson was situated, toward its mouth, was almost due north; but just before reaching the town, and in passing it, westward. Upon a bluff, rising by a gentle slope from the river, just at the bend, to the height of a hundred feet, the State of Tennessee had built Fort Donelson. The fort was on the south, or left bank, its water batteries, from an elevation of thirty feet, commanding the river as far as their guns could reach. Back of the fort extended a plateau of a hundred acres; a deep gorge broke the bluff toward the south. The town of Dover, lying just above on the river, was also on an elevation, separated from the plateau on which the fort was situated by a long valley, filled to a considerable depth with back-water from the Cumberland. The country for miles around is uneven; not mountainous, but hilly and heavily timbered. The numerous elevations that diversify the surface terminate in bluffs, whose abrupt and precipitous sides, difficult of access even to the nimble goat, lead down into rough-looking ravines. The timber on the hills immediately skirting the lines of defense had been cut down by the Confederates to secure a full sweep for artillery, and to form an extensive abatis-work obstructing the approach. To return to the fort. The table-land on which it lay was the work of art, the ground having been leveled to afford room for the fortifications and rifle-pits, which covered the entire space. By ravines along its





MAP ILLUSTRATING THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN IN FEBRUARY, 1862.

boundary the *tableau* was separated from a series of wooded hills, whose distance from the fortified line was about 800 yards.

The unfavorable feature of the defense was that the fort was so easily commanded by these neighboring ridges.

It was not until the middle of December that prominent attention was directed to the works at Henry and Donelson. "On reaching Donelson," says Tilghman, who was sent there at that time, "I found at my disposal six undisciplined companies of infantry, with an unorganized light battery, while a small water battery of two light guns constituted the available river defense. Four 32-pounders had been rightly placed, but were not available." With two forts on his hands, Tilghman found his time for preparation short. By the 25th of January, when re-enforcements were being brought up in anticipation of attack, the batteries had been completed, and a field-work, with a trace of 1000 yards, had been built in the rear of the fort, and the work of protecting the approaches by rifle-pits had been commenced. Two weeks later Fort Henry was surrendered, and the vital importance of Donelson, covering the approach to Nashville, seemed for the first time to be thoroughly understood. Beanregard and Johnston were in anxious consultation, and it was concluded between them that Nashville must be defended at Donelson—that the best engineers and the ablest generals should be sent to the fort, and all the re-enforcements which could be spared should be hurried up with all possible dispatch.

On the evening of the 6th, Heiman's command, 3000 strong, entered Donelson, with the not highly encouraging reminiscence of Foote's gun-boat fleet still clinging to them. This was the main force then occupying the defenses. Three Tennessee regiments were placed in the fort, constituting a garrison of about 1600 men. The re-enforcements which, during the next week, arrived at Donelson, came mostly from Bowling Green by railroad. General Bushrod R. Johnson came up on the 8th, and took the command until the arrival of Pillow on the 10th.

Pillow found the works incomplete. Two heavy guns for the water battery were yet unmounted; the works in the rear were deficient both in extent and strength, and competent artillerymen were lacking. It was late to make these discoveries; but prompt measures were taken to supply all deficiencies, the soldiers working in their trenches day and night. Even the tools necessary for this kind of work were so scarce that they had to be passed from one regiment to another. In the mean time artillery companies were being exercised in the use of their guns. For three days the soldiers were at work constructing rifle-pits along the first line of heights, including within its crescent the fort and water batteries, with the field-work in their rear, and also the town of Dover, which it became now an imperative necessity to defend, since it had been made a *dépôt* for supplies.

On the night of the 11th Buckner came to hand, and was placed in command of the right, near the fort. Bushrod Johnson held the left, near Dover. Between the two, prominently advanced on a strong position on the left centre, was Heiman's command. The space to be defended was a quadrangle, lined by the Cumberland on the north, by two pretty large creeks on the east and west, and on the south by the outer line of rifle-pits. The quadrangle was intersected by the wide stream of back-water running between the fort and Dover, which divided the right from the left, making it difficult to manœuvre one division in support of another; a great disadvantage, considering the length of the line—nearly three miles. This line, distant from the river from 400 to 1200 yards, was only one third completed on Wednesday morning, when Grant started from Fort Henry.

The re-enforcements to Donelson came in by detachments, some of them so tardily that they came near being left out altogether. Buckner's division, with the exception of one regiment, was all in before the 12th of February. The Second Kentucky came in with B. R. Johnson on the 8th; Brown's brigade on the 8th and 10th. Floyd's division, which, after its reverses in West Virginia, had been sent to Tennessee, was the last to arrive. His force

consisted of four Virginia and one Mississippi regiment, and was distributed into two brigades—Wharton's and McCausland's, to which a portion of Baldwin's brigade of Buckner's division was temporarily attached. Floyd had received the order to re-enforce Donelson on the 12th. He had already, on the 7th and 8th, sent on Wharton, but was hesitating about the policy of dispatching the rest of his division. From Clarksville, on the 12th, he wrote to Johnston, urging that the main portion of the defensive force should be concentrated at Cumberland City, "leaving at Fort Donelson enough to make all possible resistance to any attack which might be made upon the fort, but no more." He thought that the character of the country made it dangerous to concentrate the entire army in the fort, and that a large body at Cumberland City should flank the Federal army attacking the fort. He also advocated the obstruction of the river to make it impassable for gun-boats.

Whatever wisdom there may have been in these suggestions, they were too late to be applicable to the occasion. Grant was already within two miles of the fort, and Floyd had hardly dispatched his letter to Johnston before peremptory orders came from the latter to advance his force immediately. Floyd had been anxious to secure the adoption of his plan; and on the 11th, when Buckner left him to join Pillow, he carried to the latter an order from Floyd for the concentration of Buckner's and his own divisions at Cumberland City. Upon a consultation between Pillow and Floyd the plan was changed, and the morning of the 13th found Floyd's whole force inside of the Confederate intrenchments. The same morning also the Forty-first and Forty-second Tennessee arrived. On this Thursday morning the defensive army probably numbered at least 15,000 men.<sup>1</sup>

On Thursday, the day set for the attack, there was but little disparity between the opposing forces; what there was favored the Federals, but it did not amount at most to more than 3000 or 4000 men. The gun-boats and transports not arriving according to appointment, another twenty-four hours' grace was given the Confederates, of which they sedulously took advantage. Federal artillery was placed on the spurs opposing the lines of defense; McClelland's division was brought up as nearly as possible to the south of Dover, so as to command the river road to Charlotte, the main outlet for escape in that direction. Oglesby's brigade held the extreme right, supported on the left by W. H. L. Wallace; Smith's division was drawn up on the left. Skirmishers had the day almost entirely to themselves. Among those on the Federal side the most famous were Birge's regiment of sharpshooters, each one of whom, in gray uniform and gray felt cap, watched from behind his stump for the appearance of Confederate heads above their defenses. The distance between these keen-eyed watchers on one side and on the other was only about 300 yards. The fire was so incessant and so fatal that the Confederates were allowed no rest except in their uncomfortable rifle-ditches, it being impossible for them to reach their tents over the ridge without exposure. These ditches, with the earth-work in front, had been, as Floyd plaintively intimates in his report, carelessly, because hastily, constructed so far from the ridge as to compel this exposure.

The great event of the day was the gallant but useless assault made by three Illinois regiments—the Seventeenth, Forty-eighth, and Forty-ninth—supported by two others, on an advanced position of Heiman's. The Forty-eighth belonged to W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, the others to Payne's. When Wallace moved in the morning to the support of Oglesby, Colonel Hayne, with the Forty-eighth, had been left near the centre in support of a battery; 500 yards to his right were posted the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth, under Colonel Morrison. Hayne moved his regiment up to these, and, assuming the command of all three at Morrison's request, prepared to storm the redoubt in their front. This redoubt, separated from them by a wooded valley, formed Heiman's right centre. Heiman's position was an elevation shaped like a V in contour. On either side a valley separated his brigade from Buckner on the right, and on the left from Drake's brigade, which occupied another elevation, and which we have hitherto considered

<sup>1</sup> In the estimate of the number of men defending Donelson the Confederate accounts are various. Lieutenant F. H. Duqueyron, one of the officers engaged, reports the number as 18,000. This also was the estimate given in an account of the battle by the *Richmond Dispatch*. He ought to have had some opportunity of knowing; he belonged to the Fourteenth Mississippi, which reached Dover from Bowling Green on the 9th, and was present until Saturday noon, when he received a wound in the leg. Contrary to this is Pillow's report, which puts the number at only 13,000. The *Nashville Patriot*, in the corrected copy of its list of casualties at Donelson, gives the following estimate of the numbers engaged:

48th Tenn....	230	3d Tenn....	650 (750)	3d Miss....	500
42d " " " " "	498	51st " " " " "	80	4th " " " " "	535
53d " " " " "	280	50th " " " " "	650	14th " " " " "	475
49th " " " " "	300	2d Ky.....	618	20th " " " " "	562
30th " " " " "	654	8th " " " " "	300	26th " " " " "	434 (443)
18th " " " " "	615 (685)	7th Tex....	300	50th Va....	400
10th " " " " "	750	15th Ark....	270	51st " " " " "	275
26th " " " " "	400	27th Ala....	216	56th " " " " "	350
41st " " " " "	450 (575)	1st Miss....	280	36th " " " " "	250
32d " " " " "	558 (555)				11,480 (11,781)
Battalions of infantry: Colin's and Gowan's.....	330				
Battalions of cavalry: Gantt's .....	227 (800)				
Milton's .....	15				
Forrest's .....	600 (1200)				
Artillerists.....	677				
					1,849 (2,922)
Total.....					13,329 (14,703)

The numbers in the parentheses are corrections made from the reports of Confederate officers. Wherever these reports give numbers at all, they, save in one instance, exceed the corresponding ones in the list. It is fair, then, to presume that where no number is given there would also be an increase. It is certainly evident that Pillow understated his force; and it is possible that Duqueyron's would, if all the data were known, prove much nearer the truth. Two things should be remembered in this connection. One is, that, on account of hurry of preparation, so urgent as to forbid the ordinary roll-call in the morning, and also by reason of the irregularity with which re-enforcements came in, as well as the confusion consequent upon the surrender, no actual estimate was made. Floyd, when questioned by the Confederate Secretary of War, was entirely ignorant of the strength of his command. It is also to be remembered that, as a rule, Confederate reports studiously underestimate the forces engaged on that side. The estimate which we have given in the text is the one given by the Confederate Lieutenant Colonel Gilmer, chief engineer of the Western Department.





INTERIOR OF WATER BATTERY AT FORT DONELSON.

as a part of Heiman's command. Heiman's advanced salient was, at this stage of the investment, the only portion of the Confederate line distinctly visible. From this point the enemy's cannon had sweep of the valley across which the Federal troops filed in approaching Dover. Through the valley on Heiman's right ran a road from Dover westward to the Tennessee; here the line of rifle-pits was broken. On this side Heiman had two regiments; in the centre was posted Maney's battery, with two regiments, supported by another on the left side. The battery was on the summit of the hill and exposed. It was opposed on the 12th by two Federal batteries, which were under cover of the woods, one of them bearing on Heiman from the right, and the other from the left, the latter bearing also on Buckner's left. These two Federal batteries had kept up a bombardment all day Wednesday, their fire being returned not only by Maney's battery, but also by Graves's on Buckner's left, and by another at Drake's position. On the morning of the 13th another battery was brought against Heiman's left, and the one bearing on his right was advanced. In the course of the forenoon the advance line of skirmishers from the Illinois troops was observed making its way through the woods. Maney began to shell the woods; Graves also kept up a fire to the right, the gunners suffering severe punishment from Federal sharpshooters. Two lieutenants fell at Maney's in quick succession, but the guns were kept in play. Meanwhile Hayne's column, at 11 o'clock, had pushed across the valley and up the hill to within forty rods of the enemy's rifle-pits. The Confederates now commenced firing along the entire line from 2000 rifles, while the three batteries kept up their thundering. The path of the approaching Federals was impeded by brushwood and fallen timber. The slaughter was abundant and merciless. Fifteen minutes of this deadly work seemed enough for endurance that in the end only promised to be bootless. The brave Illinoisans began to give way. Then they rallied again, and were repulsed; and still again, when they finally withdrew, having been under fire for nearly an hour. Colonel Morrison was severely wounded in the action, and carried from the field.

Somewhat farther to the left, and at about the same time, a less formidable though equally gallant assault was made by a portion of Lauman's brigade, the fourth of General Smith's division. This brigade consisted of four regiments, together with which Birge's Sharpshooters were associated. On Lauman's right front Cavender's 20-pound rifled Parrots had been placed in a position commanding a portion of the enemy's works, the Seventh Iowa and Birge's regiment acting as support. This had been the position on the evening of Wednesday. Thursday morning two regiments—the Fourteenth Iowa and the Twenty-fifth Indiana—were ordered to assault the Confederate line one mile from their front. The movement was over rugged ground. In the wooded ravine just beneath the position to be assailed the line was formed. The Twenty-fifth Indiana then moved up the hill, “under a most galling fire of musketry and grape,” says Lauman, “until their onward progress was obstructed by the fallen timber and brushwood.” A position was gained and held at a severe cost in life for two hours, when the regiment was ordered back out of range. In the mean time the Fourteenth Iowa had crossed a ravine and gained a position away to the right, which it held to some purpose, while Lieutenant Parrott, who, with the Seventh, was supporting the Cavender Parrots, came up between the two assailing columns, holding the centre. This position was held by Lauman's brigade till night. In addition to these assaults, a heavy cannonade was kept up all day, and nearly all night firing was continued, keeping the Confederates under arms in their trenches.

Thursday night, the weather, which had previously been genial for February, began to be cold and disagreeable; a storm of snow, mingled with sleet, caused great suffering among the troops. The change was so sudden that evidently no preparation had been made for it.

There was yet no sign of any of the gun-boats except the Carondelet, which reached Donelson on the 12th, and the next day gave the enemy a foretaste of good things to come by sending upward of one hundred and fifty shells into the fort. This was on the morning of the 13th, and was intended to aid the assaults made at that time on portions of the Confederate line. The enemy returned the fire with spirit, but most of their guns shot over the gun-boat, only two striking; one of these, a 128-pound shot, passed through the port casemate of the Carondelet, burst her steam-heater, and fell into the engine-room. No one, however, was seriously injured. During this engagement, which lasted about an hour, the Confederate Captain Dixon, of the Engineer Corps, was killed at the battery. As to the other boats besides the Carondelet, thus: Tuesday night, before Grant had left Fort Henry, the steamer Minnehaha, with Colonel Baldwin and his regiment, the Fifty-seventh Illinois, on board, came up to the fort, and transports with reinforcements were following after. These transports Grant ordered, through Baldwin, to be turned back to Paducah, whence they were to start under convoy of the gun-boat fleet for Smithland, and thence up the Cumberland to a point a few miles below Donelson, where they were to land the reinforcements the next afternoon. The Minnehaha started down the Tennessee at midnight, and reached Paducah early the next morning, having met on the way eight or ten transports loaded with troops. But it was found that only a part of the fleet were at Paducah; the remainder straggled slowly up; and it was ten o'clock on Wednesday night when the whole armament arrived at the mouth of the Cumberland.

“The scene,” writes the *Times* correspondent, “was magnificent beyond description. The night was as warm as an evening in August in our more northern latitudes; a full moon looked down from an unclouded sky, and glanced off from bayonets, plumes, and sword-hilts without number. At intervals long jets of fleecy smoke burst out along the parapets of the two forts on the heights overlooking the town, and the boom of the welcome



went reverberating over the hills, till from the long distances in Kentucky it came back like a whisper. In turns the bands on the boats charmed the ear with most eloquent music, which, added to the effect of scores of gayly-dressed ladies promenading the upper decks, gave the scene more the character of some vast drawing-room gathering; so much like was it, that no one would have been surprised had the whole crowd suddenly resolved into eddies of whirling waltzes, or the swift, changeful currents of quadrille or gallopade."

The progress of the fleet, slow enough hitherto, now began to be impeded by the downward current of the Cumberland. Forty-five miles only were made in nine hours. This brought the fleet to Eddyville, where it was greeted with vociferous demonstrations of loyalty; one gray-haired man was so affected at hearing "Yankee Doodle," that he took off his hat and gave three cheers for the Union. At midnight, Thursday, the armament reached its destination. It consisted of six gun-boats and fourteen transports. From the latter a column of 10,000 men were landed, bringing Grant's army up to 30,000 strong. These fresh troops were General Lew. Wallace's division, consisting of regiments from Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, and Nebraska. The landing was about three miles below the fort. The distance to be traversed by these troops before they could reach McClernand's left was very great, and the march could only be accomplished by means of a circuitous route, which, avoiding the back-water west of the fort, ran around by Smith's rear along the ridges held by the Federal army. In this way it happened that Lew. Wallace's men were all day Friday getting into position.

This delay led to a new disappointment. It had been intended that, as early as possible in the day, a combined attack should be made by the gun-boats on the water batteries and by the land forces on the rear. In the latter part of the programme the new troops were given an important part, but their necessarily tardy movements prevented any operations on Friday by Grant's army except the usual skirmishing and cannonade.

The gun-boats, however, steamed up the river, and at three o'clock P.M. commenced the attack. They were six in number. Four—the St. Louis, Carondelet, Louisville, and Pittsburg—were iron-clad, each mounting thirteen guns; the other two, the Tyler and Conestoga, were wooden, mounting each nine guns. There was one boat less than the number at Fort Henry, and the conditions of the conflict were materially altered. The armament of Fort Donelson was greater than that at Fort Henry. Besides eight pieces in the main fort, there were the two batteries, mounting thirteen guns. Then, again, the water batteries at Fort Henry were of no use on account of their inferior position; those at Donelson, on the other hand, were elevated thirty or forty feet above the river. Remembering, therefore, that at Fort Henry two of his iron-clads had been disabled, it is hardly possible that Commodore Foote entered upon this engagement without serious apprehensions regarding the result. He had discovered the vulnerable points of his gun-boats, but, before he had leisure to fortify them, he was called upon to expose them again to danger.

As at Fort Henry, the wooden boats kept well to the rear of the iron-clads, which steamed up to the fort in the form of a crescent, opening fire at a distance of a mile and a half. The Confederate batteries did not reply until the boats were within point-blank range of their guns. Only twelve bow-guns could be brought to bear from the fleet; the enemy, from the fort and the batteries, worked nearly twice that number. The fleet moved slowly up into closer and closer combat, until it reached a point only about 300 yards (Pillow says 150) from the Confederate guns. Foote probably hoped that close range would make his fire more effective. From where he stood he could have reached with his shot and shell nearly every spot within the Confederate lines. But he had no time to regard the opportunity, tempting as it was. These heavy guns, belching out ruin against the sides of his vessels, must be attended to first of all. Already the shot from a ten-inch columbiad and a rifled 32-pounder were beginning to tell on his boats, and Pillow was carefully watching their effect. But the fire from the fleet also was beginning to drive the gunners from their post; only give the gun-boats fifteen minutes more, and the victory would be theirs. But just at this critical moment "two unlucky shots" turned the tide. One, penetrating the pilot-house and mortally wounding the pilot, carried away the wheel of the St. Louis; the other disabled the tiller-ropes of the Louisville, and both vessels drifted helplessly down the stream. The frightened gunners returned to their batteries and redoubled their efforts, and soon the Pittsburg and the Carondelet followed their retiring comrades. After a fight of an hour and a half the gun-boats had been defeated with a loss of fifty-four killed and wounded; among the latter was the commodore himself, whose foot was seriously injured. A portion of the casualties was due to the bursting of a rifled gun on board the Carondelet. The Confederate batteries, well protected and well served, were essentially uninjured; according to the report of Gilmer, the Confederate chief engineer, not a man in them was killed. The wooden gun-boats, as has been said, participated in the battle only at long range, and threw curveting shell, which, passing over the Confederate works, exploded in the air above them; on board these boats there were no casualties. It may have somewhat contributed to the defeat of the gun-boats that, in the excitement natural to a situation of more imminent peril, their guns were not worked with the deliberation which more than any thing else secured success for them at Fort Henry.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> General Grant's Report.

<sup>2</sup> Foote's great difficulty for some weeks had been that he was unable to get enough men to man his gun-boats. Thus, when he was about to move against Fort Henry, he says in a letter to Secretary Welles,

"I have been obliged, for want of men, to take from the five boats remaining at Cairo all the men, except a sufficient number to man one gun-boat for the protection of that important post. . . . It is peculiarly unfortunate that we have not been able to obtain men for the flotilla, as





After the attack, the cessation of which was like the clearing up of a thunder-storm, a consultation was held between Foote and Grant, in which it was decided that the former should return to Cairo to prepare a more formidable fleet, while General Grant should complete his investiture of Donelson. To prevent Columbus from re-enforcing Donelson, the Tyler was sent around to complete the destruction of the railroad bridge just above Fort Henry. Phelps's expedition of the previous week had failed, it seems, of doing its work thoroughly at this important point. The St. Louis and the Louisville were yet in a condition to remain, and it being thought necessary to keep up a show of force, or, at the least, to protect the transports, they did remain. The next day they steamed up the river and threw a few shells into the fort; but the only serious attack made by the gun-boats was that of the 14th.

Floyd, who as senior officer assumed the chief command on his arrival, had inferred, from the close pressure of the Federal troops up to his lines, and from the pertinacity of their assaults on Thursday, that he would certainly be attacked by Grant's whole army Friday morning. We have seen already how he came to be disappointed. All the forenoon he waited in vain; there was nothing but the usual skirmishing. Doubt made the Confederate commander restless, for something on one side or the other must be done quickly. If Grant would not fight him, then he must fight Grant. Of the two alternatives he very much preferred the former, remembering the assaults of yesterday; every repetition of these assaults exhausted the assailant. At last, after waiting nearly all day, the matter was decided for him; at three o'clock the gun-boats attacked in front, but the accompaniment of assault in the rear was not forthcoming. The gun-boats were driven away disabled, beaten. But, in spite of the shouts of victory arising from the two water batteries, Floyd had been disappointed. "I was satisfied," he says, "from the incidents of the last two days, that the enemy did not intend again to give us battle in our trenches. They had been fairly repulsed, with very heavy slaughter, upon every effort to storm our position, and it was but fair to infer that they would not again renew the unavailing attempt at our dislodgment, when certain means to effect the same end without loss were perfectly at their command. We were aware of the fact that extremely heavy re-enforcements had been continually arriving, day and night, for three days and nights,<sup>1</sup> and I had no doubt whatever that their whole available force on the Western waters could and would be concentrated here, if it was deemed necessary, to reduce our position. There was no place within our intrenchments but could be reached by the enemy's artillery from their boats or their batteries. It was but fair to infer that, while they kept up a sufficient fire upon our intrenchments to keep our men from sleep and prevent repose, their object was merely to give time to pass a column above us on the river, both on the right and left banks, and thus to cut off all our communication, and to prevent the possibility of egress."

It was Floyd's policy, therefore, to fight the enemy at the earliest possible moment. But it was too late to accomplish any thing that day. A little after dark, at Floyd's summons, all the division and brigade commanders of the Confederate army were gathered together for consultation at General Pillow's head-quarters. It was then and there unanimously agreed that an attack should be made, in accordance with Floyd's proposition, the next morning, for the purpose of cutting their way out into the open country southward. It fell upon Pillow and Buckner to plan the attack. The situation to be considered was this: there were three roads leading southward from Dover. One of these closely skirted the river for a distance of twelve or fifteen miles, then branched off toward Charlotte. Another ran farther to the west, connecting with the former road and also with Charlotte. The third, still farther west, is mentioned in the Confederate reports as the Wynn's Ferry road. Across these roads stood Oglesby's and W. H. L. Wallace's brigades—in fact, the great body of McClelland's division. Lew. Wallace's division held the ridge on the left of the Wynn's Ferry road. Every one of these roads was strongly fortified by Grant with 24-pound siege guns. In order to secure a retreat, Grant's right must be defeated and rolled up on his centre. But how dispose the forces for this attack? This was the great difficulty. Pillow's force alone, estimated by himself at 7000, including Floyd's, was incompetent for such a task; it was necessary that the great bulk of the three corps under Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner should be massed against the Federal right. Yet the proposition submitted by Pillow was that Buckner should lend him Hanson's Second Kentucky regiment, and that, with this and the troops already intrenched on the left, he (Pillow) would roll up Grant's right to a point opposite Buckner, where the latter should attack in flank and rear, and the enemy be driven to his gun-boats. A very satisfactory operation, if it could be accomplished. But one thing the over-sanguine Pillow had lost sight of in his calculations: if he should fail in his part, as most probably he must, then the battle would have been ventured in vain. Buckner, demurring to this impossible plan, had one of his own to

suggest, which certainly was wiser, though it was doubtful if any more good would come out of it than from Pillow's. His plan was, that, leaving a regiment or two in his intrenchments on the right, he would move his command up near to Pillow's, and, while the latter attacked Grant's right, he would attack the right centre, "and, if successful, take up a position in advance of the works on the Wynn's Ferry road, to cover the retreat of the whole army." Buckner also lost sight of the fact that, in leaving his lines on the left, he left them open to the enemy. But this circumstance was of no serious moment except in the event of a failure in the main assault; but in that very possible event all would be lost! General Buckner's plan prevailed.

The night which followed—that of Friday—was as bitterly cold as the preceding. The next morning opened with a cold and cheerless sky. Pillow had ordered his men under arms at half past four, to march out of their works at five, more than an hour before light, but a halting brigade made the time of march fifteen minutes past five.

Baldwin's brigade, consisting of a Mississippi and a Tennessee regiment, had the advance, moving along the road west of the river road. A third of a mile on the march, and the enemy was found in some force. Baldwin found great difficulty in manœuvring. The Twenty-sixth Mississippi, in front, was three times broken up in disorder while deploying. On the left of the road was an open field of 400 or 500 acres, open to the enemy's fire. The Twenty-sixth Mississippi having been formed on the right, and the Twenty-sixth Tennessee filling up a gap still left between that regiment and the road, and also holding the road itself, Pillow sent the Twentieth Mississippi around to the left in the open field just mentioned, where it was only food for powder, and was soon afterward withdrawn. By this time Baldwin's right was re-enforced by the arrival of McCausland's Virginians and other regiments, while his left was strengthened by Wharton's brigade. Pillow's entire force operating against the Federal right was, at his own estimate, not less than 7000 strong.

The attack was wholly unexpected by the Federals, who were taken at considerable disadvantage. The several brigades of McClelland's division were very much detached from each other, and the difficulty of support was heightened by the masses of tangled brushwood, black-jack, and dense undergrowth of trees, which made the manœuvre troublesome. Opposed to the advancing column of attack was a portion of Oglesby's brigade, a few Illinois regiments, who held the road, inadequately supported by artillery.

At first the advanced Federal regiments occupied the crest of the hill at the foot of which Baldwin, McCausland, and Wharton were deploying their forces. The troops on both sides were mostly under cover of the woods—a circumstance which concealed the immense volume of the Confederate assault. Part way up the slope the Confederate column advanced and watched its opportunity, skirmishing and sharp-shooting, in the mean while, actively going on. Wharton tried to gain way in the open field on the left, but a storm of Minié balls kept him back. After an hour's skirmishing, the left of the column, under General Johnson, pushed up a ravine around to the left, flanking the Illinoisans, a dozen Confederate batteries in the mean while crashing the woods with their missiles. Hitherto Oglesby's favorable position had baffled the enemy's advance. The Confederate troops, many of them raw recruits, required "extraordinary exertions on the part of their field and company officers to prevent their being thrown back in confusion to their trenches."<sup>1</sup> But the movement to the left drove Oglesby's right back to another position. Here a determined attack was made, met by an equally determined resistance.

The battle extended along the lines, involving, at seven A.M., two regiments of W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, supporting Oglesby on the left. These were the Eleventh and Twentieth Illinois, under Ransom and Marsh. A Confederate column charged up the hill in their front, and gained the road—the one west of the river road—but were repulsed, giving way to a fresh line, which advanced boldly to repeat the assault. Wallace brought nearly his entire brigade, consisting of 3400 men, upon the hill, and, with the assistance of Taylor's and McAllister's batteries, again and again drove back the defiant foe.

It was now half past eight o'clock, and re-enforcements from the centre of the line, held by Lew. Wallace, were moving past to the extreme right, which, bent out of its original line, was yet obstinately disputing every step of ground. Lew. Wallace's division had been awakened in the morning by the noise of battle far away to their right, and had supposed that Oglesby was attacking the enemy. At eight o'clock a message came from McClelland asking for assistance. Wallace had been ordered to hold the centre at all risks, to prevent the enemy's escape in that direction. A messenger was dispatched to Grant's head-quarters, but the latter was on one of the gun-boats, consulting with Foote in regard to the possibilities of another naval attack. Lew. Wallace, receiving a second and more urgent message from McClelland, stating that his flank had already been turned, sent forthwith Colonel Craft's brigade. This brigade, consisting of two Indiana and two Kentucky regiments, moved on to the woods beyond Taylor's battery, and nearly to the extreme right of the line. Here it became engaged with a column of the enemy emerging from a ravine in Oglesby's rear.

Oglesby's brigade, which had held on till the last, was now getting out of ammunition. Graves's battery, from the Confederate intrenchments, had now more effective range than it had had all the morning, and thinned the ranks at every discharge. In good order the brigade gave way, breaking through Craft's line in its retreat, and leaving the latter fearfully exposed to the sweeping fire of the enemy's infantry and artillery. Craft had been misled by his guide, and had taken a position too far to the right, which he was

they only are wanting to enable me to have at this moment eleven full-manned, instead of seven partially-manned, gun-boats ready for efficient operations at any point. The volunteers from the army to go in the gun-boats exceed the number of men required, but the derangement of companies and regiments, in permitting them to leave, is the reason assigned for not more than fifty of the number having been thus far transferred to the flotilla."

Again, starting for Donelson:

"I leave again to-night with the Louisville, Pittsburg, and St. Louis for the Cumberland River, to co-operate with the army in the attack on Fort Donelson. I go reluctantly, as we are very short of men, and transferring men from vessel to vessel, as we have to do, is having a very demoralizing effect upon them. Twenty-eight men ran off to-day (Feb. 11), hearing that they were again to be sent out of their vessels. I do hope that 600 men will be sent immediately. I shall do all in my power to render the gun-boats effective in the fight, although they are not properly manned; but I must go, as General Halleck wishes it. If we could wait ten days, and I had men, I could go with eight mortar boats and six armored boats."


<sup>1</sup> This was not true. The only considerable body of re-enforcements which had reached Grant by Friday night were Lew. Wallace's division. It was true, however, that Grant intended to complete the investment of Floyd's position, if it took 50,000 men to accomplish it.

<sup>1</sup> See Baldwin's Report.



soon compelled to abandon. Every thing now seemed to depend upon the steadfastness of W. H. L. Wallace's brigade. Upon his batteries, from three separate and commanding situations, the Confederate artillery was pouring its vials of wrath. Looking out upon his right hand, he could see Pillow's columns already pressing upon his rear. Between his brigade and them only a single regiment of Oglesby's command remained on the field. That regiment was the Thirty-first Illinois, commanded by Colonel John A. Logan, late a Congressman from Illinois, but who, at the beginning of the war, had resigned his seat for the colonelcy of this regiment. Colonel Logan had been wounded in the thigh, but he still kept his post. Having ordered the surgeon to dress his wound, he again went to the front, remarking that he had fired twenty-two rounds since his hurt, and he could fire at least as many more now that the wound was dressed. His regiment partook of his dauntless spirit, and remained on the field till the last cartridge was gone.

Matters were now, indeed, getting on rather badly in McClernand's division, and they got on worse and worse until nearly noon, when the Confederates had gained their first point, having pushed him off of the two roads to Charlotte. They had also captured a portion of his artillery. Swartz's battery they had taken and lost, and taken again. A part of McAllister's battery was also captured. McClernand's whole line was retreating, but in good order. "He did not retreat," says Pillow, "but fell back, fighting us and contesting every inch of ground." It had taken Pillow from six o'clock till noon to perform his part of the day's work, viz., to roll McClernand back upon Lew. Wallace, upon the Wynn's Ferry road. But where was Buckner?



LEWIS WALLACE

Going back, then, to trace Buckner's progress during the day, we find it in the morning considerably behind time in its operations. In the first place, it had to wait for Head's regiment to come up from Heiman's left to take possession of the abandoned lines. In the second place, the roads were slippery with ice, and in the darkness this was a great inconvenience. The fight was already in progress with McClernand when Buckner reached the rifle-pits on the right of Pillow's previous line. Here, as the tardy regiments came up, the line was formed near the point where the Wynn's Ferry road crossed Pillow's intrenchments. Colonel John C. Brown's brigade, consisting of three Tennessee regiments, partly held the rifle-pits, and was partly held in reserve. Graves's battery was placed at the left of the road, bearing on two Federal batteries in its front, one on the road, the other opposite Buckner's left. This battery also gave a good share of its attention, as has been already seen, to McClernand's brigades on the Federal right, who were contesting the field with Pillow, and who were already gradually giving way.

Buckner's attack proceeded from a point on Heiman's left. The latter, however, kept his original position, and Drake, who had the day before held the hill on his left, was now with Pillow. Buckner's command amounted to over 4000 men. Not wishing to waste his force by assaults, he intended simply to hold his position and await the issue of the battle, which was now culminating on his left. But Pillow needed a more active co-operation than this; Buckner must relieve him by an advance. At nine Buckner was made to understand this, and sent the Fourteenth Mississippi, supported by two of his Tennessee regiments, against the batteries in his front, while Graves sent his compliments entirely to the Federal right, his fire in front being masked by Buckner's advance. Yesterday these compliments were lightly

thought of—"Valentines" the soldiers called them facetiously—it was the middle of February—but to-day it was more serious. Graves's artillery made more impression than even Buckner's advance. While McClernand's right was retiring, exhausted of ammunition, his left was pushing the Confederates back to their defenses. Here Buckner, thwarted, crouched till noonday, when Pillow, who had almost forgotten him in the excitement of his partial victory, began to bethink himself of his military partner—of operations then due on the Wynn's Ferry road.

Accompanied by Gilmer, he rode across the field, and found Buckner where we have just left him, resting behind his intrenchments, and contemplating the strength of the two Federal batteries yonder in his front. But that would not take the batteries. A movement was quickly made, at Pillow's order, flanking them on their left and rear, while Pillow himself, with Forrest, his right-hand cavalry-man, who had been harassing Oglesby's and W. H. L. Wallace's rear, made a charge from the right. The batteries were driven back, leaving four pieces in the hands of the enemy. Buckner had gone around by way of the valley just off Heiman's left, and now his forces joined those of Pillow, who had come round from the other side.

Now, if ever, was the time for this Confederate army, or "our people"—as Floyd, in his peculiar but unmilitary style, expresses himself—to escape southward toward Nashville. The route to Charlotte was open, and now the Wynn's Ferry road also was clear. This evidently was the design from the beginning. With a view to this, all the regiments had taken with them blankets and knapsacks, with three days' rations. But the excitement of successful pursuit made a mere escape appear a tame and unworthy consummation of so costly a victory. Why not continue the movement against Lew. Wallace, and then against Smith himself, and sweep Grant's army entirely away from the front of Donelson? This question was not modestly nor wisely answered by Pillow and his associates in command. It was forgotten that, although a portion of Grant's army, unprepared for assault, had been met and beaten in detail, the attack could no longer have this advantage. The fight had already lasted six hours; the regiments which had been driven had retired slowly, and were by no means demoralized. Many of these regiments had already had time to recover themselves, and with the troops yet untouched in their rear, presented a firm and irresistible front to their now well-nigh exhausted enemy. Nor this alone; but it was probable that in two hours more Floyd's army would itself be driven, and the avenue of escape which was now open be again closed against it. All this was forgotten in the excitement of victorious advance.

Instead of the whole army escaping by the river route to Charlotte, only Baldwin's two regiments remained on this route, B. R. Johnson having hurried off the others to the right for a new battle.

Lew. Wallace had not been idle all this time. After sending Cruft's brigade to McClernand's assistance, it was not long before fugitives from the right crowded in confusion upon his rear, and a mounted officer came galloping down the road, shouting, "We are cut to pieces!" To remain stationary longer would invite panic. Thayer's brigade was moved forward, with Wallace himself in advance. The junior Wallace, Oglesby, and McArthur, with portions of their brigades, were almost immediately met retiring in good order, and calling for more ammunition. The enemy was following close upon these. Between Pillow's advance and the retiring troops Thayer's brigade was interposed, being advanced to the tip of the ridge, and there formed in a line at right angles with the old one. This was the nucleus for a new front. Wood's battery, a portion of the Chicago light artillery, was posted in the road along which the enemy must advance—at its right an Illinois and Nebraska, and at its left an Illinois and Ohio regiment. Two Illinois and an Ohio regiment were held in reserve. In the mean time, McClernand's men were refilling their cartridge-boxes. Cruft's brigade had joined Thayer's on the right, and Taylor's battery was brought to bear on the enemy, whose advance was now completely checked. Now the waves of battle began to flow backward against the Confederates.

At three o'clock General Grant rode up the hill and ordered an advance against the retiring ranks of the enemy. At McClernand's request, Lew. Wallace, whose troops were comparatively fresh, undertook the assault. Cruft's brigade, headed by the Eighth Missouri and the Eleventh Indiana, from Smith's division, with two Ohio regiments in reserve, formed the assailing column. The ground to be gained was in great part the same which had been given up in the forenoon. Across the valley or extended ravine in Wallace's front was the ridge which had been last yielded. Here the Confederates were re-forming their line. Up this ridge a charge was made by two Missouri and Indiana regiments, led by Colonel M. L. Smith, while Cruft moved around the base of the hill to the right. Before Smith lay an ascent of one hundred and fifty yards, "broken by outcropping ledges of rock, and, for the most part, impeded by dense underbrush." Cruft had to make his way around upon the enemy's flank through brushwood. At intervals up the hill Smith's skirmishers were rapidly advanced, and a lively bushwhacking followed between them and the Confederate pickets, each side taking shelter, as opportunity offered, behind rock and tree. Slowly the two regiments followed, and, when less than fifty yards had been gained, received a volley from the hill-top. It now fared hard with the skirmishers. Smith ordered his men to lay down, and when the violence of the fire was exhausted, they rose again and pushed on up the hill. Thus falling when the fire was hottest, and then rising again, they at last reached the top, and Cruft at the same time attacking the enemy on the hill-side, the ridge was cleared. The fight and pursuit lasted for two hours, and by five o'clock the enemy had entirely disappeared from the field, taking refuge in his intrenchments.

While this was going on along the Wynn's Ferry road, an assault was



also being made by Smith's division on Buckner's intrenchments. While Buckner was yet on his way back to his lines the storm fell upon Head's almost solitary regiment, which had been distributed along the rifle-pits for a distance of three quarters of a mile. The regiment altogether only numbered a little over 400 men fit for duty. These had been sharp-shooting all the forenoon. At two o'clock Buckner's men began to return to their rifle-pits, but in great disorder. An attack was made by Smith before Hanson's regiment, which was the first to return, had got into position.

General Smith's troops were fresh, and impatient to take part in the action. His division consisted of four Iowa, three Indiana, two Illinois, and one Missouri regiment. Three of these, the Second and Seventh Iowa, and the Twenty-fifth Indiana, supported by others, were selected for the assault, the main column of the division making a feint farther to the right. The ground to be gained was more precipitous and difficult than elsewhere along the lines.

The assault was undertaken under cover of Stone's Missouri battery. The regiments engaged in it were not surpassed by any in the service. It was at the head of the Second Iowa that General Lyon charged and fell at the battle of Wilson's Creek. After the fight had lasted an hour at the right of the entire Confederate line, this regiment made an onset and gained a portion of the rifle-pits. Stone's battery was brought forward, and although two regiments were ordered up from the fort, and others of Buckner's were now at hand, it was impossible for the enemy to regain what he had lost. This position enfiladed the entire right of the defenses of Donelson, and, if darkness had not intervened, Buckner's force would have been immediately routed.

The day had come to a close—a day of uninterrupted battle. For the first time during the war had it occurred that all day long an engagement had been continued between the two opposing armies. The troops engaged on either side must be credited with distinguished bravery. It was on this occasion, for the first time, that Southerners admitted that Northern troops would fight as well as their own, and even then it was given out that this was true of the Western troops alone. Those engaged on the Confederate side were mostly from Tennessee and Mississippi; those on the Federal mostly from Illinois. From the latter state were at least twenty-nine regiments, four of which were of artillery; from Iowa there were six regiments; from Indiana the same number; from Kentucky there were two, and from Missouri three. If these troops—and many of them were raw recruits—had not been pretty richly endowed with Western "grit," there is no doubt but that Pillow would have effected his design and delivered his army. But although, for nearly four hours, Oglesby almost entirely alone bore the brunt of the tremendous blow aimed at the Federal right, there was no flinching, and, until the ammunition gave out, there was no retreat. They so severely punished the Confederates that even after the latter had, by an obstinate contest of six hours, gained possession of the roads leading southward from Dover, they were no longer in a condition for the escape which they had fought to secure.

In a battle so severe, the casualties were on both sides remarkably small. Grant gives no definite estimate of losses in his report, but sets them in the rough at not less than 1200, which is far beneath the true figure.<sup>1</sup> Pillow estimates his losses at 2000. The list of Federal losses are especially remarkable for the number of field-officers killed and wounded. The two regiments which lost more than any others were the Eleventh and Thirty-first Illinois, these two being the last to give way when McClelland was driven. The loss of the Eleventh Indiana was almost half that of Wallace's entire brigade. It was the resolution with which both officers and men resisted the overwhelming attack of Pillow and Johnson that gained the day for the Federals. "We came to take that fort," said Oglesby, "and we will take it!" This was the sentiment of Grant's entire army.

That night the Confederate generals held a second council of war about midnight. It had taken till 12 o'clock to bury the Confederate dead. As on the previous night, the place of meeting was at General Pillow's headquarters in Dover. Floyd was there, and Pillow, attended by his aids, and Buckner, and in the course of the consultation Colonel Forrest made his appearance. The council was held under circumstances of ill omen. "Our people" had made a desperate fight, but the gateways of escape which it had forced open were now shut against it. This had been clearly ascertained by scouts, who had returned with the gloomy intelligence that the Federal camp-fires were in the same positions as on Friday night. Forrest did not believe this testimony, but ocular evidence satisfied him of its truth. At one o'clock orders had been given for the entire command to be under arms at four o'clock in the morning, to march out on the road to Charlotte. Now these orders would have to be rescinded. And there was no other way of escape. Floyd had at night sent up the river to Nashville

all the boats, with the wounded, and three hundred Federal prisoners which had been captured during the day, so that even this outlet was closed. The scene at Pillow's head-quarters at about three o'clock on Sunday morning had all the interest of a drama. The following dialogue will represent in substance the consultation which followed after the report of the investment of Dover had been made by the scouts.

FLOYD. "Well, gentlemen, what is now best to be done?"

Profound silence.

FLOYD (again). "General Pillow, what do you think it is best to do?"

PILLOW. "I think that we had better adhere to our previous resolution to cut our way out, sir."

FLOYD. "Well, General Buckner, what do you think it is best to do?"

BUCKNER. "We can try to cut our way out, as we did yesterday, but we should lose three fourths of our command, sir. I can not hold my position for half an hour after daylight. If I attempt to take my force out I shall be seen by these fellows that have ensconced themselves in part of my intrenchments. They will surely cut me to pieces!"

COLONEL FORREST. "But I will cover you with my cavalry."

BUCKNER. "That will make no difference. We can not cut our way out without its costing us three fourths of our men."

FLOYD. "I concur with General Buckner."

PILLOW. "If we can fight them another day in the trenches, by to-morrow we can have boats enough here to transport our troops across the river, and let them make their escape to Clarksville."

BUCKNER. "It will be impossible for me to hold my position for half an hour, as I have already informed you."

PILLOW. "But why can't you hold your position? I think you can hold your position; I think you can, sir."

BUCKNER (a little touched). "I know my position better, perhaps, than you do, sir. I can only bring four thousand men to bear against the enemy, while he can oppose me with any given number. You, gentlemen, know that yesterday morning I considered the Second Kentucky, Colonel Hanson's regiment, as good a regiment as any in the service; yet such was their condition yesterday afternoon, that, when I learned the enemy was in their trenches (which were to our extreme right, and detached from the others), before I could rally and form them, I had to take at least twenty men by the shoulders, and put them into line as a nucleus for formation."

FLOYD. "It is evident, as General Buckner says, that we can no longer hold out in the trenches. What shall we do?"

BUCKNER. "The other alternative, it appears to me, is a plain one. We can surrender. It is an alternative which we can accept without dishonor, considering our determined resistance of yesterday. To repeat that resistance to-morrow would cost three fourths of the command—a sacrifice which no commander has a right to make."

FLOYD. "We will have to capitulate; but, gentlemen, I can not surrender; you know my position with the Federals; it wouldn't do—it wouldn't do!"

PILLOW (still bent on "cutting out"). "I will neither surrender myself nor my command; I will die first!"

BUCKNER. "Then I suppose, gentlemen, the surrender will devolve upon me?"

FLOYD (looking out for the main chance). "General, if you are put in the command, will you allow me to take my brigade out by the river?"

BUCKNER. "Yes, sir, if you move your command before the enemy act upon my communication offering to capitulate."

FLOYD. "Then, sir, I surrender my command."

PILLOW (angrily). "I will not accept it; I will never surrender!"

BUCKNER (calling for pen, ink, and paper, and not forgetting the bugler) "I will accept, and share the fate of my command."

Floyd, Pillow, and Forrest then began to busy themselves about getting out of the way. The former escaped with about fifteen hundred men, one half of his command, on board the steamer General Anderson and another smaller boat. These had come down at about daybreak from Nashville. Curiously, considering the state of affairs at Donelson, one of these boats brought down four hundred raw troops. The manner of proceeding with the escape was to cross the river with a boat-load of troops, and then to return for more. Pillow and his staff got across in a small flat-boat, four feet by twelve, procured for him by an aid-de-camp, making their way to Clarksville by land. Forrest in the mean time, with a portion of his command, "cut out" by crossing the back-water on the left, and appear to have had an unpleasant time of it. To say nothing of the water, which was "saddle-skirt deep," the weather was so intensely cold that "a great many of the men were frostbitten, and it was the opinion of the generals that the infantry could not have passed through the water and have survived it." The two hundred were brave fellows, but Gantt, and Wilcox, and Henry—Forrest's subordinates—preferred to remain with Buckner, and were surrendered.

The scene at the river, where Floyd was embarking his "people," became exciting as the morning light grew more distinct. All Floyd's brigade, with the exception of the Twentieth Mississippi, consisted of Virginians under Wharton and McCausland. For these latter he showed the preference; they were embarked first; and, "to prevent stragglers from going aboard," Colonel Brown, commanding the Mississippi regiment, was directed to place a strong guard around the steam-boat landing. The boats had only come down a short time before daylight, and the rumor that the position was to be surrendered spreading through the camps, a multitude of soldiers flocked to the river "almost panic-stricken and frantic," hoping to escape. But the Twentieth Mississippi "stood like a stone wall." After several trips

<sup>1</sup> The following is the list of casualties as given in the officers' reports immediately after the battle:

Twenty-fifth Kentucky.....	84	Second Iowa.....	198
Thirty-first Indiana.....	69	Twenty-fifth Indiana.....	115
Seventeenth Kentucky.....	40	Seventh Iowa.....	39
Forty-fourth Indiana.....	43	Birge's Sharpshooters.....	4
Eleventh Illinois.....	330	Eighth Missouri.....	45
Twentieth Illinois.....	133	Eleventh Indiana.....	34
Forty-eighth Illinois.....	12	Twelfth Iowa.....	30
Forty-fifth Illinois.....	22	Taylor's Battery.....	2
Seventeenth Illinois.....	81	McAllister's Battery.....	9
Forty-ninth Illinois.....	68	Total.....	1388

Less than half the regiments are here represented. The greatest number of casualties of course befell McClelland's division, Smith's suffering hardly any. Not a regiment of Oglesby's or Thayer's brigade is represented in this list; yet Oglesby must have suffered more in proportion than any other brigade engaged. W. H. Wallace's brigade lost 687. If we put Oglesby's loss at only 700, we have, together with the numbers given in the list, a little over 2000, without including Thayer's losses.



had been made, and nearly all of the Virginia regiments taken across, Buckner, who had already capitulated, began to grow uneasy, and ordered the boat to leave the landing, threatening, in case of delay, to send a shell in that direction.

Thus the night and morning with the Confederate army. Outside of their intrenchments, meanwhile, was a painful and heart-sickening scene. Thousands of dead and wounded were lying on the bloody field. On such a night, to be helpless from severe wounds was a suffering less dreadful than death itself, for it was bitter cold. Where Lew. Wallace's division held the battlefield, the terrible sufferings of these helpless soldiers were, so far as possible, relieved. The ground, according to Wallace's report, "was thickly strewn with the dead of McClernand's regiments. The number of Illinoisans there found mournfully attested the desperation of the battle, and how firmly they had fought it. All night, and till far in the morning, my soldiers, generous as they were gallant, were engaged in ministering to and removing their own wounded and the wounded of the first division, not forgetting those of the enemy."

As morning broke upon the Federal ranks, it found them on all sides drawn up ready for an assault on Donelson, in conjunction with an attack by the two gun-boats which Foote had left behind. Before the action was commenced a white flag was seen above Fort Donelson, the sound of Buckner's bugle was heard, and the following note came directed to General Grant from General Buckner:

"SIR,—In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until twelve o'clock to-day. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, S. B. BUCKNER."

To which General Grant replied:

"Yours of this date, proposing an armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms other than an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.

"I propose to move immediately upon your works. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT."

This elicited from General Buckner the following remarkable answer:

"SIR,—The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. I am, sir, your very obedient servant, S. B. BUCKNER."

The Fifty-eighth Ohio Volunteers was the first regiment on the enemy's battery, and, immediately upon possession, its band opened with the "Star Spangled Banner."

At the lowest estimate, 10,000 men were surrendered with the fort, besides forty pieces of artillery. Grant estimated the number of prisoners at from 12,000 to 15,000. The prisoners were, for the most part, dressed in citizens' clothes, having no military mark except black stripes on the pants. The officers had on gray uniforms, and were distinguished from Federals holding similar rank by the great profusion of gold lace. Most of the Tennessee regiments had enlisted only for twelve months, and had received no pay since they had entered the service.<sup>2</sup>

The results of the victory at Donelson distinguished it above any victory which had hitherto been gained in American history. The prisoners taken would have made a larger army than Scott led in Mexico. It was not merely a siege, but a great battle. In his congratulatory order to his troops General Grant said:

"The victory achieved is not only great in the effect it will have in breaking down rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken in any battle on this continent." And surely he did not overstep the limits of a becoming modesty in adding, "Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the map of our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live in the memory of a grateful people."

Very soon after the surrender of Donelson both General Floyd and General Pillow were relieved of their commands.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The German colonel, Bausenwein, commanding the Fifty-eighth, was full of innocent rapture over the Confederate booty. In his report to the adjutant-general he breaks out in this wise: "I have some 4000 muskets, revolvers, Bowie-knives, etc., now under guard, and thousands of tents, provisions of enormous bulk (!)—in fact, every thing of war implements. Hundreds of horses and mules! Our company officers walk no more; they are supplied with Seesh saddles, horses, and mules, and happiness beams from their eyes and lips!"

<sup>2</sup> As regards the disposition made of the prisoners the following order will inform the reader:

"SPECIAL ORDER.

"Head-quarters, Army in the Field, Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862.

"All prisoners taken at the surrender of Fort Donelson will be collected as rapidly as practicable, near the village of Dover, under their respective company and regimental commanders, or in such manner as may be deemed best by Brigadier General S. B. Buckner, and will receive two days' rations preparatory to embarking for Cairo. Prisoners are to be allowed their clothing, blankets, and such private property as may be carried about the person, and commissioned officers will be allowed their side-arms. By order U. S. GRANT, Brig. Gen."

<sup>3</sup> The Confederate Congress commenced its session two days after the capture of Donelson. Just one week after the capture, Jefferson Davis was inaugurated as President of the Confederate States under the auspices of a permanent government. It is hardly a wonder that Mr. Davis should have resented the echoes of disaster coming to his ears at such a time. It was an ill omen for the so-styled permanent government. His resentment was certainly not diminished by the consciousness that he himself was responsible for the defeat. Anxious to divert popular vengeance from his own freshly-crowned head, he, on the 11th of March, sent to Congress, together with the official reports of the battle, the following special message:

"Executive Department.


"I transmit herewith copies of such official reports as have been received at the War Department of the defense and fall of Fort Donelson. They will be found incomplete and unsatisfactory. Instructions have been given to furnish farther information upon the several points not made intel-





The more immediate results of the Federal victory were the evacuation of Bowling Green and Columbus by the Confederates. While the battle was being fought on Saturday, General A. S. Johnston was already at Nashville, awaiting the arrival of his command from Bowling Green.

The column dispatched by Buell against Bowling Green consisted of General Ormsby M. Mitchell's (third) division. General Mitchell was a na-



ORMSBY M. KNIGHT MITCHELL.

ligible by the reports. It is not stated that re-enforcements were at any time asked for; nor is it demonstrated to have been impossible to have saved the army by evacuating the position; nor is it known by what means it was found practicable to withdraw a part of the garrison, leaving the remainder to surrender; nor upon what authority or principles of action the senior general aban-

doned responsibility by transferring the command to a junior officer. In a former communication to Congress I presented the propriety of a suspension of judgment in relation to the disaster at Fort Donelson until official reports could be received. I regret that the information now furnished is so defective. In the mean time, hopeful that satisfactory explanation may be made, I have directed, upon the exhibition of the case as presented by the two senior generals, that they should be relieved from command, to await farther orders whenever a reliable judgment can be rendered on the merits of the case.

JEFFERSON DAVIS."

The charges intimated in the above were more specifically stated by H. B. Brewster, the Confederate A. A. General, in the following communication, addressed to Generals Floyd and Pillow, March 16:

"Under date of March 4 the Secretary of War says: 'The reports of Generals Floyd and Pillow are unsatisfactory, and the President directs that both these generals be relieved from command till farther orders.' He farther requests General Johnston 'in the mean time to request them to add to their reports such statements as they may deem proper on the following points:

"1st. The failure to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison of Fort Donelson to repel attack.

"2d. The failure of any attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when found untenable.

"3d. Why they abandoned the command to their inferior officer, instead of executing themselves whatever measure was deemed proper for the entire army.

"4th. What was the precise mode by which each effected his escape from the post, and what dangers were encountered in the retreat.

"5th. Upon what principle a selection was made of particular troops, being certain regiments of the senior general's brigade, etc."

The different answers made by the two generals to these charges were characteristic. Pillow's was manly but independent; and inasmuch as he had himself advised an effort to escape with the entire army, he could hardly have felt the burden of blame resting very heavily on his shoulders; still he answered as if the charges applied to himself as much as to any body. In regard to the failure to give timely notice of the need of re-enforcements, he said that up to Friday, the 14th, there was no such need; but if there had been, General Johnston had no men to spare. In this case it was clearly, as it appeared to him, the best policy to fight their way out. He seemed inclined to blame Buckner, as indeed he had reason to, for having failed to do his part of the work on Saturday, and thus enabling the enemy to recover himself. It was his own opinion that the assault might have been again tried with success on Sunday; but this was only his private opinion, and when the command was delivered over to him, he could not act upon it in the face of Buckner's and Floyd's assertion that it would cost three fourths of the army.

Poor Floyd, on the other hand, feeling that the onus of complaint unavoidably rested on himself, was disposed to resent the charges and to kick them back in the President's face.

In the first place, he had planned the whole defense to suit himself, but stupid Johnston did not agree to his plans. He knew that Johnston's whole army could not repel the Federal advance up the Cumberland (!) He considered the fort ill chosen, to begin with. Then, again, it had only thirteen guns, and only three of these were available against iron-clads. [Pretty well available, we should say, considering the results of the gun-boat fight on Friday!] He did not call for re-enforcements because he thought there were already troops enough in the miserable fort, considering that it was only a trap after all. He thought the main object of the defense at Donelson was to gain time for Johnston to evacuate Bowling Green with all his supplies and munitions of war.

Hold Donelson, indeed! Why, it could not be held except with a force of 95,000 men; 50,000 at the fort, 20,000 at Clarksville, and 25,000 more at Nashville. What use, then, of making



GENERAL MITCHELL'S DIVISION CROSSING GREEN RIVER, FEBRUARY, 1862.



NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE.







RAILROAD BRIDGE ACROSS THE CUMBERLAND AT NASHVILLE.

Bowling Green, a distance of forty-two miles. The town was occupied on the 15th without resistance, only three regiments of the enemy remaining behind. Both of the bridges across the Big Barren River were destroyed, and the Confederates had succeeded in shipping all their artillery to Nashville. In the mean time, Johnston, as we have said, was at Nashville directing operations, and awaiting the event of the battle at Donelson. Up to the latest moment Pillow promised him success. So late as Saturday night that sanguine officer telegraphed to him, "On the honor of a soldier, the day is ours!" The telegram was received at midnight, and Nashville rang with the jubilations of an excited people. At dawn the news came of the surrender of the fort. Then cheers were exchanged for a tumult of fear. It was Sabbath morning, and the good people of the town were at church thanking God for a great victory, when Governor Harris galloped through the streets of the capital proclaiming that Donelson had fallen, and their army had been captured, and that at any moment the enemy might come down upon them. In an excited, hurried manner he summoned the state Legislature, and adjourned it to Memphis, leaving by a special train in the afternoon himself with the state archives. A scene of the utmost confusion followed. If the city had become the victim of a universal conflagration, the panic could scarcely have been greater. The churches were broken up, the streets were crowded with weeping women, and the side-walks were filled with trunks and baggage thrown hastily out of the houses, and sometimes from the third story windows. The more reckless of the citizens abandoned themselves to plunder. In the midst of this general and confused exodus, General Johnston's army might have been seen moving across

an ado about a re-enforcement of a dozen or so thousands of men, which would be but a drop in the bucket.

As to the "failure of any attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when found untenable," this seemed to Floyd a biting sarcasm on Jeff. Davis's part. Pray, what had the bloody fight of the 15th meant, if it was not an "attempt to save the army by evacuating the fort." But perhaps the President was not satisfied because the attempt, unsuccessful on Saturday, was not repeated on Sunday. He would remind the President that "there is such a thing as human exhaustion—an end of physical ability in men to march and fight—however little such a contingency may seem possible to those who quietly sleep upon soft beds, who fare sumptuously every day, and have never tried the exposure of protracted battles and hard campaigns." Floyd then begins to grow somewhat extravagant in his details of what his army had suffered; he speaks pathetically of "the conflict, toll, and excitement of unsuspended battle running through eighty-four hours."<sup>(1)</sup> His excited imagination sees three Federal soldiers where there was but one. How was this force, six times his own, to be thrust aside? Then, besides, if his soldiers should cut their way out, "they would have to march over a battle-field strewn with corpses."<sup>(2)</sup>

The remaining charges related chiefly to Floyd's escape with a good part of his own division after a surrender had been determined upon. This was easily explained. There were two boats, and these came so late that it was impossible for only a small part of the army to escape. The senior general preferred, of course, to save his own troops to any others.

However ludicrous some parts of Floyd's report may appear, his arguments, on the whole, were perfectly just and reasonable. Like Tilghman at Fort Henry, Floyd could, by the defense of Donelson, effect nothing, except to gain time for Johnston to form a new line more defensible farther south. Donelson was, indeed, nothing else but a "trap," as Floyd called it; and if any one was culpable for setting this trap, it was Jefferson Davis himself. He had placed the Confederate army of the West in a situation adapted neither to offensive nor defensive operations, being too feeble for the former, and disposed in the worst possible manner for the latter.

the Cumberland, with a long train following, which did not get over all night. Floyd had got up with his small detachment, and now remained as a rear guard until the retreat should be accomplished. On the following Thursday he too took his departure.

There was sufficient reason why Nashville should have been abandoned, but there was hardly any occasion for the panic which crazed its citizens, who expected to see the gun-boats coming up before sundown. General Johnston had received the tidings of defeat as early as four o'clock Sunday morning. If he had issued a simple proclamation to quiet the natural alarm of the citizens, the tumult which followed would have been avoided. He left all this in the governor's hands, who only made matters worse. It was true that Nashville was no longer tenable. The city had no natural situation which could be made available for defense. Good turnpike roads led to it from all sides, and through it ran the Cumberland, navigable for the Federal fleet. Johnston's engineer reported that the city could not be held by a force less than 50,000 strong. This, however, was only ground for the removal of the army, and need only have disturbed such of the citizens as were particularly desirous of leaving their homes and property for the sake of sharing the fortunes of the Confederacy. But that which moved the citizens of Nashville was not so much disinterested patriotism as mortal terror. The Southern leaders had studiously endeavored, and in a great measure had succeeded in producing a popular impression among the people that within the lines of the Federal armies they were secure from no violence. This had been the impression ever since Beauregard had said that "Beauty and booty" was the motto of the Union soldiers.<sup>1</sup>

The day after the surrender of Donelson, Commodore Foote, though still suffering from his wound, left Cairo with eight mortar-boats, two iron-clads, and the Conestoga, for another advance up the Cumberland—this time against Clarksville, a fortified position on the river, about fifty miles below Nashville, and on the Virginia Railroad. On the 20th, Clarksville, abandoned by its garrison, fell into Foote's hands. The railroad bridge across the river had been destroyed. The commodore, at the request of the mayor and other prominent citizens, issued a proclamation, guaranteeing safety to such citizens as chose to remain in the city. General Smith was left in command, while Foote returned to Donelson to prepare an expedition against Nashville. Buell had already sent large re-enforcements to Grant. A portion of these, under General Nelson, accompanied Foote on transports. These

<sup>1</sup> The following, from the Nashville *Banner of Peace* of about this date, indicates the manner in which this impression had been produced:

"We have felt too secure, we have been too blind to the consequence of Federal success. If they succeed, we shall see plunder; insult to old and young, male and female; murder of innocents; release of slaves, and causing them to drive and insult their masters and mistresses in the most menial services; the land laid waste; houses burned; banks and private coffers robbed; cotton and every valuable taken away before our eyes, and a brutal and drunken soldiery turned loose upon us."





COLUMBUS, KENTUCKY.

troops occupied the capital without opposition. General Buell himself arrived on the 26th, and issued a proclamation, the object of which was to secure the citizens of Nashville from spoliation or injury. By this order, soldiers were "forbidden to enter the residences or grounds of any citizens on any plea, without authority."


The next day, General Grant, accompanied by his staff, came up from Clarksville. Among other of the citizens, they called on Mrs. James K. Polk, the wife of a late President of the United States. This lady, then about fifty years of age, had all her life been associated with the South, and her sympathies were clearly with the Confederate rather than with the United States government. But these sympathies she did not express, from a courteous regard for her visitors. "She hoped that the tomb of her husband" (which was in a corner of the beautiful garden, surrounded by cedars and magnolias) "would protect her household from insult and her property from pillage; farther than this, she expected nothing from the United States, and desired nothing."

The Confederate government, by their too hasty abandonment of Nashville, lost a large amount of stores. These consisted especially of clothing and commissary supplies. The mob had, for the most part, taken care of this property. Floyd had great difficulty in driving off the greedy crowd. The Confederate quarter-master left the city eight days before the arrival of the Federal army; if he had remained, he could doubtless have saved property amounting in value to hundreds of thousands.

With remarkable rapidity, it was now proposed to move on Columbus with Foote's fleet. This was needless, as already General Beauregard had ordered Polk to evacuate that strongly fortified place, and to adopt a position on the river farther south. The position selected by Polk was Island No. 10, the main land in Madrid Bend, on the Tennessee shore, and New


Madrid, on the opposite bank. Island No. 10 was about ten miles below Columbus. Defensive works had been thrown up at these points the previous autumn, and heavy batteries were being constructed. On the 25th orders were issued for the removal of the sick, preparatory to the evacuation of Columbus. Two days afterward General McGown was assigned to the command of the new position, his division being ordered thither February 27. The commissary, quarter-master's, and ordnance stores had all been removed, and afterward the heavy guns. March 1, Polk's entire army, except the cavalry, evacuated Columbus—General Stuart's brigade moving, by way of the river, to New Madrid, the remainder by land to Union City. On the 3d, two days after Polk and his staff left the works, a scouting party, consisting of a portion of the Second Illinois cavalry, sent from Paducah by General Sherman, took possession of the town. The next day the fleet came down, and three regiments, under Generals Cullum and Sherman, took permanent possession.

The campaign commenced on the 1st of February had now terminated. It had been brief, but decisive. It had lasted but one month, but it was a continued series of victories. It renewed the enthusiasm of a people which had grown tired of waiting for results. Grant and Foote—the two heroes of this campaign—came before the people bearing splendid trophies in their hands. Henry, Donelson, Bowling Green, Nashville, and Columbus—all reduced within a period of thirty days—appeared to Unionists to speak prophetically of the fate awaiting all Confederate strong-holds. A month ago, and one half of Kentucky was firmly held in the grasp of the Confederate armies; now, not only that state, but the greater part of Tennessee also, was restored to Federal allegiance. Hopes were entertained that another year of vigorous work would bring back all the seceded states.



THE CAPITOL AT NASHVILLE.





BURNSIDE'S EXPEDITION OFF FORTRESS MONROE. NIGHT SCENE.

## CHAPTER XII.

## ROANOKE AND NEWBERN.

Hatteras Inlet at the beginning of 1862.—Situation and Importance of Roanoke Island; its defensive Works.—General Wise's Command.—The New England Const Division; its original Destination.—McClellan's Instructions to Burnside.—The Burnside Expedition.—Commodore Goldsborough.—Arrival of the Fleet off Hatteras.—The Battle of Roanoke Island.—Destruction of the Confederate Fleet and Capture of Elizabeth City.—Capture of Edenton, Plymouth, and Winton.—The Battle of Newbern.—Capture of Washington.—Bombardment and Capture of Fort Macon.—Beaufort.

THE old proverb that "misfortunes never come singly" was proved true to the Confederacy in the month of February, 1862. Between the loss of Fort Henry and of Fort Donelson was sandwiched in, as it were, the capture of Roanoke Island. Floyd and Wise, compatriots in the Western Virginia campaign of the last autumn, but always at loggerheads with each other, were now fitly disposed by Mr. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of War, at points as wide apart as possible. Wise, with his legion, had been sent to Roanoke Island, the eastern terminus of the Confederate line. Floyd had been dispatched to Tennessee, the western limit. Just one week before Floyd surrendered Donelson, or, rather, left Buckner to transact the disagreeable business for him, Wise had surrendered Roanoke Island.

When North Carolina seceded from the United States, the Confederate authorities fortified Hatteras Inlet by the construction of Forts Hatteras and Clark. Other works were erected commanding Oregon Inlet, farther north. It was not long, however, before these works on the North Carolina coast were reduced by the Federal fleet under Butler and Stringham. Within the long, narrow sand-bar extending almost from Cape Henry to Cape Lookout, lie the waters of two extensive sounds, Albemarle and Pamlico. Pamlico Sound, together with the embouchures of its two tributary rivers, the Neuse and the Pamlico, had been gained by Butler's victories. The Confederate force defending these waters, compelled to resign the inlets, had concentrated on Roanoke Island. This island commands the only entrance to Albemarle Sound, which connects with Pamlico by means of Croatan and Roanoke Sounds on either side of the island.

Roanoke Island is the key not only to a large portion of Northeastern North Carolina, but also to an important slice of Virginia—an especially important slice, as including Portsmouth and Norfolk.<sup>1</sup> The island was de-


fended by a few regiments, mostly from North Carolina. General Wise was assigned to the command during the latter part of December, 1861. Benjamin desired him to bring his legion up to 10,000 strong by recruiting in North Carolina. It does not indicate any great enthusiasm in the Confederate cause on the part of that state that Wise was obliged to fall back upon the military authorities at Richmond for support. But no troops could be spared from the Virginia army. It appeared very likely that Roanoke Island would prove to be another of Secretary Benjamin's traps. The fortifications were on the western coast, commanding the Croatan Sound, which was the only channel available for naval approach. There were three sand forts built at intervals on the northern half of this coast: Fort Bartow, at Pork Point; Fort Huger, at Weir's Point; and midway between these, Fort Blanchard, mounting four guns. The works at Pork and Weir's Point were quite formidable, mounting together twenty-two guns, three of which were 100-pound rifles. Opposite Pork, at Redstone Point on the main land, was Fort Forest. On the east side of the island there was a battery, covering the passage of troops to or from Nag's Head, on the bar outside. On the southern end of the island there were no works whatever. Even if the marshy and densely-wooded character seemed to preclude the possibility of any formidable attack by land from this direction, it was still important that there should be some work commanding the entrance to Croatan Sound, either on the island or on the main land. To resist the approach of Federal troops toward the northern portion of the island, there was in the middle of it, nearly on a line with Fort Bartow, a strong redoubt, constructed with a pond covering it in front and flanking both extremities. This battery was thirty-five yards wide, and commanded a cart-road, the only available approach from the south. Across from Redstone to Pork Point a line of obstructions, consisting of piles and sunken vessels, had been formed, leaving an open channel under the guns of each of the two forts. A fleet of eight steamers, mounting each two guns, completed the defenses of Roanoke Island.

In the mean time an expedition was planning on the Federal side which would soon set these defenses at naught. On the 6th of September, 1861, General McClellan had requested the Secretary of War "to organize two brigades, of five regiments each, of New England men, for the general service, but particularly adapted to coast service." At the time this request was made, it was McClellan's intention to use this force in the inlets of Chesapeake Bay and on the Potomac. But so great was the difficulty of obtaining suitable vessels, and adapting them to the service required of them, that the expedition was not ready until January, 1862. McClellan, in the mean

<sup>1</sup> "Roanoke Island was the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two sounds, Albemarle and Currituck; eight rivers, the North, West, Pasquotank, the Perquimans, the Little, the Chowan, the Roanoke, and the Alligator; four canals, the Albemarle and Chesapeake, the Dismal Swamp, the Northwest Canal, and the Suffolk; two railroads, the Petersburg and Norfolk, and the Sea-board and Roanoke. It guarded more than four fifths of all Norfolk's supplies of corn, pork, and forage, and it cut the command of General Huger off from all its most efficient transportation. It endangers the subsistence of his whole army, threatens the navy yard at Gosport, and to cut off Norfolk from Richmond, and both from railroad communication with the South. It lodges the enemy in a safe harbor from the storms of Hatteras, gives them a rendezvous, and

large, rich range of supplies, and the command of the sea-board from Oregon Inlet to Cape Henry. It should have been defended at the expense of 20,000 men and of many millions of dollars."—Report of General Wise.





MAP OF THE NORTH CAROLINA COAST.





LOUIS M. GOLDSBOROUGH.

while, had been appointed general-in-chief. In his larger combinations he changed his original intention in regard to this expedition, and determined to give it a wider range, sending it to the North Carolina coast; partly because Butler's operations had opened the way, partly because permanent possession of Albemarle Sound would greatly facilitate the task of the blockading fleet, but chiefly because he hoped to be able to strike a blow at the Weldon Railroad after the capture of Newbern. In his letter of instructions, January 7, to General Ambrose E. Burnside, who was to command the expedition, he indicated the following series of operations: Burnside was first to unite with Flag-officer Goldsborough, in command of the fleet, at Fort Monroe; the first point of attack was to be Roanoke Island; then Newbern was to be attended to, and, if possible, the Weldon road also. Raleigh itself might perchance come within reach, but there must be caution about that. Having taken Newbern, Burnside was to push down to Beaufort, reduce Fort Macon, and open the port. Wilmington was brought up in prospect as the "next point of interest," but with a hint that its capture might require an additional force. The instructions concluded with the following caution regarding proclamations: "In no case would I go beyond a moderate joint proclamation with the naval commander, which should say as little as possible about politics or the negro; merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is the preservation of the Union and upholding the laws of the general government, and stating that all who conduct themselves properly will, as far as possible, be protected in their persons and property."

The expedition, when completed, constituted a formidable armada. The naval force consisted of twenty light-draught vessels, having altogether an armament of over fifty guns, of which more than one fourth were 9-inch

<sup>1</sup> The following is a list of the naval vessels, with the names of their commanders and the character of their armament:

1. Stars and Stripes...	Lieut. Com'g. Worden .....	4 8-in., 55 cwt.; 1 20-lb. Parrott.
2. Louisiana.....	Lieut. Com'g. Murray .....	{ 1 8-in., 63 cwt.; 1 32-lb., 57 cwt.; 2 32-lb., 3 cwt.; 1 12-lb. rifled.
3. Hetzel.....	Lieut. Com'g. Davenport.....	1 9-in.; 1 80-lb. rifled.
4. Underwriter.....	Lieut. Com'g. Leffers .....	{ 1 8-in., 63 cwt.; 1 80-lb. rifled; 1 12-lb. rifled; 1 12-lb. smooth bore.
5. Delaware.....	Lieut. Com'g. Quackenbush..	{ 1 9-in.; 1 32-lb., 57 cwt.; 1 12-lb. rifled.
6. Valley City.....	Lieut. Com'g. Chaplin.....	4 32-lb., 42 cwt.; 1 12-lb. rifled.
7. Southfield.....	A. V. Lieut. Com'g. Behm.....	3 9-in.; 1 100-lb. rifled.
8. Hunchback.....	A. V. Lieut. Com'g. Colhoun.....	3 9-in.; 1 100-lb. rifled.
9. Morse.....	Acting Master Hayes .....	2 9-in.
10. Whitehead.....	Acting Master Trench .....	1 9-in.
11. Seymour.....	Acting Master Wells .....	1 30-lb. rifled; 1 12-lb. rifled.
12. Shawshoon.....	Acting Master Woodward....	2 20-lb. rifled.
13. Lockwood.....	Acting Master Graves .....	{ 1 80-lb. rifled; 1 12-lb. rifled; 1 12-lb. smooth bore.
14. Ceres.....	Acting Master McDiarmid...	1 30-lb. rifled; 1 32-lb., 33 cwt.
15. Patnam.....	Acting Master Hotchkiss.....	1 20-lb. rifled.
16. Brinker.....	Acting Master Giddings.....	1 32-lb. rifled.
17. Granite.....	Act'g Master's Mate Boomer..	1 32-lb., 57 cwt.
18. Perry.....		— 9 in.
19. Birney.....		— 9 in.
20. Whitehall.....		— 9 in.

guns; there were two 100-pound rifles, and only twelve of the guns were of less calibre than 30-pounders.<sup>1</sup> This part of the expedition was under the command of Flag-officer Louis M. Goldsborough, a native of the District of Columbia, and a citizen of Maryland. He had been fifty years in the naval service of the United States, and over eighteen years he had passed at sea. He was flag-officer of the North Atlantic blockading squadron. A late act of Congress had placed him on the retired list, but of the opportunity thus offered he had not availed himself.

The military division consisted, in the first place, of an army nearly fifteen thousand strong. There were seven gun-boats connected with this division: the Picket, which was Burnside's flag-ship; the Pioneer, the Hussar, the Chasseur, the Ranger, the Lancer, and the Vidette; the latter mounting three guns and the others four. The flotilla of transports numbered nearly forty vessels, each capable of conveying between four and five hundred men; in addition, there was a large amount of small craft, fifty or more additional vessels, for the transportation of supplies sufficient for sixty days' rations. General Ambrose E. Burnside, commanding the military division, was born in Indiana, May 23, 1824. He graduated at West Point in 1847, and was attached to the Confederate General (then Captain) Bragg's command in the Mexican war and the subsequent Indian campaigns. Retiring from military service in 1853, he did not enter it again until the civil war. He assumed command of the First Rhode Island Volunteers, but in the battle of Bull Run commanded a brigade. Soon after that battle he was made a brigadier general, and when the Coast Division was raised he was appointed its commander. Decisive in character, and at the same time a keen analyst of character in others, courteous in manner and of a commanding presence, he was more than any other man fitted for the important position assigned to him.

General John G. Foster, commanding the first brigade of Burnside's army, was a native of New Hampshire, and at the time of our history now reached was nearly forty years of age. He was second lieutenant of engineers in the regular army, belonging to the company of which McClellan was first lieutenant. He took part in the Mexican campaign, and at the battles of Contreras and Churubusco earned the first lieutenantancy. At El Morino del Rey he was severely wounded, and promoted to a captaincy. In 1854 he became Assistant Professor of Engineering at West Point. General Foster was one of the garrison of Fort Sumter when that work was assailed at the beginning of the insurrection.

The expedition sailed out of Hampton Roads January 11, at half past nine o'clock at night, and arrived off Hatteras on the 13th, just as a northeast gale began to blow up, threatening danger in any attempt to pass over the bulk-head. Even in the most quiet sea there were several vessels which must re-



STORM OFF HATTERAS.

main outside on account of their too great draught of water. The City of New York, drawing sixteen feet of water, attempted to pass the shoals on the 14th and got aground. The next day the vessel went to wreck in sight of thirty vessels that could render her no assistance. All day on the 14th and that night her crew were lashed to the rigging to prevent the waves from sweeping them overboard. Four of her boats were gone. In the remaining one, two brothers, William A. and Charles H. Beach, two mechanics from Newark, New Jersey, accompanied by the fireman, the second engineer, and the colored steward, managed to gain the fleet, and surf-boats were sent out to rescue their comrades. The next morning the gun-boat Zouave sunk at her anchorage, running foul of some obstruction. The Louisiana grounded the same day with the City of New York. A few days afterward the Pocahontas was wrecked. It was with great difficulty, and in connection with such dispiriting incidents as have been related, that the fleet was conveyed into the waters of the sound through "the shallow, narrow, and tortuous" channel of the bulk-head. Says Goldsborough, alluding to this channel, "Under the most favorable circumstances, scarcely an inch more than seven and a half feet of water can be found in it. It was only by the greatest exertions and perseverance on the part of my officers and men, and by turning every possible expedient to prompt account, that our vessels of the heaviest draught (some of them drawing quite eight feet) were worried through this perplexing gut." It was not until the 28th that this feat had been successfully accomplished.





JOHN G. FOSTER.

On the 5th of February, the fleet, with fifteen days' rations, was in motion for Roanoke Island, which is distant thirty-eight miles from Hatteras Inlet. Williams's brigade, consisting of four regiments, was left at the Inlet. The naval division led, advancing in three columns, commanded respectively by Worden, Murray, and Davenport. It was a fine day, but the fleet moved slowly, and it was not until evening that the low, swampy shores of North Carolina were visible. Curiously, the enemy had forgotten to remove the buoy on the eastern extremity of Long Point Shoal, twenty miles from the Inlet, and thus probably the loss of several vessels was prevented. That night a force was dispatched to the main land to secure the services of a certain individual, peaceably or by force, as a pilot. The errand was successfully accomplished. The next day was unpromising. A thick fog obscured all distant objects. Once during the forenoon it cleared away, disclosing Roanoke Island and the vessels of the Confederate fleet; but the fog returned again when the channel of Croatan Sound was nearly reached, and it began to rain. The next day, Friday, February 7, was clear, and at nine o'clock the fleet weighed anchor for the third time, at the sign of the Union jack, and the Ceres and Putnam led the way, as on the previous day, in search of obstructions. Arriving soon at the entrance of Croatan Sound, there were then the marshes to be threaded. Through these the passage is so narrow that not more than two ships can pass abreast. At half past ten these had been cleared, and a signal gun was fired from one of the forts on the island announcing the impending attack. The Underwriter, which had been sent to discover the presence of a battery, if there was one, at Sandy Point, near Ashby's Harbor, where Burnside intended to land his troops, gave signal a little after eleven o'clock that the coast was clear at that point. A few minutes later the naval division, accompanied by the seven gun-boats of the coast division, approached Pork Point, beyond which the Confederate fleet was drawn up behind a double row of piles. Before the bombardment commenced, Goldsborough signaled from the Philadelphia, "This day our country expects every man to do his duty." All the forts and vessels opened fire upon the attacking fleet, but the latter, in return, gave especial attention to Fort Bartow. At one o'clock the flag-staff of this fort was carried away by a shot, and in less than half an hour afterward the barracks in the rear were in flames.

In the course of the afternoon the troops began to disembark at Ashby's Harbor, under cover of the gun-boats. The landing was not entirely unguarded by the enemy, who had posted a small force there with a field battery. But the Delaware, with Rowan on board, took up a position just south of Pork Point, and cleared the way with a few shots from her guns. In the mean time the bombardment went on. It had been hottest between two and three o'clock. Two hours later Fort Bartow ceased firing, and the Confederate fleet withdrew around Weir's Point.

While this was going on, General Wise was lying sick at Nag's Head, four miles east of the island, on the sand-bar. The Confederate force upon the island on the morning of the 7th consisted of the Eighth North Carolina regiment, under Colonel H. M. Shaw, who, in the absence of Wise, was the senior officer; the Thirty-first, under Jordan, and three companies of the Seventeenth, under Major G. H. Hill. These, allowing for an absence of four or five hundred men, made up a garrison of nearly 1600 men. Early on the morning of the 7th this garrison was re-enforced by ten companies of the Wise Legion, under the command of Colonel Anderson and Captain Wise, the general's son. General Wise, notwithstanding his illness, issued all the necessary orders from his sick-bed, and attended to the wants of his army.

By midnight on the night of the 7th nearly 10,000 Federal troops had been landed at Ashby's Harbor. It was a dismal night for the soldiers, who, before emerging upon the firm sandy plain in the interior, had to wade through mud knee deep, and then to content themselves with such sleep as they could get with only their overcoats to protect them from the cold rain.

The next day, Saturday, the 8th, was Burnside's. The gun-boats, indeed, kept up their fire during the day, and a little after noon passed the obstructions in the Sound, but the burden of the day's labor fell on the military division. At seven o'clock in the morning the line of battle was formed. The advance up the island was in three columns: Foster's brigade in the centre, Parke's on the right, and Reno's on the left. Foster was to move along the cart-road in front, while Reno and Parke flanked the enemy's position by advancing through the woods on either side. The marshes and lagoons with which the island is covered rendered the approach difficult. A battery of six 12-pound boat howitzers headed the central column.

The field work, which constituted the enemy's sole defense against this land attack, was about a mile distant from Ashby's Harbor, on the cart-road. In its front the timber had been cut away to afford range for the artillery. It was garrisoned by 300 men, the remaining portion of the defensive force being held in reserve. Besides the clearing in front, the position was covered, front and flank, by an extensive lagoon.

The Confederate skirmishers were soon met and driven in, and at a curve in the road the battery of howitzers was placed to bear upon the enemy's battery a short distance ahead. The howitzers were exposed to a severe fire from three heavy guns in the Confederate work. An advance was made by the enemy with a view to flank Foster's brigade, the others not having yet come into action or even attracted the notice of the Confederate officers. A




JESSE L. RENO



pretty sharp action followed between the Twenty-third and Twenty-seventh Massachusetts regiments and a portion of the Wise Legion under Anderson and Captain Wise, in which the Confederates were repulsed. Here it was that Captain Wise received a wound which soon afterward proved mortal. The heroism of the Federal soldiers, who in many cases were obliged to stand waist-deep in water, was admirable. The wounded, as they were carried to the rear, smiled cheerfully and encouraged their companions. Nowhere did a single soldier flinch from the work in hand. Soon Parke passed Foster on the right and came into action. A charge was then ordered to be made by Hawkins's regiment of Zouaves, the Ninth New York, and simultaneously with this movement the flanking column under Reno was disclosed on the left. The Confederate battery was now enfiladed from both sides by a raking fire which the bravest soldier could not stand and live, and the only hope left was in flight. The stars and stripes were hoisted above the hostile battery, and the Federal columns hastened on in pursuit of the Confederates, who were retreating toward Nag's Head. The Twenty-first Massachusetts and the Fifty-first New York were in the advance, and just reached the shore in time to prevent the escape of a small number of prisoners, among whom was Captain Wise. The Confederate encampments were still farther north; from these the enemy's reserve force was driven toward the upper end of the island. But there was no chance for Shaw to make another stand. He therefore surrendered his entire command, which had that morning been re-enforced by four companies of the First North Carolina and a battalion under Colonel Green, bringing it up to a strength of at least 2500 men. Three thousand stand of small arms were also captured. Among the prisoners we have mentioned Captain Jennings Wise. He was wounded in the battle, and only survived it a few hours. Captain Wise had been previously editor of the Richmond Enquirer. The casualties in the Federal fleet amounted to twenty-five, of whom six were killed; in the military division Burnside reported a loss of 235, of whom thirty-five were killed.

The Confederate fleet endeavored to escape by running up the Pasquotank River to Elizabeth City. The day after the capture of Roanoke Island, thirteen steamers, under Commander Rowan, were sent in pursuit. It was also a part of Rowan's mission to proceed up the river and destroy a link of the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 10th, Rowan met the enemy's vessels off Elizabeth City, and captured or destroyed the entire fleet.<sup>1</sup> The *Ellis*, one of the Confederate steamers, was transferred to the Federal fleet. Between forty and fifty prisoners were taken.



LANDING OF THE TROOPS BELOW NEWBERN.

session of the town. Eight cannon, and a schooner on the stocks, were destroyed. Two schooners were captured, one of them having on board 4000 bushels of corn. On the 18th of February, Flag-officer Goldsborough and General Burnside issued a joint proclamation to the people of North Carolina.<sup>1</sup>

Albemarle Sound, at its western extremity, opens northward into the Chowan River, and eastward into the Roanoke. Leaving Croatan Sound on the afternoon of the 18th, Commander Rowan, with the *Delaware*, proceeded on a reconnoissance up this river. Two steamers were to follow him with Hawkins's Zouaves from Roanoke, and, stopping at Elizabeth City, he took away with him the force at that point, consisting of five steamers. Having ordered a reconnoissance to Plymouth, and anchored his fleet at the mouth of Roanoke River, with orders to follow him when the reconnoissance should be completed, he proceeded, with the *Delaware* and *Perry*, to Winton. At this place Union men were said to be in arms in expectation of the arrival of Burnside's men. His vessels were fired upon by a North Carolina battery. Early on the 20th, the entire command having arrived, after a short conflict the town was captured.

General Burnside, after the capture of Roanoke Island, directed his force, in conjunction with the naval division, now left under Rowan's command, against Newbern. This city was situated up the Neuse River, which empties into Pamlico Sound on the western side. The two commands embarked from Hatteras Inlet March 12, and that night anchored off the mouth of Slocum's Creek, eighteen miles below Newbern. Here, the next morning, the military division landed under cover of the fleet. The troops were disembarked in the midst of great enthusiasm, some of them, too impatient to wait for the boats, leaping into the water and wading waist-deep to the shore. It was twelve miles from the place of landing to the enemy's camp, and the roads were rivers of mire, through which the soldiers were obliged to march, dragging their heavy artillery with them. This toilsome march consumed the day, and the boat howitzers did not come up till three o'clock on the morning of the 14th. The vessels of the fleet, in the mean while, had moved up the river, shelling the woods in advance of the troops. At daylight on the 14th General Burnside ordered an advance, throwing General Foster with a column against the Confederate left. A second column, under Reno, was to attack the right; while a third, under Parke, was to attack in front. General Reno advanced along the railroad, and the other two columns by the turnpike. The soldiers had suffered much from tedious marches and exposure to rain, but they advanced to the attack with eager-



SINKING OF THE CONFEDERATE FLEET

The next morning, after the conflict between the two fleets, the Federal steamers passed into the harbor off Edenton, at the west end of Albemarle Sound. A portion of a flying artillery regiment stationed in the town fled, and many of the citizens, excited by apprehension on account of some unfounded reports, left their homes. The Federal troops took undisturbed pos-

<sup>1</sup> "The names of the men-of-war vessels captured and destroyed by our vessels since we reached this island are as follows: Flag-steamers *Sea-bird*, destroyed; steamer *Forest*, destroyed; steamer *Curlew*, destroyed; steamer *Fanny*, destroyed; steamer *Ellis*, captured; steamer *Black Warrior*, destroyed; and a new gun-boat on the stocks at Elizabeth City, also destroyed—making seven vessels in all; and each of the first six, I may add, was remarkably well armed as a gun-boat. All of them, except the *Curlew*, were destroyed or captured in the attack at Elizabeth City; and it may be proper to mention that the whole of them, saving, of course, the one on the stocks, were struck by our projectiles of one kind or another in the course of the engagement they had with us off here on the 7th instant. The *Curlew*, during the engagement of the 7th, was so badly injured by one of our 100-pounder shells that she was compelled to seek shelter close under Fort Forest, where, as soon as our vessels burst through the double row of extensive obstructions (formed by piles and sunken vessels, and at, as we are credibly informed, a cost of \$400,000) in order to get at her and also attack the fort, she was set on fire by her own crew, and, almost simultaneously, the fort, too, shared the same fate from the hands of those who were in it. In about an hour afterward, in the dark of the evening, both blew up."—Flag-officer Goldsborough's Report, February 20, 1862.

<sup>1</sup> "The mission of our joint expedition is not to invade any of your rights, but to assert the authority of the United States, and to close with you the desolating war brought upon your state by comparatively few bad men in your midst. Influenced infinitely more by the worst passions of human nature than by any show of human reason, they are still urging you astray to gratify their unholy purposes. They impose upon your credulity by telling you of wicked and even diabolical intentions on our part; of our desire to destroy your freedom, demolish your property, liberate your slaves, injure your women, and such like enormities, all of which, we assure you, is not only ridiculous, but utterly and willfully false.

"We are Christians as well as yourselves, and we profess to know full well and to feel profoundly the sacred obligations of that character. No apprehensions need be entertained that the demands of humanity or justice will be disregarded. We shall inflict no injury unless forced to do so by your own acts, and upon this you may confidently rely.

"These men are your worst enemies. They, in truth, have drawn you into your present condition, and are the real disturbers of your peace and the happiness of your firesides. We invite you, in the name of the Constitution, and in that of virtuous loyalty and civilization, to separate yourselves at once from their malign influence, to return to your allegiance, and not compel us to resort farther to the force under our control. The government asks only that its authority may be recognized, and, we repeat, in no manner or way does it desire to interfere with your laws constitutionally established, your institutions of any kind whatever, your property of any sort, or your usages in any respect.

"L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH, Flag-officer commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.  
"A. E. BURNSIDE, Brigadier General commanding Department of North Carolina."





ELIZABETH CITY, NORTH CAROLINA.

ness. They had the day before learned of the evacuation of Manassas by the Confederate army of the Potomac. Reno, on the railroad, had the advance. The enemy's works were five miles below Newbern, and were a mile in extent, protected on the river bank by a battery of thirteen guns, and on the opposite side by a line of redoubts over half a mile in length. This line of works was defended by eight regiments of infantry, five hundred cavalry, and three batteries of field artillery of six guns each. The Confederate forces were under the command of General Braneh.

General Reno's column was moving upon the enemy's right flank. As it moved up the railroad, a train was observed which had just arrived, bringing re-enforcements to the enemy. This train was attacked, and the enemy driven behind his intrenchments. The engagement then commenced, the Twenty-first Massachusetts regiment coming within short range of the enemy's redoubts and drawing their fire. General Foster's brigade had come up on the main road at the right and had formed his line, the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts on the extreme right and the Tenth Connecticut on the left. Between the Tenth and Reno's position General Parke held the centre. The Federal line thus formed extended more than a mile. The action, which was already begun, was quite severe. In some parts of the Federal line, particularly on the right centre, the swampy ground, broken by ravines opening toward the enemy, exposed the soldiers to the enemy's fire. The Twenty-third Massachusetts, on the left of the Tenth Connecticut, had hardly got into position before its colonel, Henry Merritt, fell, a cannon shot having passed through his body. The naval battery was placed in the centre, and the officers in charge of the guns stood by them persistently, although in some cases but a single gunner remained. Hammond, in charge of the Hetzel, lost all his men. On Reno's right, also, the fire was very hot. Adjutant Frazer A. Stearns, son of President Stearns, of Amherst College, and attached to the Twenty-first Massachusetts, was shot early in the battle.

Thus far the Confederate troops had the advantage, for, although inferior in numbers, they fought behind breast-works. A charge was now made by four companies of the Twenty-first, who marched from the railroad at double-quick and drove the enemy from one of their breast-works, hoisted the Union colors, and were advancing against a second work, when a larger force attacked them, and they were obliged to withdraw. An assault made by the Fourth Rhode Island on Parke's right was more permanently successful, resulting in the capture of a battery and two flags. From this work, in the centre of the Confederate line, Colonel Rodman, pursuing his advantage, charged upon the enemy's works farther to the left, which Reno was also assailing with his entire command. Their centre being now broken, the enemy fell back under the combined attack on his right. While this was going on, the Twenty-fourth Massachusetts, holding the extreme right of the entire line of attack, pushed forward by a rapid movement and gained a position within the enemy's intrenchments, which were then occupied by Foster's whole brigade. The Confederates were now, after four hours' fighting, in full retreat to Newbern. All three of Burnside's brigades were soon engaged in pursuit, and reached the river bank opposite Newbern about the middle of the afternoon. In the mean time the gun-boats had come up, and, by means of a steamer which they had captured, the army was conveyed across the river. The Confederates had escaped, by means of the railroad, to Goldsborough, after having burned the bridge across the river.

The gun-boats had safely passed the obstructions below the city, and three or four forts which commanded the river, the most formidable of which was Fort Thompson, mounting thirteen guns, two of them rifled 32-pounders. This fort protected the left flank of the land force resisting Burnside's approach, and its reduction by the gun-boats formed an important part of the battle. Not a man was lost in the naval division. Several of the vessels were slightly injured in passing the obstructions.



WATER BATTERY AT NEWBERN.





LANDING OF TROOPS AT SLOCUM'S CREEK.

BOMBARDMENT OF NEWBORN.



As the results of this victory, besides the city, General Burnside took eight batteries, numbering forty-six heavy guns, and three batteries of light artillery of six guns each, two steam-boats, and a large amount of commissary and quarter-master's stores, and two hundred prisoners. The Federal loss, as estimated in Burnside's report, was ninety-one killed and 466 wounded; the loss in officers was very severe. The Confederates admitted a loss of 500, including the prisoners.

A week after the fall of Newbern, Washington, at the mouth of Pamlico River, was surrendered to a portion of the Federal fleet under Lieutenant Commander A. Murray. On the 19th of April, General Reno, with five regiments, took possession of Camden, the capital of Camden county, and situated on the Pasquotank River, opposite Elizabeth City. Three of the regiments were landed at midnight of the 18th-19th three miles below Camden, but, by an incompetent guide, were led nearly a dozen miles out of their way. The Confederates were intrenched at South Mills, across the road by which Reno the next morning approached the town. Their rear was protected by a thick wood. From this position they were driven after a sharp engagement, in which the Federal loss was fourteen killed and ninety-six wounded. Most of Reno's men were so much wearied with their long march and the heat that pursuit was impossible.

The work of the expedition, according to the plan laid down by General McClellan, was now almost accomplished. It is true nothing had been done to seriously threaten the Weldon Railroad, but the Confederate position at Norfolk had been effectually flanked, and complete possession had been gained of Albemarle and Pamlico Sound. The reduction of Fort Macon would give the national government the entire coast of North Carolina. This fort commanded the entrance of Beaufort Harbor, one of the best on the Southern coast. It was situated on the eastern extremity of Bogue Banks, opposite Morehead City, and was considered more formidable than either of the forts yet attacked by the Federal fleet. This fort was bombarded on the 25th of April by three steamers and by three siege batteries on shore. One of the latter was mounted with three 32-pounder Parrotts. These shore batteries were constructed behind sand-hills, and, besides the Parrott guns, mounted eight mortars. The naval squadron carried about thirty guns, and was under Commander Samuel Lockwood, of the Daylight. The military division consisted of two regiments, the Eighth Connecticut and Fourth Rhode Island, with five companies of the Fifth Rhode Island. The action commenced early in the morning from the batteries on shore. At half past eight the squadron began to fire on the fort, the three gun-boats moving in an ellipse, and delivering their fire by turns. It was evident, however, in a very short time, that these boats, in the unsteady waters where they were situated, would have little effect on the fort, while they were themselves suffering severe injury, and at ten o'clock they withdrew. The batteries on shore, also, during the early part of the day, fired too high, and most of their heavy shells exploded too far beyond the fort. About half an hour, however, after the withdrawal of the boats, this mistake was corrected. The bombardment from shore was continued nearly all day. There was not a strong garrison in the fort, not more than five companies, all told, under Colonel White, and they held out with great tenacity until their guns were all silenced. At four o'clock P.M. the flag of truce was displayed and the firing ceased. Four hundred prisoners were captured. The reduction of Fort Macon gave the Federal navy a port of entry and a harbor fitted for vessels of heavy draught. One of the most favorable results of the occupation of the North Carolina coast was the accession of a large number of negroes, who would otherwise have contributed greatly to the military strength of the Confederacy, as every slave on the plantation was equivalent to a white in arms. The slave population of the counties occupied was estimated in 1850 as over 30,000.



*Bombardment of Fort Macon.*





JOHN ERICSSON.

## CHAPTER XIII.

## THE VIRGINIA AND THE MONITOR.

Confederate Privateers.—Treatment of captured Privateersmen.—Necessity of Iron-clads.—Transformation of the Merrimac into the Virginia.—The Stevens Battery.—Iron-clads proposed to the Federal Government.—Approval of the Plan of the Monitor.—Its Inventor and Builder.—The Revolving Turret, and its Inventor.—Launch of the Monitor.—Hampton Roads.—Appearance of the Virginia.—Sinking of the Cumberland.—Destruction of the Congress.—The Minnesota, Roanoke, and St. Lawrence.—Wooden Vessels and Iron-clads.—Close of the first Day's Fight.—Appearance of the Monitor.—First Encounter of Iron-clads.—The Result.—The Monitor and Virginia watching each other.—Destruction of the Virginia.—Action at Dreyer's Bluff.—Loss of the Monitor.—Perilous Voyage of the Passaic.—New Monitors built.—Obstacles to their Construction.—Forging Armor-plates.—Capacity of Turreted Vessels.—The Turrets as proposed by Timby.—Automatic Aiming and Discharge.—Advantages of the Turret System.

AT the commencement of the war the Confederates were without any naval force. Of the fifty vessels which they had seized in their ports and rivers only a few were capable of service on the ocean. They had neither time nor means to construct vessels of war; but the Federal merchantmen offered a tempting prize which it was hoped might be secured by private armed vessels sailing under letters of marque. During the spring and early summer of 1861 several privateers were fitted out. Most of them came to grief; none were successful. The revenue schooner Aikin was seized at Charleston, and fitted out as a privateer under the name of the Petrel. She had hardly got to sea when she came in sight of the frigate St. Lawrence, to which she gave chase, supposing her to be an unarmed merchantman. Coming within range, the frigate discharged a single broadside, which sank the privateer. The Echo, a condemned slaver, was seized at Charleston, and equipped as a privateer under the name of the Jeff Davis. She made several prizes. Among these was the S. J. Waring, captured within less than two hundred miles from New York. The colored steward, William Tillman, and two scamen, were left on board, with a prize crew of five men, to take the vessel to Charleston. One night Tillman killed three of the captors, and, aided by one of the crew, compelled the others to take the Waring to New York, where salvage was awarded to him as the recaptor. The Jeff Davis was soon after wrecked on the Florida coast. The Savannah, a pilot schooner of only 54 tons, was fitted out as a privateer. After making a single prize, she was captured by the frigate Perry, and her captain and crew were put in irons as pirates. They were brought to trial as pirates, but the jury failing to agree, they were remanded. The Confederate government thereupon selected an equal number of Federal officers, among whom was Colonel Corcoran, captured at Bull Run, and placed them in close confinement, to be treated in the same manner as the crew of the Savannah. In consequence of this action, and of the prevailing sentiment at home and abroad, the Federal government receded from its position, and the rights of prisoners of war were tacitly conceded to captured privateersmen.

The blockade of the Southern coast soon became so strict that privateers had no chance of sending their prizes into their own ports, and those of foreign nations were closed by proclamations of neutrality. Privateers could only destroy their prizes without gaining any profit for themselves. The only practical advantage which the Confederates derived from the issue of letters of marque was the tacit acknowledgment by the Federal government that they were actual belligerents, and that prisoners made from them on the sea as well as on the land were to be considered as prisoners of war.

Though Confederate citizens could not wage war upon the ocean with

profit to themselves, government might greatly injure the enemy by preying upon its commerce. Armed vessels might be fitted out under the Confederate flag, bearing regular commissions as men-of-war. They had no ships built for this purpose, and no means for constructing them at home. Until they could buy or build them abroad, they could only arm and equip some of the merchant-steamers which had fallen into their hands. The Nashville, formerly plying as a packet between New York and Charleston, and the Marques de la Habana, a New Orleans and Havana trader, her name having been changed to the Sumter, were armed and sent to sea. The fate of these two vessels, which has already been described in this History, showed that steamers built for commerce were not adapted for cruisers. Steamers possessing great speed and sufficiently staunch to carry a heavy armament were demanded. In course of time several of these were procured in Great Britain. The career of two of these, the Florida and the Alabama, will be narrated hereafter. We now turn to a subject of greater importance, which comes up earlier in order of time.


The Confederate authorities early saw the necessity of floating batteries to defend their coasts, harbors, and inland waters. They could not hope to rival their enemy in the number of vessels. They must rely upon the superior offensive and defensive force of a few. The maritime powers of Europe had instituted experiments to test the practicability of rendering ships invulnerable by clothing them with iron. France had built La Gloire, and Great Britain the Warrior. These were ordinary men-of-war, covered wholly or in part with solid iron plates four or five inches thick, which was thought sufficient to withstand the heaviest shot possible in naval warfare. But to construct a vessel of this class, with all the appliances of European navy yards and foundries, required months. The Confederates needed such vessels in weeks. They had no means of building a hull or of making an engine. They had no iron which a European naval constructor would have thought fit for armor. But imbecility, treachery, and accident gave them a hull and engine ready for immediate use.

In 1855 the United States built at different navy yards three powerful steam frigates, the Merrimac, the Roanoke, and the Minnesota. They were all nearly alike, of about 3500 tons burden, carrying from forty to fifty heavy guns. In April, 1861, the Merrimac was at the Norfolk Navy Yard, undergoing repairs. When that place was abandoned, she was set on fire, scuttled, and sunk. She was soon after raised by the Confederates, and John M. Brooke, formerly a lieutenant in the United States Navy, John L. Porter, Confederate naval constructor, and William P. Williamson, chief engineer, were ordered to examine into her condition and the use to which she might be put. They reported that her upper works were so much damaged that she could not be rebuilt without great expense and delay; but the bottom part of the hull, the boilers, and heavy parts of the engine, were almost without injury, and that these could be adapted for a shot-proof steam battery more quickly and for one third of the sum which it would cost to construct such a vessel anew. The plan was furnished by Brooke and Porter. The central part of the hull, for something more than half of its length, was cut down to within three or four feet of the water-line to form the gun-deck, and the hull was plated with iron to a depth of about six feet below the water-line. A casemate of entirely novel construction was built upon the gun-deck. Pine beams, a foot square and fifteen feet long, were placed side by side, like rafters, at an inclination of about 45 degrees. These projected over the sides of the vessel like the eaves of a house, their ends dipping two feet below the water. Upon these beams were placed two layers of oak planks four inches thick, one layer horizontal, the other vertical. This was first overlaid with ordinary flat bars of iron four and a half inches thick. Experiments which were made under the care of Lieutenant Brooke showed that this thickness of iron was inadequate, and a layer of railroad iron was added. This casemate did not come to a point, like the roof of a house, but there was a flat space on the top, rendered bomb-proof by plates of wrought iron. From this roof projected a short smoke-stack. The armament consisted of eight 11-inch guns, four on each side, and a 100-pound rifled Armstrong gun at each end. The ends of the vessel were cut down still lower, so as to be two feet below water. A light bulwark, or false bow, of wood was built. This served the twofold purpose of preventing the water from banking up against the casemate when the vessel was in motion, and of a tank to diminish the draft. The inclined roof and submerged eaves and ends constituted the novel and distinctive features of this battery, to which was given the name of the Virginia. The draft of the Merrimac had been about twenty-three feet, and her speed was fourteen or fifteen miles an hour. The iron heaped upon her when she was converted into the Virginia brought her down about two feet more, and her speed was reduced quite one half.<sup>1</sup>

The construction of the Virginia was commenced in June, 1861, and pushed forward as rapidly as possible. The fact that this battery was being built could not long be concealed from the Federal authorities, but every effort was made to mislead them by false information. Now it was reported that the Virginia was ready for action, and would soon come out; then some Southern paper would contain a paragraph affirming that she was a failure;

<sup>1</sup> The description of the Virginia is necessarily imperfect. The plans were carefully concealed in the archives of the Confederate naval department, which has never divulged them. No one except her builders and crew appears ever to have been on board of her. When she was blown up, so complete was the destruction that no fragment of her armor has been discovered. There is some doubt as to the character and thickness of the iron which covered the casemate. We have accepted, with some doubt, the statement of the double thickness, flat bars and railroad iron, making from seven to nine inches in all. This is confirmed by the effect of the shot which she withstood, which would certainly have penetrated four inches if struck perpendicularly.—The accompanying picture is the best ever taken. The submerged stern is not shown, as it was below water and invisible. The bow, which appears projecting before the casemate, was simply the light, false bow, built upon the real bow, which was below water. The sloping sides should have been represented as dipping below the water, instead of stopping at the edge of the hull, above the water-line.





THE VIRGINIA.

her armor had been found too thin to be of service; more had been piled upon her, until accurate calculation showed that she would never float. Again it was said that her back had been broken in attempting to launch her, and that she was abandoned. Several persons made their appearance in the Federal lines claiming to have been employed upon her, and furnished rude drawings of her construction. Whether they were treacherous or ignorant can not be known; but their descriptions were certainly far from accurate.

The Federal government was slow to perceive the necessity of iron-clad vessels. Before the rebellion it had made no direct experiments in this direction. Robert and Edwin Stevens, wealthy citizens of New Jersey, had indeed, for some years, been engaged in constructing an iron battery upon a plan of their own, and Congress had at different times made appropriations to the amount of half a million; the builders had also expended more than a quarter of a million dollars. In December, 1861, a commission was appointed to examine this vessel. They reported unfavorably. To complete her would cost more than \$550,000, making the whole expense nearly \$1,300,000, and it would be months before she could be made available. Meanwhile, when Congress met in extra session in July, 1861, the Naval Department asked for an appropriation of \$50,000 for the purpose of testing iron plates. This was refused; but the President ordered that plate should be prepared, without waiting for an appropriation. At length, on the 3d of August, just before the close of the session, an appropriation of \$1,500,000 was made for building one or more iron-clads. The next day an advertisement was issued for proposals, and a commission appointed to examine the plans suggested. Seventeen proposals were presented for vessels ranging from 83 to 400 feet in length, to cost from \$32,000 to \$1,500,000 each. The commission reported in favor of three different vessels. The Ironsides, by Merrick & Sons, of Philadelphia, was to be a regular man-of-war, covered with four and a half inch solid plates. She was to be 240 feet long, about 3500 tons burden, to carry 20 heavy guns in broadside. She would be completed in a year, at a cost of \$780,000. The Galena, by C. S. Bushnell, of New Haven, was to be a steamer of 700 tons, brigantine rigged, pierced for 18 guns. Her frame to be of solid timber 18 inches thick, covered from 2 to 4 inches with plates of thin rolled iron. Her armor was found in the end to be wholly inadequate to resist heavy guns. Her cost was \$235,000. Both these vessels were built upon general models which had been long in use.

Of an altogether different class was the Monitor proposed by John Ericsson, of New York.<sup>1</sup> Her design was so wholly new in every respect that the approval of the commission was cautiously guarded. They said: "This is novel, but seems to be based upon a plan which will render the battery shot and shell proof. We are somewhat apprehensive that her properties for sea are not such as a sea-going vessel should possess; but she may be moved from place to place on our coast in smooth water. We recommend that an experiment be made with one battery of this description on the terms proposed, with a guaranty and forfeiture in case of a failure in any of the points and properties of the vessel as proposed."

Novel as the plan was to others, it was no sudden conception of the inventor. It had been thought out to the minutest detail, and been constructed in drawings and models for years. So confident was Ericsson of the perfect success of his invention, that he proposed for it the name of the "Monitor," in order "to admonish the South of the fate of the rebellion; Great Britain of her fading naval supremacy, and the English government of the folly of spending millions in fixed fortifications for defense." These terms were accepted. The price was to be \$275,000. The contract was signed on the 5th of October. The construction of the vessel was undertaken by Thomas F. Rowland, who, starting in life as the driver of a railway engine, then becoming an engineer and ship-builder, had, at the age of twen-

ty-eight, become proprietor of the "Continental Works" at Greenpoint, in the city of Brooklyn. Ericsson superintended the whole work in person. In spite of his threescore years, he was every where skipping up and down ladders, and over planks and gangways, as though he were a boy of sixteen. It seemed as though a plate could not be fitted or a bolt driven without his being at the workman's side. So rapidly was the work pressed forward that the vessel was launched, with her engines on board, on the 30th of January, just a hundred days after the keel was laid.

The hull of the Monitor was constructed of a double thickness of iron, three eighths of an inch thick, strengthened by iron ribs and knees. It was 140 feet long, 30 feet wide at the broadest part, and 12 feet deep. The shape and proportions were like those of the half of an egg-shell slightly flattened at the bottom. An Indian canoe is an almost perfect miniature of this hull, and is apparently hardly less frail, for a cannon ball would pierce the thin iron as easily as a pistol shot would the bark sides of the canoe. But this frail hull was so protected that when afloat no shot could reach it. Five feet below the top, an iron shelf, strongly braced, projected nearly four feet from the sides. This shelf was filled up with oaken blocks three and a half feet thick, over which were bolted five series of iron plates, each an inch thick. This armor-shelf or platform projected sixteen feet at the stern, in order to cover the rudder and propeller, and ten feet at the bow, to protect the anchor. The entire length on deck was 166 feet, the breadth 42. When afloat, the entire hull and three feet of the armor-platform were submerged. To the eye the vessel was merely a low raft, rising only two feet above water. No shot from a hostile vessel could reach the vulnerable hull without passing through the invulnerable armor. This defensive structure of the Monitor was solely the invention of Ericsson.


But a vessel of war must possess offensive as well as defensive power.




THOMAS F. ROWLAND.

<sup>1</sup> John Ericsson was born in Sweden in 1803. From boyhood he manifested decided aptitude for mechanical invention. In 1823 he went to England, where he acquired the highest reputation as a constructive engineer. He came to America in 1839, assuming at once and maintaining a foremost place in his profession.







ENGINE-ROOM



TURRET MACHINERY




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
INTERIOR OF THE TOWER.



WHEEL HOUSE



CAPTAIN'S CABIN.




BERTH DECK.



READY FOR ACTION.





LAUNCH OF THE MONITOR.

This in the Monitor was embodied in two 11-inch guns, a heavier ordnance than had ever before been placed on any vessel. Ericsson had struck upon a principle which all European engineers had strangely missed. In the field, the primary object in warfare is to slaughter the enemy's men; in naval warfare, to destroy his vessels. A rifle bullet will disable a man as effectually as a cannon ball; heavy shot only will destroy a ship. In the field, the combatant will succeed who can strike the more blows; on the water, the one who can strike the heavier. The guns of the Monitor could be placed only upon the deck; these, as well as the gunners, must be protected. For the means of doing this the Monitor was indebted to the revolving turret, the invention of another than Ericsson, though he displayed rare genius in first adapting it to practical use. Ten years before Ericsson had dreamed of the Monitor, a lad residing in an inland American village had thought of revolving turrets.

Theodore R. Timby was born in Dutchess County, New York, in 1822. He received the education usual among the sons of American farmers. Before he was twenty years old he was engaged in active business; but the bent of his mind was toward mechanical invention. At sixteen he constructed a model of a floating dry-dock, but it was pronounced to be practically useless by those to whom it was proposed, and he abandoned it. Years after it was re-invented by others; but these docks now in use contain nothing essential which was not embodied in the model of this young resident of a country town. Several other inventions were more profitable. His first model for a revolving turret was made in 1841. It was hardly six inches in height, but contains the germ of the whole invention. On the 18th of January, 1843, he filed his first caveat for this in the Patent Office. The specifications were for a "revolving metallic tower, and for a revolving tower for a floating battery, to be propelled by steam." In the mean while he was constructing a large iron model, which was finished in the spring of 1843, and was during that year publicly exhibited throughout the country. He urged his invention upon the attention of the American government, besides constructing several models, one of which was sent to the French government, and another to the Emperor of China. Our military authorities admitted the practicability of the invention, but assumed it to be wholly superfluous. The defenses of the country, it was said, were already more than could ever be required. A favorable report was indeed made, in 1848, to the Senate, one of the committee being Jefferson Davis. No farther action was taken on this report, although it was endorsed by the chief of the Ordnance Bureau. Timby, however, took out patents covering the broad claim "for a revolving tower for offensive and defensive warfare, whether used on land or water." The advantages of the revolving turret for naval warfare are apparent at a glance. It furnishes a shield for guns and gunners which can be made invulnerable without using a weight of iron greater than can be floated; and it enables the vessel, without altering its own position, to bring its whole ordnance to bear upon any point in the circle. When Ericsson bent himself to the invention of a floating battery, he found the one essential thing necessary to give it practical offensive power ready to his hands, though it is not probable that he then knew to whom he was indebted for it.


The turret of the Monitor was constructed of plates of iron an inch thick, about three feet wide,

and nine feet long. Eight of these plates constituted its thickness. It was thus nine feet high and eight inches thick, with a diameter of about twenty feet. The two port-holes, side by side, were oval, just large enough horizontally to allow the gun to be run out, with sufficient vertical height to give room for the elevation of the guns to secure the range for different distances. It was made to revolve upon a central shaft by means of a separate engine. When not in action, by driving back a wedge it rested firmly upon a metallic ring upon the deck. The guns were loaded within the turret, and only run out to be discharged. The deck was perfectly flat, without even a permanent railing. The smoke-pipe and draft-pipe for admitting air to the hull could be lowered below the deck. When the vessel was prepared for action the deck presented a smooth surface, broken only by the huge round turret, and a low square pilot-house near the bow. The vessel drew ten feet of water, and was rated at 776 tons.

The work of the constructors was completed early in January. Two full months were spent in fitting the armament and testing the apparatus. On the 5th of March, in obedience to a sudden order, she set out for Fortress Monroe. She reached her destination on the night of the 8th, just in time to avert an overwhelming catastrophe, but just too late to prevent a great disaster; for the Virginia had come out ten hours before, and won the first battle in Hampton Roads.

Hampton Roads is an indentation setting in westward from Chesapeake Bay. The narrow entrance is guarded by Fortress Monroe, built on a peninsula jutting out from the southern shore. It then spreads out into an oval harbor some five miles in diameter. Here and there is a shallow place; but almost every part is deep enough to float the largest vessel. The estuaries of two rivers enter the top of the harbor from opposite directions: the James from the northwest, and the Elizabeth from the southeast. At the head of the estuary of the Elizabeth, eight miles from its opening, are Norfolk on the east side, and Portsmouth, with Gosport, its suburb, on the west. The navy yard is at Gosport, which is about twenty miles from the entrance to the Roads. The harbor formed by the bay and estuary is one of the best on the continent. Hampton Roads was made the great naval rendezvous for the Federal fleet. The north shore was occupied by the Federals, who had a camp at Newport News, at the mouth of the James. The Confederates had intrenched camps at Sewall's Point and Craney Island, on each side of the mouth of the Elizabeth, covering the approach to Norfolk. During the spring and early summer of 1861, Norfolk had been so feebly held that it might have been taken. Butler, who had 11,000 men at Fortress Monroe, projected an expedition for this purpose; but the battle of Bull Run put a stop, for a time, to all active operations by the Federal armies. Every possible man was withdrawn to Washington. Only 5000 were left at Fortress Monroe, and for six months the enemy were left to construct the Virginia without hinderance.

Meantime Federal fleets had assembled in the Roads and had been dispatched upon various expeditions. In the first days of March the only vessels of war at that point were the steam frigates Minnesota and Roanoke, twins of the Merrimac, and the sailing frigates Cumberland, 24 guns, saved from the seizure at Norfolk, and Congress, 50 guns. The St. Lawrence, 50-gun ship, mounting 12 guns, came in on the 6th from a cruise. Besides these was a fleet of transports and tugs. The Minnesota and Roanoke lay down the Roads, near Fortress Monroe. The Roanoke, always unlucky, was disabled, having broken her shaft five months before. She bore the flag of Captain Marston, then the senior officer of the post, for Goldsborough, the flag-officer in command, was absent with the Albemarle expedition. The Cumberland and Congress lay off the mouth of the Elizabeth River. Goldsborough had given strict orders that no sailing vessel should be left without a tug at hand to manage it. This provision was neglected. The apprehensions excited by reports of the near completion of the Merrimac or Virginia had died away. Men had come to look upon her as a bugbear, or,



PLANS OF THE MONITOR.

These diagrams are accurately drawn to scale.—In Fig. 2 the exterior solid line represents the entire surface of the deck, including armor-shelf and overhang at bow and stern. The exterior dotted line represents the top of the proper hull; the interior line shows the dimensions of the flat bottom.—Fig. 1 is a profile of the vessel; the portion visible when the vessel is afloat is shown by the place of the water-line.—Fig. 3 is a vertical section of the turret.—The reference letters are the same throughout: A, Revolving Turret.—B, B, Smoke-pipe.—C, Pilot-house.—D, Anchor.—E, Rudder.—F, Propeller.—G, Iron Armor.—H, Braces for Deck Beams.—K, K, Water-line.—L, Gun.—M, Gun-carriage.



at worst, an enemy that could easily be managed by the Minnesota. "We are tired of waiting for the Merrimac," wrote Captain Van Brunt, of the Minnesota, "and wish she would come out."

At noon on Saturday, the 8th of March, what appeared to be three small steamers were seen coming down the Elizabeth. One of these, merely from the large size of her smoke-pipe, was conjectured to be the Virginia. Cut down as she was, she looked in the distance no larger than a tug. Her appearance at that time was a surprise. The two frigates lay at anchor, with the wash-clothes of the crew hanging from the rigging. Radford, the commander of the Cumberland, was on the Roanoke, miles away, acting as a member of a court of inquiry. He took horse and rode for Newport News, where he arrived just in time to see his vessel go down. Marston ordered the Minnesota to get under way at once, and summoned two tugs to tow the broken-shafted Roanoke to the scene of action. The Minnesota was soon under full headway. Her speed being twice that of the enemy, she could choose her own ground. Van Brunt meant to run her into the iron-clad, whose armor would be no protection against such a blow, and the shock would have broken her in two. Passing near Sewall's Point, fire was opened upon the Minnesota from the rifle battery, one shot crippling her mainmast. She returned a broadside, and steamed on till she came within a couple of miles of the enemy. The tide was running ebb; the Minnesota drew twenty-three feet, and there was now less depth of water at a shoal part of the channel; but the bottom was soft, and it was vainly hoped she might be forced over. She stuck fast, out of range of the Virginia, and lay an idle spectator of the destruction of the Cumberland and Congress. The Roanoke was dragged slowly on by two tugs. She too ran aground at the stern, in twenty-one feet of water, and could go no farther. Her head was dragged around, and the helpless hulk was pointed down the bay. Going and returning, she was fired upon from the batteries at Sewall's Point. They aimed wildly; some shot passed through the rigging and fell far beyond. The fire was returned, but the balls fell short of the mark.

The Virginia left the navy yard at Gosport at 11 o'clock in the morning. Her commander, Franklin Buchanan, had entered the United States Navy thirty-five years before. He had attained the rank of captain, and stood high on the roll. When the war broke out he was commander of the navy yard at Washington. He then threw up his commission and entered the Confederate service. Born in Maryland, he had not even the pretext of following his state in taking up arms against his country. As the Virginia left her dock, the wharves on both sides of the river were crowded with spectators. Two barricades which closed the river were opened, and the iron-clad, accompanied by the Beaufort and the Raleigh, tugs, each mounting a single gun, steamed down the stream. It was the trial trip of the Virginia, and she was found to move slowly. At one o'clock she cleared the Elizabeth River, and stood straight across the Roads toward Newport News. The Congress lay at anchor in the channel, three hundred yards from the shore; the Cumberland was two hundred yards beyond. As the Virginia came within range, she opened upon the Congress from her 100-pound bow gun. Passing the Congress at three hundred yards, she received a harmless broadside. She returned it with effect, a single shot disabling every man but one at a gun, and kept straight on for the Cumberland, which had been swung across the channel, to bring her full broadside to bear upon the approaching enemy. The Cumberland opened fire from her two pivot guns, and soon after with her whole broadside of eleven 9-inch Dahlgrens. Broadside after broadside followed in rapid succession, but the balls glanced harmlessly from the iron armor of the Virginia, which kept straight on, without returning a shot or showing a single man. She seemed to wish to give her defensive power a fair test. Nothing could be more satisfactory. Six full broadsides had been received at nearer and nearer range, with no essential damage. The Virginia kept straight on for minutes, which seemed hours, her bow pointed square at the side of the Cumberland. It was now three in the afternoon. There was a sharp shot, and a dull, heavy blow at the same instant. The iron-armed prow of the Virginia had struck the Cumberland near the bow, and below the water-line. Plank, beams, and knees gave way like laths, leaving a ragged opening into which a man might have passed; through this a torrent of water poured into the hold. The Virginia then opened fire. Every shot told. The first shot passed through the sick-bay, killing five men. Broadside after broadside followed in merciless succession, every shot reaching a vital part. Sick-bay, berth-deck, and gun-deck were covered with dead and wounded. For half an hour the pumps of the Cumberland were worked, in the hope of throwing out the water as fast as it rushed in through the yawning hole in her side. It was all in vain; the water gained momentarily. The forward magazine was soon flooded, and all the powder for keeping up the fire was brought from the after magazine. In thirty-five minutes the water had risen to the main hatchway, and the ship canted over, just ready to sink. All the wounded who could walk were ordered out of the cockpit. These were few, for most were unable to help themselves or be helped by others. All the while during these long minutes the Cumberland kept up her useless fire, no gun being abandoned until the waters creeping up toward the stern from the sinking bow drowned it out. All the while the Virginia kept up her slow and sure fire, every shot telling. Only one man was seen on board the iron-clad. Near the close of the fight he showed himself from a port-hole; a ball from the Cumberland cut him in two. The last shot from the fated Cumberland was fired by Matthew Tenney, from a gun just above water, that next to him being overflowed. He attempted to scramble out from the open port-hole, but the water rushing in swept him back, and he went down in the sinking vessel. In three quarters of an hour after the Virginia had given the fatal blow, the Cumberland went down in fifty-four foot wa-

ter, her pennant still flying from the mast-head above the waves. Not a man was captured. A few swam to land, and more were picked up by small boats from the shore. The Virginia ceased her fire when the frigate went down, and turned toward the Congress.

As soon as it was perceived that the Virginia had opened the fight, a number of Confederate steamers came out from the James River and joined in the action. These were the Teazer, of one gun, the Jamestown, of two guns, and the Patrick Henry, formerly known as the Yorktown, of six guns. The last two had formerly been packets, owned by New York merchants, and plying between New York and Richmond. They had been seized by the Confederates, and converted into armed vessels. Seeing the fate of the Cumberland, Lieutenant Smith, who commanded the Congress, hoisted sail, and, with the help of a tug-boat, ran the frigate ashore in water too shoal to permit the Virginia to run her down. All the small Confederate steamers assailed her with a sharp fire, which made terrible havoc among her crew. The Virginia, having finished the Cumberland, then turned upon the Congress. Taking up a position 150 yards astern, the iron-clad raked the frigate fore and aft with shell, every one, at that close range, telling with fatal precision. The fuses were cut short, and every shell burst inside the frigate. The first killed seventeen men at a single gun. During all the fire hardly a man was merely wounded; most who were hurt were killed outright, the head or shoulder being shorn off, or the body cut in twain. Surgical aid was useless. After the first fifteen or twenty minutes the surgeon of the Congress did not even pretend to amputate a limb. The most that he could do was to apply a tourniquet to stop the bleeding, and administer stimulants to prevent prostration. "The only insignificant wound which I dressed," he says, "was that of one of the crew who had his hand taken off."

The Congress was fast aground, and could meet the terrible broadsides of the Virginia only from her two stern guns. These were soon disabled; one was dismantled, the other had its muzzle shot off. Lieutenant Smith, the commander, was killed, and the command devolved upon Lieutenant Pendergrast. The frigate was disabled, and on fire in several places; not a gun could be brought to bear upon the enemy. If every gun had been brought to bear it would have been useless. A chance shot might enter a port-hole, but the armor of the Virginia was impenetrable. There was no hope of succor from the Minnesota, which lay three miles off fast aground. At four o'clock the colors of the Congress were hauled down. An officer of the Virginia took formal possession. The Congress prize was given in charge to Lieutenant Parker, who had brought the little gun-boat Beaufort alongside. He ordered that the frigate should be abandoned in a quarter of an hour, as he meant to burn her at once. The surgeon remonstrated. He said that it was impossible to remove the wounded in that time. A score or more of the crew of the Congress got on board the Beaufort. In the confusion it is said that they supposed her to be a Federal tug from the shore. The Congress lay within rifle-shot from the shore. A regiment or two had been hurried to the nearest point. They opened a sharp rifle and artillery fire upon the Beaufort. Several were wounded, among whom were Lieutenant Miner, of the Virginia. The gun-boat hauled off, and the Virginia again opened fire upon the ill-fated Congress, although she had a white flag flying to show that she was out of action. The Confederates reported, and doubtless believed, that they were fired upon from the Congress, after her colors had been hauled down and while the white flag was flying. They were certainly in error; but in the hurry and confusion they might well suppose that the shot which were fired from the shore came from the ship. They must stand fairly acquitted from the charge of having wantonly fired upon a defenseless enemy who had surrendered. The firing by the Federal forces from the shore can only be justified by presuming that the troops there did not see that the colors of the Congress had been hauled down, and were replaced by the white flag of truce. After firing a few shells the Virginia and her allies left the Congress and turned toward the Minnesota. The Congress was on fire in several places. Her boats were manned, and those of the crew who were unhurt, and a few of the wounded, were taken ashore. The Congress continued to burn for eight hours. At midnight the flames reached the magazine, and the frigate, blown up, disappeared beneath the waters.

The March day was wearing to a close, but there was still two hours of daylight, when the Virginia, having destroyed the Cumberland and Congress, bore down upon the Minnesota. This great steam frigate had lain all these long hours helplessly aground. Steam tugs had been vainly trying to haul her off. The Roanoke, after grounding, had gone down the Roads. The St. Lawrence, in tow of a steamer, had approached the Minnesota. She too grounded, and, after receiving a single shell, and throwing in return a harmless broadside, was dragged off, and steered down toward Fortress Monroe. This one shell, a chance shot, thrown from the distance of half a mile, went sheer through the side of the St. Lawrence just above the water-line, passed through the ward-room, the surgeon's state-room on the opposite side, demolishing a bulkhead; it then struck a heavy iron bar, and glanced back into the ward-room, where it rested, its force being expended. This shell failed to explode, and no person was injured; but the actual damage done by this one shot proved to the captain of the St. Lawrence that his vessel was no match for the Virginia. She was impervious to any shot from his fifty guns, while any shell from her might destroy the St. Lawrence.

The Virginia, Jamestown, and Patrick Henry had borne down upon the stranded Minnesota. The draft of the iron-clad prevented her from coming within a mile of her enemy. She took a position at this distance on the starboard bow, and opened fire. Only one shot hit its mark. The Minnesota returned from her 10-inch pivot, with no result. The Jamestown and Patrick Henry were more effective. They took a closer position on port-



bow and stern, firing from rifled guns, and killing and wounding several men. The return from the Minnesota was quite as effective. The Patrick Henry received a shot which passed through her boiler, killing and wounding seven men, and disabling her for the moment. She was towed off by her consorts. Two full hours had been spent in this indecisive combat. Night was closing in. The Virginia, essentially unharmed by the fiery ordeal through which she had passed, dared not lie out the night in the Roads. At seven o'clock, an hour after sunset, she hauled off, and with her consorts steamed to the sheltering batteries at the mouth of the Elizabeth. She might well do so. No vessel that ever floated had done so great a work in a single half day. She had destroyed two powerful vessels, carrying three times her number of men, and fully six times her weight of armament. She, with two feeble consorts, had engaged two other great vessels, greatly her superiors measured by any standard before known, inflicting far more damage than she received, and only prevented from destroying them because she could not come to close quarters with them. Her first day's work might fairly be claimed as the greatest ever achieved in naval warfare. Great victories had before been won upon the ocean, but never had there been such a disproportion between the losses of victors and vanquished.

The Cumberland went into action with 376 men. When the survivors were mustered there were only 255. She lost 121 in killed and drowned. The crew of the Congress were 434 officers and men; of these, 298 got to shore, 26 of them being wounded, 10 mortally; there were in all 120 killed and missing; about 20 of these were made prisoners, leaving a roll of killed and drowned of 100 men. Besides these, 3 were killed on the Minnesota, and 16 wounded; an absolute loss of fully 250 officers and men. On the Virginia there were but 2 killed and 8 wounded. On the other Confederate vessels 4 were killed and a few more wounded; an absolute loss of not more than 10 officers and men—fully twenty-five to one in favor of the Confederates. The disproportion in the loss of vessels and material was still greater. The Roanoke and St. Lawrence were driven away, glad of the accident of low water, which kept off the Virginia and enabled them to escape. The Minnesota had inflicted as much damage as she had received. The Cumberland and the Congress were utterly destroyed. They had expended their utmost fire upon the iron-clad. The result was that they had riddled her smoke-stack and steam-pipe, shot away her flag-staffs and anchor, knocked off the muzzles of two guns, which were easily replaced, and had started an armor-plate here and there. The Virginia herself, in dashing upon the Cumberland, had twisted her iron prow. All the harm which she had received was immaterial, and could be wholly remedied in a few hours. She withdrew from action only because the coming darkness intervened. On the morning of the next day she was as efficient as before.

The Virginia steamed off in the gathering darkness, leaving the Minnesota fast upon the mud-bank where she had lain for so many eventful hours. The recoil from her own heavy broadsides had forced her farther on, and she seemed to have made for herself a cradle. At ten o'clock the tide commenced to run flood, and for six hours all hands were at work, steam-tugs assisting, to haul her off the bank. Every effort was unavailing. She lay fast, and at four o'clock, the tide having fallen, the work was suspended, and the Minnesota lay immovable, awaiting a new onset from the Virginia.

Not wholly helpless, however, for a new actor had come upon the scene whose powers were yet to be tested. The Monitor had left New York three days before for Hampton Roads. The first part of the passage was stormy. The waves swept clear over her low deck, the turret often being the only thing above water. The draft-pipe for conveying air to the crew quartered in the hold was too low, and the water poured down it. It was lowered, and its opening in the deck tightly closed. Farther provision had been made for drawing air down the turret. The machinery became disarranged. The crew were almost suffocated. Water also leaked down at the junction of the turret and the deck. These deficiencies were remedied, and the battery outrode the storm, proving to be in the main an excellent sea-boat. On the evening of the 8th she came to Hampton Roads. She had for hours heard the heavy sound of the cannonading which announced that an action had been going on. At nine in the evening she reached the fortress and learned what had happened. Lieutenant Worden was ready to test his untried craft




JOHN L. WORDEN.

against the Virginia. In sixty minutes he was on his way to the Minnesota, by whose side the Monitor was anchored at an hour past midnight. The night passed, the morning broke, and the slow hours passed away until, at eight o'clock, the Virginia was seen bearing down upon the Minnesota.


The Christian day of rest has come to be the battle-day of Christendom. At sunrise the Virginia appeared coming down toward the Minnesota. All hands were beat to quarters; but the iron-clad ran directly past, almost within reach of the guns of Fortress Monroe, and then turning, stood straight up the channel through which the Minnesota had come the day before. Signal was made for the Monitor to engage. She ran down directly in the wake of the Minnesota, covering her as far as possible with her diminutive bulk, and laid herself directly alongside the Virginia. Never were antagonists apparently so unequally matched. The Monitor was only one fifth of the size of her antagonist, and appeared much smaller, for she presented to sight nothing but her flat deck just above the water, her low, square pilot-house, and round turret. The Virginia opened upon her with all her guns. Most of the shot flew over the low deck; a few struck the turret; but all except one glanced off, leaving hardly a mark. One rifled bolt, from the 100-pound Armstrong, struck fair and square, penetrating half through the nine inches of iron. The bolt broke off, leaving the head sticking in the wound. Soon the antagonists began to manœuvre for position, keeping up a fire all the while. The speed of the two vessels was about equal, but the light draught of the Monitor gave her an advantage. Once the Virginia got aground, and the Monitor steamed round and round her, trying bow, stern, and sides in search of a vulnerable point. She fired cast-iron shot of 168 pounds, and so short was the distance and so fair the mark that hardly one missed; but they struck the sloping sides of the Virginia at so great an angle that they glanced harmlessly off; had they struck a perpendicular wall they would either have gone through or been shattered.

The Virginia soon got afloat again, and finding that she could make nothing of the invulnerable Monitor, turned her attention once more to the Minnesota, which had already received an 11-inch shot just above the water-line. The iron-clad came head on, and received the full broadside of the Minnesota. Fifty solid shot struck square. Any wooden vessel that ever floated would have gone down under such a fire. The Virginia was apparently unharmed. She fired shell in return from her rifled bow-gun. The first shell passed sheer through four rooms, tearing them all into one, and in exploding set the ship on fire. The second shell went through the boiler of the steam-tug Dragon, which lay alongside, blowing her up, killing and wounding seven men. But the third shell was hardly fired when the Monitor interposed, compelling the Virginia to shift her position. She grounded again, and lay exposed once more to the full broadside of the Minnesota. Afloat again, she steamed down the bay, closely followed by the Monitor. Reaching more open water, she turned sharp around, and ran at full speed square against the Monitor. Her iron prow, which had pierced the ribs of the Cumberland as though they had been of wicker-work, left hardly a mark upon the armed side of the Monitor, upon whose turret and pilot-house she now concentrated her whole fire. Soon after the anxious spectators on the Minnesota saw the Monitor standing down the bay, while the Virginia, with the Patrick Henry and Jamestown, which had been hovering around, headed apparently straight for the Minnesota, still fast aground, badly crippled, most of her shot expended, and her crew worn out with fatigue. Why the Monitor had withdrawn could not be known. Perhaps she had expended her ammunition; perhaps she had sustained some vital injury. All that Van Brunt could know was that the Virginia and her consorts were coming down upon him, and could take up a position to rake his stern with no possibility



FIRST VOYAGE OF THE MONITOR.





SCENE OF THE FIGHT OF THE IRON-CLADS.

1, Sewall's Point.—2, Craney Island.—3, The Patrick Henry.—4, The Jamestown.—5, The Monitor.—6, The Merrimack.—7, Confederate Camp.—8, The Minnesota.—9, 10, Batteries.—11, The Congress.—12, The Cumberland.—13, Newport News.—14, Steam Tug.—15, The Ramoth.—16, Rip-Rap.—17, French Man-of-War.

of an effective reply. He gave orders that preparations should be made for destroying his ship as soon as it was clear that all hope of saving her was gone; but, upon ascending to the deck, he saw that the Confederate vessels had no intention of continuing the fight. They had changed their course, and were heading with all speed for their refuge at Craney Island.

Such was the fight of the Monitor and the Virginia, as seen through the smoke from the deck of the Minnesota. From the Monitor itself it presented some different phases. At eight o'clock the Virginia was seen close at hand. Worden took his station in the pilot-house to direct the fight; Stimers controlled the movement of the turret, Greene had charge of the guns. The action began at a quarter before nine. At half past eleven a shot from the Virginia struck square against the pilot-house. One of the wrought-iron logs, 9 inches by 12, of which it was built, was shattered. Worden was looking from a narrow loop-hole just opposite the point where the shot struck. Fragments of cement were driven into his face, blinding him, and forcing him to give the command to Greene. The fight was kept up for three quarters of an hour longer, when the Virginia drew off, sagging down at the stern as though she was leak; but her movements showed that her machinery was unharmed. The Monitor, which Van Brunt, in the excitement of the moment, thought to be heading for Fortress Monroe, soon came up to the Minnesota, but the Confederate vessels were close up to their refuge under the batteries at Craney Island. The Monitor did not pursue them. In the heat of the action it could not be ascertained how much damage had been sustained. It was certain that her pilot-house was seriously injured; another shot striking it fairly would have disabled her. Her heavy guns were an almost untried experiment; the explosion of one would probably have rendered her useless. In driving off the Virginia she had done her work. In attempting more all might have been lost. Even after the Virginia disappeared from view the safety of the Minnesota seemed by no means assured. She still lay fast, exposed to a new assault. Van Brunt determined to get her off at all hazards. Guns and provisions were thrown overboard, and water-tanks opened to lighten the steamer; more tugs were brought into use, and the great steamer was dragged half a mile from her mud bed; then the tide fell, and she was again fast. When the tide rose the next morning she was again afloat, and was brought back to Fortress Monroe.

If the importance of a battle were to be estimated solely by the actual loss inflicted or suffered, the first fight of iron-clads would be only a harmless duel. No man on the Virginia, it is affirmed, was harmed by the heavy shot of the Monitor or the great broadsides of the Minnesota. The firing had been going on for an hour and a half when a shot struck the Monitor turret fairly. One man happened to be standing so that his knee touched the wall just opposite; he was stunned, but soon recovered. Another man was partially stunned, but soon recovered. Besides Worden, no man was seriously harmed. On board the Minnesota three were killed and sixteen wounded, half of them only slightly. During the actions of the two days the Minnesota expended 247 solid shot, 282 shells, and more than two tons of powder, without any essential harm to her opponent. She was seriously damaged in hull and armament. At the close of the fight, what with guns disabled and thrown overboard, she had but eleven that could be equipped for service. During the three and a half hours of the engagement the Monitor fired 41 shot, few of which missed, but all except two or three were really harmless. She was fairly struck twenty-two times: nine times on the turret, eight times on the side armor, three times on the deck, and twice on the pilot-house. Of all these shot, delivered at close range from heavy guns, only one, which struck the pilot-house, did any perceptible damage.

The Monitor and the Virginia, exposed to such a terrible ordeal, both proved themselves invulnerable against any fire which had ever before been brought to bear by one ship against another. The conclusion seemed inevitable that wooden ships were to be of no farther use in naval warfare, and that the great navies which France and Great Britain had built at such an immense cost were practically annihilated. When the tidings of this fight crossed the Atlantic, the London Times affirmed that England had on the day before 149 first class war-ships; now there were only two; beyond these there was not one that could, without madness, be pitted against the Monitor. Even these were not invulnerable; for, being iron-plated only amidships, they would be set in a blaze at either extremity in a few minutes by shells from their unassailable antagonists. The Illustrated London News, echoing the expressions of statesmen in Parliament, urged that Great Britain should cease to erect sea-board fortifications, but should spend the money wasted upon them in cutting down the useless line-of-battle ships, plating their hulls with iron, and fitting them with cupolas armed with guns at least as heavy as those of the Monitor. Like most hasty conclusions, this was too sweeping. In a few weeks Farragut showed at New Orleans, and again in a few months at Mobile, that wooden ships, boldly and skillfully handled, could yet play an important part even against iron-clads.

The Monitor and the Virginia never again tried their strength against each other. For a month they lay watching each other, the one in the lower Roads, the other at the mouth of the Elizabeth. On the 11th of April, the Virginia, with her old consorts, steamed out, as if bent on an action. By a rapid dash the fleet captured three Federal transports lying unguarded, and then returned. Twice after she showed herself in the Roads, as if to provoke a fight, and then steamed back. The Monitor now and then went up toward the mouth of the Elizabeth, but always drew back when her enemy appeared. It was clear that neither side wished to risk losing their main defense. If the Virginia was lost, the water approach to Richmond would be in the hands of the Federals; if the Monitor was disabled, Hampton Roads would be in the power of the Confederates. All the movements



of the rival iron-clads were mere feints, with no definite object. Meanwhile the Peninsular campaign had been inaugurated. McClellan had laid siege to Yorktown. The post was evacuated by the Confederates on the 3d of May. They resolved to withdraw all their force to the front of Richmond. Norfolk was abandoned, the work-shops and store-houses at the navy yard having been burned, and the great dry dock partially blown up. The troops by which this place had been garrisoned were ordered to Richmond. Norfolk was formally occupied by the Federal forces on the 10th of May. The withdrawal from Norfolk compelled the abandonment of the strong Confederate positions at Sewall's Point and Craney Island.

The Virginia had in the mean while been placed under the command of Josiah Tatnall, a veteran officer, who had spent a whole life in the naval service of the United States. Less than two years before he had commanded the fleet of the Union in the Chinese waters. In June, 1859, he rendered important aid to the French and English in their disastrous assault upon the Pei-ho forts. When recalled from the East by the approaching troubles at home, he threw up his commission, and joined the enemies of the nation which he had so long served. The Confederate government was then eagerly courting the support of foreign powers. Tatnall's opportune service had made his name popular in France and England. To this, rather than any ability which he had ever manifested, was owing his appointment to the command of the Virginia, the most important position in the Confederate navy. The abandonment of Norfolk shut the Virginia out from her refuge up the Elizabeth. She was liable at any moment to be assailed by a superior force. The James River was still open to her. If she could be taken up that stream she might be safe, and also aid in defending Richmond, but she drew quite twenty-five feet, and forty miles below Richmond was a shoal where there was only eighteen feet of water. If she could be brought to that draft the pilots said they could take her over. The work of lightening was begun. The commander went to bed; but he was awakened by an officer who told him that the vessel had been lifted just enough to render her unfit for action, yet more than two feet less than the pilots had declared necessary to take her over the shoal. Moreover, the westerly winds which had prevailed had driven the waters down the stream, so that there was less than the required eighteen feet. The poor old commander, awoke by these tidings, saw nothing to be done but to destroy his vessel; so he ran her ashore, landed her crew, and set her on fire fore and aft. She burned fiercely for an hour, and then, just before dawn on the 11th of May, blew up. So entire was the destruction, that no fragment was ever discovered of sufficient size to enable any one to describe the details of her construction. "The Virginia," reported Commander Tatnall, "no longer exists. I presume that a court of inquiry will be ordered to examine into all the circumstances, and I earnestly solicit it. Public opinion will never be put right without it." The court was ordered, and reported that the destruction of the Virginia was not necessary. She might have been taken up the James to a point of safety, where she could still have barred the ascent of the river. Then and there, if worst came to worst, was the time to decide upon the disposition to be made of the Virginia.

Four days after the destruction of the Virginia, the Monitor engaged in her second and last action. The James River was now open for operations, and Commander John Rogers was sent up the river with five vessels, among which were the Monitor and Galena. It was hoped that they could reach Richmond and compel the surrender of the city. The expedition met with no serious obstacles until it reached within eight miles of Richmond. The river here makes a sharp turn, with high banks on either side. On the western side is Drewry's Bluff, about 200 feet high, upon which the construction of a fort, since known as Fort Darling, had been hastily commenced. The river, here about 500 feet broad, was also obstructed by a double line of barriers, piles, and sunken vessels, and the banks were lined with sharpshooters. The three wooden vessels anchored 1300 yards below the fort. The Galena ran up to within 600 yards, swung across the river, and was at once exposed to the full fire from the fort. The Monitor went still nearer, but found that her guns could not be elevated sufficiently to reach the battery, and fell farther down to a point from which her guns could be brought to bear. The action was kept up for three hours. The Galena suffered se-



THE MONITOR IN THE STORM.

verely. Thirteen shot and shell penetrated her side; bulwarks were shattered and knees started; the deck was pierced by the plunging fire, the wheel injured, and armor started in several places. It was clearly shown that the light armor of this vessel was of no practical use when opposed to heavy guns. The Monitor was hit squarely three times, once on the turret and twice on the side armor, but received no damage beyond a slight bending of the armor-plates. The Naugatuck, which lay beyond the range of the fort, was disabled by the bursting of her 100-pound Parrott gun. Having expended nearly all her ammunition, the Galena withdrew, followed by the Monitor. The Galena lost thirteen killed and eleven wounded; three others, on the other vessels, were wounded by musketry from the shore. The Confederate loss was five killed and seven wounded. This action was at the time of far greater importance than is indicated by the loss suffered or inflicted. It was considered by both sides as proving that earth-works could not be reduced by gun-boats. "The action," said Lieutenant Jeffers, who now commanded the Monitor, "was most gallantly fought against great odds, and with the usual effect against earth-works. So long as our vessels kept up a rapid fire, the enemy rarely fired in return; but the moment our fire slackened, they remanned their guns. It was impossible to reduce such works except with the aid of a land force."

The Peninsular campaign had now been fairly commenced, and it was necessary to maintain a considerable fleet at Hampton Roads in order to convoy transports and protect the right flank of the army on its march along the York and Pamunkey Rivers. The Monitor remained here until nearly the close of the year. Then operations were contemplated against Charleston, and the Monitor, with the Passaic and Montauk, two vessels of the same general construction which had just been completed, was ordered to Beaufort, South Carolina. The Monitor set out on the 29th of December, in tow of the steamer Rhode Island. The second day out they approached the stormy point of Cape Hatteras. A gale sprung up, and the sea began to rise in heavy swells, breaking over the deck and pilot-house, and dashing against the base of the turret. The packing became loosened by the working of the turret, and the water began to leak in here and through the sight-holes in the pilot-house; but the pumps threw it out as fast as it entered until after dark. Then the gale increased, and the water began to dash into



THE PASSAIC AT SEA.



PUMPING AND BAILING.





LOSS OF THE MONITOR.

the turret and down the blower-pipes. A great wave would lift the vessel, and, when she descended to meet another, the flat under surface of her armor-shelf came down square with a heavy blow, which still farther loosened the packing of the turret, and caused other leaks. All the pumps were set to work; but the water gained, slowly at first, then rapidly. At half past ten it was above the ash-pits. A signal of distress was made, and the Rhode Island was requested to send boats to take off the crew. Two boats put off, which were filled to their utmost capacity. The sea dashed clear over the deck, sweeping off several men. By half past eleven the fires were all out, and the deck was on a level with the water. The men remaining on board were crowded into the turret. The boats from the Rhode Island had at length succeeded in getting alongside again. The men were ordered to try to get on board them. Some, stupefied by fear, would not make the attempt. Bankhead, the commander, was the last man to leave the sinking boat. The last that was seen of the Monitor was at midnight, when she drifted away, the red light gleaming from her turret. She must have gone down a few minutes after, carrying with her twelve of the sixty-five men on board. The Monitor was lost just eleven months from the day when she was launched.

The Passaic, in tow of the steamer Georgia, was a few miles behind the Monitor, and was nearly lost in the same gale. She began to leak first at the junction of the turret with the deck, and then toward the bows, and soon after near the stern. Ballast was thrown over, and then shot, in order to lighten the vessel. One after another the pumps gave out, and the men were set to bailing. Huge masses of water rolled over the deck, sometimes dashing clear over the top of the turret. There was no hope of relief, for not a boat could live. For three long hours the officers and men worked in the darkness. Then came a cry that the water was within three inches

of the fires, and the last pump had given out. Then there was a fierce swash, and the water hissed over the glowing grates, for even the firemen and engineers had worked knee-deep in water. The men now gave up all hope. Some sat down and gazed silently at the rising water; some wept; some prayed; others rushed to the turret to be the last to go down. The officers urged the men to the pumps again. They were found to work, and hope again dawned. The head of the ship was turned straight toward the shore, forty miles away. This change of position saved her. The waves no longer lifted the vessel, but pitched her from side to side. As morning dawned the wind subsided. By bailing and pumping the crew gained upon the leak. The men flung themselves down upon the cold wet deck, and in a few moments were fast asleep. The next night the gale sprung up anew, and the leak began to gain a little; it was feared that new ones would be sprung. A brief account of what had happened was written, sealed up in a bottle, to which was attached a red flag, and thrown overboard. But the pumps worked well, and the storm was outrode. On the evening of the 2d of January the Passaic made Beaufort Harbor.


The battle in Hampton Roads gave each side unbounded confidence in the soundness of the principle upon which its iron-clads had been constructed. The Virginia and the Monitor furnished the models upon which other vessels were constructed. None of the Confederate iron-clads equaled the first. They had no more hulls and engines ready furnished to their hands, and had not the facilities for constructing them. The Federal government immediately commenced the construction of nearly a score of the monitor class, but larger, and embodying many improvements. At a later period other turreted iron-clads were built, of far greater size, and with such changes in construction as were thought necessary to fit them for sea-going vessels. Some of these carried also a few heavy stationary guns; but their essential offensive feature was the revolving turret. The construction of these vessels was attended with no small difficulty. The French and English iron-clads had been clothed only with solid armor-plates. Four and a half inches—just the width of this printed column—had been fixed upon as the standard thickness. In Europe there were foundries provided with the means of rolling such plates. Nothing of the kind existed in America. These plates could be produced here only by the slow process of forging.

To produce a forged plate, a quantity of fragments of all sorts of iron is bound up into a fagot about two feet square. This is thrust into a furnace, heated to a bright red, when the mass becomes almost as plastic as wax. It is then placed under a heavy steam-hammer, a few blows from which reduce the fagot to a "bloom"—a homogeneous mass of iron, looking like a fragment of a wooden joist, about six inches square, and four feet long. To forge these blooms into plates, four or five layers are piled up upon the end




ASLEEP ON DECK.





FORGING A BLOOM.




FORGING A PLATE.

of an iron bar, and thrust into a furnace. This bar answers the purpose of a handle to move the mass, and is suspended by chains so as to balance. The blooms, piled up on the flattened end of the bar, are thrust into a furnace, and heated for hours until they become plastic. They are then withdrawn from the furnace, swung around, and placed under a hammer still heavier than that which has reduced them from fagots, and beaten out flat, forming the commencement of a plate. Upon the end of this other blooms are piled, heated, and hammered out in like manner. This process is repeated until the plate has acquired the required length, when it is chiseled off from the bar. It is then simply a plank of solid iron, twelve or fifteen feet long, three broad, and four or five inches thick. This process is necessarily slow. There were no national foundries, and only two or three private ones capable of executing it. These could furnish only the plates for the Ironsides; and for the Roanoke; for this unlucky vessel being useless in its original shape, it had been resolved to cut her down, and convert her into an armored ship. The Ironsides proved in the end to be an effective vessel; the Roanoke was as useless as before. The turrets of the new monitors and their side armor must in the mean while be composed of layers of inch iron. The thickness of the turrets was increased from eight to eleven and even thirteen inches. This was found at Charleston in 1863, and at Wilmington in 1865, to be sufficient to resist the most powerful shot that could be brought to bear upon them. With some exceptions, which arose from causes nowise affecting the principle upon which they were constructed, no monitors have been seriously injured by the fire to which they have been subjected, even when put to service for which they were never designed—that of assailing fortifications.

Still, the revolving turrets hitherto constructed embody only a portion of the possible offensive power involved in the design of their inventor. Those built afford perfect protection to ordnance and gunners. They also give the vessel the power of throwing its whole offensive power upon any required point of the circle within the range of its guns. But the fire is given from a gun moving around the circumference of a circle, and the slightest interval between the aim and the discharge sends the ball in a line different from that intended. In the turret as designed by Timby provision was made against this grave defect. His turret was to revolve, not upon a central shaft, but upon rollers around its periphery. From its centre rose a plat-

form resting upon a central shaft, moving independent of the revolution of the turret itself. This platform was to be the post of the commander during action. A telescope is firmly fixed upon this platform; by his side is a wheel, by which he turns the shaft in any direction, so as to keep the telescope pointed directly at the object of attack. If it moves he follows it with the telescope, just as a rifleman moves his piece when taking aim at a bird in flight. As the turret revolves, each gun is for an instant brought in a line exactly parallel with the commander's telescope, always pointed upon the object of attack. If the gun be discharged at that instant, the ball must go straight to its mark. Provision is made to effect this with an instantaneousness unattainable by the motion of human nerves and muscles. A galvanic battery is provided, with a separate conducting wire running to each gun; this is so arranged that the connection is formed at the instant when the gun is brought by the revolution of the turret in a vertical line below the telescope. If the fuse attached to the conducting wire is placed in the vent of the piece, the discharge is instantaneous, and the telescope, and consequently the gun, being pointed directly at the object, the aim is perfect, and the ball must go straight to its mark. The accompanying diagram represents a vertical section of a large turret, designed for a stationary battery, mounting sixty guns in two tiers. It shows the interior of such a turret, with the automatic sighting and discharging apparatus. The principle and arrangement is the same whatever may be the number of the guns. The commander within the turret aims every gun of the battery with as much precision as a sharpshooter aims his telescopic rifle, discharging it by an electric current at the instant when the aim is secured. The gunners have nothing to do but to load the guns, run them to the port-hole, and insert the fuse.

The correctness of the principle on which the monitor turrets is based has been proved to be sound by the severest practical tests. Great improvements may doubtless be made in the actual construction of the turrets and hulls. Thus, instead of having the turret entirely above deck, it may be sunk for fully a third of its height below deck. Its liability to be struck would thus be diminished in that proportion, while its chief vulnerable point, the base upon which it revolves, would be effectually shielded by the side armor of the vessel. The seaworthiness of the vessel would be increased by bringing the centre of gravity nearer the keel. The protected part of the




VERTICAL SECTION OF STATIONARY REVOLVING TURRET.

A, A, Exterior and Interior Walls of the Turret, with dome-shaped Roof K, revolving by the Gearing F, upon friction Rollers G, G.—C, C, Artillery Platforms, the Gun-carriages radiating from the common Centre.—B, The Commander's Platform, revolving independently of the Turret, upon the Shaft b, b, by means of the Rod and Gearing D.—On the left of the Shaft is the "Circuit Closer," forming the connection between the Galvanic Battery and Conductors passing to each Gun.—E, E, Ventilators.—H, H, Casemates, mounted with Guns, independent of Revolving Turrets.—I, I, Wall of subterranean foundation for Turret, enclosing Chambers for Stores and Munitions.



turret would require a much less thickness of armor, and its diameter might be increased without adding to its weight. With a diameter of thirty feet instead of twenty there would be space for an armament of four or six instead of two guns. A vessel with such a turret, and with hull and engines capable of a high rate of speed, could not fail to be superior in offensive and defensive power to any iron-clad that can be built upon the European plan of vessels little differing from the old men-of-war, with lofty sides and presenting a great extent of perpendicular surface to attack, or even the Confederate plan of a long casemate with sloping sides. No vessel can be constructed upon either of these plans capable of floating the thirteen inches of iron which constitute the best monitor turrets. A man-of-war with its guns mounted in broadside can use only half its armament upon any one point at a time, and that only by exposing its whole side to the enemy. A monitor can bring its whole armament to bear upon any point at each revolution of the turret, which occupies about a minute; and if the turret should be furnished with the automatic sighting apparatus, every shot is under the absolute control of one governing mind. A monitor, moreover, fights with equal force in any position. Its whole fire can be delivered at will from bow, stern, or either side. If it have speed to enable it to choose its own position, it never needs to present any portion of its hull except its sharp bow to the enemy. This offers a mark so small that it could be hit only by the merest chance. Practically, its low turret is the only assailable point, and this, as already constructed, is capable of resisting any shot to which, in the present state of naval artillery, it can ever be exposed. It is safe to say that the defensive power of the turret can be increased more rapidly than the offensive power of artillery.

It was a part of the design of the inventor of the revolving turret to adapt



VERTICAL SECTION OF PROPOSED NAVAL TURRET AND HULL.

it to fortifications of large size for harbor defense. The following diagram represents a cordon of turrets for the protection of the Harbor of New York, the approach to which is through the "Narrows," about one third of a mile wide. This would be reduced to a quarter of a mile by docks built out from each shore. Upon the extremity of each dock would be erected a turret, and another upon an artificial foundation midway between them. Each of these turrets would be one hundred feet in diameter, mounting sixty guns in two tiers. The turrets are to revolve once a minute, equal to about three and a half miles an hour. As every gun may be discharged at every revolution, the possible effective fire from each turret would be sixty shot a minute. The three turrets could thus, in case of need, concentrate a fire of 180 guns upon any point in the circle. A series of chains is stretched from turret

to turret. When no attack is threatened these chains rest upon the bottom, leaving the passage unobstructed. They can be drawn up by a windlass, moved by the steam engine in the foundation of each turret. They are not to be drawn up "taut," but hang swaying in the water, at such a depth as to prevent the passage of a hostile fleet. They are furnished with buoys nearly sufficient to float the chains, so that only a small part of their tensile strength is expended in supporting them, leaving almost the whole strength to resist the passage of a hostile fleet. While detained here, any vessel would be exposed at point-blank distance to the whole fire of two turrets, which no ship ever built could sustain for a quarter of an hour. If thought necessary, movable torpedoes can be attached to chains in such a way as to be drawn directly below any vessel detained by the chains, and there exploded by a galvanic battery.



PROPOSED CORDON OF TURRETS FOR HARBOR DEFENSE.

#### NOTE ON THE MONITOR SYSTEM.

THE invention of the Revolving Turret has been attributed to Mr. Ericsson, and to Captain Cowper Coles, of the British Navy. The latter expressly claims it for himself upon the following grounds: He says that in 1855 he sent to the British Admiralty drawings for an armored vessel of light draft, the guns protected by a stationary "hemispherical tower." This suggestion was not acted upon. In March, 1859, he sent in drawings in which this tower, or shield, was placed upon a "turntable," thus constituting it a revolving turret. In Blackwood's Magazine for December, 1860, is an article on this subject, containing a drawing of such a turret, with the mechanism for turning it by hand. Now, in September, 1854, Ericsson had forwarded to the Emperor of France plans for a vessel provided with "a semi-globular turret of plate iron six inches thick, revolving on a column and pivot, by means of steam power and appropriate gear-work."<sup>1</sup> Coles says that his plans were "so exactly similar" to that of the Monitor "that I think it will be apparent that this invention is of English origin, and I claim it for this country"—that is, for himself. But the date of Ericsson's proposition to the French Emperor for a revolving turret antedates by almost four years that of Coles to the British Admiralty. But Timby, as has been shown, exhibited his invention publicly, and secured a right to a patent for it in 1843, eleven years before Ericsson proposed it to the French Emperor, and sixteen years before Coles claims to have thought of it. During all this time it was in many ways a matter of public record, and his claim was so clearly untenable that the contractors for the monitors purchased his patent for a large sum.

Much discussion arose as to the capabilities of the monitors, of which Ericsson says "the revolving cupola forms so important a feature."<sup>2</sup> In April, 1864, the Secretary of the Navy presented to Congress an elaborate "Report in Relation to Armored Vessels," detailing all the facts which had at that time transpired, and giving the opinions of prominent naval officers upon the subject. These opinions differed greatly. Lieutenant Jeffers, who commanded the Monitor at Drewry's Bluff, says, "I am of opinion that protecting the guns and gunners does not, except in special cases, compensate for the greatly diminished quantity of artillery, slow speed, and inferior accuracy of fire; and that, for general purposes, wooden ships, shell guns, and forts, whether for offense or defense, have not yet been superseded."<sup>3</sup> In the attack upon Fort Sumter, April 7, 1863, six monitors took part. The reports of Admiral Dupont and the commanders of these vessels were decidedly adverse to them. They were certainly considerably injured, but close examination shows that these injuries to the turrets in no wise affected the principle of their construction. Bolts were driven in, and some of the turrets were jammed at the base so as to prevent their revolution; but, although exposed to a heavier fire than any ships had ever endured, no turret was pierced. The Secretary of the Navy sums up the case thus: "Brief as was the conflict, the fire brought to bear upon the monitor vessels was such as could have been sustained by no ordinary boats, and demonstrates their power of resistance and their adaptation for harbor purposes. That the vessels in that engagement should have returned from the encounter with so few casualties, and the loss of but one life, is certainly remarkable."<sup>4</sup> In the second attack upon the Charleston forts, July 11, three monitors participated. Admiral Dahlgren "was favorably impressed with the endurance of these iron-clads. The Catskill was struck 60 times, a large percentage of the hits being very severe. The pilot-house, turret, side-armor, and decks were all more or less damaged. Some of the shots were large; one, found on deck, where it fell after striking the turret, proved to be a 10-inch. . . . The test was very severe; yet, after firing 128 rounds, the vessel came out of action in good working order, as was proved by her going into action next day."<sup>5</sup> For two months during the siege of Fort Wagner the monitors were in action almost every day. Lieutenant Simpson, of the Passaic, reports: "The strength of the turret has been severely tried. At one place two round shot of very large calibre (estimated by some as 11-inch, by others as 15-inch) have struck close together on the same plate, the impression of the second shot overlapping a portion of that made by the first. The mass of iron has been pressed in so as to form an extensive bulging on the inside, and the outer plate is broken, but no serious effect was produced. . . . The turrets are as near impregnable as any thing can be made, and eleven inches of iron

seems to be enough for all purposes of defense. The only objection to them is the 'through bolts,' which allow the nut inside to fly when the head is struck. The new system of making turrets, now adopted by the Navy Department, obviates this difficulty. . . . I recommend that a system of turret should be devised by which it will have no connection with the spindle, but have a bearing all around its base, running on friction-rollers. I would also recommend that the base of the turret should be carried below the spar deck."<sup>6</sup> This officer was probably not aware that these two features formed a part of the design of the inventor of the turret. Inspector Hughes reports: "The shot make an indentation on the iron, and break the bolts that fasten the plating together. The greatest indentations that have come to my knowledge were to the depth of 2½ and 23 inches. In my opinion, these indentations were made from 11-inch and 13-inch solid shot. A shot of this kind will generally break from one to five or six bolts. When the bolts break they can soon be replaced. I do not see that the turrets are injured practically."<sup>7</sup> Admiral Goldsborough says: "A difference of opinion exists among naval minds, at home and abroad, as to whether the better expedient is to use the guns of an iron-clad turret-wise or in broadside ports. The turret I regard as decidedly preferable. It renders one gun of a class equivalent to not least two of the same disposed in opposite broadside ports, and this with a great reduction of crew. It admits also of much heavier guns. It does not necessarily involve a breadth of beam antagonistic to velocity. It affords a better protection to guns and men, and, withal, it secures the fighting of guns longer in a sea-way."<sup>8</sup> Admiral Dahlgren, speaking of the whole of this two months' fighting, says: "The battering received by the monitors was without precedent. The Montauk had been struck 214 times, the Weehawken 187 times, and almost entirely by 10-inch shot. What vessels have ever been subject to such a test? It is not surprising that they should need considerable repair after sustaining such a severe pounding for so long a time, but only that they could be restored at all to serviceable condition. All the little defects of detail were marked by a searching process. Decks were cut through, cannon were worn out, side-armor shaken, tops of pilot-houses crushed, etc.; but all these were repairable, and no vital principle was seriously touched."<sup>9</sup> Commodore Rodgers, after comparing at length the relative advantages and disadvantages of the Ironsides and Monitor class of vessels, says: "To sum up my conclusions, I think that the Monitor class and the Ironsides class are different weapons, each having its peculiar advantages, and both needed to an iron-clad navy; but that when the Monitor class measures its strength against the Ironside class, then, with vessels of an equal size, the Monitor class will overpower the Ironside class; and as vessels find their natural antagonists in vessels, and only their exceptional antagonists in forts, it must be considered, upon the whole, that the Monitor principle contains the most successful elements for plating vessels for war purposes."<sup>10</sup> Admiral Porter says: "Any professional man who will lay aside his prejudices caused by the discomforts incident to monitors, must admit that as a harbor defense they are the best and only vessels to be built. If they have not been able to penetrate the harbor of Charleston, they have there done what no other vessels ever built could have accomplished. They held their own as no other vessels could have done, and under their shelter the army was enabled to perform its work successfully."<sup>11</sup> This favorable opinion, based upon the performances of the monitors at Charleston, was confirmed after Porter had occasion to test them at Fort Fisher, January, 1865, with the addition that the new ones which he had under his command proved themselves excellent sea-vessels, even upon the stormy coast of North Carolina. Captain Blakely, the celebrated English gun-maker, writing of the endurance of the monitors at the capture of Fort Fisher, says: "The fort contained not one gun powerful enough to sink an iron-clad ship. Most of these guns were more powerful than any gun mounted on any fort in England, or on any English ship except one, yet they failed to injure the Federal fleet. It follows that the fleet could attack Portsmouth or Plymouth with more impunity than Fort Fisher, so far as artillery fire is concerned."

<sup>1</sup> Letter to the *London Times*, April 1, 1862. <sup>2</sup> Report on Armored Vessels, p. 13. <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18. <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29. <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 99. <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 217. <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 256-257. <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 289. <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 574. <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 585. <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 694. <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 692.





DAVID G. FARRAGUT.

## CHAPTER XIV.

## THE CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS.

Gulf Expeditions proposed.—The Lower Mississippi.—Ship Island.—General Phelps's Proclamation.—Reported Defenses of New Orleans.—Butler's Instructions.—His Voyage to Ship Island.—The Naval Expedition.—Porter and Farragut.—Farragut's Instructions.—Meeting at Ship Island.—Surveys of the River.—Forts Jackson and St. Philip.—Bombardment of the Forts.—Cutting the Barricade.—Preparations for Passing.—List of Vessels.—The Passage of the Barricade.—The Fight with the Forts.—The Naval Combat.—Destruction of the Varuna.—The Hartford on Fire.—The Brooklyn, Richmond, and Pensacola.—Destruction of the Manassas.—The missing Gun-boats.—The Losses.—The Passage up the River.—Capture of the Chalmette Regiment.—Panic in New Orleans.—Destruction of Property.—The Chalmette Batteries.—Arrival before the City.—The Summons to Surrender.—Bailey and Lovell.—Farragut and the Mayor.—The Union Flag hauled from the Mint.—Farragut's Warning.—The Mayor's Reply.—Waiting for Butler.—Surrender of Forts Jackson and St. Philip.—Treachery of Mitchell.—Destruction of the Louisiana.—Condition of the Forts.—Surrender of the Vessels.—Arrival of Butler at New Orleans.—Landing of Troops.—The March through the Streets.—Military Occupation of New Orleans.

THE Federal government had no sooner recovered from the panic of Bull Run than it resolved to attempt the recapture of some of the places on the Gulf of Mexico which had been seized by the Confederates. New Orleans was the most important of these. Not only was it the only large city in the Confederacy, but it was its chief commercial emporium. More than half the cotton sent abroad was shipped from its wharves; it was the entrepôt of the great valley of the Mississippi; its possession would open the whole course of the great river. But it was supposed to be so strongly defended that no force could be spared sufficient to take it. McClellan declared that it would require 50,000 men. Mobile was next in importance, and an expedition was planned against it, to be placed under the command of General Butler. Texas was then suggested as of more immediate importance. Galveston in our possession, the German cotton-planters would, it was thought, bring the state back to the Union.

Whether New Orleans, Mobile, or Galveston were finally fixed upon as the object of attack, Ship Island was the best place of rendezvous for the expedition, being within striking distance of every point on the Gulf of Mexico. The Mississippi, reaching its long arm downward, has built up a narrow mud causeway for a hundred miles into the centre of the Gulf. The country on each side, lying below the level of the river, is a strange compound of swamps, bayous, and lagoons. Between this causeway and Cape St. Blas, on the east, is a deep indentation of the Gulf, with several smaller bays penetrating still farther inland. Midway in this indentation, known as Mississippi Sound, Mobile Bay sets up into the Alabama coast. The shallow lagoons known as Lakes Borgne and Pontchartrain, opening from the sound, pierce far into the State of Mississippi, furnishing a water route for vessels of light draught from New Orleans to the Gulf, independent of that

by the river. Almost in the centre of the sound, ninety-five miles from the mouths of the Mississippi, sixty-five from New Orleans, and fifty from Mobile, is Ship Island, a low bank of shifting white sand, seven miles long and three quarters of a mile wide, almost the counterpart of Fire Island in Long Island Sound. On the eastern end, a few groves of stunted oaks and pine find sustenance; at the western end is an excellent harbor, capable of sheltering a fleet of the largest vessels. The island possesses, also, the prime advantage of an abundant supply of water. Sink a barrel any where, and it is filled with pure water filtered through the clean white sand. The island had been for some months in possession of a small detachment from the Federal blockading navy, when in December, 1861, General Phelps was sent there with a considerable body of troops, the advance part of Butler's expedition. He signalized his advent by a strange proclamation addressed to the people of the Southwest, in which he affirmed that the admission of any new slave state into the Union was a violation of the Constitution, and that the states in which slavery existed at the adoption of the Constitution were bound, by becoming parties to that compact, to abolish it. Monopolies, he said, were destructive to national prosperity, and slavery was the greatest of all monopolies. Labor was inherently noble, and the motto of the country should be, "Free labor and workingman's rights." This proclamation was never fairly published, and so it was quietly ignored by the government.

Butler was just about to embark for Ship Island from Fortress Monroe, when the order was countermanded. The affair of the Trent had occurred; England had demanded the surrender of Mason and Slidell, and there was a prospect of war with Great Britain. This question was adjusted, and government again took up the expedition to the Gulf. New Orleans was fixed upon as its object. If the accounts of its defenses, ostentatiously put forth by the Southern papers, were true, the city was unassailable by any force that could be brought against it. Forts Jackson and St. Philip, seventy-five miles below New Orleans, on opposite sides of the river, it was said, mounted 173 rifled 63-pounders of the best English manufacture. Just below them was a dam, which no fleet could force in less than two hours, during which it would be under the direct fire of the forts, many of whose guns were furnished with red-hot shot. The forts were manned by 3000 men, many of them experienced artillerymen. Then there were almost ready two floating steam batteries, covered with four and a half inches of solid English and French iron plates, each carrying twenty 68-pounders, so arranged that their balls would "skim the water, striking the enemy between wind and water." Besides these, there were fire-ships, incendiary shells, Congreve rockets, and the like. Then there was a constant succession of redoubts all the way from the forts to the city; those at Chalmette, Jackson's old battlefield, had rifled cannon, with a proved effective range of five miles. All the





GODFREY WEITZEL.

navies in the world could not force their way up the rapid current of the Mississippi in the face of such obstacles. Moreover, in New Orleans itself were 32,000 infantry, and as many more quartered close by, all in "discipline and drill far superior to the Yankees." For generals they had Mansfield Lovell and Ruggles, "who possess our entire confidence;" and "for commodore old Hollins, a Nelson in his way."

But the Federal government had learned that the strength of the defenses of New Orleans had been greatly exaggerated, and was convinced that the city might be taken by a strong naval force, aided by a moderate army. Butler asked for only 15,000 men. These were given to him, with a conditional promise of 3000 more from Key West and Pensacola. The troops were sent by detachments to Ship Island, the commanding general accompanying the last, leaving Hampton Roads on the 25th of February. His instructions, dated two days before, directed him to keep the object of the expedition a profound secret. No one was to know the destination except Major Strong, his chief of staff, and Godfrey Weitzel, soon to be a general, but then only a lieutenant of the engineers, in which capacity he had aided in the construction of the forts on the Mississippi. "The object of your expedition," said McClellan in his order, "is one of vital importance—the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to be encountered, perhaps the only one, is in the resistance offered by forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce the works. Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault. The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some earthen batteries; here it may be necessary for you to land your troops, to co-operate with the naval attack, although it is more than probable that the navy unassisted can accomplish the result. If these works are taken the city of New Orleans necessarily falls." Then followed a plan for operations against Mobile, Pensacola, and Galveston. "It is probable," wrote McClellan, "that by the time New Orleans is reduced, it will be in the power of the government to re-enforce the land-forces sufficiently to accomplish all these objects;" but, in the mean time, Butler was "never to lose sight of the fact that the great object to be achieved is the capture and firm retention of New Orleans." This object was gained, but not in any respect in the manner proposed by McClellan. The forts were run, not reduced by the navy or carried by assault by the army; and when tidings came of the capture of the city, McClellan was calling for more men to enable him to hold his own before Richmond, instead of being able to send re-enforcements to New Orleans.

Butler took leave of the President and cabinet on the 24th of February. "Good-by, Mr. President," he said; "we shall take New Orleans, or you will never see me again." "The man that takes New Orleans," said the Secretary of War, "is made lieutenant general." The prophecy was fulfilled in spirit, if not in letter. New Orleans was taken by the navy, not by the army. The commander of the naval expedition was in time created vice-admiral, a rank in the navy corresponding to that of lieutenant general in the army. Of the man who was to be made lieutenant general, almost nothing was known, only that just a week and a day before he had "proposed to move immediately upon the works" at Fort Donelson, unless the "terms of an immediate and unconditional surrender" were accepted.

Butler, with the last of his command, left Hampton Roads for Ship Island

on the 25th of February, in the steamer Mississippi. The voyage, which should have been accomplished in a week, occupied a month. The steamer almost grounded near Hatteras Inlet; fairly grounded, and came near sinking, on the Frying-pan Shoals, off Cape Fear; put into Port Royal for repairs; started out, and ran aground again. The captain was clearly incompetent. If the vessel was to get to Ship Island by water she must have a new commander. Butler deposed the captain, put him under arrest, and appointed a new commander in his place. At length, on the 25th of March, the Mississippi reached Ship Island. The commanders of the naval expedition were already there, awaiting Butler's arrival.

The naval force had been laboriously organized. Besides the blockading squadron in the Gulf, a fleet of armed steamers, gun-boats, and a bomb flotilla consisting of twenty-one schooners, each carrying a mortar capable of throwing a bomb of 215 pounds, was provided. The mortar vessels were placed under the command of David D. Porter, then commander in the navy, since admiral. He was the son of that Commodore Porter whose exploits in the Essex form one of the most stirring chapters in the naval history of our war of 1812, and a younger brother of William D. Porter, of whom we have written, and shall have to write. The outbreak of the rebellion found him, after thirty years of service, a lieutenant in the navy, his name standing high on the list.





The government hesitated long in selecting the man who should have the chief command of the naval expedition. The choice was not made until the preparations were almost completed. It fell upon David G. Farragut, then a captain in the navy, to whom was assigned the rank of Flag-officer of the Western Gulf Squadron. The father of Farragut, a native of the island of Minorca, came to America in 1776. He entered the army, where he rose to the rank of major. After the war, having married in North Carolina, he migrated to Tennessee, taking up his residence near Knoxville, where his son was born in the first year of the present century. Like many another boy inland born, he would be a sailor. Porter, an intimate friend of the father, procured a midshipman's warrant for the child, then only ten years old, and took him upon his own vessel. Young Farragut, then fourteen years old, was with Porter in the famous Essex fight in Valparaiso Bay, and received the special commendation of his commander for his conduct, though he was too young to be recommended for promotion. In times of peace naval promotion comes slowly. Farragut, who had become lieutenant in 1825, was appointed commander in 1841, and captain in 1855. Meanwhile he had served at home and abroad, afloat and ashore, noted always for his diligence in mastering the duties of his profession, and for his facility in acquiring languages. He learned French at home, Spanish and Portuguese in South America, Italian and Arabic in the Mediterranean. The outbreak of the rebellion found him on shore duty at Norfolk, where he possessed a small estate. Of his sixty years, all but ten had been passed in the service of his country. He was proof against the temptations which assailed every officer of Southern birth or connections—temptations to which Buchanan and Tattall, Maury and Page, Semmes and Maffit yielded. He managed to make his escape from Norfolk, leaving every thing behind him. He bore his three-score years lightly. No one who saw him would suppose that he was past middle age. A modest, quiet man, doing the duty which came to his hands without show or parade, he was now to have the opportunity of showing that he possessed the highest qualities of a commander.

Farragut received his first instructions on the 20th of January. They were followed by others three weeks later. As soon as his flag-ship, the



DAVID D. PORTER.





SHIP ISLAND AND THE APPROACHES TO NEW ORLEANS.




Hartford, was ready, he was to proceed to sea, and take the command of the Western Gulf blockading squadron. The mortar boats were to rendezvous at Key West. When all was ready, he was to collect such vessels as could be spared from the blockade, proceed up the Mississippi, and reduce the defenses which guarded the approaches to New Orleans. When he appeared off that city, he was to take possession of it under the guns of his squadron, hoist the American flag, and keep possession until the troops came up. Then, if the squadron from above had not descended, he was to push a strong force up the river, and take the defenses in the rear. "As you have expressed yourself perfectly satisfied with the force given to you," wrote the Secretary of the Navy, "and as many more powerful vessels will be added before you can commence operations, the Department and the country will require of you success. There are other operations of minor importance, but nothing must be allowed to interfere with the great object in view, the certain capture of the city of New Orleans. The Department relies upon your skill to give direction to the powerful force placed at your disposal, and upon your personal character to infuse a hearty co-operation among your officers free from unworthy jealousies." This confidence was fully justified. The great object in view was gained; and if the secretary's anticipations that "if successful, you open the way to the sea for the great West, never to be closed; the rebellion will be riven to its centre, and the flag to which you have been so faithful will recover its supremacy in every state," were not at once attained, it was through no fault of Farragut and his associates. Never before, save when Nelson, supported by Collingwood, and Hardy, and Harvey, won the great fight at Trafalgar, was a commander so truly and loyally supported by his subordinates as was Farragut by Porter, Bailey, Bell, and the officers and men of every vessel in the fleet. No trace of any unworthy jealousy appeared. In the fight every officer did his best; and in the reports, while each told what his own vessel had done, every one was eager to praise his associates. These reports, fully forty in number, leave nothing to be desired by the historian who has to describe the capture of New Orleans.

Farragut reached Ship Island on the 20th of February, more than a month before the arrival of Butler, who was daily expected. He ran down with his fleet to the mouths of the Mississippi, and for a full month was busy in getting his vessels over the bar. It was supposed that there was nineteen feet of water. If so, all the vessels could be got over, except, perhaps, the Colorado, which drew twenty-two when loaded, but lightened an inch for twenty-four tons. The Wabash drew eighteen feet on an even keel, and could be got over without difficulty. All the other vessels, it was thought, could easily pass. But fifteen feet was found to be the utmost depth. Neither the Colorado or the Wabash could cross. The Mississippi, lightened almost to the bare hull, was got over, tugs pulling her through a foot of mud. The fleet which entered the Mississippi consisted of forty-five vessels of all classes. Five were powerful steam sloops, the largest vessels which had ever crossed the bar; there were seventeen gun-boats, twenty-one mortar schooners, and two large sailing vessels. All told, they carried something more than 200 mortars and guns, many of them of heavy calibre.

The last of the large steamers were not fairly over the bar until the 8th of April. But meanwhile Farragut and Butler had met at Ship Island and concerted their plan of operations. Porter's bomb vessels were to assail the forts. If he reduced them, well; if not, Farragut would try to run past them. If he succeeded, Butler should bring up his forces through the bayous to the rear of the forts, cutting them off from New Orleans, which Farragut would have held with his fleet.

Three weary weeks passed before active operations were begun. But much work was done in this interval. The whole course of the river up to the forts was accurately surveyed. No more desolate region exists than that near the mouths of the Mississippi. On the right is swamp and lagoon; on the left lagoon and swamp. A stunted tree, a dilapidated house, only breaks the dull mud level. One hardly knows whether land or water predominates. Land first fairly gets the victory after a contest of thirty miles, when a thick belt of wood finds soil from which to grow on the west bank. Just here the river makes a bend, scarcely perceptible in a general map. At this bend, on the first patch of firm ground, were placed the first and the only seaward defenses of New Orleans. On the west, or convex side of the bend, was Fort Jackson; a little above, on the east, or concave side, was Fort St. Philip. Fort Jackson itself mounted seventy-four guns, with a supplementary battery of six. Fort St. Philip had forty guns. Both forts had been constructed by the best engineers that West Point could furnish, among whom were Beauregard and Weitzel. They were not quite completed when the rebellion broke out, but the deficiencies were thought to have been supplied by the zeal of the Confederates. They were thought to be impregnable, though the voyager up the Mississippi would hardly notice them, unless it were as the first two objects which broke the monotony of the dull mud level. All that he could see was two neatly sodded green slopes, surmounted by low brick walls, with a few black openings for guns. The river here is half a mile wide, with a current of four miles an hour, its course commanded by the guns of the two forts. But these guns were only a part of the defenses. Straight across the river from Fort Jackson a strong barrier had




FIRE-RAFTS.

been stretched. Upon this the Confederates had twice lavished their labor. First, they had placed a row of heavy logs, bound together by an iron chain, across the stream. The drift-wood from above lodged against this, forming a huge raft, the pressure of which in time became too great for the strength of the chain; one night it parted, and the whole structure was swept down to the Gulf. Taught by experience, the Confederates built a new barricade upon wiser principles. Eight hulks, partially dismasted and filled with logs, were strongly anchored in the stream, with intervals through which the drift-wood could pass. A chain passing from one to another bound all together. Near the left bank the barricade could be opened at will to permit a vessel to pass. One end of the barricade was covered by the guns of Fort Jackson; the other was protected by a battery, both sweeping its entire length, while Fort St. Philip, from above, could pour its whole fire upon any assailant. Above lay a fleet of rams, gun-boats, and fire vessels, whose number and strength were unknown. The whole was in charge of a reereant Pennsylvanian, J. K. Duncan, brigadier general commanding coast defenses. The two forts were especially commanded by Edward Higgins, once an officer in the army of the United States.

The western bank of the river, for eight miles below Fort Jackson, was lined by a belt of dense woods fifty yards wide, completely hiding the fort from the view except at one point, where the trees had been cleared away in order to afford unobstructed range upon ascending vessels. Porter had resolved to place his bomb schooners close to the bank and screened by these woods, over which they were to fling their shells into the invisible fort. The exact bearing and distance of the fort from the station assigned to each vessel must be ascertained. This work was performed with no little risk by members of the coast survey detailed for that purpose. They had to resort to all kinds of observations from all possible positions, hardly one of which was upon firm ground. Some stations consisted of flags among the overhanging branches, the angles between them being measured from boats in the stream below; other stations were the chimney-tops of deserted houses, to which the observers worked their way through the roofs. All the while

they were exposed to a random fire from the guns of the fort, and to shots from riflemen lurking in the woods. But, in spite of all difficulties, the work was accomplished, and an accurate map was prepared, showing the bearing and distance of almost every point in the river from the flag-staffs of the forts.

On the morning of the 17th of April all the vessels of the expedition were drawn up closely together four miles below the forts. The enemy opened the fight by sending down a fire-raft, piled up with wood saturated with tar and turpentine. A boat which put off from the Iroquois dragged the raft ashore, where it burned itself harmlessly out. All that day and the following night fire-rafts came down, but it was soon found that they were harmless. The final preparations for the bombardment were now made. The mast-heads of the bomb vessels would rise just above the woods on shore. From them the walls of the fort could be seen, though the vessels were undistinguishable from the forts; for Porter had ordered the masts to be dressed off with branches and vines. Of the dense mass of green, no one in the fort could tell what was forest and what was mast and rigging. On the



THE FORTS AND VESSELS.



morning of the 18th all the bomb vessels had taken their positions, the foremost a little more than a mile and a half (2850 yards) from Fort Jackson. Behind this, in close order, were anchored twelve other vessels; across the river were six other mortar vessels, the foremost a little more than two miles (3680 yards) from Fort Jackson, upon which the whole fire was to be concentrated. At nine o'clock the action commenced, the mortar vessels firing in order, each one every ten minutes. The forts replied. All day long the mortar boats kept up their constant fire, while gun-boats were dashing here and there, up and down the river, firing upon and receiving fire from the forts. Fire-rafts also came down, but they were easily disposed of. No one of the vessels lying under the lee of the woods was struck this day; two of those across the river were hit, killing one man and wounding three. The day was wearing to its close when a dense column of smoke and flame was seen rising from the fort. The citadel had been fired by the bombs; all the clothing and commissary stores were destroyed, and the magazine was in imminent danger. Porter could not know this. He supposed that it was another fire-raft ready to be launched against him. Night-firing was uncertain; the wind had set in fresh; no one could know how long the bombardment would last; the men were worn with labor and fasting, and so at dusk Porter ordered the firing to cease. If he had known all, he would have kept up the bombardment through the night. As it was, he thought it best to be prudent. This, he says, was the only mistake that occurred during the bombardment. Next day the bombardment was resumed, the fort responding as briskly as before. One mortar vessel was struck by a shell and sunk, two men being wounded; another was hit by a shot which killed one man, and disabled the mortar for two or three hours. On the third day no harm was done to the fleet, and nothing showed that Fort Jackson was seriously injured by the 4000 bombs discharged at it. Porter began to lose confidence in mortars; but a deserter came in, telling a fearful story, only partly true, of the havoc made in the fort. Hundreds of shells, he said, had fallen within the works, casemates were broken in, citadel and outbuildings burnt, magazine endangered, levee cut, and men demoralized and dispirited. So the mortar fleet went to work with renewed vigor.

Farragut, meanwhile, had come to the conclusion that the mortar fleet would never reduce the forts. He must try what could be done by steamers and gun-boats. Whatever was to be done must be done quickly, or the great fleet would be again reduced to a mere blockading squadron, for shells, fuses, and cartridges were nearly expended. He would try to run the forts, or, if that could not be done, would engage them at close action, "and abide the result; conquer or be conquered; drop anchor or keep under way, as in his opinion was best," when the decisive moment should arrive.

Before the forts could be passed the harricade must be cut. This work was assigned to Bell, the fleet captain, commander of the flag-ship. Two gun-boats were given him for this work. One of these, the *Pinola*, was furnished with a petard, to be flung on board a hulk, and then ignited by a galvanic spark. The other, the *Itasca*, was to rely upon stout arms wielding hammer and chisel. The boats crept up on the night of the 20th, under cover of a fierce bombardment and of darkness. They reached the harricade. The *Pinola*, stopping her engine, threw her petard fairly upon one of the hulks; the strong current caught the vessel, whirling her down stream, and snapping the conducting wire before the spark could be transmitted. The *Itasca* was more fortunate. She steamed up to the middle hulk, and lashed herself to it. Her men leaped on board the hulk. In half an hour they cut the chain and loosed the hulk from its anchors. Gun-boat and hulk, lashed together, were swept by the current to the shore, the hulk luckily inside. The central hulk thus removed, the one on each side swung away, leaving an opening wide enough for three vessels to pass abreast. The *Pinola*, balked, through no fault of her own, in her own part of the enterprise, did good service in aiding her more fortunate consort. Getting again under way, she steamed up to the harricade, threw successively two five-inch hawsers to the *Itasca*, broke both in trying to drag her off, started her at length with a larger one, and the two boats returned in triumph to the fleet. Their joint work was done. The way to New Orleans was open to Farragut, if he dared attempt it.

Farragut was ready to dare it. He made every preparation to fit his fleet for the venture which he saw must devolve upon it. The fleet would be exposed to hazards of every kind, and every precaution was taken against them. Foremost of all was one devised by Moore, the engineer of the *Richmond*. He proposed that the iron chain cables should be looped over the side of the vessels, so as to form a sort of armor protecting the line of the engines. This defense was adopted by the whole fleet. Months after, it was adopted by the *Kearsarge* in her memorable encounter with the *Alabama*. Each commander made, besides, his own special arrangements for preventing shot from reaching vital points in his vessel. Hammocks, coal, bags of ashes, bags of sand, were piled up forward and abaft. Some rubbed their vessels with mud, to render them less perceptible; others whitewashed their decks, to make things more visible by night. Farragut's general order,<sup>1</sup> addressed to the commander of each vessel, provided for almost every possible

<sup>1</sup> The following are sentences from this order: Send down topgallantmasts. Rig in the flying jibboom, and land all the spars and rigging except what are necessary for the three topsails, foresail, jib, and spanker. Trice up the topmast stays, or land the whippers, and bring all the rigging into the bowsprit, so that there shall be nothing in the range of the direct fire ahead. Mount one or two guns on the poop and topgallant forecastle, bearing in mind that you will always have to ride head to the current, and can only avail yourself of the sheer of the helm to point a broadside gun more than three points forward of the beam. Have a kedge in the mizzen chains; a hawser bent through the stern chock; also grapnels to tow off fire-ships. Have light Jacob ladders made to throw over the side for the use of carpenters in stopping shot-holes. See that pumps and hose are in good order for extinguishing fire. Have many tubs of water about the decks, for the purpose of extinguishing fire and for drinking. Have heavy kedge in the port main chains, and whip on the main yard, ready to run it up and let fall on the deck of any vessel you may run alongside of in order to secure her for boarding.





contingency. Much of it is hardly intelligible except to the nautical mind; but there are sentences which have the ring of Nelson or Napoleon: "I wish you to understand," he says, "that the day is at hand when you will be called upon to meet the enemy in the worst form for our profession. Hot and cold shot will, no doubt, be freely dealt to us, and there must be stout hearts and quick hands to extinguish the one and stop the holes of the other. I shall expect prompt attention to signals and verbal orders, either from myself or the captain of the fleet, who, it will be understood, in all cases acts by my authority."

Farragut had resolved to attempt to run past the forts. The time was fixed for the night of the 23d. The bombardment was to be kept up until then, mainly to occupy the enemy. So a rain of shells was kept up. Duncan, in the forts, reported cheerfully for the public in New Orleans. The enemy had fired 25,000 shells, of which a thousand had fallen in the fort, doing little real harm; "they must soon exhaust themselves; if not, we can stand it as long as they can." Confidentially, he writes less confidently. Mitchell, the naval commander, was urged to get the great rain Louisiana down at once, to draw off some part of the heavy fire from the mortar vessels. The position of the fort was critical; casemates were shattered and crumbling away, and the magazine was in peril. Duncan exaggerated his danger. Instead of 25,000 shells, barely 5000 had then been thrown against him; of these, not a third of a thousand had fallen within the fort. For all practical purposes, it was as strong when surrendered on the 28th as when first assailed ten days before.

Farragut's arrangements for passing the forts, like most great things when stripped of all accessories, were very simple. The mortar fleet, with its own steamers, and the sailing vessels, were to remain behind, yet covering the advance with their fire. Five steamers and twelve gun-boats were to run or fight the forts. All told, they carried 294 guns.<sup>1</sup> They were arranged in two columns. The barricade once passed through the opening made by the Itasca, Bailey, second in command, with the right column, was to deal with Fort St. Philip; Bell, captain of the fleet, with the left column, was to deal with Fort Jackson. Caldwell, of the Itasca, had in the mean while been sent up to ascertain if the gap which he had made in the barricade was still open. He found that the channel was clear, and that the whole fleet could pass.

Just after two o'clock on the morning of the 24th two small red lights were shown. This was the signal for advance. At half past three the whole fleet was fairly under way. The Hartford—Farragut, perched in the fore-rigging, peering anxiously through his glass into the thick darkness—led the left column of the blue; Bailey, in the Cayuga, led the right, all the other vessels following in close order. The forts were about two miles above. The vessels steamed slowly up against the strong current, making scarcely two miles an hour. As soon as they were fairly under way, the five small steamers belonging to the mortar flotilla threw a hot enfilading fire upon the water batteries, while the mortar schooners opened upon the forts a bombardment fiercer than had before been delivered. For an hour there was not an instant when five shells were not in the air; sometimes there were half a score. The ascending fleet was clearly in view from the flotilla below, every spar, mast, and rope clearly visible through the flames, which seemed to be eating them up. When the last vessel disappeared in the smoke, Porter gave the signal to cease firing and drop down the river. He had done his share in the work. The rest must be left to Farragut.

Both columns passed the barricade without serious difficulty, only that three gun-boats missed the opening and were obliged to turn back. The real work was now to begin, for they were right under the guns of the forts, and open to the attack of the Confederate rams and gun-boats. Each man had now to fight at his own discretion; Farragut could only guess how each vessel was conducting itself; but he was able after the fight was over to report that "it has rarely been the lot of a commander to be supported by officers of more indomitable courage or higher professional merit."

Bailey, whose red flag was borne by the Cayuga, caught the first fire from Fort St. Philip. This fort had received no harm from the bombardment beyond the disabling of a single heavy gun. The flag-boat could bring no gun to bear at first, and steamed straight on, delivering a fire upon the fort in passing, and soon finding herself attacked by the whole fleet of Confederate gun-boats, with no supporting vessel in sight. "Hot but congenial work," says Bailey. Two large steamers, one on starboard bow, another astern, tried to board; off starboard beam was a third; but an 11-inch Dahlgren, at thirty yards' distance, quieted him; he shoved for shore, ran aground, and burned himself up. The Cayuga's fore-castle Parrott drove off her enemy on the bow; by that time the Varuna and Oneida came dashing up, and took part in the fight.

The Varuna, Boggs in command, built for a merchant vessel, was the swiftest and weakest boat in the squadron. Giving Fort St. Philip a passing fire, she dashed up stream, and soon found herself in a nest of rebel steamers. She "worked both sides" upon these. Her first opponent, apparently crowded with troops, caught her starboard fire, and drifted ashore, with boiler ex-

ploded. Three more on either side soon shared the same fate. She then slackened steam, and was overhauled by two of the enemy, both iron-clad at the bows, and intent upon running her down. Hitherto not a man had been hurt on the Varuna. But now the Governor Moore, her foremost enemy, gave a raking fire, which killed three and wounded nine men, and almost simultaneously butted her twice. The Moore got more than she gave. Boggs managed to throw three shells into her abaft of her armor, besides a few favors from a stern rifled gun, when she dropped out of action partly disabled. Another boat, iron-clad at the bows, with an under-water beak, was at the same time assailing the Varuna. She struck her fairly, with damaging force, receiving shot which glanced harmlessly from her mailed bow; then she drew off, and came back, delivering another blow on the same spot, which crushed in the side of the Varuna. But in the mêlée her bows were dragged around, exposing her unarmored side. Five 8-inch shells, delivered from the now sinking Varuna, settled her, and she went ashore. Fifty of her crew were killed and wounded. She was set on fire by her own commander, who burned his wounded with his vessel. This fight was brief. In fifteen minutes after the Varuna was first butted she was on the bottom, her topgallant fore-castle only being out of water. The Oneida had by this time come up. Boggs waved her on to finish the Moore. This accomplished, the Oneida returned and took off a part of the crew of the sinking Varuna; the rest were rescued by other vessels. The honors of the fight must be accorded to the Varuna, the only lost vessel. Before she went down she had helped to sink or disable six vessels of the enemy, any one of whom was fairly her match.

The large steamers were meanwhile having a rough time. The Hartford had hardly got under way when she received the fire of Fort Jackson. She replied from two fore-castle guns, keeping straight on for the barricade. Passing this, Farragut sheered off at the distance of half a mile, and poured in full broadsides of grape and canister, which drove every man in the fort under cover; but the casemate guns kept up a hot fire. Fort St. Philip now opened upon the advancing fleet. The fire became general, but the smoke was so dense that it was difficult to distinguish friends from foes; the flash of the guns was the only object at which forts or fleet could aim. A huge fire-raft soon loomed up amid the blackness. Farragut, in trying to avoid it, ran his vessel on shore. The raft, pushed on by the ram Manassas, whose black hull was invisible, was shoved right upon the Hartford. In a moment the good ship was on fire half way up to her tops, the flames bursting through the ports and running up the rigging. "Fire quarters" were beaten, the flames extinguished, the steamer backed off from shore, extricating herself from the raft, and pointed up stream. This in a few minutes brought her opposite St. Philip, upon which she poured her fire from one broadside, while the other blazed at Jackson. A half hour more of this hot work carried the Hartford beyond the range of the forts, and brought her among the remains of the Confederate fleet, which had been pretty thoroughly dealt with by the gun-boats, which had gained the advance.

The Brooklyn, meanwhile, had had her share of hot work. Her place in the line was directly after the flag-ship. In the smoke and darkness she lost sight of the Hartford, and became entangled among the hulks of the barricade. She fell athwart the stream, her bow grazing the bank. Here she caught the fire of St. Philip. Regaining her position, she passed the opening, and met the Manassas, which delivered a shot at ten feet distance; this was stopped by the sand-bags which protected that vital point, the steam drum. The ram twice attempted to butt; but she was too close to get up full speed, and the blows were harmless. Morse's improvised chain armor proved a perfect protection to the sides of the Brooklyn. The Manassas slid off and disappeared in the darkness, to reappear only once more. A Confederate steamer then tried the Brooklyn, which was all the time raked from Fort Jackson. "Our port broadside," says Craven, the gallant captain of the Brooklyn, "at the short distance of fifty or sixty yards, completely finished him, setting him on fire almost instantaneously." The Brooklyn groped her way in darkness and smoke until she found herself abreast of St. Philip, so close that there was but thirteen feet of water. She was in a position to bring her full broadside to bear, and for a few minutes poured in a storm of grape and canister which drove the men from their guns and silenced the fire of the fort. Having passed the forts, the Brooklyn, still under way, engaged several of the enemy's gun-boats, pouring in a destructive fire at short range, generally from sixty to a hundred yards. "The effects of our broadsides," says Craven, "must have been terrific." The Brooklyn was under fire an hour and a half, and suffered severely both in men and in damage to the vessel.

The three other steam ships played worthy but less conspicuous parts. The Richmond, the slowest vessel, groped its way through the fiery channel after the way had been cleared, suffering little. The Pensacola took the full fire of St. Philip passing slowly up, frequently stopping to return it. Her men lay flat on deck to receive the first fire of the forts. The enemy over-shot, and many lives were thus saved; but the loss on the Pensacola exceeded that of any other vessel. She did not come up with the enemy's gun-boats until the action with them was nearly over. The Mississippi, in a few months to go down at Port Hudson, felt the enemy's fire. She received ten shots, eight of which passed sheer through her, and got a severe wound from the Manassas, which she at last disabled.

The Manassas was the great reliance of the Confederate fleet. She was built somewhat after the model of the Virginia, and it was supposed that she could deal with the Federal fleet as the Virginia had dealt with the Cumberland. In the gray of the morning, when the Federal fleet had fairly passed the forts and had destroyed the Confederate flotilla, the Manassas appeared coming up after them, hoping even then to retrieve the fortunes of the fight.

<sup>1</sup> The following are the vessels, with the number of their guns, ordered to attempt to pass the forts: *Steam ships*—Hartford, 28; Brooklyn, 26; Richmond, 24; Pensacola, 24; Mississippi, 13. *Gun-boats*—Cayuga, 7; Oneida, 10; Varuna, 9; Katahdin, 7; Kineo, 6; Wissahickon, 6; Sciota, 5; Iroquois, 9; Kennebec, 5; Pinola, 5; Itasca, 4; Winona, 6; in all, 17 vessels, with 294 guns. The three gun-boats Itasca, Winona, and Kennebec failed to pass the barricade. No accurate list of the Confederate vessels encountered above the barricade has been preserved. There appear to have been in all 16 or 18 armed vessels, carrying about 50 guns. Many of them were designed for rams, so that the number of guns is no measure of their real offensive power. The iron-clad Manassas, which was supposed capable of clearing the whole river, carried but one gun. The following list, only partially accurate, is the most complete which can now be given of the Confederate flotilla: Louisiana, iron-clad, 16; Manassas, iron-clad, 1; McRae, 8; Governor Moore, 3; General Quitman, 2; Jackson, 2; Lovell, 1; Warrior, 2; Resolute, 2; Reliance, 2; Breckinridge, 1; Stonewall Jackson, 1; Galveston, 2; Anglo-Norman, 2; Star, 1.





THE HARTFORD ON FIRE.

Farragut ordered Smith of the Mississippi to turn and run her down. The head of the Mississippi was pointed down stream, and she dashed toward the ram with the full velocity of steam and stream. When only fifty yards apart, the ram put her helm apart and dodged the blow, but ran fast on the bank. Her crew got ashore as best they could. The Mississippi, balked of her blow, poured in two broadsides, thoroughly riddling the Manassas, and then boarded. But it was not worth while to save her. The hulk was dragged off from the bank, fire set to her, and she was sent drifting down the current without a man on board. Half an hour after, the Manassas came drifting down the river below the forts, seemingly ready to pounce upon the defenseless mortar vessels. Fire was opened upon the hulk, but it was soon discovered that she was harmless. Flame and smoke were pouring from every opening, and she was evidently sinking. Porter, wishing to save her as a curiosity, got a hawser on board and tied her to the bank. Hardly was this done when a faint explosion was heard, her only gun went off, and, emitting flames through her bow port, the Manassas gave a final plunge and disappeared under the turbid waters of the river.

The morning had hardly broken, and the fog was not lifted from the riv-

er, when Farragut, the battle won, looked round for his fleet. Three gunboats were missing, whether captured, sunk, or driven back he could not then know. He afterward learned that they were safe. The Winona and Kennebee had got fouled among the hulks of the barricade, and at daylight found themselves a mark for the whole fire of the two forts, against which it was madness to contend, and had turned their heads down stream. The Itasca, which had opened the barricade, had met with misfortune and disappointment. She tried bravely to pass, and only desisted when several shot from Fort Jackson passed through her. One pierced her boiler, making an opening through which the steam rushed in a dense cloud, filling fire-room and engine-room, driving every one from below. Others caused leaks which threatened to sink the boat. She was also forced to withdraw. Caldwell, her commander, gave pathetic utterance to his heartfelt sorrow and disappointment that his disabled condition prevented him from being a participant in the complete success of the enterprise to which he had contributed so much. The Varuna, victorious in death, was a total loss. The seven days' bombardment, and the three hours' fight with forts and fleet, had cost in all 37 killed and 171 wounded, more than half of which fell upon the five





THE CRESCENT CITY IN 1862.

steam ships.<sup>1</sup> The forts shot too high throughout, and the gun-boats, lying low, were overshot. Their injuries were mainly received in the combat with the enemy's flotilla.<sup>2</sup> The entire loss of the Confederates has never been ascertained. In the forts 14 were killed and 38 wounded. The loss on the boats must have been very severe, for at least twelve of them were sunk or burned.

Farragut found his fleet somewhat battered, but sufficient for the work which it had to do. Boggs, his own vessel being lost, volunteered to take a boat, make his way through the bayous bordering the Mississippi, and convey dispatches to Porter and Butler, still below the forts. Butler was told that the way was clear for him to send up his troops by the bayous in the rear of the forts, where their landing would be protected by gun-boats left for that purpose. For Porter there was a note from Farragut, telling in sharp sailor phrase of the rough time which he had had; how once he thought it was all up with him; how he fought his way through, destroyed the Confederate fleet, was starting for New Orleans; the city captured, he would come back and attend to the forts, which Porter should hold as they were, unless, indeed, they should surrender, as he thought they would, upon being summoned. Just now he was going ahead. "I wish," he concluded, "to get above the English Turn, where they say the enemy have not placed a battery yet, but have two above, nearer New Orleans. They will not be idle, and neither will I. You supported me nobly."

But after passing the forts there was no serious opposition. The batteries which had been reported to line the levee above had no existence. The Chalmette regiment was encamped at the quarantine station five miles above the forts. Bailey ran the Cayuga up to the bank, hailed the colonel, and ordered him to pile his arms and come on board. The regiment surrendered, and were released on parole, only they must remain where they were until next day. The fleet steamed up the river through a scene of almost pastoral quiet. The banks for a mile on each side were lined with sugar plantations, green with young cane, dotted over with gangs of negroes busy at work. Now and then a white flag, or the Union colors, was hung out from a villa, or waved from the levee. Sometimes a white man would appear, making gestures of hatred or defiance. Here and there the slaves swarmed up to the levee, hoe in hand, waving their battered hats, and shouting a welcome to those who, they had learned by the strange system of free-masonry peculiar to the negroes, had come to be their deliverers. On other plantations, where they were kept under more strict control, they dug doggedly on, not seeming to notice the unwonted spectacle of an armed fleet steaming up the river. As evening fell, the fleet came to anchor eighteen miles below New Orleans by the bends of the river, but only half that distance in a

straight line. Huge volumes of fiery smoke were seen rolling up. A great panic had suddenly fallen upon the Crescent City.

On the morning of the 24th no man in New Orleans dreamed that the city was in danger. Duncan had telegraphed the evening before, giving an account of affairs up to the morning. "Heavy and continuous bombardment all night, and still progressing. No farther casualties except two men slightly wounded. We are cheerful, and have an abiding faith in our ultimate success. Twenty-five thousand 13-inch shells have been fired by the enemy, one thousand of which fell into the fort. They must soon exhaust themselves; if not, we can stand it as long as they can." Duncan overcounted. Hardly 5000 shells had then been thrown. Eight or nine thousand was the utmost limit after two days' more.

This cheering report appeared in the New Orleans morning papers of the 24th. Every body thought every thing was well until half past nine, when the alarm-bell was heard. Twelve strokes, four times repeated, summoned all armed bodies to their headquarters. A telegram from below, cut off at the fifteenth word, said, "It is reported that two of the enemy's gun-boats have succeeded in passing the forts." Not two, but seven times two, if the truth had been known. Five long hours passed without a farther word. Mansfield Lovell, commander at New Orleans, had the day

before gone leisurely down toward the forts. He came back, dashing along the levee at racing speed, bringing tidings that the whole Union fleet—not merely two gun-boats—had passed the forts, destroyed the Confederate flotilla, and were approaching New Orleans. It was late in the afternoon. The panic set in. Officers rode about impressing carts to haul the cotton from the store-houses to the levee for burning. The foreign consulates were crowded with persons bringing their valuables to be deposited for safe-keeping under foreign flags. The banks sent off their four millions of gold, which soon found its way to the Confederate treasury, never to be reclaimed. The military bodies hurried to their armories; but instead of the 64,000 infantry in and about the city, "in discipline and drill far superior to the Yankees," there were less than 3000 troops and a few thousand militia. Lovell abandoned the city, taking off his soldiers, and followed by some thousands of the militia; the others doffed their uniforms and remained behind. The governor of the state fled up the river in the swiftest steamer he could find, scattering proclamations directing the burning of every bale of cotton and every barrel of sugar which the enemy could by any possibility reach. The whole city was mad with apprehension and rage, with bewilderment and fury. Some denounced Duncan, some upbraided Lovell, some demanded that the city should be made another Moscow, some clamored that every Union man should be brought to the lamp-post. Worse even than the coming of the Yankees, all the scoundrelism of the city, noted for the number of its scoundrels, broke loose. The municipal authorities, restored to administration by the cessation of martial law, were at their wits' end. The police was powerless. There was but one way to save the city from burning and plunder. The mayor called upon the European brigade, composed of foreigners, to take charge of the city. They accepted the charge, and suppressed the tumult. At evening the authorized work of destruction began. The torch was applied to 15,000 bales of cotton, piled up on the river bank; to nearly a score of cotton-ships, ready to elude the blockade through some of the fifty outlets; to as many steam-boats, the relics of that mighty fleet which once lined the levee, four deep, for miles; to a great iron-clad ram, almost completed, which was to sweep the river; to miles of steam-boat wood and acres of coal; to ship-timber, dry docks, board-yards—to every thing combustible which the Yankees could use. The heads of hundreds of barrels of sugar and hogsheds of molasses were stove in. Men, women, and children, white, black, and parti-colored, scooped up molasses and sugar from the ground, and carried it off in pails, baskets, tubs, and aprons. Few of the inhabitants of New Orleans, except the slaves, slept on the night of Thursday, the 24th of April.

At dawn the next morning Farragut weighed anchor, and steamed cautiously up the river. Evidences of the panic in New Orleans were every where visible. Burning cotton-ships and ship-yard apparatus on fire came floating down. The destruction of property was awful. At half past ten they came in view of Jackson's old battle-field, three miles below the city. Earth-works were visible by the old lines on each shore. The fleet was drawn up in two lines as before, one to attend to each bank. Bailey, in the Cayuga, was far ahead, not having seen the signal to slacken speed and allow the slower vessels to come up. A raking fire was opened upon him for a mile from twenty guns—not the famous five-mile rifled cannon which the newspapers had placed there just twenty days before. He could reply with only two fore-castle guns. In twenty minutes the fleet got up. Each vessel, in passing, bore away, and gave the forts a broadside of shells, shrapnel, and grape, silencing them effectually. This affair cost the fleet one man, Midshipman John Anderson, of the Brooklyn, knocked overboard by the wind of a ball and drowned. For the rest, it was, in Farragut's words, "one of the little elegancies of the profession—a dash and a victory."

At noon the fleet rounded the bend, came into full view of the Crescent City, and cast anchor. Fires were blazing all along the shore; the stream was full of burning vessels; the levee was aswarm with an angry mob, who

<sup>1</sup> The following is the loss on each vessel belonging to the running fleet, as reported by the surgeon general:

BELL'S DIVISION.			BAILEY'S DIVISION.		
	Killed.	Wounded.		Killed.	Wounded.
Hartford.....	3	10	Mississippi.....	2	6
Brooklyn.....	9	26	Pensacola.....	4	33
Richmond.....	2	4	Cayuga.....	—	6
Sciota.....	—	2	Oneida.....	—	3
Iroquois.....	6	22	Varuna.....	3	9
Kennebec.....	—	—	Katahdin.....	—	—
Pinola.....	3	7	Kineo.....	1	8
Itasca.....	—	4	Wissahickon.....	—	—
Winona.....	3	5		10	65
	26	80			

Besides these, during the seven days' bombardment, 2 were killed (one by a fall from the mast-head) and 26 wounded. One more was killed afterward. The entire cost of the capture of New Orleans was 39 men killed and 171 wounded; one mortar boat and one gun-boat sunk.

<sup>2</sup> According to the accounts of a deserter, the casemate guns which threw hot shot from Fort Jackson erred on the other side. The officer in command, fearing to fire too high, depressed his guns below the horizontal line; wishing to work his guns vigorously, they were run out with a jerk; the consequence was that the balls rolled out into the moat, while the guns blazed harmlessly away with powder and wadding. The officers on the rampart told him that his shot were falling short. He tried to remedy the defect, and, fixing a correct aim on one particular vessel, blazed away at it. Only when the Federal fleet had got out of range did he discover that he had been devoting himself to one of the Confederate chain hulks.



amused themselves with hunting down a few persons who raised a faint cheer for the Union. A fierce rain-shower came down and melted away a part of the crowd. In the midst of it a boat put off from the Hartford, with no white flag of truce flying. The crew were rigged in the freshest man-of-war style, as though they were on a pleasure-trip. In the stern sat three officers—Morton in command of the boat, Bailey and Perkins charged to see the authorities, whoever they might be, and demand the surrender of the city. These two stepped ashore, amid cheers for Jeff. Davis and the South, and groans for Lincoln and his fleet. Some of the crowd, wiser than the rest, conducted the two messengers to the City Hall, the mob yelling around. "No violence," said a newspaper next morning, "was offered to the officers, though certain persons who were suspected of favoring their flag and cause were set upon with great fury and roughly handled;" but it added, "on arriving at the City Hall it required the intervention of several citizens to prevent violence being offered to the rash ambassadors of an execrated dynasty and government."


The story of the actual surrender of New Orleans reads like a farce, which might at any moment be turned into a tragedy; for the furious mob, and the city which sheltered it, lay at the mercy of the Union fleet.

The two officers entered the City Hall, and introduced themselves to his honor the mayor—a smug, pompous little gentleman, addicted to the use of flowery phrases. After formal salutations had been exchanged, Bailey announced that he had come to demand the surrender of the city and the hoisting of the Union flag on the public buildings. Mayor Monroe had no authority to surrender, and would not hoist the Union flag; General Lovell was the military commander; he should be sent for. Meanwhile conversation was kept up; courteous in form, but with an occasional sharp tang. The Union officers praised the valor of the Confederate forts and fleets, and regretted the destruction of so much property in the city. The mayor rejoined, tartly, that the property was their own; if they chose to destroy it, it was nobody's business. Bailey replied that, as things stood, it looked very much like biting off one's own nose to spite his face. Just then Lovell came in. After due hand-shakings, Bailey again announced his errand. Lovell could not think of surrendering the city. He had evacuated it with his troops; it was defenseless, and Farragut could shell it if he chose. He would retire and leave the city authorities to do as they thought proper. The mayor thereupon said that he would consult the City Council, and report the result next day.

Farragut was amused and puzzled; but, as his men were tired out, he concluded to wait till next day for the action of the city fathers, especially as there were several matters that could be attended to in the mean while. There were sundry rams, almost completed, meant to be the terror of the river; several forts; and, above all, a boom lying ready to swing across the river to prevent the descent of any fleet from above. It was a stupendous structure, three quarters of a mile long, composed of logs four feet in diameter and thirty feet long, lying three abreast, bound together with chains. There were ninety-six of these lengths. These were all rendered harmless.

An hour after daylight on Saturday a boat put off from the shore containing messengers from the mayor. The City Council would meet at ten, and the Federal commander should be apprized of the result of their deliberations. Farragut replied that it was not within the province of a naval officer to assume the duties of a military commander. He had come to reduce New Orleans to obedience to the laws of the United States. The city must be surrendered, all hostile flags must be hauled down, and that of the United States be hoisted on all public buildings by noon; there must be no more outrages upon loyal people; they should try to quell disturbances, restore order, and call upon the people of New Orleans to return to their usual avocations; the rights of person and property should be secure.

The city fathers met, and the mayor read to them the reply which he had prepared for Farragut. They approved it heartily. It was the most singular document ever offered to a conqueror by the authorities of a conquered town. The city had been evacuated by the troops, the administration of its government and the custody of its honor had been restored to the mayor, whose duty it became "to transmit the answer which the universal sentiments of his constituency, no less than the promptings of his own heart, dictated on that sad and solemn occasion. I am no military man," he continued; "it would be presumptuous in me to attempt to lead an army to the field, and I know still less how to surrender an undefended place. The city is yours by the power of brutal force. As to the hoisting of any other flag than the one of our own adoption, the man lives not in our midst whose hand and heart would not be palsied at the mere thought of such an act; nor could I find in my entire constituency so wretched and desperate a renegade as would dare to profane with his hand the sacred emblem of our aspirations." The mayor went on to compliment the commander upon the sentiments which he had manifested. "They sprung from a noble but deluded nature," were worthy of one "engaged in a better cause," and the mayor "knew how to appreciate the motives which inspired them." The Federal commander should remember that he had "a gallant people to administer; a people sensitive to all that can in the least affect its dignity and self-re-



THE LEVEE IN 1862.

spect. Do not allow them to be insulted by the interference of such as have rendered themselves odious and contemptible by their dastardly desertion of the mighty struggle in which we are engaged, nor of such as might remind them too painfully that they are the conquered and you the conquerors. Peace and order may be preserved without a resort to measures which could not fail to wound their sensibilities and fire up their passions." And more of the same sort, the purport of all being that the captors were modestly desired to withdraw the fleet which commanded the city, and leave the people to themselves, with full power to work their will upon any Union men in their midst. At all events, if they wanted the Federal flag raised, they must do it themselves. There was bravado, if not bravery, in this reply; but a man powerless to harm his opponent, who knows that he can be harmed only by being struck through the bodies of women and children, may safely venture upon bravado.

Next morning Farragut sent a small party ashore to hoist the Union flag on the Custom-house and Mint, with strict orders not to use their arms unless actually assailed. They were insulted, but not assaulted. The flags were left without a guard; but the guns of the Pensacola were trained upon the Mint, and the mob were warned that fire would be opened upon the building if any attempt was made to disturb the flag. At eleven o'clock the crews of all the ships were assembled on deck to "return thanks to Almighty God for his great goodness and mercy in permitting them to pass through the events of the last two days with so little loss of life and blood." An April shower seemed coming up, and the gunner of the Pensacola removed the wafers by which the guns are discharged. The report of a howitzer from the main-top turned all eyes toward the Mint. Four men were seen upon the roof; one cut the flag from the staff, and all dragged it off. Without orders, the strings to every gun of the Pensacola were pulled. No shot followed. The fortunate removal of the wafers alone prevented a full broadside from being poured into the city. The flag was carried into the street, paraded in a cart to the sound of fife and drum, trailed through the mire, and then torn into shreds, which were distributed among the screaming crowd.

Farragut hardly knew what to do. The insult had been committed; he could take ample vengeance, but only by opening fire, and punishing the innocent as well as the guilty. His kindly nature revolted at this. He took till next day to consider and to consult with Butler, who had come up the river, as yet without bringing any troops. The result was that Farragut wrote to the mayor, noticing the refusal to haul down the state flag, detailing the outrages which had been committed, and warning him that "the fire of this fleet might be drawn upon the city at any moment, and in such an event the levee would in all probability be cut by the shells, and an amount of distress ensue to the innocent population, which I have heretofore endeavored to assure you that I desired by all means to avoid. The election is therefore with you; but it becomes my duty to notify you to remove the women and children from the city within forty-eight hours, if I have rightly understood your determination."

The mayor returned an impudent reply. He could not conceive that the Federal flag had been hoisted by the orders of "Mr. Farragut;" the interference of any force while negotiations for surrender were pending was a flagrant violation of the courtesies, if not of the rights, recognized among belligerents. The city still contained a population of 140,000, and "Mr. Farragut" must be aware of the utter inanity of such a notification. "Our women and children," he continued, "can not escape from your shells, if it be your pleasure to murder them on a question of mere etiquette. You are not satisfied with the peaceable possession of an undefended city, opposing no resistance to your guns, because of its bearing its doom with something of manliness and dignity, and you wish to humble and disgrace us by the performance of an act against which our nature rebels. This satisfaction



you can not expect to obtain at our hands. We will stand your bombardment, unarmed and undefended as we are. The civilized world will consign to indelible infamy the heart that will conceive the deed, and the hand that will dare to execute it."

This insolent message gave Farragut an opportunity to extricate himself from the dilemma of submitting to an insult to his flag or of avenging it by punishing the innocent with the guilty. He simply replied that the mayor had made his letter so offensive that it would terminate all intercourse between them. General Butler was close at hand with his forces. When he arrived the charge of the city would be turned over to him. But, in the mean time, the flag of the Union was to be raised on the Custom-house, and the mayor must see that it was respected. Every ensign and symbol of government, whether state or Confederate, except that of the United States, must be hauled down. This was done. Captain Bell, with a few marines, marched into the city, hauled down the Confederate flag, hoisted that of the Union, locked the Custom-house, put the key in his pocket, and returned, leaving the flag unguarded. It was not again molested.

By this time it was known that Forts Jackson and St. Philip had been surrendered, the remainder of the Confederate fleet destroyed or given up, and the river-road to New Orleans open to the unarmed transports which were to bring up Butler's troops. The forts had been passed—not reduced, or even seriously injured. The great iron-clad ram Louisiana was unharmed. She had taken no part in the action, though on the day before her work had been assigned. It is said that her crew were all drunk. Three armed steamers had moreover escaped. If they were no match for the Union armed vessels, they might yet make havoc of the mortar schooners and transports. As soon as the passage was achieved, Porter sent a flag demanding the surrender of the forts. Higgins had no official information that New Orleans had been occupied, and could not then entertain a proposition for surrender. The next day, the 28th of April, Colonel Higgins had occasion to change his mind. Weitzel, whose old duck-shooting experience came into use, had guided expeditions through the bayous; they had got above both forts, cutting them off from communication with New Orleans. A mutiny had broken out in Fort Jackson; 250 men had come out and surrendered to the Union pickets. Porter again demanded a surrender. "You have defended the forts gallantly," he said, "and no more can be asked of you. I know you can hold out some time longer, but in the end you must yield. You can gain nothing by farther resistance. You shall have terms sufficiently honorable to relieve you from any feeling of humiliation. Officers shall retire on parole, with their side-arms; soldiers shall be paroled, laying down their arms; public property shall be given up; private property shall be respected." Higgins replied that he would give up the forts on these terms, but he had no authority over the navy, and was not responsible for what it should do. There had been a quarrel between the military and naval commanders. Each accused the other of failure of duty. Four Union boats steamed up with white flags flying, answered by white flags on the forts. Duncan and Higgins came on board the Harriet Lane, where the articles of capitulation were to be formally drawn up. While this was being done, word was brought to Porter that the Louisiana, all ablaze, was coming straight down upon them. "This is not creditable to the naval commander," said Porter. "We are not responsible for the acts of these naval officers," responded Higgins. "Is there much powder aboard, and are the guns loaded?" "I presume so; but we know nothing of naval matters here." The heated guns now began to go off, with every probability of throwing shot and shell amid friends and foes. Porter coolly remarked to the Confederate officers, "If you do not mind the explosion which is soon to come, we can stand it." No one moved from his seat, and the conference proceeded as calmly as though nothing had happened. The current sheered the burning vessel across the river, and when it was just abreast of Fort St. Philip it blew up, scattering the fragments in every direction, and killing one man in the fort. The noise was heard for miles. When the smoke cleared away not a vestige of the Louisiana was visible; she had gone down in the deep waters of the Mississippi. Had the explosion occurred, as Mitchell, the treacherous naval commander, intended it should, in the midst of the Federal fleet, every vessel would have been destroyed.

Duncan and Higgins acted with perfect good faith. Not the slightest change was made in the forts while the articles of capitulation were being drawn up. Every thing was surrendered as it stood when the white flag was raised. Officers and men were released on parole. They came out from the fort looking more like school-boys going home than men who had just been made prisoners. Not a few were of Northern birth, who had enlisted to man the forts in the full belief that they would never be called

upon to fight. New Orleans, it was thought, might be assailed from above; nobody dreamed that a fleet from below would seriously attempt to fight or pass the forts. Yet such is the marvelous power of discipline, that they stood to their work like men who were fighting for a cause dear to them, instead of one for which they had no sympathy. A part of them, indeed, took the first fair occasion to desert. Duncan appeared at New Orleans next day, and harangued the angry crowd on the levee. He declared, with tears in his eyes, that nothing but the mutiny of a part of his command could have induced him to surrender. But for that he could have held out for months.

Fort St. Philip was hardly scarred. Fort Jackson, to an unprofessional eye, had been severely handled. It had been plowed with shells, the citadel had been burnt, the magazine endangered, casemates crumbled and flooded, walls cracked, drawbridge broken down, causeways blown up, holes made by bombs every where visible. Naval officers, who knew that a shattered ship was defenseless, were justified in supposing that the fort was really reduced; that another day's bombardment would have finished it; that it could have stood but little more without coming down about its defenders' ears, and would need to be demolished and rebuilt if government ever intended to fortify the site again. Weitzel, who knew better the capabilities of a fort, told a very different story. The navy, he reported, passed the forts, but did not reduce them. St. Philip, with one or two exceptions, was without a scratch. To an unexperienced eye, Jackson seemed badly cut up; but to resist an assault, or even regular approaches, it was as strong as when the first shell was fired against it.

The forts having been surrendered, Porter turned his attention to Mitchell, who lay half a mile above with three steamers, one of which he had just scuttled. A shot fired over him from the Harriet Lane caused him to lower his flag. Twenty-one officers and 300 men surrendered at discretion. The men were dismissed on parole; the officers were retained as prisoners to answer for their perfidious conduct in continuing hostilities while they had a flag of truce flying.

The forts were surrendered on the 28th of April. Butler, hastening down to bring up troops some way, found the river-road open. The transports, among which was the Mississippi—not the war steamer of the same name—were soon under way, freighted with soldiers who had been wearily waiting at the Head of the Passes. At sunset on the 29th she reached the forts, now held by blue coats instead of gray. At midnight the general came on board, and the vessels passed up the river. The voyage occupied the whole of the last day of April. At noon on the 1st of May the Mississippi lay along the levee of New Orleans. A crowd had gathered, but not the angry mass which had been seen there for almost a week. They seemed to be disposed to make a joke of the circumstances. There was a popular song, set to a rollicking tune, telling how a mythical "Picayune Butler" had come to a mythical town. The coincidence of names struck the mob. "Picayune Butler" was asked to come ashore and show himself. The general grimly enjoyed the joke. He wished the tune of "Picayune Butler" played for the delectation of the mob. The band happened to be destitute of the score, and were obliged to give "Yankee Doodle" and the "Star Spangled Banner" instead.

But, apart from chaffing, there was work to be done. Butler determined to take military possession of the city at once. In four hours a company of the Thirty-first Massachusetts landed on the levee and quietly pressed the crowd back, making room for the remainder of the regiment and for the Fourth Wisconsin. Both regiments then formed, a file taking each side of the street, the general and his staff marching on foot. Strict orders had been given for the conduct of the troops. There was to be no plundering of public or private property. No officer or soldier should, upon any pretext, absent himself from his station without arms or alone. They were to march in silence, except that the bands were to play; no notice to be taken of offensive or insulting words. If a shot was fired from a house, they should halt, arrest the inmates, and destroy the house. If they were fired upon from the streets, the offender should, if possible, be arrested, but they should not fire into the crowd unless absolutely necessary for self-defense, and then not without orders. The troops moved steadily on, seemingly unconscious of the surging masses crowding the side-walks, hurrahing for Beauregard, Bull Run, and Shiloh, cursing Butler and the Yankees. They passed the St. Charles Hotel, now deserted; five days before it was the head-quarters of Lovell; to-morrow it was to be the head-quarters of Butler. They reached the unfinished, roofless Custom-house, which the government had been building, Beauregard being engineer, when the rebellion broke out. The Union flag floated, unguarded and unmolested, from its walls. The door


was locked, and the key was on board the Hartford. Entrance was forced and, half an hour before sunset on the 1st of May, the Union troops were making preparations in an upper story for their first meal in New Orleans. Strong guards were posted at all needful points. The rage of the mob had exhausted itself, the city relapsed into perfect quiet. Butler returned to the vessel, to add the last words to the proclamation which was formally to announce on the morrow that New Orleans was again under the flag of the Union.



PASSING UP THE BAYOU.



THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS.





## CHAPTER XV.

## BUTLER'S ADMINISTRATION AT NEW ORLEANS.

The Condition of New Orleans.—Character of its Population.—Butler at the St. Charles.—Interview with the Mayor.—Quelling the Mob.—Butler's Proclamation.—Soulé's Remonstrance.—Butler and the City Authorities.—Occupation of Baton Rouge.—Providing Food.—Charles Heidseck.—Feeding the Poor.—The City Authorities reproved.—The Women Order.—The General and the Mayor.—Deposition of the Municipal Government.—Regulating the Currency.—The Banks and their Issues.—Property sequestered by the Confederacy.—Cleaning the Streets.—The Quarantine.—Pardon of the Monroe Guard.—Execution of Mumford.—Execution of Plunderers.—Punishment of Outrages.—Mrs. Phillips.—The Oath of Allegiance or Neutrality required.—Protest of Consuls.—Modified Oath.—Butler and the Clergy.—Dr. Leacock.—Disarming the Population.—Consular Protest.—The Confiscation Act.—The Negro Question.—Colored Regiments.—Military Operations.—The Pass System.—Occupation of the Lafourche District.—Sequestration of Property.—Growth of Union Sentiment.—Butler's Plans.—Charges against him.—His Recall.—Butler and the Consuls.—His Farewell Address.

IN assuming the military government of New Orleans, General Butler undertook a difficult and delicate task. It will be the object of this chapter to show how he performed it. The people were heterogeneous. At the outbreak of the rebellion the resident population was 168,000; 155,000 were free and 13,000 slaves. Of the free population, 10,000 were colored; of the whites, 80,000 were born in the United States, 65,000 in foreign countries. Ireland sent 24,000, Germany 20,000, France 11,000, England 3000. Almost half of the free white population were born abroad; more than half out of the state. Of those of foreign birth, few became citizens by naturalization, as is shown by the small vote cast. In the presidential election of 1860 less than 11,000 votes were given; of these, Bell received one half, the remainder being almost equally divided between Douglass and Breckinridge; not a single vote was given to Lincoln. No city in the Union has so few citizens in proportion to its white population. The alien element was strong beyond its ratio of number. Two thirds of the business men were of foreign birth. They had come to New Orleans to make money. For the country which protected them they cared nothing. All that they cared for was the profits which they could gain by trading; so that these were safe, they cared not for king or emperor, for Union or Confederacy. Of citizens by birth, the majority belonged to the Creole race; that is, as the word is used in Louisiana, people born in the state, but of French or Spanish blood. They are fond of money, and yet not specially active in the pursuit of gain. In ordinary cases, they kept rather aloof from politics, preferring luxury to excitement. Under the impulse of passion or revenge they were ready for any desperate deed. Two or three assassinations, as many fights and "encounters" in street or bar-room, and as many more formal duels, were the average from day to day. Besides the resident population, there was a floating mass of renegadoes and desperadoes from all quarters of the globe, fiery Frenchmen, revengeful Spaniards, sneaking Cubans, and, worse than either, the refuse of all the gamblers, swindlers, and ruffians swarming down the Mississippi from every part of the Union. A desperado for whom Vicksburg or Natchez-under-the-Hill had become too hot, but who had no taste for roughing it in Texas, looked to New Orleans as a temporary refuge. This floating population, shifting from day to day, of which the census could take no account, numbered from 5000 to 10,000.

New Orleans was a purely commercial city. It owed its being to the fact that it stood on the first tolerably firm patch of land above the mouths of the Mississippi. The resident population were at first loth to imperil their interests by rushing into secession; but the controlling mass of aliens, who could lose nothing, and might hope to gain much by the overthrow of the Union, soon seduced or forced the indolent impetuous Creoles to their views. Secession became the fashion. No young man who cared to have a place in society dared to do other than volunteer for the Confederate army. The population of New Orleans was depleted by 30,000 of the flower of its youth. They were in every army of the Confederacy.

When New Orleans found itself powerless before the fleet of Farragut, its population numbered about 140,000. It was made up of the poor who could not leave, of the scoundrels who would not leave, and of people who cared not whether they staid or left, so that they could have either security or profit, going or staying. The scoundrels of the city, known by the Hindoo name of "Thugs," were those who thronged the streets, and with whom the Union commander had first to do.

The city of New Orleans had been built upon commerce. Most of its industrious population lived by trade. When the blockade from above and the blockade from below cut off all but the venturesome trade of blockade-running, great distress ensued. The demand for labor was almost extinct. There was barely thirty days' provisions in the city. The ordinary sources of supply were cut off. No more flour came from Mobile, no more cattle from Texas, no more marketing from up the Mississippi and the fertile Red River country. The rich could hardly obtain food, for the markets were empty and provision-stores mostly closed. Prices rose enormously; a barrel of flour cost sixty dollars. Fifty thousand people were in danger of immediate starvation. The hot season was also at hand, and the appearance of yellow fever might reasonably be anticipated. Its last appearance as an epidemic was in 1853, when, out of the 30,000 unacclimated population, 29,020 were attacked and 8101 died in three months, 5269 dying in the single month of August.<sup>1</sup> There was every thing in the sanitary condition of the city to render its appearance as an epidemic probable, and in that case the utter annihilation of the unacclimated Northern army was almost inevitable. "You'll never see home again!" "Yellow Jack will have you before long!" yelled the mob, as the advance of Butler's force marched into the city.

The whole actual force of the army now under the command of Butler was about 14,000 men. Ship Island, Forts Jackson and St. Philip, Baton Rouge, and many posts on the lagoons, must be occupied and garrisoned. To hold New Orleans, with its hostile population of more than 100,000, he had at the outset barely 7000 men. Should the yellow fever appear, he would in a month have not one. The enemy had a considerable force in the neighborhood, which might at any moment attempt to dislodge him. Farragut's fleet, indeed, commanded the city, but it could act only by destroying it. If the Confederates chose to make a Moscow of New Orleans, the army of occupation might be annihilated. Butler was not merely to hold the city, but to govern it. He could not deal with it as Davoust dealt with Hamburg, or as the British dealt with Delhi. It was to be treated as if it were in fact as well as in theory a city of the United States, with no severity or rigor which was not absolutely necessary to maintain the authority of the Union.<sup>2</sup>

Butler decided to make the St. Charles Hotel his temporary head-quarters. It was closed; but an entrance was effected, and a son of one of the proprietors discovered. He could not give up the hotel to General Butler; should he do so, he would be shot before he could reach the next corner; waiters, cooks, and porters would not serve, cook, or carry for him; besides, there were no provisions in the market. These difficulties were quietly set aside. Butler would take the hotel; the general and his attendants could, if need were, wait upon and cook for themselves; for food, they had become accustomed to army rations, and could live very well upon them. His head-quarters established, Butler sent to the mayor, informing him that he would be happy to meet him and the Common Council at two o'clock. The mayor, emboldened by the moderation displayed by Farragut, replied impudently that his place of business was in the City Hall, where he could be seen during office hours. He was courteously informed that such a reply would not be likely to satisfy the commanding general. Monroe finally concluded to accept the invitation to the St. Charles. At the appointed hour he made his appearance, accompanied by several friends, among whom, as counsel and mouthpiece, was Pierre Soulé, a shrewd lawyer, fluent speaker, and unscrupulous politician, of French birth, and a great favorite among the Creoles. Nine years before he had been appointed by Pierce, the most unprincipled, and, after Buchanan, the feeblest of our presidents, minister to Spain. He was a member of the noted Ostend Conference.

A cannon had been placed at each corner of the hotel, around which was drawn up a regiment, commanded by General Williams. The open space around was filled by a dense mob, who gathered courage from the quiet demeanor of the troops, and filled the air with hootings and execrations. Williams sent an aid to inform Butler that he feared he could not control the mob. "Then let him open upon them with artillery," replied Butler. "Don't do that!" shouted the mayor. "The mob must be controlled," replied Butler; "we can't have a disturbance in the streets." "Shall I go out and speak to the people?" asked Monroe. "As you please," answered Butler; "but order must be preserved in the public streets." The speeches of the mayor and his friends quieted the mob for a time; but their rage broke out anew at the sight of a half company of soldiers escorting the loyal Judge Summers, once Recorder of New Orleans, to a place of safety in the Custom-house. The orders given to Lieutenant Kinsman, who commanded the squad of fifty men, were brief and emphatic: "If any one molests or threatens you, arrest him. If a rescue is attempted, fire." The squad, drawn up in two lines, with a space between in which were the lieutenant and the judge, worked its way through the surging mob. Those nearest the soldiers kept quiet; those behind them, sheltered by the quiet ones, yelled and hooted. Half the way from the St. Charles to the Custom-house was accomplished without a collision. Then one of the noisiest of the crowd happened to be within reach. "Halt!" ordered the lieutenant; "bring out that man." In an instant he was dragged between the lines, still screaming and shouting. "Stop your noise," was the sharp order. "I won't," was the reply. "Sergeant, lower your bayonet. If another sound comes from that man's mouth, run him through." The man was as mute as a corpse. Once more on the way a similar scene was performed, with the same result. Their work accomplished, the squad marched back through a crowd as silent as a funeral. Nobody had been hurt; but the mob of New Orleans was cowed by the mere display of the force of the law embodied in one lieutenant and fifty men.

The afternoon had worn away, and the conference between the general and the mayor was adjourned, to be resumed in the evening. Butler opened it by reading his proclamation, printed copies of which were given to the other side. The printing of this proclamation had cost a little trouble. The printer, who was desired to print it, could not think of doing so, nor should it be done in his office with his consent. In two hours a file of soldiers were drawn up before the building. Half a dozen of them entered the office, laid down their muskets, and stepped quietly to the cases. The quick click of type was heard. In two hours more the proclamation was in type, proofs read, corrected, revised, and copies enough for present use worked off. Its purport was that the city of New Orleans was occupied by the forces of the United States, who had come to restore order under the laws and the Constitution. For the present—for the third time in its history—the city would be governed by martial law. No ensigns or flags except those of the United States and of foreign consulates could appear. All citizens who should renew their oath of allegiance to the United States would be fully protected. All who maintained their allegiance to the Confederate states would be considered rebels and enemies. Those who had been in the serv-

<sup>1</sup> See Alexander Walker, editor of New Orleans Delta, in Harper's Magazine for November, 1853; and J. Snowden Pigott, M.D., *ibid.*, June, 1857.

<sup>2</sup> Parton's "General Butler in New Orleans" furnishes full details of the administration of Butler in New Orleans.



ice of the Confederate States, who should give up their arms and return to peaceful avocations, would not be unnecessarily molested. Foreigners not naturalized would still enjoy the protection of the laws of the United States. The killing of any soldier would be considered as assassination; the owner of any house in which such act should be committed would be held responsible, and the house would be liable to be destroyed by military authority. All disorders, disturbances of the peace, and crimes of an aggravated character interfering with the forces or laws of the United States, would be tried and punished by a military court; other misdemeanors would be subject to the municipal authorities, if they desired to act; civil cases would be tried by the ordinary tribunals. The circulation of Confederate bonds and scrip was prohibited; but, as Confederate current notes were the only money in the hands of the poorer classes, they might circulate, if any one would take them. If a soldier of the United States should commit any outrage upon person or property, he would be promptly punished, and full redress be made. Martial law would be enforced, mildly if possible, rigorously if necessary, so long as the authorities of the United States deemed proper. In brief, Butler wished to govern only the military forces, and sustain the government of the United States against its enemies, leaving the authorities of the city in full exercise of their ordinary municipal and civil functions.

Soulé, still spokesman for the mayor, objected to the proclamation. It would give great offense, and the people would never submit to it. They were not conquered, and could not be expected to behave as a conquered people. The presence of the troops would irritate a high-spirited and sensitive people. The troops could have no peace while they remained. "Withdraw them," he said, "and leave the city government to manage its own affairs. If they remain, there will certainly be trouble." Butler flamed up at this. "I did not expect," he said, "to hear a threat from Mr. Soulé on this occasion. New Orleans is a conquered city. If not, why are we here? Have you welcomed us? Are we here by your consent? Would you not expel us if you could? New Orleans has been conquered by the forces of the United States, and by the laws of nations lies subject to the will of the conquerors. I have proposed to leave to the municipal government the free exercise of all its powers, and I am answered by a threat."

Soulé disclaimed any intention of threatening the troops, but had merely stated what he thought would be the consequence of their remaining. Butler replied that he would gladly take every one of his soldiers from the city, as soon as it could be shown that the city government had rendered it possible for him to ride alone, without insult or danger, from one end of the city to another. But the events of the afternoon had proved that the city authorities were unable to control the mob. Lovell himself had been forced to proclaim martial law to protect peaceable citizens against the rowdies. "I know," he concluded, "more about your city than you think. I know that this hour there is an organization established for the purpose of assassinating my men by detail. But I warn you that, if a shot is fired from any house, that house will never again cover a mortal's head; and if I can discover the perpetrator of the deed, the place that now knows him shall know him no more forever. I have the power to suppress this unruly element in your midst, and I mean so to use it that, in a very short period, I shall be able to ride through the entire city free from insult and danger, or else this metropolis of the South shall be a desert from the plains of Chalmette to the outskirts of Carrollton."<sup>1</sup>

The discussion was continued, but Butler was immovable. The mayor declared that the functions of the city government should be at once suspended, and the general could act his pleasure. This was objected to by others, and it was finally agreed that the City Council should deliberate upon the matter, and announce their decision the next day. They decided that the city government should continue to exercise its usual functions, but requested that the troops should be withdrawn from the vicinity of the Court-house, so that there might be no appearance that the authorities were acting under military compulsion. The request was more than complied with. The camps within the city were one by one broken up. Some of the troops established a permanent camp at Carrollton, on the outskirts; others were posted across the river at Algiers; others garrisoned the abandoned forts on the lagoons. A full brigade was sent to occupy Baton Rouge, of which possession had been taken by Commander Palmer, of the Iroquois, belonging to Farragut's fleet.<sup>2</sup> When all these dispositions had been made there remained in New Orleans itself only 250 men, who were posted in the Custom-house, and served merely as a provost guard. Butler had resolved to try a conciliatory policy, confining himself solely to his strictly military functions, leaving the internal government of the city to the municipal authorities, aided, if necessary, by the European brigade, who had been requested to continue their organization. How ill this mild policy succeeded will soon appear; but under it the city for a few days enjoyed a tranquillity to which it had long been a stranger.

<sup>1</sup> Parton's "Butler in New Orleans," p. 296.

<sup>2</sup> The proceedings at Baton Rouge were, on a small scale, similar to those at New Orleans. The body of the fleet had passed up the river without stopping. On the 8th of May the Iroquois anchored off the town, and the commander sent a note to the mayor demanding that the town should be surrendered; the flag of the United States be hoisted on the Arsenal; the property of the Confederate states to remain intact, and be delivered over when demanded; the rights and property of citizens to be respected. The mayor and selectmen replied that the city of Baton Rouge would not be surrendered voluntarily to any power on earth; but it was without military force, and had no means of defense. Its occupation would be without the consent and against the wish of the peaceable inhabitants. The city had no control over the Arsenal, except for the purpose of preserving the buildings since its evacuation, and it could not be expected to surrender it, or exercise any act which would be offensive to the sensibilities of the people, by hoisting the flag of the United States. Palmer did not wait to bandy messages, but sent a few men ashore, took possession of the Arsenal and barracks, and hoisted the Union flag without opposition. He then sent a note to the mayor telling him what he had done, and warning him that, although he had left no force on shore to protect it, the flag must not be molested; adding, significantly, "The rash act of some individual may cause your city to pay a bitter penalty."

This quiet interval gave Butler an opportunity to provide against the famine and pestilence with which New Orleans was threatened. The question of food was the most pressing. There was at Mobile a quantity of flour purchased by the city for the subsistence of its citizens; a safe-conduct was to be given to steam-boats to come and return, conveying this flour. The Opelousas Railroad was authorized and required to run trains to bring provisions into the city. At the junction of the Mississippi and Red Rivers were large quantities of cattle, flour, and other provisions purchased for the subsistence of the city; a safe-conduct was granted to two steamers each day to bring these to New Orleans. The city authorities were to appoint an agent to superintend these transportations, the faith of the city being pledged that no aid or intelligence should be conveyed to the Confederates.<sup>1</sup> The orders which gave these privileges were drawn up on the suggestion of the city authorities. The faith of the city, solemnly pledged, was throughout deliberately and persistently abused. Under cover of it provisions were sent to Lovell's troops, and most important information was regularly furnished to the Confederate authorities. A small but scandalous case was that of Charles Heidseck. He was a Frenchman, a member of the firm whose Champagne bottles are known all over the world. He had come to America to look after the business of his house, and had for some time been a resident of Mobile. When the order appeared authorizing boats to convey flour from Mobile to New Orleans, he went on board as bar-tender. In this capacity he made several trips, conveying letters and information. He was finally detected, arrested, and sent to Fort Jackson. "I arrested him as a spy," wrote Butler; "I confined him as a spy; I should have tried him as a spy; and would have hanged him, upon conviction, as a spy, if I had not been interfered with by the government at Washington." After some months of confinement the Champagne dealer was released, and suffered to return unhung to France.

Food began to come in from all these sources. Butler contributed a thousand dollars to feed the poor. Much beef and sugar intended for the rebels in the field had been captured. A thousand barrels of this were distributed without charge. Supplies came from New York exceeding the wants of the army. The commissary was authorized to sell the surplus to families at cheap rates: flour, seven and a half cents a pound; salt meats, ten; "city bank-notes, gold, silver, or United States treasury notes to be taken in payment." All this brought down the market price of provisions. Flour fell in a few days from sixty to twenty-four dollars. Those who had or could get money other than Confederate paper need not starve. But more than a third of the population had no money or means of earning it. To find work for these, and the means of paying the laborers, came up in a short time.

The city was reeking with the filth accumulated for weeks, forming a train for the yellow fever whenever a chance spark from the tropics should be at hand to fire it. The authorities had undertaken to clean the streets. They neglected to do so. Butler, on the 9th of May, sharply reminded them of their neglect. "You have assumed this work," he said, "and it must be performed. The present suspension of labor furnishes ample supplies of hungry men who can be profitably employed to this end. Three days since I called the attention of the mayor to this subject, and nothing has been done." The mayor averred that he had set 300 men at work upon the streets; but not a man of them could be discovered. Butler put forth a general order inveighing sharply against the conduct of the city authorities, and of the wealthy leaders of the rebellion, who had gotten up the war, and were endeavoring to prosecute it, without regard to the starving poor. "They have betrayed their country; they have been false to every trust; they can not protect those whom they have ruined, but have left them to the mercies of a chronic mob; they will not feed those whom they are starving. The United States have sent forces here to fight and subdue rebellious armies in array against their authority. We find substantially only fugitive masses, runaway property-burners, a whisky-drinking mob, and starving citizens with their wives and children. It is our duty to call back the first, punish the second, root out the third, feed and protect the last."

The male mob of New Orleans had been cowed by the mere fear of artillery and bayonets; but there was a female mob, composed mainly of the wives and daughters of the upper classes, who could not thus be reached. Protected by the immunities of their sex, they embraced every opportunity of insulting the Union troops. They flaunted secession colors upon their dresses, they sung secession songs, and thrummed secession tunes upon their pianos. If a body of soldiers passed the balconies where they were standing, they would turn their backs contemptuously. If they met a Union officer on the pave, they would sweep aside their dresses as if to avoid defilement, and turn into the middle of the street with insulting words and gestures. If a Union officer entered a street car or a church pew, these women would leave in a body. These annoyances, petty in themselves, grew to be unendurable. The climax was reached when a woman deliberately spat in the faces of two officers who were quietly walking in the street. Butler resolved to put a stop to these insults, and to do it not by the exercise of military power, but simply by carrying into effect an old and well-known municipal law of the city. By this a prostitute plying her vocation in the street was liable to be arrested, confined over night in the calaboose, brought in the morning before a magistrate, and fined five dollars. What constituted plying this vocation in public? Simply that a woman openly and obtrusively endeavored to attract the attention of strange men. For this purpose opprobrious epithets and insulting gestures are used as often as smiles and blandishments. Thereupon, on the 15th of May, was issued the famous General Order No. 28. The result in New Orleans itself was precisely what

<sup>1</sup> General Orders, May 4, 1862.



was intended. Women who had grossly insulted soldiers and officers, knowing that their sex shielded them from personal resentment, and who would have courted military arrest and formal trial as a kind of martyrdom, shrank back from the prospect of the calaboose and the police court. Not a single arrest was made under the order. There was no occasion for one. The threat of the calaboose and the police court did for the women what the mere threat of cannon-shot and bayonet-thrust had done for the men.<sup>1</sup>

In New Orleans the import of the order was thoroughly understood. Beyond the city, where the municipal law upon which it was based was unknown, it was misunderstood and misrepresented. It was interpreted to give up the women of New Orleans to violence and outrage. Rewards were offered at the South for the assassination of Butler. In the British Parliament, Lord Palmerston denounced it as "infamous." Punch, the representative of British sentiment, compared Butler with Nena Sahib. The Secretary of State admitted to the English chargé that he "regretted that, in the haste of composition, a phraseology which could be mistaken or perverted had been used." This admission was correct in substance. Ten words explaining that each offending female was, "in strict accordance with the municipal law of New Orleans," to be regarded "as a woman of the town plying her avocation," would have obviated all chance of misconstruction or misrepresentation.

This order was the occasion, not the cause, of the deposition of the municipal government. Two weeks' trial had demonstrated that the government of New Orleans could not be administered conjointly by two authorities so utterly hostile in aim as the Union general and the Confederate mayor and council. The city authorities not only neglected to perform the duties which they had undertaken, but they undertook to perform offensive acts beyond their sphere. A French armed vessel, supposed to be the precursor of a large fleet, was in the river. The Common Council offered the hospitalities of the port to this fleet, the offer being couched in terms offensive to the Union. Butler rebuked them sharply. Your action, he said, is an insult both to the United States and to France. The tender of hospitalities by a government to which only police duties and sanitary regulations are intrusted, is simply an invitation to the calaboose and the hospital. The United States authorities are the only ones here capable of dealing with foreign nations. "The action of the city council in this behalf must be revised." This was on the day when Order No. 28 was published. When that order appeared, the mayor sent to Butler a letter written by his clerk, and signed by himself, protesting against the order. He could not suffer it to be promulgated without protest. Union officers and soldiers were by it allowed to place what construction they pleased upon the conduct of the women of New Orleans. He would not be responsible for the peace of the city while this order, which had "aroused the passions of the people, and must exasperate them to a degree beyond control," and was "a reproach to the civilization, not to say the Christianity of the age," was in force. Butler at once issued an order suspending the mayor, and ordering his commitment to Fort Jackson. Before the order was executed, an interview was granted. Butler said the letter was insulting. The mayor protested that he had not meant to insult the general; he only wished to vindicate the virtuous ladies of New Orleans. The general expounded the order, showing that it could refer only to those whose conduct evinced that they were not virtuous. The mayor averred that he was perfectly satisfied, and asked to withdraw his offensive letter. Butler wrote an indorsement, which Monroe signed, and was relieved from arrest.<sup>2</sup> In a few hours the mayor sent a note asking to withdraw his withdrawal. This was on Saturday. The mayor reiterated his request on Sunday, but was told that this was not a business day; on Monday his affair would receive attention. He came on Monday, accompanied by a half score of friends and advisers. Butler, meanwhile, had received information which determined him to make short work. Each of the mayor's friends was asked whether he sanctioned the offensive letter. The mayor and three others who avowedly sanctioned it were sent to Fort Jackson; the others were discharged. Pierre Soulé, the mouthpiece of secession in the city, was also arrested, and sent to Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor. In a few weeks, however, he was released at the request of Butler, upon his parole not to return to New Orleans, nor to commit or advise any act hostile to the United States.

The city government was suppressed, and the work of governing New Orleans was intrusted to General Shepley. On the 20th of May he issued a notice saying that, "in the absence of the late mayor," he should "for the present, and until such time as the citizens of New Orleans shall elect a loyal citizen of the United States as mayor of the city, discharge the functions which have hitherto appertained to that office." Ample protection was assured to all peaceable citizens; any outrage committed by or upon soldiers would be punished; all city ordinances not inconsistent with the laws of the United States or with the general orders of the commanding general would be continued in force; all legal contracts made by or with the city authorities would be held inviolate. Captain Jonas H. French was appointed provost marshal, with the general functions of chief of police, and Major Joseph M. Bell provost judge, to try all charges of violation of municipal or national laws.

Four things claimed the immediate attention of the new government: to



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supply food for the population: to furnish labor, so that the poor could procure food; to provide a safe currency; and to guard against the yellow fever.

Provisions soon began to appear in sufficient quantities to preclude the absolute necessity of famine. Dealers were at first disposed to close their stores, and it was necessary, for a few days, to order them to be kept open under penalty of a fine. The only currency in actual circulation consisted of "shimplasters," car and omnibus tickets, and Confederate notes, the latter depreciated seventy per cent. in value. The banks had sent off their specie, but it was supposed that it could be recovered, and in that case they would be perfectly solvent. The banks were anxious to regain their funds. They asked Butler to give protection to the specie, if it could be recovered and brought back, promising to hold it in good faith to protect their bill-holders and depositors. Butler agreed to this, with the proviso that banks as well as individuals should restore all the property belonging to the United States which had come into their hands. "I have come," he said, "to retake, repossess, and occupy all and singular the property of the United States, of whatever name and nature. Farther than that I shall not go, save upon the most urgent military necessity, under which right every citizen holds all his possessions. Therefore, as safe-conducts may be needed for agents of banks to go and return with the property, these will be granted for a limited but reasonable period of time."<sup>3</sup> No safe-conducts were required for this purpose. Meininger, the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury, wrote that "the coin of the banks of New Orleans was seized by the government to prevent its falling into the hands of the public enemy. It has been deposited in a place of security under the charge of the government; and it is not intended to interfere with the rights of property in the banks farther than to insure its safe custody. They may proceed to conduct their business in the Confederate States upon this deposit just as though it were in their own vaults."<sup>4</sup>

To produce any thing like a redeemable currency the Confederate notes must be driven out. These had been allowed to circulate provisionally. A general order was issued<sup>5</sup> directing that neither the city nor any bank should exchange its obligations for Confederate notes, nor put out any obligation payable in such notes; and that after the expiration of ten days<sup>6</sup> all circulation of and trade in such notes should cease; that all sales thereafter made in consideration of such notes should be void, and any property thus sold would be confiscated, a quarter of the proceeds to go to the informer. Banks and bankers at once issued notices requiring all persons having deposits with them of Confederate notes to withdraw them at once, those not withdrawn "to be at the risk of the owners;" that is, the banks, who had grown rich upon the traffic in these bills, now that they were worthless wished to throw the whole loss on the community. They had received them as money when they were supposed to be valuable, and wished to pay them out when they were mere waste paper. Butler promptly interposed. He ordered that no incorporated bank or private banker should pay out any thing but specie, United States treasury notes, or the current bills of city banks.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> May 11.

<sup>2</sup> July 6.

<sup>3</sup> May 16.

<sup>4</sup> That is, on the 27th of May.

<sup>5</sup> "GENERAL ORDER NO. 28.—As the officers and soldiers of the United States have been subject to repeated insults from the women (calling themselves ladies) of New Orleans, in return for the most scrupulous non-interference and courtesy on our part, it is ordered that hereafter, when any female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation."

<sup>6</sup> The indorsement was in these words: "General Butler,—This communication having been sent under a mistake of fact, and being improper in language, I desire to apologize for the same, and to withdraw it."

<sup>7</sup> GENERAL ORDER NO. 30, May 19, 1862.—"The following are abbreviated extracts from this order. The banks suspended specie payments, and then introduced Confederate notes as currency, buying them at a discount, receiving them on deposit, paying them out, and collecting notes and





REPAIRING THE LEVEE AT NEW ORLEANS.

The Bank of Louisiana alone protested against this order, and endeavored to avoid compliance; but Butler had might as well as right on his side. He was inflexible, and the bank, "having no alternative but compliance," yielded with the best grace in its power. Confederate notes and shipplasters disappeared, and were replaced by the currency of the United States, and by small notes issued by the city government.

Soon after<sup>1</sup> an order appeared with which the banks had to do. Any person who had in his possession or under his control any property belonging to the "so-called Confederate States," was required, under penalty of imprisonment and confiscation of property, to give information concerning it. This order signified, among other things, that money deposited in any bank to the credit of the Confederacy had become the property of the Union, and must be surrendered. The Citizens' Bank reported that the Treasurer of the Confederate States had upon its books a credit of \$219,000. It proposed to pay over this sum in Confederate notes. Moreover, there were on deposit in the bank to the credit of various Confederate receivers \$215,000; this, the bank thought, was to be considered a special deposit, which should be paid in the same currency in which it was received. Butler would not accede to this view of the case, and ordered that the latter sum should be paid at once in gold, silver, or United States currency. For various reasons, he would refer the former sum to the government for adjudication; but the bank must, in the mean time, hold the notes as a special deposit, and also keep a like amount of bullion to await the decision.<sup>2</sup> Nearly a quarter of a

million of dollars was thus recovered from the banks, and paid over to the treasury of the United States. "This," said Butler, "will make a fund upon which those whose property has been confiscated may have claim."

million of dollars was thus recovered from the banks, and paid over to the treasury of the United States. "This," said Butler, "will make a fund upon which those whose property has been confiscated may have claim."

Soon<sup>1</sup> came another order which concerned individuals as well as corporations. It ordered that all sums due to any citizen of the United States which had been in any way sequestered by the ordinances of the Confederate States,<sup>2</sup> or by those of Louisiana, were to be paid over to the lawful owners. Not a few debts due to American citizens were thus recovered. Among those affected by this order was John G. Cocks, a judge at New Orleans. In 1860 he had bought a score and a half of slaves from Major Anderson, for which he had given his notes. A month after the fall of Fort Sumter, Cocks put forth in a New Orleans paper an insulting letter, addressed to "Major Robert Anderson, late of Fort Sumter," in which he said that these notes would never be paid. Butler took possession of the large estates of Cocks, who had fled from New Orleans, holding them as security for the liquidation of Anderson's claim.

In a few weeks provisions had poured into New Orleans in sufficient quantities to obviate a famine; but the laboring classes were without means to purchase, and the filthy condition of the streets invited pestilence. The poor must be fed, and the streets must be cleaned. It appeared to Butler that these two objects might be combined. He accordingly proposed<sup>3</sup> to the military commandant and city council that the city should employ 2000 men, to each of whom should be paid fifty cents a day by the city, the United States also issuing to each laborer a full soldier's ration, worth quite as much, and sufficient for the subsistence of a man and a woman. This suggestion was accepted; the force was placed under the charge of Colonel T. B. Thorpe, a native of New York, who had for many years resided in Louisiana. The work thus undertaken was well done. The accumulated filth of months was purged away, and the city placed in a better sanitary condition than it had known for years. Moreover, the changes of the river constantly create new lands within the city limits. This new land, known as

recognizing Confederate notes, can only leave them with the bank, to be held by it hereafter in special deposit as so much worthless paper."

How far these considerations applied to the case of the sums deposited by the Confederate treasurer was left to the decision of the government; but the bank was required to give security for payment in case the decision should be against it. But the decision of Butler in case of the deposits made by Confederate receivers was clear and definite. He said:

"The several deposits of the officers of the supposed Confederate States were received in the usual course of business; were doubtless, some of them, perhaps largely, received in Confederate notes, but, for the reason above stated, can only be paid to the United States in its own constitutional currency. These are, in no sense of language, 'special deposits.' They were held in general account, went into the funds of the bank, were paid out in the discounts of the bank, and, if called upon to-day for the identical notes put into the bank, which is the only idea of a special deposit, the bank would be utterly unable to produce them. As well might my private banker, with whom I have deposited my neighbor's check or draft as money, which has been received as money, and paid out as money, months afterward, when my neighbor has become bankrupt, buy up other of his checks and drafts at a discount, and pay them to me, upon the ground that I had made a 'special deposit.'"

<sup>1</sup> July 9.<sup>2</sup> For which, see *ante*, p. 212.<sup>3</sup> June 4.<sup>1</sup> General Order No. 40; June 6.

<sup>2</sup> Extracts from Butler's Reply to the Bank, Jan. 13, 1862.—"The report finds that there is to the credit of the Confederate States \$219,090 94. This is, of course, due in *present* from the bank. The bank claims that it holds an equal amount of Confederate treasury notes, and desires to set off these notes against the amount so due. This can not be permitted. Confederate treasury notes are not due till six months after the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States. When that time comes it will be in season to set off such claims. The United States being entitled to the credits due the Confederate States in the bank, that amount must be paid in money or valuable property. I can not recognize the Confederate notes as either money or property. The bank having done so by receiving them, issuing their banking upon them, loaning upon them, thus giving them credit to the injury of the United States, is estopped to deny their value. But there are other considerations which may apply to this item: only the notes of the Confederate States were deposited by the treasurer in the bank, and by the order of the ruling authority then here the bank was obliged to receive them. In equity and good conscience the Confederate States could call for nothing more than they had compelled the bank to take. The United States succeeded to the rights of the Confederate States, and should only take that which the Confederate States ought to take. But the United States, not taking or



batture or "shoal," is at first a mere mud-bank, and requires to be protected from the water before it is available as property. By well-directed labor, batture worth a million of dollars was in a few months added to the city property.

The cleansing of the streets and canals was not alone an adequate safeguard against the yellow fever. Butler had adopted the theory that this pestilence is indigenous in no region where there is frost every winter. Wherever there is great summer heat acting upon decaying vegetable and animal matter, the fever may spread. This forms the train ready for explosion, but it must be fired from abroad. New Orleans furnishes every condition for the spread of the disease when once introduced.<sup>1</sup> To prevent the introduction of this spark, a vigorous and judicious quarantine was established. The duration of this was in each case left to the discretion of the health-officer. His instructions were to detain a vessel as long as he thought necessary to protect the city, whether the time were one day or a hundred. A vessel loaded with hides and wool, its hold reeking with dead and putrid matter, was not placed on an equality with a steamer carrying only passengers and merchandise not likely to absorb and generate contagion. The rule was simply that any vessel should be kept in quarantine just so long as the health-officer deemed necessary to secure the city from infection. For a few days there was an alarm. One man, who had come on a steamer which had touched at Nassau, was seized by the disease. The house was cleared of all persons except an acclimated attendant, and the whole block guarded by sentinels. The man died; every article in his room was burned or buried; his attendant was quarantined; the whole quarter of the city was cleaned and fumigated. This was the sole case of yellow fever in New Orleans during the summer of 1862.

Food sufficient to obviate the absolute peril of famine had been brought to New Orleans. Labor sufficient to feed 4000 persons was furnished; but there were ten times as many whose ordinary means of livelihood had been cut off. These must be cared for; and in a few weeks there were 35,000 persons, nearly a quarter of the population, fed from the public funds. Butler considered that this great burden ought to be made to fall, as far as possible, upon those who had been most active in bringing starvation upon the poor and helpless. A loan of a million and a quarter of dollars had been made by various corporations and individuals, and placed in the hands of a "Committee of Public Safety" for the defense of New Orleans. The subscriptions were in sums varying from a few thousand to more than two hundred thousand dollars. The subscribers to this loan showed that they had means to pay largely for the support of their starving neighbors. Butler<sup>2</sup> ordered a sum equal to one quarter of their subscriptions to be paid by each of these persons. This produced more than \$300,000. Moreover, about a hundred cotton-brokers, the leading commercial men in New Orleans, had published a circular urging planters not to bring their produce to the city. Butler, by the same order, assessed a fine of from \$100 to \$500 upon each of these. Under this order nearly \$350,000 was received, which was set apart as "a fund for the purpose of providing employment and food for the deserving poor." From this fund a thousand men were to be paid to work on the streets and canals. Each was to receive a dollar and a half a day, the wages which had been paid for labor on the fortifications; the rations heretofore issued by the United States to these laborers being discontinued. This fund was exhausted early in December, and one of the last acts of Butler<sup>3</sup> was to impose another assessment of a like amount upon the same parties.

Meanwhile William B. Mumford, the man who had hauled down the flag from the Mint, had remained in New Orleans. He appeared in public, boasting of his deed, and defying the authorities to molest him. He was apprehended, brought before a military commission, tried, and condemned to death. While this was going on, it was discovered that a number of men had organized themselves into a military company, under the name of the "Monroe Guard," with the purpose of breaking through the lines and joining the Confederate army. Among these were six soldiers who had been paroled at Fort Jackson. These were arrested and condemned to death, under the recognized laws of war. Strenuous efforts were made to procure their pardon. In these many of the Union men of the city joined. It was represented that they were ignorant men, who were totally unaware of the nature of their act. One of them, when brought before the commission, declared that he did not know any thing about paroling. "Paroling," he said, simply, "is for officers and gentlemen; we are not gentlemen." Butler yielded to the urgent petitions for mercy. To one of these he replied: "You, who have exerted your talents to save the lives of Union men in their hour of peril, ought to have a determining weight when your opinions have been deliberately formed. You ask for the lives of these men. You shall have them. You say that the clemency of the government is best for the cause we all have at heart. Be it so. You are likely to be better informed upon this than I am. But if this example of mercy is lost upon those in the same situation, swift justice can overtake others in like manner offending." The men were reprieved and sent to Ship Island. But the reprieve of these six rendered it impossible to spare Mumford. To pardon him would be judged by the mob as a confession of weakness. Butler firmly resisted all entreaties. One venerable man, one of the noblest in

the city, begged for mercy. "Give me this man's life," he prayed; "it is but a scratch of your pen." "True," replied Butler; "but a scratch of my pen could burn New Orleans. I could do the one act as soon as the other. I think one would be as wrong as the other." Mumford was hung on the 7th of July: a tall, black-bearded man, aged forty-two, rather prepossessing in appearance, a gambler by profession. He met his fate with composure. He said that the act for which he was condemned was committed under excitement, and he did not think that he was suffering justly. The Confederates endeavored to elevate Mumford to the rank of a martyr. His execution formed a leading part of the charge in virtue of which Jefferson Davis<sup>1</sup> declared Butler to be an outlaw, who was to be hung at once in case he was captured. The execution was justified by every law of war, and demanded by the exigencies of the times. It effectually subdued the mob, which otherwise would need to have been quelled by cannon and the bayonet.

No other military execution took place at New Orleans, except those of a gang of scoundrels who committed robbery and theft under the pretense of being Union officers. Early in June there were complaints that men wearing the Federal uniform, claiming authority to search for concealed arms, had repeatedly entered houses, and had gone off carrying with them valuable property. A flagrant case of this kind occurred on the 11th. The next day one of the perpetrators was detected. He betrayed his accomplices, two of whom were arrested on the 12th, and three more on the 13th. All were tried, convicted, and ordered to be executed on the 16th. They were William M. Clary, George William Cragg, late officers on board Union vessels; Frank Newton, a private in a Connecticut regiment; and Stanislaus Roy and Theodore Leib, residents of New Orleans. Leib was a mere boy, and his punishment was commuted, as was that of the informer. The others were promptly hung just five days after the commission of their crime.

At the close of June reports reached New Orleans of disasters to the Federal armies in Virginia. These came by telegraph over Southern lines, and were greatly exaggerated. The spirits of the Confederate sympathizers rose. Fidel Keller, a bookseller, procured a skeleton from a medical student, and exposed it in his window, labeled "Chickahominy," intending that the bones should be taken by the populace to be those of a Union soldier slain before Richmond. John W. Andrews displayed in club-rooms and other public places a cross, which he declared to have been made from the bones of a Union soldier. These offenders were sent for two years to Ship Island. Lieutenant De Kay, a gallant young officer, had been fatally wounded by guerrillas while descending the Mississippi. After a month, he died on the 27th of June. His funeral took place the next day at an Episcopal church, where Leacock, the rector, an Englishman by birth, had promised to perform the rites of the Church. He failed to be present; but the sacred edifice was filled by a gang made up of the scum of the rabble, whose conduct was scandalous beyond description, and the solemn rites were hastily hurried over. The funeral procession was mocked and insulted as it passed along the streets. The most prominent among the insulters was a woman named Phillips, the wife of Philip Phillips, a native of Charleston, educated in Vermont and Connecticut, subsequently a member of the South Carolina Nullification Convention of 1832. He emigrated to Alabama, whence he was sent to Congress in 1853. At the close of his term he declined a re-election, and took up his residence in Washington. His wife was one of the leaders of fashion in the national capital during the administration of Buchanan. She was one of a clique of traitresses who, from their supposed influence in political matters, were popularly known as the "boudoir cabinet." She was exiled from the Union, and went to New Orleans, where she made herself notorious as an advocate of the Confederates. Her conduct at the funeral of De Kay exhausted the measure of Butler's forbearance. He ordered that she should be sent to Ship Island.<sup>2</sup> She was in a few weeks released and sent to Mobile.

The population of New Orleans, native and foreign, might be fairly divided into two main classes—Union men and rebels. Six weeks after the occupation of the city, Butler concluded that it was necessary, as a public exigency, "to distinguish between those who were well disposed to the government of the United States and those who still held allegiance to the Confederate States." He therefore directed<sup>3</sup> that every person claiming to exercise any official function, military or civil, should take the oath "to bear true faith and allegiance to the United States of America, and to support the Constitution thereof." Every official act performed by persons failing to take this oath within five days was to be null and void. All persons also, who had been citizens of the United States, who desired any right, favor, or privilege beyond mere protection from personal violence, must take the oath before their request could even be heard. Every person born in the United States, and every person of foreign birth who had resided therein for five years, and who had not claimed and received protection from the consul of his own government, was declared to be a citizen within the meaning of this order. Every alien was required to take an oath that "So long as my government remains at peace with the United States, I will do no act, or consent that any be done, or conceal any that has been or is about to be

<sup>1</sup> Proclamation of Dec. 23, 1862; see *ante*, p. 219.

<sup>1</sup> "Lying upon a low alluvial plain, below the level of the Mississippi River at high water, it is surrounded by extensive undrained swamps, and has itself been reclaimed from a marsh. Its rich alluvial soil contains great quantities of vegetable mould, and is so damp that water can be obtained any where at the depth of a few feet. There are a number of cemeteries within the city limits which greatly taint the air. The drainage is imperfect, and the scavenger duty very badly performed. The open lots are also sources of disease, being the receptacle of the offal of the surrounding houses."—Dr. Pigott, in *Harper's Magazine*, June, 1857.

<sup>2</sup> General Order No. 55, August 4.

<sup>3</sup> December 9.

<sup>2</sup> "Mrs. Phillips, wife of Philip Phillips, having been once imprisoned for her traitorous proceedings and acts in Washington, and been released by the clemency of the government, and having been found training her children to spit upon officers of the United States at New Orleans, for which act of one of those children both her husband and herself apologized, and were again forgiven, is now found on the balcony of her house during the passage of the funeral procession of Lieutenant De Kay, laughing and mocking at his remains; and upon being inquired of by the commanding general if this fact were so, contemptuously replies, 'I was in good spirits that day.' It is therefore ordered that she be not regarded and treated as a common woman of whom no officer or soldier is bound to take notice, but as an uncommon, bad, and dangerous woman, stirring up strife and inciting to riot, and that therefore she be confined at Ship Island," etc.—*Butler's Order*, June 30, 1862.

<sup>3</sup> General Order No. 41, June 10.



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done, that shall aid or comfort any of the enemies or opposers of the United States." There were also in the city many thousands who had served in the Confederate army. To them the option was given either to take the oath, or to surrender themselves as prisoners of war, to be paroled until regularly exchanged, or to be put in confinement, as they might choose. The members of the Common Council, who had up to this time acted as the legislative power in the city, refused to take the oath, and their functions were suspended "until such time as there shall be a sufficient number of the citizens of New Orleans loyal to their country and their Constitution to entitle them to resume the right of self-government."<sup>1</sup> Nearly a half of the score of foreign consuls at New Orleans united in a protest against the oath required by this order. Their protest was sharply worded. Its substance was, that some persons of foreign birth, in order to receive protection, were required not merely to swear allegiance to the United States, but also not to "conceal" any acts done against the government. Butler rejoined with greater sharpness. If a foreigner wished to enjoy the privileges accorded to American citizens, let him take the oath of allegiance. If he did not choose to do this, but wished to remain a neutral, let him take the oath to do nothing to aid the enemies of the United States. If he wished to do neither, but was content to remain with mere protection from personal violence, let him "be quiet, and keep away from his consul." If he did not like any of these conditions, let him take himself away—the sooner the better for all parties. This reply concluded with an admonition that the foreign consuls, as a body, should present no more argumentative protests against his orders. This was no part of their duties or their rights. If any one of them had any suggestion to offer, he could easily learn the proper mode. Butler could not, however, refrain from one bit of grim humor. The French legion had been required to take an oath to "defend the Constitution of the State and the Confederate States," without any protest from the French consul. Butler modified the oath required of foreigners so as to correspond with this, merely inserting the words "Constitution of the United States" instead of "Constitution of the State and of the Confederate States;" the oath, for the benefit of foreigners, being given in French as well as English.<sup>2</sup>

The consuls had no farther protest to offer upon this topic. But some months after it was reopened by the Reverend Dr. Leacock, the clergyman who had promised and then neglected to perform the funeral rites of De Kay. Some 12,000 persons had taken the citizens' oath, 2500 the foreign neutrals' oath, and more than 5000 Confederate officers and soldiers had given the required parole. Leacock was moved "to speak affectionately and candidly" to the Union general. He had been "eating up God's people as it were bread," by inducing them to take oaths which they never intended to fulfill. The general was urged to "pause and consider his course," to take "a very different course from that which he was pursuing." The doctor had "great sympathy for the general," and prayed that "God would give him grace to see his error, and sustain him in the discharge of his arduous and manifold duties." Before the act of secession was performed Leacock had published a sermon, the concluding paragraph of which strongly urged secession. This was printed, and 30,000 copies had been sold. The doctor now said that this paragraph, printed from his own manuscript, was not actually delivered. In fact, he was, and always had been, a friend of the Union, in proof of which he adduced a paragraph of a sermon preached some weeks after the former one, in which the destruction of the Union was earnestly deprecated. If this sermon was actually delivered at the time stated, it was a strange sequel to the one already published.

A question had meanwhile come up which must be decided. The rubric of the Episcopal Church prescribed that prayers should be offered for the "President of the United States and all others in authority." For this had been substituted, by direction of the bishop, Major General Polk, a prayer for the President of the Confederate States. After the occupation of New Orleans by the Union forces this could not clearly be done. When that part of the service was reached, the priest was wont to invite the congregation to spend a few moments in silent prayer. This at length came to be so notorious as to demand attention. Butler invited the prominent Episcopal clergymen to a conference. The question was whether they should offer the prescribed prayer for the President of the United States. Leacock endeavored to make a side issue. "Your insisting upon the oath of allegiance is causing half of my flock to perjure themselves." "If that is the result of your preaching," rejoined Butler, "the sooner you leave the pulpit the better." "Are you going to shut up the churches?" "I am more likely to shut up the ministers." The result was that Butler gave them the choice either to read the prayer for the President, omit the silent act of devotion, or leave New Orleans as prisoners of state. Leacock, and Goodrich and Fulton, much better men, refused to comply, and were sent North. Their churches were, however, kept open, service being performed by army chaplains, as laid down in the rubric.

As a rule, every "gentleman" of New Orleans wore a pistol or a knife as

certainly as he did a hat or a coat. For a time Butler refrained from interfering with this local practice. But when Breckinridge, on the 5th of August, made his determined but unsuccessful attack upon Baton Rouge, among the Confederate killed and wounded were found citizens wearing their usual arms, who only the day before had mingled with the Union officers, but who, on the approach of the Confederates, had hurried out to join them. Butler, on the representation of Weitzel, then resolved to disarm the population of New Orleans, and ordered that every private weapon, from a rifle to a dirk, should be given up, unless it were held by a written permit. The French consul remonstrated against the execution of this order, so far as it applied to French subjects. There were signs, he said, that the servile population meant to break the bonds which bound them to their masters, and they were only "partially kept in subjection by the conviction that their masters were armed, although their weapons were only such as could be used in self-defense." Butler replied by showing that the professed neutrality of many Frenchmen was not to be trusted. Few of them had taken the oath not to act against the United States. Bonnegras, the French consul at Baton Rouge, had been allowed to retain his arms, but his son was captured fighting against the Union. He could not see how arms which would serve for personal defense could not be used for offensive warfare. The fear that the blacks would wish to break the bonds which bound them to their masters was quite natural, since they, being an imitative race, would be quite likely to follow the example set them of rebellion against constituted authorities; "but surely the representative of the emperor, who did not tolerate slavery in France, could not desire that his countrymen should be armed for the purpose of preventing the negroes from breaking their bonds." But the United States could and would give better protection against outrage, whether from white men or negroes, than could be furnished by any improvised citizens' organization. Whenever the inhabitants of New Orleans should by a united act show their loyalty or neutrality, he would be glad of their aid to keep the peace, and would even restore the city to them. But, until that was done, he should require the arms of all the inhabitants, white and black, to be under his control.<sup>1</sup> This order was followed by another offering specific rewards for the discovery of hidden weapons. Concealment being an overt act of rebellion, any slave giving information of such hiding by his master was to be emancipated. Moreover, any offense which might be lawfully resisted by arms, whether committed by whites or blacks, would be capitally punished. Men known to be in favor of the Union were allowed to retain their arms by special permission. Some secessionists doubtless kept their weapons; but for the practical purpose of aiding in the recapture of New Orleans, they were disarmed.

The Confiscation Act<sup>2</sup> divided the rebels into two classes. The property of the first class, consisting mainly of high civil and military officials, was to be confiscated at once; that of the second class, comprising the great mass of the people, was liable to confiscation in case they did not return to their allegiance within sixty days after the issue of a proclamation to that effect. This proclamation was put forth on the 25th of July. One provision of this act made void all transfers of property made by rebels after the close of the sixty days of grace, which expired on the 23d of September. Disloyal citizens began to make nominal sales of their property to foreigners for the most paltry consideration. Before the passage of the Confiscation Act Butler had assumed the responsibility of sequestering the property of Twiggs and Slidell, taking the house of the former for his own head-quarters. Twiggs, displaced from his command at New Orleans, had fled on the approach of the Union fleet, leaving behind him letters which showed that he had sought the command in Texas in order to betray his trust. He died, unregretted by friend or foe, soon after the capture of the city.

Ten days before the expiration of the time of grace every neutral foreigner was ordered to register himself, as it "might soon become necessary to distinguish the disloyal from the loyal citizens and honest neutral foreigners residing in the department." The day after the close of the period of grace, an order appeared pronouncing void every sale or contract, except for actual necessities of life, made by any citizen who had not returned to allegiance to the Union, and ordering every one who had not renewed his allegiance to report himself, with a description of all his property, actual or contingent, to the nearest provost marshal, whereupon he would receive a certificate showing him to be a registered enemy of the United States. Every householder was ordered, under severe penalties, to furnish a list of all the denizens of his house, giving their names, age, sex, and occupation. These lists furnished a complete record of the *status* of every resident of New Orleans. It was added that every person who should within a week renew his allegiance to the United States, and remain truly loyal, would be recommended to the President for pardon for all previous offenses.<sup>3</sup>

The great slave question never came fairly before Butler for adjudication. His official instructions were silent on this point. His private verbal instructions were to the effect that the government had not been able to decide upon a comprehensive policy. The President, wisely resolved to take no step that must afterward be retraced, directed him, in his straightforward, homely phrase, to "run the machine as he found it;" in other words, to raise no issues, and to meet those which presented themselves in such a way as to avoid censure from radicals or conservatives. Hence Butler gave little encouragement for slaves to leave their masters. But flagrant abuses were redressed; the jails were no longer permitted to be used as whipping-places for slaves; and, more than all, blacks were made equal with whites in the eye of the law. The decision which established this point was rendered almost casually by Major Bell, the provost judge. A negro was called to the

<sup>1</sup> Order, June 27.

<sup>2</sup> Extract from General Order No. 42, July 9.—"The commanding general has received information that certain of the foreign residents have scruples about taking the oath prescribed in General Order No. 41. Anxious to relieve the consciences of all who may honestly entertain doubts upon this matter, he hereby revises the order so as to permit any foreign subject, at his election, to take and subscribe the following oath, instead of the oath as set forth. He is sure that no foreign subject can object to this oath, as it is in the very words of the oath taken by every officer of the European brigade, prescribed more than a year ago, and claimed as an act of the strictest neutrality by the foreign officers taking it, and for more than a year passed by all the foreign consuls without protest:

"I do solemnly swear that I will, to the best of my ability, support, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States [the Constitution of the State and of the Confederate States]. So help me God."

[TRANSLATION.]

"Je jure solennellement, autant qu'il sera en moi, de soutenir, de maintenir, et de défendre la Constitution des États Unis [de l'État et celle des États Confédérés]. Que Dieu me soit en aide."

<sup>3</sup> Butler to Count Mejan, August 14.

<sup>2</sup> General Order No. 76, September 24.

<sup>3</sup> See ante, p. 198, 206.





BATON ROUGE, THE CAPITAL OF LOUISIANA.

white man." "Has Louisiana gone out of the Union?" asked Bell. "Yes," responded the lawyer. "Then," rejoined Bell, "she took her laws with her; let the man be sworn."

The formation of regiments of free colored men had, however, an important though indirect bearing upon the question of slavery. The general government, sadly bestead in Virginia, could send no re-enforcements to Louisiana. Butler, who must have men, called upon the free persons of color to volunteer. The call was met; in a few weeks there were three colored regiments of infantry and two batteries of artillery ready for service. He was recalled before these troops had opportunity of showing their worth. His successor had occasion to prove it at Port Hudson. The conduct of these regiments demonstrated, what many, both North and South, had doubted, that the colored race are capable of becoming soldiers, and, consequently, of becoming freemen. How this fact came to be recognized on both sides, and how it influenced the policy of both parties in the war, must be narrated hereafter.

The capture of New Orleans had weakened the Confederacy, but had not given to the Union the additional strength which had been anticipated. It had not opened the Mississippi, whose navigation was interrupted by the fortifications at Vicksburg, impregnable against a naval attack. The attempts made by the fleet to reduce these works, and the failure of the plan devised by Butler to avoid them by changing the course of the river, so as to convert Vicksburg into an inland town, will be narrated hereafter. Toward the close of his administration he had the mortification of seeing the batteries at Port Hudson springing up almost under his eye. A re-enforcement of five thousand men and two monitors would have enabled him in October to have taken this place. But these could not be furnished to him. The disasters in Virginia, and the march of the enemy into Maryland, compelled the Federal government to concentrate all its strength for the defense of the heart of the nation.

Butler could undertake no important military operations, for, besides the occupation of Baton Rouge, he had a force barely sufficient to hold New Orleans and its approaches. It would have been cruel for him to have taken possession of any points which he could not permanently hold. The moment his troops abandoned any place, every person even suspected of Union feeling would have been exposed to the vengeance of the returning enemy. Moreover, under the strict orders of the Confederate authorities, all cotton and sugar would have been destroyed in advance of his march in any direction, entailing ruin upon innocent holders. Butler's wish was to have sent to him, or to be allowed to raise upon the spot, an army sufficient to hold every important point, with a supporting force that could not be overcome, the region being made to pay the expense. He believed that a few months under that régime would reduce the hostile population to subjection, and would convince Union men that they were not, by the withdrawal of the troops, to be given up to rapine and murder.

The pass-office at head-quarters presented the most striking illustrations of Butler's rigorous rule. Within the Union lines there were food, medicine, and clothing; beyond them were destitution and desolation. There were residents of New Orleans whose families were enduring the extremity of suffering; there were continuous applications for permission to convey food and medicine to them. These were at first freely granted; but it soon appeared that these permissions were systematically abused. Under cover of them supplies and munitions were conveyed to the hostile camps. A trunk of clothes would be found to have a false bottom concealing military supplies; thousands of percussion caps would be hidden in a barrel of flour; the persons of women were stuffed out with contraband articles. The restrictions upon the granting of passes were made more and more stringent, until at last they were almost invariably refused.

The most notable operation of Butler beyond New Orleans was the occupation of the Lafourche District, a fertile and wealthy region lying west of the Mississippi. This was accomplished by Weitzel late in October. A series of swift marches, one spirited action,<sup>1</sup> and some minor conflicts, accomplished the occupation of this district in four days. An immense amount of property liable to confiscation was found. The holders of it were glad to sell this at any price. Some of the officers of the invading force began to purchase sugar upon speculation. Butler, knowing that this practice would demoralize his army, put a stop to it by a sweeping general order. Believing, he said, that the district was largely occupied by persons disloyal to the United States, whose property was liable to confiscation, and that sales were made of it to the prejudice of the rights of the government, it was directed that all the property in the district should be sequestered, and all sales thereof be held invalid; that the movable property be brought to New Orleans, and sold at public auction, the proceeds to be held subject to the rightful claims of loyal citizens and neutral foreigners. A commission was appointed to take charge of this property, with authority to employ the negroes of any plantation in working the same; any person who had not been actually in arms against the United States since the occupation of New Orleans might, upon returning to his allegiance, work his own plantation, and retain possession of his property except such as was necessary for the military service of the United States. The commissioners were also empowered to decide upon all questions of loyalty and neutrality, and to report to the commanding general such persons as they should judge proper to be recommended to the President for amnesty, pardon, and the return of their property, "to the end that all persons that are loyal may

witness-staud to testify against a white man. The defendant's counsel objected that, "by the laws of Louisiana, a negro can not testify against a

<sup>1</sup> This action, fought at Labadieville October 27, is described at length by Captain J. W. De Forest as, "of all the combats which I have seen, the most scientific, orderly, comprehensible, and artistically satisfactory. Similar results would have followed the same tactics if a hundred thousand men had been opposed to each other instead of less than six thousand."—*Wide World Magazine*, September, 1864.



suffer as little injury as possible, and that all persons who have been heretofore disloyal may have an opportunity now to prove their loyalty and return to their allegiance, and save their property from confiscation, if such shall be the determination of the government of the United States."<sup>1</sup> Major Bell, the provost judge, was president of this commission, but the chief labor devolved upon Colonel Kinsman. For six weeks he was employed in applying the provisions of the Confiscation Act to the District of Lafourche, setting the negroes at work upon abandoned plantations, and restoring to loyal men their estates which had been temporarily sequestered. The confiscated property was sold at auction to the highest bidder, and the proceeds paid over to the general treasury. No portion of Butler's administration, with the exception of the woman order, has been so sharply criticised as this. But if the claim be granted that secession is rebellion, and that those who had taken up arms against the government were rebels, this measure is fully justified by every provision of public law and policy.

Meanwhile a strong Union sentiment had been gradually growing up in New Orleans. This was shared only in a slight degree by the upper classes on the one hand, or by the lower classes on the other. But it was predominant among the middle classes. Large and enthusiastic Union meetings were convened, and an election was held on the 3d of October, by order of General Shepley, to choose two delegates to the Federal Congress. The canvass was eager, and no citizen who had taken the oath of allegiance was excluded from voting; 7500 votes were cast, of which nearly 5000 were given for Michael Hahn and Benjamin F. Flanders, both uncompromising Union men. The validity of this election was not, however, recognized, and the members-elect were not allowed their seats.

As winter approached, Butler urged the government to furnish him with a force sufficient to enable him to extend his operations, and especially to reduce the works at Port Hudson. Early in December Senator Wilson called upon the Secretary of War to urge the importance of the request. Mr. Stanton approved of Butler's vigor and ability, and promised to do what he could to aid him. Yet at this moment, not only was the recall of Butler determined upon, but his successor had been appointed more than three weeks before. On the 9th of November, the very day upon which Butler issued his Lafourche order, General Banks was assigned to the command of the "Department of the Gulf, including the State of Texas."

The reasons for the recall of Butler have never been made public.<sup>2</sup> There were, indeed, insinuations that he had prostituted his official position to serve his own private interests. Some color was supposed to be given to these charges from the fact that his brother, Andrew J. Butler, entered into large and profitable business transactions in New Orleans. When the port was opened in June, no man, with means and capacity, could fail to make money. Turpentine could be bought for \$3 in New Orleans, and would sell for \$38 in New York; flour was \$24 in New Orleans, in New York \$6; sugar was three cents in New Orleans, in New York more than twice as much. Andrew Butler, with large means and credit, entered into business, and, until prices at the two places were equalized, his profits were large. Later came large auction sales of confiscated property. Butler bought much of this; but there is not the slightest proof that he received any undue favor. He purchased in open market, and if he secured a larger share than most of his competitors, it was because he was able and willing to pay more than they. Even if it is true, as has been alleged, that the general advanced his own private funds to his brother, and shared the profits, this of itself forms no ground of accusation. It was for the interest of the government and the country that the trade of New Orleans should be revived. If the general could by his own means advance this object, he was so far a public benefactor. One transaction, indeed, had a suspicious look upon its face. A quantity of cotton had been seized; Butler sent this to his own agent, with directions to sell it. Government seized the cotton. Upon investigation, it appeared that the laborers upon Ship Island were without pay. Butler borrowed \$4000 upon his own draft, paid the laborers with the proceeds, sent the cotton to his agent to be sold, the draft to be paid, and the balance held to his order, so that, when the account was stated, he might settle with the government. Government, having seized the cotton, suffered the draft to be protested, much to Butler's disadvantage; but when the affair was explained the money was refunded.

This, and one other transaction of a much larger amount, are averred<sup>3</sup> to have been the only operations of a mercantile nature in which Butler was engaged while in command of the Department of the Gulf. There was at the levee a large number of transports which, by the terms of their charters, were to be sent home in ballast. No ballast was to be had nearer than the sand of Ship Island, thirty hours' steam from the city. The steamer Mississippi, hired at \$1500 a day, required 250 tons of ballast; to take this at Ship Island, and afterward discharge it, would require at least fourteen days, at a cost to the government of \$21,000. There was on the levee sugar enough to ballast the whole fleet; sufficient to ballast the Mississippi could be taken on board and discharged in four days, at a cost of \$6000, thus saving \$15,000. Butler proposed to allow merchants to ship sugar at a moderate freight, say \$5 a hogshead, amounting, in the case of the Mississippi, to \$2000 more—\$17,000 in all. The difficulty was to find money to buy sugar at the mo-

ment. Government had then no money at New Orleans; the general had none; but by pledging \$150,000, his whole private fortune, he borrowed \$100,000. This he placed in the hands of his brother, who with it bought and shipped sugar, receiving a commission on his shipments. Government took the sugar thus shipped, merely repaying the advance. Other merchants were also allowed to ship sugar upon payment of a moderate freight to the government. The transports went home ballasted with sugar instead of sand. How much was saved in all by this arrangement has not been stated. The saving to government on the Mississippi alone was \$17,000. Some of the owners of the transports, who had contracted that their vessels should be sent back in ballast, conceived that they had a right to the payment of freight, now that the ballast was in the form of sugar instead of sand. Their unreasonable claim was not allowed; and whoever was dissatisfied, the Secretary of the Treasury was not.

The true reason for the recall of Butler is probably to be found in the determination of the government to avoid all difficulties with foreign nations, and more especially with France. For many reasons, the administration of Butler had become odious abroad. This was owing, in a great measure, to the relations in which he became involved with the foreign consuls. The active population of New Orleans being largely composed of foreigners, gave the consuls great influence. With, perhaps, a single exception, they were in favor of secession, and believed in the ultimate triumph of the Confederacy. Reichard, the Prussian consul, joined the Confederate army, raised a battalion, rose to the rank of brigadier general, and was now in Virginia, leaving as acting consul his partner, Kruttschmidt, who had married a sister of his co-religionist Judah P. Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of War. Mejlan, the French consul, took such an open part against the Federal authority that the emperor was finally obliged to recall him. Others were more or less involved on the same side. For a while it seemed to be their main business to protest against Butler's acts. Half of them protested against the oath of neutrality required from foreigners. The British consul protested against an order directing the members of the British Guard to leave the city because they had sent their arms and uniforms to Beauregard's camp. The French consul protested against the order for disarming the population, and against that for imprisoning Heidseck, of Champagne and bar-tending notoriety, and against several other orders. The Spanish consul remonstrated against the quarantine regulations; and so on. Once the whole consular body, with the exception of the Mexican consul, joined in a formal protest. The occasion was this:

The Citizens' Bank, whose capital consisted mainly of bonds held by European owners, the interest upon which was payable semi-annually at Amsterdam, was in February alarmed at the probability of an attack upon New Orleans from above, and resolved to deposit \$800,000 in silver with the agent of the bondholders, to meet the interest which would become due in the course of the year. The agent of the bondholders, apprehensive that in case the city was abandoned by the Confederate troops it would be plundered by the rabble, placed this money in charge of Mr. Conturié, the Dutch consul. Butler, thinking that this transaction was a fraudulent one, designed merely to get the specie under the control of the Confederate government, demanded that it should be given up to him until the matter could be investigated. Conturié refused. Butler had the key of the vault in which it was deposited taken by force from the consul, who was kept under formal arrest for a few hours. The consuls remonstrated, to Butler, to the Federal authorities, and to their own governments, against this violation of the person of a foreign representative. The Secretary of State, in reply to a communication from the Dutch minister at Washington, apologizing for the restraint put upon the consul at New Orleans, proposed to appoint a commissioner to investigate the matter; meanwhile government should hold the silver, to deliver it up to the claimants if it should prove to belong to them. The bank, just before the passage of the forts, moreover bought something more than \$700,000 of foreign exchange, paying for it specie, which was deposited with the French consul, the bills not to be accepted until the coin had been shipped. Butler, believing this transaction to be a fraudulent pretense to get the coin out of the bank, requested Mejlan to retain it under his charge.

Several other transactions, involving the same principles, occurred, the principal of which was the seizure of 3200 hogsheads of sugar which had been bought by Covas, a Greek, reputed to be the agent of an association of merchants in London and Havana. He had sold specie for Confederate notes, with which he had bought the sugar. Butler ordered the sugar to be retained until the transaction could be investigated. The English, French, and Greek consuls protested against this.

The Federal government appointed Reverdy Johnson, an eminent lawyer of Baltimore, as a commissioner to investigate these transactions. He reached New Orleans early in June, and, after spending six weeks in investigation, decided against Butler in every important case. The seizures, he said, "were evidently made under a misapprehension, to be referred to the patriotic zeal which governs him, to the circumstances encircling his command at the time so well calculated to awaken suspicion, and to an earnest desire to punish, to the extent of his supposed power, all who had contributed, or were contributing, to the aid of a rebellion the most unjustifiable and wicked that insane or bad men were ever engaged in."

Butler was deeply chagrined at this decision. He wrote to the Secretary of State that another such commissioner as Mr. Johnson sent to New Orleans would render the city untenable; that the result of his mission had caused it to be understood that the general was not supported by his gov-

<sup>1</sup> General Order, November 9.

<sup>2</sup> He was received with great cordiality by the President and cabinet. He inquired the reason of his recall. The President referred him to the Secretary of War, who had recommended the measure. Mr. Stanton said that the reason was one which did not imply, on the part of the government, any want of confidence in his honor as a man or in his ability as a commander. "You have told me," answered Butler, "what I was not recalled for. I now ask you to tell me what I was recalled for." "You and I," replied the secretary, laughing, "are both lawyers, and it is of no use for you to file a bill of discovery upon me, for I sha'n't tell you."—PARTON'S *Butler in New Orleans*, p. 613.

<sup>3</sup> By Mr. Parton, who claims to have fully investigated the subject, with full access to every document bearing upon it.—*Vide Butler in New Orleans*, p. 407-413.



ernment; that he was to be relieved, his acts overhauled; that a rebel might do any thing he pleased in the city, as the worst that could happen would be a few days' imprisonment until a new commander should arrive. If this state of things was to continue, he would prefer that the government should get some one else to govern New Orleans. This suggestion was acted upon. But three days' after his successor was appointed, and a month before the official notice was received, Butler had the pleasure of forwarding a report which showed so clearly the misdeeds of Mejan, the French consul, that he was recalled. Sanford, the American minister at Brussels, wrote home in September that the Confederate agents in Europe were seriously embarrassed by the non-arrival of a large quantity of coin which they expected from New Orleans, but that "assurances were now given that the money was in the hands of the French consul, and would be shortly received." The purveyors of cloth were specially mentioned as unable to get their pay from the Confederate agents. This letter was sent to Butler, with directions to investigate the matter. He had many reasons for doing this work thoroughly. It was discovered that a firm doing business in New Orleans, under the name of Ed. Gautherin and Co., with a branch house at Havre, had a year before contracted to furnish the Confederate government with a large quantity of cloths for uniforms. These were the unpaid cloths referred to by Sanford. Early in April these cloths reached Havana, whence they were shipped to Matamoras, in Mexico, were smuggled into Texas, and delivered to the Confederate agent. At this time, just before the Federal fleets passed the forts, De Bow, the Confederate produce-loan agent, borrowed of the People's Bank in New Orleans \$400,000 in specie, without interest, upon a pledge of cotton. This specie, intended to pay for these cloths, was deposited for security with the French consul. It was far into June before the goods were delivered, and until this was done payment was not to be made. Mejan, in the mean while, had promised not to deliver up any specie held by him in trust without the consent of Butler. Reverdy Johnson's report induced the government to direct that Mejan should be released from this engagement. He delivered the specie to Gautherin, who got it conveyed to Havana on board a Spanish man-of-war. In consequence, a second installment of goods, which was not to be delivered until the first was paid for, was forwarded to the Confederate authorities. Mejan, indeed, averred that he knew nothing of Gautherin except that there was a French house of that name in New Orleans, and that there was no money in his hands to carry out their contract with the Confederates. But incontestable documents demonstrated his complicity. His wife had accepted a present "to close the affair well;" his clerk received a percentage for keeping the money in the consulate; besides which, there was good reason to believe that out of a sum of \$19,000 charged to "expenses," the French consul received a fifth. "Count Mejan," wrote Butler in conclusion, "has connived at the delivery of clothing for the Confederate army since the occupation of New Orleans by the Federal forces; he has taken away nearly half a million of specie to aid the Confederates. His flag has been made to cover all manner of illegal and hostile transactions, and the booty arising therefrom. I am glad that my action here has been vindicated to the world, and that the government of the United States will be able to demand of the French government a recall of its hostile agent."

This vindication came too late. Before it was written the successor of Butler had been appointed; before it reached Washington that successor was on his way to New Orleans. Banks, bringing considerable re-enforcements, arrived at New Orleans on Sunday, the 14th of December, and proceeded to the residence of Butler. On Tuesday the two generals met at head-quarters, and Butler formally surrendered the command of the Department.

He took leave of his comrades in a touching general order addressed to

<sup>1</sup> November 13.

<sup>2</sup> The following are extracts from Butler's Farewell Address to the citizens of New Orleans:

"Commanding the Army of the Gulf, I found you captured, but not surrendered; conquered, but not orderly; relieved from the pressure of an army, but incapable of taking care of yourselves. I restored order, punished crime, opened commerce, brought provisions to your starving people, reformed your currency, and gave you quiet protection, such as you had not enjoyed for many years. Whoever has quietly remained about his business, affording neither aid nor comfort to the enemies of the United States, has never been interfered with by the soldiers of the United States.

"Some of your women flouted at the presence of those who came to protect them. By a simple order, I called upon every soldier of this army to treat the women of New Orleans as gentlemen should deal with the sex, with such effect that I now call upon the just-minded ladies of New Orleans to say whether they have ever enjoyed so complete protection and calm quiet for themselves and their families as since the advent of the United States troops.

"I hold that rebellion is treason, and that rebellion persisted in is death, and any punishment short of that due a traitor gives so much clear gain to him from the clemency of the government. Upon this thesis have I administered the authority of the United States. I might have reigned you with the amenities of British civilization, and yet been within the supposed rules of civilized warfare. Your property could have been turned over to indiscriminate 'loot,' like the palace of the Emperor of China; works of art, which adorned your buildings, might have been sent away, like the paintings of the Vatican; your sons might have been blown from the mouths of cannon, like the Sepoys at Delhi; and yet all this would have been within the rules of civilized warfare as practiced by the most polished and the most hypocritical nations of Europe. But I have not so conducted. On the contrary, the worst punishment inflicted, except for criminal acts punishable by every law, has been banishment, with labor, to a barren island, where I encamped my own soldiers before marching here.

"I have levied upon the wealthy rebels, and paid out nearly half a million of dollars to feed 40,000 of the starving poor of all nations assembled here, made so by this war. I saw that this rebellion was a war of the aristocrats against the middling men — of the rich against the poor; a war of the landowner against the laborer; that it was a struggle for the retention of power in the hands of the few against the many; and I found no conclusion to it save in the subjugation of the few and the disenfranchisement of the many. I therefore felt no hesitation in taking the substance of the wealthy, who had caused the war, to feed the innocent poor, who suffered by the war.

"the Soldiers of the Army of the Gulf:" "I greet you, my brave comrades," he said, "and say farewell! You have deserved well of your country. Without a murmur, you sustained an encampment on a sand-bar so desolate that banishment to it, with every care and comfort possible, has been the most dreaded punishment inflicted upon your bitterest and most insulting enemies. You had so little transportation that but a handful could advance to compel submission by the Queen City of the rebellion, whilst others waded breast-deep in the marshes which surround St. Philip, and forced the surrender of a fort deemed impregnable to land attack by the most skillful engineers of your country and her enemy. At your occupation, order, law, quiet, and peace sprang to this city, filled with the bravoes of all nations, where for a score of years, during the profoundest peace, human life was scarcely safe at noonday. By your discipline you illustrated the best traits of the American soldier, and enchained the admiration of those that came to scoff. You have fed the starving poor, the wives and children of your enemies, so converting them into friends, that they have sent their representatives to your Congress by a vote greater than your entire numbers, from districts where you were tauntingly told that there was 'no one to raise your flag.' By your philanthropy you have won the confidence of the 'oppressed race' and the slave. Hailing you as deliverers, they are ready to aid you as willing servants, faithful laborers, or, using the tactics taught them by your enemies, to fight with you in the field. You have met double numbers of the enemy and defeated them in the open field. But I need not farther enlarge upon the topic. You were sent here to do that. I commend you to your commander. You are worthy of his love. Farewell, my comrades! Again farewell!" To the citizens of New Orleans he issued a farewell address, in which he declared the policy upon which he had acted, set forth and vindicated the measures he had employed, and urged upon the people to take the only measures compatible with duty or interest.<sup>2</sup> This done, he took leave of New Orleans, where he had for seven months exercised an authority as absolute as was ever committed to a single man.



VIEW IN THE FRENCH QUARTER OF NEW ORLEANS.

"I found you trembling at the terrors of servile insurrection. All danger of this I have prevented by so treating the slave that he had no cause to rebel. I found the dungeon, the chain, and the lash your only means of enforcing obedience to your servants. I leave them peaceful, laborious, controlled by the laws of kindness and justice.

"I have demonstrated that the pestilence can be kept from your borders. I have added a million of dollars to your wealth in the form of new land from the batture of the Mississippi. I have cleansed and improved your streets, canals, and public squares, and opened new avenues to unoccupied land. I have given you freedom of elections greater than you have ever enjoyed before. I have caused justice to be administered so impartially that your own advocates have unanimously complimented the judges of my appointment.

"You have seen, therefore, the benefit of the laws and justice of the government against which you have rebelled. Why, then, will you not all return to your allegiance to that government — not with lip service, but with the heart?

"There is but one thing that at this hour stands between you and the government — and that is slavery. The institution, cursed of God, which has taken its last refuge here, in His providence will be rooted out as the tares from the wheat, although the wheat be torn up with it.

"I came among you, by teachings, by habit of mind, by political position, by social affinity, inclined to sustain your domestic laws, if by possibility they might be with safety to the Union. Months of experience and of observation have forced the conviction that the existence of slavery is incompatible with the safety either of yourselves or of the Union. As the system has gradually grown to its present huge dimensions, it were best if it could be gradually removed; but it is better, far better, that it should be taken out at once, than that it should vitiate the social, political, and family relations of your country. I am speaking with no philanthropic views as regards the slave, but simply of the effect of slavery on the master. See for yourselves. Look around you, and say whether this saddening, deadening influence has not all but destroyed the very framework of your society. I am speaking the farewell words of one who has shown his devotion to his country at the peril of his life and fortune, who in these words can have neither hope nor interest save the good of those whom he addresses.

"Come, then, to the unconditional support of the government. Take into your own hands your own institutions; remodel them according to the laws of nations and of God, and thus attain that great prosperity assured to you by geographical position, only a portion of which was heretofore yours."





SAMUEL R. CURTIS

## CHAPTER XVI

## FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG.—THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI CAMPAIGN OF 1862.

Price's Retreat from Springfield.—General Samuel R. Curtis.—Federal Occupation of Springfield and Advance into Arkansas.—The Indian Tribes West of the Mississippi; the Sioux War; Albert Pike's Intrigues.—Battle of Pea Ridge.—The Barbarities of War.—Operations in New Mexico.—Arizona; its social Organization; Hostility of the Apaches.—Resumé of the revolutionary Proceedings in Arkansas and Texas in 1861; Seizure of Arsenal at Little Rock; Meeting in Austin, Texas, in 1860; Governor Houston's Career; General Twiggs's Surrender; Confederate Forces in Texas at the Beginning of the War.—Sibley's Invasion of New Mexico.—John R. Baylor.—Colonel Canby's Defense of Fort Craig; Battle of Valverde.—Retreat of Sibley to Texas.—Curtis's Operations in Arkansas after the Battle of Pea Ridge; Advance on Little Rock; Governor Rector; Expedition up White River; Change of Base from Batesville to Helena.—Confederate Forces in Arkansas in the Autumn of 1862.—Guerrilla Operations.—Battles at Cane Hill and Prairie Grove.—The political Situation in Missouri; General Halleck's Policy.—Capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10.

IN this and the subsequent chapter we purpose to follow the course of military events in the West from the capture of Fort Donelson down to the Vicksburg campaign. This will bring the history of the war in the West down to the close of 1862. The events narrated are naturally grouped under two separate departments. To the first belong the military operations west of the Mississippi; to the second, the operations along the Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers—including the battle of Shiloh, the capture of Memphis, and the advance into Mississippi—and General Buell's and Rosecrans's campaigns in Kentucky and Tennessee.

These campaigns, even if we confine ourselves to the immediate field of active operations, disregarding the distant military centres from which instructions were issued and whence supplies were obtained, covered an area of nearly 100,000 square miles. The battle of Pea Ridge was fought on the very confines of civilization, at a point 500 miles distant from the line of General Bragg's march into Kentucky. From New Madrid to the mouth of the Arkansas was more than 200 miles in a straight line; from the latter point to St. Louis was more than 300; and yet this field, so wide in extent, was but a part of the theatre of war. General Halleck's and Buell's forces were the right wing only of the Federal army, separated from the left, indeed, by nearly a thousand miles, and by the wild and tortuous ranges of the Alleghenies, but still co-operating with it as effectually as if there had been no such vast interval of space between.


At the close of 1861 General Price had fixed his headquarters at Springfield, in the southwestern part of Missouri. At that time, of the four lines of railroad in the state starting from

St. Louis, the two proceeding westward were entirely under Federal control. A portion of the lines to Springfield and to Ironton were in the hands of the Confederates. The situation of Price's army was not favorable for an offensive movement, but by retaining it during the winter he had gained a good supply of clothing for his troops and about 4000 fresh recruits from the state. He did not even regard his position as tenable. When, in the latter part of January, General Samuel R. Curtis advanced along the line of the railroad to Rolla and then to Lebanon, Price began to retreat toward Arkansas.

General Curtis, to whom General Halleck had given the command of the army in the field, was a native of Ohio, and at the time of which we are writing was fifty-five years of age. He had studied at West Point, and received an appointment in the army, but in 1832 had resigned his commission, and devoted himself to law and afterward to engineering. He fought under General Taylor in Mexico with the rank of colonel, was appointed military governor of Monterey and of other places occupied by the United States troops, and in these positions had developed a good degree of administrative ability. Subsequently he took a prominent part in the construction of railroads in the West. From Keokuk, in Iowa, he was elected to Congress in 1858 and again in 1860, but at the beginning of the war he resigned his seat in order to participate in the great struggle. He accompanied the New York Seventh from Philadelphia to Washington, and was made an honorary member of that regiment. He then went back to Iowa, superintended the earliest organization of troops in that state, and from the skirmish at Booneville was engaged in the war in Missouri under the conduct of General Lyon. He was at first colonel of the Second Iowa, but was soon made brigadier general of volunteers. He served under General Fremont, and afterward under General Halleck. The latter, upon the withdrawal of General Price to Springfield, gave General Curtis the command in the southwestern part of the state. The army committed to his hands was organized into four divisions, under Generals Sigel, Asboth, and Davis, and Colonel Carr. It was chiefly made up of troops from Missouri and Illinois. There were also some Indiana and Iowa regiments, and a battery from Ohio.

This army moved from Lebanon February 11th, and on the 14th General Halleck telegraphed to Washington that the Union flag then floated over the court-house in Springfield; that, after a short engagement, Price had retreated, leaving behind a large amount of stores and equipments, and that Curtis's cavalry were in close pursuit. The fact that Price had abandoned his sick, amounting to about 600 men, proves that that general scarcely anticipated the Federal advance. He had waited, however, till the last moment, expecting re-enforcements from the Confederate army in Arkansas. This gave General Curtis a great advantage; for, although Price was undisturbed in his retreat to Cassville, he was obliged from that point to keep up a running fight for four days, until he reached Cross Hollows in Arkansas. From this position he was soon driven fifty miles southward to the line of Boston Mountains, leaving behind him again his sick and most of his stores. Indeed, General Curtis's commissary had been mostly supplied by stores captured from the enemy during his march southward from Springfield. A large number of recruits were captured on their way from Missouri to join Price's army. Among these was Brigadier General Edward Price, son of the Confederate commander.

General Halleck kept up a series of dispatches to Washington of the most encouraging nature. Four days after he had announced that the Union flag floated over the Springfield court-house, he notified to General McClellan the fact that it was also floating in Arkansas. He added that Price had been driven several miles across the Arkansas line, that his rear was being cut up, and that stores and prisoners were being captured from him hourly. The country, wild with excitement over the capture of Donelson, accepted these dispatches as certain indications of victory already obtained by the Army



MAP OF THE THEATRE OF WAR IN MISSOURI.



of the Southwest. In fact, not only had nothing decisive been accomplished by that army, but it was daily being drawn into a perilous situation. The danger was not chiefly in its distance from a military base, but in its inferiority in numbers to the force which was being gathered against it. All along his line of advance—at Rolla, at Lebanon, at Springfield, and at Cassville—Curtis had weakened his force by leaving detachments to guard his communications, and could not, therefore, bring into the field more than ten or twelve thousand men, while the available force of the enemy was nearly twice that number, without counting the Indian allies of the Confederates. Situated just south of the border line between Arkansas and Missouri, and flanked on the west by the Indian Territory, the field of the proposed contest was the one which would have been selected of all others as the most favorable for the concentration of Price's, McCulloch's, and the Indian forces. Yet General Halleck's confidence in the Army of the Southwest was not wholly without justification. A good portion of General Curtis's force had bravely met the enemy at Carthage, at Wilson's Creek, and in subsequent battles, and even when opposed to superior numbers had dealt very effective blows. The Confederate army, too, was badly armed and weak in artillery.

The attitude assumed by the Indian tribes toward the war should here be briefly noticed. In 1789 there were within the limits of the United States, including the Territories, less than 100,000 Indians. In 1853, by the extension of the territorial domain from the acquisition of Texas, New Mexico, Utah, and California, their number had increased to more than 400,000. In California alone, upon its accession, there were 100,000. In New Mexico the estimated number was upward of 50,000. In Texas there were nearly 30,000. In Utah there were 11,000. At the beginning of the war, the pressure of emigration westward for a score of years had driven all the great Indian tribes west of the Mississippi. What was known as the Indian Territory then covered only a small area comparatively upon the map, and was hedged in on all sides by territories which had either already become states of the Republic, or would soon become such. This limited space had been given by the United States to the Indian tribes which had been driven across the Mississippi. Elsewhere, in Minnesota, Iowa, Oregon, and in the Territories, the Indians existed in great numbers indeed, but they were limited to certain reservations. The relation of the government to all the Indian tribes in the West had been peculiar. The policy pursued regarded the permanent interest of the white man alone, while it bestowed temporary indulgences upon the red man. Every thing else was left in the hands of the missionaries, who exercised a favorable influence upon this rapidly declining



INDIAN WOMAN WINNOWER WHEAT.

race. It was unfortunate, however, that the patronage which the government bestowed upon the Indians was frequently dispensed through agents who took many opportunities to defraud the beneficiaries. This, and the natural antipathy against the white man which it is almost impossible to eradicate from the Indian blood, led, finally, in the summer of 1862, to an outbreak of hostilities even among the tribes as far north as Minnesota. The Sioux Indians in that state, numbering about 1200 warriors, suddenly, in the month of August, attacked the settlements of the whites, and began a series of massacres, unrivaled in their horrible details except by the former outrages perpetrated by the same race upon the infant colonial settlements of the Eastern States. The only premonition of this terrible event had been a rumor which prevailed in the spring and early summer that the Indian tribes of Utah, Colorado, Dakota, and Western Nebraska were making preparations to ravage the Territories and frontier states. It was given out that Confederate emissaries had been among them, instigating them to revolt. This rumor, taking so general a shape, and being, moreover, the natural product of an excited imagination, appears to have had no practical effect. It aroused no serious suspicions in the minds of the settlers, although it led the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to publish an advertisement warning the public of the dangers likely to be encountered by travelers on the overland route to the Pacific. Without attributing the outbreak in August directly to Confederate agencies, it is yet quite certain that the distraction of the country by civil war led the ignorant Sioux to hope for success in an undertaking upon which in more tranquil times they would scarcely have ventured. Apart from the first success of the marauders not much was effected by them. The loss of life was estimated in round numbers at 800, and that

of property at between two and three millions of dollars. A few companies of troops under Colonel H. H. Sibley, afterward promoted to a generalship,



INDIAN CAMP CAPTURED BY COLONEL SIBLEY.

soon quelled the insurrection. In giving these details of the Sioux War we have anticipated in regard to time, but this seemed the most fitting place in which to speak of them, as they were somewhat nearly related to events which had been going on during the few previous months among the tribes farther south upon the Confederate border. In the summer of 1861 Albert Pike had been among these tribes acting as "commissioner of the Confederate States to the Indian nations and tribes west of Arkansas." Here, on the 12th of August, he had entered into a treaty with the Camanches, according to the terms of which that nation agreed to settle upon reserves claimed to have been leased by the Confederates from the Choctaws and Chickasaws, in the southern portion of the Indian Territory, namely, that portion included between the Red and Canadian Rivers; in return for which agreement the Camanches were to be under Confederate protection, in token of which Albert Pike gave their chiefs letters of safeguard.<sup>1</sup> Other tribes than the Camanches were also decoyed from their allegiance to the Federal government. A few days before the above treaty was made, the Confederate government had been organized at Mesilla, in Arizona, under John R. Baylor as governor. This movement was undertaken in spite of, rather than by the assistance of the Indians of that Territory. The evacuation of Fort Stanton by the Federal troops on the 8th of August left the enemy in possession of property equal to \$300,000, including the fort, and there was not a single Federal soldier left within the limits of Arizona. The territory claimed to have been leased from the Choctaws and Chickasaws embraced an area of 23,437 square miles, or a little less than one fourth of the Indian Territory. If the Creeks, Seminoles, Osages, and Cherokees could also be alienated from the United States, the Confederacy would then have secured the entire Territory, having a population of nearly 72,000 souls. This country, with its 52,000,000 of acres, would add greatly to the resources of the Confederate government, and, if it could be retained, would become a valuable security for the payment of the vast debt which that government must incur in the course of the war. Its mountains were filled with iron and coal. The Red River ran along its southern border, and the Arkansas almost through its centre. Albert Pike spared no pains to secure this boon for the Confederacy. To some extent he succeeded in bringing over even the Cherokees to the side of his masters. On the 21st of August, a mass meeting, attended by about 4000 of that nation, at Tahlequah, declared their adherence to the Confederate cause. The proceedings of this Indian convention were transmitted by John Ross, the principal chief of the Cherokees, to General McCulloch.<sup>2</sup> The Rev. Mr. Robinson, a missionary to the Cherokees, also made a

<sup>1</sup> The following is a copy of the letters of safeguard:

"The Confederate States of America to all their officers, civil and military, and to all other persons to whom these presents shall come:

"The bearer of this is Bis-te-va-na, the principal chief of the Yn-pa-rih-ca band of the Ne-nm, or Camanches of the Prairie, and those who accompany him are the head men of that band, all of whom have this day concluded and signed in behalf of the whole Ya-pa-rih-ca band articles of a convention of peace and friendship between that band and other bands of the Ne-nm with us, and have thereby agreed to settle and live upon reserves in the country between the Red River and the Canadian, leased by us from the Choctaws and Chickasaws; and the said chief has also agreed to visit the other bands of the Ne-nm, not parties to the same convention, and now on the Staked Plain or elsewhere, and persuade them also to settle upon reserves in the same country.

"We have accordingly taken the said chief and the said head men, and all other persons of both sexes and all ages, of the said Yn-pa-rih-ca band, from this day forward under our protection, until they shall for just cause forfeit the same, and that forfeiture be declared by us; and we have therefore granted, and do grant to them and to each of them, these our

"LETTERS OF SAFEGUARD

for their protection, and to avail each and all of them as far as our authority and jurisdiction extends.

"You are therefore hereby charged to respect these letters, and give all the said persons protection and safe-conduct; and any infraction by any of you of this safeguard will be visited by us with all the penalties due to those who violate the public faith and dishonor the Confederacy.

"In testimony whereof, Albert Pike, commissioner of the Confederate States to all the Indian nations and tribes west of those states, doth hereunto set his hand and affix the seal of [SEAL] his arms.

"Done and granted at the agency of the Confederate States for the Camanches, Wichitas, and other bands of Indians near the False Wichita River, in the leased country aforesaid, this twelfth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one.

"ALBERT PIKE,  
"Commissioner of the Confederate States to the Indian nations and tribes west of Arkansas.  
"Countersigned,  
WM. QUEENSBURY,  
"Secretary to the Commissioner."

<sup>2</sup> The following is a copy of John Ross's letter:

"Executive Department, Park Hill, Cherokee Nation, August 24, 1861.

"TO MAJOR CLARK, ASST QUARTERMASTER, C. S. A.:

"Sir,—I herewith forward to your care dispatches for General McCulloch, C. S. Army, which I have the honor to request you will cause to be forwarded to him by the earliest express.

"At a mass meeting of about 4000 Cherokees at Tahlequah, on the 21st instant, the Cherokees, with marked unanimity, declared their adherence to the Confederate States, and have given their authorities power to negotiate an alliance with them.

"In view of this action, a regiment of mounted men will be immediately raised and placed under the command of Colonel John Drew, to meet any exigency that may arise.

"Having espoused the cause of the Confederate States, we hope to render efficient service in the protracted war which now threatens the country, and to be treated with a liberality and confidence becoming the Confederate States.

"I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your humble servant, JOHN ROSS,  
"Principal chief of the Cherokee nation."



report of the affair to the Federal government. He stated that the Confederate commissioner had assumed the payment of the annuities hitherto received by the Cherokees from the national government. This was not a mere paper treaty. The Cherokees followed up the convention with active preparations to defend themselves and to assist their new ally. A home guard of 1200 men was formed. The Creeks, also, had raised a thousand men for service in the Confederate army. It is probable that in these movements the Cherokees, Creeks, and Camanches were led by the same motives which in that very month the next year led the Sioux Indians to revolt. There was the same natural antipathy to the white man, mingled with a sentiment of revenge for past wrongs, real or imagined, and the same ignorant belief that the fortunes of the republic were declining, while the star of the Confederacy was in the ascendant. There was this difference, however. The Indians farther south very naturally considered that their immediate, if not their future destiny must be linked with that of the Confederacy, which was now opposing a very bold front against the national armies. All the Indian tribes, moreover, were doubtless gratified by the spectacle that was being afforded them of millions of white men pitted, army against army, in fraternal strife, and were willing, so far as possible, to add fuel to the fire of rebellion. They never proved an ally of much consequence to the Confederates, who had an eye rather to their territory than to their services in the field. The Indian troops which were raised were placed under the command of Albert Pike, who received as the reward of his labors the rank of brigadier general in the Confederate army.

Although Mr. Davis, in his message to the Confederate Congress, had declared that the events of the previous year had demonstrated that the government had attempted more than it had power successfully to achieve, and that serious disasters had resulted from the effort to protect the whole territory of the Confederacy, sea-board and inland, yet there was no disposition manifested in the subsequent conduct of the war to attempt any thing less. Certainly no such disposition was shown west of the Mississippi. If Price had been retreating, it was only because of the military advantages to be gained by retreat. Indeed, he would have remained at Springfield if McCulloch had promptly come to his support. Besides, the Confederacy, at this time, was intent upon holding the power which it had gained over the Indian country on its border, and which would have to be given up if its Western army should fall back far from that border. Every effort was now made to secure victory in the impending battle. The command of the trans-Mississippi Department was given to General Earl Van Dorn, who reached the camp at Boston Mountains on the 2d of March. Price and McCulloch had been at loggerheads in previous campaigns, and this appointment of Van Dorn to the command of the entire army exercised a wholesome influence.

General Curtis selected Sugar Creek, on the confines of Missouri, Arkansas, and the Indian Territory, as a line of defense. Here he awaited the attack of the enemy, which was made on Thursday, the 6th of March. Colonel Jefferson C. Davis, acting as major general in command of the third division, held a position on Pea Ridge, north of the creek, commanding the Fayetteville road, one brigade on the right of the road, the other on the left. Two batteries, one of six and another of four guns, covered the approach, and one of them commanded the valley to the eastward and westward. Sigel's two divisions were seven miles south of the creek, at Bentonville. Carr's division held the eastern part of the ridge. This ridge, from which the battle receives its name, extends along the north bank of Sugar Creek, and is broken toward the north by gradual slopes, with an occasional ravine. From the position occupied by the army to the Missouri line was nearly eight miles. Two roads traverse the ridge, one from Bentonville, another from Fayetteville, and converge toward Keetsville. As the Missouri line is approached, these roads pass through a narrow valley, and are lined on either side by steep and continuous ranges of hills. Midway between the roads as they strike the ridge is Lectown, near the creek; on the road from Fayetteville, and northeast of Lectown, was Elk-horn Tavern. From this tavern the Confederates designated the action as the battle of Elk Horn. To the northwest of Lectown an extensive ravine, known as Cross-timber Hollow, crossed the Bentonville road. The camp was protected in the rear by a thick oak scrubbery, which extended to the road on the west. Beyond this was an open field, bounded on the right by a range of hills near Elk-horn Tavern.

On the 5th, General Sigel, at Bentonville, was apprised of the enemy's approach through a scout, and also by a message from General Curtis, which conveyed similar tidings, and ordered his return to Sugar Creek. He promptly dispatched his train of 200 wagons northward, protected by a rear-guard. This guard, consisting of the Thirty-sixth Illinois and part of the Second Missouri, was attacked the next day by greatly superior numbers, and surrounded. But Sigel had remained behind, and succeeded in bringing off his men with an inconsiderable loss. He joined Curtis on the afternoon of Thursday.

Van Dorn had begun to advance on Tuesday. With General Pike's Indian division, his numbers probably did not fall short of 20,000 men. In the newspaper reports of the time they were estimated at from twenty-five to thirty thousand.<sup>1</sup> His march was by way of Fayetteville and Bentonville. Sending only a small force to demonstrate in Curtis's front, his plan was to make a detour to the westward, turning the Federal right, and, if possible, to gain the defile in Curtis's rear. But for Sigel's admirable skill in his retreat from Bentonville, by which he availed himself of the advantages which the nature of the ground afforded for the use of artillery against the enemy, he must have been cut off, his trains captured, and the whole Federal army

placed in a position of great peril. He, however, accomplished a junction with the main army near the western edge of Pea Ridge. Van Dorn had, on the night of the 6th, gained the rear of the Federal army, with Price on his left, fronting southward, and McCulloch on the right nearly opposite Sigel. The position taken by the Confederates compelled General Curtis to change front, after he had been all day engaged in obstructing the approaches on the south side. The new line thus formed was at right angles to the one previously occupied, and extended from Sugar Creek to Cross-timber Hollow. Davis held the centre, Sigel the left, and Carr the right.

The battle of Pea Ridge opened on Friday morning, Van Dorn, concentrated against the Federal right, bearing down heavily upon Carr's division. Curtis, also, had so distributed his force that, while he had three divisions on his right—Carr's, Davis's, and Asboth's—only Osterhaus's division had been left to Sigel. McCulloch endeavored early in the day to move eastward, so as to co-operate with Price and Van Dorn, and thus the action became general. Osterhaus's division, with two of Davis's regiments, moved out a mile beyond Leetown. Three pieces of flying artillery were sent in advance, supported by the Third Iowa Cavalry. This was to delay the movements of the enemy until Osterhaus could come up. But the cavalry and artillery were swept back from the field like chaff before the wind. Farther to the right, Carr was also being driven back toward Elk-horn Tavern. The low brushwood and numerous hollows and ravines afforded shelter to the Confederate troops as they advanced, and enabled them to engage the Federals at close quarters, where their shot-guns, loaded with buck-shot, were more than a match for the best long-range rifle.

The enemy was pressing closely up to the road, which was the only possible avenue of retreat to the Federal army. Once gained in force by Van Dorn, and the day would be lost to the Federals if only McCulloch should hold his own, and prevent Davis and Osterhaus from re-enforcing the right. The battle going on between Leetown and Elk-horn Tavern must decide the event. When the Third Iowa Cavalry had been driven back, and the forces of McCulloch had reached the cover of the brushwood beyond Leetown, Colonel Osterhaus came up and engaged the enemy in a large open field to the left. Then the second brigade of Davis's division was sent in on the right, but was soon driven back. The enemy had gathered in large force on this part of the field. Here were now several thousand of McCulloch's men, supported by a large body of Indians. Davis's First brigade was with Osterhaus in the open field to the west. This was ordered to change its front and attack in the rear that portion of the enemy which was pressing the Second brigade. This movement was accomplished with good effect, though not until the Second brigade had lost some of its guns, which were soon after recovered by the First. The success of the sortie made by Davis's First brigade allowed the Second an opportunity to recover itself, and the enemy was driven from this part of the field, leaving behind him his killed and wounded. Among the former were General McCulloch and General McIntosh, his second in command. Then two regiments of Sigel's command re-enforced Davis, and were sent in on the right to support Carr. The desperate fight on the left centre had saved the day. Price's men had by night reached the Fayetteville road in Curtis's rear, and Van Dorn made Elk-horn Tavern his head-quarters. But, though victorious on his left, the enemy had been badly defeated on his right, and it was doubtful whether he could sustain his position on the morrow. In regard to the ill success of the Confederate right, it can not be doubted that McCulloch's and McIntosh's death discouraged their troops, and contributed materially to their repulse.

The result of the day, though very unsatisfactory to either army, were especially discouraging to the Federals. The enemy held their line of communications. Their supplies were nearly exhausted. Their mules had been without food for forty-eight hours. There was no escape except by defeating Van Dorn, who had strongly posted himself on the hills commanding the defile northward.

Saturday morning opened from a sky overcast with clouds. The enemy's cannon looked menacingly down upon the Federal encampment from the bold eminences to the northward, 200 feet in height. Batteries and battalions were posted at the base of these hills on either side. The Federal line was again changed, so that Davis held the right, Carr the centre, and Sigel the left. To General Sigel was allotted the most important part of the day's operations. The battle commenced at eight A.M. Sigel opened a heavy cannonade on Van Dorn's position, and advanced around to the left under cover of the fire. The Confederate artillery replied, but without much effect. Davis pushed round on the right, turning the enemy's left. The advantage gained was that the Federal artillery enfiladed the Confederate lines. Some of the enemy's guns were captured, and, to save them all from capture, they had to be withdrawn. Before the battle had lasted two hours, it had terminated in the retreat of the enemy from the field. The Confederates had failed of their object; but, on the other hand, it can not be said that the Federals had gained a very decisive victory. On both sides men and guns had been captured. The loss in killed and wounded on both sides was nearly equal, amounting, in either case, to about 1000.<sup>1</sup> Van Dorn withdrew his forces from the field without molestation.

<sup>1</sup> The Federal force engaged in the battle of Pea Ridge consisted of the following troops: First division, Colonel Osterhaus: Thirty-sixth Illinois, Twelfth Missouri, Seventeenth Missouri, Twenty-fifth Illinois, Forty-fourth Illinois, battalion Third Missouri, two battalions Benton Hussars (cavalry), battalion Thirty-ninth Illinois Cavalry, two batteries of 6 guns each.


Second division, Brigadier General Asboth: Second Missouri, Fifteenth Missouri, Sixth Missouri Cavalry, battalion Fourth Missouri Cavalry, two batteries 6 guns each.

Third division, Colonel Jeff. C. Davis: Eighth Indiana, Twenty-second Indiana, Eighteenth Indiana, Thirty-seventh Illinois, Ninth Missouri, First Missouri Cavalry, two batteries, one of 4 guns another of 6.

Fourth division, Colonel Carr: Fourth Iowa, Ninth Iowa, Thirty-fifth Illinois, Twenty-fifth Missouri, Third Iowa Cavalry, Third Illinois Cavalry (two battalions), Bowen's battalion of cavalry, two batteries of 6 guns and one of 4.

<sup>1</sup> Pollard says 16,000; but he evidently does not include the Indians.





MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF PEA RIDGE.

A. Camp of General Curtis.—B. Route of Sigel from Bentonville.—C. Spot where McCulloch fell.—J. Tableau of Pea Ridge.

The day after the battle, the Confederate commander sent a burial party to General Curtis, under a flag of truce, to ask for the dead left upon the field. The request was granted by the Federal commander, who took occasion to express his regret that he had found on the battle-field many of his dead who had been tomahawked, scalped, and otherwise shamefully mutilated. A few days afterward Van Dorn replied, making a counter-charge that some of his men who had surrendered themselves prisoners of war had been murdered in cold blood by Germans of Sigel's command. Sigel did not deny the charge, but stated, in a communication to General Curtis, that when Elbert's three pieces of artillery were taken, the men serving at the guns were surrounded and shot dead, although seeking refuge behind the horses. "When such acts are committed," said General Sigel in this letter, "it is very natural that our soldiers will seek revenge, if no satisfaction is given by the commander of the Confederate army."<sup>1</sup>

After the battle of Pea Ridge, Van Dorn retreated south of Boston Mount-

Only a few of these regiments were full, a large number of sick having been left behind at Rolla and Lebanon.

The official report of losses was as follows: First division, 144; second division, 119; third division, 329; fourth division, 701; total, 1351, of which 203 were killed. General Van Dorn stated his loss at 600. This does not include the prisoners taken by General Curtis, which the latter claims to have amounted to 1000. Pollard says that Van Dorn took 300 prisoners.

<sup>1</sup> How far General Sigel's account is justified may be inferred from the following extract from a narrative of the battle which appeared a month afterward in the *Richmond Whig*. It was written by an officer of General Price's army. He gives a vivid description of the action on Friday in that part of the field near Lee town, where General McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, which we quote in full:

"After listening some moments to the terrible tumult in the distance" [the writer refers here to the conflict going on near Elk-horn Tavern between Price's column and the Federal right], "suddenly, and within 300 yards of me, two or three cannon opened their brazen throats, hurling their missiles of death through the undergrowth in almost every direction. As the sound of the cannon came the third or fourth time, like the noise in springtime on the marshy margin of a lake, only more shrill, loud, and apparently more numerous than even the frogs, came the war-whoop and hideous yell of the Indians. Here I was unconsciously in the midst almost of McCulloch's charging squadron, and in range of a battery of three guns that were hurling death and defiance at them." [These were the guns of Elbert's flying artillery, which had been sent in advance to arrest McCulloch's progress toward the Federal right centre.]

"The battery was speedily charged and captured, those supporting it being borne backward three quarters of a mile by the impetuous forward press of the Confederates. Their retreat, most of the way, was through a corn-field, down a road upon its borders, but continuing into woods adjacent, full of undergrowth, where the main force of the enemy's strongest wing was posted. Here began the rattling musketry, which soon increased to a Niagara in sound. For hours there was hardly an intermission, save that created by the stunning roar of the cannon, so close that the ears of both parties were deafened. Within this vortex of fire fell McCulloch and McIntosh. At one time, having concluded to make my way to the immediate command of General Price, after passing from the corn-field down to the edge of the woods, just as four of us entered the woods a shell was thrown at us, bursting in our midst. . . . I then went leisurely over the corn-field, and rode back to the deserted guns.

"About forty-five men lay in the space of two or three hundred yards to the rear of the battery, all save one entirely dead, and all but three *Dutchmen*. . . . Here was a sterner feature of war than any I had yet seen. The Texans, with their large, heavy knives, had cloven skulls in twain, mingling blood, and brains, and hair. The sight was a sad one, but not devoid of satisfaction to our own exiles from home and wife. The character of the bloody victims, as denoted by their countenance, betokened victory for the South. I looked upon the faces of many dead enemies that day, and among them all found no expression of that fixed, fierce determination which Yankees describe as belonging peculiarly to the heroic hirelings who enlist for pay to desolate our homes."

ains. General Curtis fell back to Keetsville, where he received re-enforcements from Kansas and Missouri.

While General Curtis was on his march into Arkansas, events of considerable importance, though having no important bearing on the general campaign, were in progress farther westward, in that part of New Mexico which, since February, 1863, has been known as the Territory of Arizona.<sup>1</sup>

This country had a population of whites roughly estimated at 20,000. The Indian population was more than twice as numerous, about half of whom were friendly to the whites, while the other half were hostile. The Apaches, the most hostile of the tribes, had overrun the country several times, and were called "devils" by their own race on account of their fiendish outrages. Although rich in mineral treasure of every sort, the Territory had been but partially developed. This was due to three causes. The principal obstacle was the negligence of the government during the few previous years. The two other unfavorable elements in the way of rapid growth—the hostility of the Apaches and the sterility of the vast deserts—could have been either removed or counteracted if the authorities at Washington had properly appreciated the value of the Territory. The great motive to emigration which existed in the mineral wealth of the country lost its effect upon the people on account of the insecurity of life, which intimidated all except the adventurer, the speculator, and the reckless criminal from settling in a region known from time out of mind as the theatre of Indian massacre. The essential defect was the absence of a military force adequate to protect settlers from pillage and murder.<sup>2</sup> This region of our Western territory has an additional importance from the fact that it furnishes the most convenient route for the proposed Pacific Railroad. While there were great objections to be brought against any of the projected routes, those against this were fewer and of a less formidable character. It was this route, running along the 32d parallel of latitude, that Jefferson Davis very ably advocated in the Senate. It was a much shorter route than any of the others which were under consideration, and it traversed a much milder region. The greatest obstacle was the scarcity of water along the route. Springs were, on an average, over twenty miles apart. In some cases as many as forty miles intervened between one supply of water and another. This scarcity of water was also a considerable obstacle to a continuous line of military posts. But this was a difficulty very easily obviated by a system of artesian wells. Such a system was, indeed, in 1858, in process of construction, in order to facilitate communication across the desert from Fort Fillmore to Albuquerque, and from Fort Union to Santa Fé. The events of 1861 not only interrupted the scheme of the Pacific Railroad route, but for more than a year threatened to deprive the United States of all military occupation of the Territory.

Upon the first outbreak of the Southern insurrection, and even before active hostilities were inaugurated, the revolutionists had their own way in the territory west of the Mississippi. In Arkansas, before that state had seceded from the Union, the United States Arsenal at Little Rock had been seized, with 9000 muskets, forty cannon, and a large supply of ammunition. Fort Smith was captured by the Confederates April 26, 1861. In Texas, General Twiggs, to whom had been committed all the forts and the military property of the United States in that department, had, before the secession of Texas, and without the slightest plea on the score of necessity, delivered up all the posts under his command, together with property which, not including forts and public buildings, was valued at a million and a half of dollars. The troops were allowed to leave the state. When the Ordinance of Secession had been passed, on March 2 of that year, there still remained in Texas a few detachments of Federal troops, and these were made prisoners and re-

<sup>1</sup> The act establishing the Territory of Arizona was approved by the President February 24, 1863. The first section defines the Territory as "all that portion of the Territory of New Mexico situated west of a line running due south from the point where the southwest corner of the Territory of Colorado joins the northern boundary of the Territory of New Mexico, to the southern boundary-line of said Territory of New Mexico."

<sup>2</sup> In his report for 1858, the Secretary of War, John B. Floyd, afterward Confederate general, thus treats of the situation on the Western frontier at that time:

"The whole strength of the army, as posted, consists of 17,984 men, and the actual strength on the 1st of July last was 15,764. In addition to other movements, this force is called upon to garrison 68 forts of a large and permanent character . . . and to occupy 70 posts less permanently established, where the presence of a force is absolutely required. The area over which these forts and posts are spread embraces a circuit of about 3,000,000 square miles, and requires a journey of many thousand miles to visit the principal ones of them."

"The external boundary of our country, requiring throughout a more or less vigilant military supervision, is 11,000 miles in length, presenting every variety of climate and temperature, from the inclement cold of our Canada frontier to the tropical regions of Southern Texas. But the occupation of this long line of frontier is a trifling difficulty in comparison with that of protecting the double line of Indian frontier, extending from the Lake of the Woods to the banks of the Rio Grande, on the east side of the Rocky Mountains, and from beyond the River Oregon on the British frontier, to the head of the Gulf of California on the western slope of those mountains. Superadded to these lines, requiring to be occupied, are the great lines of intercommunication between the Valley of the Mississippi and the Pacific Ocean, which imperatively demand that protection which only the United States troops can furnish. These lines are very long, and are now extremely important, while every year renders them more and more so. From our Western frontier of settlements to those of Northern Oregon the distance is about 1800 miles; from the same frontier to the settlements of California, via Salt Lake, is 1800 miles; from the frontier of Arkansas, at Fort Smith, by Albuquerque, or Santa Fé, to Fort Tejon, is about 1700 miles; and from San Antonio, by El Paso, to San Diego, near the borders of the white settlements, is 1400 miles; constituting an aggregate line of 6700 miles, which ought to be occupied, and which we pretend in some sort to keep open. This simple statement of facts demonstrates, stronger than any arguments could do, the absolute necessity for an increase of the army. . . . If there is a higher duty than that of devolving upon a well-regulated government, it is to afford perfect protection to its citizens against outrage and personal violence; yet this great obligation is not performed by the government of the United States. For a large portion of the year, scarcely a week elapses without bringing us intelligence of some Indian massacre or outrage more shocking than death itself; and it most frequently happens that these acts go unpunished altogether, either from the want of troops for pursuit, or from their remoteness from the scenes of slaughter, which renders pursuit useless. In former times, when the hardy pioneer was allured away from the line of white settlements by fertile lands alone, he scarcely ventured so far as to be beyond succor and protection from those he left behind. But far different is the state of things at present. Our Pacific settlements, with their great inducements of rich lands, salubrious climate, and fabulous mineral treasures, present to the inhabitants of the Atlantic states temptations to emigration which the privations of an intervening wilderness and desert, and continual danger from roving bands of savages, hanging upon their march for many hundred miles together, can not deter them from undertaking. This migration strengthens the natural ties between the Atlantic and Pacific states, and adds immensely to the defensive strength of that remote region. Justice and humanity alike demand protection for these emigrants at the hands of government."





FORT WASHITA.



FORT ARBUCKLE.




FORT DAVIS.






FORT BROWN.



FORT LANCASTER



THE ALAMO, SAN ANTONIO, GENERAL TWIGGS'S HEAD-QUARTERS.



leased on parole. The secession sentiment in Texas had never been violent. In December, 1860, the largest meeting ever held in Austin passed enthusiastic resolutions in favor of the old Union, and the meeting was made the occasion for a gala-day. Governor Houston, in a letter to the commission-



SAM. HOUSTON.

er sent to Texas by the State Convention of Alabama, said that secession would involve civil war and the ruin of our institutions, if not liberty itself. The governor, it seems, from another portion of this correspondence, had some schemes of his own in connection with the future of Texas. "Texas," said he, "has views of expansion not common to her sister states." He proposed to make the conquest of Mexico by the prowess of that single state. He was opposed to holding a State Convention. But the Convention was called, and the sentiment of the people having undergone a rapid change, the vote in favor of secession obtained a large popular majority. The governor endeavored to have the matter referred to the Legislature of the state, which was to assemble on the 18th of March. His reluctant attitude provoked the members of the Convention. It was thought by many that he was opposed to the confederation of Texas with the other Southern states, and favored her setting up for herself. The Convention insisted upon its absolute authority, and declared the act of secession an accomplished fact. State troops were then dispatched to the Rio Grande to occupy the posts abandoned by the Federal troops. Subsequently an ordinance was passed in the Convention, requiring the state officers to appear before that body and take an oath of allegiance to the Confederacy. The governor and secretary of state refusing to comply with this demand, their chairs were declared vacant. Lieutenant Governor Clark then became acting governor of the state.<sup>1</sup> In June all intercourse with the people of the Northern states was forbidden, and all citizens of the latter states were warned to leave Texas within twenty days. During the year 1861 no offensive operations were undertaken by the national government against Texas, with the exception of a bombardment of the Confederate batteries at Galveston in the month of August.

Of the forts surrendered by General Twiggs, the principal ones were Forts Davis, Arbuckle, and Wachita. Fort Davis was situated on the Rio Grande, about 500 miles from San Antonio, in a cañon of the Lympia Mountains. It was in the midst of the most picturesque scenery. On either side, the immense rocks forming the sides of the cañon tower upward to a height of 500 or 600 feet. Fort Arbuckle was on the northern frontier of the state, and Fort Wachita was sixty miles northwest of Arbuckle. It was near Fort Wachita that General Van Dorn had, in 1858, routed the Camanches in a pitched battle. Fort Brown, on the Rio Grande, and Fort Lancaster, on the San Antonio and San Diego mail route, were also included in the terms of

the surrender. General Twiggs had served with great distinction in the Mexican War. He was breveted major general for his gallantry at Monterey, and received a sword from Congress. As a reward for his disgraceful surrender of the United States forts and property in Texas, he received from the Confederacy the command of a major general, and was for a short time in command of New Orleans. He died at Augusta, Georgia, September 15, 1862. The surrender was made to Colonel Ben. McCulloch, who had been selected for this purpose by the revolutionary committee of the state, styling itself the "Committee of Public Safety." McCulloch, also, had served in the Mexican War, and had earned especial commendation from General Taylor in the battle of Buena Vista. He had had a great deal of experience in partisan warfare on the Texan frontier, and had done much for the cavalry service of the United States. As soon as Lincoln's election was known, he had identified himself with the secessionists in Texas. He had 800 men under his command when he received the surrender of San Antonio. He was soon sent abroad to procure arms for the state; but, before he had succeeded in this mission, he was made a brigadier general. His part in the war in Missouri has already been shown in this history. He died, as we have seen, in the battle of Pea Ridge.

Texas, immediately after her accession to the Confederacy, sent forces into all parts of the field to sustain the cause which she had adopted. Three regiments, under Wigfall, Hood, and Archer, were sent to Virginia; two, under Terry and Gregg, to Kentucky; and two, under Green and Lock, to Missouri. By the 1st of November, 1861, there were nineteen regiments in the field, of which seven were disposed of as above stated. Six were dispatched to the coast of Texas. The others were sent to the northern frontier, or were organized for operations in the Territories.

Texas, from her geographical position, became the natural base for operations against New Mexico.<sup>1</sup> The troops designed for the campaign in that country consisted, in November, of three regiments, organized into a brigade under the command of Brigadier General W. U. Sibley. During the previous summer the Confederates had not been idle in New Mexico. In July, although they did not invade the Territory in any formidable force, they created such a panic that nearly all of the Federal military posts were abandoned without a struggle. Forts Breckinridge and Buchanan were abandoned upon the rumored approach of the Texan troops, without any attempt at defense, and even without an estimate of the amount of force likely to be brought against them. The garrisons, numbering about 450 men, started over the mountains eastward to Fort Craig, which was located near Valverde, on the Rio Grande. While they were moving in that direction, the garrison of Fort Fillmore, consisting of nearly 700 men, under Major Isaac Lynde of the regular army, disgracefully surrendered to a force of less than 200 Texans on the 27th of the month. Four months afterward Major Lynde was dropped from the army list as a punishment for his delinquency. The next week after the surrender of Fort Fillmore, Lieutenant Colonel John R. Baylor, commanding the Confederate forces in the southern portion (Arizona) of New Mexico, issued a proclamation taking possession of the Territory in the name of the Confederacy, assuming the title of military governor. Soon after Fort Stanton was abandoned, thus throwing into the hands of the revolutionists property valued at nearly half a million of dollars. Fort Craig was also abandoned. Mesilla became the military capital of Arizona. General Albert Sidney Johnston received from Governor Baylor the command of the Confederate forces in the Territory, which at this time numbered less than 1000 men. On the 8th of September, however, General Johnston became commander of the entire military department of the West, and the charge of the operations in New Mexico was committed to General Sibley, who was preparing a military expedition for the complete conquest of that Territory. Sibley's head-quarters were at Fort Bliss, in Texas.

In the mean time the small Federal force left in New Mexico was under the command of Colonel E. R. S. Canby, who, by a general order of the War Department, was soon after placed at the head of the Department of New Mexico, with his head-quarters at Santa Fé.

The Confederate General Sibley had proposed to reach the field of operations early in September, 1861, but failed to do so, as he explains in his report, "from misunderstandings, accidents, deficiency of arms, etc." He says: "I found myself at this point" [Fort Bliss] "as late as the middle of January, with only two regiments and a half, poorly armed, thinly clad, and almost destitute of blankets. The ranks were becoming daily thinned with those two terrible scourges to an army, small-pox and pneumonia. Not a dollar of quarter-master's funds was on hand, or had ever been, to supply the daily and pressing necessities of the service, and the small means of this sparse section had been long consumed by the force under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Baylor, so that the credit of the government was not as available a resource as it might otherwise have been." Having established a general hospital at Donna Anna, he prepared to move up the Rio Grande, and on the 7th of February reached a point seven miles below Fort Craig, which, together with Fort Stanton, had been retaken by Canby. The latter occupied Fort Craig, the immediate object of the Confederate attack, with a garrison of 2500 men, 1000 of which were regulars.

On the 16th of February Sibley reconnoitred, advancing to within a mile of the fort. Finding the latter too strong to be attacked, and the Federal commander declining a battle in the open field, he determined to cross the Rio Grande below the fort to the east bank, to turn the Federal position, and thus compel an engagement. It was supposed in the fort that Sibley was withdrawing his force, especially as Colonel Canby's scouts had declared it

<sup>1</sup> A few months after these events the ex-governor declared the act of secession justifiable and necessary.

"The life of General Houston is full of romance and adventure. He was born in Virginia, March 2, 1793; taken by his widowed mother to Tennessee while yet a boy; abandoned school because he could not agree with his teacher about his studies; ran away from a store, employment in which was too confining for his tastes; lived among the Indians as an adopted son of one of their chiefs for three years; returned home; entered the army as a private at the age of twenty; earned by his bravery promotions and the lasting friendship of General Jackson, under whom he served; obtained the appointment of Indian Agent, in which office he distinguished himself by his zeal in preventing the importation of negroes through Florida, then a Spanish province, into the States; resigned his commission in the army; studied law six months; was forthwith elected prosecuting attorney, and honorably acquitted himself in this position; gained such popularity as to obtain almost without opposition any office the State of Tennessee could give him: was elected, first, major general of militia, the representative to Congress, then twice governor of the state; in 1829 separated from his wife, resigned his gubernatorial office, left Tennessee forever to make his home thenceforth with the Indians; proved a faithful and valuable friend to them; accomplished the removal of several Indian agents for fraud; wearied in turn of this half savage life, emigrated to Texas; assumed at once a prominent position in this then nebulous republic as general in chief of all her forces; defeated and captured Santa Anna, and secured the independence of the state in a brief but brilliant campaign; left the military command of the Lone Star Republic to accept its presidency; proved himself as able and efficient in managing its civil affairs as he had in wielding the sword; represented her subsequently for two successive terms in the Senate of the United States; left the Senate only to be made governor; and continued, until a short period previous to his death, the most popular, as he certainly was the most able, man which the state contained."—*Harper's Magazine*, vol. xxx., p. 581.

<sup>1</sup> In speaking of New Mexico, it will be well understood by the reader that Arizona is included under that designation, since the events of which we write occurred over a year before the territorial organization of Arizona.





impossible for the enemy to advance through the sand-hills on the east side of the river. In truth, General Sibley, by crossing, had placed his army in an unfavorable situation, as his camp was destitute of water, which could only be obtained by gaining a point above the fort. The Confederates crossed on the 20th. The day before, Canby had ordered his regulars—the Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Infantry—together with Colonel Kit Carson's and Pino's regiments—also to cross the river and occupy an elevation opposite to and commanding Fort Craig. On the 20th he sent across some cavalry and artillery to cover the infantry. An engagement followed, which was confined to the artillery, but in the course of which Pino's regiment became demoralized, and the entire force had to be withdrawn to the fort.

The Confederates were without water all day, and their animals, suffering extremely from thirst, became exhausted, and so completely broken down that the wagons could not be moved. It was now of the utmost importance that a Federal force should cut off the approach of the enemy to the river at Valverde, where was the only supply of water in the vicinity. For this purpose, the regulars, with Carson's regiment, some cavalry, and two batteries, were moved up the west bank in that direction, but, upon arriving at their destination, it was found that the Confederates had already anticipated them. The batteries were opened upon the enemy, compelling his retreat with considerable loss. The Federals crossed to the east bank, and encountered the full strength of Sibley's command, which now made a desperate stand, and there followed the action known as the battle of Valverde.

Colonel Canby came upon the field at noon with Pino's regiment of New Mexicans, which had occasioned so much disorder on the previous day. The forces engaged on both sides were nearly equal, in either case amounting to a little over 1500 men. The earlier part of the battle was little more than an artillery duel. The two Federal batteries were situated, one of them, Lieutenant Hall's, on the right, and the other, Captain McRae's, on the left. The latter, about two P.M., was advanced toward a wood which covered the enemy's right. A furious charge was made by the Texans, under Captain Lang, against this battery. His regiment was thinned at every step by successive volleys; but it still pressed on, picking off the gunners, one by one, with shot-guns and pistols, until only two men remained to man the guns. The force detailed to support McRae could not be brought up. Captain McRae had fallen; and soon the impetuous advance of the enemy decided the contest in this part of the field. The battery was captured, and no attempt was made for its recovery. On the right a similar attempt was made against Hall's battery, but the latter was gallantly supported by Carson, and the enemy at this point was repulsed. But the confusion on the left, consequent upon the loss of McRae's battery, made it necessary that Canby should withdraw from the field. He retired upon the fort in good order. The Federal loss in this battle was estimated at about 200; that of the enemy somewhat less.

Not being in a condition to assault Fort Craig, General Sibley moved northward against Albuquerque and Santa Fé, which were evacuated by the Federals. About the same time, Tucson, near the southern border of the Territory, was occupied by a band of roving guerrillas under Captain Hunter. From this point Hunter advanced northward toward the Pimo villages, and even threatened Fort Yuma, on the California boundary. The hostile Indians united with the Confederates, and the whole Territory, with the exception of the strong forts held by the Federal troops, was devoted to rapine and murder.

General Canby, in March, was able to take the offensive. After successful skirmishes with the Confederates at Apache Pass and Pigeon's Ranch,

he threatened Albuquerque, the enemy's principal dépôt of supplies. This movement compelled Sibley to evacuate the Territory, leaving his sick and wounded behind in the hospitals at Santa Fé, Albuquerque, and Sorocco. The Confederates had, by their outrages upon peaceful citizens, exasperated the inhabitants and made them bitter enemies. This doubtless hastened their retreat into Texas, which, under the steady pressure of the Federal force in their rear, was a succession of disasters. As they withdrew, Fort Fillmore, Fort Bliss, and El Paso were immediately occupied by the Federals under the command of General Carleton, who, being now re-enforced by troops from California, was enabled to hold the Territory against the enemy, and turn his attention to the conquest of the hostile Apaches.<sup>1</sup>

After the battle of Pea Ridge, the military operations of either army in Arkansas were not especially significant. About a month after that battle, it was supposed that Price was moving toward Springfield. This led to a temporary withdrawal of the Federal army from Arkansas. But early in May General Curtis was again penetrating the state by a more easterly route. Moving southward from Salem, he occupied Batesville, on the White River. Be-

tween Batesville and Little Rock, on the Arkansas, was a distance of nearly eighty miles. This latter point, the capital of the state, was the object of the Federal advance. As Curtis moved in that direction, there was great excitement in the capital. Governor Rector, on the one hand, upbraided the Confederate government for having made no provision for the defense of the state, while, on the other, he frantically appealed to the Missourians and Texans to come to the rescue. He said: "It was for liberty that Arkansas struck, and not for subordination to any created secondary power, north or south. Her best friends are her natural allies, nearest at home, who will pulsate when she bleeds, whose utmost hope is not beyond her existence. If the arteries of the Confederate heart do not permeate beyond the east bank of the Mississippi, let Southern Missourians, Arkansians, Texans, and the great West know it and prepare for the future. Arkansas lost, abandoned, subjugated, is not Arkansas as she entered the Confederate government; nor will she remain Arkansas, a Confederate state, desolated as a wilderness. Her children, fleeing from the wrath to come, will build them a new ark, and launch it on new waters, seeking a haven somewhere of equality, safety, and rest."

But the governor does not appear to have rallied about him any formidable forces of resistance. He soon took a hasty departure from the capital, and the executive government passed over to the martial authorities. The pressing need of men in Tennessee had depleted the Confederate armies of the Southwest almost to the last extremity of weakness. But, on the other hand, the importance of the Tennessee campaign to the Federal cause also reduced Curtis's army to such an extent that he was forced to abandon the campaign against Little Rock. Thus there occurred a lull in the trans-Mississippi campaign, which was only partially disturbed by frequent military expeditions. The principal one of these was that undertaken in June, after the capture of Memphis, up the White River. The object of this expedition was to open communication with the army of General Curtis. Four gunboats—the St. Louis, Mound City, Lexington, and Conestoga—accompanied by a transport having on board Colonel Fitch's Indiana regiment, moved up the river toward St. Charles. The Mound City led, and, as it approached St. Charles, received the fire of two concealed batteries. The troops from



TUCSON, ARIZONA.

<sup>1</sup> At the close of the official report of his operations in New Mexico, General Sibley says: "In concluding this report . . . it is proper that I should express the conviction . . . that, except for its political geographical position, the Territory of New Mexico is not worth one quarter of the blood and treasure expended in its conquest. As a field of military operations it possesses not a single element, except in the multiplicity of its defensive positions. The indispensable element, food, can not be relied on. During the last year, and pending the recent operations, hundreds of thousands of sheep have been driven off by the Navajoes. Indeed, such were the complaints of the people in this respect, that I had determined, as good policy, to encourage private enterprises against that tribe and the Apaches, and to legalize the enslaving of them."





JOHN M. SCHOFIELD.

the transport were landed with the purpose of taking the batteries in the rear, when a ball from the bluff penetrated the casement of the Mound City, and passed through her steam drum. The result was that only 23 out of a crew of 175 escaped scalding. A scene of great confusion followed. Frantic with pain, men leaped into the water, and some of them were drowned. Boats sent to their relief from the other vessels were fired upon with grape and canister with fearful effect. But Colonel Fitch, hearing of the accident, only pressed his regiment more rapidly forward, and carried the batteries at the point of the bayonet. But the expedition failed of its main object, and General Curtis, on the 24th of June, evacuated Batesville, and by the middle of the next month had securely established a new base at Helena, on the Mississippi, about fifty miles above the mouth of White River. The events of the year from this time resolve themselves into a bare chronicle. On the 19th of September General Curtis was called to the command of the Department of Missouri, which was so defined as to comprehend Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas. General Steele, who had arrived at Helena with a division of troops, then assumed the command of that post.

About this time the Confederate forces in Arkansas numbered probably 25,000 men. General Hindman, with about 5000 men, covered Little Rock

on the north side. At Batesville there were 2000, under McBride. Holmes held Little Rock itself with 2000 men. Farther down the river, near Pine Bluff, Roan had 5000. Rains held the northwestern part of the state with four or five thousand. Between these scattered detachments and the Federal forces there was an occasional encounter of arms. Sometimes the Confederates would group together in small detachments, and, marching into Missouri, would there unite with irregular banditti for the purposes of plunder or guerrilla warfare. When Curtis assumed command of the department, an army, styled the "Army of the Frontier," was organized under General John M. Schofield, whose object was to subdue guerrilla bands, and generally to co-operate with the other forces in the trans-Mississippi district. Just at the close of October, a portion of this army, under Generals Herron and Totten, and numbering six or seven thousand men, came into collision with the Confederates in Southwestern Arkansas. The battle was fought near Fayetteville Hollows, a few miles north of Boston Mountains. Totten, with the main column, advanced from Osage Springs, while Herron, with another column, started from Cross Hollows, with the design of striking the flank of the enemy, who was thought to be in the vicinity of Fayetteville, seventeen miles distant. Herron had a force of less than a thousand men, made up chiefly of cavalry, imperfectly equipped. It turned out that this force had alone to contend with a much superior force of Texan Rangers; but, notwithstanding the disparity of numbers, the enemy was driven four miles. In the same vicinity, just one month later (November 28, 1862), there was a small skirmish at Cane Hill, between three Federal brigades, under General James G. Blunt, and a force of Confederates, made up of Marmaduke's men, considerably re-enforced by guerrillas. This also resulted favorably to the Federals.

A few days afterward there was a more stubbornly contested action at Prairie Grove, a short distance northwest of Cane Hill. After the battle of Cane Hill, General Blunt had held the country in the immediate vicinity of the battle-field, that being the great wheat and corn growing district of the state. The Confederate forces were strongly re-enforced by bringing up the several detachments scattered over the state, and were commanded by General Hindman. These forces may be roughly estimated at 15,000. Hindman, with great promptness, advanced northward to cut General Blunt off from his communications. Blunt, at the first notice of this movement, sent for General Herron, who was at Wilson's Creek with the second and third divisions of Schofield's army. Herron moved at the instant, and in three days had marched over a hundred miles. In the mean while Blunt remained at Cane Hill, and the enemy slipped by him on his flank, thus gaining a position which, while it was strong against either Blunt or Herron, also enabled him to prevent their conjunction. It was, however, a position favorable to the Federal generals, on the simple condition of the ability of both to participate in the critical battle.

On the morning of December 7 Herron had reached Fayetteville, and, resting for an hour, pressed on along the road from that place southward. Up to the previous night he had kept up communication with Blunt, but that was now broken off, for Hindman was planted between them, and hoped to fight them in succession. It was Sunday morning; "a more beautiful morning or a grander sunrise," says Herron, "I never beheld;" but it inaugurated a day of bloody, terrible battle. Herron had sent 3000 cavalry to Blunt's support, and now his own need of such a force was most urgent. Part of his infantry and artillery must be detailed to guard his train of 400 wagons, leaving him, at his own estimate, only 4000 available men. As he came out on the prairie by the mountain road seven miles south of Fayetteville, the Arkansas cavalry, which had the advance, came "dashing back in great disorder." His army and Hindman's had met, having, as a newspaper



BATTLE OF ST. CHARLES, ON WHITE RIVER, ARKANSAS.





JAMES G. BLUNT



FRANCIS J. HERRON.

correspondent remarked, run together like two locomotives. Hindman's advance was pushed back on his main lines, which were found posted on a long ridge by a creek, and in Herron's immediate front. The Federal commander decided to attack, trusting that Blunt, who could not be more than ten miles away, would hear the booming of artillery, and attack in time to decide the contest in his favor. By ten o'clock the crossing began under cover of several batteries. Herron was fortunate in his artillery, as also in the superior discipline of his command. The contest went on fiercely on his left. A battery of the enemy, strongly posted on a hill, was captured, and then the position had to be abandoned. A counter-charge was ordered, but the Confederates could not stand up in the face of Herron's guns. Here, with varying fortune, the fighting was kept up till long after noon, and as yet nothing had been heard from Blunt.

General Blunt, when he first heard the sound of battle, a little after noon, was more than five miles from the scene of conflict. At two o'clock he was upon the field. He found the enemy on the ridge across the Fayetteville road. "On the north, and in front of the enemy's lines," says he, in his report of the battle, "was an open valley, divided into large fields, a portion of them cultivated in corn. At the east end of this valley, General Herron, with the second and third divisions, was engaged with the enemy." Blunt's column entered the valley at its western extremity, on the left wing of the enemy. Hindman was thus engaged in front and rear at the same time; but his force, though divided, was yet strong in each part. Between his and

Blunt's position there was a piece of woods, into which the greater part of Blunt's column was thrown. From three o'clock until nightfall there was no interruption of the battle. Both Herron's and Blunt's commands slept on their arms all night, prepared to renew the contest on Monday; but, under cover of the darkness, the enemy slipped away, and retreated across the Boston Mountains. The loss on both sides was severe; in Herron's command alone amounting to little less than a thousand. Blunt came upon the field later, and fought under less disadvantage, and suffered less severely. The Federal artillery had been worked with promptness and accuracy, and with terrible effect against the enemy, whose loss exceeded that of the Union army. The Confederates acknowledged that Hindman had been defeated. At the close of the month Blunt advanced south of Boston Mountains and took possession of Van Buren without any considerable resistance.

Early in 1863 a force of the enemy, under General Marmaduke, moved on Springfield, Missouri; but that place had been so carefully provided for against attack by General Browne that the Confederates were repulsed.

The military situation in Missouri was closely interwoven with the political. General Fremont's well-known political history, and his self-committal from the first to an anti-slavery policy, had excited against him the prejudices of the Missourians. His policy had been unwise, because it was both partisan and premature. When General Halleck was sent to take his place, in November, 1861, he was especially instructed to shape his political course in such a manner as to prove that President Lincoln's administration was committed, not to the abolition of slavery, but to the suppression of armed treason. To such a course Halleck steadfastly adhered so long as he was commander of the department. The necessity of severe military restrictions rendered political tolerance indispensable. Even after the Confederate armies were driven out of the state, there were thousands of citizens who still sympathized with the Confederate cause, and who were willing to sacrifice much for its success. Against these there could be only severity in so far as they gave actual aid to the enemy. But there were also thousands of citizens thoroughly loyal to the United States government. Severity against these, and in regard to points not involved in the main issue of the war, could not fail to alienate many of them from their adherence to the government, and drive them over to its opponents. In a state rent with intestine faction, it was wise to compose the strife so far as this could be done consistently with the simplest interpretation of loyalty.

With General Halleck the only test of loyalty was support of the government. Those who could not stand this test were singled out and treated as enemies. Any one was at liberty to think as he chose of slavery, but it fared hard with those who stumbled at the oath of allegiance. His measures against those found in arms against the government within the state, or contributing in any way to the comfort of the enemy, were justly severe. He ordered that all persons within his lines who, disguised as loyal citizens, were found giving information to the enemy, should be shot. Union families, crowding into St. Louis from all parts of the state, were quartered upon avowed secessionists. All the municipal officers of the city were required to take the oath of allegiance. His government, while it mulcted and punished the disloyal, yet protected them against all unauthorized violence. There could be no seizure of private property except on the plea of strict military necessity, and even in this case, if it was unauthorized, it was pun-








ISSUING PASSES AT ST. LOUIS.

ished with death. No arrests were made except upon definite and substantial charges. No slaves were taken from their masters except in cases where the latter were disloyal, and had used their slaves, or permitted them to be used for disloyal purposes. No fugitive slaves were admitted into his camps. Martial law was strictly enforced. All civil authorities attempting to interfere with the execution of any order from the head-quarters of General Halleck were arrested and punished. An order was issued requiring all publishers of newspapers, those of St. Louis excepted, to furnish General Halleck a copy of each issue for inspection, under penalty of having their papers suppressed. The officers of mercantile associations were required to take the oath of allegiance to the Federal government. The president and faculty of the University of Missouri, and the officers of all the railroad companies in the state, were required to take the same oath. Lawyers were not allowed to practice before submitting to the oath. The oath of allegiance was made the test of the privilege of suffrage at elections. Citizens who, as such, engaged in acts of hostility, were treated with marked severity. The arrest and trial of some persons apprehended for destroying railroad bridges and other property became the occasion of a correspondence, in which General Price insisted that these men should be treated as prisoners of war. General Halleck replied that no orders of General Price could save from punishment spies, marauders, and incendiaries; that if armed forces in the garb of soldiers, and duly organized as legitimate belligerents, destroyed

railroad bridges as a military act, they would be treated as prisoners of war; but that soldiers in the garb of citizens must suffer the usual penalties inflicted upon citizens for their crimes. In accordance with this response, eight persons, who were convicted of the crime of destroying the railroad bridges, were shot in the month of February, 1862. After the Federal victories in Tennessee, and the expulsion of Price from the southern border of the state, the military regulations hitherto in force were somewhat relaxed. During the remaining portion of General Halleck's career the disturbance from guerrillas was inconsiderable. General Schofield assumed the command of the department June 1, 1862, which position he resigned in September to General Curtis.


While Grant and Buell were preparing for an advance southward from Nashville, and Curtis was carrying on his campaign west of the Mississippi, General Pope and Commodore Foote moved upon the enemy's works at New Madrid and Island No. 10. The conflict on either side of the river was not more important than that for the possession of the river itself. Columbus had to be surrendered as the consequence of the capture of Donelson, but the new positions occupied by the Confederates at Island No. 10 and New Madrid were southward from Columbus only from twenty-five to thirty-five miles. The enemy determined to fall back step by step, in this way preventing the Federal gun-boats from establishing a connection with Farragut's fleet at the mouth of the river.



THE CAMOUFFLET RUNNING THE CONFEDERATE BATTERIES AT ISLAND NO. 10.



Island No. 10 is situated in a bend of the Mississippi, on the Tennessee border, and although ten miles above New Madrid on the river, is south west of that place. New Madrid is on the Missouri shore. It was upon this island that the Confederates had erected their principal fortifications, which consisted of eleven earth-works, mounting seventy heavy guns. At New Madrid there was a bastioned earth-work mounting fourteen guns, and in the upper part of the town a battery of seven pieces. The line of intrenchments between the upper and lower work constituted the defense of the



A MORTAR

place. These works were occupied by five regiments of Confederate infantry, with several companies of artillery. In the river the enemy had also six gun-boats, carrying from four to eight guns. The Confederate General McCown commanded the troops holding New Madrid.

New Madrid, being below Island No. 10, and its possession cutting off that island from its natural communication southward, was the first to be attacked. General Pope appeared before the town on the 3d of March, but had no

heavy artillery, and no means of contending with the naval force in the river. While awaiting the arrival of his large guns, he posted a battery at Point Pleasant, twelve miles below, thus cutting off McCown from reinforcements and supplies from the South. This battery had, of course, to be mounted with small guns, and, as a protection against the heavier artillery of the Confederate gun-boats, the guns were placed in sunk batteries, between the rifle-pits, which afforded protection to a thousand infantry. Thus invested on the south side, McCown drew reinforcements from the island. The number of his command was nearly doubled, and three additional gun-boats increased the naval force, which was under the command of Commodore Hollins.

After waiting over a week, Pope received his siege guns from Cairo, which were, on the night of the 12th, placed within 800 yards of the enemy's main fortification, commanding the work and the river above it. At daylight the batteries were opened, and the fire of four heavy guns was concentrated upon the gun-boats with such effect as to disable some of them: also three guns in the enemy's land-works were dismounted. The only impression made by the Confederate batteries on Pope's lines was in the injury done to one gun, attended by the wounding of eight men, and in the loss of three men in an Ohio regiment. The result of the day's operations convinced the Confederate commander that it was useless to attempt farther resistance at that point, for General Pope was already about to cut off the line of retreat. McCown therefore abandoned New Madrid on the night of the 13th, leaving his dead unburied, and all his stores and ammunition, and even the knapsacks of his soldiers, and fell back upon the island. In regard to the military property abandoned by the enemy, the testimony of General Pope is that it included "all their artillery, field batteries, and siege guns, amounting to thirty-three pieces, magazines full of fixed ammunition of the best character, several thousand stand of inferior small-arms, with hundreds of boxes of musket cartridges, tents for an army of 10,000 men, etc." Untouched suppers, candles left burning in the tents, and the general appearance of the encampment, indicated that the retreat had been effected with unceremonious haste.

The Confederate force was now concentrated on the island. General Pope's occupation of New Madrid secured a perfect blockade of the river, and the defenders of Island No. 10 were too far removed from the main army under Johnston to receive any help from that source. The island, moreover, was not a good defensive position. It is flat, and commanded by the high ground on the left bank of the river. Its defenses had been constructed under the superintendence of General Beauregard, who, at the last moment, on the 5th of April, turned the command over to General McCall.

On the 14th of March, the day of the capture of New Madrid, Commodore Foote moved from Cairo with an armament consisting of eight gun-boats, all iron-clad except the Conestoga, and ten mortar boats, lashed to steamers.<sup>1</sup> Two regiments of infantry accompanied the expedition, which reached a point about four miles above Island No. 10 on the morning of the 15th. The next day a bombardment commenced, which continued until the 7th of April. The great point to be gained was the rear of the fortifications, which Beauregard had erected on the high ground commanding the island. To

<sup>1</sup> These mortar boats were constructed at St. Louis at the suggestion of General Fremont. They were about 60 feet long and 25 feet wide, surrounded on all sides by an iron plate bulwark six or seven feet high. The weight of the mortar itself was 17,210 pounds. Its bore admitted easily a 13-inch shell. From the edge of the bore to the outer rim was 17 inches. The weight of the mortar bed was 4500 pounds; that of the shell, filled with wet sand, was 230 pounds; filled with powder, 215 pounds.



MORTAR BOATS IN PROCESS OF CONSTRUCTION.









ISLAND NO. 10 AFTER THE SURRENDER.

effect this, it was necessary that Pope should have transports to convey his troops from New Madrid to the Tennessee shore. Opposite Island No. 10, on the Missouri side, was a peninsula called Donaldson's Point, which widens inland. From New Madrid across the widest part of this peninsula Wilson's Bayou extends for about eight miles. Terminating in a large pond, it is only four miles distant from another pond which opens out into the river some distance above New Madrid. It occurred to General Hamilton, a subordinate of General Pope, that, by means of a canal, which should take advantage of the bayou and traverse the land between the two ponds, transports might be brought from Foote's fleet to New Madrid. This canal was undertaken, and cost the troops very much labor. It was twelve miles long, and for half of that distance it passed through heavy timber, which had to be sawed off by hand four feet under water. In this way the transports were brought through. But there was now another obstacle to the passage of the troops. From Tiptonville to the fortifications east of the island McCall had erected batteries commanding the river. It was necessary to have gun-boats to cover the passage. These fortunately succeeded in running the enemy's batteries on the island, the Carondelet on the 4th of April, and the Pittsburg on the 6th. These soon silenced the hostile works along shore, and by midnight on the night of the 7th the army was on the west bank of the Mississippi. "The passage of this wide, furious river by our large force," says General Pope, in his official report, "was one of the most magnificent spectacles I ever witnessed." Pope and Foote were now masters of the situation. The latter had been shelling the island for three weeks. During this bombardment the bursting of a rifled gun on board the St. Louis had killed and wounded fourteen men.

There was no battle. As soon as the crossing of Pope's command was ascertained, the Confederates withdrew from the island. Not a single life had been lost by Pope's army. There were captured three general officers, over 100 heavy siege guns, twenty-four pieces of field artillery, and several thousand stands of arms. A floating battery of sixteen guns was also taken, which had been brought from New Orleans to Memphis, and thence to Island No. 10. The prisoners, according to General Pope's estimate, including those taken on the main land, numbered 6700, including 273 field and company officers. Although the victory was bloodless, yet no battle-field had hitherto yielded so large results in captured material. The disaster to the Confederates was the more mortifying from the fact that, during the long siege, daily bulletins from the commanding general had assured them that the position was impregnable to the naval attack in front and unassailable in the rear. There appears to have been no knowledge on the part of the Confederate officers that the canal was being constructed on the west side of the river. The crossing of the Federals from New Madrid had all the effect of a surprise, which was followed by a panic, and those who escaped in the general confusion suffered very much from hunger and fatigue.

The same day that Island No. 10 was surrendered, the issue of the battle of Shiloh was being determined, more than 100 miles distant, on the banks of the Tennessee.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### FROM DONELSON TO VICKSBURG.—OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, TENNESSEE, AND NORTHERN MISSISSIPPI.

The Confederate Military Situation early in 1862; Lack of Munitions of War; Expiration of Terms of Enlistment.—Davis's War Policy an Offensive-defensive Policy.—Confederate Plans of Operation.—Bragg and the Army of the Mississippi.—Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.—General Grant's Position; Lack of defensive Preparations.—Confederate Success of April 6th.—Arrival of Re-enforcements.—Defeat of the Confederates.—Halleck's Arrival at Pittsburg Landing; Reorganization of the Army.—Advance against Corinth.—Colonel Elliott's Expedition.—Capture of Memphis.—Naval Contest on the River.—Mitchell's Campaign in Northern Alabama.

Kirby Smith and Bragg North of the Tennessee.—Guerrilla Warfare.—John Morgan.—Invasion of Kentucky.—Battle at Richmond, Kentucky.—Excitement in Cincinnati and Louisville.—Kirby Smith's Proclamation.—Bragg's Movements; Capture of Manfordsville; the Race for Louisville.—Buell's Army at Louisville.—Tragic End of General Nelson.—Bragg's Proclamation to the People of the Northwest.—Junction of the two Confederate Armies.—Bragg's Retreat.—Battle of Perryville.—Evacuation of Cumberland Gap.

Grant's Army in Northern Mississippi.—Battles of Iuka and Corinth.—Grant's Advance along the Central Mississippi Railroad.—General Hovey's Expedition.—Confederate Occupation of Holly Springs.

Rosecrans in command of the Department of the Cumberland.—His Campaign for the Defense of Nashville.—Battle of Murfreesborough, or Stone River.—Retrospect of Political Events in Tennessee.—Governor Johnson's Administration.


**A**FTER the evacuation of Nashville, Albert Sidney Johnston's army had fallen back to Murfreesborough. This position covered the approach into East Tennessee. The Federal plan of the campaign clearly did not contemplate an advance in that direction, for, although such an advance would afford relief to many suffering Unionists, still, for that reason alone it was not worth while to forego certain obvious military advantages connected with a campaign pushed directly southward toward Corinth. The principal of these advantages was the celerity of movement which was possible in an advance up the Tennessee River, and there was added to this the greater facility of obtaining supplies. An attempt was made by the Confederates to anticipate this advance by the fortification of Pittsburg Landing, a few miles from the southern border of Tennessee. This attempt was frustrated by the prompt action of two of Foote's gun-boats securing that point as a base of operations for General Grant's column, which advanced about the middle of March. This column consisted of five divisions, under Smith, McClelland, Wallace, Sherman, and Hurlbut. The two latter, made up chiefly of Ohio troops, had been added since the capture of Donelson. It took eighty-two transports to convey this army with its material of war. Savannah, a few



miles below Pittsburg, was made the grand dépôt for supplies, which were drawn from St. Louis and Cairo. General Buell's army had its headquarters at Nashville, on the Cumberland, more than a hundred and twenty miles distant. Both armies were now under a single department, created by the President's order of March 11, and designated the Department of the Mississippi. To this department also belonged General Pope's command, and General Hunter's, in Kansas. The supervision of the Department of the Mississippi was given to General Halleck.

In the mean time the Confederate government had been making a great effort to reorganize its military forces in the field. In the first stage of the war troops had been enlisted only for the short period of twelve months, and during the early months of 1862 this term was expiring. Many of these re-enlisted. Calls were issued upon the states—upon Mississippi for seven regiments, upon Alabama for twelve, upon Georgia for 12,000 men, upon North Carolina for five regiments. These new levies, with the re-enlisted men, were all in the field by the 1st of April. All leaves of absence were revoked. Provision was also made for bringing into the army by conscription all able-bodied men between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five; those between these ages already in the army were compelled to remain.

Tennessee being the especial arena of the war in the West, her governor, Isham G. Harris, made extraordinary efforts to bring men into the field from that state. Before February 20 he had organized and put in the field fifty-nine regiments of infantry. He now proposed to "prepare for efficient service in the field the whole military strength of the state." As yet the war had done little toward exhausting the fighting material of the Confederacy. But few sanguinary battles had been fought. It has not been seldom that a single European battle has put out of combat a larger number of men than had been disabled or captured in the Confederate armies before April 1, 1862, and the number of captured had been considerably larger than that of the disabled. Even the most martial class of Southern fighting men, those who were readiest to volunteer, and who became fittest officers in the field, still remained almost intact. The streets of the larger towns and cities of the South were still thronged with able-bodied young men. The Confederate President urged as his plea for conscription not the fact that volunteer service was likely to prove inadequate, but that it confined the burden of the war to the most patriotic class of citizens; he proposed by conscription merely to regulate the supply of force, so that an effective reserve might be held back to await a future exigency.



THE WAR IN KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE.

The principal difficulty now attending the military operations of the Confederates in the West, as in the East, was the lack of munitions. At the beginning of the war the seizure of all Federal forts along the coast had furnished material for a short period of war. But the Federal expeditions directed against important points on the sea-board soon called into requisition all the heavy guns thus captured. The Confederate factories were not yet adequate to supply the pressing demand either for small-arms or heavy artillery. Of the sixty regiments furnished by Tennessee, the government had only been able to arm but 15,000; the rest were armed with old rifles and shot-guns furnished by citizens. At Fort Henry, Donelson, New Madrid, and Island No. 10, hundreds of heavy guns and large numbers of small-arms had fallen into the hands of the Federals. The systematic evasion of the blockade, which, at a later period, contributed largely to the supply of the Confederate armies in war material, did not yet exist. Saltpetre for the manufacture of gunpowder was so scarce, and its possession so completely monopolized by speculators, that the Confederate Secretary of War, on the 4th of February, issued an order that all military commanders should impress the saltpetre in every district where it was found, paying therefor at the rate of 40 cents per pound. Then, again, in regard to the manufacture of light artillery, although there was an abundance of copper, there was not enough tin to convert the copper into bronze. The Ordnance Bureau, therefore, solicited from citizens the use of all bells which could be spared. The reason of this was that bells contained so large an amount of tin in their composition; a ton of bell-metal being sufficient, with the proper amount of

copper, for a battery of six pieces. The bells furnished from Fredericksburg alone sufficed for two such batteries. Beauregard issued a similar notice to the people of the Southwest, which met with a prompt response. The public prints of the South were full of offers made by Southern women to give to the government all the bell-metal which could be gathered from their kitchen furniture. Lead for bullets was also scarce, and one lady sent the lead weight attached to the striking part of her clock to help supply this deficiency. Subsequently, munitions of war were brought in large quantities from abroad, some of which came through Atlantic ports, and a large quantity by way of Matamoras, on the Rio Grande; so that at the close of 1862 there was no longer any marked deficiency.

The general plan of military operations adopted by Davis, and which now began to be clearly developed, was an offensive-defensive policy; at any rate and always to check the Federal column of advance on a line as far northward as could be safely chosen, and to seize upon every opportunity for a counter-advance which should carry the war into the loyal states—this was the theory upon which the war was to be conducted by the Confederacy. Considering the main purpose of the revolution itself, and the circumstances under which it was undertaken, this policy was eminently wise. The war had been begun, on the part of the revolutionists, to secure the empire of slavery over a vast section of territory; for its support it rested upon the wealth of the slaveholding class, and the power which that wealth gave this class over the poor whites of the South. Undertaken in the interest of wealth and power, it was an unpopular war. The first principle controlling the conduct of the war was that every slave state must be retained within the bounds of the Confederacy, and as much of the Territories as could be held. The second principle was that the war must be removed as far as possible from the Southern states, partly because this would give the Confederacy a bold military front, but chiefly because the people, with the war at their thresholds, and levying upon them its utmost burden of want and horror, could not safely be trusted. With the presence of Federal armies on Southern soil the old Union sentiment would revive, the popular respect for the national flag would return, and the people, in conjunction with the Federal government, would turn the tables against the slaveholders. There would thus be a revolution within a revolution, in which event that class which was most directly interested in the war would suffer the entire burden of loss and shame. If the revolution had been a popular movement, then the problem involved would have been mainly a military one, unem-

barrassed by political entanglements. In that case, the more pressing the demand for sacrifice of property or life, the more firm and sacred would have been the purpose to resist invasion. Under the circumstances, therefore, Davis's plan was wise. Other plans there might have been displaying greater military sagacity, but there was none which promised so much as this one.

This plan was one which we have termed offensive-defensive. But in the early months of 1862 only the defensive features could have been developed, and even these were developed under great difficulties, such as have been already detailed. The armies of the Union immediately available for conflict considerably outnumbered the revolutionary armies. This relation was reversed in a few months by the action of the Confederate conscription law. But this law did not begin to affect the army until early in June. Now every

thing must depend upon the new levies of volunteers.

The defensive plan which, under these circumstances, was adopted by the Confederates, was a simple one. Two routes were open to the Federal advance, along two separate systems of railroad communication. One of these—the Georgia system—centred in Atlanta. The other, which drained the states of Alabama and Mississippi, was connected with the Georgia system by means of the line eastward from Montgomery, had no one vital centre, and its destruction would therefore involve a more complex and extended campaign. The natural approach to the one system was through Chattanooga—to the other through Corinth and Memphis. Buell's army, at Nashville, threatened rather the one; Grant's, at Pittsburg, threatened rather the other. Johnston, so long as he remained at Murfreesborough, covered the approach to Chattanooga, and a large column was being gathered at Corinth to oppose Grant. The Federal armies united would outnumber the Confederate, and this fact favored a concentration either in East or West Tennessee. Almost every military consideration dictated an advance on Corinth from Pittsburg. Johnston, fully aware of these considerations, did not long remain at Murfreesborough.

On the 5th of March, General Beauregard, who had just left Island No. 10 to its fate, assumed command of the Confederate forces in the Department of the Mississippi. In an address to his soldiers issued that day from Jackson, he said that the Confederate losses since the commencement of the war were about the same as those sustained by the national arms, and that for the reverses lately experienced the enemy must be made to atone. He wish-





GENERAL BUELL CROSSING DUCK RIVER AT COLUMBIA, TO RE-ENFORCE GRANT.




SHILOH MEETING HOUSE



PITTSBURGH LANDING





PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH, OR PITTSBURG LANDING.

ed those who shrunk from the task to transfer their arms to braver and firmer hands, and to return home—a request which, at a later period, no Confederate officer would have dared to make lest it should be complied with. Beauregard's army consisted of troops which had been in service for a few months in Tennessee and the adjacent states, to which large additions were daily being made. He had for his associates in command Generals Bragg and Polk, both of whom brought re-enforcements to his commands. Bragg had evacuated Pensacola in January for the more perfect defense of Mobile, and had now brought up a "fine corps of troops" from that city to Beauregard's assistance. Polk brought his entire command, with the exception of the detachment left on the Mississippi. Johnston, too, was already on the march from Murfreesborough with an army of veterans. By the 1st of April the united army was well in hand in the vicinity of Corinth, holding the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads. Beauregard commanded the entire army, which was divided into three corps under Polk, Bragg, and Hardee.

Not until the 28th of March did Buell leave Nashville. Grant's army was located on the south side of the Tennessee River, only eighteen miles from the combined armies of Johnston and Beauregard, who had already perfected their arrangements for an attack. It was three days before Buell's army had crossed Duck River, and then they were ninety miles from Grant. The enemy had every advantage, if he could only bring up his three corps and compel a battle, which must terminate disastrously to the Federal column, so inferior in numbers, at Pittsburg. Why, with this overwhelming advantage, Beauregard did not precipitate a battle with greater promptness, will always be an enigma to the historian. It was known, Beauregard says, in his report of the battle, as early as the 2d of April, that Buell was on his way to join Grant. Orders were issued at one o'clock on the morning of the 3d for the movement, and there were only eighteen miles between Beauregard and Grant. Beauregard might have moved even sooner than this. The only reason he gives for not doing so is the "want of general officers needful for the proper organization of divisions and brigades of an army brought thus suddenly together." He had had nearly a month in which to supply this want, and it is to be supposed that Johnston's column was already properly organized and officered. At least it is certain that the army was no better off in this respect on the 2d than it was two or three days ear-

lier. There was considerable delay in the movement. The orders issued by General Beauregard on the morning of the 3d contemplated that, on the 4th, the three corps would have reached the vicinity of Shiloh Church, so that an attack might be made on the 5th; a not very difficult undertaking, considering the short distance to be traversed. But the delays on the first day were great, and a severe rain-storm on the 4th interposed a farther impediment, so that it was not until late on Saturday afternoon of the 5th that the army reached the intersection of the road from Pittsburg to Hamburg. It must be remembered, however, that the difficulties in the way of Beauregard were also impediments in an equal degree to Buell's march. Yet the latter had arrived at Savannah, seven miles from Pittsburg, with the advance of his army, on the evening of the 5th.

Turning now to General Grant's position, we find it most vulnerable to attack. Pittsburg Landing is a narrow ravine, with high bluffs on either side. Farther back from the river the country is broken and thickly wooded, with here and there an open field. On the very eve of battle we find Grant's army encamped without a single breast-work or a single protection for a battery. The time had not yet come when the armies on either side had learned the all-important lesson of the value of artificial defense; but it was inexcusable that a permanent encampment should have been so entirely destitute of intrenchments. There were two gun-boats on the river—the Tyler and Lexington. Grant's advance line, consisting of three divisions, under Sherman, Prentiss, and McClernand, extended, without any judicious arrangement, from Owl Creek, on the right, to Lick Creek, on the left. The arrangement on the left was extremely faulty. Here one brigade of Sherman's division, under Stuart, was posted beneath bluffs which commanded the position. The rest of Sherman's force was three or four miles distant, away off to the right of Shiloh Church. This gap was only filled by Prentiss's division, as McClernand's was massed close up to Sherman's left and rear. Behind, and nearer the Landing, were the divisions of Hurlbut and Smith. The latter was commanded by W. H. L. Wallace, in the absence of General Smith, who was suffering still from a wound received at the siege of Donelson. At Crump's Landing, some miles below on the river, lay Lew. Wallace's division.

Such was Grant's position when it was attacked by the enemy, Sunday morning, the 6th of April. The attack was made in three lines. The first



was under Hardee, with one of Bragg's brigades; the second advanced in the rear of the first, under Bragg; while Polk's corps, with a reserve, under Breckinridge, in its rear, formed the third. The entire force attacking was estimated by Beauregard as a little over 40,000 men. The first blow, falling upon Prentiss and Sherman, amounted almost to a surprise. The pickets were driven in, and, close upon their heels, the enemy followed. There was the least possible preparation for an attack. Prominent officers were still in bed. Breakfasts were being prepared, as if no such an event as a battle were at hand; and there was an entire lack of readiness in all details. Sherman, although, like the rest, taken by surprise, not having his men under arms until his advance guard had been driven back upon the main body, yet acted with great promptness and coolness. He called immediately to McClernand to come to his support on the left; sent word to Prentiss that the enemy was in his (Sherman's) front in force, and called upon Hurlbut to come up to Prentiss's aid. Leaving out Stuart's brigade, which must, under the circumstances, be left to its separate commander, being on the extreme left near Lick Creek, Sherman's division was drawn up in the vicinity of Shiloh Church. McDowell's brigade held the extreme right, with a battery guarding the bridge on the Purdy road over Owl Creek. Next to the left, and just west of the Corinth road, on which stood Shiloh Church, was Buckland's brigade. Hildebrand's brigade was on the east side of the road, with the church between him and Buckland. In front of Sherman's position ran a creek along his entire line. The position was good for defense, and, if advantage had been taken of it, and an abatis been constructed, the approach of the enemy up the slope to his encampment might have been repelled with ease. As it was, however, there was not even a breast-work, while the woods in front afforded cover to the enemy. Along the road in rear of the church Sherman had eight companies of cavalry, used to service at Donelson. A little after seven o'clock the general rode along his line on the left and became directly exposed to the fire, the enemy having already gained the woods in front, where he was massing his forces for attack. Here his orderly was killed. Apple's regiment—the Fifty-third Ohio—held the extreme left, and was ordered to hold it at all hazards, being encouraged to do so by the presence of a battery on his right, which was supported by three of McClernand's regiments. Two other Ohio regiments were on Apple's left, also having a battery on their right, at the church.

The battle was fairly begun at about eight o'clock in the forenoon. In excellent order, Hardee's columns advanced out of the woods in Apple's front, a portion of them passing obliquely to the left to occupy the huge gap between Prentiss and McClernand, others advancing directly against Sherman, and all covered by a heavy artillery fire from the woods, to which the two batteries already mentioned, in Hildebrand's front, responded. Soon Sherman heard sounds of musketry and artillery away to the left, indicating that Prentiss was engaged. In less than an hour these sounds grew ominous, clearly announcing that Prentiss was falling back. Sherman's own left, too, was being broken. Apple had fired but two rounds when he fell back, and was heard from no more during the battle, the movements of his regiment from this point becoming what Hildebrand, in his report, styles "general." The regiment at his right followed soon, and the battery posted between them was thus compelled to retire, with a loss of three guns, McClernand's three regiments being unable to support it. Hildebrand's own regiment then breaking up completed the rout on the left of the church. This necessitated the retreat of the battery at the church, and the abandonment of Sherman's entire encampment. So complete was the demoralization of Hildebrand's brigade, that the officer commanding saw no more of it that day. A new line was formed by Buckland and McDowell on the Hamburg road, a short distance in rear of camp, but was no sooner formed than it was abandoned with the loss of a battery. The only thing now to be done was to fall back still nearer to the river and close up on McClernand's right. This movement was fortunate for McClernand, who was now being hard pressed. McDowell's brigade was thrown against the enemy's left flank. Here the struggle was maintained until three o'clock P.M., the men taking advantage of every cover which the nature of the ground afforded.

On the left the Confederates met even greater success than on the right. Prentiss, as we have seen, was attacked nearly at the same time as Sherman. At this point, also, the surprise had been more complete than on the right. Prentiss's command consisted of seven regiments, nearly one half of which were from Missouri. The line was formed on the open field, while the enemy were sheltered by woods. On both flanks the Confederate columns advanced. A portion of Bragg's corps came in on Hardee's right. Prentiss was soon driven from his position; his rear was gained by the enemy, and he himself, with nearly half of his division, were captured. Before ten o'clock Prentiss's encampment was in the enemy's possession. Stuart's isolated brigade was now placed in a perilous position. McArthur's brigade, of W. H. L. Wallace's command, started for his assistance, but, coming in too far on the right, became involved in the retrograde movement of Prentiss's division. Stuart was on the Hamburg road, and a column of the enemy which came in on the field by this route attacked him just after he had withdrawn so as to be out of Bragg's way. Unable to hold his position, which was commanded by high bluffs, he fell back from ridge to ridge, making gallant resistance at each point, until at noon he was completely disorganized, and withdrew from the field.

In the mean while the columns which had swept aside Prentiss's division bent their whole force upon McClernand's position. This division was the best and strongest in the advanced line. It numbered twelve regiments, all but one composed of Illinoisans. The other two divisions in front consisted of raw men; but McClernand's division had borne the brunt of the Confederate assault at Fort Donelson, and in some measure was used to the hor-

rors of the battle-field. But having no efficient support on either hand, and the enemy being able to bring forward fresh troops continually, McClernand fell back, though not until he had lost more than half his artillery. His retreat was in good order, bringing him out at length on a line with Hurlbut. Thus by noon the entire Federal advance was driven in, routed for the most part, leaving three large encampments in the hands of the enemy, and having sustained heavy loss in artillery.

Two divisions alone now remained intact, Hurlbut's and W. H. L. Wallace's. These alone barred the victorious foe in front from the depôts of ammunition and the transports. Wallace was now on Hurlbut's left, partially filling up the gap caused by Prentiss's rout. Hurlbut, for the sake of a better position, abandoned his camp and fell to the dense wood in the rear, where from this cover he had an advantage in repelling the enemy's advance across the open fields in his front. Soon after Wallace also fell back, and at half past four o'clock the entire Federal army was crowded into a narrow semicircular area extending about half a mile from the Landing.

For eight hours the battle had lasted, and yet the Confederates, notwithstanding their success, still lacked a complete victory. They could see on every side many of the material fruits of victory, such, indeed, as rarely ever attends a decisive triumph; but the business still before them gave them no leisure to secure these fruits. The work of the day would not be done until the Federals were swept from the field—from the Landing itself—as they had been from their camps. Besides, notwithstanding they had inflicted heavy injuries on Grant's army, their plan of battle had failed. It had been Johnston's design to leave an outlet of escape toward the north down the river, and to drive Grant's army in this direction by massing overwhelming columns against his left. Instead of this, the Federals had fallen back on either side upon the centre, and still presented an obstinate front. One circumstance had especially daunted the Confederates. At half past two o'clock their commander in the field had been killed while leading a charge against Wallace's division. He had received a Minie ball in his leg which severed an artery, and soon died from loss of blood. This had led to some confusion and delay on the most critical part of the field. Beauregard, who was suffering from indisposition, was then obliged to take the field, and, in the mean while, the Federals had fallen back to their last line about the Landing, and organized their scattered commands.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, the deceased Confederate commander, had had a somewhat eventful military career. His military education was completed at West Point in 1820. He served in the Black Hawk War, after which he left the army until 1836, when he emigrated to Texas, arriving there shortly after the battle of San Jacinto. He then entered the Texan army as a private soldier. Soon he superseded General Felix Houston in the chief command. This led to a duel between the two officers, in which Johnston was wounded. In 1838 he was appointed Secretary of War in



ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON.





HAMBURG LANDING.—COMMISSARY DEPUTY ON THE TENNESSEE.

Texas, and the next year carried on a successful campaign against the Cherokees. He warmly advocated the annexation of Texas to the United States. In 1846 he commanded the volunteer Texan Rifles; was six months afterward an inspector general on General Butler's staff. President Taylor appointed him paymaster in 1849 with the rank of major, and upon the passage by Congress of the act authorizing the raising of additional regiments, he was made colonel of the Second Cavalry. In 1857 he was placed at the head of the forces sent to Utah, and was soon made the commander of that district. He resigned his position in the army at the beginning of the civil war, and upon his arrival at Richmond received a general's commission and the command of the Confederate Department of the Mississippi. He died upon the battle-field for lack of prompt surgical attendance. His death was at first carefully concealed from the army, and it was given out that it was not he, but George M. Johnston, provisional governor of Kentucky, who had been killed. The latter, who participated in the battle, was also mortally wounded.<sup>1</sup>

The Federal situation was discouraging, but far from hopeless. W. H. L. Wallace had been mortally wounded. Prentiss, with a good part of his division, had been captured. Half of the artillery of the army had been lost. The river, from Savannah to Pittsburg, was lined with stragglers, who were panic-stricken and unfit for fighting. Lew. Wallace's division of veteran troops, which had been expected all day from Crump's Landing, had mistaken its route, and had not yet reached the battle-field; and the whole army was now buddled together in the vicinity of the encampment which had been occupied by W. H. L. Wallace. The hospitals along the ridge near the Landing were full to overflowing with killed and wounded. All day the battle had been fought without any definite plan; at its opening Grant himself was miles away at Savannah, and when he came upon the field, at ten A.M., he saw nothing better to be done than to oppose the most stubborn resistance to the enemy. But the enemy had done his worst and spent his force. His loss in killed, wounded, and missing nearly equaled Grant's. Grant's depôts of ammunition were still intact, and there was not the slightest doubt on his part that he would be able to hold with perfect ease the line which he had adopted. In this state of affairs General Grant visited Sherman's line. The two generals estimated their loss, and a plan was formed for future operations. The time was to come when these two officers were together to wield the united armies of the republic against the revolutionary forces which now, at the sunset of this 6th of April, were so defiant and confident of success. Grant naturally recurred to the battle of Donelson. He said to Sherman that, at a certain period of the battle, he saw that either side was ready to give way if the other showed a bold front. He

had taken the opportunity, and had ordered an advance all along the line, and the enemy had been beaten. It was just such a crisis now. The two instances were very nearly analogous. At Donelson, Pillow had succeeded in turning the Federal left upon its centre, driving one entire division from its camps. The reverse in the present instance was greater; but here, as before, the enemy had spent his force in exhausting charges, and a few fresh troops would be certain to turn the tide. These were now near at hand under Lew. Wallace. It was then decided that the army, thus re-enforced, should on the morrow assume the offensive.

In the mean time the defensive position at the Landing had been strengthened. All the artillery of the army had been placed by Colonel Webster, Grant's chief of staff, to cover every approach. For some time there had been a lull in the firing. The enemy was marshaling his columns for the final charge of the day. It was not long before these columns approached over the broken ground in front. But the fire from twenty guns checked their advance. They could make no headway against it. Suddenly, too, there burst forth against them a rapid and overwhelming fire from the two gun-boats, which had been waiting all day for an opportunity to share in the battle. This opportunity was now afforded by the position of General Grant's army. This new element in the conflict discomposed the Confederates, who were compelled to withdraw from the field.

That night Beauregard's head-quarters were at Shiloh Church. Just at dark Lew. Wallace came up. A portion of Buell's army had arrived. Buell came to Sherman at the close of the interview between the latter and General Grant, and assured him that he could bring 18,000 fresh men for to-morrow's battle. All night long these men were crossing in the transports. Nelson and Crittenden had been able to get on the field just at the close of the last repulse of the enemy. These divisions were formed near the Landing, in a line perpendicular to the river, stretching up to the Corinth road. This line was continued in the same direction west of the road, where Hurlbut, McClernand, and Sherman took up their position. Among these last three divisions were apportioned the fragments which were left of Prentiss's and W. H. L. Wallace's. Lew. Wallace came in on the extreme right, continuing the line to the neighborhood of Shiloh Church. During the night McCook's division of Buell's army took the position on Crittenden's right, close up to the Corinth road. At nine o'clock it began to rain—a fortunate circumstance for those of the wounded who had been left on the field of battle, and were suffering from thirst. The gun-boats kept up an annoying fire all night, thus depriving the enemy of that sleep which was so necessary in view of the duties to be met in the morning. It was owing to this cannonade that the enemy was found the next morning to have withdrawn from the camps which he had captured on Sunday.

The battle of Monday did not compare either in length or severity with that of the previous day. The advance was along either side of the Corinth road, Grant on the right and Buell on the left. It would have been better, doubtless, if this disposition had been exactly reversed, as in that event the hardest of the fighting would have fallen upon Buell's fresh men; for, while the enemy had yesterday massed against the Federal left, he now directed his heaviest column against the right, which was held in great part by the jaded troops of Grant's army.

Beauregard was now outnumbered, and, although he made a gallant resist-

<sup>1</sup> The following extract from an article published in *Harper's Weekly*, January 30, 1858, shows in what esteem General Johnston was then held in the army:

"Colonel Johnston is now in the matured vigor of manhood. He is above six feet in height, strongly and powerfully formed, with a grave, dignified, and commanding presence. His features are strongly marked, showing his Scottish lineage, and denote great resolution and composure of character. His complexion, naturally fair, is, from exposure, a deep brown. His habits are abstemious and temperate, and no excess has impaired his powerful constitution. His mind is clear, strong, and well cultivated. His manner is courteous, but rather grave and silent. He has many devoted friends, but they have been won and secured rather by the active dignity and nobility of his character than by his powers of address. He is a man of strong will and ardent temper, but his whole bearing testifies the self-control he has acquired. As a soldier he stands very high in the opinion of the army. As an instance of this it may be mentioned that, in a large assembly of officers and gentlemen, the gallant and impetuous Worth, when asked who was the best soldier he had ever known, replied, 'I consider Sidney Johnston the best soldier I ever knew.'"



*Commissary Store Boats.*



*The Interior of a Sanitary Steamer.*



*Landing Cannon.*



*The General Hospital at Hamburg.*



*Morning Siege Guns to our lines.*



GENERAL HALLACK'S ARMY ON THE TENNESSEE.





FORT PILLOW.

ance in the early part of the day, he had by noon brought into action his entire reserve force, and it was evident that he could neither hold his ground nor secure the fruits of yesterday's victory. He withdrew from the field in good order, falling back on Corinth.

We have called the attack on Sunday morning a surprise. General Grant claims that this was not the case, and that, if the enemy had sent him word when and where he would attack, he could not have been better informed. "Skirmishing," he says, "had been going on for two days between our reconnoitring parties and the enemy's advance." It is certain, however, that Johnston's attack had all the practical effect of a surprise. Grant himself admits: "I did not believe that they intended to make a determined attack, but simply to make a reconnoissance." It was just this determined attack, preceded by only a feeble and imperfect warning, which tended more than any thing to the Federal reverse on Sunday. A larger number of Grant's army were new troops as compared with the Confederate army. The enemy had the important advantage of attack also, while Grant's command had not even ordinary advantages in the way of defense. Thus the panic arose. With the exception of McClelland's division, there was not a regiment in the advance line, on the morning of the 6th, which had ever seen a battle, and Johnston gave these men their first impression of the fury of a charge, which came upon them so suddenly as immediately to produce demoralization. It was not the fault of field and company officers that this happened, for these officers did their best to rally their broken regiments, and themselves remained on the field after they had been totally abandoned by their commands.

The battle had no decisive effect on the campaign. The losses were not far from equal on both sides. The Confederate loss Beauregard estimates at nearly 11,000; that of the Federals was about 3000 more; and this difference may be explained by the number of prisoners lost in Prentiss's division. As to the forces engaged, there are no exact official estimates given on the Federal side. Grant had about forty regiments the first day, one fourth of which, at the lowest estimate, were of no use on the field. Buell and Lew. Wallace added to this force, on the second day, about 25,000 men.

added an army which, if we are to believe a statement made to his soldiers by General Bragg, almost equaled "the Army of Shiloh." Bragg's entire address to his soldiers on May 5 indicates that the Confederate army at Corinth was quite equal to Halleck's. He says: "You will encounter him" [the enemy] "in your chosen position, strong by nature and improved by art, away from his main support and reliance, gun-boats and heavy batteries, and, for the first time in this war, with nearly equal numbers." He continues: "The slight reverses we have met on the sea-board have worked us good as well as evil; the brave troops so long retained there have hastened to swell your numbers; while the gallant Van Dorn and invincible Price, with the ever-successful Army of the West, are now in your midst, with numbers almost equaling the Army of Shiloh. We have, then, but to strike and destroy, and, as the enemy's whole resources are concentrated here, we shall not only redeem Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri at one blow, but open the portals of the whole Northwest." It must be admitted that Halleck's army was much superior to Beauregard's in artillery and equipments.

The roads south from Pittsburg were at this season of the year peculiarly difficult. At all times low and marshy, the country was now almost impassable; bridges which the enemy had burned had to be rebuilt; but, on the 3d of May, over comparatively dry roads, the army had advanced to within eight miles of Corinth. This place is twenty miles west of the Tennessee River, and somewhat farther from Pittsburg Landing. It is situated at the intersection of the Charleston and Mobile railroads. Between the small village and the Tennessee the country was broken, the roads across the marshes had been torn up, and the bridges destroyed. In the advance General Pope commanded the left, Buell the centre, and Grant the right; afterward the right was given to Thomas, Grant being made second in command. Pope's division was re-enforced with a division drawn from Curtis's Army of the Southwest. In order to prevent the re-enforcement of Beauregard, and to cut off his retreat, an expedition was sent out under Colonel Elliott, consisting of two cavalry regiments, with orders to strike the Mobile and Ohio Railroad in the vicinity of Booneville, and destroy the track, so as to

Since the Confederates had taken the initiative of attack for the purpose of defeating one of two armies against which, combined, there was little hope of successful defense, and had failed in that purpose, the result of the battle, so far as they were concerned, was equivalent to a defeat. As a test of force it afforded encouragement to the Federal commanders. General Halleck determined to reorganize the armies under Grant and Buell, and to re-enforce them with every regiment that could be spared from other portions of the field. He started from St. Louis the very day after the battle. In less than two weeks after his arrival on the field, General Pope's division, 25,000 strong, had been brought up from New Madrid, and before the close of April the three columns, under their respective commanders, were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to move. The army thus gathered together under Halleck's command numbered more than a hundred thousand men. Beauregard, also, had increased his force by calling Price and Van Dorn from Arkansas, who



COLONEL ELLIOT'S RAM FLEET.





CLOSING SCENE OF THE NAVAL FIGHT BEFORE MEMPHIS.


effectually prevent its use for the next few days. Elliott, it was intended, should then make his way through Northern Alabama, reporting there to General Mitchell at Huntsville. General Mitchell's division of Buell's army, instead of moving with the others to Pittsburg Landing, had, just before the battle of Shiloh, pushed directly south into Northern Alabama. Elliott was partially successful, destroying a large number of locomotives and ears at Booneville.

Notwithstanding the confident tone with which Beauregard and Bragg had both addressed the army, indicating that Corinth must not be abandoned without a desperate struggle, that place was evacuated at the close of May without any considerable conflict with the Federal forces marching against it. Not a piece of ordnance was left behind.

At the time of the evacuation the water was falling so low in the Tennessee River that Halleck could no longer rely upon his water-base, and was obliged to resort to railway communications. This caused great delay, and the enemy were able to withdraw no inconsiderable number of troops eastward for the defense of Richmond, then threatened by McClellan. But to give up Corinth was also to retire from Memphis.


Immediately after the surrender of Island No. 10, Commodore Foote, with his mortar boats and some transports, moved down the river against Fort Pillow. This and Forts Wright and Randolph were the fortifications guarding the approach to Memphis, which was seventy miles below Fort Pillow, and fifty-eight below Fort Randolph. Fort Pillow is situated on the First

Chickasaw Bluffs on the Tennessee shore. These bluffs rise to the height of seventy-five or one hundred feet, and are broken by ravines. This point on the river is the first good position for defense below Island No. 10. The river here makes a wide bend around Plum Point, and immediately below, at the Bluffs, another bend, so that Fort Pillow commands several miles of the river both above and below. Upon the Second Chickasaw Bluffs stands Fort Randolph, with Fort Wright just above, so that these two works take up the line of defense where Fort Pillow leaves it off. Foote established his mortars at Craighead Point, opposite Fort Pillow, and three fourths of a mile distant. The bombardment commenced on the 17th of April by a fire from these mortars upon the fort and a small Confederate fleet in the vicinity of the latter. This attack was repeated daily, without any very sensible effect. In the mean time the Federal gun-boats lay at anchorage just out of range above the fort. There was no possibility of a co-operation of the land forces, at first on account of the height of the water in the river, and afterward because Pope's division was called upon to co-operate in the movement against Corinth. Pope's army of 20,000 men was withdrawn on the morning of the 17th to join Halleck's command at Pittsburg, which step, says Commodore Foote, "frustrated the best matured and most hopeful plans and expectations thus far formed in this expedition." Two regiments only, under the command of Colonel Fitch, were left to co-operate with the flotilla. The plan of attack proposed to be carried out, if Pope had remained, was, that a canal should be built on the Arkansas side, so as to enable the gun-boats and transports to get in the rear and thus cut off the Confederate batteries. Even with the small force left under Colonel Fitch, amounting



COLONEL ELLET'S RAM APPROACHING MEMPHIS.






OLD BATTERY AT THE NAVY-YARD



STEAMBOAT LANDING.



THE COTTON LEVEE.  
MEMPHIS BEFORE THE WAR.





JACKSON'S MONUMENT AT MEMPHIS.

to not more than 1200 men, an attempt was made to carry out this plan, but without success.

The circumstances in which Commodore Foote was placed greatly chafed his spirits. He expected, when he left New Madrid, to be able to capture Memphis within the space of one week, and the departure of Pope's army was, under these circumstances, a bitter disappointment. The wound which he had received at Fort Donelson added to his despondency. On the 14th of April he wrote to Secretary Welles:

"The effects of my wound have quite a dispiriting effect upon me from the increased inflammation and swelling of my foot and leg, which have induced a febrile action, depriving me of a good deal of sleep and energy. I can not give the wound that attention and rest it absolutely requires until this place is captured."

His position was one in which he could not make a formidable attack, and one even which occasioned him apprehension. His force consisted of seven iron-clad and one wooden gun-boat, sixteen mortar boats, "only available in throwing shells at a distance, and even worse than useless for defense," and the small land force under Colonel Fitch. Against him were nine Confederate gun-boats already at Fort Pillow, and ten others reported on their way to Memphis from the Lower Mississippi. He expected soon to hear of the arrival in his front of the heavy gun-boat Louisiana, just being completed at New Orleans. This boat occasioned him some alarm, though he had not much to fear from the others, most of which were wooden, though armed with heavy guns. Fort Pillow, according to his report, had not less than forty heavy guns. "Under these circumstances," he writes, "an attack on our part, unless we can first establish a battery below the fort under the protection of the gun-boats, would be extremely hazardous, al-

though its attempt might prove successful, and even be good policy under other circumstances: but it can hardly now be so regarded, as a disaster would place all that we have gained on this and other rivers at the mercy of the rebel fleet, unless the batteries designed to command the river from below are completed at No. 10, or at Columbus, which I very much doubt. I therefore hesitate about a direct attack upon this place now, more than I should were the river above properly protected." Commodore Foote doubtless retained a vivid recollection of his contest with the water-battery at Donelson. At New Madrid and Island No. 10 every thing had been made to depend upon a movement in the rear of the enemy's works. Such a movement was now scarcely possible. Even the tools necessary for cutting the proposed canal were not at hand, having been removed with Pope's army. Foote's indisposition, early in May, rendered it necessary for him to transfer the command of the Mississippi flotta to Captain C. H. Davis. He returned to the East, and at Washington took the superintendence of the Bureau of Equipment until the summer of 1863, when he was appointed to supersede Admiral Dupont in the command of the South Atlantic squadron. While on his way to that destination he was taken ill, and died at New York on the 26th of June, 1863. His services in the West had been properly appreciated by the people and the government. He had been raised to the rank of rear-admiral, his commission dating from July 16, 1862.

On the 10th of May a naval action took place on the river between the Federal and Confederate fleets. The Confederate squadron consisted, according to Davis's report, of eight iron-clad steamers, four of which were fitted as rams from old New Orleans tow-boats, the upper works of which had been cut away, and their sides protected, in some instances, by railroad iron, and in others by bales of cotton, hooped and bound together by iron bands.



HOISTING THE NATIONAL FLAG OVER THE POST-OFFICE AT MEMPHIS.





HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA.

These rams proceeded up the river and attacked the mortar boats. The gun-boat *Cincinnati*, under Commander Stembel, followed by the *Mound City*, under Commander Kilty, hurried up to the support of the mortar boats. The *Cincinnati* had hardly cut loose from the shore, and was in a position which prevented her from being easily handled, when the most formidable of the rams came up to close quarters. Twice the *Cincinnati* let fly her stern guns at the ram, but without effect, and the latter came against her with great force, although without effecting any serious damage. This blow enabled the *Cincinnati* to move out from shore, when she hurled broadside after broadside against the sides of her grim antagonist. The ram again trusted to her striking power, and the two vessels again struck with a violent blow, and, at the same moment, the ram received a full broadside from the gun-boat alongside, while on both sides there was a free discharge of musketry. At this crisis, and while all around him was in confusion, Commander Stembel shot the pilot on board the ram, and the next moment himself received a severe wound. But the ram was disabled and drifted down the stream. In the mean while the *Mound City* disabled two others of the enemy's vessels. The entire Confederate fleet had withdrawn before the action had lasted an hour. The *Mound City* and the *Cincinnati* were so badly crippled as to need repairing.

Fort Pillow was evacuated on the 4th of June, as a consequence of the evacuation of Corinth. Every thing of any value was either carried away or destroyed. All that now stood between the Federal force and Memphis was the Confederate fleet. Flag-officer Davis started immediately down the river, and, on the morning of the 6th, the enemy's fleet of eight vessels was discovered lying off the levee at Memphis. On both sides preparations were made for an immediate contest. Five gun-boats—the *Benton*, *Cairo*, *Carondelet*, *Louisville*, and *St. Louis*—with two vessels of the ram fleet, the *Queen of the West* and *Monarch*, under Colonel Ellet, moved down the river, the rams getting into action first. The Confederate fleet was ranged in two lines of battle. The contest was not long, lasting little more than an hour, and terminated in the destruction or capture of seven of the enemy's vessels. In the very beginning of the action the General Lovell was sunk by the *Queen of the West*, in the middle of the river, with most of her crew. The *Beauregard* and *Little Rebel* had their boilers blown up; the former went down, and the latter had to be abandoned by her crew. One boat, the *Jeff. Thompson*, took fire from the Federal shells, and burned to the water's edge. The *General Price* was run ashore and abandoned. The *Sumter* and *Bragg* were disabled and captured. A single boat—the *Van Dorn*—succeeded in effecting an escape. Only three men of the Federal flotilla were wounded in the engagement.

Memphis was immediately surrendered by the mayor, John Park; and Colonel Fitch, with his little command, took possession of the city. During the whole of the naval action the levee had been crowded with a throng of interested spectators. Not a few of these hoped that it might terminate in the triumph of the national arms. The capture of Memphis left the Confederates no large city in Tennessee. Indeed, with the exception of a small force in East Tennessee, about Chattanooga, Knoxville, and Cumberland Gap, there was not, at the time of the capture of Memphis, any Confederate army in the state. *Beauregard's* army had fallen back to Tupelo, about eighty miles south of Corinth, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, followed by the advance of the Federal army under General Pope. General Grant's army held the line of railroad skirting the southern boundary of Tennessee from Memphis to Corinth. Buell's column was already moving upon Chattanooga, which had been uncovered by *Beauregard's* retreat. In this direction, as we have already indicated, General Mitchell had been operating for the last two months, and had established himself at Huntsville, on the railroad connecting Memphis and Corinth with Chattanooga; but, for want of support, he had been obliged to withdraw from all territory occupied by him south of that point. On the 1st of May he wrote to the Secretary of War: "The campaign is ended, and I now occupy Huntsville in perfect security, while all of Alabama north of the Tennessee River floats no flag but that of the Union." When Buell moved against Chattanooga, Mitchell's command was given to General Rousseau, and General Mitchell received the command of Port Royal. Thus, about the middle of June, we find Southern Tennessee, from Memphis nearly to Chattanooga, held by three Federal armies, whose combined strength can not have been less than 125,000 men. Soon we shall see this line completely broken up by a formidable movement of the enemy in the rear.

Shortly after his retreat from Corinth, General *Beauregard* retired for a brief period from the army on account of ill health. His command was turned over to General Bragg, who forthwith prepared to assume the offensive. He began to move his army from Tupelo westward toward Chattanooga. One reason of this movement was to anticipate General Buell's march in the same direction; but Bragg had an ulterior purpose beyond that. He intended from Chattanooga to strike boldly into Kentucky. By this movement he expected not only to compel the abandonment by the Federals of their advanced positions, but also, by the aid of Kentuckians, to establish the Confederate government in Kentucky. He was certainly justified in assuming the offensive; for, although the Confederates had been steadily losing territory, they had, in the mean time, by this very contraction, been steadily gaining men. Detached forces had been drawn in from all parts of the Confederacy, and were available at the most critical points of conflict. The Conscription Act also had brought into the field large numbers of fighting men. The Federal armies, on the other hand, though, taken all together at this time, not far outnumbering the forces of the enemy, were scattered all along the rivers in the West, and all along the Atlantic coast. The advance southward of Halleck's army necessitated a series of detached garri-





JOHN MORGAN.

sions along the lines of railroad used for the transportation of supplies. These garrisons were made the more necessary on account of the guerrilla operations of the enemy, which in the summer of 1862 were especially troublesome in Kentucky.


Bragg's projected invasion was preceded by a series of guerrilla expeditions. The lower counties of Kentucky suffered chiefly from their ravages. Property was stolen, outrages of every sort were not unfrequently perpetrated upon Union citizens, bridges were burned, and even the friends of the Confederacy did not escape the lust of these desperadoes for plunder. The most successful of these expeditions was one undertaken by John Morgan, the most noted guerrilla leader of the war. Morgan was a native of Kentucky. When the war broke out he was a planter of considerable means, but he left his plantation and became attached to General Hardee's division of the Confederate army. He had protected Johnston's rear in the retreat from Nashville. Soon after that event he gathered about him a band of daring Kentuckians, whom he led in a series of predatory operations against railroads, supply-trains, and loyal citizens. His own regiment was joined on this occasion by some partisan rangers from Georgia, a Texas squadron, and two companies of Tennessee cavalry. He started from Knoxville July 4, and his expedition was accomplished in less than one month. During that time he penetrated two hundred and fifty miles within the Federal lines, captured a large number of defenseless towns, took a large number of small-arms, and destroyed a great amount of valuable military property. On the 11th of July Morgan had reached Lebanon, a short distance south of Frankfort. The place was protected by less than a hundred men, and fell easily into Morgan's possession. Here large government dépôts, filled with sugar, coffee, and other provisions, were destroyed. Morgan proceeded as far northward as Cynthiana, where the garrison was surrounded and captured, after a desperate conflict with superior numbers. This put an end to Morgan's successful career. He was soon overtaken at Paris, and defeated by a Federal force under the command of General Green C. Smith. At the same time Forrest was engaged in an expedition of a similar character. On the 13th of July, the day Morgan entered Cynthiana, Murfreesborough, in Tennessee, was surrendered to Forrest. The surrender was attended by the capture of an entire Michigan regiment. The impetuous onset of the Confederate cavalry appears to have at once nearly settled the fate of the town. The force defending the place no doubt exceeded Forrest's command. According to General Buell's report, the attack might have been effectually repelled. Encouraged by these successes, Colonel Morgan, who had retreated into Tennessee, even ventured to attack Clarksville, on the Cumberland River, below Nashville, and succeeded in capturing that place, with a large quantity of military stores.

The retreat of Beauregard's army from Corinth was without doubt a most judicious movement. It was, in great measure, a surprise to General Halleck, who was thus compelled to form new combinations. Bragg, who came into command on the 16th of June, had in this way gained time not only to re-enforce his army, but even to prepare for a formidable movement into Kentucky. Every day brought some new increment to his army through the operation of the Conscription Act. As we have said previously, the Confederacy had suffered very little from the exhaustion of its fighting population; and, in regard to the munitions of war, there soon ceased to be any

great uneasiness, for every week now brought into the several Confederate ports artillery of various calibre and small-arms without number; and, even apart from this foreign supply, there were already in operation, at Richmond and the great military centres in Georgia and the Carolinas, extensive manufactories devoted to the production of all the needed material for conducting the war. The situation since the early spring had wonderfully changed. The prospects of the Confederacy were every day growing brighter. The vast combinations which McClellan had formed for the capture of Richmond had miscarried, as will be shown in the subsequent chapter. The government established by the revolutionists had shown itself competent to meet emergencies which but a few months since had threatened its speedy overthrow. That government, although it had failed to obtain recognition from the great European powers, had elicited signal marks of respect by the energy with which it was conducting a war of so great magnitude; and by many eminent foreign statesmen, whose words carried with them great weight and authority, it was considered to be on the fair road to success. At home, that government had not yet betrayed its inherent weakness. Its hold upon the masses of the Southern people had not yet been relaxed. The bold front which it was now prepared to show in the field inspired the timid with respect and confidence, and silenced its strongest opponents. But this bold front must be maintained, and at much risk. Any very deliberate action was not within the scope of the policy which was forced upon the Confederate executive. Like all revolutionary governments, the Confederacy was in no position where it could exactly measure its resources and exercise a rigid economy in the exhaustion of its vital forces. Whatever else it might be, it *must* be audacious; when it ceased to be that, it gave up its prestige altogether. It was not permitted to stand upon the defensive, and await the developments of the national government against which it was arrayed. In a game of that sort it must inevitably be the loser. Depending for its very existence upon impulse rapidly awakened, it must be maintained also by popular impulse. To hesitate, even upon the most rational and carefully considered policy for effective defense, was to invite a popular reaction. Audacity was, therefore, the watchword of the revolutionists. The enemy must be stricken, blow upon blow, and paralyzed before he should have time given him to develop his more various resources for war. And with the splendid armies now in hand, both in the East and West, this seemed quite possible to the Confederates. It looked like an easy matter to push back the waves of war northward, and, by a contrary tempest, to sweep every battle-field, and in the heart of the great commercial cities of the North, and perchance in the national capital, to dictate the terms of peace. What these terms would be was significantly foreshadowed in the daily editorials of the Richmond journals. Among these were the acceptance by the Northern states of the Confederate Constitution, and the acknowledgment of the right of secession.

Evidently the Confederates were on the eve of important offensive movements, from which they expected the most extravagant measure of success. What these movements were in the West has already been indicated. To what issue they came, under the leadership of General Bragg, it will be our business to show in the remaining portion of this chapter.

The possession of Knoxville and East Tennessee gave General Bragg the



N. B. FORREST.





CINCINNATI, OHIO.

necessary foothold for the invasion of Kentucky. If General Mitchell's column had been sufficiently strengthened, it might have occupied such positions in Northern Alabama and Georgia as would have compelled the evacuation of East Tennessee. In the month of June the Confederates had abandoned Cumberland Gap. With a little exertion on General Buell's part, Chattanooga and Knoxville might have been captured. The summer months were occupied by Buell in straggling, impotent blows against the enemy. He sent an expedition where he ought to have marched with an army. Thus, on the 7th of June, General Negley appeared before Chattanooga with a handful of troops, and instituted what perhaps might be called the feint of a siege. A few more thousand men, who could easily have been spared for the purpose, would have captured the place, insured our possession of Knoxville, and have given the Federal army a strong position on the enemy's flank if he should advance into West Tennessee. By the want of energy displayed in the West, the Confederates were allowed two advantages. They were able to re-enforce their army in Virginia, and they were permitted in the West to take the initiative and to advance northward by the most auspicious route. It is true, doubtless, that the battle of Shiloh had been a heavy blow to the army. But this blow had fallen chiefly upon

General Grant's column. Buell's army was fresh and well organized. The great want in the West was of a military leader—a man with military intuitions—a man of sufficient nerve to hold in hand and effectively wield the columns of a large army. Such leaders there were. Grant, Sherman, and Thomas—afterward recognized as the great martial heroes of the continent—belonged to the Western army, and held prominent positions; but they were overshadowed by officers whose claims were more ostentatious. General Grant had shown great ability in the conduct of the operations against Fort Donelson. This the country had appreciated simply because it resulted in success; the coolness with which the general had formed new combinations when his first plan had been disturbed by the sudden attack on his lines, and the promptness with which he had done the right thing at just the right time—these qualities had passed unobserved. At Pittsburg Landing, on the 6th of April, he had exhibited the same coolness and nerve, and the result was a success; but, just at the point of success, Buell came on the field, and the sudden turn which eighteen thousand fresh men gave to the battle caused the latter to be regarded as the hero of the entire action. Both Grant and Sherman had made great mistakes—they had not yet learned all the lessons of the battle-field. We have seen how, at Fort Henry, Grant, by



VOLUNTEERS CROSSING THE OHIO FROM CINCINNATI TO COVINGTON.



waiting too long, had let the garrison slip by him on the road to Donelson. We have seen also what meagre preparation both he and Sherman had made against Beauregard's attack in the battle of Shiloh; but the time had not yet come when the armies on either side had learned to intrench themselves even in the most temporary encampment. General Thomas owed whatever elevation he had at this time to his victory over Zollicoffer at the battle of Mill Spring; but the time was to come yet when he should win most important victories—when, by a simple master-stroke, he should wipe out of existence the Confederate Army of the West. General Halleck, the commander of the department in which these generals were operating, was himself an officer of more than ordinary ability. He was a careful student of military science, and was capable of great strategic combinations. He lacked, however, those peculiar characteristics which insure success to the commander on the field. Early in July, just after McClellan's celebrated change of base, he was called to Washington to occupy the position of general-in-chief, a position for which he had eminent qualifications. His retirement from the West left Buell and Grant as the two great actors in that field, the former at that time being considered the greater general. Pope, who had won great distinction as the hero of New Madrid and Island No. 10, was also removed to the East, to take an important command in Virginia.

This latter general was fighting a desperate battle on the old field of Bull Run on the same day that an important engagement was going on between the Federal troops and the advance of General Kirby Smith at Richmond, Kentucky. Kirby Smith commanded the Confederate forces in East Tennessee. Early in August he had commenced to move northward in two divisions, commanded by Churchill and Claiborne. Though he met with little resistance in his march, he encountered many difficulties. For many days his men had nothing to eat but green corn. His ordnance train was brought through without loss. However troublesome the intermediate journey, Smith's army knew that it was marching to the fertile valley of the Kentucky. At Richmond the first formidable resistance was encountered. This place is situated about fifty miles southeast of Frankfort, the capital of the state. There was a force stationed here under the command of Brigadier General M. D. Manson, consisting of about eight regiments, mostly Indiana troops, a small squadron of cavalry, and nine pieces of artillery. Smith's army was met a short distance from Richmond by this force, and the action began early on the morning of August 30. The enemy executed a successful flank movement with a portion of Churchill's division, and broke the Federal lines. General Manson was captured. Just as the field was being abandoned to the enemy, General Nelson, coming from Lexington, tried to rally the flying troops, but without success; he was wounded in the effort. The superiority of the enemy in cavalry, as well as infantry, to a great degree decided the battle. The Federals left a large number of killed and wounded on the field, and lost largely in prisoners. Nearly all of their artillery, too, was captured.

This sudden movement of the enemy, who had already reached the banks of the Kentucky, created intense excitement both in Kentucky and Ohio. In Frankfort the Legislature was in session, but on receiving intelligence of the defeat at Richmond adjourned to Louisville, removing to that place the archives of the state, and about one million of money from the banks of Richmond, Lexington, and Frankfort. A proclamation was issued by Gov-

ernor Robinson calling upon the citizens to take up arms in defense of the state. In two days time Lexington was taken. At this stage of his progress Kirby Smith proclaimed to the people the object of his invasion. He said: "We come, not as invaders, but liberators. We invoke the spirit of your resolutions of 1793. \* \* \* We call upon you to join with us in hurling back from our fair and sunny plains the Northern hordes who would deprive us of our liberty that they may enjoy our substance." The Confederate cavalry entered Frankfort on the 6th of September. There was no efficient force, as it then seemed, to prevent Kirby Smith from reaching the Ohio River. It was even anticipated that he might capture Cincinnati.

The excitement in Cincinnati was so great that martial law was proclaimed, all places of business were closed, and the citizens were required to arm in defense of the city. Governor Tod issued a proclamation urging upon the citizens of Ohio the immediate requirements of the hour. General Lewis Wallace was placed in command of the force gathered together to cover the approach to Cincinnati.

In the mean time, while Kirby Smith was demonstrating against the line of the Ohio farther north, the great bulk of Bragg's army entered Kentucky, by way of Chattanooga, *en route* for Louisville. The season for this movement was well timed. If successful, the abundant harvests of the Kentucky and Ohio valleys, already ripening in the fields, would fall into the hands of the victors; for, while Kirby Smith was charging against the Federals that they were holding Kentucky in order to secure her substance, the Confederates were open to precisely the same charge.<sup>1</sup> Suddenly, as Bragg drew nearer to Frankfort, Kirby Smith left Cincinnati, and, by a forced march, succeeded in effecting a junction with him at the capital on the 4th of October. Here the two commanders amused themselves with the inauguration of Mr. Hawes as provisional governor of Kentucky.


General Bragg's own column when he entered the state on the 5th of September consisted of thirty-six infantry regiments, with five regiments of cavalry. In one week's time the advance of the column appeared in front of Munfordsville, at the crossing of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad over Green River, and demanded the surrender of the place. Up to this time Bragg had demonstrated against Nashville, in order to keep Buell at the latter place until he could strike the railroad between the Federal army and Louisville, which was its great base of supplies. He had, to a great degree, succeeded in deceiving Buell as to his real object, but his purpose was at length betrayed through intercepted dispatches. His movements had been well planned. Smith's column demonstrated against Cincinnati on the right, Bragg's against Nashville on the left; then suddenly, in both cases, the mask was laid aside, and both columns joined near Frankfort, a few miles from the real objective point of the campaign. The movement was as bold in conception as it was ingenious in design. But it failed in one important particular—it proceeded too leisurely. General Bragg was

<sup>1</sup> "The great and true source of meat supply is the State of Kentucky. If our armies could push directly forward over that state, and occupy it to the hanks of the Ohio, the political advantages secured to the South would be of even small account compared with those she would derive in a sumptuary point of view. There are more hogs and cattle in Kentucky available for general consumption, two or three to one, than are now left in all the South besides; and steps ought to be taken by government to drive back these animals, as well as mules and horses, as our armies march forward, and place them within our lines. It is not only positively important to us that these animals should be promptly secured as they fall within our grasp, but it is negatively so, also, in depriving the enemy of the convenient supplies of meat for their armies which they have derived from Kentucky."—*Richmond Examiner*, September 12, 1862.




FEEDING TROOPS AT THE MARKET-PLACE IN CINCINNATI.





GENERAL BUELL'S ARMY ENTERING LOUISVILLE.





VETERAN TROOPS MOVING UP THE OHIO TO LOUISVILLE AND CINCINNATI.

too confident of the completeness of his disguise. It will be admitted that both columns of his army encountered great obstacles in the way of a rapid march. He was compelled, in a great measure, to depend upon the country for supplies; but the country was full of adherents to the Confederate cause. He had, in the earlier stage of his march, a difficult route; mountains were to be crossed, and here, where there must be the greatest delay, supplies were least abundant. Then, again, after a difficult march, his troops needed rest before they would be in a condition to fight decisive battles. All these difficulties must be admitted; but, in view of other marches made by great armies during the war—marches longer and far more difficult, but accomplished in one half the time—it is impossible not to lay the failure of Bragg's really splendid scheme for the occupation of the line of the Ohio to his slowness of movement. It was on the 21st of August that he had crossed the Tennessee River, just above Chattanooga. It was six weeks before his army was joined by Smith's at Frankfort. Yet he was delayed by no important battle. The battle of Richmond, in which Kirby Smith was engaged, was decided in one day. Bragg himself had fought a battle at Munfordsville on the 14th and 16th of September. The advance of his column, as previously stated, had demanded the surrender of this place on the 13th. The Federal force stationed there for the protection of the bridge, under Colonel Wilder, consisted of a little over three thousand men, with four guns. This force surrendered on the 17th, after having sustained two attacks, with a loss of eight men killed and twenty wounded. Re-enforcements had arrived, so that the number of prisoners taken by the enemy was four thousand five hundred men, with ten guns. Apart from these battles, which gave the enemy over seven thousand prisoners, there was no serious engagement on the line of march. There can scarcely be a reasonable doubt but that Bragg and Smith, if they had moved with greater rapidity, might have taken possession of Louisville without a struggle. What would have followed it is hard to say. Evidently General Bragg counted upon a more considerable demonstration in his favor from the citizens of Kentucky than he received. As had just been proved in Maryland, so too it was demonstrated in Kentucky, that the state was at heart loyal to the national government. Even the occupation of Louisville would not have, probably, added materially to the number of Bragg's army, while his advanced position would have been untenable against the combination of forces which must soon have gathered against him.

But in the race for Louisville Buell came out ahead. Having been made aware of Bragg's purpose, Buell kept in his front, covering Nashville at the same time. Although the enemy had destroyed the bridge across Green River, Buell's command forded that stream, driving the Confederates out of Munfordsville, and advanced rapidly toward Louisville. To this latter place had been transferred the intense excitement which a few days before had

prevailed in Cincinnati. Many veteran troops, chiefly from Grant's army, had been sent to both these places up the Mississippi and the Ohio, and, mingled with the new levies of troops, had done much to allay the popular apprehension. The command at Cincinnati was given to General Lewis Wallace, and General William Nelson commanded the troops at Louisville. Notwithstanding Buell's haste to reach Louisville, it is still quite certain that, but for one circumstance, Bragg would have beaten him in the race. The road which the latter was taking crossed Salt River near Bardstown, about thirty-five miles south of Louisville, and the bridge at this point he found destroyed. The delay thus occasioned gave Buell the start. Just before the Federal army entered Louisville, on the 25th of September, the panic there had reached its height. In twenty-four hours more Nelson would have abandoned the city. All non-combatants had been sent out, and every thing was in confusion. To confusion was added a want of confidence on the part of many in General Buell's generalship. Indeed, the latter had scarcely got his army into the panic-stricken city before he found that an order had been issued from the War Department placing General Thomas in command, and it was mainly on account of the persistent solicitation of the latter that Buell was retained.

The position which General Buell held was very similar to that of McClellan at the same period. Both generals were unfortunate from the political associations in which, whether by their own will or otherwise, they had become entangled. Americans do not easily forget the past histories of prominent public characters. This tenacity of memory is shown in the embarrassments which attended Fremont's administration in Missouri. It had not been forgotten that McClellan and Buell had in former times had political affiliations with men who were now leaders of the revolution. The great masses of the people, notwithstanding this knowledge, were willing to wait until the military competence or incompetence of these officers should have been proved, and to rest their judgment upon that basis alone, although there were many honest men who, from the well known sympathy of McClellan and Buell with a distinctively Southern sentiment, feared that they would conduct the war with less vigor than might else be expected. There are many circumstances which to the historian will show that this apprehension was well grounded, though, as regards patriotism, no impeachment will ever rest against the names of either of these generals. In the mean time, even if they had been so inclined, they were not allowed to pursue a purely military policy without disturbance. A few partisans were determined to meddle with their military policy. Those whose sympathies were allied to theirs pressed them to a lenient policy, which would soften the blows directed by their arms against the wealthy slaveholding classes of the South. These recommended the advance of those according with them in sentiment to the first commands. On the other hand, there were those equally parti-



man who pressed them in exactly the opposite direction. These were unwilling that the war should be conducted, no matter how successfully, upon a policy which should touch too lightly the institution of slavery. They did all in their power to incite popular opposition to McClellan and Buell, and they urged strongly upon the President the necessity of their removal from command. The latter, taking sides with the great masses of the people, waited the course of military events, determined that the war for the Union must succeed, and that, if success should seem to be more sure from leaving slavery intact, he would so leave it; if by its destruction, then it should be destroyed.

Buell's temporary removal had no other than military grounds, the justice of which was afterward fully proved. Thomas, as we have seen, though better fitted to command, protested against the decree from Washington, which was then retracted. He himself was made second in command, and thus occupied a position in which his military talent could not be made available.

General Buell's army, designated as the Army of the Ohio, numbered altogether, after its junction with Nelson, about a hundred thousand men, one half of whom were new recruits, who had been pouring into Louisville for the last few days. At Louisville he lost thousands by desertion. The army consisted of three corps. General Alexander McDowell McCook commanded the First Corps, and General Crittenden the Second. Both these corps had been engaged in the second day's fight at Shiloh. The Third Corps, commanded by General C. C. Gilbert, was Nelson's old command. The command had been assigned to Gilbert at first temporarily, when Nelson was sent to Louisville. Nelson's tragical end gave him the permanent command.

General Nelson was shot at Louisville on the 29th of September by General Jefferson C. Davis. The affair grew out of the insolence of General Nelson toward the latter, who immediately borrowed a pistol and shot him as he was ascending the stairs of the Galt House. General Nelson was a native of Kentucky. He had been, at the beginning of the war, over twenty years in the naval service, when he was suddenly transferred to a military department, relieving General Anderson of his command in Kentucky. When General Buell's army advanced to Nashville, Nelson had an important command. At the time of his death he had not yet recovered from the wound which he had received at the recent battle of Richmond. He was rough in his manner, but a good disciplinarian, and an excellent officer on the field. The difficulty between Generals Davis and Nelson appears to have sprung from some domestic dissension, and to have been aggravated by an exhibition of insolence on the part of Nelson, who had given Davis an insignificant command over the home guard defending the city. On the morning of the 29th Nelson met Davis at the Galt House, and asked him respecting the number of men in his command. Davis answered that he had about so many, giving the number approximately. Nelson replied angrily, mingling expressions of rage with those of insult, and upon Davis demanding an apology, struck the latter in the face. Davis then borrowed a pistol from a lawyer in the vicinity, followed Nelson up the stairs and shot him, inflicting a mortal wound. For this act he was subsequently tried by court-martial and acquitted. General Davis was not a graduate of the Military Academy, but had been, previous to the war, appointed from civil life to a command in the regular army. He was one of Major Anderson's sub-

ordinate officers in the defense of Fort Sumter. Immediately after the surrender of that fort he returned to Indiana, his native state, and took command of the Twenty-second Indiana Volunteers, joining General Fremont's army in Missouri, where he was promoted to the command of a brigade, and took a prominent part in the conflict with General Price, both under Fremont and subsequently under General Curtis. The spirit of General Davis was evinced in the affair at Milford in 1861, where, with a force of scarcely five hundred of the Iowa cavalry, he surprised a Confederate camp, capturing a force of the enemy nearly three times the number of his own command, with a thousand stand of arms, and a large quantity of military stores. It was not until this action that he received from the government a rank corresponding to his actual position. His commission as brigadier general dates from December 18, 1861.

General Bragg at Bardstown, September 26, issued a proclamation which is worthy of note, because it discloses the hopes at this time entertained by a large portion of the Confederacy in regard to the Northwestern states of the Union. Disclaiming any purpose of invasion, he said that his object was "to secure peace, and the abandonment by the United States of their pretensions to govern a people who never have been their subjects, and who prefer self-government to a union with them." He said that, at the inauguration of the Confederate government, commissioners were sent to Washington to adjust the difficulties growing out of a political separation, but that the national government refused them recognition. "Among the pretexts," said he, "urged for the continuance of the war is the assertion that the Confederate government desires to deprive the United States of the free navigation of the Western rivers." On the contrary, he stated that the Confederate Congress had, prior to the commencement of the war, publicly declared that the navigation of the Mississippi should be free to the states upon its borders. Having thus appealed to the interest of the people of the Northwest, he proceeded to make another appeal, namely, to their desire for peace. The Confederacy, he said, restricted itself to the moderate demand that the United States should cease to prosecute war against it; but, because the government at Washington was relentless in this particular, the Confederates were driven to protect their own country by transferring the seat of war to that of an enemy who pursued them "with an implacable and apparently aimless hostility." "So far," he said, "it is only *our* fields that have been laid waste, *our* people killed, *our* homes made desolate, and *our* frontiers ravaged by rapine and murder." It rested, therefore, with the people of the Northwest to put an end to the invasion of their homes, either by prevailing upon the general government to desist from war, or, if that should not prove possible, their own state governments, in the exercise of their sovereignty, should secure immunity from the desolations of war by making a separate treaty of peace, which the Confederate government would be "ready to conclude on the most just and liberal basis." "Nature," he said, "has set her seal upon these states" [i. e., the states of the South], "and marked them out to be your friends and allies. She has bound them to you by all the ties of geographical contiguity and conformation, and the great mutual interests of commerce and productions. When the passions of this unnatural war shall have subsided, and reason resumes her sway, a community of interest will force commercial and social coalition between the great grain and stock-growing states of the Northwest, and the cotton, tobacco, and sugar regions of the South. The Mississippi River is a grand artery of their mutual national lives, which men can not sever, and which never ought to have been suffered to be disturbed by the antagonisms, the cupidity, and the bigotry of New England and the East. It is from the East that have come the germs of this bloody and most unnatural strife. It is from the meddlesome, grasping, and fanatical disposition of the same people who have imposed upon you and us alike those tariffs, internal improvement, and fishing bounty laws, whereby we have been taxed for their aggrandizement. It is from the East that will come the tax-gatherer to collect from you the mighty debt which is being amassed mountain high for the purpose of ruining your best customers and natural friends. \* \* \* You say you are fighting for the free navigation of the Mississippi. It is yours freely, and always has been, without striking a blow. You say you are fighting to maintain the Union. The Union is a thing of the past. A union of consent was the only union ever worth a drop of blood. When force came to be substituted for consent, the casket was broken, and the constitutional jewel of your patriotic adoration was forever gone."

General Bragg was not the only one who anticipated important results from the offer of peace to the Northwest based on a future alliance. The very same day that Bragg issued the above proclamation, the Committee on Foreign Affairs laid before the Confederate Congress a report in favor of recommending to the President the "issuance of a proclamation touching the free navigation of the Mississippi and its tributaries, and the opening of the markets of the South to the inhabitants of the Northwestern states upon certain terms and conditions." The time at which this report was made, and the likeness which in all respects it bears to Bragg's proclamation, indicates that the latter was a deliberately considered document, in which the military officer was the representative of a policy already approved by the great body of the Confederates. It is quite evident, also, that prominent men in the Northwest, in sympathy with the revolution, had given considerable encouragement as to the success of such a policy. As much as this is directly stated in one part of the report. "It is gratifying," the document reads, "to discover that high-spirited and intelligent public men in several of the Northwestern states have of late become exceedingly active in their endeavors to discourage and suppress the ferocious war spirit heretofore raging among their fellow-citizens, and that their honest and patriotic efforts have been already attended with the most marked success." At the same



JEFFERSON C. DAVIS.



time, a minority report was laid before Congress dissenting from the views expressed by the majority of the committee. This report was signed by E. Barksdale, J. R. McLean, and W. R. Smith. These individuals did not believe it advisable to offer exclusive commercial privileges to a portion of the people against whom the Confederacy was in arms. They did not see but that similar motives and arguments might be brought to bear upon the Eastern states as successfully as upon those of the Northwest. The manufacturers of the New England states, they thought, would be as likely to be conciliated by a discriminating tariff as the Northwestern farmers by the removal of all tariff, and their ship-owners by a monopoly of the carrying trade of the South as the people along the Mississippi by the free navigation of that river. Give the city of New York, said they, the conduct of our commercial affairs, and she would be as likely to desist from her wickedness toward the Confederates as Cincinnati would be if allowed to exchange her pork on profitable terms for Southern cotton and tobacco. The signs of returning reason, indicating a desire for the return of peace among the inhabitants of the Northwestern states, were not as apparent to them as to the majority of the committee.<sup>1</sup> But, notwithstanding this view of the case, as presented in the minority report, it is very evident that the prosperity of the South would have been enhanced to a far greater degree by an alliance with the Western than one with the Eastern states, if she should succeed in establishing her independence. The great obstacle in the way was the indisposition of the Western states to form such an alliance upon such a basis.

General Bragg's proclamation contained a formidable menace in the event of the refusal by the Northwest of the proposed adjustment. He said in effect: "Here I am with an army which, including Smith's off at my right, numbers not less than sixty thousand men. I bring also the olive-branch, which you refuse at your peril." But, unfortunately for him, the bridge across Salt River was down, and Buell, with his army, had already entered Louisville. At the same time that he menaced, it was likely that he must prove his ability to accomplish his threats. Indeed, it now was becoming quite clear that this Bardstown proclamation was to be the great feat of his boldly-planned campaign. He forthwith made arrangements for retreat. Instead of pushing on toward Louisville, he ordered his trains eastward toward Harrodsburg, leaving a strong force at Bardstown, with orders to keep Buell back until October 4th. In the mean time he went to Frankfort, where Kirby Smith arrived on the 4th, and the two officers on that day amused themselves with the inauguration of a Mr. Richard Hawes as provisional governor of the state.

Buell was slow to move against the enemy. His army was tired with long marching, and his men came to Louisville without shoes and poorly clad; but it can scarcely be doubted that the enemy were suffering even more inconvenience from precisely the same causes. He gave his army a full week's rest at Louisville, and it was only on the 1st of October that, forming a movable column out of his three corps, he marched out, with a train of nearly two thousand wagons, stretching over twenty-two miles, to

find the enemy. During the week he had been waiting the enemy's cavalry had swept the country in the vicinity of Louisville, destroying daily property estimated by hundreds of thousands. In this matter of cavalry Bragg had great advantages over Buell, whose army, on the other hand, was no doubt more perfectly equipped, and was certainly larger in point of numbers than Bragg could bring upon the field. Buell advanced at the rate of about ten miles per day, and reached Bardstown the very day Bragg had determined upon as that beyond which it was no longer necessary to hold the place. But, leisurely as were Buell's movements, they brought his army into such close proximity with Bragg's rear as to give the Confederate general some uneasiness. This brought on the battle of Perryville, which was fought on the 8th of October.

Buell, either from excessive caution, or because he was not aware of the enemy's situation, had already lost a precious opportunity. He ought to have been fighting the enemy at Bardstown on the 1st, instead of just then beginning his march. If he intended to fight at all, here he had every advantage in his favor. Let us see what he really did, and with what result.

Smith, after the mock inauguration of Governor Hawes was over, fell back toward Harrodsburg. Buell had dispatched one division—Sill's, of McCook's corps—to look after him. The other two divisions—Rousseau's and Jackson's—formed the left column of Buell's army, and took the road to Mackville. Gilbert, with the third corps, formed the centre column, moving by a road farther westward. Crittenden's corps, the right column, moved to Bardstown, and was delayed at that point by slight skirmishes. Gilbert reached the northern skirt of Perryville on the 7th, and began to annoy Bragg's rear with his artillery. McCook was within call; Crittenden would be in the course of twenty-four hours. Bragg had from fifteen to twenty thousand men within call. These were not all upon the field at Gilbert's first collision with Bragg's rear, for the reason that the latter had preferred to make a stand at Harrodsburg, where, on the 9th, he would be re-enforced by Kirby Smith's army. Buell's movements had altered this determination, and Bragg, with great promptness, brought up Hardee's two divisions, under Buckner and Anderson, and Cheatam's, which was commanded by General Polk. Buell, notwithstanding he could outnumber the enemy, still wished to avoid a battle at this point, and he ordered up McCook's corps from Mackville—a place equidistant from Harrodsburg and Perryville, and ten miles from either—only because he anticipated that he should meet with some resistance at this stage of his march.

McCook received this order at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 8th, and hurried up his column. His advance connected with Gilbert's left on the road to Perryville before eleven A.M. The march had been through a rugged country so destitute of water that the men suffered much, and even the hospitals were insufficiently supplied. Along the route Gilbert's artillery was heard all the morning, but there was no general engagement in the forenoon. McCook arrived upon the field not a moment too soon, as the enemy was already preparing to occupy the commanding position on Gilbert's flank, which Buell intended the First corps to hold. This position

<sup>1</sup> The following is the text of both reports:

**MAJORITY REPORT.**—The Committee on Foreign Affairs, to whom was referred certain resolutions relating to the true policy of the war, and recommending to the President the issuance of a proclamation touching the free navigation of the Mississippi and its tributaries, and the opening of the market of the South to the inhabitants of the Southwestern states upon certain terms and conditions, have had the same under consideration, and now report back said resolutions, with one or two slight amendments, and recommend that they be adopted.

The expediency of conducting the war in which we are engaged with all possible activity, and of carrying that war into the enemy's country, so soon as the same shall be found practicable, is believed to be now universally admitted by all enlightened men who have given their attention to the subject. It is evident that we must rely alone upon our own energies for success in the struggle of arms which is now in progress. In the present condition of affairs it is quite manifest that, in order to bring the sanguinary struggle in which we are engaged to an early termination, it will be necessary that every portion of our army should be kept in a state of constant readiness for active exertion, and that no opportunity should be neglected of striking the forces of the enemy, wherever to be found upon Southern soil, with that boldness and heroic energy which are so certain to secure to our arms the most signal success.

It is equally manifest that the enemy will never be willing to desist from the unjust and ferocious war which they are now waging until the evils and inconveniences thereof shall have been brought home fully to themselves. When our valiant and disciplined armies (enhanced in numbers and in strength, as it is hoped they will shortly be) shall have once found their way to the heart of the enemy's country, and have inflicted a just retaliation upon those who have so ruthlessly ravaged our territories, pillaged our towns, and desolated our homes, it is to be reasonably expected that even they will at last be able to discern the rank injustice and brutal cruelty which they have compelled us to experience, and for the perpetration of which they have not been heretofore subjected to any thing like adequate punishment.

Your committee are well satisfied that the issuing of some such proclamation by the President as that described in the resolutions referred to them, at such time as he shall deem expedient, could not but be attended with the most salutary effects. It is no undoubted fact that the government at Washington, aided by unscrupulous local demagogues in the Northwestern states, has succeeded to a considerable extent in deluding the people of that region into a general belief that, should we succeed in our struggle for independence, it is the intention of the government and people of the Confederate States to shut them out from the free navigation of the Mississippi River and its great tributaries; and though the Provisional Congress of these states long ago emphatically negatived this idea by well-known acts of formal legislation, yet your committee are assured that the delusion on this subject still continues to exist among the people of the Northwest, and that the gross misapprehension in regard to the intentions and policy of the Confederate States of America, thus engendered and kept in existence by wicked and designing men, has operated most effectively in prompting the people of the Northwestern states (so closely connected with the South heretofore, both by geographical and political ties) to contribute freely, both in men and money, to the prosecution of a war which, if successful on the part of those with whom it originated, would be, eventually, as disastrous in its effects to the people of the Northwestern states themselves as to those of the Confederate States of America. It is gratifying to discover that high-spirited and intelligent public men in several of the Northwestern states have of late become exceedingly active in their endeavors to discourage and suppress the ferocious war spirit heretofore raging among their fellow-citizens, and that their honest and patriotic efforts have been already attended with the most marked success.

Such a proclamation as that recommended in the resolutions referred to this committee, it is confidently believed, would have a tendency greatly to strengthen the efforts of the advocates of peace in the Northwestern states, be calculated to bring those states quickly into amicable relations with the states of the South, withdraw them ultimately altogether from their present injurious political connection with the states of the North and East, with which they have really so little in common, and thus enable us to dictate the terms of a just and honorable peace from the great commercial emporium of that region, through whose influence mainly has this wicked and unnatural war been thus far kept in progress.

**MINORITY REPORT.**—The undersigned, a minority of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, beg leave to dissent from the report of the majority upon certain resolutions referred to the committee, touching the issuing by the President of a proclamation to the inhabitants of the Northwestern

states, tendering to them the free navigation of the Mississippi River, and advantageous treaty stipulations at the close of the war.

It is submitted that subjects relating to the conduct of the war are not appropriate matters of investigation by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

But, waiving this consideration, the undersigned totally dissent from the views of the majority touching the duties of this house. It is a work of supererogation for this body to undertake to decide and to declare the mode of conducting the war. It is a question involving consequences of vital moment, legitimately pertaining to the functions of the executive and those who have been chosen to lead our armies. But if such duty were, in fact, devolved upon this body, as is implied by the report of the majority, it would be in violation of all the rules of enlightened warfare to unfold the plan which it is designed to pursue in the prosecution of the war.

It is believed that thus far the executive has availed himself of the means placed at his disposal for conducting the war in the manner most judicious and effective; and that in the signal success which has attended our struggle for the maintenance of the independence of the Confederate States will be found sufficient reason for leaving him, without interference, to the exercise of the duties imposed by the Constitution.

The undersigned dissent from the recommendation that the government should tender to a portion of the citizens of the government with whom we are at war exclusive commercial privileges. It is not the part of wisdom to commit our government to any fixed policy in advance. Legislation should not be anticipated, but should be shaped by existing events. If a deviation from this plain suggestion of wisdom be advised in the present instance upon the idea of the influence of an appeal to the self-interest of the inhabitants of the Northwestern states, it should not be forgotten that the same argument might, with equal propriety, be addressed to the inhabitants of the New England states. The manufacturers of that section would be conciliated by pledges that a discriminating tariff would, at the close of hostilities, be put into speedy operation for building up their interests, and ship-owners would be propitiated by pledges that they would be permitted to perform the carrying trade of the South as under the old Union. And the city of New York would be induced to pause in her course of folly and wickedness toward the Confederate States if assured that they would confer upon her the privilege of conducting their commercial affairs and enriching herself upon the proceeds of her labor.

The Northern people derived, under the former government, an annual profit of not less than \$100,000,000 upon Southern trade. Their implements of war will be laid aside when assured that their coffers shall be filled with the proceeds of Southern labor. But the undersigned do not hesitate to repel the suggestion that the people of the South are willing to purchase peace by such a sacrifice of their rights, and by so degrading a concession to Northern capidity. To be respected, our course must be firm and our legislation rational and just.

At an early period after the organization of the government of the Confederate States, a law was passed declaring the free navigation of the Mississippi River, with certain salutary restrictions. The policy of the government has not been changed on this subject. It is presumed to have been known to the inhabitants of the Northwestern states before they embarked in a wicked and unjustifiable war against the people of the Confederate States. To proclaim this policy at the present time, coupled with offers of their lucrative trade, in the manner suggested by the majority, would be, in the highest degree, derogatory to the dignity of the government. It would bring upon it the imputation of pusillanimity. It would be accepted by the enemy as a confession of conscious weakness, and its inevitable tendency would be to prolong the war.

The undersigned are firm in the opinion that the most effective mode of conquering a peace is not to be found in extending to the enemy propositions of reconciliation, but in the vigorous prosecution of the war.


The signs of returning reason, indicating a desire for peace among the inhabitants of the Northwestern states, upon the discovery of which the majority have congratulated the House, are believed to be delusive. The undersigned regret to say that they have not been able to discern them. But, in the event of the actual existence of these alleged pacific indications, it is clear that they are the result, not of temporizing expedients on the part of the government of the Confederate States, but of its manifestations of purpose to prosecute the war with vigor and effect.

For these reasons the undersigned dissent from the views of the majority, and ask the concurrence of the house in the opinion that they should be rejected.

E. BARKSDALE,  
J. R. MCLEAN,  
W. R. SMITH.



on Gilbert's left was especially important, because it secured access to Chaplin's Creek. McCook formed his line on the range of hills known as Chaplin's Hills west of that stream, the road to Perryville being in the rear. Two of Rousseau's brigades held the right; Terrell's, of Jackson's division, held the left. This latter brigade not only guarded the left flank, but protected the trains in the rear. In order to still farther strengthen the left, Starkweather's brigade of Rousseau's division was placed in reserve behind Terrell. Another brigade of Jackson's division, under Colonel Webster, was in reserve farther to the right, near Russell's house.



Bragg attacked a little after noon. He was compelled by McCook's position to cross the stream more to the north, but his batteries played upon the national troops from favorable positions on both sides of the stream. Before long, Terrell's brigade was attacked with great impetuosity. This brigade consisted entirely of raw troops, and it was only through some mistake in manoeuvre that it was not in reserve in the place of Starkweather's. Terrell's men wavered beneath the shock, and, although their division commander, General Jackson, advanced to rally them, they were swept from the field, leaving Parsons's battery in the hands of the enemy. Jackson was killed at the first fire. He was struck in the right breast by a piece of an exploded shell, and, with the exclamation "Oh God!" fell from his horse and died without a struggle. Even the enemy paid a tribute to his gallantry. Terrell also fell directly after, and McCook's left flank was uncovered, and would have been destroyed, with the loss of the trains, but for the pluck of Starkweather's men. These belonged to Rousseau's division, General O. M. Mitchell's old command.

As soon as McCook had become assured of the safety of his left, he rode over to the right only to find that Rousseau also had been driven back. He was even compelled to use Webster's brigade. His reserves were now all in the front, and he was obliged to call for re-enforcements. In his effort to support the right, Colonel Webster was killed; Lytle, who held the extreme flank, fell on the field. It was not until the position at Russell's house had been abandoned that McCook received any re-enforcements. Then Colonel Gooding's brigade, of R. B. Mitchell's division, came upon the field. This brigade consisted of three regiments, accompanied by a battery, and added fifteen hundred men to McCook's command, which in the morning had numbered thirteen thousand. Of these there were now not more than seven or eight thousand men capable of fighting.

It was nearly dark when Gooding had succeeded in wresting the position at Russell's house from the enemy and saving the line. But this had been accomplished at great sacrifice. At the close of the brief but desperate encounter, five hundred out of the fifteen hundred had been killed or wounded. Colonel Gooding himself had been taken prisoner. Then there came up another brigade from Gilbert, which went into position on Gooding's right. In fact, Buell was only just now aware that any battle was in progress. He had given orders that McCook should not fight; but as the enemy attacked, and so much depended upon McCook's position, it is hard to see what else could have saved the day but fighting. The battle was now over. McCook had with great difficulty held his own, and had saved his command, while Gilbert stood apart, with some twenty thousand men or more, giving scarcely more assistance or co-operation than if he had been fifty miles from the field. The enemy, with one third of the force which Buell had in his front, had, by making that force bear upon McCook's corps alone, overwhelmed the latter on both flanks, and almost swept it from the field.

The loss had been very heavy on the Federal side. In Rousseau's division alone the casualties amounted to over 2000; in Jackson's the loss was greater, but many of these were counted as missing. The Confederates must have lost nearly as many men, as they attacked formidable positions.

The next morning General Bragg withdrew his force to Harrodsburg, and, with Kirby Smith, moved southward toward Camp Dick Robinson, and thence out of the state altogether. The Confederates, although they failed in the military object of their invasion, succeeded in carrying out of Kentucky a great deal of plunder. According to a statement made by the Richmond Examiner, "the wagon train of supplies brought out of Kentucky by General Kirby Smith was forty miles long, and brought a million yards of jeans, with a large amount of clothing, boots, and shoes, and two hundred

wagon loads of bacon, six thousand barrels of pork, fifteen hundred mules and horses, eight thousand beeves, and a large lot of swine." Of the jeans nearly all were taken from a single establishment in Frankfort. A large amount of plunder was captured. The enemy staid there four weeks, and during all that time trains of cars were running southward laden with mess pork and other stores, and numerous wagon trains similarly laden were traversing all the roads in that direction. The fact that this was possible illustrates the need which then existed for an efficient Federal cavalry force. Indeed, the want of such a force shows an extraordinary degree of negligence on the part of the government at this stage of the war.

The invasion of Kentucky had made it necessary for the Federal troops under General Morgan to evacuate Cumberland Gap. This gap is nearly eighty miles in length, and is about one hundred and fifty miles south-east of Lexington. The mountain on either side rises to the height of twelve hundred feet; the gap itself is traversed by an excellent road. The position was important to the Confederates, chiefly because it guarded the approach to East Tennessee, and thus covered the line of railroad connecting Richmond with the valley of the Mississippi. It had remained in their hands until General Mitchell's campaign had compelled them to abandon it, about the middle of June, when it was occupied by a division of national troops under General George W. Morgan. A number of unsuccessful attempts were subsequently made by the Confederates to regain the Gap. It was only when Bragg's advance into Kentucky had cut off all supplies that General Morgan determined to withdraw. He held out bravely to the last moment. On the 11th of September he had no corn left, and only a meagre supply of beans and rice. On the 17th he withdrew from the Gap, blowing up the magazine, and burning the commissary building, with his tents, wagons, gun-carriages, and other martial appliances. His retreat of two hundred and fifty miles, through a mountainous and unproductive country, to the banks of the Ohio, forms an interesting episode of the war. Sometimes destitute of water, always dependent for its daily supply of food on foraging, harassed perpetually by Confederate cavalry, and sleeping at night under the open sky, his command reached the Ohio River on the 4th of October. The whole command numbered nearly twelve thousand men, and it succeeded, in spite of many embarrassments, in bringing off twenty-eight pieces of artillery and four hundred wagons. This success is the more remarkable when it is considered that Morgan was continually skirmishing with the enemy, and was obliged to build new roads, under very disadvantageous circumstances, for the conveyance of his trains. His sick he had been compelled to leave at the Gap.

Bragg's invasion had broken up the advanced line of the national forces in Eastern Tennessee. It had also, to a great extent, depleted General Grant's army in Mississippi; portions of which had been sent to Cincinnati and Louisville. But a sufficient force was left to retain the line already held, which extended from Corinth, in Mississippi, to Tusculum, in Alabama. Some important changes had occurred since the month of July. General Halleck had been called to Washington to assume the position of general-in-chief, and the command of that portion of the Western army not included in General Buell's department had been given to General Grant. Pope had been called away to take command of the Army of the Potomac, and his place was now taken by General Rosecrans.



ROBERT A. MITCHELL.





FERRVILLE, KENTUCKY.

Though Bragg had taken the bulk of the Confederate army in the West into Kentucky, still a large Confederate force had been left in Northern Mississippi. This force, under the command of Generals Price and Van Dorn, confronted General Grant in September, holding a position which, from its uninterrupted railroad connection with Chattanooga, enabled it to co-operate with Bragg's movement. Van Dorn was the principal in command. If his force had been united to that of General Price, the whole would have constituted an effective army. Instead of this, the plan of operations agreed upon contemplated that Price should cross the Tennessee River to operate against the rear of General Buell, who was then advancing northward to intercept Bragg; and, in the mean time, while Grant's forces would thus be drawn eastward from Corinth, the latter place was to be captured by Van Dorn. Upon the first development of this plan, Grant began to concentrate his army by abandoning Tusculum and Iuka. A small force under Colonel Murphy was left at the latter place. Almost immediately afterward a body of Confederate cavalry dashed into the town, drove Murphy out, and captured the place, which contained a large quantity of medical and commissary stores. For neglecting to destroy the six hundred and eighty barrels of flour which were there stored, Colonel Murphy was arrested by General Buell. It was now determined by General Grant to attack General Price on the north, west, and south.

The left wing of Price's army rested near Iuka, a little village of about three hundred inhabitants. Against this position, Grant, accompanied by Ord's division, moved with about eighteen thousand men, taking the road to Burnsville, a little northwest of Iuka. Rosecrans, with two divisions, under

Generals Stanley and Hamilton, was ordered to Jacinto, to attack in the rear. Both columns started at the same time. Rosecrans reached Jacinto on the 18th of September, and the next day, after a march of twenty miles, advanced against the enemy. The enemy's skirmishers were met at Barnett's Corners, and were driven in. Grant in the mean time had arrived at Burnsville. By some misunderstanding, each column awaited for the attack to be commenced by the other. This occasioned considerable delay. At length a dispatch came from General Grant stating that he was waiting upon Rosecrans's attack. The latter promptly moved forward, and found the Confederates posted on a high ridge about two miles from Iuka. It was then four o'clock P.M. General Hamilton's division formed in line under a severe fire. The enemy had clearly an advantage in position. Hamilton could bring but a single battery, the Eleventh Ohio, to bear upon him. The ground was broken by ravines, and densely covered with undergrowth. It has been claimed for each side that it was outnumbered by the other. Rosecrans, in an order issued eight days after the battle, speaks of the unequal ground, which permitted the enemy to outnumber his men three to one. On the other hand, Pollard says that the Confederates were "overmatched by numbers."

It was almost night when the battle commenced, but in the two hours during which it lasted it raged with uncommon fierceness. Upon the Fifth Iowa and the Eleventh Missouri, supporting the battery, fell the most stunning blows from the enemy. The former lost seventy-six, the latter one hundred and sixteen, in killed and wounded. About the Eleventh Ohio battery there was the hottest work. The action had scarcely lasted half an



IUKA, MISSISSIPPI.





RICHARD F. OGLESBY.

hour before seventy-two of its men were put out of combat. The battery was charged and captured by the Confederates, and was again recaptured by the Fifth Iowa. Thrice again was it captured and recaptured. The fighting was in some instances hand to hand. It is said that in one spot, not over sixteen feet square, there were counted the next morning seventeen Confederate soldiers lying dead around one of their officers.

Grant did not attack, and during the night Price's army left the field. By casualties in the field and captures during the forced retreat, the loss sustained by that army amounted to upward of two thousand men. The Federal loss was nearly eight hundred. General Grant's combinations rendered it impossible for General Price to carry out his original plan of co-operation with Bragg. Van Dorn had also failed of his object, not having reached Corinth soon enough to insure its capture. The two armies, under Price and Van Dorn, were soon concentrated at Ripley, some distance west of Iuka, for an attack on Corinth. General Grant had abandoned Iuka and returned to Corinth. Four days afterward, Rosecrans, who had just been promoted to be a major general, assumed command of that place. In order to guard the line of railroad upon which the Federal army depended for supplies, General Grant proceeded to Jackson, fifty miles north of Corinth, having posted Ord's force on the same railroad farther south, at Bolivar. Thus Rosecrans was left at Corinth with an army numbering little more than twenty thousand men.

Van Dorn, in command of the Confederate army in Mississippi, moved against Corinth on the 2d of October, the day after Buell marched from Louisville against Bragg. The battle known as the Battle of Corinth was fought on the 3d. Van Dorn moved from Chewalla, on the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, west of Corinth. It ought to have been evident to the Confederate commander that an attack on Corinth had scarcely a chance of success. He had a larger army than Rosecrans, it is true; but the latter held a position which, considering the situation of Grant's and Ord's columns, was defensible against an army more than twice as strong as that constituting its defense. The reason that Van Dorn moved from the west on Corinth was his knowledge of the fact that Beauregard, early in the year, had constructed fortifications on the north and east. These fortifications had been very much strengthened since the Federal occupation. Halleck had constructed a line of works inside of those constructed by Beauregard, and Grant had constructed still another inside of this latter. This interior line consisted of a chain of redoubts, arranged with a view to concentrate the fire of several heavy batteries upon an attacking force.

As soon as the enemy's approach assumed a definite shape, Rosecrans called in the outpost garrisons on the south side at Iuka, Burnsville, and Rienzi. The outpost on the Chewalla road was withdrawn a short distance and strengthened. It yet appeared doubtful to Rosecrans whether the main attack would be directed against himself, or against Bolivar, Bethel, or Jackson, at which places there were strong garrisons. But he would rather gain than lose on either supposition. If the attack was mainly against Corinth, then his position was eminently favorable for defense; if against any position farther north, then his position was equally favorable for offensive operations in the enemy's rear. Of the two cases offered, he would have much preferred the latter, as more fatal to Van Dorn. In an interview with his

division commanders on the morning of the 3d, Rosecrans instructed them "to hold the enemy at arm's-length" until the latter should assume a definite position, when they were to take a position where they could avail themselves of their batteries and the favorable ground in the vicinity of Corinth.

On the 3d, the Federal troops on the Chewalla road had been pushed back with severe loss. Brigadier General Hackleman was killed, and General Oglesby was severely wounded. It was Davies's division that had been principally engaged. The fight all day had been a general skirmish in the midst of dense timber, where heavy artillery could not be used to advantage. The plan of attack was, however, pretty fully developed. The main rebel column under Van Dorn rested its right upon the Chewalla road, and extended toward the north; its left, under Price, lay upon the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, almost directly north of Corinth, while Lovell held the extreme right. It was upon this side of the town—the northwest side—that Van Dorn expected to find the line of defense weakest. But during the past ten days other works had been built here, of which the Confederate commander was ignorant. The new line consisted of four redoubts. On the right, near Beauregard's old line, one of these was situated. On the night of the 3d, Fort Richardson, mounting five guns, was constructed, to cover the approach by the Bolivar road, which ran out from Corinth a little east of north. Fort Williams, which had been built to command the heights over which ran the road from Chewalla, was a very strong work, mounting several heavy Parrott guns; and Fort Robinette, built on a high, narrow ridge, enfiladed both the Bolivar and the Chewalla roads. Still another fort on the extreme left, near the Corinth Seminary, strengthened that flank, at the same time that it afforded additional protection to the centre. The ground along this line was unusually favorable to the use of artillery.

With admirable skill, Rosecrans had anticipated the probable approach of Van Dorn's army—had done his best, indeed, to tempt the latter in this very direction, and had made this part of his line as strong as any other. His line of battle on the morning of the 4th faced northward. Hamilton's division, which had just fought the battle of Iuka, held the right from Fort No. 1 to Fort Richardson. Then came Davies's division, joined on the left by six companies of Yates's sharpshooters. Stanley's division, consisting of two brigades, came next in order, its left resting on Fort Robinette, and McKean's division, with McArthur's brigade, held the extreme left. The cavalry, under Colonel Mizner, was posted on both wings and in the rear. The whole line was covered well in front by the undulations of ground, and the various batteries, under Lieutenant Colonel Lathrop, were either protected by fortifications or by an apron of hay or cotton-bales.

The near approach of the Confederates had placed the town of Corinth in an uncomfortable situation. There were a great number of non-combatants in the place, and the knowledge that the enemy was within a thousand yards of Rosecrans's line, and could easily shell the town, was a reasonable ground of uneasiness. Whatever apprehension there may have been on this point was realized before daylight. A battery had been planted by the enemy in Stanley's front, and not more than two hundred yards distant from Fort Robinette, from which, before daybreak, a fire was opened upon the town. The breakfast-fires of the Federal soldiers enabled the enemy to get the proper range, and a good number of shells were sent into the streets of Corinth. There was panic then among the non-combatants, who had been



DAVID B. STANLEY.



uneasy all night, and who now had recourse to hurried flight. At daylight a fire from Fort Williams in a very few minutes silenced the troublesome battery. The enemy meanwhile was forming at a little distance in the woods, while batteries on either side were already in action, and skirmishing was going on between sharpshooters in the marshy ground in front.

At about half past nine Price's column, in a dense mass, debouched on the Bolivar road. As it advanced it took the form of a wedge, and moved up with fierce velocity, as if it would pierce and overwhelm all opposition. Every Federal battery directed its full and unobstructed fire against this massive column, piercing it in front and on the flank, and making huge gaps in it—gaps which were no sooner made than filled. Musketry was then added to artillery; "but," says an eye-witness, "the enemy bent their necks downward and marched steadily to death, with their faces averted like men striving to protect themselves against a driving storm of hail." The Federal sharpshooters from behind their hastily-built breastworks poured in their fire, but still Price's column moved inflexibly onward. As it came nearer, the wedge had opened and developed into two columns, spreading out over the whole front of the field. Up the whole line pressed over every obstruction—up to the crest of the hill, flanking Fort Richardson on the right. Davies's division began to falter; but at the right moment Rosecrans was in its ranks, and they rallied, but not until the enemy had gained Fort Richardson. Even Rosecrans's head-quarters were captured, and from the shelter of the house a fire was opened on troops in the rear. In the yard of this house seven Confederate soldiers were found dead after the battle. Richardson, after a desperate and unequal contest for the possession of the fort, fell at last, and the enemy rushed into the captured work. Scarcely had the fort been taken before it was retaken by the Fifty-sixth Illinois.

Hamilton's division on the right had, in the mean time, swept the enemy's lines on the flank with a steady fire. Having fallen back a little when Stanley wavered, it now charged forward in the wake of the Fifty-sixth Illinois. There was an advance all along the line. A few minutes before, and it had appeared for a moment uncertain whether the enemy might not compensate for his terrible loss in approaching by an important success on Rosecrans's flank. But now all was changed. Price's entire column was broken and in swift retreat, flinging aside its arms, and scattering into the woods from which, but a little before, they had issued an immovable phalanx.

Van Dorn's column, which was to have attacked simultaneously with Price on the Chewalla road, was delayed by the nature of the ground. Ravines, and densely-wooded thickets, and artificial obstructions were in his way. The action with Price was over in a few minutes, and Van Dorn came on the field too late. Still the latter advanced. If the advance of Price's column had been gallant, yet it was surpassed by the almost incredible bravery of the Texan and Mississippian soldiers of Van Dorn's command. Besides the entanglements and topographical obstacles in their way, their line of advance was within point-blank range of the thirty-pound Parrott guns of Fort Williams and the guns of Fort Robinette. Supporting these works was a strong column of veterans as yet fresh for the battle. But Van Dorn's men overcame all obstacles with a courage that seemed irresistible. Colonel Rogers came on in advance at the head of his Texan brigade. But they paused at the ditch; Rogers fell just as he had leaped over. Then the Ohio brigade of Stanley's division, which Colonel Fuller had all this while kept lying with their faces to the ground behind the ridge on the right of the fort, rose and delivered six successive volleys, driving the Texans back. But the Confederate supports came up, and there was a severe hand-to-hand fight, which resulted at length in the success of the national troops. The victory had been gained at a fearful cost of life. The Sixty-third Ohio went into the fight with two hundred and fifty men, and left just one half that number of killed and wounded on the field. The rout of Van Dorn's column was as complete as had been that of Price's. Forts Williams and Robinette, the latter of which had borne the brunt of the assault, now poured their ruinous shower of shell into the midst of the flying enemy. Such had been the obstinacy of the assault on Fort Robinette that fifty-six dead Confederates were found heaped up in front of the redoubt.

The battle had lasted now for an hour and a half since Price's column came out on the Bolivar road. But the pursuit was an important part of the battle. Says the correspondent from whom we have already quoted: "The pursuit of the beaten foe was terrible. Sheets of flame blazed through the forest. Huge trunks were shattered by crashing shells. You may track the flying conflict for miles by scarified trees, broken branches, twisted gun-barrels and shattered stocks, bloodstained garments and mats of human hair, which lie on the ground where men died; hillocks which mark ditches where dead rebels were covered, and smoothly-rounded graves where slaughtered patriots were tenderly buried." The retreat was continued across the Hatchie River to within a short distance of Ripley. General Hurlbut, of Ord's command, joined in the pursuit. Hurlbut, while the battle was going on, had started from Bolivar, intending to strike the enemy's rear. On the 5th the enemy's retreat was intercepted. Eight guns were captured, many hundred small-arms, and several hundred prisoners.

As regards the generalship displayed in the battle of Corinth, there can be but one opinion. General Rosecrans planned and fought the battle with consummate skill. It must of course be admitted that he was exceedingly fortunate in having opposed to him two generals who were as rash in their attempt against Corinth as their attack was magnificent. Very few battles in the war were so obstinate and bloody as the battle of Corinth. General Rosecrans, in a congratulatory order issued October 25th, said to his troops:

"Upon the issue of the fight depended the possession of West Tennessee,



E. O. G. ORL.

and perhaps even the fate of operations in Kentucky. The entire available force of the rebels in Mississippi, save a few garrisons and a small reserve, attacked you. They were commanded by Van Dorn, Price, Villipigue, Rust, Armstrong, Maury, and others, in person. They numbered, according to their own authorities, nearly forty thousand men—almost double your own numbers. You fought them into the position we desired on the third, punishing them terribly; and on the fourth, in three hours after the infantry entered into action, they were beaten. You killed and buried one thousand four hundred and twenty-four officers and men, some of their most distinguished officers falling, among whom was the gallant Colonel Rogers, of the Second Texas, who bore their colors at the head of his storming column to the edge of the ditch of Battery Robinette, where he fell. Their wounded, at the usual rate, must exceed five thousand. You took two thousand two hundred and sixty-eight prisoners, among whom are one hundred and thirty-seven field-officers, captains, and subalterns, representing fifty-three regiments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, thirteen batteries, seven battalions, besides several companies. You captured three thousand three hundred and fifty stands of small-arms, fourteen stands of colors, two pieces of artillery, and a large quantity of equipments. You pursued his retreating columns forty miles in force with infantry and sixty miles with cavalry, and were ready to follow him to Mobile, if necessary, had you received orders. \* \* \* \* \*

"But our victory has cost us the lives of three hundred and fifteen brave officers and soldiers, besides the wounded. \* \* \* The memory of the brave Hackleman, the chivalrous Kirby Smith, the true and noble colonels Thrush, Baker, and Miles, and Captain Guy C. Ward, with many others, live with us and in the memory of a free people, while history will inscribe their names among its heroes."

The same day that this order was issued General Rosecrans was ordered from Corinth to Cincinnati to command the Department of the Cumberland, which was made to comprise that portion of Tennessee east of the Tennessee River, and such parts of Northern Georgia and Alabama as might be taken possession of by the national forces. The armies of the West were at this time reorganized, the troops under General Grant constituting the Thirteenth Army Corps, and those under Rosecrans the Fourteenth. On the 16th of October Grant had been assigned to the command of the Department of the Tennessee, which was defined to include Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, Northern Mississippi, and all of Kentucky and Tennessee west of the Tennessee River.

After the battle of Corinth, Van Dorn, collecting together the scattered fragments of his army, took a position in the vicinity of Holly Springs, on the Cairo and New Orleans Railroad. General Grant, having received a considerable re-enforcement from new levies, followed the line of this railroad, advancing southward from Bolivar and Jackson. He began this movement on the 4th of November. During the month of November it remained at Lagrange, three miles east of Grand Junction. The Federal occupation of New Orleans, and the advance which the national armies had made into Arkansas, seemed to render possible a successful campaign for the complete





conquest of the Northwest, or at least for the possession of the Cairo and New

Orleans Railroad. But there were great obstacles in the way of success in this direction, the most formidable of which was that the advance was far into the enemy's country. A long line of communications stretched back in the rear, which must be guarded against attack. No small portion of Grant's army must be detached for garrisons at Columbus, Humboldt, Trenton, Jackson, Bolivar, Corinth, and Grand Junction, and at every stage of the advance there must be a farther depletion. Much might have been effected by a large and effective force of cavalry; but this force was wanting. The distance over which supplies were to be transported, even to Grand Junction, was one hundred and forty miles. Memphis was far preferable to Columbus as a base of supplies, being only fifty miles distant from Grand Junction, but the road was not in running order.

On the 28th of November Grant moved from Lagrange. The next day Hamilton's advance entered Holly Springs, from which Van Dorn had retired, and was reported to be strongly fortified on the Tallahatchie River. By December 1 the main portion of Grant's army was in camp at Lampkin's Mills, south of Holly Springs, and seven miles north of the Tallahatchie. Simultaneously with Grant's advance General Curtis marched a column of seven thousand men, under General Alvin P. Hovey, from Helena, in Arkansas, on the Mississippi, intending to co-operate with Grant by striking Van Dorn's flank on the Tallahatchie. This caused Van Dorn to give up the position held by him on that river and to retire farther southward, through Oxford, closely followed by Grant.

Hovey's expedition was very successful. The cavalry which accompanied it, under Colonel Washburn, contributed greatly to this success. Hovey's column crossed the Tallahatchie on the 28th of November, and then destroyed the railroad line for some distance. At Oakland an engagement occurred with the Confederate cavalry, which resulted favorably to Colonel Washburn. The Confederate steam-boats on the Tallahatchie were destroyed, and some locomotives which had been left behind by the enemy. Having effected this much, and the enemy having fallen back nearly to Jackson, the expedition returned to Helena. A few days later, General Grant having made his headquarters at Oxford, Van Dorn saw the way open for an attack on Grant's rear. He determined, therefore, to surprise and capture Holly Springs. About daylight on the morning of December 20, Van Dorn's cavalry, consisting of twenty-two regiments, appeared in the streets of Holly Springs. In the railroad dépôt, on the east side of the town, there were two trains of cars, one of them empty and the other loaded with cotton. These were fired. A hundred men were guarding the valuable government stores at the dépôt, but these were soon overwhelmed and captured. Other detachments of infantry in the suburbs of the town were surprised and captured in squads. Six companies of the Second Illinois Cavalry were surrounded, but, after a gallant fight, cut their way out, and the enemy began his work of destruction. All the Northern men in town were taken prisoners, and, after being plundered, were paroled. The passenger and freight dépôts were burned. The arsenal, full of arms and ammunition, suffered the same fate. Some twenty or thirty buildings on the public square and eighteen hundred bales of cotton were involved in the conflagration. It was estimated that the government property destroyed amounted to two millions of dollars, besides the cotton.

The attack on Holly Springs was not a surprise to General Grant, who had telegraphed to Colonel Murphy, commanding the town, that he would be attacked. He had sent on re-enforcements, which, however, arrived too late. The telegraphic dispatch to Colonel Murphy reached him on the evening of the 19th. He had under his command five or six hundred infantry, besides the Second Illinois Cavalry, and, with a proper disposition of this force, and making the necessary preparations for defense, he might have resisted the attack successfully until re-enforcements came to his assistance. General Grant, in his order four days afterward, properly stigmatized the surrender of the place as disgraceful. He said: "With all the cotton, public stores, and substantial buildings about the dépôt, it would have been perfectly practicable to have made, in a few hours, a defense sufficient to resist, with a small garrison, all the cavalry force brought against them, until the re-enforcements, which the commanding officer was notified were marching to his relief, could have reached him."<sup>1</sup>

Other stations along the line were captured, and it was the enemy's intention to destroy every bridge between Corinth and Columbus. The destruction of his dépôt of supplies at Holly Springs rendered it impossible for Grant to continue his advance southward. He returned to Holly Springs with his army, from which a detachment of ten thousand men was sent to General Sherman to assist in the operations against Vicksburg.

Returning from General Grant's department to that which was now under

<sup>1</sup> The Richmond Dispatch of January 15 contained the following estimate of the victory gained at Holly Springs:

"The surprised camp surrendered 1800 men and 150 commissioned officers, who were immediately paroled. And then commenced the work of destruction. The extensive buildings of the Mississippi Central dépôt—the station-house, the engine-house, and immense store-houses—were filled with supplies of clothing and commissary stores. Outside of the dépôt the barrels of flour were estimated to be half a mile in length, one hundred and fifty feet through, and fifteen feet high. Turpentine was thrown over this, and the whole amount destroyed. Up town, the court-house and public buildings, livery-stables, and all capacious establishments, were filled, ceiling-high, with medical and ordnance stores. These were all fired, and the explosion of one of the buildings, in which was stored one hundred barrels of powder, knocked down nearly all the houses on the south side of the square. Surely such a scene of devastation was never before presented to the eye of man. Glance at the gigantic estimates:

"1,809,000 fixed cartridges and other ordnance stores, valued at \$1,500,000, including 5000 rifles and 2000 revolvers.

"100,000 suits of clothing and other quartermaster's stores, valued at \$500,000; 5000 barrels of flour and other commissary stores, valued at \$500,000.

"\$1,000,000 worth of medical stores, for which invoices to that amount were exhibited, and 1000 bales of cotton, and \$600,000 worth of sutlers' stores."

According to this account, General Grant's wife was among the captured.





HOLLY SPRINGS, MISSISSIPPI.





ALVIN P. HOVEY

Rosecrans's command, we find the eastern, and a large portion of the central part of Tennessee occupied by the Confederate army which Bragg had withdrawn from Kentucky in October.

The army which Rosecrans received from Buell was now largely re-enforced by new levies. President Lincoln had, in July and August, called 600,000 new men into the field.<sup>1</sup> Buell's army had been greatly depleted by desertions. In June some 14,000 men were absent from his command. This demoralization increased to such an extent that, in September, special officers were appointed to arrest deserters and return them to service. Rosecrans had in his army so many raw recruits that he was compelled to devote considerable time to their discipline. In moving against Bragg, he had also to contend against another difficulty. Two large armies had ravaged the space intervening between the Ohio and the Tennessee Rivers since the middle of summer. It was now autumn; and, unless Rosecrans waited for the harvests of another year to ripen, he could enter upon an active campaign only after he should have accumulated a large store of provisions. Not only could he not supply his army from the country, but the very avenues of communication with a distant base of supplies must be provided. The Cumberland River was too low for his purpose. The Louisville and Nashville Railroad had been destroyed by Bragg. The bridges had been burned, and the tunnel at Gallatin, north of Nashville, had been destroyed. The railroad must be repaired, and even then it would be a poor substitute for the river. The enemy had a superior force of cavalry, under Forrest and Morgan, and it would be no difficult matter for Bragg to dispatch a force to his rear which would undo in an hour the work of days. It would not have been easy to interrupt the water communication except by elaborate fortifications. A river does not depend upon the safety of bridges, as does a railroad, for its continuous and perfect communication.

In the subordinate officers there was some change. We drop Gilbert, and have the good fortune of Thomas's company as an actual instead of a nominal commander. McCook and Crittenden are retained, and Rousseau is deservedly elevated to the command of a corps. In the exchange of Buell for Rosecrans we are also gainers, if we look for vigorous operations. There are many obstacles in the way, as we have pointed out; but Rosecrans meets these with a determined will. Little more than a month after his assumption of command he is on the move, and by the 1st of November has his advance at Bowling Green. A week later McCook's corps passed through Nashville. But the railroad had been completed only as far as to the northern border of Tennessee.

<sup>1</sup> The following table, prepared from official reports, shows the number of troops furnished by each of the loyal states up to December 1, 1862. This table does not include the 80,000 furnished just after the capture of Fort Sumter.

Maine.....	30,240	Indiana.....	96,698
New Hampshire.....	16,000	Illinois.....	130,059
Vermont.....	19,006	Michigan.....	47,220
Massachusetts.....	72,107	Wisconsin.....	42,557
Rhode Island.....	10,000	Minnesota.....	10,957
Connecticut.....	28,551	Iowa.....	50,000
New York.....	219,059	Kansas.....	14,000
New Jersey.....	27,400	California.....	9,000
Pennsylvania.....	230,000	Oregon.....	1,500
Delaware.....	2,500	Colorado.....	3,300
Maryland.....	10,000	Nebraska.....	3,500
West Virginia.....	20,000	New Mexico.....	2,000
Kentucky.....	55,000	District of Columbia.....	2,000
Missouri.....	38,081	Total.....	1,355,087
Ohio.....	164,402		

This estimate includes nearly 100,000 volunteers furnished for special service and for a short period of time.

If the Confederates ever needed a commander bold, and at the same time wise, it was now. The opportunity offered to such a commander was even greater than it had been in the summer. Then the Confederate armies were being rapidly filled by the new Conscription Act, and numbers had made Bragg confident of great results to be gained by a march to the Ohio. His invasion had not gained the objects for which it was undertaken. He had failed to take Louisville and Cincinnati. He had not even gained any important victory in the field. The Northwestern states had not sued for peace, notwithstanding the magnanimous terms which he had offered. Even the citizens of Kentucky had not rallied around his standard. Those who joined him had been pressed into the service against their will. What might have been the attitude of Kentuckians if he had succeeded in the military objects of his invasion is only conjecturable. Many had greeted his arrival when the way seemed open to a grand success. Many had been intimidated by the formidable appearance of his army when there was a panic in the great Northern cities on the line of the Ohio, and when as yet the Federal armies appeared incompetent to oppose an adequate resistance. But when his army began to halt, then to waver, and finally to retreat without the prestige of victory before Buell's army, the situation was reversed. Those who were intimidated lost their fears. Those whose expectations of Confederate success had been aroused now lost their hope, and began to fear for the consequences of their premature demonstrations in Bragg's favor. Bragg had been unable to accomplish what he had threatened against those who resisted him, and had disappointed those who had been too hasty and prodigal in their trust. When his troops left Lexington, women ran through the streets wringing their hands in terror and dismay, and his train was encumbered with the vehicles of panic-stricken refugees. When the more wealthy citizens looked upon the flaming piles in which their property was being consumed, because if left it would no longer enrich a Confederate army, the keen anguish of distress was mingled with a sentiment of disgust for the treachery of which they had become the unhappy victims. But an immense amount of stores which had been captured from the defenseless was carried away by the retreating army, and this was almost the solitary token of its poor success. When the train passed through Bryantsville, on the 13th of October, the few guns and ammunition wagons which had been captured had the precedence. Then came the long train of captured stores, which was followed by humiliated refugees, flying with their negroes in every imaginable sort of vehicle, from stately carriages and stage-coaches down to ambulances and Jersey wagons. The infantry, artillery, and cavalry of the army brought up the rear, and intermixed with the medley spectacle were vast herds of cattle, horses, and mules. "The effect of our retreat along the road every where," writes a Confederate historian,<sup>1</sup> "was sinking and depressing in the extreme. No miniature banners waved, no white kerchiefs greeted our troops with approving smiles from lovely women, and no wild cheer was heard responsive to the greetings which had attended their march into Kentucky. Trembling women stole to the doors to look upon the strange, mystified scene before them, and, as the truth gradually forced itself upon them, their eyes filled with tears, and they shrank back, fearing even to make the slightest demonstration of friendliness. All was sullen, downcast, and gloomy." The same writer farther on admits "that the South was bitterly disappointed in the manifestations of public sentiment in Kentucky." He says: "The exhibitions of sympathy in this state were meagre and sentimental, and amounted to but little practical aid to our cause. Indeed, no subject was at once more dispiriting and perplexing to the South than the cautious and unmanly reception given to our armies, both in Kentucky and Maryland. The reference we have made to the sentiment of each of these states leaves but little room to doubt the general conclusion that the dread of Yankee vengeance and love of property were too powerful to make them take risks against these in favor of a cause for which their people had a mere preference, without any attachment to it higher than those of selfish calculation."

In the summer, then, Bragg had been overconfident of his power to overwhelm the states of the Northwest by his newly-conscripted army. Now his force was less in number, but the opportunity offered was, even under this disparaging circumstance, more tempting to a vigorous military leader. It was possible now to make use of the solitary advantage gained by the summer campaign. The devastation of the country over which both armies had passed and repassed, while it hindered Rosecrans, in so far helped Bragg. The latter had shown a great degree of boldness in design in the summer campaign, but, at the same time, had betrayed his lack of great executive ability. So far as successful execution of a plan depended upon fearless firmness, he could be trusted; so far as it depended upon keen and comprehensive insight, he was almost certain to be foiled. It was just this latter element, which he so much wanted, that was most necessary in an encounter with Rosecrans, who was himself especially distinguished by this very characteristic of genius. The Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston was now in command of the department, but he was unable to take the field on account of a severe wound received in Virginia, in the battle of Seven Pines. That Johnston was a far abler general than Bragg can not well be questioned, but what would have been the prospect of success if he had been actually in command, it is scarcely possible to infer from the most careful scrutiny into his subsequent campaigns.

On the 26th of November the cars for the first time ran through to Nashville. A heavy force was posted at Gallatin to protect the road. From that time the preparations for the campaign were speedily pushed forward. At the close of December the army had been clothed, and sufficient ammuni-

<sup>1</sup> Pollard's Second Year of the War, p. 159.





WILLIAM B. ROSECRANS.

tion and supplies were brought to Nashville to secure the army against the needs which might at any time arise from the interruption of the railroad. Having made these preparations, Rosecrans awaited his opportunity, which was not long wanting. It was impossible for Bragg to make a false move which would not immediately lay him open to his wary antagonist. To all appearance Rosecrans was at his leisure. It was given out that he would no doubt go into winter quarters at Nashville. But, as soon as his army was provided for, he began to look with dissatisfaction upon the interval between Nashville and Murfreesborough. Which army should cross that intervening space to attack the other—his or Bragg's? Bragg's army numbered sixty thousand men, of which force nearly one third was cavalry. Rosecrans had 40,000 infantry and about 3000 cavalry. The question as between a movement from Nashville on Murfreesborough and one from Murfreesborough on Nashville was momentous. The army receiving the attack would avoid the waste of force attending an advance movement, and be able to avail itself of fortifications. But it was important that an action should not long be delayed. The enemy could well afford to wait, but every day materially diminished Rosecrans's stock of provisions. Happily for Rosecrans, Bragg solved the problem, and in a highly satisfactory manner, by sending off a large portion of his cavalry under Forrest and Morgan. Forrest was dispatched to General Grant's rear, while Morgan advanced into Kentucky to break Rosecrans's line of communication. This was a fortunate event for Rosecrans. One brigade of the enemy's cavalry, under the best horseman of the Confederacy, was thus out of the field. Morgan was not dangerous, acting in his rear, as provision had been made against that event. These "clouds of mounted men," as Rosecrans called them, had been his principal annoyance. They swept the country in every direction. Rosecrans's cavalry force was so small that it was kept within the infantry lines. Bragg had still a large cavalry command left under Generals Wheeler and Wharton. So settled was Bragg's opinion as to Rosecrans's indisposition to assume the offensive, that he had on neither of the roads leading in his direction any heavy force. Polk and Kirby Smith were at Murfreesborough, while Hardee held the left toward Franklin with an advanced guard at Nolensville. Rosecrans deemed that his opportunity had arrived, and moved December 26th. McCook's corps of three divisions advanced on the

Nolensville pike against Hardee. Thomas, with two divisions under Negley and Rousseau, advanced by the Franklin and Wilson pikes to threaten Hardee's flank, and then to fall in to Nolensville, ready, in the event of McCook's success, to support Crittenden against an attack at Stone River, south of Laverne; for Crittenden had advanced along the Murfreesborough pike to the latter place with Wood's, Palmer's, and Van Cleve's divisions. Crittenden's corps at Laverne was the pivot of the entire movement; McCook's was to strike hard upon Hardee; and Thomas's was to support either McCook or Crittenden, as circumstances should decide. The plan was admirably well conceived. There were two possible issues to the action: either Hardee would be re-enforced, and the main battle would be fought west of Murfreesborough; or he would fall back on Murfreesborough, uniting with Polk and Smith in the defense of that place.

On the 26th McCook was skirmishing all day, and at night occupied a strong position at Nolensville. The same night Crittenden was at Laverne, having passed over a rough and difficult country, intersected by forests and cedar brakes. Thomas also had made good progress, meeting little resistance. All this day and the next the separate columns pushed on through a dreaching rain. The Christmas holidays were now begun, but they were no holidays to the weary soldier. On the second day of his advance the movements of Hardee were clearly developed. He was retreating, but not southward. It was now certain that the battle would be fought at or a little north of Murfreesborough. On the night of that day Crittenden had reached Stewart's Creek. Thomas had brought his column to Nolensville. McCook was following Hardee closely and watchfully. On the 29th McCook's advance brought him within seven miles of Murfreesborough; Crittenden moved to within three miles of that place, at Stone River; and Thomas held the centre, Rousseau's division being nearer to Crittenden, and held in reserve; while Negley's was in the front. That night Rosecrans, having moved his head-quarters to Stewart's Creek, went to the front, where he remained. Although it was only about thirty miles from Nashville to Murfreesborough, Rosecrans's advance on the latter was greatly impeded by Wheeler's and Wharton's cavalry. The main cause of delay, however, was the necessity for Rosecrans to await the development of the affair between McCook and Hardee.



The situation of Bragg's army was a good one for defense. Upon Murfreesborough as a centre numerous important pikes converge. The railroad from Nashville, taking Lavergne upon its route, runs through the town in a southeasterly direction. As Rosecrans had little cavalry, it was not necessary for Bragg to detach from his army any considerable force to guard that portion of the railroad which was in his possession. He held a central position, while Rosecrans moved along the radii of a quadrant. One thing, however, was unfavorable. The topography of the country in the vicinity of Stone River rendered it difficult to operate successfully with cavalry. It was a broken and heavily-wooded country, with here and there an open field, and was well adapted to the use of infantry and artillery.

The battle known as the battle of Stone River lasted several days. But the main actions—those which decided its character and result—were fought on the 31st of December, 1862, and the 2d of January, 1863. The battle was fought on the banks of Stone River, a stream which, flowing eastward, crosses the pike a mile north of Murfreesborough, where it abruptly changes its course, flowing northward and parallel with the road. On the evening of December 30th, the left of Rosecrans's line lay along the river on its western bank. Two divisions of Crittenden's corps, Van Cleve's and Wood's, extended from the Murfreesborough pike to the river. The other division—Palmer's—held the cotton-field on the right of the pike. Thomas held the centre, with Negley on Palmer's right, and Rousseau in reserve. McCook lay off to the left, his line being extended to a great length toward the Franklin road, facing southeastward.

Stone River, which skirted the Federal left, ran through the enemy's line. The great mass of the Confederate army lay on the west bank opposite McCook. This portion of Bragg's lines was held by Hardee's corps. Breckinridge's division of this corps was detached from the rest, and held a position on the east bank. Polk held the ground between Hardee and Breckinridge.

Both Bragg and Rosecrans had determined to attack on the 31st, and the plan of attack formed by each exactly corresponded. On each side the bulk of the army was massed on the left wing. Bragg thought to whip McCook, and push Rosecrans off from the pike connecting him with Nashville. Rosecrans designed to crush Breckinridge, and, rapidly following up the blow, get in between the enemy and Murfreesborough. Neither had any positive expectation of being attacked by the other. As Rosecrans was obliged to bring his left wing across the river in order to carry out his plan, his movements were subject to greater delay. He was thus somewhat anticipated by Bragg. He had instructed McCook, in case of an attack being made upon his corps by Hardee, to hold out stubbornly, thus insuring the success of the attack on Breckinridge and Polk.

McCook's corps consisted of three divisions, which extended from left to right thus: Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The latter division was surprised by Hardee at daybreak on the 31st, and while Rosecrans's movements on the left had hardly begun. The latter was not unwilling that McCook should be attacked, if only it did not disturb his prearranged plan. But in this respect he was destined to be disappointed. He was not aware of the advantage which Hardee was rapidly gaining on McCook. Perhaps he remembered the obstinacy with which this corps of McCook's had a few weeks before withstood the attacks of the same enemy at Perryville. Three or four hours of obstinate resistance on McCook's part would without doubt enable him to overwhelm Breckinridge; certainly such commanders as Davis and Sheridan could maintain the battle for that length of time. There was one thing, however, which disturbed Rosecrans's confidence. McCook's line, he feared, was not arranged in a proper manner. He had the night before spoken of this arrangement to McCook. Said Rosecrans: "I don't like the facing so much to the east, but must confide that to you, who know the ground." The battle had been going on about an hour, when one of McCook's staff officers announced that the right was heavily pressed, and needed assistance. The messenger was not sufficiently explicit. He certainly failed to impress upon Rosecrans's mind the impression that there was any danger. The fact was that two of Johnson's brigades—Kirk's and Willich's—had been routed, leaving their batteries in the enemy's hands. Davis, too, had been doubled up brigade by brigade, although gallantly resisting, and driven back. This was not reported to Rosecrans; and the latter, although he heard the battle swerving more and more to the left, supposed that McCook was refusing his right gradually, according to the instructions given him. He therefore directed the officer to return and direct General McCook to hold on obstinately.

It was not long before a second officer arrived, as Van Cleve was crossing Stone River, and stated that the right wing was being driven. This was now only too evident to Rosecrans, who could hear the sound of battle rapidly swaying northward. Sheridan had followed Davis, and the peril was now imminent. Van Cleve was recalled, and two of his brigades sent over to the centre. Rousseau's division was sent into the cedar brakes to support Sheridan, and become the nucleus of a new formation. The scene which met Rosecrans's eye as he went over to the right would have unnerved a man of less resource. The stragglers from McCook's routed command were swarming to the rear through the brakes in crowds. The enemy had succeeded in breaking up Rosecrans's plan of attack, and had carried his first position. Even Negley had given way in the centre, and Rousseau could scarcely bear up against the impetus of the attack. All the troops on Palmer's left had been sent to the right. The only division which retained its original position was Palmer's. Let us see how that division was situated, so much now depended upon it. Most of the division was now on the right of the pike. Cruft's brigade was a little in the rear, in the wood. Hazen stood across the pike, so that his front line extended eastward to the

railroad which runs between the pike and the river. It was of the first importance that this position of Hazen's should be held, in order to cover the formation of a new line, in which work Rosecrans was now engaged. The river on Palmer's left, being deep and having but a single ford, was a good flank defense. A rise of ground at the railroad afforded some protection against the enemy's artillery. Palmer's troops were well-disciplined veterans, and were fresher than the troops of the enemy, who had been fighting since morning. About ten o'clock Hazen and Cruft were attacked in great force; but, fortunately, the valor of the Federal troops and the strength of Parsons's artillery baffled every onset. The whole of Bragg's army, with the exception of Breckinridge, was now engaged. At one o'clock P.M. and at four o'clock fresh attempts were made to drive Hazen from his position, but without success.

In the mean time Rosecrans had been at work farther to the right. When McCook's routed battalions retreated out of the corn-fields and through the skirts of the woods on Rousseau's flank, the latter officer found it quite impossible, under the circumstances, to get his division into position in the cedar thicket. Galloping off to General Thomas, he described his situation. In the rear there was open ground, about three miles distant from Murfreesborough. Here the railroad and turnpike, about fifty rods apart, run through a slight cut, forming a natural rifle-pit. Farther back there is on either side of the road a swell of ground, which, once gained and held, constituted an impregnable position. To this favorable position Rousseau withdrew his division, with General Thomas's permission. Gueuther's and Loomis's batteries were posted on the left, with Stokes's Chicago battery, and were strongly supported by a brigade of regulars. Scribner's brigade took position in the natural rifle-pit above mentioned, and Beatty's brigade held the crest on the right, which stretched away to the northern edge of a cedar wood. Scarcely had the line been formed, stretching from Hazen northwestwardly to Van Cleve's position on the right flank, when the gray uniforms of Hardee's troops were seen issuing from the edge of this wood. The hill on the left, where the batteries had been placed, commanded the entire space in front of the wood on the right, and as rapidly as the enemy came forth into the open ground his ranks were mown down without mercy. It was impossible for Bragg to move Rosecrans from his strong position, while every onset decimated the ranks of his own troops. The prompt formation of the Federal line in the strongest possible position had turned the fortune of the battle. But Rosecrans's loss in the early part of the day had been heavy. Over twenty-five pieces of artillery had fallen into the enemy's hands, and a large number of prisoners had been captured by Wharton's cavalry. Wheeler had the day before succeeded in gaining Rosecrans's rear, and captured a large number of wagons loaded with supplies and baggage, and so small was the Federal cavalry command that he made the entire circuit of the lines, and joined Wharton on the left. But these movements of the enemy's cavalry scarcely disturbed Rosecrans, who could not by any mere annoyance, or even partial reverse, be diverted from the end he had in view.

The battle on Wednesday ended with the complete repulse both of Hardee on the right and of Polk at the centre. Hazen at the close of the day withdrew from the advanced position which he had held with wonderful tenacity for ten hours. The next day opened the new year, 1863. Rosecrans's position was so strong that Bragg feared to make an assault, and contented himself with skirmishing and a few cavalry raids. Rosecrans had been re-enforced by Starkweather's and Walker's brigades; but he preferred to wait for fresh supplies of food and ammunition before resuming offensive operations.

On Friday, the 2d of January, the contest was renewed with some degree of vigor. Bragg early in the morning directed a heavy cannonade against the Federal centre from four strong batteries, and made demonstrations against the right. But this show of attack was not followed up, and, indeed, was intended merely to discover whether Rosecrans still kept his position in force; for the cavalry scouts had reported to Bragg indications of a retrograde movement on the part of the Federal commander.

While Bragg was speculating thus in regard to the movements of Rosecrans, the latter was quietly crossing Stone River with Van Cleve's division, and, before Bragg was fully aware of the movement, he had gained a position on and under cover of an eminence which commanded Polk's line, enfilading it. Either Polk must withdraw or Van Cleve. The whole of Breckinridge's division, therefore, was massed in front of the threatening position, and heavily supported by artillery, and by cavalry to the number of 2000. Before the formidable assault which was made by Breckinridge at about four o'clock P.M., Van Cleve retired in some confusion to the other side of the river. But it was not long before the situation at this point was exactly reversed, and the pursuers were the pursued.

Just on the other side of the river from the eminence carried by Breckinridge was the crest from which, on Wednesday, Loomis's, Guenther's, and Stokes's batteries had belched forth destruction against the enemy. Here General Crittenden, who commanded on this part of the field, directed his chief of artillery to dispose his batteries for a terrific cannonade, while three brigades—two of them from Negley's division—were ordered up to meet the enemy, who was endeavoring to push his advantages. At this point Rosecrans reports: "The firing was terrific and the havoc terrible. The enemy retreated more rapidly than they had advanced. In forty minutes they lost 2000 men." Bragg had timed his assault fortunately for himself. Had it occurred earlier, with the same disastrous result, there would have been no need of protracting the already sufficiently bloody battle of Stone River for another day. Rosecrans says: "It was now after dark and raining, or we should have pursued the enemy into Murfreesborough. As it was, Crittenden's corps passed over, and, with Davis, occupied the crests, which were in-





THE APPEARANCE OF BRAGG'S DESERTED ENCAMPMENT.



MURFREESBOROUGH, TENNESSEE.




trenched in a few hours." If Bragg had deemed Polk's line untenable with a single division in this commanding position, now that it was occupied by a whole corps it was absolutely necessary for the Confederate general to withdraw. In order to guard against an attack on his right, which might again, as on Wednesday, disturb his plans, Rosecrans resorted to a very ancient, but very effective species of strategy. By a heavy division of camp-fires, and by a feigned line of battle, whose only reality consisted in torches, he succeeded in impressing the Confederate commander with more respect for his forces in that direction than might have been entertained upon a closer inspection.

About noon on the 3d of January, Bragg determined to give up the contest. Up to that time there had been no fighting during the day. It had been raining since long before daybreak, and Rosecrans would have found great difficulty in pushing the enemy, dragging his artillery through the muddy fields. Besides, the troops of both armies were nearly exhausted by exposure and fatigue. That night Bragg retreated to Duck River with perfect security. It was an utter impossibility for Rosecrans, under the circumstances, to follow in pursuit. Even if the weather had been favorable, he had no cavalry, and his artillery horses were worn out.

Bragg and Rosecrans, in their official reports of the battle, both claim that they were opposed by superior numbers. Rosecrans estimates the force with which he left Nashville at nearly 47,000, and in the battle at 43,000. The enemy's force he estimates at over 62,000. Bragg, on the other hand, gives the number of his effective force, on the morning of December 31, as less than 35,000, and estimates the force opposed to him at nearly 70,000.

Considering the numbers engaged, the battle of Stone River was one of the bloodiest of the whole war. The entire Federal loss in killed was 1553, of whom 92 were officers. The wounded numbered a little over 7000, and the loss in prisoners was nearly 3000, making the Federal loss in the aggregate nearly 12,000, or more than one fourth of the entire army. The entire Confederate loss is stated by Bragg as 10,000. Both armies lost the services of important general officers by death or wounds. General Sill, of McCook's corps, was killed. On the Confederate side, Generals James E. Rains and Roger M. Hanson were killed, and Generals Chalmers and Adams were disabled.



THE STONE RIVER MONUMENT.

Turning now from the military operations in Tennessee, we will close this chapter with a review of the political situation in that state.

The manner in which Tennessee was first carried over to the side of the rebellion has been recorded in this history. The governor of that state, Isham G. Harris, had from the first identified himself with the Confederate leaders. With evident reluctance, Tennessee followed the policy urged upon it by its governor. The eastern portion of the state was intensely loyal, giving 33,000 out of 48,000 votes against secession. Among those who disapproved of secession was John Bell, who, as Presidential candidate, carried the largest vote in the state. But he equally disapproved of what was then styled the coercive policy of the administration in relation to the seceded states. He regarded this policy as a justification of the state in refusing aid to the general government, but, as a matter of expediency, advised the people to take the attitude of neutrals and mediators. It was impossible, however, after the President's proclamation of April 15, 1861, for the more conservative citizens to stem the tide which then set in in favor of the revolutionists. Those who had before counseled inaction now looked with favor upon that clause of Governor Harris's reply to Secretary Cameron, which, while it refused two regiments of militia to put down the insurrection, threatened to raise 50,000 troops, if necessary, for the defense of Southern rights. Even Neil S. Brown, formerly Governor of Tennessee, who had joined Bell in his efforts to sustain a neutral position, now recommended a vigorous war policy. He said: "I have hoped obstinately against such an alternative; but the conviction is forced upon my mind that it is the settled policy of the administration, and, so far as I can see, of the whole North, to urge a war of extermination against the South. The clouds are gathering in every direction, and the signs now are that the border states are to be the battle-ground. In this view, the first duty is to arm at once; and to talk of keeping out of such a contest, if it comes, is simply idle."

When the Legislature met in extra session on the 25th of April, Governor Harris, in his message, recommended the passage of an ordinance separating the state from the Union, with a view of joining the Confederacy as soon thereafter as possible. The members of the Legislature had not been elected upon any such issue as was now presented, and could not fairly be said to represent the views of the people. But the governor "could see no propriety for encumbering the people of the state with the election of delegates to do that which it was in the power of the Legislature to enable them to do for themselves." The Legislature had been in session about a week, when Henry W. Hilliard, commissioner from the Confederate States, appeared before it, and addressed the members. His object, he said, was to establish a temporary alliance between Tennessee and the Confederacy, as a movement preliminary to a permanent relationship. Something more was at issue than the right to hold slaves, namely, the right of self-government.

This address and the governor's message induced the Legislature, on the 1st of May, to instruct Governor Harris to enter into a military league with the Confederacy. The governor, in obedience to this instruction, appointed as commissioners for that purpose Gustavus A. Henry, Archibald O. W. Totten, and Washington Barrow. The league was established May 7th between these gentlemen and Mr. Hilliard. According to the terms of the Convention, the military operations, offensive and defensive, of Tennessee against the United States were, until the union of that state with the Confederacy, to be as completely under the control of President Davis as if the union had already been established. Upon becoming a permanent member of the Confederacy, the state would turn over to the Confederate government all the public property, naval stores, and munitions of war in her possession and acquired from the United States. The expenditures of the state in the interim were to be met and provided for by the Confederate government.

There was a great majority of the Legislature in favor of the ratification of this treaty. On the 6th of May an ordinance was passed submitting to the vote of the people a Declaration of Independence. At the same time with the Ordinance of Secession, another for the adoption of the Confederate Constitution was submitted to the people. The Legislature passed an act calling on the governor to raise 55,000 men for the defense of the state, 25,000 of whom were to be immediately fitted for the field. Before the day of election—June 8, 1861—Governor Harris had most of these 25,000 men in camp, equipped, for the most part, with munitions belonging to the United States. The presence of this army was intimidating to the people; it was an indication of the governor's determination to sustain the revolutionary party in any event; for these armed men had been put into the field before the people had expressed a desire to separate from the Union, and it was not likely that any expression of opinion which the people might now make would avail any thing. Apparently, the result of the election was a majority of 57,000 in favor of secession. What the vote really cast was it will never be possible to ascertain. The means already used by the governor to precipitate the secession of the state had not been so honorable as to preclude a reasonable suspicion that his agents would see to it that the revolutionary party should show an overwhelming majority.


In order to still further strengthen the power which he had gained, Governor Harris, in May, ordered the disbandment of all organizations except his own, and that all arms belonging to such organizations be returned to the State Arsenal at Nashville. All debts due to the citizens of Northern states, he declared, must be repudiated.

So steadfast were the counties of East Tennessee to the Union, that the general government had not yet discontinued the mails in that section.<sup>1</sup> At Knoxville in May, and at Greenville in June, large Union Conventions were held. Several of the central and western counties joined in the protest against the revolution. The Convention at Greenville lasted three days. A declaration of grievances was adopted, in which it was stated that the right of free suffrage had been obstructed by Governor Harris's government; that the people had been insulted in their own homes, and that women and children had been shot down by brutal soldiery, and innocent citizens plundered and butchered. It was declared that the Ordinance of Secession was not binding upon loyal citizens. A memorial was prepared, petitioning the Legislature to afford the people of East Tennessee a separate government. But this portion of the state was unable to cope with Governor Harris and his army, and it was not yet possible for the United States to furnish any material assistance. In spite of weakness, the people held fast to their opinions, and were abundantly rewarded with persecution. Irregular squads of cavalry and infantry swept the country, conscripting the citizens, destroying the crops, and beaping every possible indignity upon defenseless women and children. Soon the thoroughfares into Kentucky were crowded with refugees, who made their way across the mountains with great difficulty. Able-bodied men also fled and entered the Union army. The first regiment of loyal Tennesseans was composed of soldiers who had been exiled from their homes. Many of these were wealthy, and, for the Union cause, left all their possessions behind them to be ravaged by the secessionists, and many left behind them families. The number of men left, however, was sufficient to oppose an obstinate resistance, and the mountainous character of the country favored their efforts for self-defense. At length these men grew bolder, and, in an irregular manner, assumed a sort of offensive warfare, burning the bridges along the line of the railroads over which the Confederate forces received their supplies.

Tennessee was the first of the Confederate States occupied by the national

<sup>1</sup> The counties in which loyalty prevailed were the following: Anderson, Bledsoe, Blount, Bradley, Campbell, Carter, Claiborne, Cocke, Grainger, Green, Hamilton, Hancock, Hawkins, Johnson, Knox, Marion, McMuir, Meigs, Monroe, Morgan, Polk, Rhea, Sevier, Sullivan, and Washington.





WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN.

armies. The fall of Donelson insured the fall of Nashville also. The Confederate government of the state then transferred its seat to Memphis. All the troops raised by Governor Harris had been ungrudgingly yielded up to the demands of General Albert Sidney Johnston, and at the time of the capture of Donelson the governor had not a single armed company subject to his command. General Buell occupied Nashville on the 25th of April, 1862. Three days before this, General Grant issued an order declaring West Tennessee under martial law. The capture of Memphis in the June following entirely disorganized Governor Harris's government. The governor himself took the field, and was present at some of the most important battles of the year.

The appointment of Andrew Johnson as military governor of Tennessee, with the rank of brigadier general, was confirmed by the United States Senate on the 5th of March, 1862. Andrew Johnson, who was to be the next Vice-President of the United States, and who was, through a melancholy occasion, to be also its President, was born at Raleigh, North Carolina, December 29, 1808. His parents occupied a humble station in life. The father died when the son was about four years of age, and the circumstances of the

family were still more straitened. When ten years old the boy became a tailor's apprentice, and in the shop, through an accidental acquaintance with a man of eccentric but studious habits, he learned to read, and acquired a rudimentary education. He went to Tennessee while still a young man, and there married. His choice of a partner proved quite fortunate to his future prospects, for his wife became his teacher. In 1829 Mr. Johnson held his first office, that of alderman of Greenville, of which city he was, in the subsequent year, elected mayor. In 1835 he was sent to the state Legislature, where he espoused the principles of the Democratic party. Under the auspices of this party he was elected a member of Congress in 1843, where, in regard to the important questions of the admission of Texas, the Mexican War, the Tariff of 1846, and the Homestead Bill, he strongly advocated the policy upon which his election was based. In 1857 he was elected to the United States Senate for the full term which would end in 1863.

Johnson was a Democrat after the school of Andrew Jackson. The Jacksonian element of his democracy was especially apparent in his career at the time of the first development of the secession theories in the Senate of the United States. Among the Southern senators he stood almost alone in his



denunciation of secession as treason, and in his advocacy of the right of the general government to exact from the states submission to the Constitution and the laws. In his speech delivered December 19, 1860, his argument against disunion was very strong as affecting Southern interests. He predicted that disunion must destroy slavery; that a hostile or even alien government upon the border of a slaveholding state would be the natural haven of rest to the hunted slave. "If one division was allowed, others would follow; and," said he, "rather than see this Union divided into thirty-three petty governments, with a little prince in one, a potentate in another, a little aristocracy in a third, a little democracy in a fourth, and a republic somewhere else—a citizen not being permitted to pass from one state to another without a passport or a commission from his government—with quarreling and warring among the petty powers, which would result in anarchy—I would rather see this government to-day—I proclaim it here in my place—converted into a consolidated government." In view of the proposed aggression by the Southern states upon the Federal forts and Federal ships, his language was still stronger. In a speech delivered March 2, 1861, he said: "Show me those who make war on the government and fire on its vessels, and I will show you a traitor. If I were President of the United States I would have all such arrested, and, if convicted, by the Eternal God I would have them hung."

In assuming his position as Governor of Tennessee, Mr. Johnson was, of course, obliged to resign his seat in the Senate. Fortunately, he had been twice governor of the state in previous years, and knew well the temper of the people with whom he would have to deal. But even thus his course

<sup>1</sup> "The President has conducted this mighty contest, until, as commander-in-chief of the army, he has caused the national flag again to float undisputed over the Capitol of our state. Meanwhile the state government has disappeared. The executive has abdicated; the Legislature has dissolved; the judiciary is in abeyance. The great ship of state, freighted with its precious cargo of human interests and human hopes, its sails all set, and its glorious old flag unfurled, has been suddenly abandoned by its officers and mutinous crew, and left to float at the mercy of the winds, and to be plundered by every rover upon the deep. Indeed, the work of plunder has already commenced. The archives have been desecrated, the public property stolen and destroyed; the vaults of the State Bank violated, and its treasures robbed, including the funds carefully gathered and consecrated for all time to the instruction of our children."

"In such a lamentable crisis, the government of the United States could not be unmindful of its high constitutional obligation to guarantee to every state in this Union a republican form of government, an obligation which every state has a direct and immediate interest in having observed toward every other state; and from which, by no action on the part of the people in any state, can the Federal government be absolved. A republican form of government, in consonance with the Constitution of the United States, is one of the fundamental conditions of our political existence, by which every part of the country is alike bound, and from which no part can escape. This obligation the national government is now attempting to discharge. I have been appointed, in the absence of the regular and established state authorities, as military governor for the time being, to preserve the public property of the state, to give the protection of law actively enforced to her citizens, and, as speedily as may be, to restore her government to the same condition as before the existing rebellion."

"In this grateful but arduous undertaking, I shall avail myself of all the aid that may be afforded by my fellow-citizens. And for this purpose I respectfully but earnestly invite all the people of Tennessee, desirous or willing to see a restoration of her ancient government, without distinction of party affiliations or past political opinions or action, to unite with me, by counsel and co-

was a difficult one to pursue. The state had not been wholly occupied by the national arms. Even those portions which had been brought again under Federal control were infested by the raids of Morgan and other daring partisan rangers. The Union sentiment among the citizens was not as fervent as had been anticipated, partly because sectional antipathies had been naturally intensified by the bloody strife, and partly because the chance of war might in a few weeks reverse the current of success in favor of the Confederates.

Governor Johnson reached Nashville on the 12th of March, accompanied by Emerson Etheridge, clerk of the House of Representatives, and Horace Maynard, member of Congress from Tennessee. The next evening after his arrival he was called upon by citizens, who desired to elicit an expression of opinion on the critical question of the day. The address which he delivered on the occasion he afterward published as an "Appeal to the People of Tennessee." It was eminently conservative. Military rule was, for a time, a necessity. It did not arise from the desire of the Federal government to usurp powers belonging to the states, but from the constitutional obligation imposed upon the President to provide for every state a republican form of government. In the present instance, there was a state which had no government whatsoever. The government which had been had disappeared, and, in the confusion incidental to a period of strife, anarchy must ensue, unless, for a period, a provisional government could be established. His declaration of the policy which he intended to pursue was succinct, but very plain. Those who had been loyal would be honored; those who would become so would be welcomed on their return; but intelligent and conscious

operative agency, to accomplish this great end. I find most, if not all of the offices, both State and Federal, vacated either by actual abandonment, or by the action of the incumbents in attempting to subordinate their functions to a power in hostility to the fundamental law of the state, and subversive of her national allegiance. These offices must be filled temporarily, until the state shall be restored so far to its accustomed quiet that the people can peaceably assemble at the ballot-box and select agents of their own choice. Otherwise anarchy would prevail, and no man's life or property would be safe from the desperate and unprincipled."

"I shall, therefore, as early as practicable, designate for various positions under the state and county governments, from among my fellow-citizens, persons of probity and intelligence, and bearing true allegiance to the Constitution and government of the United States, who will execute the functions of their respective offices until their places can be filled by the action of the people. Their authority, when their appointments shall have been made, will be accordingly respected and observed."

"To the people themselves the protection of the government is extended. All their rights will be duly respected, and their wrongs redressed when made known. Those who through the dark and weary night of the rebellion have maintained their allegiance to the Federal government will be honored. The erring and misguided will be welcomed on their return. And while it may become necessary, in vindicating the violated majesty of the law, and in reasserting its imperial sway, to punish intelligent and conscious treason in high places, no merely retaliatory or vindictive policy will be adopted. To those especially who in a private, unofficial capacity have assumed an attitude of hostility to the government, a full and complete amnesty for all past acts and declarations is offered, upon the one condition of their again yielding themselves peaceful citizens to the just supremacy of the laws. This I advise them to do for their own good, and for the peace and welfare of our beloved state, endeared to me by the associations of long and active years, and by the enjoyment of her highest honors."



A LOYAL SOUTHERN FAMILY FLYING NORTH.





FORT NEGLEY, NASHVILLE.

treason must be punished. A full amnesty was offered to all who in a private, unofficial capacity had been hostile to the government.

Upon the refusal of the Common Council of Nashville, and other officers, to take the oath of allegiance, Governor Johnson declared their places vacant, and appointed others to fill them. The mayor was arrested for "disloyal practices." The press was placed under military supervision. This firm policy elicited important results. The citizens began to express anxiety to take the oath, and even Confederate soldiers were desirous of availing themselves of the general amnesty. Trade began to revive; vacant houses were reoccupied; there was security of life and property.

That the majority of the citizens in Nashville was not any too loyal is apparent from the vote given May 22d for judge. A disunionist, Turner S. Foster, was chosen by a majority of 190. Governor Johnson gave Judge Foster his commission, and the same day had him arrested and sent to the Penitentiary. On the 12th of May a Union meeting was held at Nashville, and a fortnight afterward at Murfreesborough. Substantially the same resolutions were adopted on both occasions. The state to which the revolution had reduced Tennessee is touchingly depicted in the language of these resolutions. Schools, colleges, universities, churches, were closed; the common-school fund had been abstracted and carried away; the funds of the State Bank had been seized by Governor Harris and his adherents; the state debt had been increased by millions; commerce had been cut off and manufactures shut up; judicial proceedings were suspended—and all this was the result of the unfortunate alliance into which the state had entered with the Confederacy.

Governor Johnson's policy was such as the circumstances of his position compelled him to adopt. In all things he was firm. It would have pleased him better if he had not been so frequently forced to take arbitrary measures. But indulgence to the enemies of the government was certain to be abused. He was even obliged to force those who could not desist from the use of treasonable language to go south beyond the Union lines. He found loyal citizens who had been reduced to extremest poverty by the rebellion, and he deemed it not unjust to assess the wealthy sympathizers with the rebellion for the relief of these people.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The following was the form of the circulars sent by Governor Johnson to some of the richest secessionists of Nashville:

"State of Tennessee, Executive Department, Nashville, August 18, 1862.

"SIR,—There are many wives and helpless children in the city of Nashville and county of Davidson who have been reduced to poverty and wretchedness in consequence of their husbands and fathers having been forced into the armies of this unholy and nefarious rebellion. Their necessities have become so manifest, and their demands for the necessities of life so urgent, that the laws of justice and humanity would be violated unless something was done to relieve their suffering and destitute condition.

"You are therefore requested to contribute the sum of ——— dollars, which you will pay over within the next five days to James Whitworth, Esq., Judge of the County Court, to be by him distributed among these destitute families in such manner as may be described.

"ANDREW JOHNSON, Military Governor."

Nashville, the military centre of the Federal armies in Tennessee, was four times isolated from the Northern states before the end of August. On the 28th of August General Rousseau was placed in command of the city. He was soon succeeded by General Thomas; but the presence of the latter with Buell's army being very much needed, Negley assumed the command. While Bragg was fighting Buell at Perryville, the Confederate Generals J. R. Anderson and Forrest, attended by Governor Harris, concentrated a large force east of Nashville for the purpose of making an attack upon the city. But the army which they had brought together was defeated at Laverne on the 7th of October by a detachment of General Negley's troops, commanded by General Palmer. Other attempts were directed by the Confederates against Nashville, but these never succeeded. That which caused Negley the most annoyance was the busy persistence with which Morgan worried his line of communication with the North. At one time, soon after the battle at Laverne, both Negley's army and the citizens were so far deprived of supplies that they were compelled to live off the country, and even the area allowed them to forage in was very much restricted by the Confederate cavalry. The troops had been for some days living on half rations when Rosecrans reached Nashville with his army in November.

The retreat of Bragg's army from Murfreesborough after the battle of Stone River brought the whole of Western and Middle Tennessee under Federal control. Afterward Burnside's operations in East Tennessee almost entirely defeated the forces of the Confederacy in that portion of the state. But for the power of Morgan and Forrest, it would have been possible to have reorganized the state under a permanent government. As it was, the provisional government continued throughout the year 1863, and it was not until January 26, 1864, that Governor Johnson issued his proclamation for a state election.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Governor Johnson would willingly have taken this step at an earlier stage if the people had been prepared for it. His views on the subject of reorganization are thus expressed in a public speech made in September, 1863:

"Tennessee is not out of the Union, never has been, and never will be out. The bonds of the Constitution and the Federal power will also prevent that. This government is perpetual; provision is made for reforming the government, and amending the Constitution, and admitting states into the Union, not for letting them out of it.

"Where are we now? There is a rebellion; this was anticipated, as I said. The rebel army is driven back. Here lies your state—a sick man in his bed, emaciated and exhausted, paralyzed in all his powers, and unable to walk alone. The physician comes. Don't quarrel about antecedents, but administer to his wants, and cure him as quickly as possible. The United States sends an agent or a military governor, whichever you please to call him, to aid you in restoring your government. Whenever you desire, in good faith, to restore civil authority, you can do so, and a proclamation for an election will be issued as speedily as it is practicable to hold one. One by one, all the agencies of your state government will be set in motion. A Legislature will be elected. Judges will be appointed temporarily, until you can elect them at the polls; and so of sheriffs, county court judges, justices, and other officers, until the way is fairly open for the people and all the parts of the civil government to resume their ordinary functions. This is no nice, intricate metaphysical question. It is a plain, common-sense matter, and there is nothing in the way but obstinacy."



## CHAPTER XVIII. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

### I. FROM THE POTOMAC TO THE CHICKAHOMINY.

**Authorities for the Peninsular Campaign.**—The Strength of the Army of the Potomac.—Impatience at its Inactivity.—Army Corps.—Lincoln's and McClellan's Plans for the Campaign.—McClellan's Argument.—Strength of the Confederate Army.—The Council of War adopts McClellan's Plan.—The President's Order for an Advance on the 22d of February.—Condition of Beauregard's Army.—Fortifications at Centreville and Manassas.—Beauregard repelled by Johnston.—New General Orders.—Centreville and Manassas abandoned.—McClellan's Promenade.—Condition of the Confederate Fortifications.—McClellan's Plan modified. The President orders it to be carried into effect.—McClellan relieved from the general Command.—McClellan's Address to the Army.—His new Plan of Operations.—Topography of the Peninsula.—Yorktown.—The Defenses of the Peninsula.—Magruder's Force.—Landing of the Federal Troops at Fortress Monroe.—Conflicting Opinions as to the Strength of the Enemy.—Blenker, Wool, and McDowell withdrawn from McClellan's Command.—The Reasons for this.—Its Effect on future Operations.—Proposed Naval and Military Attack upon Yorktown abandoned.—Statements of McClellan and Goldsborough.—Unsuccessful Attempt to force the Lines at Lee's Mill.—Magruder's Account.—Siege Operations begun.—Smith's Attempt to force the Lines at Wynne's Mill.—The Force of the Parties.—McClellan and the President.—Progress of the Siege.—Arrival of Franklin's Division.—Strength of the Army, June 30.—Proposed Attack upon Gloucester abandoned.—The Sieges of Yorktown in 1781 and 1862.—Completion of the Federal Batteries.—Losses during the Work.—Effectiveness of the Army.—The Abandonment of Yorktown.—McClellan's Disputch.—Weakness of the Warwick Line.—Johnston's Retreat.—The Battle of Williamsburg: Stoneman repulsed; Confusion as to Command; Hooker at first successful; he is hard pressed; is relieved by Kearney; Movements of Peck and Hancock; Hancock's decisive Charge; Losses; Movements of McClellan.—Franklin sent up the River.—He is attacked at West Point.—The White House taken as a Base.—Johnston's Plans.—Norfolk to be abandoned.—Its Surrender.—The Destruction of the Virginia.—Tatnall's Trial.—Note on the Virginia.—Drewry's Bluff.—Combined Attack on Fort Darling proposed by Goldsborough and declined by McClellan.—The Reason.—McClellan again demands Reinforcements.—McDowell's Corps promised.—The President's Order.—Johnston's Proceedings.—His probable Force.—Panic in Richmond.—Proceedings of the Authorities.—Jefferson Davis and his Family.—The Citizens and the Press.—McClellan's Advance from Williamsburg.—He reaches the Chickahominy.

FROM the survey of the operations in the West, we now turn to the more important and disastrous campaign on the Peninsula of Virginia.<sup>1</sup> McClellan, when, in July, 1861, placed in command of the Army of the Potomac, found in and about Washington hardly 50,000 men, with thirty imperfectly equipped field-pieces. The panic which followed the rout at Bull Run soon subsided. The nation had unbounded confidence in the new commander, to whom was ascribed the entire credit of the successful operations in Western Virginia. This confidence was not shaken by the disaster of Ball's Bluff. On the 1st of November he was appointed to the chief command of the armies of the United States. The whole nation applauded the action of the government.<sup>2</sup> Re-enforcements poured in, and by the middle of October there were in and about Washington 152,000 men, of whom 133,000 were present and fit for duty. On the 1st of November the Army of the Potomac numbered 168,000, of whom 147,000 were fit for duty; but there were 13,000 imperfectly equipped, leaving an effective force of 134,000. The artillery numbered nearly 300 guns. Its weakest arm was the cavalry. This numbered nominally about 15,000, of whom half were wholly or partially unarmed.<sup>3</sup> Yet, in the opinion of many generals, the cavalry force was

<sup>1</sup> The conduct of the Peninsular Campaign has been assailed and defended upon purely partisan grounds. So differently has it been represented, that I have thought proper to give the authority upon which every important statement in the text has been made. The works which are only occasionally referred to are fully designated in the proper places. The following authorities, which are continually cited, are designated thus:

"*McC. Rep.*"—Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, etc. By GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Major General United States Army.—This report is a defense, as well as a statement, of the operations of the commander. The edition cited is that put forth by the author. Where the same document is found here and in other authorities, it is usually referred to this report.

"*Com. Rep.*"—Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War (1863).—This report is especially valuable for the official documents which it embodies, and for the sworn testimony of leading generals. Only Part I., which relates to the Army of the Potomac from its organization to the battle of Fredericksburg, is referred to in these chapters.

"*Sec. of War Rep.*"—Report of the Secretary of War, Dec. 1, 1862. This report embodies that of General Halleck, general-in-chief, after July 11, and several important documents from General McClellan, not embraced in his detailed report.

"*Reb. Rec.*"—The Rebellion Record, etc. Edited by FRANK MOORE.—My obligation to this valuable collection of documents is not to be measured by the frequency of direct citations. Usually, when documents are referred to without direct citation, they are to be found in this collection, where they are presented in a more accurate form than in the newspapers of the day. Not unfrequently they have been corrected by the authors themselves.

"*Art. Op.*"—Report of the Engineer and Artillery Operations of the Army of the Potomac, etc. By Brigadier General J. G. BARNARD, Chief Engineer, and Brigadier General W. F. BARRY, Chief of Artillery.

"*Pen. Camp.*"—The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents, as Developed by the Report of Major General George B. McClellan. By J. G. BARNARD, Brigadier General, etc.—This is a review of some points in McClellan's Report. It is strongly controversial in tone, but embodies some important semi-official statements.

"*POLLARD.*"—Southern History of the War, etc. By EDWARD A. POLLARD, Editor of the Richmond Examiner.—This is chiefly valuable as the only formal attempt to present the history of the war from a Southern standpoint. It is thoroughly partisan. It is hard to tell whether hatred to the Union cause or hatred to the Richmond administration predominates in the author's mind. The work, however, embraces many citations from official reports not as yet accessible in any other form.

"*MAGRUDER.*"—Report of Operations on the Peninsula. By Major General J. B. MAGRUDER, Commanding.—This report embraces only the first half of the period occupied by the siege of Yorktown, down to April 16, when Magruder was displaced by the arrival of Johnston. It is contained in "Official Reports of Battles" (p. 515-537, as republished in New York), published by order of the Confederate Congress.

"*DE JOINVILLE.*"—The Army of the Potomac, etc.—This appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of Paris, over the signature of A. Trognon. It is attributed, without contradiction, to the Prince de Joinville, son of Louis Philippe, who accompanied his nephews, the Comte de Paris and the Duc de Chartres, with the Army of the Potomac, in which they served on the staff of General McClellan. It throws much light upon many points of the history.

"*LEE.*"—Report of General ROBERT E. LEE of the Operations of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, from the Battle of Seven Pines to that of Fredericksburg.—This report, though printed by order of the Confederate authorities, has not as yet (July, 1865) been published. After the capture of Richmond a copy of it fell into the hands of the editor of the *New York Herald*, to whom I am indebted for it. Having it only in newspaper "slips," I am not able to cite the pages to which reference is made.

<sup>2</sup> "With the retirement of General Scott came the executive duty of appointing in his stead a general-in-chief of the army. It is a fortunate circumstance that neither in council nor country was there, so far as I know, any difference of opinion as to the proper person to be selected. The designation of General McClellan is, therefore, in a considerable degree, the selection of the country as well as of the executive, and hence there is better reason to hope that there will be given to him the confidence and cordial support thus by fair implication promised."—*President's Message*, Dec. 3, 1861.

<sup>3</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 47.

greater than was needed.<sup>1</sup> The importance of this arm of the service was yet to be learned. McClellan had from the first insisted that the war was to be mainly fought by the Army of the Potomac. The resources of the nation were lavished upon it; to it every other department was subordinated. Before the 1st of November it had nearly reached its utmost strength in numbers and discipline. Officers and men were eager to commence active operations. No one dreamed of going into winter quarters. The strength of this army was, indeed, much below that which McClellan thought requisite for an advance movement. He wished for a nominal force of 240,000, which would give about 208,000 effective men. Of these, 35,000 were to garrison Washington, 10,000 to garrison Baltimore and Annapolis, 13,000 to guard the Potomac above and below the capital, leaving 150,000 for the column of active operations. This force provided, he thought the Army of the Potomac might successfully assume active operations, the great object to be attained being "the crushing defeat of the rebel army at Manassas;" the advance "not to be postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possible to avoid it."<sup>2</sup>

The Confederate army of the "Department of Northern Virginia" lay mainly at Centreville and Manassas. Its outposts were pushed forward within a few miles of Washington; from their most advanced points the Capitol was visible. They had also a force in the Valley of the Shenandoah, threatening the capital from above; and had erected batteries at every commanding point along the lower Potomac, completely closing the approach by water. McClellan believed that at the close of October their "force on the Potomac was not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded, and strongly intrenched."<sup>3</sup>

The autumn months of 1861 had been unusually favorable for military operations; yet week after week passed, and no movement besides reconnoissances and consequent skirmishes was made by the Federal army. The impatience grew stronger as autumn lapsed into winter, and winter verged toward spring, with no indications of activity. The Confederate flag floated in plain view across the Potomac from the Capitol; the unmolested Confederate batteries barred the lower Potomac. Was the great national army, whose perfect organization had been so loudly vaunted, meant for work or for play? Were there not private plans, working against the public weal, which kept it motionless? Surmise grew into accusation. The administration was charged with wishing, for selfish purposes, to protract the war rather than to end it. A difference of opinion had arisen between the President and the general as to the organization of the army. Lincoln wished it to be divided at once into several corps. McClellan was opposed to this. It was a delicate matter, he said, to appoint major generals before they had been tried by actual service, and had shown their fitness to be selected to command 30,000 or 40,000 men. A major general could not be stowed away in a pigeon-hole, if he should prove incompetent, as easily as a brigadier general. He proposed to manage the entire army himself in some battle or campaign, and then select from the brigadier generals such as should prove themselves competent for higher commands;<sup>4</sup> yet he himself, wholly untried in military operations on a large scale, wished to have the sole command of an army of 150,000 men. The Secretary of War and most of the generals were in favor of the immediate organization of army corps; but the President, who was slowly feeling his way, deferred for a time to the opinion of McClellan, and the corps were not arranged until the very day when the Army of the Potomac was ordered to prepare for the expedition to the Peninsula.

Of far more importance was the difference of opinion as to the entire plan of the campaign. The bulk of the Confederate force lay at and near Centreville and Manassas, drawing its supplies mainly from Richmond by way of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. The President wished the Army of the Potomac to advance directly upon this railroad, at a point between Manassas and Richmond, and, by assailing the enemy's base of supply, force him to come out of his intrenchments and give battle in the open field. McClellan wished to assume the lower Chesapeake Bay as his base of operations, transporting the army by water down the Potomac and up the Rappahannock, disembarking at Urbana, and thence marching upon Richmond, forty miles distant.

Two full months passed beyond the time which McClellan had fixed upon for the advance, and the direction in which it was to be made was not decided. The general laid his plan before the President, who disapproved it, and adhered to his own. To assure the country that this inaction was to come to an end, the President, on the 27th of January, issued a general order appointing the 22d of February as the day for a general advance of all the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. This was followed, on the 31st of January, by a special order, directing that, after providing for the defense of Washington, the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac should be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of Manassas Junction, the details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move on or before the 22d of February. McClellan asked to submit in detail his objections to this plan,

<sup>1</sup> "In my judgment, a large amount of cavalry is not useful, and can not be used south of the Potomac. I have always said that the regular cavalry would have been sufficient for the operations of this army—merely as advanced guards, and to carry reports and messages."—RICHARDSON, *Com. Rep.*, 113. "I think we have more cavalry than we want; I should suppose that one half of the cavalry that is across the river [less than 12,000] would be sufficient."—HEINTZELMAN, *Ibid.*, 119. "I have in my division one regiment of cavalry. I would be very glad to get rid of two thirds of it. I think, as things are situated now, that 2000 cavalry are as much as we want for the whole army."—FRANKLIN, *Ibid.*, 124. "There are twelve divisions. My division has one regiment of cavalry. I think we might do with less. I think I might have done with two thirds of the amount of cavalry I have. If we were organized by corps of three divisions each, two regiments of cavalry would be sufficient for the three divisions."—MCDOWELL, *Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 46-49.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>4</sup> *Com. Rep.*, 6.





SOUTHEASTERN VIRGINIA.



and his reasons for preferring his own.<sup>1</sup> Lincoln granted permission in a note, in which he said that he would give up his own plan if McClellan would show wherein McClellan's was preferable in point of cheapness, certainty, and worth of victory, or facility for retreat in case of disaster.<sup>2</sup>

McClellan replied on the 3d of February, in an elaborate paper which he had previously prepared.<sup>3</sup> It proceeds throughout on the assumption that the force of the enemy was at least equal to his own. At the close of October he had estimated that they had on the Potomac 150,000 men. In March he reduced the estimate to 102,500, besides 13,000 in the Valley of the Shenandoah. In this paper no direct estimate was given. The nominal force of the Army of the Potomac, including those in Maryland and Delaware, was, on the 1st of February, 219,000, of whom 28,000 were sick, absent, or in confinement, leaving 191,000 present for duty.<sup>4</sup> After providing for the safety of Washington, he hoped to have from 110,000 to 140,000 troops to be thrown upon the new line.<sup>5</sup>

His principal objections to the President's plan were, that the nature of the country and the condition of the roads were such that the movement must be so slow that the enemy could not be taken by surprise; that, even if the roads were in a tolerably firm condition at the commencement, they were liable to be obstructed at any moment by rain and snow; that, however the operation was undertaken, whether by a direct assault upon his fortifications, or by an attempt to turn either or both flanks, the enemy, occupying a strong central position, with roads diverging in every direction, could concentrate his whole force for a decisive action upon any one point; and that, even if the operation were successful, the result would be indecisive. We should gain merely the possession of the battle-field, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac, and the moral effect of the victory. The main army of the Confederacy would not be destroyed. It could fall back upon other positions, and fight again and again, should the condition of his troops permit. If he was in no condition to fight again out of the range of his intrenchments at Richmond, he could fall back to them, destroying railroad bridges and otherwise impeding our progress through a region where the roads are as bad as they well can be; "and we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change the whole theatre of war, or to seek a shorter land-route to Richmond, with a smaller available force and at an expenditure of much more time than were we to adopt the short line at once. We would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces and perfect his defensive arrangements at the very points where it is desirable to strike him when least prepared."<sup>6</sup>

In favor of his own plan, he urged that the route from the lower Chesapeake Bay was the shortest land-route to Richmond, striking directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the East; that the region was more favorable for offensive operations than that in front of Washington, the roads being passable at all seasons of the year, and the spring two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line would oblige the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas in order to cover Richmond and Norfolk; for, should he permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction could be averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle, in which he must be the assailant. If the movement were successful, it would give us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk would fall, all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours—all Virginia would be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Carolina. The alternative presented to him would be to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, disperse, or surrender. If we were beaten in battle, we should have a perfectly secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fortress Monroe, with both flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. During the whole movement our left flank would be covered by the water; our right would be secure, for the enemy would be too distant to reach us in time; he could oppose us only in front, we bringing our fleet into full play. Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we could use Mob Jack Bay; or, "the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fortress Monroe as a base, and operate with complete security, though with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula." In conclusion, he said: "It is by no means certain that we can beat them at Manassas. On the other line I regard success as certain by all the chances of war. We demoralize the enemy by forcing him to abandon his prepared position for one which we have chosen, in which all is in our favor, and where success must produce immense results. Nothing is certain in war, but all the chances are in favor of this movement. So much am I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer the movement from Fortress Monroe as a base—as a certain though less brilliant movement than that from Urbana—to an attack upon Manassas."<sup>7</sup>

The argument was ably stated; but, as the event proved, McClellan greatly overestimated the obstacles in the way of the President's plan, and as greatly underestimated those in the way of his own. The force of the enemy at Manassas was hardly half what he supposed.<sup>8</sup> When he reached

the Peninsula he found the region far more difficult than that in front of Washington, even after he had adopted the line from Fortress Monroe, upon which he had supposed that he could "operate with complete security, although with less celerity and brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula." The order directing an advance upon Manassas was not formally revoked, but its execution was not required. The President, according to his wont, took time to consider. He was still in favor of his own plan, but he said he was not a military man, and would submit the question to a council of war consisting of the twelve generals commanding divisions, and be governed by the decision of the majority. Four of the generals, Sumner, McDowell, Heintzelman, and Barnard, were in favor of Mr. Lincoln's plan of an onward movement right on to Richmond. Eight generals, Fitz John Porter, Andrew Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Keyes, and Naglee (who represented Hooker), voted for McClellan's plan. This council was held on the 8th of March.<sup>9</sup>

McClellan's plan having thus been definitely sanctioned, Lincoln determined that it should be put into execution. On the same 8th of March two general orders were issued. By the first order McClellan was directed to organize his army for active operations into four corps, to be commanded according to seniority of rank: First Corps, McDowell; Second Corps, Sumner; Third Corps, Heintzelman; Fourth Corps, Keyes. Besides these was to be a Fifth Corps, under Banks, to operate in the Valley of the Shenandoah; and the defenses of the capital were to be placed under Wadsworth, who was to be military governor of the District of Columbia.<sup>10</sup> The second order directed that no change of base should be made without leaving a sufficient force to render the capital entirely secure; that not more than half of the Army of the Potomac should be moved, without the assent of the President, until the Potomac River was freed from the enemy's batteries; and that the movement toward the lower Chesapeake should be commenced not later than the 18th of March.<sup>11</sup> On the next day, March 9, came important tidings from two different quarters. In Hampton Roads the Virginia had sunk the Cumberland and Congress, and had encountered the Monitor; and the Confederate army had evacuated its position at Centreville and Manassas, and along the Potomac, and were falling back toward Richmond.

During the long period of inaction, Beauregard had commanded the Confederate forces in Northern Virginia. He was the popular hero of the day. He had taken Fort Sumter. He had won the fight at Bull Run. During the pleasant months of the late summer and early autumn, volunteers flocked to the army and filled its camps. They expected a short war; possibly a fight or two, to be decided by their terrible bowie-knives, at the very sight of which every Yankee who could would run. All idea of discipline and organization, every thing that distinguishes an army from a mob, was scouted. Quite possibly at this time there were 100,000 or 150,000 Confederate troops toward the Potomac. But by the time winter set in the spirit of volunteering had died out. The old volunteers were anxious to return to their homes, and no new ones came to fill their places. At the close of January, 1862, Beauregard was displaced from his command. The pretext was that his services were needed at the West. Joseph Johnston was placed in command. For the first, but not for the last time during the war, the thankless task was imposed upon him of retrieving the errors of his predecessors. He found an army diminished in numbers, ill disciplined, ill provided, and suffering from sickness.<sup>12</sup> He saw at once that it was beyond his power to

March, have been preserved, all purporting to be based upon reports of McClellan's secret service corps. The first is stated by Colonel Lecompte, a Swiss officer serving on McClellan's staff, to have been furnished on the 21st of February by the Count of Paris, who was also on the staff (*Barnard, Pen. Camp.*, 13); the second was laid before a council of war on the 2d of March (*Ibid.*, 95); the third is given by McClellan (*Report*, 122), as furnished on the 8th of March by the chief of the secret service corps. These estimates, adapting the locations to those laid down in the last, are as follows:

McClellan, March 8.		Council, March 2.	Count of Paris, Feb. 21.
At Manassas, Centreville, Bull Run, Upper Occoquan, and vicinity.....	80,000	Same region.... 29,900	Same region..... 47,000
At Brooks's Station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan, and vicinity.....	18,000	Same region.... 20,600	Same region..... 18,000
At Leesburg and vicinity.....	4,500	Not given (say) 4,500	Leeshurg..... 6,000
In the Shenandoah Valley.....	13,000	Not given (say) 13,000	Winchester... 12,000 to 18,000
	115,500	63,500	83,000 to 89,000

The Committee on the Conduct of the War say, "The strength of the enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the highest estimates based their opinions upon information received at headquarters. Subsequent events have proved that the force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these estimates; and the strength of their fortifications was very greatly overestimated."—*Com. Rep.*, 7.

<sup>1</sup> Sumner's and Barnard's testimony (*Com. Rep.*, 360, 387). This important council, whose vote fixed the general plan of the campaign, has been strangely unnoticed. The question before it was whether the plan of Lincoln or that of McClellan should be adopted. No one of the generals taking part in it who testified before the committee could even fix the date. It was, they thought, late in February or early in March. Mr. Raymond (*Administration of President Lincoln*, 225) says it was held "late in February." The true date is fixed incidentally by McClellan (*Report*, 116). But he speaks of it merely as a meeting of commanders of divisions, convened by his invitation "for the purpose of giving them their instructions, and receiving their advice and opinions respecting their commands." <sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 58. <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 117.

<sup>4</sup> "It was really most surprising to observe the inertness which followed the battle of Manassas. Our War Department, our generals, our soldiers, were all reposing on their laurels, lost in the happiest dreams of their late success. Nothing was done toward insuring the fruits of this victory. The idea of having beaten the Northern army was so consoling that the Southerners began to think that the idea that the soldier should be taught was pure folly. 'We have now,' they said, 'heaven Scott, the greatest general of the age; we have destroyed his army, and, consequently, it would be a waste of time to drill, exercise, and do things of that kind. We need only to draw our dreaded bowie-knives, and every enemy who is able to run will do so.' These ideas predominated among the soldiers of the army, and the officers took no pains to counteract them. When McClellan was appointed to the chief command of the Federal army, and set to work to strengthen his position by the construction of field-works in order to be enabled to proceed the better with the organization of his forces, Beauregard at last began to bestir himself, and to rouse his officers and men from their lethargy. Fortified works on a grand scale were now undertaken, and, indeed, the preparations were so extensive that it appeared as if the whole state of Virginia was to be fortified. No steps were, however, taken for the erection of hospitals, the improvement of the roads, or the instruction of the soldiers. We were especially ill provided with medicines and clothes, and the troops suffered greatly in consequence. Added to this, sickness broke out in Beauregard's camp. It was the more serious, inasmuch as our authorities had never directed their attention to any sanitary precautions. Wounded men and horses were alike treated in the most negligent manner, and the consequences were indeed appalling. Dead horses lay about in hund-

<sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 96, 97.

<sup>2</sup> *Lincoln to McClellan*, Feb. 3, 1862. "You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac. Yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across and to the terminus of the railroad on the York River. Mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours: *First*. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money? *Second*. Wherein is victory more certain by your plan than mine? *Third*. Wherein is victory more valuable by your plan than mine? *Fourth*. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would? *Fifth*. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?" <sup>3</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 98-107. <sup>4</sup> *Ib.*, 52. <sup>5</sup> *Ib.*, 106. <sup>6</sup> *Ib.*, 105.

<sup>7</sup> The Confederate government carefully abstained from making any public statement of the strength of its armies in the field. Their actual force in Northern Virginia at any period can be given only by approximation. At the close of October, when it was probably largest, McClellan had estimated it at 150,000. A few weeks later, Butler, collecting all accessible official evidence, calculated that there were 70,000. Three estimates of the number, near the beginning of





RUINS OF BRIDGE AT BLACKBURN'S FORD.

withstand a serious attack, and resolved to fall back the moment any determined movement was made by the Federal forces. Beauregard had, indeed, laid out immense works at Centreville and Manassas. At Centreville were two lines. One faced east, a mile and three quarters long; the other faced north, two miles long. In both were thirteen distinct forts, connected by "infantry parapets," "double caponniers," and "redans." There were embrasures for seventy-one guns. On a high hill commanding the rear of both lines was a large redoubt with ten embrasures. Manassas was defended in all directions by a system of detached works, with platforms for heavy guns, arranged for marine carriages, and connected by infantry parapets; the system being rendered complete by a very large work with sixteen embrasures, commanding the highest of the other works by about fifty feet.<sup>1</sup> The works at Manassas had been mounted with guns. Those at Centreville had

reds as they had fallen, and nobody seemed to care any thing about it, or to take any steps to put an end to a state of things so detrimental to the health of the army. Before long the hospitals in Beauregard's camp became enormously overcrowded, and the scythe of death reaped a large harvest in the narrow lanes of the camp, mowing down the lately blooming youth of the South. Happily for the army, General Beauregard received orders to assume command of the army on the Mississippi. It was, indeed, high time for a change in the administration of the Army of the Potomac, as the demoralization, negligence, and the lax discipline which permitted the soldiers to assume a bearing which verged on actual insubordination were becoming quite unbearable. Pale, haggard faces peered out upon you from the tents, and forms worn to the bone by hunger and disease tottered about. Nobody seemed to exert any authority, and nobody was disposed to obey. Beauregard left his army in the most deplorable condition, hurrying straight to the scene of his future defeat."—ESTYAN, *War Pictures from the South*, 107-109.

"The Acts of Congress providing for re-enlistments had failed to effect the desired object. The spirit of volunteering had died out, and the resolution of our soldiers already in the field was not sufficient to resist the prospects, cherished for months amid the sufferings and monotony of the camps, of returning to their homes. The exigency was critical, and even vital. In a period of thirty days the term of one hundred and forty-eight regiments expired. There was good reason to believe that a large majority of the men had not re-enlisted, and of those who had re-enlisted a very large majority had entered companies which could never be assembled, or, if assembled, could not be prepared for the field in time to meet the invasion actually commenced."—POLLARD, II., 23.

<sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 123.

been merely laid out, but no heavy artillery had been placed in them, and for weeks they were occupied only by a corps of observation, ready to fall back upon any alarm.

Beauregard's order upon giving up the command of the army, issued on the 30th of January, and Johnston's order upon assuming it, five days later, clearly indicate that both were aware of their perilous position. The main point of each was an urgent appeal to the troops not to disband.<sup>1</sup> Johnston, however, before giving the final orders for evacuation, waited for some definite movement on the part of the enemy. He had trusty friends who informed him at once of every thing that took place in Federal councils. So long as the Federal authorities were undecided where to strike, he might safely hold his position. But the moment he learned of the order to move by the way of the Peninsula, he called back his corps from Centreville, destroyed the bridges over Bull Run, and fell back to Manassas. The next day, March 10, he evacuated this place, burning every thing which he could not carry away.<sup>2</sup>

Early on the 9th of March McClellan was apprised that the enemy was


<sup>1</sup> Beauregard said: "I can not quit you without deep emotion, without even deep anxiety in the moment of our country's trials and dangers. This is no time for the Army of the Potomac—the men of Manassas—to stack their arms and quit, even for a brief period, the standards they have made glorious by their manhood."—*Reb. Rec.*, IV., 66. Johnston said: "Accustomed to the comforts and luxuries of home, you have borne and met the privations of camp life, the exactions of military discipline, and the rigors of a winter campaign. Your country now summons you to a noble and a greater deed. The enemy has gathered up all his energies for a final conflict. He does not propose to attack this army so long as it holds its present position with undiminished numbers and unimpaired discipline; but, protected by his fortifications, he awaits the expiration of your term of service. Expecting a large portion of our army to be soon disbanded, he hopes that his immense numbers will easily overpower your gallant comrades who will be left here. The commanding general calls upon the twelve-months' men to stand by their brave comrades who have volunteered for the war. You can not, you will not draw back at this solemn crisis of our struggle, when all that is heroic in the land is engaged, and all that is precious hangs trembling in the balance."—*Reb. Rec.*, IV., 130.

<sup>2</sup> *Com. Rep.*, 250.



EVACUATION OF MANASSAS JUNCTION.





CONFEDERATE HUTS AT CENTREVILLE.

evacuating his positions at Centreville, Manassas, and on the upper and lower Potomac. This, he thought, presented a good opportunity for his troops to gain some experience on the march and bivouac preparatory to a campaign, and to get rid of the superfluous baggage and other impediments which accumulate around an army in camp. He hoped, though rather faintly, that by marching upon Manassas he might be able to harass the rear of the retreating enemy.<sup>1</sup> On the morning of the 10th the Army of the Potomac began its "promenade" toward Manassas. Centreville was reached at noon. For once the Virginia mud did not prevent a rapid march. The formidable works which had so long been an object of dread were found to be thoroughly dilapidated. They did not appear to have been touched for months. The banks and escarpments were washed down by the rains. The ditches were so filled up that a man might leap across them. There was not the slightest evidence that a single heavy gun had ever been mounted upon them. There were, indeed, huts sufficient to shelter an army of 50,000 or more men; but the utmost force collected here at any time was 12,000 or 15,000.<sup>2</sup> The army marched no farther than Centreville, but McClellan and a strong escort rode on to Manassas, wading Bull Run, for the rude bridge at Blackburn's Ford had been destroyed. The strong-hold at Manassas was a scene of ruin. Here the promenade ended. Stoneman, with a force of 2300 cavalry and infantry, pushed on fourteen miles in the track of the retreating Confederates. They found the roads strewn with abandoned small-arms, stores, and munitions, showing that the final retreat had been hasty. They were, however, far from disorganized. After ascertaining their position, and finding them too strong to be assailed, Stoneman returned. The whole army then marched back, and in less than a week after it had set out was again in its camps near Washington.

In the course of this week the plan of the campaign was modified. Instead of going up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and thence marching straight across the Peninsula, as McClellan had all along proposed, the "less brilliant" plan of landing at Fortress Monroe was adopted. This change was made at a council of the four newly-appointed corps commanders, McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, held at Fairfax Court-house on the 13th of March. According to the memorandum of the proceedings given by McClellan, it was unanimously voted "that, the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers," provided that certain conditions were secured; but if this could not be done, "the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment."<sup>3</sup> But Sumner testified that no such proposition was submitted to the council, and, had it been submitted, he should have voted against it.<sup>4</sup> McClellan assented to what he considered the decision of the council, and communicated it to the War Department. The Secretary of War replied that the President had considered the plan, made no objections to it, but ordered that in its execution sufficient force should be left at Manassas Junction to make it sure that the enemy would not repossess himself of that position and line of communication; that Washington should be left entirely secure, and then the general should "move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or any where between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route."<sup>5</sup>

The President had by this time become convinced that the direction of the active operations of the Army of the Potomac would fully occupy all of McClellan's powers, without the task of controlling the entire military operations of the nation. Accordingly, on the 11th of March, an order was issued stating that "General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military departments, he retaining the command of the Army of the Potomac." All the region west of Knoxville was formed into a new Department of the Mississippi, the command being given to Halleck; and a new Department of the Mountain, embracing all between those of the Mississippi and the Potomac, was created for Fremont. All commanders of departments were to report directly to the Secretary of War. McClellan, though chagrined that this order was published before it was officially communicated to him, yielded to it with a good grace. He wrote to the President, "I have said to you that no feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever prevent me from devoting myself to the service. I am glad to

<sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 118, 119.

<sup>2</sup> *Com. Rep.*, 243-250.

<sup>3</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 128.

<sup>4</sup> "When the army returned to Fairfax Court-house a council was convened there, consisting of the four corps commanders, McDowell, Heintzelman, Keyes, and myself, and the proposition was submitted to us in this form: Whether, as the enemy was then rapidly retreating through the country, and the roads were in a very bad condition, it would not be better to turn them by a movement by water—as my understanding was, to descend the Potomac and land at Urbana. With the understanding that the army was to land at Urbana, I yielded to the proposition; and I will add, that I was never more surprised in my life than, when I embarked at Alexandria, to learn that the whole army was going down to Fortress Monroe. I had not dreamed of any such movement, and would not have voted for it."—*Com. Rep.*, 360. The testimony of General Keyes, however, confirms the view of McClellan. He says: "About the 13th of March a council of corps commanders was held at Fairfax Court-house, at which were present Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and myself. General McClellan was not much present during the discussions. The subject of the campaign was talked of. I do not know that any minutes were made. It was finally agreed and understood that we were to take the army down to Old Point Comfort and move up the Peninsula. . . . The corps commanders were unanimous in their agreement. In consequence of the arrangements made there, the army was embarked for Old Point Comfort."—*Com. Rep.*, 598. He also wrote to Senator Harris, June 7: "The plan of campaign on this line was made with the distinct understanding that four army corps should be employed, and that the navy should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left, by moving gun-boats up the James River. . . . The above plan was adopted unanimously by Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and was concurred in by General McClellan, who first proposed Urbana as our base. The army being reduced by 45,000 troops, some of them among the best in the service, and without the support of the navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for."—*McC. Rep.*, 165.

<sup>5</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 129.




have the opportunity to prove it; and you will find that, under present circumstances, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, and that no consideration of self will in any manner interfere with the discharge of my public duties."<sup>1</sup>

On the 14th McClellan issued a stirring address to his army. "For a long time," he said, "I have kept you inactive, but not without a purpose. You were to be disciplined, armed, and instructed. The formidable artillery you now have had to be created; other armies were to move and accomplish certain results. The patient labors of many months have produced their results. The Army of the Potomac is now a real army, magnificent in material, admirable in discipline and instruction, excellently equipped and armed. Your commanders are all that I could wish. The period of inaction has passed. I will bring you now face to face with the rebels, and only pray that God may defend the right. In whatever direction you may move, however strange my actions may appear to you, ever bear in mind that my fate is linked with yours, and all that I do is to bring you where I know you wish to be—on the decisive battle-field. I shall demand of you great, heroic exertions, rapid and long marches, privations perhaps. We will share all these together." And more in the same strain.<sup>2</sup>

McClellan then submitted to the War Department his proposed plan of operations. Fortress Monroe was to be the first base of operations, Richmond being the objective point, to be reached by the way of Yorktown and West Point. It was assumed that the enemy would concentrate his forces, and that a decisive battle would be fought between Richmond and West Point. The first object of the campaign was to capture Yorktown by a combined naval and military attack, which would be the work of only a few hours; then West Point would be established as the new base, about twenty-five miles from Richmond, "with every facility for developing and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks of the James." The co-operation of the navy was again and again insisted upon as an absolutely necessary part of this programme. "Without it the operations may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front several strong positions, which, by its aid, could be turned without serious loss of either time or men. . . . For the prompt success of this campaign, it is absolutely necessary that the navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most powerful vessels, upon Yorktown. There is the most important point—there the knot is to be cut."<sup>3</sup>

The Peninsula of Virginia lies between the James and York Rivers, which, running nearly parallel from the northwest, empty into Chesapeake Bay, their mouths forming wide estuaries. Fortress Monroe occupies the extremity of the Peninsula, and is connected with the main portion only by a narrow sand beach. The extreme length, from the fort to a line drawn between Richmond and West Point, is about sixty miles; the average breadth about twelve. At Yorktown, twenty miles up, it is narrowed to eight, which width it preserves ten miles, to Williamsburg; then the rivers begin to diverge. The shores of the lower portion of the Peninsula are deeply indented with creeks, some of which extend half way across. The land is flat and low,



THE NELSON HOUSE, YORKTOWN.

covered with swampy forests, through which sluggish streams flow lazily, expanding after every rain into miry ponds. Here and there is a small settlement, grouped around a rude church, a court-house, or a cross-road tavern. The roads, winding from one to another, hardly passable at any time, are, after a storm, impracticable for a wheel-carriage. The climate is unhealthy during the summer, but the soil is generally fertile, and the fisheries productive, the oysters of the York and James Rivers being among the finest in the world. The population is 45 to the square mile, about equal in density to that of Pennsylvania, the slaves slightly outnumbering the whites. Yorktown is a dilapidated village of some fifty houses, on the York River, twenty miles from Fortress Monroe. It is chiefly noted for the surrender of Cornwallis in 1781. In the colonial times it was much larger, and for a long time vied with Williamsburg, the capital of the colony. The principal building is the Nelson House, built by Thomas Nelson, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, and afterward governor of Virginia. For years it had been occupied as a tavern, the only one in the place. It stands upon a bluff, the highest point of land on the Peninsula below Richmond. Opposite is Gloucester Point, setting sharply in from the northern bank, reducing the width of the York River from two miles to one.

Strong fortifications had been thrown up at Yorktown under the direction of General Magruder, formerly an officer in the United States army. On one side they commanded the river, and on the other overlooked the narrow neck of land. He had also prepared an elaborate line of defense, stretching for miles down both rivers, and almost meeting in the centre of the Peninsula. Magruder was confident that, with 25,000 men to hold it, this line could not be broken by any force that could be brought against it. But 11,000 was the utmost force given him, and he had to adopt a shorter line, which could be held by his small force. This line, which was thirteen miles long, followed the course of the Warwick River, a muddy stream rising close by the Yorktown bluff, and flowing through swamps across the Peninsula into the James. At intervals of three or four miles were mill-dams, which set the water back, forming a series of shallow ponds. The only roads crossed these dams. Redoubts were thrown up at the heads of the bridges and at various points along the Warwick. Six thousand men were retained in garri-

son at Yorktown, Gloucester, and Mulberry Island, leaving five thousand to defend the line of the Warwick.<sup>1</sup>

The Federal army was hurried to the Peninsula as rapidly as transportation could be furnished. The advance, consisting of Heintzelman's corps, landed on the 23d of March. They were ordered to encamp close by Fortress Monroe, in order to leave the enemy in doubt whether Norfolk or Yorktown was to be the immediate object of attack. Four days afterward a reconnoissance was made as far as Big Bethel, but strict orders had been given by McClellan that no demonstration should be made. Heintzelman believed that, had he been permitted to advance, he could have forced the enemy's lines with a single brigade, have isolated the troops at Yorktown, and have compelled the surrender in a few days. Hooker was of the same opinion.<sup>2</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> MAGRUDER, 516.

<sup>2</sup> Heintzelman testifies: "A few days after I got to Fortress Monroe, I got information, which I considered reliable, that General Magruder had about 7500 men on the Peninsula; at all events, not to exceed 10,000. . . . I think, if I had been per-



FORTIFICATIONS OF YORKTOWN, LOOKING TOWARD THE RIVER.

<sup>1</sup> McC. Rep., 125.

<sup>2</sup> Reb. Rec., iv., 306.

<sup>3</sup> McC. Rep., 132-134.



Confederates were fully aware of the weakness of their position, and of the disasters which would follow had it been forced.<sup>1</sup>

McClellan reached Fortress Monroe on the 2d of April, preceded or immediately followed by the bulk of his force. It was less than he had demanded. Blenker's division of 10,000 men had been withdrawn from his immediate command, to be held in a position to re-enforce Fremont. He had expected to be authorized to draw 10,000 men from Wool's force at Fortress Monroe. On the day following his arrival he received orders depriving him of all control over Wool's forces, and was forbidden to detach any of his troops without his consent. "This order," he says, "left me without any base of operations under my own control." The very next day he was informed that McDowell's whole corps was detached from his immediate command, and ordered to remain behind. It had been stipulated by the council which recommended the Peninsular movement that "the force to be left to cover Washington should be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace." Sumner thought that 40,000 men in all for the defense of the city would be sufficient; the other corps commanders thought that, "with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice." To man the forts, it was estimated, would require 25,000 first rate troops—50,000 in all. McClellan proposed to leave for the defense of Washington and its approaches 73,000 men. Of these, 35,000 were in the Valley of the Shenandoah; 20,000 at Warrenton, Manassas, and on the lower Potomac; and 18,000 in and before the capital. But the military authorities at Washington "did not consider the force in the Valley of the Shenandoah as available for the immediate defense of the capital, being required for the defense of that valley;" and Wadsworth, who had been appointed military governor of the district, said that the force under his command was "nearly all new, imperfectly disciplined, several of the regiments in a very disorganized condition, and entirely inadequate to and unfit for the important duty to which it had been assigned." They reported that the stipulation and the order of the President "had not been complied with;" and, in consequence, Lincoln ordered McDowell's division to remain behind.<sup>2</sup>

The combined naval and military attack upon Yorktown, which McClellan had declared to be the essential feature of his plan of operations, was never made. It seems hardly to have been mentioned after his arrival at Fortress Monroe. It appears to have been set aside in consequence of the presence of the Virginia, which lay apparently ready for another raid upon the fleet. "Flag-officer Goldsborough," says McClellan, "then in command of the United States squadron in Hampton Roads, regarded it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Virginia, and as he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach for the assistance of the army a suit-

able force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy prepared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our land batteries had partially silenced the works." Goldsborough, however, asserted that he had given to McClellan all the assistance for which he asked. "I was requested," he says, "to perform services in connection with the army, and every thing was done that was asked. General McClellan came on board my ship to consult me, and I pointed out to him what I thought the best plan, to which he assented. The plan of attack upon Yorktown was that I should furnish him with seven gun-boats, which I did. Every thing was furnished to General McClellan by the Navy Department that he desired in the way of gun-boats. He told me that he wanted no more than I had detailed for him." By the plan then agreed upon, the approach to Richmond was to be made by the York River, Goldsborough guaranteeing to prevent the Virginia from interfering with it, for which he said that he had ample means. The main body of the army was to advance direct upon Yorktown from Fortress Monroe; a strong force to be landed, under cover of the gun-boats, within four miles; while another column was to land on the northern side of the York, and attack Gloucester in the rear, where it was wholly unprotected. Gloucester, it was thought, would fall without any fighting, and its fall would involve that of Yorktown, whose river front could be attacked from the Point more effectually than by the fleet. No attempt was made to execute this plan—why, Goldsborough never knew.<sup>3</sup> The reason undoubtedly was that McClellan, who greatly overestimated the enemy's strength, dared not attempt it at once after the withholding of McDowell's corps, to whom he had assigned the attack upon Gloucester, nor even a fortnight later, when he was joined by Franklin, whose division formed a considerable part of that corps.

McClellan then undertook to carry out the plan, which Heintzelman had proposed, of piercing the Confederate line in the centre of the Peninsula, and interposing a force between Yorktown and Richmond. W. F. Smith's division of Keyes's corps was directed, on the morning of the 5th of March, to go straight up the Peninsula to the Half-way House, between Yorktown and Williamsburg, so as to prevent the escape of the garrison at Yorktown, and prevent re-enforcements from being thrown in. Heintzelman was to send Fitz John Porter's division by a road nearly parallel, but to halt at Powers's House, six miles below Yorktown, there to await further orders. Heavy rains fell all the morning, which made the roads almost impassable for the infantry of Smith's column. He could bring forward only a few guns; ammunition, provision, and forage could not be brought up at all. Early in the afternoon he unexpectedly found himself brought to a stand by the Warwick River, and the works which guarded its passage at Lee's Mill. On all the maps of that region the river was laid down as running parallel with, and not crossing, the main road from Newport News to Williamsburg, re-entering a creek on the James, and making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island. Instead of this, the Warwick was now found to run directly

mitted to advance when I first landed on the Peninsula, I could have isolated the troops at Yorktown, and the place would have fallen in a very few days. . . . I supposed that we could force the enemy's lines at about Wynne's Mill, so as to prevent the enemy from re-enforcing it. . . . I was always of opinion that we could have forced their lines; and, from information that we got at the Adams House, about two miles from Williamsburg, the day before the battle there [i. e., May 4], I was satisfied we could have done so. We were willing to try it with a single brigade. General Hamilton made the application, and I forwarded it to the commanding general."—*Com. Rep.*, 346, 347.

Hooker testifies: "When General McClellan landed, there were somewhere between 8000 and 15,000 at Yorktown. . . . From my examination of the works at Yorktown, I felt that their lines could be pierced without any considerable loss by the corps with which I was on duty—Heintzelman's corps. We could have gone right through and gone to the rear of the enemy. They would have run the moment we got to their rear, and we could have picked up the prisoners. Right there at Yorktown they had expended a great deal of labor. But I would have marched right through the redoubts which were a part of the cordon they had, and got on the road between Yorktown and Richmond, and thus compelled the enemy to fight me on my ground, and not have fought them on theirs. If McClellan had thrown his army between Yorktown and Williamsburg, it would have resulted in the capture and destruction of the enemy's army. I know of no reason why that could not be done."—*Com. Rep.*, 575, 576.

McClellan estimated the enemy's force much higher. He says: "Information which I had collected during the winter placed General Magruder's command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of General Huger's force at Norfolk. Knowing that General Huger could easily spare some troops to re-enforce Yorktown, and that he had indeed done so, and that Johnston's army at Manassas could be brought rapidly by the James and York Rivers to the same point, I proceeded to invest the town without delay."—*Report*, 155. General Keyes wrote on the 7th of April: "Suppose we succeed in breaking through the line in front of us, what can we do next? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains the command of James River, and we do not first reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible for us to sustain this army three marches beyond where it is now. . . . The line in front of us is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of the enemy capable of being increased beyond the numbers we have to oppose to him. . . . If we break through and advance, both our flanks will be assailed from two great water-courses in the hands of the enemy; our supplies would give out, and the enemy, equal if not superior in numbers, would, with the other advantages, beat and destroy this army."—*McC. Rep.*, 167, 168. General Keyes appears subsequently to have modified his opinion. In testifying before the committee a year after, he said: "My impression now is that, if the whole army had been pushed forward, we should have found a point to break through. . . . I will not say that, if we had pressed on immediately on arriving in front of their lines, we might not have found a point where we could have broken the line, and then have invested Yorktown on two sides, when the fall of it would, of course, have been hastened. It is my opinion that if we had pressed on rapidly when we first arrived, we might have found a point through which we could have broken."—*Com. Rep.*, 600, 601.

Colonel Cabell, the Confederate chief of artillery, reports: "From the topography of the ground, it was absolutely necessary to occupy the whole of this line in the then condition of our forces. Our forces were so few in number, that it was essential to the safety of the command that the whole should be defended, as the breaking of our lines at any point would necessarily have been attended by the most disastrous results; the centre broken or our flank turned, compelling a precipitate retreat to Yorktown or Mulberry Island, to stand a siege of the enemy's land force, assisted by the whole naval force, with but little prospect of relief or re-enforcements when the enemy occupied the intervening country. Three roads led up from the Peninsula and crossed our line of defenses. The first, on our right, was the Warwick Road, that crossed at Lee's Mill; the second crossed at Wynne's Mill; and the third was commanded by redoubts Numbers 4 and 5, near Yorktown. The crossing at Lee's Mill was naturally strong, and fortifications had been erected there and at Wynne's Mill. Below Lee's Mill, the Warwick River, affected by the tides, and assisted by swamps on each side, proved a tolerable protection; but the marshes could easily be made passable, and the river bridged."—*MAGRUDER*, 531.

For full details of these withdrawals, see *McC. Rep.*, 134, 139-142; *Com. Rep.*, 251, 252, 303-305. McClellan, in reviewing his campaign, says this reduction of force "removed nearly 60,000 men from my command, and reduced my force by more than one third after its task had been assigned, its operations planned, its fighting begun. To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a different, and a less effective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was a fatal error."—*Report*, 160.



THE PENINSULA, BELOW WILLIAMSBURG.

<sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 166.

<sup>3</sup> Goldsborough's testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 631-633.



across the Peninsula. Heintzelman's division, after overcoming some slight resistance at Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge, found itself in like manner checked when almost in front of Yorktown.<sup>1</sup> Skirmishing, which Magruder magnifies into an attack of "furious cannonading and musketry," ensued at both points; but the result was that the Confederates held the line of the Warwick intact. If McClellan found the line "stronger than was expected, unapproachable by reason of the Warwick River, and incapable of being carried by assault,"<sup>2</sup> Magruder was still more astonished that the line was not forced. He believed that he had before him the whole army of the Potomac, "forming an aggregate of not less than 100,000, since ascertained to have been 120,000," and that he had held them in check with 5000. For several days he expected another attack; his men slept in the trenches under arms, but, to his surprise, day after day passed without an assault. In a few days the object of the delay became apparent. Long lines of earthworks began to appear in every direction through the intervening woods and along the open fields.<sup>3</sup> McClellan had become convinced that "instant assault upon Yorktown would have been simple folly," and that he must prepare for it by the preliminary employment of heavy guns and some siege operations.<sup>4</sup> The five thousand Confederates, who, without re-enforcements, held for at least six days the line of the Warwick, decided the whole course of the campaign. They delayed the entire Federal army for a month in the swamps of the Warwick.

Much was to be done before Yorktown could be formally invested. Miles of road were to be cut and corduroyed through swampy forests, and bridges to be built over sluggish streams. Direct hostile operations were suspended. McClellan ordered Keyes, whose corps was posted opposite the line of the Warwick, "not to move any of the troops from their positions unless the enemy actually lands or crosses the Warwick." Once only did he depart from this cautious policy. Smith, whose division was posted on the extreme right, chafed at this inactivity. Keyes, who had more than once "seen a disposition on his part to try to break through the enemy's lines with his division, or a part of it," ordered that no such attempt should be made. Smith had discovered that the weakest point was at Wynne's Mill, near the centre of the enemy's line. He was authorized by McClellan, without the knowledge of Keyes, to push a strong reconnoissance to this point, and sustain the reconnoitring party by a real attack, if found expedient.<sup>5</sup> At this point the enemy had only a single battery of three six-pounders. The fire of this was silenced, and four companies of the 3d Vermont, wading to the arm-pits, crossed the stream, and drove a North Carolina and Georgia regiment from their rifle-pits. These rallied, and, re-enforced by three regiments, forced the Vermonters out of the pits and back across the stream, with heavy loss. The other regiments who were preparing to support the advance were recalled. Later, an attempt was made by the 6th Vermont to cross by the dam; but a single gun of the enemy commanded this passage, and the attempt was abandoned. The four companies of the 3d which crossed the Warwick lost 25 killed and 50 wounded, most of them severely. The entire loss was 35 killed and 120 wounded. Magruder represents this affair as a decided victory; the Federal loss, he thought, could not be less than 600, his own being not more than 75; "but," he adds, "all the re-enforcements which were on their way to me had not yet joined me, so that I



WILLIAM F. SMITH.

was unable to follow up the action by any decided step." He enumerates fourteen entire regiments of infantry, besides artillery and dragoons, as engaged or within supporting distance. These were the forces on the line of the Warwick. Adding to them the troops in the fortifications, the Confederate force in and about Yorktown probably numbered from 20,000 to 25,000 men. Additional re-enforcements soon arrived, and with them came officers who outranked Magruder, and he ceased to command.<sup>1</sup> This was the only serious engagement on the Peninsula previous to the evacuation of Yorktown, although an almost continuous artillery fire and picket shooting was kept up on various parts of the line.

Meantime for a fortnight an almost continuous dialogue was held by telegraph and mail between McClellan and the government at Washington, running thus:<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> McC. Rep., 154, 159.  
<sup>2</sup> McC. Rep., 162.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 160.

<sup>4</sup> MAGRUDER, 517.  
<sup>5</sup> McC. Rep., 177; Com. Rep., 533.

<sup>1</sup> MAGRUDER, 517-535.

<sup>2</sup> Com. Rep., 319-323.



MAKING ROAD THROUGH THE SWAMP.



**McCLELLAN, April 5.** The enemy are in large force along our front. Deserters say they are daily re-enforced from Richmond and Norfolk. I beg you to reconsider the order, detaching the first corps from my command. If you can not leave me the whole of that corps, let me not lose Franklin and his division. **April 6.** The order forming new departments, if enforced, deprives me of the power of ordering up wagons and troops absolutely necessary to enable me to advance to Richmond. I request that my orders for wagon-trains, etc., that I have left behind, as well as Woodbury's brigade, may be at once complied with. I repeat my request that Franklin may be restored to my command.

**LINCOLN, April 6.** Your orders for forwarding transportation and Woodbury's brigade under your command will not be interfered with. You have over 100,000 troops with you, independent of Wool's command. You had better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to Warwick River at once. They will probably use time as advantageously as you can.

**McCLELLAN, April 7.** Johnston arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong re-enforcements. It seems clear that I shall have on my hands the whole force of the enemy—not less than 100,000 men, possibly more. When my present command all joins me, I shall have about 85,000 men. With this army I could assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry them; but were I in possession of their intrenchments, and assaulted by double my numbers, I should not fear the result. I shall do all in my power to carry the works; but I should have the whole first corps to land upon York River, and attack Gloucester in the rear.

**LINCOLN, April 9.** My explicit directions that Washington should be left entirely secure have been neglected. Do you think I should permit the line from Richmond to this city to be entirely open except the resistance which could be offered by less than 20,000 unorganized troops? When I telegraphed that you had more than 100,000 men, I had just obtained a statement, taken from your own returns, making 108,000 with you or on the way. You say you have but 85,000. Where are the other 23,000? Wool's command is doing for you just what a like number of your own command would have to do if that command was away. I suppose your whole force is with you now. If so, it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. The enemy will gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcements alone. Let me tell you it is indispensable for you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. I have always thought that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, not surmounting a difficulty: we should find the same enemy, and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country is noting that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. I will do all I can to sustain you; but you must act.

**McCLELLAN, April 10.** The reconnaissance of to-day proves that it is necessary to invest and attack Gloucester Point. Give me Franklin's and McCall's divisions, and I will at once undertake it. If you can not possibly send me the two divisions to carry out this final plan of the campaign, I will run the risk, and hold myself responsible for the result, if you will give me Franklin's. Grant me this request. The fate of our cause depends upon it. I wish the two divisions; Franklin's is indispensable. I have determined on the point of attack, and am engaged in fixing the positions of the batteries.

**ADJUTANT GENERAL, April 11.** Franklin's division has been ordered to embark immediately for Fort Monroe.

**McCLELLAN, April 12.** Thank you for the re-enforcements sent me. Franklin will attack on the other side. The moment I hear from him I will state point of rendezvous. I am confident. **April 13.** Arrangement proposed by Franklin would assist me much. Our work progressing well. We shall soon be at them, and I am sure of the result. **April 14.** Have seen Franklin. Thank you for your kindness and consideration. I now understand the matter, which I did not before. Our field-guns annoyed the enemy considerably to-day. Roads and bridges now progressing rapidly. Siege-guns and ammunition coming up very satisfactorily. Shall have nearly all up to-morrow. The tranquillity of Yorktown is nearly at an end.

**SECRETARY OF WAR, April 20.**<sup>1</sup> I am rejoiced to learn that your opera-

<sup>1</sup> In the Committee's Report this dispatch is dated the 27th. This is doubtless an error, as it clearly refers to the two preceding dispatches, and to McClellan's dispatches of the 18th (not given in the Report) relating to the affair of the 16th, in which he says, "The conduct of the Green Mountain Boys is spoken of in the highest terms. They drove a superior number of the enemy from their fortified position, but were forced to relinquish it on the rebels being re-enforced. The loss of the enemy must have been very heavy, as the well-directed fire of our artillery mowed them by acres."



REMAINS OF BRITISH WORKS AT YORKTOWN.

tions are progressing so rapidly, and with so much spirit and success, and congratulate you and the officers and soldiers engaged upon the brilliant affair mentioned in your telegrams. Every thing in the power of the department is at your service. I hope soon to congratulate you upon a splendid victory that shall be the finishing stroke of the war.

Here the colloquy appears to have closed for a while. The tranquillity of Yorktown was not disturbed for a fortnight; and it was many months before the splendid victory was achieved which was to be "the finishing stroke of the war." Franklin, with his division, 11,000 strong, reached Yorktown on the 14th, raising the effective force of the Army of the Potomac to more than 100,000 men,<sup>1</sup> besides the 10,000 of Wool, who at Fortress Monroe were doing just what, had they been removed, McClellan would have been obliged to do with the same number of his own command. McClellan's first plan, for the success of which he proposed to hold himself responsible, was to join Hooker's division to Franklin's, and, landing on the Severn, to make a diversion by attacking Gloucester in the rear. This plan was abandoned because "no more troops could be spared" to assist Franklin. He then determined to act on Gloucester by disembarking Franklin on the north bank of the York, under the protection of the gun-boats. A place for landing was selected, but nothing more was done. Franklin's division was kept for more than three weeks on board the transports, and was not disembarked until the 6th of May, after Yorktown had been abandoned and the battle of Williamsburg had been fought.<sup>2</sup>

By the middle of April the works at Yorktown had been reconnoitred, the locations for the batteries determined, and the roads and bridges to reach them well advanced. The topography of the place indicates the position of its defenses. The Confederate works occupied the precise lines of the British works of 1781, which were until recently in fair preservation. The level bluff upon which Yorktown stands forms an irregular parallelogram, the longer sides, running northwest and southeast, being 1200 yards, the shorter sides being 400 and 600 yards. It is inclosed by deep ravines, which almost meet in the rear. The American forces in 1781 advanced southwestwardly from Williamsburg. The Federal forces in 1862 advanced from the opposite direction; but the attack in both cases was directed against the southwestern face of the works. In 1781 the assailing batteries were advanced to within 200 and 300 yards from the defensive works; in 1862 they were from 1500 to 2500 yards; one battery, with two two-hundred pound and five one-hundred pound Parrotts, was 3810 yards from the nearest point of the defenses. All told, there were fifteen batteries, mounted with 111 guns and mortars. By the 3d of May these were essentially completed and armed. The work had been carried on under an incessant but inf-

<sup>1</sup> McClellan undesignedly gives the impression that Franklin joined him a week later. He says (*Report*, 176), "On the 22d of April, General Franklin, with his division from General McDowell's corps, had arrived and reported to me." The misdate here implied has been positively made by various writers; among others, by Hillard, who says (*Life and Campaigns of McClellan*, 180), "On the 22d of April, while the siege of Yorktown was going on, General Franklin's division of General McDowell's corps arrived, and reported to General McClellan. These troops were kept on board the transports, and not embarked for some days." The force of the Army of the Potomac at this precise date has not been given; but, on the 30th of April, no considerable re-enforcements having arrived in the interval, McClellan (*Report*, 53) says that there were, nominally, including Franklin, 126,387 men. Of these, however, 11,037 were absent by authority, and 6015 sick or under arrest, leaving an effective force of 109,335.


The Assistant Adjutant General furnished the following detailed statement, "accurately compiled from the morning Report of the Army of the Potomac on the 30th day of April, 1862, signed by Major General McClellan and his assistant adjutant general" (*Com. Rep.*, 323):

Number of Men composing the Army of the Potomac, April 30, 1862.


	Present for duty.	Sick and on special duty.	Aggregate absent.	Present and absent.
General Staff, Engineers, and Engineer Brigade, Cavalry Division, Escort to Headquarters, and Provost Guard.....	13,787	798	2,072	16,657
Second Corps, General Sumner.....	19,054	887	2,061	22,002
Third Corps, General Heintzelman....	34,633	2009	3,068	39,710
Fourth Corps, General Keyes.....	33,586	1886	4,089	39,561
Franklin's Division.....	11,332	270	846	12,448
	112,392	5850	12,136	130,378

The Assistant Secretary of War states (*McC. Rep.*, 109), "In thirty-seven days (and most of it was accomplished in thirty days) from the time I received the order [Feb. 28], there were transported to Fort Monroe 121,500 men." Franklin's division can not, from the dates, be included in this number.

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 176; *Com. Rep.*, 621, 632; *Art. Op.*, 71-82.




BATTERY NO. 1.



MORTAR BATTERY NO. 4.






SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, OCTOBER, 1781.

A, British Outposts, taken possession of by the Americans on their arrival. B, First Parallel. C, D, American Batteries. E, Bomb Battery. F, French Battery. G, French Bomb Battery. H, Second Parallel. I, Redoubt stormed by the Americans. L, Redoubt stormed by the French. M, M, French Batteries. N, French Bomb Battery. O, American Batteries.

fectual fire from the enemy. Not a score of lives were lost by this fire.<sup>1</sup> But the troops suffered severely from sickness during that month. Nearly an eighth of the army was disabled by disease. Its morale was also impaired; it was hard to bring officers and men to endure, day after day and week after week, the weary toil of digging in the Warwick swamps. The Army of the Potomac was less effective at the beginning of May than it had been a month before.<sup>2</sup>

McClellan, in opposition to the opinion of the chief of engineers, would not open fire from the batteries, one by one, as they were finished, but resolved to wait until all were ready, when he would have such an overwhelming force as would crush every thing before it. He departed from the plan only so far as to open with solid shot and shell from the 100 and 200 pounders of Battery No. 1, upon the wharf at Yorktown, 4800 yards distant, where the enemy were discharging several vessels. Most of the percussion shells failed to explode, and those filled with Greek fire produced no perceptible effect. The vessels were driven off, and took refuge across the river, behind Gloucester Point.<sup>3</sup> Daybreak on the 6th of May was the time fixed upon for the general fire to open. On the afternoon of the 3d the enemy began a vigorous fire of shells into Heintzelman's camp, which was nearest to Yorktown. A balloon, which was sent up to reconnoitre, seemed to be a special mark. They kept up a random fire, without any apparent object, until after midnight. Toward daylight, Heintzelman was awakened by a rattling fire of musketry. He telegraphed to the officer commanding the skirmishers in the trenches, and received answer that there was no fighting, but the light of a great fire in Yorktown was visible. At daylight it was reported that the enemy were evacuating their works. Heintzelman went up in the balloon, saw that the number of camp-fires about Yorktown was much dimin-



SIEGE OF YORKTOWN, APRIL, 1862.

The Figures (1-15) designate the Union Batteries. The Letters (A, B, C, D) designate Redoubts.

- NO. ARMAMENT.
- 1, 2 200-pdr. Parrotts.
  - 2, 3 44-inch Rifled,
  - 3, 300-pdr. Parrotts.
  - 4, 200-pdr. Parrotts.
  - 5, 10 13-inch Mortars.
  - 6, 5 10-inch Mortars.
  - 7, 6 20-pdr. Parrotts.
  - 8, 6 20-pdr. Parrotts.
  - 9, 10 10-inch Mortars.
  - 10, 7 41-inch Rifled,
  - 11, 3 100-pdr. Parrotts.
  - 12, 4 10-inch Mortars.
  - 13, 5 10-inch Mortars.
  - 14, 3 100-pdr. Parrotts.
  - 15, 2 8-inch S. Howitzers.

ished, and the guns had disappeared. Presently he saw the Federal skirmishers entering the works. He came down, and, presuming that he should be at once ordered in pursuit, gave direction for his troops to prepare three days' rations. But hour after hour passed, and no orders came. He rode over to head-quarters, and found that orders had been given for the pursuit; but it was past noon before they got off.<sup>4</sup> Magruder, who had constructed the works, and had so obstinately held them without re-enforcements, had ceased to command a fortnight before. A council of war had decided that the fortification was untenable, and must be abandoned; and the fire of the previous evening was merely to mask the evacuation. Of the ninety-four guns, fifty-six were left behind, only three of them disabled.<sup>5</sup> McClellan telegraphed to Washington, "We have the ramparts; have guns, ammunition, camp equipage, etc. We hold the entire line of his works, which the engineers report as being very strong. I have thrown all my cavalry and horse-infantry in pursuit, supported by infantry. No time shall be lost.

<sup>1</sup> "An incessant fire was kept up during the day with rifled projectiles and eight-inch shell and solid shot, and thirty-two and forty-two pounder shot, without retarding the work in the least. Since our first appearance before Yorktown (April 5), and particularly since the 15th, the ravines have been filled with men night and day, making roads, building batteries and parallels, and guarding the works. The loss of life has been most trifling. I have not the exact number, but I have reason to believe that it does not amount to a dozen."—*Art. Op.*, 146.

<sup>2</sup> On the 30th of April the sick-list numbered 5618; there were also "absent by authority" 11,037 (*McC. Rep.*, 53). It is fair to assume that two thirds of the leaves of absence must have been given by reason of disability. "April 19. Colonel Alexander states that the men worked well, but their officers do not attach sufficient importance to the work to be performed, many of them lying in the shade in place of superintending the work" (*Art. Op.*, 159). "April 21. Of the 3000 men asked for, 2326 reported this morning for duty" (*Ibid.*, 160). "April 26. Very little work was done last night; it was impossible to get the working parties to do any thing" (*Ibid.*, 169). "April 27. A great deal of difficulty and delay is still experienced in regulating the working parties. Details, after waiting at the place where they have been directed to go, return to camp and report no engineer officer to be found; while the engineer officer reports waiting several hours without seeing them" (*Ibid.*, 171). "April 28. To-day only 1000 men reported in place of 1500 to Lieutenant McAlester" (*Ibid.*, 173). "We should probably have succeeded [in an immediate assault upon Yorktown], and if we failed, it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would have been more demoralizing than the labors of the siege. Our troops toiled for a month in the trenches, or lay in the swamps of the Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold upon the army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired the morale. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there" (*Ibid.*, 62).

<sup>3</sup> *Art. Op.*, 63, 127; *Com. Rep.*, 429.

<sup>4</sup> *Com. Rep.*, 347.

<sup>5</sup> *Art. Op.*, 189.



TAKING POSSESSION OF YORKTOWN.





MAJOR GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK (1860)

The gun-boats have gone up the York River. Gloucester is also in our possession. I shall push the enemy to the wall."<sup>1</sup>

The works at Yorktown were certainly of very great strength. Probably they could not have been carried by assault unless the assailants were fully twice as many as the defenders. There were also strong outworks, extending for a mile to the head waters of the Warwick. This stream, with its swampy borders, presented a very strong defensive line if held by an adequate force. But, extending for more than ten miles, a much larger force than the enemy had at his disposal would have been needed to hold them against a determined attack. They consisted of an infantry parapet and trenches along the bank, with three or four redoubts and batteries, mounting only two or three light field-pieces to sweep the main approaches. At no time before the 16th of April could Magruder have given more than 10,000 men to the defense of this whole line without stripping Yorktown of its garrison. A real attack by 20,000 men could have pierced the line. Once broken, there was nothing between the assailants and Williamsburg.<sup>2</sup>

Johnston, who had for a fortnight been in command on the Peninsula, conducted the retreat from Yorktown with rare ability. Besides the heavy guns, and ammunition belonging to them, he left little behind. His trains and the mass of his troops were well under way hours before their departure was perceived. The weather had favored him. Several clear days had put the roads in good condition, and before the pursuit was commenced he was past the defensive lines before Williamsburg, and well on his way to Richmond. A strong rear guard was left behind near Williamsburg, where works had been thrown up to check any pursuit. Two main roads run down the Peninsula from near Williamsburg; one, following the York River, goes to Yorktown; the other, following the course of the James, crosses the Warwick at Lee's Mill. These two roads, which are connected by numerous cross-roads, come together a mile east of Williamsburg. At this point was Fort Magruder, the centre of the Confederate works, which, to the number of thirteen, stretched clear across the narrow isthmus between the two rivers. All these works were hidden by heavy forests, concealing them from view until the observer was within a mile. The trees near the works had been felled, so that the occupants of the redoubts might have timely notice of the approach of an enemy and bring their artillery to bear.

McClellan, though he was convinced that the force of the enemy outnumbered his own, had no idea that they would make a stand before Williamsburg. He remained at Yorktown to direct the movements of Franklin's division by the York River to West Point, having ordered Stoneman, with all the available cavalry and four batteries of horse artillery, to pursue the enemy and harass his rear. A heavy and continuous rain-storm now set in, which soon rendered the roads difficult. But Stoneman pressed on, and, a little past noon of the 4th, debouched from the screen of woods, and found

himself under a hot fire from Fort Magruder. He fell back, suffering some loss in men and guns, to await the coming up of the infantry, without whom it was useless to attempt to assail the enemy's works. Hooker's division of Heintzelman's corps had been ordered to support Stoneman. They left Yorktown about noon. While struggling to reach the position where Stoneman stood at bay, they found the road occupied by Smith's division, which, coming up from Lee's Mill, had turned into this road. Hooker had to stop for three or four hours until Smith had passed. Night was closing in before he was able to advance. He pressed on for four hours through the darkness and rain, hoping to come up with the enemy before morning; but the men were exhausted by laboring the previous night in the trenches before Yorktown and by the long march. They must have rest. An hour or two before midnight they were ordered to halt, and flung themselves down in the miry road. At daybreak they were aroused and summoned to march. In an hour after they came in sight of Fort Magruder. Hooker required but a few minutes to decide upon his course. He was in pursuit of a retreating army. It was his business to attack it, and, if he could not capture it, to hold it in check. His own force was hardly 9000; but within two hours' march were 30,000 men, and within four hours' march was the bulk of the Army of the Potomac, 60,000 more. He was sure that he could hold his grasp upon the enemy against thrice his numbers for twice the time that it would be required for aid to reach him. The Confederates were soon driven into Fort Magruder, and Hooker pushed his skirmishers so close to the works that not a gun could be worked. If a man showed his head or hand he got a ball in it. Hooker sent word to the commanding officer in the rear that there was nothing in the way of his advancing his troops. The enemy "was in a vice," and could not fire; the line of defenses across the isthmus could have been carried, he said, without the loss of ten men.<sup>1</sup>

But there was really no commanding officer there. McClellan was at Yorktown. Heintzelman had been ordered to take charge of operations in front; but Sumner had come up in person the night before without any troops of his own corps, and assumed command in virtue of seniority. "Sumner ranked me," says Heintzelman, "and I had nothing to do." That night nothing was done. Next morning a consultation was held. Sumner decided to assail the enemy's left, and troops were ordered up for that purpose. So hour after hour passed away. Hooker all the while had been hotly engaged upon the left. The sound of the firing was plainly heard at headquarters. Heintzelman was sent in that direction to take charge of operations. He had scarcely gone when Hooker's letter came, telling Heintzelman that he had been hotly engaged all the morning; his men hard at work, but much exhausted; but communication was open; troops could come up, take post by his side, and whip the enemy. In twenty minutes the letter was returned from Sumner, with an endorsement that it had been opened and read by the senior officer on that field.<sup>2</sup> But no re-enforcements came up. For hours Sumner was apprehensive of an attack upon the centre, where he kept his post, though he repeatedly gave orders for the troops in the rear to move up on the same road which Hooker had taken.<sup>3</sup>



GEORGE STONEMAN.

<sup>1</sup> *Reb. Rec.*, iv., 6.

<sup>2</sup> For the strength of the Confederate works on the Warwick, see especially *Art. Op.*, 194-201. The most exaggerated reports were put forth respecting the strength of this line. Thus the *New York Herald* of April 22 furnishes an elaborate map showing three continuous lines of intrenchments running completely across the isthmus. The first line mounts 140 guns, the second, two miles in the rear, has 120 guns, both being provided with "hot shot furnaces." The third, two miles beyond, has 240 guns, and consists, besides the intrenchments, of six forts. Behind these appear the "encampments of the rebel army in four grand divisions," besides a "reserve at Williamsburg;" in all, 500 guns, besides those of Yorktown itself. The works on Gloucester Point were said to have "eighteen 100-pounder rifle guns." Instead of which, most of the pieces were light navy guns; "the others are believed to be as heavy as 32-pounders." Of the whole, only eight in all bore on the river and on our positions.—*Art. Op.*, 193.

<sup>3</sup> *Com. Rep.*, 577.

<sup>2</sup> Hooker's Report, *Reb. Rec.*, iv., 15.

<sup>3</sup> Keyes, in his testimony (*Com. Rep.*, 603), says that these orders were countermanded; but Sumner (*Testimony*, *Ibid.*, 361) makes no reference to any such countermand; and Kearney's division, which relieved Hooker, and Peck's and Hancock's brigades, which performed important parts toward the close of the battle, came up under orders from Sumner. McClellan (*Report*, 183) merely mentions the countermanding by Sumner of orders to re-enforce Hancock.



Hooker had opened the battle at half past seven in the morning. At nine he had silenced the fire of Fort Magruder, and kept his advantage for two or three hours. But the enemy began to receive re-enforcements, and took the offensive. Longstreet, who commanded the rear, had retreated beyond Williamsburg; he turned back to strengthen the force which was engaged. Three times in succession the Confederates charged upon Hooker's centre, each time with fresh troops, and each time were thrown back with heavy loss. Hooker's ammunition began to give out. Longstreet made a furious charge upon a battery left for a moment without support, and captured four guns, but was again driven off. So the tide of battle ebbed and flowed until between four and five in the afternoon, when Kearney came upon the field. For six hours he had been struggling up along a single muddy road, encumbered with other troops and trains. He outranked Hooker, who gladly left the command to him, his wearied regiments resting from the fight. Kearney dashed impetuously forward, and, after a sharp contest, drove the enemy back, gained his rear, and won the fight on this part of the scene. Darkness now closed in, and the regiments bivouacked on the field which they had won.

Toward the close of the day the action had stretched to the right of Fort Magruder. Peck's brigade, which had come up, took position there, and held its ground against all attacks. Hancock had come up still farther to the right. He took possession of two redoubts, which were weakly held, and repeatedly asked for re-enforcements to enable him to advance and take another redoubt which commanded the plain between him and Fort Magruder. Sumner twice ordered this re-enforcement, and twice countermanded the order at the moment of execution. At length, the request being repeated, Sumner ordered him to fall back; but Hancock deferred the execution of this order to the last moment. He was unwilling to lose the advantage which he had gained. The enemy began to press hard upon him. Feigning to retreat slowly, he suddenly turned upon them, poured in some terrific volleys of musketry, and then giving the word, "Now, gentlemen, the bayonet!" charged with his whole brigade. The enemy broke into utter rout, leaving behind more than 500 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Hancock's loss was only 31. This brilliant charge, just in the dusk, closed the battle. The entire Federal loss was 2228; of these, 456 were killed, 1400 wounded, and 372 missing. More than two thirds of this was suffered by Hooker's division, which lost, in all, 1575, of whom 338 were killed, 992 wounded, and 335 missing. Nearly all of the prisoners were taken on the night preceding the battle. They were men who had straggled into the woods, and, not being able to extricate themselves in the darkness, were captured by the enemy's pickets. The loss of the Confederates must have been larger. During the greater part of the fight they attacked with superior numbers, and were flung back by cannon and musketry. Hooker believed that the killed of the enemy was double his own. The next day more than eight hundred of his wounded were found in the hospitals at Williamsburg; others were distributed among private houses, and all the available tenements in the vicinity of the battle-field were filled with them.

McClellan had remained at Yorktown to superintend the preparations for sending Franklin's troops up the river. He sent aids to observe operations in front. It was past noon before he heard any thing to lead him to suppose that there was any thing occurring beyond a simple affair of a rear guard. At one o'clock came a message importing that all was not going well in front. Soon Sprague, the governor of Rhode Island, who was acting as aid to the chief of artillery, dashed up, reported how matters stood in front, and urged him to go up there at once. "I thought they could take care of that little matter," replied McClellan; but promised to go up.<sup>1</sup> He reached Sumner's head-quarters between four and five, took the command in person, and, hearing heavy firing toward the right, ordered three brigades in that direction; but, before the orders could be executed, Hancock had decided the day on that part of the field.<sup>2</sup>

Night put an end to the contest, and the wearied troops slept upon the muddy field, many without food, and all without shelter. The enemy took advantage of the darkness to decamp, leaving their dead and wounded behind them. During the night McClellan sent word to Heintzelman not to renew the attack in the morning, as he was about to make other dispositions, and would send re-enforcements. The Confederates, making no delay at Williamsburg, pushed on up the Peninsula for Richmond. A few cavalry were sent after them, who succeeded in picking up some prisoners and four or five guns which had stuck fast in the mud.

The day after the battle four divisions were sent in transports up the York River. They landed at West Point. The landing had just been effected, when, at nine o'clock on the morning of the 7th, an unsuccessful attempt was made to drive them off by a body of Confederates who had got thus



THE WHITE HOUSE.

far on their retreat. A sharp musketry fire was kept up till afternoon, when the Confederates withdrew, and kept on their retreat. The Federal loss in this affair was 49 killed, and 154 wounded and missing. After two or three days' delay at Williamsburg, the army commenced its slow march up the Peninsula, and on the 16th of May the head-quarters were established at the White House, on the Pamunkey, one of the two streams which unite to form the York River. This place is thirty miles north of Williamsburg, and twenty-five east of Richmond, with which it is connected by the Richmond and York River Railroad.<sup>3</sup>

Johnston had determined to abandon Yorktown some days before the evacuation took place. On the 28th of April he wrote to Tattall, the commander of the Virginia, "The enemy continues his cautious policy. The preparations for opening fire upon Yorktown seem to be nearly completed. His great superiority in artillery will probably enable him to dismount our guns very soon." He suggested to Tattall that possibly he might make a dash past Fortress Monroe and destroy the Federal transports in the York River. On the 10th of May Johnston wrote: "Finding it necessary to abandon this position, and regarding the evacuation of Norfolk as a consequence of that measure, I have directed Major General Huger to withdraw his troops from that place and remove to Richmond. I have also desired Captain Lee to abandon the navy yard, and report to the Secretary of the Navy in Richmond, saving as much as possible of the public property, and destroying, if practicable, what he can not save." Norfolk had been held by Huger with 15,000 men. The greater part of these went toward Richmond almost simultaneously with the evacuation of Yorktown. A few thousand were left behind until the last moment. Intelligence of this reached Fortress Monroe on the 8th. Wool, with a few thousand men, set out to take possession. They approached Norfolk on the afternoon of the 10th. At the outskirts they were met by the mayor and a deputation of citizens with a white flag, and bearing a letter from Huger, stating that, being unable to hold the city, he had surrendered it into the hands of the civil authorities. The mayor said that he had come to surrender the city into the hands of the United States, and to ask protection for the persons and property of the citizens. This was assured by Wool. The general, Mr. Chase, the Secretary of the Treasury, who had accompanied the expedition, and the mayor, then entered a carriage and drove to the City Hall to inaugurate the new government. Wool issued a proclamation appointing General Viele military governor, who was to see that no peaceable citizen should be molested, and that no United States soldier entered the city without a written permit from the commanding officer of his regiment. Wool then left the city. A crowd of people assembled. The mayor made a speech. He said that if the question

<sup>1</sup> Sprague's testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 570.

<sup>2</sup> De Joinville says (p. 55): "The success of Hancock had been decisive, and the reserves brought up by the general-in-chief, charging upon the field, settled the affair." McClellan (*Report*, 184) shows that the contest was over before these re-enforcements could come up. Estvan, who scarcely ever tells the truth even by accident, and whose work is only worthy of notice because others have repeated his statements, brings McClellan personally into the action. He says (*War Pictures*, 279): "Suddenly a shout of a thousand voices broke upon the ear like the rushing of a mighty wind from the wood. What did this portend? There was little time left for us to speculate. Charge after charge was made upon our men, and the news then spread that McClellan, with the main body of his army, had arrived on the field of battle. This explained the loud cheers from the wood. Our men could no longer stand their ground. McClellan in person led on his troops into the midst of the fire. Magruder, now finding that the battle was lost, ordered a retreat to be sounded."

<sup>3</sup> The place derived its name from a plain white wooden house, occupying the site of the residence of Mrs. Custis, afterward the wife of Washington. This, as well as Arlington House on the Potomac, had fallen to the daughter of George Washington Parke Custis, the son of Martha Washington by her former husband. She was now the wife of General Robert E. Lee. The family of Lee had been residing at the White House, but had, just before the arrival of the Federal troops, removed to the neighborhood of Richmond. Mrs. Lee left upon the wall the following note: "Northern soldiers, who profess to honor the memory of Washington, forbear to desecrate the home of his first married life, the property of his wife, now owned by her descendants.—A Granddaughter of Mrs. Washington." Under this one of the Union guards wrote: "A Northern officer has protected your property, in sight of the enemy, and at the request of your overseer." This residence was burned at the close of June, when the Federal forces abandoned West Point.







*The Mayor & Councils of Norfolk meeting the Federal forces under a flag of truce*



*The Council tree*



*Hoisting the old flag in the Custom-house*



*Entering the City of Norfolk*



*Burning of the Confederate Navy Yard*

THE OCCUPATION OF NORFOLK.

had rested with him he would have defended the city to the last man, but the government had decided differently; the citizens of Norfolk had been deserted by their friends, and all that the city authorities could do was to make the best terms possible. The Union commander had granted all that had been asked, and now the citizens should yield, and abstain from acts of violence and disorder. The crowd dispersed, having given three cheers for Davis and three groans for Lincoln. No notice was taken of this impudent proceeding. The loss of Norfolk, as has already been related, involved the destruction of the iron-clad Virginia.<sup>1</sup> A court of inquiry decided that this was unnecessary. A naval court-martial was convened, before which Tattall was arraigned. The court honorably acquitted him, affirming that, on the day before the evacuation of Norfolk, a council was held by order of the Secretary of the Navy to determine what should be done with the Virginia; that Tattall was in favor of passing Fortress Monroe and taking the ship into York River, or of running to Savannah with her, but that he was overruled by the council, who directed that she should remain on this side of Fortress Monroe for the protection of Norfolk and Richmond; that she was

<sup>1</sup> Ante, page 257.

lightened in order to enable her to go up to a safe place on the James; that she could not be lightened sufficiently to enable her to reach that place, but was thereby rendered vulnerable;<sup>1</sup> that all which was necessary for the enemy to do was to keep a watch upon her until her provisions were exhaust-

<sup>1</sup> NOTE ON THE VIRGINIA.—The report of the trial of Tattall enables us to correct and supplement our account (ante, page 250) of the Virginia. It shows that she was far less formidable than was supposed. The iron plating of the roof or shield was only four inches thick. The "knuckle" formed by the projection of the roof beyond the hull was twenty inches under water. Below this the hull was covered for a depth of two feet by three layers of iron, each an inch thick and eight inches broad, put on horizontally. She then drew between twenty and twenty-two feet of water. After her encounter with the Monitor she was put on the dock, with the purpose of putting additional plates two inches thick perpendicularly upon the hull; the iron, however, gave out before all her whole length could be covered. These additional plates reached about one hundred and eighty feet from the bows, leaving sixty feet at the stern with only three inches. Four shots from the Monitor struck within a space of eight feet. A rafter was cracked and the plates somewhat broken, but there was no serious injury. When the additional plating was put on she drew twenty-two feet forward and twenty-three feet aft. Her engines were very defective. They failed several times, and the engineer said they were liable to fail at any moment. It was often found difficult to start, or to reverse them. In the opinion of Buchanan, her first commander, she was not seaworthy, not being sufficiently buoyant, and would founder in a common sea; the moment a sea struck her it would wash into her ports; she was only fitted for harbor defense. Catesby Jones, her executive officer, thought her no match for the Monitor, if properly handled; the Monitor ought to have sunk her in fifteen minutes; one of the smallest tugs might have disabled her rudder and propeller.



ed, and then capture her; and that, under these circumstances, the only alternative of her commander was to abandon and destroy the ship, as he had done. The navy yard at Gosport was destroyed by fire, and an attempt, only partly successful, was made to blow up the great stone dry dock. All the batteries which guarded the James River were abandoned, and the water approach was open to within eight miles of Richmond.

Four days after the destruction of the Virginia, the Galena, Monitor, and two gun-boats were repulsed at Fort Darling on Drewry's Bluff. Among those who defended the fort were the crew of the Virginia.<sup>1</sup> The boats had been put to a work for which they were not adapted. Goldsborough urged McClellan to send a force to capture that fort, which was of no great strength.<sup>2</sup> He offered to lead the naval attack in person. If the fort should be captured, he said that the vessels could remove the obstructions above, go straight to the city, and shell it to surrender. McClellan considered the proposal, and concluded to defer a decision until he had got his army on the other side of the Chickahominy.<sup>3</sup> The truth was, that, in consequence of his urgent representations, an order had just been given to McDowell which rendered it necessary to move on the basis of the York River rather than on the far preferable line of the James.

Yorktown had scarcely been evacuated when McClellan again began to represent his force as wholly inferior to that of the enemy. On the evening of the battle of Williamsburg he telegraphed, "I find Joe Johnston in front of me in strong force, probably greater a good deal than my own, and very strongly intrenched." Five days later, Williamsburg having been abandoned, he writes from "three miles beyond Williamsburg," "I regard it as certain that the enemy will meet us with all his force on or near the Chickahominy. They can concentrate many more men than I have. Every effort should be made to re-enforce me with all the disposable forces in Eastern Virginia. If I am not re-enforced, it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers strongly intrenched. I do not think it will be possible for me to bring more than 70,000 men upon the field of battle." Four days later he said, "I can not bring into actual battle more than 80,000 men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in position, probably intrenched, a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers. I beg that you will cause this army to be re-enforced without delay by all the disposable troops of the government. I ask for every man that the government can send me. Any commander of the re-enforcements whom your excellency may designate will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I may heretofore have addressed to you on the subject. I will fight the enemy, whatever their force may be, with whatever force I may have, and I firmly believe that we shall beat them; but our triumph should be made decisive and complete." He desired that these re-enforcements should be sent by water, because their arrival would be more safe and certain, and because he would then be free to rest his army on the James River whenever the navigation of that stream should be opened.

To these repeated and urgent requests, the President replied on the 18th that he was unwilling to uncover the capital entirely; that, even if this were prudent, the junction could be more speedily made by a land march than by water; but, in order to increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond, McDowell, whose forces had been augmented to 35,000 or 40,000 men, would march by the shortest route, and, keeping himself always in a position to save the capital from any possible attack, he should so operate as to put his left wing in communication with McClellan's right, which should be extended to the north of Richmond. The communication between the forces might be established either north or south of the Pamunkey River. After this had been effected, McDowell was to be under the orders of McClellan; but he must give no orders which could put McDowell out of position to cover Washington. This definitive order decided the plan of the operations against Richmond.<sup>4</sup>

The conduct of Johnston evinced that he was at no time in command of the powerful force attributed to him. He had made no attempt to interfere with the siege operations against Yorktown, but abandoned his strong works as soon as he found that they were likely to be assailed. He gave up his strong lines at Williamsburg after fighting just long enough to enable his trains to escape, abandoning his sick and wounded. He pursued his retreat to Richmond, making no attempt to impede or harass the enemy beyond the slight attack upon a single division which was for a moment isolated at West Point. Instead of 150,000 or 160,000 men, it is hardly possible that his strength could have exceeded 50,000 or 60,000.

The approach of the Federal army occasioned a fearful panic at Richmond. Congress adjourned in haste on the 21st of April. The Confederate officials sent off their wives and children, and packed up the government archives for transportation to Columbia. Packing-boxes and trunks became the staple wares, and encumbered all the sidewalks; the railway dépôts were crowded with baggage, the trains thronged with refugees. The panic increased as successive tidings came that Yorktown had been evacuated, Williamsburg abandoned, Norfolk surrendered, the Merrimac destroyed, and the Federal gun-boats were ascending the James River. The only obstruction to their ascent was the incomplete fort at Drewry's Bluff, and the unfinished barrier just above it. The Secretary of the Navy advertised for timber to construct new defenses; schooners loaded with plaster and guano were seized and sunk in the river; sharpshooters were called upon to organize into companies to line the banks. One enthusiastic individual

offered to be one of a hundred to board the whole fleet of gun-boats and take them at all hazards. The state Legislature resolved that the city should be defended to the last extremity, "if such defense is in accordance with the views of the President," and appointed a committee to wait upon him to learn his intentions. He said that it would be the effort of his life to defend Virginia and to cover the capital; he had never thought of abandoning the state; if Richmond should fall, which he did not anticipate, that would be no reason for withdrawing the army from Virginia; the war could be carried on in the state for twenty years. Notwithstanding his confident words, he was worn and haggard. His family feared for his life. He lost no time in putting his house in order. He was baptized at home one Tuesday morning, and was confirmed in church an hour later. His family should go to Raleigh; they only feared that they had delayed too long already. The 16th was appointed as a fast-day. On the day when the proclamation was issued, tidings had just come of the capture of New Orleans. The evacuation of Yorktown and the abandonment of Norfolk had been determined upon. Well might the proclamation declare that "recent disaster has spread gloom over the land, and sorrow sits at the hearth-stones of our countrymen." In the interim Norfolk had been seized, and the Virginia, "the iron diadem of the South, worth an army of 50,000 men," destroyed. On the day before the fast, Letcher, the governor, summoned all who were willing to unite in defending the capital of the state to assemble at the City Hall. He was there, in the vinous condition which was his wont, and made a speech. "I have been told," he said, "that the duty of surrendering the city would devolve upon the President, the mayor, or myself. I answered, if the demand is made upon me, with the alternative to surrender or be shelled, I shall reply, Bombard and be damned!" Mayo, the mayor, followed in the same vein. "When the citizens of Richmond," he said, "demand of me to surrender the capital of Virginia and of the Confederacy to the enemy, they must find some other man to fill my place. I will resign the mayoralty; and when that other man elected in my stead shall deliver up the city, I hope I have physical courage and strength enough left to shoulder a musket and go into the ranks." The governor ordered all the stores and other places of business, except such manufacturing establishments as were engaged in fulfilling contracts for the government, to be closed at two o'clock in the afternoon, so that all persons should have time for drill and discipline, and directed the militia to assemble at three, every day excepting Sunday, to be drilled for the four hours until sunset. The city was thronged with refugees from the border states, the dregs of the Baltimore mob predominating. A few of these, with nothing to lose, held a public meeting and passed resolutions devoting Richmond to flames as soon as the Union troops should enter it. A portion of the city press clamored for this. "To lose Richmond," said the Dispatch, "is to lose Virginia, and to lose Virginia is to lose the key to the Southern Confederacy. Virginians, Marylanders! ye who have rallied to her defense, would it not be better to fall in her streets than to basely abandon them? The loss of Richmond in Europe would sound like the loss of Paris or London, and the moral effect will hardly be less. It is better that Richmond should fall as the capital of the Confederacy than that Richmond exist the dépôt of the hireling horde of the North. The next few days may decide the fate of Richmond. It is either to remain the capital of the Confederacy, or be turned over to the Federal government as a Yankee conquest. The capital is to be either secured or lost—it may be feared not temporarily—and with it Virginia. Life, death, and wounds are nothing if we only can be saved from the fate of a captured capital and a humiliated Confederacy. Let the government act—let the people act. There is time yet. If fate comes to its worst, let the ruins of Richmond be its most lasting monument."

McClellan's advance toward the panic-stricken city was slow. The distance from Williamsburg was a little more than forty miles. On the 8th the troops collected there began to move. In two days nineteen miles had been gained. On the 13th the army was concentrated near West Point. On the 14th and 15th rain fell. On the 15th and 16th two divisions set out for the White House, five miles farther. So bad were the roads, that the train of one division occupied thirty-six hours in passing this distance. About this time two provisional army corps were organized—the Fifth, consisting of the divisions of Porter and Sykes, and the reserved artillery, was placed under Fitz John Porter; the Sixth, consisting of Franklin's division and that of Smith, which was detached from Keyes's corps, was placed under Franklin. On the 16th headquarters were at the White House; on the 19th five miles beyond. On the 20th more rain fell, but the advanced light troops reached the banks of the Chickahominy. On the 21st the main body of the army was near that stream, which was henceforth to be historic.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the panic in Richmond, see POLLARD, i., 322-325; ii., 28-34, 309-311. *Reb. Rec.*, iv., 136, 424-426. An intercepted letter, written on the 7th of May by a niece of Jefferson Davis, resident in his family, furnishes some striking details. She writes: "I am ready to sink with despair. There is a probability of General Jackson's army falling back on Richmond; and, in view of this, no lady is allowed to go up on the railroad to Gordonsville, for fear, if allowed to one, that many others would wish to do it, which would incommode the army. General Johnston is falling back from the Peninsula or Yorktown, and Uncle Jeff. thinks we had better go to a safer place than Richmond. If Johnston falls back as far as Richmond, all our troops from Gordonsville and Swift Run Gap will also fall back to this place and make one desperate stand against McClellan. The Yankees are approaching Richmond from three different directions—from Fredericksburg, Harrisonburg, and Yorktown. Uncle Jeff. is miserable. He tries to be cheerful and bear up against such a continuation of troubles, but I fear he can not live long. Our reverses distressed him so much, and he is so weak and feeble, it makes my heart ache to look at him. What a blow the fall of New Orleans was! It liked to have set us all crazy here. Everybody looks distressed, and the cause of the Confederacy looks drooping and sinking. We all leave here to-morrow morning for Raleigh. Three gun-boats are in the river on their way to the city, and may probably reach here in a few hours, so we have no longer any time to delay. I only hope we have not delayed too long already. I am afraid that Richmond will fall into the hands of the enemy, as there is no way to keep back the gun-boats. James River is so high that all obstructions are in danger of being washed away; so there is no help for the city. She will either submit, or else be shelled. Uncle Jeff. was confirmed last Tuesday, in St. Paul's Church, by Bishop Johns. He was baptized in the morning, before church."—POLLARD, ii., 31. <sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 187, 188.


<sup>1</sup> *Tattnall's Trial*, p. 89.

<sup>2</sup> POLLARD, i., 324; ii., 30, says that it mounted only four guns.

<sup>3</sup> Goldsborough's testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 633.

<sup>4</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 191-195; *Com. Rep.*, 324-329. "Had McDowell joined me by water," says McClellan, "I could have approached Richmond from the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the army massed in one body instead of being necessarily divided by that stream."—*Report*, 195.





THE MARCH FROM WILLIAMSBURG.





COLD HARBOR.—MCCLLELLAN'S HEAD-QUARTERS.

## CHAPTER XIX.

## THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

II. ON THE SHENANDOAH AND THE CHICKAHOMINY.<sup>1</sup>

The Chickahominy.—McClellan's Advance.—Correspondence between McClellan and the President.—McDowell ordered to move.—The Order suspended.—Jackson's Operations in the Valley of the Shenandoah.—Retreats from Winchester.—Joined by Ewell.—Battle of Kernstown.—The Order to McDowell.—Battle of Bull Pasture.—Position of the Union Forces.—Battle of Front Royal.—Retreat of Banks to the Potomac.—Crosses the River.—Panic at Washington.—Fremont's Movements.—Battle of Lewisburg.—McDowell ordered to follow Jackson.—He sends Shields reluctantly.—Jackson in Peril.—He Retreats up the Shenandoah.—Eludes Fremont and Shields.—The Pursuit by Fremont.—Battle of Cross Keys.—Battle of Port Republic.—End of the Pursuit.—Results of Jackson's Expedition.—The Union Army on the Chickahominy.—Battle of Hanover Court-house.—Elation of McClellan.—Condition of Johnston.—The Union Left across the Chickahominy.—Battle of the Seven Pines: Johnston's Plan.—His Statement of his Force.—The Storm at Richmond.—Casey driven back.—Conduct of his Division.—Keyes and Kearney forced beyond the Seven Pines.—New Line formed.—Close of the Action.—Battle of Fair Oaks: Sumner crosses the Chickahominy.—The first Action, May 31.—The second Action, June 1.—Repulses of the Confederates.—Hooker's Reconnoissance.—The Losses.—Results of the Battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks.—What might have been accomplished.—McClellan and McDowell.—Bridges and Intrenchments.—Lee takes Command.—His Antecedents and Character.—Resigns his Commission.—Enters the Southern Army.—Fortifies Richmond.—His Plan on assuming Command.—Stuart's Expedition.—McClellan ready.—Affair of King's School-house.—McClellan's Dispatches.—The Evening before the Seven Days.

THE Chickahominy, rising in swampy uplands northwest of Richmond, flows southeastwardly for about fifty miles, parallel with and midway between the James and the York rivers. It then turns sharply to the south, and, after a winding course of twenty miles, falls into the James forty miles below Richmond and ten west of Williamsburg. Toward its mouth it becomes a considerable stream, navigable by small steamers for twenty or thirty miles. The military operations of the Peninsular campaign embraced that part of the stream between Bottom's Bridge on the south, where it is crossed by the Williamsburg road, and Meadow Bridge, fifteen miles to the north, where it is crossed by the Fredericksburg Railroad. Richmond lies nearly opposite the centre of this line, about six miles from the Chickahominy at its nearest approach.

Between these points the river flows through a belt of wooded swamp three or four hundred yards wide. The swamp is bordered on both sides by low bottom lands sloping gently up to the level of the surrounding country. The entire breadth of the interval is about a mile, in some places a little more, in others a little less. The tops of the trees rise to the level of the uplands, screening the view from one side to the other. In dry summer weather the stream is a mere rivulet, flowing sluggishly through the swamp, sometimes in a single channel, oftener in several. A moderate shower fills the channel, which is about a dozen yards wide and four feet deep. A heavy shower or a continuous rain-fall, causing a rise of two feet more, floods the swamp and overflows the bottom lands. These bottoms are intersected by deep ditches, and even when not overflowed are so soft as to be impassable for cavalry and artillery.

The swamp and stream had been crossed by several bridges. All of those in front of Richmond had been destroyed by Johnston when he fell back from Yorktown and Williamsburg, and the approaches to them were com-

manded by batteries on the southern side. Besides the bridges were a few fords, approached by side-roads, over which a pedestrian could in dry weather make his way over swamp and stream. But this season had been unusually rainy. The channel was always full to the brim, and every shower flooded swamp and bottoms. Infantry might possibly have picked their way across in loose order, but cavalry would have sunk to the horses' girths, and artillery and trains beyond their axles, in the spongy soil. For an army the Chickahominy was impassable except by bridges, and these, as experience soon proved, must be built above the level of the highest floods, and provided with long approaches across the swamp. The best places for the bridges were covered by the batteries of the enemy, and other points had to be chosen. Bridges of boats and pontoons were out of the question. The soil was too soft and spongy to afford a foundation for piles. It only remained to build the bridges upon trestles, the approaches being embanked or corduroyed. As a military obstacle, the narrow Chickahominy, with its bordering swamps and bottoms, liable to overflow at any moment, was more formidable than a broad river which could be crossed by boats, or over which a pontoon bridge could be thrown in a few hours.<sup>1</sup>

In moving from Williamsburg the right wing of the Federal army had kept to the north, striking the Chickahominy at New Bridge, directly in front of Richmond; the left wing, keeping to the south, had reached the river at Bottom's Bridge, thirteen miles below. On the 22d of May, Stoneman's advance guard of cavalry and Franklin's corps, on the right, were near New Bridge, with Porter at supporting distance in the rear; Keyes, on the left, was at Bottom's Bridge, with Heintzelman as a support; between Keyes and Porter was Sumner, connecting the right with the left. The head-quarters were established at Cold Harbor, just in the rear of the head of the right wing. The bulk of the enemy were across the Chickahominy, on the main road from New Bridge to Richmond; but a detachment had been left at Mechanicsville, on the north bank, four miles above.<sup>2</sup> This was brushed away on the 24th by the artillery, which forced it across the bridge, which was then destroyed.

The approaches to Richmond from below were only slightly held. Bottom's Bridge had been demolished, but close by was a practicable ford, which had been seized on the 20th, when a division crossed the river and occupied the opposite high ground. Naglee made a long reconnoissance in force down the right side of the Chickahominy, taking almost the same route by which, five weeks later, the Union army retreated to the James. He followed this by another reconnoissance directly toward Richmond, going beyond the Seven Pines, only six miles from the city. In neither reconnoissance was any serious resistance encountered, or the enemy found in force. Keyes's corps was then sent across the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge, with orders to take up a position near the Seven Pines. Heintzelman's corps was also sent across; and he, being the senior officer, was placed in command of all the forces then on the south side of the stream.<sup>3</sup> Johnston, in his retreat, had strangely neglected to obstruct the York River Railroad, running directly from Richmond to the White House on the Pamunkey. The bridge by which the railroad crossed the Chickahominy was indeed destroyed, but so little other damage was done that by the 26th the road was in operation up to the river, and the bridge nearly reconstructed.


<sup>1</sup> Since the date of note <sup>1</sup>, p. 328, we have secured the Confederate "Reports of the Operations of the Army of Northern Virginia, from June, 1862, to and including the Battle of Fredericksburg, Dec. 13, 1862." They include the reports of Jackson and his subordinate officers of the operations in the Valley of the Shenandoah, and Lee's report of his operations from the Seven Days' Battles to the Battle of Fredericksburg. There are also about 350 reports of subordinate officers, the whole forming two large volumes. These will be cited as "*Lee's Rep.*;" the references being throughout to the pages of the edition printed by order of the Confederate Congress at Richmond in 1864.

<sup>1</sup> For the character of the Chickahominy as a military obstacle, see especially *Art. Op.*, 19, 20; *McC. Rep.*, 189; also both works *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> Strictly speaking, the banks of the Chickahominy are the northwest and the southeast. In reports and documents they are variously denoted as the *south* or *west*, and the *north* or *east*. The side toward Richmond, being the right looking down the stream, will be called by us the *right* or *south*; the opposite one, the *left* or *north*.

<sup>3</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 186-188: 213, 214.





McClellan still continued to urge that his force should be re-enforced; especially that McDowell's whole corps should be sent to him at once by water. "My pickets," he writes,<sup>1</sup> "are within a mile of Bottom's Bridge, and scouts are within a quarter of a mile. I am advancing on the other roads. The indications are that the enemy intend fighting at Richmond. Our policy seems to be to concentrate every thing there. They hold central positions, and will seek to meet us while divided. I think we are committing a great military error in having so many independent columns. The great battle should be fought in mass; then divide if necessary." Sound advice: if he had himself acted upon it two weeks later at Fair Oaks, or six weeks later at Cold Harbor, his campaign would have had a different termination.

Three days later<sup>2</sup> he transmitted what the President calls his "long dispatch." It had been raining, and "rain on this soil soon makes the roads incredibly bad for army transportation;" yet this was the very region where he had insisted, not four months before, that "the roads are passable at all seasons of the year."<sup>3</sup> He had been a mile across the Chickahominy, the enemy being about half a mile in front. All the bridges were destroyed, and "the enemy were in force on every road leading to Richmond, within a mile or two west of the stream." Yet on the previous day they were not in great force opposite Bottom's Bridge,<sup>4</sup> upon the Williamsburg road; and on the same day Naglee had made his reconnoissance down the right bank for a dozen miles, crossing other roads, without serious resistance, or finding "the enemy in force;" and on the third, fourth, and fifth days after, "a very gallant reconnoissance was pushed by Naglee with his brigade beyond the Seven Pines," seven or eight miles beyond the river, meeting "considerable opposition," but none which his single brigade could not overcome.<sup>5</sup> Thus one of the main approaches to Richmond by way of the Williamsburg road and the York River Railroad for eight miles beyond the stream and within six of the city, was not, for a full week, "held by the enemy in force." All accounts, McClellan continued, represented the numbers of the enemy as greatly exceeding his own, and every thing gave positive assurance that the approach to Richmond involved a desperate battle between the opposing forces. All his divisions were moving toward the foe, and he should advance steadily and carefully, attacking in such a manner as to employ his greatest force. He regretted the state of things in McDowell's command; he had no means of knowing when he would start, what were his means of transportation, or when he would be in the vicinity of the Chickahominy; but there was little hope that he would come by land in time for the coming battle. He was, moreover, not sure that he comprehended the orders which had been given to McDowell; he wished that the extent of his own authority should be clearly defined, and hoped that McDowell would be placed under his orders, he himself being strictly responsible for the closest observance of the President's instructions; and, above all things, let McDowell be sent at once by water. "But, in any event," he concluded, "I shall fight with all the skill, caution, and determination that I possess, and I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my government, or that it may close my career."

To this the President replied on the same day, "You will have just such

control of McDowell and of his forces as you indicate;" adding that McDowell could go by land quicker than by water; by land "he can reach you in five days after starting, whereas by water he will not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience."<sup>1</sup>

On the morning of the 24th McClellan received a dispatch from the President announcing that McDowell would soon be with him. The President had left McDowell's camp the evening before. Shields's command was there, but so worn that he could not move till Monday, the 26th; but both he and McDowell said that they would positively move on the morning of that day. Meanwhile Anderson, the Confederate general who was opposing McDowell's advance, had as his line of supply and retreat the road to Richmond. Could not McClellan, almost as well as not, while he was building the Chickahominy bridges, send a force from his right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the two forks of the Pamunkey, and intercept the enemy's retreat? If he could do that, he would prevent the army now opposed to him from receiving an accession of nearly fifteen thousand men, and if he saved the bridges he would secure a line of railroad for supplies besides the one he then had. The President closed by reiterating, "You will have command of General McDowell after he joins you precisely as you indicated in your last dispatch to me of the 21st." There was in this dispatch one sentence ominous of evil: "We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to us of a regiment of infantry and two companies of cavalry, and putting Banks in some peril."<sup>2</sup>

McClellan was greatly elated by this dispatch. McDowell's forty thousand would soon be added to his command, giving him a force "sufficiently strong to overpower the large army confronting him." His elation was brief. On the afternoon of the same day he received another dispatch from the President announcing that the order for McDowell to march toward Richmond had been suspended.<sup>3</sup>

The reason for this sudden change of order is to be found in the bold and skillful operations of "Stonewall Jackson," one hundred and fifty miles from McClellan, and half as far from McDowell. In the previous autumn Jackson had been assigned to the command of the Confederate forces in the Valley of the Shenandoah. During the winter and early spring his force was about ten thousand men, but his numbers were apparently doubled by the celerity of his movements. "The rapidity of his marches," says a Confederate writer, "is something portentous. He is heard of by the enemy at one point, and before they can make up their minds to follow him he is off at another. He keeps so constantly in motion that he never has a sick-list, and no need of hospitals. He will assuredly make his mark in this war, for his untiring industry and eternal watchfulness must tell upon a numerous enemy, unacquainted with the country, and incommenced by large baggage trains."<sup>4</sup> His operations were annoying rather than important, except as they compelled the Federal government to keep a considerable force to watch him; but by hard service his command was brought into a state of great efficiency.

Simultaneously with Johnston's abandonment of Manassas in March, Jackson fell back up the valley from Winchester toward Staunton, followed by Shields, with a division of Banks's Fifth Corps. This retreat, which was kept up as far as Newmarket, brought Jackson within fifty miles of Johnston, who lay near Gordonsville, awaiting the development of McClellan's plans. Shields undertook to decoy Jackson from joining Johnston. He made a feigned retreat back to Winchester, marching his whole force thirty miles in one day. The ruse was successful. Jackson turned to pursue. Banks, who thought it impossible that Jackson would venture to attack him, marched his whole corps, with the exception of Shields's division, toward Centreville. Shields, who still hoped that Jackson would venture an attack, secretly posted the bulk of his division in a secluded position two miles from Winchester. The people of that town, ignorant of this, reported to Jackson that the place was evacuated except by a small rear-guard. On the evening of March 22, Jackson's cavalry made a dash into Winchester, driving in Shields's pickets. The attack was repulsed after a sharp skirmish, in which Shields was severely wounded, his arm being broken by the fragment of a shell. Banks, confident that Jackson would not renew the engagement, set off next morning for Washington; but Shields, anticipating a strong attack, notwithstanding his wound, prepared to receive it. The assault began at noon with a sharp artillery fire, which met with a strong reply. At three o'clock Tyler's brigade charged upon the Confederate batteries on the left, and captured them. Then followed a general and successful assault upon the Confederate right and centre. The Confederates retreated, leaving their dead and wounded behind. Banks returned next morning, and pursued the retreating enemy thirty miles to Woodstock, ceasing the pursuit only when his men were thoroughly exhausted. The Federal loss in this engagement was 103 killed and 441 wounded. Of the Confederates, 270 were reported to have been buried on the battle-field, and many others by the inhabitants. Their entire loss was estimated at 500 killed and 1000 wounded.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Com. Rep.*, 329.

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 199.

<sup>3</sup> "In consequence of General Banks's critical position. I have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Harper's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's force and a part of General McDowell's in their rear."—*McC. Rep.*, 200.

<sup>4</sup> *Southern Generals*, 172.

<sup>5</sup> The Federals usually style this action, fought March 23, the Battle of Winchester. The Confederates more properly call it the Battle of Kernstown, from the hamlet near which it was fought. Shields states his own force to have been 6000 infantry, 750 cavalry, and 24 pieces of artillery. He estimates the force of the enemy at 9000 infantry, 1500 cavalry, and 36 guns.—(*Reb. Rec.*, iv., 328-343.) Pollard says that the Confederate forces amounted to 6000 men, besides Ashley's cavalry, while Shields was 18,000 strong. "The enemy," he says, "was left in possession of the field of battle, two guns, four caissons, and about 300 prisoners. Our loss was about 100 killed,

<sup>1</sup> May 18; *Com. Rep.*, 327.

<sup>2</sup> May 21; *McC. Rep.*, 196-198.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 190.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 213; Naglee's Report, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 81.





JAMES SHIELDS.

This repulse was a severe check to Jackson. He fell back, faintly pursued by Banks, to Harrisonburg, where he remained for three weeks; and then, on the 19th of April, crossed the south fork of the Shenandoah, thus placing himself within supporting distance of Johnston, who, "shutting out his army from all intercourse with the public," held his position behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, the main body being near Gordonsville. Toward the close of April, when the plans of McClellan had become developed, Johnston took the bulk of his forces to the Peninsula, but detached Ewell's division of about ten thousand to the support of Jackson. The junction took place on the last day of April.<sup>1</sup>

In the mean while great changes had been made, and were proposed to be made, in the disposition of the Federal forces in this region. A new Department, called that of the Rappahannock, including the District of Columbia, had been created, the command being assigned to McDowell. Shields's division was withdrawn from Banks and attached to McDowell, who, thus strengthened, was ordered on the 17th of May to join McClellan before Richmond, but still to keep himself in a position to cover Washington.<sup>2</sup> Banks, who had followed Jackson as far as Harrisonburg, was at the same time ordered to fall back fifty miles to Strasburg, and there fortify himself. Forces from Fremont's Mountain Department were approaching Jackson's

and probably twice as many wounded; that of the enemy was certainly more than double. The greater portion of our dead left on the field of battle were buried under the direction of the mayor of Winchester. Some fifty citizens collected the dead, dug a great pit on the battle-field, and gently laid the poor fellows in their last resting-place. Scarcely a family in the country but had a relative there."—*Southern History of the War*, i., 281-284.

Shields, in a published letter, congratulated himself that "Jackson and his stone-wall brigade, and all the other brigades accompanying him, will never meet this division again in battle." Yet he adds, somewhat inconsistently, "The enemy's sufferings have been terrible, and such as have nowhere else endured during the war; and yet such were their gallantry and high state of discipline that at no time during the battle or pursuit did they give way to panic. Mount Jackson, and ere by this time, in communication with the main body of the rebel army." In his official report he says: "Jackson, with his supposed invincible stone-wall brigade, were compelled to fall back in disorder upon their reserve. Here they took up a new position for a final stand. A few minutes only did they stand, when they turned disarrayed and fled in disorder."—*Reb. Rec.*, iv., 329-335.

<sup>1</sup> *Southern Generals*, 175, 263, 347.

<sup>2</sup> "Upon being joined by General Shields's division, you will move upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, co-operating with the forces under General McClellan, now threatening Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York Rivers. While seeking to establish, as soon as possible, a communication between your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such a position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces. General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with your left wing, and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Richmond and throwing itself upon your column before the junction of the two armies is effected."—*McC. Rep.*, 195.

position from the direction of Romney. The advance, under Milroy, came along the western side of the Shenandoah Mountains as far as McDowell, a village forty miles southwest of Harrisonburg, which was still occupied by Banks. Here Milroy was attacked, on the 8th of May, by Jackson, and, although re-enforced by Schenck, who had come up just in time with a small re-enforcement, was compelled to retreat after a sharp engagement. In this action, sometimes called that of Bull Pasture, the Confederates sustained the heavier loss, but, having a strong supporting force at hand, though not actually engaged, they gained their point of driving Milroy from the field and capturing a considerable amount of stores.<sup>1</sup> Fremont, with his main body, had been coming down from the same direction. His advance having been thus driven back, he halted at Franklin for fully ten days.

The Federal forces in this region were now so widely scattered as to invite an attack upon some of their severed portions. Banks, stripped of Shields's division, was at Strasburg with barely 6000 men. Fremont was at Franklin, seventy miles away to the southwest, with the Shenandoah Mountains between him and Banks. McDowell was near Fredericksburg, as far to the southeast, just ready to march toward Richmond. A single regiment, and a few companies, 1400 men in all, were at Front Royal under Colonel Kenly; these, with a few at Rectortown, formed the only connection between Banks and McDowell. Jackson, who had concentrated his command at Harrisonburg, was practically nearer each of these bodies than any one of them was to any other. Banks was the nearer and weaker enemy, and Jackson resolved to strike at him. Concentrating his whole command at Newmarket, he marched down the South Fork of the Shenandoah, placing the three ranges of the Massanutten, the North, and the Shenandoah Mountains between himself and Fremont, and struck Kenly at Front Royal at noon on the 23d. The Union force was posted here merely as a protection against guerrilla raids, and was wholly too weak to resist an attack in force. It was swept away after a brave but brief resistance, four fifths being killed or captured.

The Confederates then pushed toward Winchester, hoping to gain the rear of Banks, who was still at Strasburg, and cut off his retreat down the Valley. Banks's position was perilous. To remain at Strasburg was to be surrounded, and either starved out or beaten. An attempt to retreat westward over the mountains would involve the abandonment of his trains at the outset, with the certainty of being attacked on his flanks by a superior force. All that remained for him was to retreat down the Valley, "entering the lists with the enemy in a race or a battle, as he should choose, for the possession of Winchester, the key of the Valley." The distance for each was about equal. At nine o'clock on the morning of the 24th the retreating column was on its march, the train in front. The rear had hardly gone three miles when reports came from the front that the enemy held the roads. The train was sent to the rear, and the troops moved to the front. After a short encounter, the head of the Confederate column was beaten back, and Banks succeeded in reaching Winchester. Before daybreak next morning he was assailed by Jackson with superior and constantly increasing force. After a desultory conflict of five hours, Banks began a hurried retreat toward Martinsburg. Here he halted a couple of hours, and then pushed on for the Potomac, which he reached at Williamsport by sunset. The river was still between him and the pursuing enemy. The ferry was barely sufficient to transport the ammunition train; the ford was occupied by the wagons; the cavalry could wade and swim the stream; but there was no apparent means

<sup>1</sup> Our casualties amounted to 28 killed, 80 severely wounded, 145 slightly wounded, and 3 missing, making a total of 256.—*Schenck's Report*. "The Confederate loss in this action was considerable. Of 350 killed and wounded, nearly two thirds were Georgians. We engaged the enemy with not more than one third of his own numbers, which were about 12,000."—*POLLARD*, ii., 35. But the official reports of Milroy and Schenck give their entire force at 2268, while they believed that the Confederates "brought into action not less than 5000, besides their reserved force of 8000 in the rear."



FRONT ROYAL.





SCENE OF THE BATTLE NEAR FRONT ROYAL.

to get the infantry across. Fortunately, however, a pontoon train had been brought along all the way from Strasburg, and by its aid the infantry were all got across before noon of the next day. "Never," says Banks, "were more grateful hearts in the same number of men than when, at midday on the 26th, we stood on the opposite shore." In this retreat of fifty-three miles Banks lost six or eight hundred men, of whom the greater part were captured. Of his train of 500 wagons he lost 55, besides considerable stores destroyed at Strasburg and Winchester. Banks, some days after, estimated his entire loss at about 900, of whom 38 were known to be killed and 155 wounded, the rest missing.<sup>1</sup>

Jackson reached the river just in time to see his enemy safe on the Maryland side. He rested there for a single day, and had divine service performed in camp. He issued an address to his army congratulating them upon their success in driving the Federal army from the Valley of the Shenandoah, and capturing several thousand prisoners, and an immense quantity of stores and provisions.

This movement of Jackson caused a panic in Washington almost as great as that which the approach of McClellan had occasioned at Richmond. Rumor trebled his force. Geary, who was posted at Manassas Gap, reported that, besides those in pursuit of Banks, there were 10,000 at Front Royal, and as many more at Orleans, all pressing forward in the same direction. Washington was thought to be menaced. "I think," telegraphed the President to McClellan on the 25th, "that the time is near at hand when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job, and come back to the defense of Washington." The Secretary of War telegraphed to the governors of several states that "intelligence from various quarters left no doubt that the enemy in great force were marching toward Washington," and directed them to send all their militia and volunteers for the defense of the capital. Military possession was ordered to be taken of all railroads, and they were directed to hold themselves in readiness to transport troops and munitions to the exclusion of all other business.

Fremont was ordered to move southeastward from Franklin to Harrisonburg, thus throwing himself upon Jackson's rear. On the very day before this order was sent, and at the very hour when Kenly was annihilated at Front Royal, a brigade of Fremont's command, under Colonel Crook, had gained a decided advantage over a superior force of the enemy, under Heth, at Lewisburg, fifty miles to the southwest, across the Alleghany Mountains. Fremont issued a glowing order to his troops, announcing that "the results of this victory would be important," and that "the forces now under his immediate command lacked but the opportunity to emulate the gallantry and share the glory of their comrades of the Army of the Kanawha."<sup>2</sup> The opportunity was not wanting, for at that moment the order was on its way directing him to march against Jackson. Instead of going southeastward to Harrisonburg as ordered, he went northeastward toward Strasburg, making a much longer march, but, as he averred, by a more practicable route, to throw himself upon Jackson's rear.


McDowell was at the same time ordered to lay aside for the present the movement upon Richmond, and to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah, to operate either in conjunction with Fremont or alone against Jackson, and for the relief of Banks. He obeyed the order with a heavy heart. He wrote to the President, "Co-operation between General Fremont and myself to cut off Jackson is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a practical impossibility. I am beyond helping distance of General Banks, and no celerity or vigor will avail as far as he is concerned. The line of the retreat of

the enemy's forces up the Valley is shorter than mine to go against him. It will take a week or ten days for the force to get to the Valley by the route which will give it food and forage, and by that time the enemy will have retired. I shall gain nothing for you there, and shall lose much for you here. It is, therefore, not only on personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the matter, but I feel that it throws us all back; and from Richmond north we shall have all our large masses paralyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accomplished." The President replied, in his simple, earnest way: "I am highly gratified at your alacrity in obeying my order. The change was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or to any one. Every thing now depends upon the celerity and vigor of your movement."<sup>1</sup> McDowell seems not to have dreamed that Jackson would follow Banks up to the Potomac, placing himself, going and returning, almost twice as far from Strasburg as either Fremont or McDowell would have to go to reach that vital point. This remonstrance

was dated on the 24th of May. Nine days after, Jackson, on his retreat, passed through Strasburg, just before the junction of Fremont and Shields, whose division of McDowell's corps was sent to the Valley, was to have been effected. Had either or both of these commands marched with only half the celerity of Jackson in his advance and retreat, the Confederate force would have been shut up in the lower portion of the Valley, with scarcely a possibility of escape.

Jackson perceived the full peril of his situation. Giving his wearied force but a single day's rest, he began his retreat on the 29th, masking the

<sup>1</sup> *Com. Rep.*, 274, 275.



<sup>1</sup> Banks's Report, etc., *Reb. Rec.*, 52-67; 139-141.

<sup>2</sup> *Reb. Rec.*, 141.



movement by a feigned attack upon Harper's Ferry by Ewell's division. On the 30th his whole reunited force was at Winchester, but made no delay there, pushing straight on for Strasburg. On that same day, Fremont, after a hard march up the west side of the Shenandoah Mountains, had crossed this and its outlying range, Hunting Ridge, and was at Wardensville. Next day the advance was pushed forward to the road between Winchester and Strasburg. Jackson had passed that point only a few hours before on the way to Strasburg. Fremont followed, and on the morning of the 1st of June his advance came upon Jackson's rear. A skirmish ensued; but Fremont's advance was checked, and Jackson got clear to Strasburg. Here he was told that Shields had been for forty-eight hours in possession of Front Royal, but had not joined Fremont. He at once inferred that he was marching down the South Fork of the Shenandoah by way of Luray, meaning to cross and get first to Newmarket. Sending a detachment to burn the bridges over the South Fork, Jackson kept rapidly on up the turnpike, harassed by Fremont's pursuing force. So close were they upon him that his only means of escape seemed to be to put the North Fork of the Shenandoah between him and his pursuers. He crossed the stream at Mount Jackson on the 3d, destroying the bridge behind him. This was hardly accomplished when the Federal forces appeared on the opposite bank. It took a whole day to reconstruct the bridge; Jackson had thus secured so much the start, and on the 5th reached Harrisonburg, the point from which he had commenced his adventurous march a fortnight before. Here he made no delay, for Fremont was again close on his rear. He turned to the east toward Port Republic on the North Fork, hoping to cross that before Shields, who was marching more slowly down its east side, could come up. Ashby's cavalry, with some infantry, was left as a rear-guard at Harrisonburg. Colonel Wyndham, of the Union cavalry, making a reconnoissance on the 7th, fell into an ambuscade, and, with a considerable portion of his men, was captured, an infantry skirmish ensued, in which each side suffered some loss. In this skirmish Ashby was killed.

Thus far, owing to the happy accident which enabled him to slip between Fremont and Shields at Strasburg, and to the start gained by the destruction of the bridge at Mount Jackson, the Confederate army had retreated without serious loss. But the two commands of the Federals, each fully equal to his own, were marching in parallel lines about fifteen miles apart, but with the deep South Fork of the Shenandoah, over which all the bridges

below Port Republic had been destroyed, between them. If Shields reached this place first in force, Jackson would be hemmed in. There was now no alternative but to prevent this junction by checking Fremont, and then either out-fighting or out-marching Shields. Ewell, whose division had performed the main part of the fighting in this expedition, was posted at the Cross Keys, midway between Harrisonburg and Port Republic, while Jackson himself kept on four miles farther, to the neighborhood of the latter place.

Ewell's position was strong. In front was a valley and rivulet, with woods on either flank. He was attacked by Fremont on the 8th. The action lasted from eleven in the morning till four in the afternoon, skirmishing and artillery fire being kept up until dark. Ewell held his position during the night, but before dawn was ordered to join Jackson, who was seriously threatened at Port Republic by Shields. In this action Ewell had five brigades of 8000 men, but only 6000 were brought into close action. Fremont's whole force was about 18,000, less than half of whom were brought upon the field. Both Fremont and Ewell assert that they occupied the field of battle, and thus each claims the technical honors of victory. The real advantage was certainly with Ewell. He had checked Fremont's advance, and left Jackson's whole force for another day free to act against Shields.<sup>1</sup>

Port Republic is a forlorn village, situated in the angle formed by North and South Rivers, affluents of the South Fork of the Shenandoah. The South River is a shallow stream easily fordable, the North River crossed by a wooden bridge connecting the town with the Harrisonburg road. Shields's advance had reached this place on the morning of the 8th. A body of cavalry dashed across the South River into the town, and planted a gun opposite the entrance to the bridge. A Confederate brigade crossed, drove them back, and captured the gun, the cavalry falling back three miles to their infantry support. Night closed this skirmish, which was going on simultaneously with the battle at Cross Keys, seven miles distant. By dawn Ewell had joined Jackson, who resolved to throw his whole force across the river and attack Shields, burning the bridge in his rear, so as to prevent Fremont from joining Shields. His whole force was now upon the east side of the South Fork, which ran between him and Fremont. Tyler, who led the advance of Shields, had barely 3000 men. Posting these in a commanding position, covered by a battery of six guns, he awaited the attack. "Several assaults of the enemy were repelled with heavy loss; but a Confederate brigade, marching through a dense forest, charged upon Tyler's left flank, and by a combined assault on front and flank forced him from his position, with the loss of all his guns except one; these were abandoned because the artillery horses had been killed. The retreat was orderly, the enemy pursuing for a number of miles.

Just at the close of the action the force of Fremont appeared on the opposite side of the river, but no attempt was made to cross. Jackson states his loss in this battle at 133 killed, 929 wounded, and 14 missing—1167 in all, of whom nearly two thirds belonged to Ewell's division, which had been also engaged the previous day. In these three days this division lost nearly 1000 men. The Union loss in killed and wounded must have been much smaller, but Jackson claims to have taken 450 prisoners.<sup>2</sup>

Here ended the pursuit of Jackson. Why the forces of Fremont and Shields were not united and brought against Jackson is one of the mysteries of this miserable campaign. On the 8th of June, the day of the battle of Cross Keys, orders were sent from the War Department that Fremont should "take post with his main force near Harrisonburg, to guard against operations of the enemy down the Valley of the Shenandoah;" and Banks, who had meanwhile recrossed the Potomac, should take position at or near Front Royal; and that McDowell, "having first provided adequately for the defense of the City of Washington, and for holding the position at Fredericksburg, should as speedily as possible execute his former instructions to march toward Richmond, whither, indeed, McClellan's division of his army had in the mean while been ordered to go by water."<sup>3</sup> Fremont, instead of stopping at Harrisonburg, fell back in a few days as far as Mount Jackson, leaving his wounded behind; Shields took post at New Market; and Jackson, on the 12th, retired across the South River, where he remained near Weyer's Cave for three days, when he set out to join Lee at Richmond. The object which he had in view had been fully accomplished. With barely 20,000 men he had neutralized McDowell's 40,000, Fremont's 20,000, and driven Banks's 6000 beyond the bounds of the Confederacy, leaving McClellan to confront first Johnston and then Lee before Richmond.

The order of May 24th shut off McClellan from all hope of any immediate support from McDowell's corps, and he proceeded to shape his measures accordingly. The first thing to be done, in his estimation, was to throw a series of bridges across the Chickahominy, in order to enable his whole army to cross at different points. Of these there were eleven, "all long, difficult, and with extensive log-way approaches." The necessity of all these is not apparent, for nearly the whole army was finally passed over by two of them. "The entire army," McClellan affirms, "could probably

<sup>1</sup> Each commander, in his official reports, greatly exaggerates the loss of the other in this battle. Ewell says: "There are good reasons for estimating the loss of the enemy at 2000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. On a part of the field they buried 101 at one spot, 15 at another, and a house containing some of their dead was said to have been burned by them; and this is only a part of their loss."—(*Lee's Rep.*, i., 63.) Fremont, in his report, made next day, says: "The enemy's loss we can not clearly ascertain. He was engaged during the night in carrying off his dead and wounded in wagons. This morning, on our march, 200 of his dead were counted on one field, the greater part being badly mutilated by cannon-shot. Many of his dead were also scattered through the woods, and many have been already buried."—(*Reb. Rec.*, v., 110.) Fremont estimated his own loss at 125 killed and 500 wounded, making no mention of prisoners, of whom, indeed, it is hardly possible there could have been many. Ewell's report states his loss specifically at 43 killed, 230 wounded, and 14 missing—287 in all.—(*Lee's Rep.*, i., 120.)

<sup>2</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 55-60, 121; Tyler's Report, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 110.

<sup>3</sup> *Com. Rep.*, 275



THOMAS JONATHAN JACKSON.





BRIDGE ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY SWAMP.

have been thrown across the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank to guard our communications, or to protect our right and rear. If the communication with our supply dépôt had been cut by the enemy, with our army concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water as it was many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not furnishing a single day's supplies in advance, the troops must have gone without rations, and the animals without forage; the army would have been paralyzed.<sup>1</sup> But Bottom's Bridge and the railway bridge, only a mile apart, and on the direct line of his communications, were above the reach of the highest water, and, these protected, his communications across the river were safe. It was surely easier to protect these than a half score of points. He believed all the time that he was confronted across the river by a force greatly superior to his own; and yet, by some unexplained course of reasoning, he decided, "under the circumstances, to retain a portion of the army on the left bank of the river until our bridges were completed."<sup>2</sup> He divided his army into two parts, neither of them in a position to aid the other in case of a sudden attack in force. The troops that crossed the Chickahominy were directed in a General Order "to go prepared for battle at a moment's notice." They were to preserve discipline, obey orders, and especially to bear in mind "that the Army of the Potomac has never been checked; keep well together, throw away no shots, but aim carefully and low, and, above all things, rely upon the bayonet."<sup>3</sup>

By the 28th of May the two corps of Keyes and Heintzelman, forming the left wing, were on the south side of the Chickahominy, massed checker-wise along the Williamsburg road for a distance of about six miles. The right wing, comprising the corps of Sumner, Franklin, and Porter, was stretched for eighteen miles along the north bank of the Chickahominy. The two wings formed an acute-angled triangle of unequal sides, the apex being at Bottom's Bridge. The distance between the centre of the two wings was hardly five miles in a direct line, but between them flowed the Chickahominy, over which no practicable bridge had been thrown except at the apex of the triangle. If the left wing, which was thus thrown across the river toward Richmond, were attacked in force by the enemy massed in superior numbers on that side, the right wing could come to its aid only by a march of more than twenty miles; so if the right were assailed, it could be aided by the left only by an equal march.<sup>4</sup> For a hostile commander, with any thing like an equal force, there were two courses open. He could throw his entire strength upon the weaker left wing with a probability, as sure as any thing in war can be, of annihilating it; or he could fling his

whole army upon the Federal right, attacking its weak line of communication with its supplies. Johnston tried the former plan at the close of May. He failed only through accidents which neither party could anticipate. Lee tried the second plan at the close of June, under circumstances which should have insured its defeat. The result was that the Federal army, outgeneraled, but not outfought or outnumbered, was driven from the Chickahominy to the James, bringing the Peninsular campaign to a disastrous close.

For a few days McClellan's dispatches to the President were hopeful. On the 25th of May, the time was very near when he should attack Richmond. Next day, he was "quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last struggle." He had cut the Virginia Central Railroad in three places, and would try to cut the other railroad. He thought the Richmond intrenchments not very formidable, and hoped soon to be within shelling distance. His arrangements for the morrow were very important, and, if successful, would leave him free to strike on the return of the force detached.<sup>1</sup>

He had just learned that a considerable force of the enemy was near Hanover Court-house, to the right and rear of his army, threatening his communications, "and in a position either to re-enforce Jackson or to impede McDowell's junction, should he finally move to join us." This force, as it afterward appeared, was Branch's division of raw men from North Carolina. Fitz John Porter was ordered to dislodge them. Marching fourteen miles through a heavy rain, Porter's advance, under Emory, reached the neighborhood of Hanover Court-house at noon on the 27th, and found a portion of the enemy drawn up across the road to dispute their progress. Emory, re-enforced by a portion of Morell's brigade, routed this body after an hour's firing, and the main body of the Union force were ordered to pursue them northward, while Martindale, with three regiments, was sent westward toward Ashland to obstruct the railroad and cut the telegraph wires. He soon found himself opposed by a superior force, and sent to Porter for re-enforcements. For reply he received orders to march to the right, in which direction the enemy were, as Porter supposed, retreating north, pursued by the main part of the corps. Martindale rejoined that the enemy was on his left, but prepared to obey orders, when he was directed to march to a certain distance and halt. But so confident was he that Porter was misinformed of the position of the enemy that he obeyed the order only in part, keeping back a portion of his force to guard the van of the main column. Soon his force of 1000 men was attacked by the whole strength of the enemy, estimated at from 5000 to 7000 men. He stood his ground stoutly for two hours, but was sorely bested. His centre was broken, and the enemy getting through the woods upon both his flanks. Porter at length found that he was mistaken in supposing the enemy was retiring to the north, and that he had been "pursuing a myth." He faced his whole column about, and fell upon the flanks of the enemy, who were held at bay by Martindale. The Confederates were routed, and fled in confusion.

McC. Rep., 204-205.

<sup>1</sup> McC. Rep., 200.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 201.

<sup>3</sup> Gen. Order, May 25th, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 431.

<sup>4</sup> McClellan, while attempting to explain why he failed to push his advantage at Fair Oaks, shows the complete isolation of his two wings. He says: "The only available means of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for an advance upon Richmond, soon after the battle, was to march the troops from Mechanicsville and other points on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottom's Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the position near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three miles. In the condition of the roads at that time this march could not have been made with artillery in less than two days."—*Report*, 223.





SHELLING ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY SWAMP.

"The immediate results of these affairs," says McClellan, "were some 200 of the enemy's dead buried by our troops, 730 prisoners sent to the rear, one 12-pound howitzer, one caisson, a large number of small-arms, and two railroad trains captured. Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and missing."<sup>1</sup>

McClellan was jubilant at the result of this action, the first which had been fought by his direction. It was, he said, a glorious victory; the rout of the rebels was complete—not a defeat, but a complete rout. Porter had gained two complete victories over superior forces. The enemy were concentrating every thing on Richmond; he would do his best to cut off Jackson, but was doubtful whether he could. All the railroads had been cut but that from Richmond to Fredericksburg. The President replied that he was very glad of Porter's victory, but added, "If it was a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized. Again: As you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and Fredericksburg, I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can have any except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the Virginia Central from Richmond to Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating upon Richmond I think can not be certainly known to you or me." McClellan was no wise satisfied with this guarded congratulation. "I do not think," he wrote, "that you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. He has entirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously threatened; routed and demoralized a considerable portion of the rebel forces. It was one of the handsomest things of the war, both in itself and its results. Porter has returned, and my army is again well in hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle passable for artillery."<sup>2</sup> Martindale, whose firm stand against superior forces had secured the victory, was not so enthusiastic either as to the conduct of the affair or its value.<sup>3</sup>

Johnston was in no position to attack, or even seriously to threaten, McClellan's right on the eastern side of the Chickahominy. He had fallen back from Yorktown, from Williamsburg, and then across the Chickahominy, simply because he was opposed to a greatly superior force. Of course, plausible reasons must be given for these movements. Yorktown, it was said, was evacuated because "McClellan, by his arrangements, had made the place untenable;"<sup>4</sup> the strong lines at Williamsburg were abandoned because he wished to fight the enemy in the open field, out of the reach of gun-boats,<sup>5</sup> the Chickahominy was crossed because he did not wish to fight a great battle with so formidable an obstacle in the way of his retreat, in case he was worsted.<sup>6</sup> Branch's six regiments, so far from being sent from Richmond to threaten McClellan's right and his communications with his base of supplies, were moving down from Gordonsville to the defense of Richmond, whither Johnston was calling every man, with the exception of Jackson's command in the Valley of the Shenandoah. Two days before the

affair at Hanover Court-house, J. R. Anderson, who had been confronting McDowell near Fredericksburg, was on his way to Richmond, and the day after the battle his force passed Ashland, almost within sight of Porter's battle-field, and hurried on to the capital. There was now no enemy between McDowell and McClellan, and their advanced guards were only fifteen miles apart. Jackson was at this moment at Williamsport on the Potomac, 200 miles away. The terror excited at Washington by his bold movement alone prevented the junction of McDowell with McClellan.<sup>7</sup>

But if McClellan's right wing, stretched along the eastern branch of the Chickahominy, was unassailable by any force at Johnston's command, the weaker left, practically isolated on the other side of the stream, invited a sharp and sudden blow. About 30,000 men, belonging to Keyes's and Heintzelman's corps, had been sent across the Chickahominy.<sup>8</sup> Keyes, whose corps was in the advance, intrenched itself a mile behind a place on the Williamsburg road known as "The Seven Pines," nearly midway between the river and Richmond. The place was named from a clump of pine-trees which formerly stood at the crossing of several roads. Casey's division of this corps was pushed a thousand yards beyond the Pines to Fair Oaks Farm.<sup>9</sup> Here were two pleasant houses in a grove of fair oak-trees, with a long pile of wood cut for the railroad. Casey's pickets were advanced a thousand yards farther to the edge of a dense forest, through an opening in which the enemy were desecrated in force. The region was mostly wooded and intersected by marshes, with small clearings around the few houses. The trees were hastily cut down to form abatis, rifle-pits were dug, and one or two redoubts for artillery hastily constructed.

Heintzelman's corps lay behind that of Keyes, stretching also to the left, in order to cover the approaches to the White Oak Swamp, which came close up to the Williamsburg road. Although Keyes was in the advance, Heintzelman was told by McClellan that he was to command on that side of the Chickahominy, and if there was any fighting to do, he must do it. He thought the troops were too much scattered, but dared not change their position in face of the positive orders which he had received; but after a week he got authority to place his men as he saw fit, and sent half of them

<sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 211. <sup>2</sup> *De Joinville*, 68. —As early as May 29th McClellan was apprized of the significance of the Confederate troops near Hanover Court-house. On that day he wrote to the Secretary of War: "General Anderson left his position in the vicinity of Fredericksburg at 4 A.M., Sunday [May 25th], with the following troops: 1st South Carolina; one battalion South Carolina Rifles; 12th, 13th, and 14th South Carolina; 3d Louisiana; two batteries of four guns each, namely, Leitcher's Virginia, and McIntosh's South Carolina batteries. General Anderson and his command passed Ashland yesterday morning en route for Richmond, leaving men behind him to destroy the bridges over the telegraph road, which they traveled. This information is reliable. It is also positively certain that Branch's command was from Gordonsville, bound for Richmond, whither they have now gone. It may be regarded as positive. I think that there is no force between Fredericksburg and the Junction" [of the Virginia Central and Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroads, ten miles north of Ashland]. Yet the very next day he wrote that his right flank had been "seriously threatened" by Branch, the dispersal of whose division had effected "the clearing of our right flank and rear;" thus "dispersal," apart from the loss of prisoners and killed, amounting only to hastening their march to Richmond. He repeats this statement in his Report prepared more than a year later, asserting that Branch's force "was in the vicinity of Hanover Court-house, to the right and rear of our army, thus threatening our communications."—(*Report*, 211, 212, 205.) They were certainly to the right, at a distance of fifteen miles, and endeavoring to get away; but they were not in his rear, and could only threaten his communications by almost reversing their line of march, and putting the Chickahominy and three fifths of the Union army directly between themselves and the Confederate force before Richmond. Lee, indeed, made this very movement a month later, but not until his strength was nearly double that of Johnston, and he had measured the capacity of his antagonist. He made it, also, with more than 60,000 men, instead of with six raw regiments.

<sup>3</sup> "There were four divisions on the right bank of the Chickahominy—one a very weak one. I should think the strength of the four divisions must have been 30,000 men, perhaps."—McClellan's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 433.

<sup>4</sup> There are two Fair Oaks mentioned in the reports of the actions of May 31st and June 1st. The failure to discriminate these has given rise to much confusion. "Fair Oaks Farm" is on the Williamsburg road, something more than half a mile beyond the Seven Pines. "Fair Oaks Station" is a woody point on the railroad, about a mile from the farm.

<sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 208.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 208-212.


<sup>3</sup> "The whole line of our march and our left flank, by the order of the commander-in-chief, was left exposed and open to assault; following the directions which the general gave, instead of a victory, we should have been involved in an ugly catastrophe. . . . I went with a force of only about 1000 men to encounter the whole force of the enemy that day, from 5000 to 7000. The general results were these: A cross-fire opening upon us from the woods; I had my wings supported in columns—my centre was broken—and maintained my position there about two hours, while the rest of the army were pursuing a myth, when the return of the second brigade under Morell enabled us to take the rebels thus held at advantage, and repulse them, resulting in the rout of the enemy. . . . I never comprehended any object in the movement to Hanover Court-house except it was to intercept some of the enemy, if any should happen to be between Hanover Court-house and Fredericksburg."—Martindale's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 635-637.

<sup>4</sup> *Southern Generals*, 265.

<sup>5</sup> *Pollard*, ii., 16.

<sup>6</sup> *Memphis Appeal*.





Spring on the R.R.



The last resting place



R.R. bridge over the Chickahominy



In Camp.  
ARMY SCENES ON THE CHICKAHOMINY.




Rail Road to Richmond



Bridge-builders.





SEVEN PINES AND FAIR OAKS.

forward to the Seven Pines. This was only the day before the battle opened.<sup>1</sup>

Johnston, in the mean while, was informed, but only partially, of the movement across the Chickahominy. His "trusty scouts" could only tell him on the 30th of May that Keyes's corps had crossed, and were encamped on the Richmond side of the stream. He resolved to "attack them next morning, hoping to be able to defeat Keyes's corps completely in its advanced position before it could be re-enforced." The attack was to be made by the four full divisions of Huger, Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and G. W. Smith, comprising fully three fifths of Johnston's entire force.<sup>2</sup> The main assault was to be made in front by Longstreet, with his own division and that of Hill; Huger was to move down the Charles City road, and attack the left flank of the force engaged by Longstreet; and Smith was to march down to the junction of the New Bridge and Nine-mile roads, and be ready to assail the right flank of Keyes or to cover Longstreet's left.

During the afternoon and night of the 30th a storm more violent than had been known for a generation swept over Richmond. This seemed providential for the Confederates. The channel of the Chickahominy was already full to its brim. The stream, swollen by the storm, would overflow the swamp and bottom, preventing any aid to be sent to Keyes from the other side. The left wing of the Union army seemed doomed. Though it was twice as strong as Johnston supposed, it was still greatly overmarched, and its destruction would have been the greater success for the Confederates.<sup>3</sup>

The attack was to be made simultaneously at daybreak. The storm delayed the movements of the troops, but by eight o'clock Longstreet was in position, ready to begin. Hour after hour he waited for Huger, unwilling to make a partial attack instead of the combined movement which had been planned. Noon had passed before he decided to commence the assault, without waiting for the dilatory Huger.<sup>4</sup>

Casey's division of Keyes's corps was in the advance at Fair Oaks Farm, three quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, its pickets being pushed a third of a mile farther, up to the very edge of the wood in and behind

which the enemy was posted, his strength being fully screened from view. There had been indications of an impending attack. The cars had been heard running all the night before from Richmond, indicating that troops were being brought to the front. Early in the morning an aid of Johnston was captured close to the Union lines. Keyes ordered his division to be under arms at 11 A.M. Soon tidings were brought that the enemy were coming in force down the Williamsburg road. Casey advanced several batteries toward his picket-lines to meet them, at the same time sending back for re-enforcements. He had scarcely done this when the enemy burst through the screen of woods. The pickets and supporting regiments were swept back in confusion. The artillery had been thrown forward; in order to save the guns, Naglee made a bayonet charge upon the advancing enemy, and pressed them back to the woods. Here he was met with a furious fire of musketry, and forced back; the guns were saved, with the exception of a single piece, and the whole division fell back to the line of defense at Fair Oaks Farm. Here this weak division, scarcely five thousand strong, held its ground for three hours against three times its number. But at length, pressed in front, almost enveloped on both flanks, and having lost one third of its number, it fell back to the second line of defense in front of the Seven Pines, then held by Couch's division. The retreat was made just in time. Had it been delayed a few minutes, the whole division would have been surrounded and captured. As it was, they lost a battery of five guns. Casey maintained that this stubborn resistance at this line really saved the day, and prevented this action from resulting "in a severe repulse, which might have resulted in a disastrous defeat."<sup>5</sup>

Couch's division at the Seven Pines had been weakened by sending regiments to the support of Casey. Their line of defense, protected by a slight abatis, lay across the road. Keyes, the corps commander, who was now on the ground, brought forward what re-enforcements he could from the rear, and made a stand. Thus far the weight of the fight on the Confederate side had been borne by Hill's division, which was in the advance. Longstreet's force now came up, and pressed the line in front, while its superior numbers enabled it to assail the right and left flanks at the same time. Couch, who was on the right with two regiments, was forced from his position. Instead of falling back, he withdrew along the Nine-mile road to Fair Oaks Station, where he took part in the action which soon began at that point. Longstreet, who was now on the field, leaving the Union right, pressed with all his force upon the centre and left, between Couch and the main body of the division. Heintzelman by this time had brought forward Kearney's division of his corps, Hooker's being then near White Oak

<sup>1</sup> The conduct of Casey's division was at the time a matter of sharp discussion. Several officers, who saw only the disorganized regiments, reported that it had behaved disgracefully: McClellan, in his first dispatch, declared that "Casey's division, which was the first line, gave way unaccountably and discreditably." Upon more complete information, he officially withdrew the charge, saying, "I withdraw the expression contained in my first dispatch, and I cordially give my indorsement to the conclusion of the division commander, that 'those parts of his command which behaved discreditably were exceptional cases.'" (*McC. Rep.*, 222.) Still it is certain that the division, as such, was broken by the overwhelming force to which it was opposed. A portion of it, with others, rushed back, a disorganized mass. Heintzelman, in his Report, states the case fairly. He says: "Some of the regiments fought gallantly till overwhelmed by superior numbers. After they were once broken, however, they could not be rallied" [as a body, that is, since, as he implies and as Keyes affirms, among the fragments of regiments which formed the line which finally checked the Confederate advance were portions of Casey's, as well as of Couch's and Kearney's divisions]. "The road was filled with fugitives (not all from this division) as far as Bottom's Bridge. Colonel Starr's regiment, of General Hooker's division, had to force its way through them with the bayonet, and a guard I placed at Bottom's Bridge stopped over a thousand men."



GILAS CASEY.

<sup>1</sup> Heintzelman's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 351.

<sup>2</sup> In the organization of the Confederate army, a "division" was the largest member, answering to a "corps" in the Union army. Each division comprised from four to six brigades. The strength of a division at this time was about 12,000, so that the attack, as planned, would have been made by 48,000 men; but, as Huger failed to execute his part, there were but 36,000 Confederates actually engaged. Including Branch and Anderson, who reached Richmond the day before with about 12,000, Johnston could have had barely 20,000 men beyond these four divisions; as Huger had only recently been brought from Petersburg, where he was posted for some time after his abandonment of Norfolk, Johnston could not have fallen back from Yorktown and Williamsburg with more than 45,000. For General Johnston's own statement of his force at different periods of the campaign, see note at the end of this chapter.

<sup>3</sup> "I determined to attack next morning [May 31st], hoping to be able to defeat Keyes's corps completely in its more advanced position before it could be re-enforced. . . . Heavy and protracted rains during the afternoon and night, by swelling the stream of the Chickahominy, increased the probability of our having to deal with no other troops than those of Keyes." (*Johnston's Report*.) "The storm of May 30th was terrible. Never, even in the tropics, have I seen a more sudden and sweeping deluge. The creek which flowed at the bottom of the hill below the house in which I lived [in Richmond], and over which, in ordinary times, a boy might leap, filled the valley, on the morning of May 30th, with a shallow lake more than one hundred yards in width." (*Hurlbert, in De Joinville*, 114.) "During the day and night of the 30th of May a very violent storm occurred. The rain, falling in torrents, rendered work on the rifle-pits and bridges impracticable, made the roads almost impassable, and threatened the destruction of the bridges across the Chickahominy. The enemy, perceiving the unfavorable position in which we were placed, and the possibility of destroying that part of our army which was apparently cut off by the rapidly-rising stream, threw an overwhelming force upon the position occupied by Casey's division." (*McC. Rep.*, 215.) "General Keyes's corps and a part of General Heintzelman's were on the right bank of the Chickahominy. General Sumner's corps, with the rest of the army, were on the other bank of the river. The enemy took advantage of our position, and the small force that was on the right bank, and made their preparations to just gobble up Keyes's whole corps. They attacked me on the 31st of May. The preceding night was one of the worst I ever saw. I never before heard such a thunder-storm as there was on that night." (*Casey's Testimony, Com. Rep.*, 443.) "On Friday night we had one of the worst rain-storms, thunder and lightning, that I ever saw. A man who had lived there twenty-nine years said that it was one of the worst storms they ever had in that country." (*Heintzelman's Testimony, Com. Rep.*, 354.) "Through all the night of the 30th of May there was a raging storm, the like of which I can not remember. Torrents of rain drenched the earth. The thunderbolts rolled and fell without intermission, and the heavens flashed with a perpetual blaze of lightning. From their beds of mud and the peltings of this storm, the Fourth Corps rose to fight the battle of the 31st of May, 1862." (*Keyes's Rep.*)

<sup>4</sup> Johnston says that the advance was made at 2 P.M., "the engagement being opened by artillery and skirmishers, and by 3 o'clock it had become close and heavy." But, according to the concurrent accounts of all the Union officers, the skirmishing began by noon, and within an hour the action became serious. Johnston's report was written nearly a month after the battle, and while he was still feeble from the effects of his wound. There can be no doubt that he is incorrect in his statements of time, placing the important periods of the action two hours later than they actually occurred. In giving the time, we adopt the general statements of the Union authorities.





DARIUS N. COUCH.

Swamp, too far away to come up in time. The fight raged fiercely with varying success for an hour and a half, until five o'clock, when the Union force began slowly to give way, and fall back from the position at the Seven Pines. The right, with Couch, had moved northward toward Fair Oaks Station; the left, with Berry, of Kearney's division, held its ground, keeping the enemy before it in check until nightfall, when they fell back southward by way of the White Oak Swamp. The Union centre fell back fighting a few hundred yards to a narrow strip of woods crossing the Williamsburg road. Here Heintzelman in person succeeded in rallying about eighteen hundred men, the fragments of regiments, and checked the advance of the enemy, who never got beyond this belt of woods. It was almost by accident that this stand was successful. Keyes, who was on the left of the proposed line, saw that the key to the position was a spot where the wooded ground sloped abruptly to the rear. If the enemy gained this the day was lost. He called a single regiment to follow him across an open field of seven or eight hundred yards. They dashed on in the face of a scorching fire, and gained the spot just in time. "Had they been two minutes later," says Keyes, "they would have been too late to occupy that fine position, and it would have been impossible to have formed the next and last line of battle, which stemmed the tide of defeat, and turned it toward victory." The new line, formed of fragments from regiments from every division which had been engaged—Casey's, Couch's, and Kearney's—had hardly been formed, when a heavy mass of the enemy, which had been held in check, came down upon it. They were met by a fire so deadly that their advance was checked.

It was now past six o'clock, and, though it wanted an hour of sunset, the dense vapors rising from the swamp made all objects indistinct. The Confederates, who had pressed the Union forces for two miles from Fair Oaks Farm to beyond the Seven Pines, fell back a little toward Richmond, passing the night under arms on the battle-field and in the camps which they had won. The Union troops fell back a mile in the other direction to an intrenched camp.

The battle had hardly opened when the sound of musketry was heard at McClellan's head-quarters, six miles away in a direct line, on the other side of the Chickahominy. He was confined to his bed by illness, but sent an order to Sumner, whose corps lay nearest the battle-field, and who had just thrown two bridges over the Chickahominy, to hold himself in readiness to march to the scene of action. The storm which had on the previous evening burst so furiously over Richmond, had spent its force there and to the south; northward it was comparatively slight. The inundation which Johnston supposed would render the Chickahominy impassable by day-break began to appear at noon. It was now two hours after noon. The bridges had become almost impassable, many of the timbers of the best one being already floating. Sumner more than obeyed the order which he had received. Instead of merely preparing to move, he advanced his two divisions—those of Sedgwick and Richardson—halting the leading company of each upon the bridge opposite it. He thus saved an hour, when, as events proved, minutes were priceless.

Tidings came to head-quarters that the day was going hardly, and Sumner, at half past two, was ordered to cross. Sedgwick's division in the advance pressed over the shaking bridge. The artillery was dragged with difficulty through the swamp on the other side. Sumner, with this division, guided by the sound of the firing, pushed on to Fair Oaks Station, where he arrived just in time to fight the battle of Fair Oaks, which, although no one

then knew it, prevented that of Seven Pines from being an entire defeat for the Union forces. At Fair Oaks Station he met Couch, who told him that he had been separated from the rest of the army, and was momentarily expecting an attack. Sumner took the command, and hastily formed Sedgwick's division and Couch's few regiments along the north side of the railroad from the station eastward. The formation was incomplete, when, at five o'clock, the enemy opened a furious attack upon his centre, hoping to get possession of the battery of artillery which had been posted there.

This Confederate force was composed of G. W. Smith's division, which had for eight hours remained idle at its post where the Nine-mile road joined that leading to New Bridge. Johnston had taken his place here, and Jefferson Davis had come out to witness the fight. This division had taken its post at eight o'clock in the morning. For three hours, from one till four, Johnston was utterly unaware that a battle had been going on scarcely four miles away.<sup>1</sup> At four o'clock Johnston ordered Smith to move, and in an hour he had begun a hot attack upon Sumner's line. The early twilight was just closing in, when Sumner, who had sustained a heavy fire, charged with six regiments directly into the woods, and hurled the enemy back in confusion. At this moment Johnston was struck by a fragment of a shell, severely wounded, and borne from the field. Night closed the battle of Fair Oaks, as it closed at almost the same moment that of the Seven Pines.

Just then Richardson's division of Sumner's corps came upon the field. He had begun to cross the Chickahominy by "Sumner's lower bridge," which was nearest to his own camp; but before his division was half over, the rising waters made this bridge impassable, and two brigades, with all the artillery, had to cross by the upper bridge, over which Sedgwick had crossed. When this division came up, it was posted along the railroad to the left of Sedgwick, connecting this with Birney's brigade of Heintzelman's corps, which had been sent in that direction, but had halted, without having taken part in the fight.<sup>2</sup> The two forces bivouacked in the field, their picket lines being within speaking distance.

The disabling of Johnston left the Confederates with an incompetent leader. Smith, who succeeded to the command, appears to have gone over to the Seven Pines, but found the forces there in no condition to renew their attack here on the next morning.<sup>3</sup> But the attack was fiercely renewed on

<sup>1</sup> We here follow Johnston's notation of time, as it relates to matters that came under his personal observation. He says: "I had placed myself on the left of the force employed in this attack, with the division of General Smith, that I might be on a part of the field where I could observe and be ready to meet any counter-movement which the enemy's general might make against our centre or left. Owing to some peculiar condition of the atmosphere, the sound of the musketry did not reach us. I consequently deferred giving the signal for General Smith's advance until four o'clock, at which time Major Jasper Whiting, of General Smith's staff, whom I had sent to learn the state of affairs with General Longstreet's column, returned, reporting that it was pressing on with vigor. . . . Smith's division moved forward at four o'clock, General Whiting's three brigades leading. Their progress was impeded by the enemy's skirmishers, which, with their supports, were driven back to the railroad. At this point Whiting's Own and Pettigrew's brigades engaged a superior force of the enemy. Hood's, by my orders, moved on to co-operate with Longstreet. General Smith was desired to hasten up with all the troops within reach. He brought up Hampton's and Hatten's brigades in a few minutes. The strength of the enemy's position, however, enabled him to hold it until dark. About sunset, being struck from my horse, severely wounded, by a fragment of a shell, I was carried from the field, and Major General G. W. Smith succeeded to the command."

<sup>2</sup> Birney was put under arrest by Heintzelman, and brought before a court-martial on charge of disobedience of orders in having halted his brigade. He was honorably acquitted, it being shown that he had obeyed orders received from Kearney, his immediate commander. His brigade, then commanded by Colonel Hobart Ward, did good service in the action of the following day.

<sup>3</sup> Thus only can we explain Johnston's statement that "General Smith, who succeeded to the command, was prevented from resuming his attack on the enemy's position next morning by the discovery of strong intrenchments not seen on the previous evening." He indeed adds: "Smith's division bivouacked on the night of the 31st within musket-shot of the intrenchments which they were attacking when darkness stayed the conflict." But there were no intrenchments near Fair Oaks Station, where Smith's attack upon Sumner was made. Johnston represents the sharp fighting on the railroad next day merely as a demonstration upon two of the Confederate brigades, which was repelled. But he was clearly misinformed as to the character of this action. The con-



EDWIN V. SUMNER.



SEARCHING FOR THE DEAD AND WOUNDED.







PICKETS IN THE WOODS.

the right, near Fair Oaks Station. The Confederates advanced down the railroad—avoiding Sedgwick's division, which had fought the previous day, and was still held to the right by Sumner in position at Fair Oaks—and fell upon Richardson's division, which formed the centre. The attack, repulsed at one point, was renewed at another, but without success, Richardson's line, supported by artillery, standing firm.

Meanwhile Hooker had come up from the left, making for the heaviest fire, for the ground was so densely wooded that the position of the combatants could not be seen. He found Birney's brigade, now commanded by Ward, drawn up in line of battle, and with this force fell upon the enemy's rear, and, after an hour's hard fighting, pushed them from the woods by which they were sheltered. He then ordered a bayonet charge. The enemy broke and fled toward Richmond. Almost at the same moment Richardson's whole line, farther to the right, advanced, pouring in its fire at close range, following up the advantage by a bayonet charge, which put the enemy to flight. The line of retreat followed by the Confederates took them from the railroad to the Williamsburg road, where the forces who had the day before gained the battle of Seven Pines still held the direct way to Richmond, and the whole force moved back, utterly foiled in the object for which the attack had been made. The Union force was too much scattered to venture a pursuit.<sup>1</sup>

The battle of Sunday, June 1st, began at seven in the morning, and was over at eleven. At noon McClellan came upon the field at Fair Oaks, but he had no orders to give; he was quite satisfied with what had been done.<sup>2</sup> On the next day the Union forces assumed the position at Fair Oaks Farm which they had held before the battle. Sumner also retained his position at Fair Oaks Station, strengthening it by earthworks. The losses in killed and wounded in these two battles were nearly equal. That of the Confederates was 4233; that of the Union, 4517, of whom 890 were killed; there were also 1222 missing, three quarters of them from Keyes's corps.<sup>3</sup> The

current accounts of all the Union generals show that it was a serious attack by Smith's entire division, which was effectually repulsed.—See Richardson's Letter, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 87; Sumner's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 363; Hooker's Testimony, *ibid.*, 578; *McC. Rep.*, 220; *De Joinville*, 77.

<sup>1</sup> Heintzelman gave orders to pursue, but countermanded them at the urgent request of Kearney, who said it was better to let well enough alone, and that McClellan would order a general advance in a few days. Next day he learned that the Confederates had retreated in confusion, and sent Hooker forward, who penetrated to within less than four miles of Richmond. He was then stopped by order of McClellan, and directed to establish his command on the ground occupied before the battle by Casey's division at Fair Oaks Farm.—*Com. Rep.*, 352, 578.

<sup>2</sup> Sumner's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 363.

<sup>3</sup> These are the official statements. McClellan's report of his loss is:

Corps.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
General Sumner's.....	183	894	146
" Heintzelman's.....	259	980	155
" Keyes's.....	448	1753	921
	890	3627	1222

Johnston does not distinguish between killed and wounded. He says:

Longstreet reports the loss in his command at being about.....	3900
Smith reports his loss at.....	1233
	4233

Confederate attack was well conceived, and, had it been carried out according to Johnston's plan, would hardly have failed of success. If Huger had come down upon the left at any time, or if Smith had moved only an hour earlier from the right, Heintzelman and Keyes must have been utterly crushed. Or had the full flood of the Chickahominy come down, as was expected, four hours before instead of four hours after noon, Sumner could not have crossed, and the Union forces on the south side of the river would have been annihilated in plain sight of the whole army on the opposite bank, utterly powerless to give any aid.

As it was, the blow had utterly failed, and the Confederate force hurried back to Richmond broken and dispirited. Had McClellan known how utterly broken it was, he might have marched straight on to Richmond on the 1st of June.<sup>1</sup> The city itself and its approaches were then utterly unfortified. Even McClellan was convinced, only six days before, that the Richmond intrenchments were not formidable.<sup>2</sup> There was, indeed, nothing between him and Richmond except the six miles of space, a few rifle-pits and sand-works not mounted with artillery, and the disjointed fragments of a defeated army. The formidable works which in a few days crowned every hillock and swept every road were hardly begun. They were the work of Lee, constructed at a later date. Hooker saw nothing of them when he

McClellan indeed says (*Rep.*, 221), "General J. E. Johnston reports the loss of the enemy in Longstreet's and Smith's divisions at 4283; General D. H. Hill, who had taken the advance in the attack, estimates his loss at 2500, which would give the enemy's loss 6783." But Hill's division was included in Longstreet's "command," and his loss forms a part of Longstreet's. There is, indeed, reason to suspect that the Confederate loss is understated by Johnston. Hurlbert, the translator of *De Joinville*, who was at the time detained in Richmond under surveillance, says: "There were published in the Richmond papers detailed brigade and regimental reports of the losses in sixty out of seventy-two organizations, regiments, battalions, and companies mentioned as taking part in the engagements. I computed these losses as they were published. The sum total was 6733, killed, wounded, and missing." Correcting a probable misprint (6233 for 6283), this is within one of McClellan's statement of the Confederate loss, purporting to be taken from Johnston's Report. It is to be noted, however, that the 2500 loss ascribed to Hill's division make just the difference between the two statements (4233 and 6733). It might be supposed that some one, seeing these two statements, and finding in Johnston's Report no separate mention of Hill, whose loss must have been large, his division doing most of the fighting on the first day, assumed this number in order to make the accounts coincide, and that McClellan hastily adopted the statement without verifying it by Johnston's Report. From the nature of the actions, the Confederates charging intrenchments, and being exposed to artillery, while they brought none into the field, their loss might be presumed to be in excess. We, however, admit Johnston's statement into the text.

<sup>1</sup> Hurlbert (*Appendix to De Joinville*, 112) says: "They were in a perfect chaos of brigades and regiments. The road to Richmond were literally crowded with stragglers, some throwing away their guns, some breaking them on the trees—all with the same story, that their regiment had been 'cut to pieces,' that the 'Yankees were swarming on the Chickahominy like bees, and fighting like devils.' In two days of the succeeding week the provost-marshal's guard collected between 4000 and 5000 stragglers, and sent them into camp. What had become of the command of the army no one knew. By some persons it was reported that Major General Gustavus W. Smith had succeeded Johnston; by others, that President Davis had taken the reins of the army. General Johnston himself was reported to be either actually dead or dying. . . . Had I been aware on that day of the actual state of things upon the field, I might easily have driven in a carriage through the Confederate lines directly into our own camps. It was not, indeed, till several days after the battle that any thing like military order was restored throughout the Confederate positions."

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 204.



FAIR OAKS FARM—BURYING THE DEAD AND BURNING THE HORSES.







PICKET GUARD ON THE CHICKAHOMINY.

advanced within three and a half miles of Richmond. Had it been found inexpedient to endeavor to march into Richmond, there was nothing to prevent the Union lines from being advanced fully a mile and a half, clear beyond the woody belt which had sheltered the Confederates. Richmond would then have been within shelling distance. McClellan seems never to have imagined the possibility of an advance by his left wing, which then comprised three of his five corps. He simply said that he could not at once throw his whole army across the Chickahominy, and pronounced the idea of then marching upon Richmond as too absurd to be entertained by any one. But his ablest officers, who had met the enemy at Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, were of a different opinion.<sup>1</sup>

The Chickahominy continued to rise slowly but continuously all through Sunday, June 1st, though the rain had ceased. Many supposed that its upper waters had been dammed, and that the sluices had been opened. All the bridges, except the railroad bridge, were swept away or their approaches submerged. For several days the railroad bridge was the only communication between the two wings of the army, and that was made passable only by planks laid between the rails.<sup>2</sup> To build new bridges high above the water seemed to McClellan the work of the time. He kept up, however, a brisk correspondence with the government at Washington, the main topics being the weather, and what he was going to do when the weather should permit.<sup>3</sup> The weather was certainly unpropitious. Never, within the mem-

ory of the oldest inhabitant, had there been on the Peninsula such a rainy season as this.

McDowell was now, for the third time, ordered to join McClellan. He wrote from Manassas to McClellan joyfully announcing the fact. McClellan's division was to go by water, the remainder of the corps by land. He himself, with the remainder, would be with him in ten days by way of Fredericksburg. This was on the 10th of June. Two days after, he wrote that McClellan was on the way, but circumstances would prevent him from coming with the other troops at the time promised; but he asked that McClellan's division should be so placed as to join the remainder of his corps when they arrived. McClellan had all along been jealous of McDowell. He wrote to the President intimating that McDowell was willing that the general interests should be sacrificed to increase his own command. He wished no troops not under his full control, but would prefer to fight the battle with what he had, and leave others responsible for the result.<sup>4</sup> McClellan's division

very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fortress Monroe" [he had just been officially informed that Wool's department had been merged into his own, General Dix there replacing Wool, who was sent to Fort McHenry, near Baltimore]. "But the morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much, and do not fear for odds against me. The victory is complete, and all credit is due to our officers and men."—(*Com. Rep.*, 333.) June 2. "Our left is every where advanced considerably beyond the positions it occupied before the battle." [This is erroneous. The left never occupied a position on the Williamsburg road in advance of Fair Oaks Farm; and Fair Oaks Station, where Sumner posted himself, was no nearer Richmond.] "I am in strong hopes that the Chickahominy will fall sufficiently to enable me to cross the river. We have had a terrible time with our communications, bridges and causeways, built with great care, having been washed away with the freshet. All that human labor can do is being done to accomplish our purpose." June 3. "The Chickahominy has been almost the only obstacle in my way for several days. Every effort has been made, and will continue to be, to protect the communications across it. Nothing of importance except that it is again raining." June 4. "Terrible rain-storm during the night and morning; not yet cleared off; bridges in bad condition, and still hard at work upon them. I have taken every possible step to insure the security of the corps on the right bank, but I cannot re-enforce them from here until my bridges are all safe, as my force is too small to insure my right and rear, should the enemy attack in that direction, as they may probably attempt. I have to be very cautious now." June 5. "Raised most of the night—has now ceased, but it is not clear. The river is still high and troublesome. Enemy opened with several batteries on our bridges near here this morning; our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced them, though some firing is still kept up. The rain forces us to remain in *statu quo*." June 7. "The Chickahominy has risen so as to flood the entire bottom to the depth of three and four feet. I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this; and the men are working night and day, up to their waists in water, to complete them. The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely impassable for artillery or even cavalry, except directly in the narrow roads, which renders any movement either of this or the rebel army utterly out of the question until we have more favorable weather. I am glad you are pressing forward re-enforcements so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment McClellan reaches here, and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, driving off the rebel pickets and securing a very advantageous position." [It is hard to see in what direction the pickets were advanced a mile; certainly not toward Richmond.] June 10 (much abridged). "I have information, not reliable, that Beauregard has arrived. I am completely checked by the weather; the Chickahominy is in a dreadful state; we have another rain-storm on our hands. I shall attack as soon as weather and ground will permit; but there will be a delay. I suggest that large detachments should be sent from Halleck's army to strengthen this. I will attack whenever the weather permits."—(*McC. Rep.*, 224-230.)

<sup>1</sup> McDOWELL TO MCCLELLAN—June 10: "For the third time I am ordered to join you, and hope this time to get through. In view of the remarks made with reference to my leaving you and not joining you before by your friends, and something I have heard as coming from you on

<sup>1</sup> After having shown (see *ante*, p. 348, Note 4) the utterly isolated position of the two wings of his army, he proceeds: "The idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only five miles distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for a moment seriously entertained by any one connected with the Army of the Potomac. An advance, involving the separation of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy, would have exposed each to defeat in detail. Therefore I held the position already gained, and completed our crossings as soon as possible."—(*McC. Rep.*, 223.) But Keyes testified: "I think McClellan should have pushed right on after the battle of Fair Oaks. I do not know why he did not cross and attack, and win the battle. I think, if he had possessed the great quality of an energetic general, we should have taken Richmond."—(*Com. Rep.*, 445.) Sumner testified: "When the enemy had retreated after the battle of Fair Oaks, I know of no military reason for not immediately following them up to Richmond; and from information which we afterward received, I do believe that if the general had crossed the Chickahominy with the residue of the army, and made a general attack with his whole force, we could have carried Richmond. . . . If we had attacked with our whole force, we should have swept every thing before us; and I think the majority of the officers who were there think so now."—(*Ibid.*, 366.) Keyes testified: "I am not able to state why the enemy were not pursued; but it is my opinion that if they had been vigorously pursued by all the forces available for the pursuit, our army might have gone into Richmond."—(*Ibid.*, 609.) Hooker was asked, "Suppose that, the next day after the repulse of the enemy at Fair Oaks, General McClellan had brought his whole army across the Chickahominy, and made a vigorous movement upon Richmond, in your judgment, as a military man, what would have been the effect of that movement?" He replied, "In answer to that, I would say, that at no time during the whole campaign did I feel that we could not go to Richmond."—(*Ibid.*, 579.) Hooker had, the day after the battle, advanced a mile or more toward Richmond beyond Fair Oaks Farm, meeting no resistance except a little picket-firing, when he was recalled by a telegram to the effect that he should "return from his brilliant reconnaissance: we can not afford to lose his division." "I had no expectation," he said, "of being lost."—(*Ibid.*, 578.)

<sup>2</sup> June 2. "Our left is within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force, and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a





WOODBURY AND ALEXANDER'S BRIDGE

arrived on the 12th and 13th. They were posted on the extreme right, the point nearest to Fredericksburg. A few new regiments, seven in all, were sent from Baltimore and elsewhere to Fortress Monroe, and a like number of older ones were sent thence to the Chickahominy.<sup>1</sup> McClellan moved his head-quarters across the Chickahominy on the 13th. By the 20th the bridges over the Chickahominy were measurably finished—in all eleven, of which seven were practically of use: Bottom's Bridge; the Railroad Bridge, the means of bringing up most of the supplies to the left wing; the Foot Bridge, on the shortest line between the two wings, "available for infantry under certain circumstances;" Duane's Bridge, "practicable for all arms;" Woodbury's Infantry Bridge, "available for infantry;" Woodbury and Alexander's Bridge, "for all arms;" and Sumner's upper bridge, or the Grapevine Bridge, the one over which Sumner had crossed to win the battle of Fair Oaks, "in condition to be used in emergency by all arms."<sup>2</sup> Franklin's corps was now passed over, leaving only Porter's corps and McCall's division on the north side. Earth-works were in the mean while thrown up along the entire front on the south side, in an irregular semicircle, from the edge of White Oak Swamp up to Fair Oaks Farm and Station, then down to the Chickahominy at Woodbury's Bridge, five miles measured around the arc, and three along its chord formed by the river. The works were of no great strength, for the generals in command disapproved of them; they thought they made the men timid.<sup>3</sup> There were half a dozen redoubts, each mounting six or eight guns, connected by infantry parapets of timber and earth, with a ditch in front. The redoubts had parapets ten or twelve feet thick, and some were provided with magazines; the connecting lines were three or four feet thick at top.<sup>4</sup>

On the 3d of June, two days after the battle of Fair Oaks, Robert E. Lee was appointed to the command of the Confederate army in Virginia. For almost two centuries the Lees had been among the "First Families of Virginia." A century ago, Thomas Lee, grandson of the first American Lee, and grandfather of Robert E. Lee, was President of the Council and acting governor of the province. He kept almost royal state at his residence in Stafford.<sup>5</sup> Three of the sons of Thomas Lee bore prominent parts in our Revolutionary struggle. Two of them, Richard Henry and Francis Lightfoot Lee, were among the signers of the Declaration of Independence: the former, on the 7th of June, 1776, moved in the Continental Congress the fa-

mous resolution that "These United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent states; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved." Another son, the father of the Confederate general, was Henry Lee—the famous cavalry commander "Legion Harry." He was chosen by Congress to deliver the funeral oration on the death of Washington, in which occurs the phrase, "First in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen." He fell into pecuniary embarrassments, and died in 1818, leaving among other children Robert Edmund Lee, a boy of twelve.<sup>1</sup>

It was not hard for the son of "Legion Harry" to gain admission to West Point. He entered this national institution in 1825, and, after four years, graduated with the highest honors of his class. It is recorded of him that "he never received a reprimand or had a mark of demerit against him." For more than thirty years his military record was not merely stainless, but most honorable. During the war with Mexico he was with Scott as Chief of Engineers. He was, indeed, the favorite officer of that veteran commander, and was mentioned with special honor in almost every one of his voluminous dispatches. This war over, he became Superintendent at West Point; but after two years he left, having received a commission in the cavalry. He served with honor in various quarters, fighting the Indians on the Texan frontier, and capturing John Brown at Harper's Ferry. The outbreak of secession in 1860 found him again in Texas, with the rank of colonel, but standing first on the list recommended for promotion to the rank of general. Thirty years before he had married the daughter and heiress of Mr. Custis, the step-child and adopted son of Washington. Through her he had become the proprietor of Arlington House, on the Potomac, and other large estates, all connecting him directly with the wife of Washington.

He was now fifty-five years old. For thirty-six years he had been in the military service of the United States. He had time and again sworn the military oath, binding him by the strongest obligation known among men to loyalty to the nation. He had risen high in his profession, and the highest rank in it was within his reach. To abandon the Union would peril every thing: professional rank, private fortune, and, if secession failed, his good name among men. But he was a Virginian, and, according to the theory of his section, his primary allegiance was due to his state. If she broke away from the nation, he must go with her. He came to Washington, and had a meeting with Scott, his old commander and friend. This was on the 18th of April, 1861, the day succeeding that upon which the Virginia Act of Secession was passed. He considered himself bound, he said, not to retain his commission in the army. Scott urged him not to resign. "I must," said Lee; "I can not consult my own feelings in the matter." Two days later he sent in his resignation, accompanying it with a pathetic letter, which breathed a hope that he might not yet be called to fight against the flag under which he had so long served.<sup>2</sup> The hope was

that subject, I wish to say I go with the greatest satisfaction, and hope to arrive with my main body in time to be of service. McClellan goes in advance by water. I will be with you in ten days with the remainder, by Fredericksburg." June 12. "The delay of General Banks to relieve the division of my command now in the Valley beyond the time calculated upon will prevent my joining you with the remainder of the troops I am to take below at as early a day as I named. My third division (McCall's) is now on the way. Please to do me the favor so to place it that it may be in a position to join the others as they come down from Fredericksburg."—(*Raymond's Administration of President Lincoln*, 247.)

MCCLELLAN TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR—June 14: "It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McClellan's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, General McDowell should wish the general good to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. If I can not fully control all his troops, I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the result. . . ."—(*McC. Rep.*, 232.)

<sup>1</sup> "On the 12th of June the 16th Massachusetts joined Hooker's division. Several regiments arrived about that time. I got about 5000 men for my corps about that time."—(*Heintzelman*, in *Com. Rep.*, 355.)

<sup>2</sup> "I was never in favor of those field-works. I think they have a tendency to make the men timid, and do more harm than good; and I think the older officers of the army think so. Formerly it was a matter of army regulation not to throw up field-works, because it made the men timid."—(*Sumner's Testimony*, *Com. Rep.*, 366. For the nature of these field-works, see *Art. Op.*, 30, 31, with Plan No. 15.)

<sup>3</sup> "There is no structure in our country to compare with it. The walls of the first story are two and a half feet thick, and of the second story two feet, composed of brick imported from England. It originally contained about one hundred rooms. Besides the main building, there are four offices, one at each corner, containing fifteen rooms. The stables are capable of accommodating one hundred horses."—(*Lossing's Field-Book of the Revolution*, ii., 217.)

<sup>1</sup> General Charles Lee, dismissed from the Revolutionary army for his conduct at and after the battle of Monmouth, and thenceforth the bitter enemy of Washington, has been strangely confounded with "Legion Harry," one of his most trusted officers during the war, and his intimate friend thereafter. Charles Lee was born in Wales, and was in no way connected with the Lees of Virginia. For a sketch of the last days of Charles Lee, see John Estlin Cooke, in *Harper's Magazine* for September, 1858, p. 502.

<sup>2</sup> LEE TO SCOTT, April 20, 1861: "Since my interview with you on the 18th instant, I have felt that I ought no longer to retain my commission in the army. I therefore tender my resignation, which I request you will recommend for acceptance. It would have been presented at once but for the struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a service in which I have devoted all the best years of my life, and all the ability I possessed. . . . Save in defense of my native state, I never desire again to draw my sword." To his sister he wrote on the same day: "The whole South is in a state of revolution, into which Virginia, after a long struggle, has been drawn; and though I recognize no necessity for this state of things, and would have forborne and plended to the end for redress of grievances, real or supposed, yet in my own person I had to meet the question whether I should take part against my native state. With all my devotion to the Union, and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my





ROBERT E. LEE.

futile. Lee soon found himself fighting with his state and against his nation, with what skill, and bravery, and ill-fortune is yet to be told. That very month, four years after, he surrendered the fragments of his great army to the successor of the man who had so vainly urged him against taking the fatal step.

Three days after his resignation, Lee formally accepted from the State Convention the position of commander of all the forces of Virginia, not yet one of the Confederate states, though soon to become one. The President of the Convention, in formally announcing the appointment, amplified the famous sentence which the father of the general had uttered respecting the Father of the Union. Lee rejoined, reiterating that he should only fight in behalf of Virginia.<sup>1</sup>

When the state forces of Virginia were merged into the army of the Confederacy Lee was appointed brigadier general, but was still outranked by Cooper and A. S. Johnston, who

had held older commissions in the army of the United States.<sup>1</sup> His unsuccessful operations in Western Virginia have been already narrated.<sup>2</sup> He was then sent to superintend the coast defenses in Georgia and South Carolina. When the Union forces began to menace Richmond, he was recalled to superintend the defenses of the Confederate capital. Randolph was nominally Secretary of War, but the actual functions of the office were performed by Lee.

Little had been done to fortify Richmond before the battle of Fair Oaks. When Lee was appointed to the command he issued a stirring address to his troops. The army, he said, had made its last retreat, and henceforth its watchword must be "Victory or Death." He first set himself at work to surround the capital with defenses, while he awaited the arrival of new troops, and watched the developments of the plans of his opponent. By the time McClellan's bridges were complete Richmond had become a fortified camp, and Lee thought himself in a condition to assume the offensive at a favorable moment.<sup>3</sup> To ascertain the precise position of the Federal right,

upon an abler man. Trusting in Almighty God, an approving conscience, and the aid of my fellow-citizens, I devote myself to the service of my native state, in whose behalf alone will I ever again draw my sword."—(*Southern Generals*, 44.)

<sup>1</sup> Of Albert Sidney Johnston, killed at Shiloh, we have had occasion to speak (*ante*, p. 299, 300). We shall not henceforth have to speak of Samuel Cooper, and will here dismiss him in a brief note. He was born in the State of New York in 1798; was educated at West Point; rose by slow seniority until 1852, when we find him colonel and adjutant general. He married into the Mason family of Virginia, and became a Virginian by adoption. When secession occurred he resigned his commission, offered himself to the Confederates, and was named adjutant general. Traitor to his state as well as to his nation, like Semmes of the Alabama, it is notable that his last official act as Adjutant General of the United States was to affix his signature to the order by which Twiggs was "dismissed from the army of the United States for his treachery to the flag of his country." Cooper sent in his resignation on the 7th of March, 1861. It was accepted, but was to take effect from the 1st, the day when he signed the order for the dismissal of Twiggs. On the 15th he was at Montgomery tendering his services to the Confederacy. He acted as Adjutant General of the Confederacy during the war.—(*Southern Generals*, 286-294.) <sup>2</sup> *Ante*, p. 144.

<sup>3</sup> "After the battle of Seven Pines, the Federal army, preparatory to an advance upon Richmond, proceeded to fortify its position on the Chickahominy. . . . The intention of the en-



SAMUEL COOPER.

mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, and my home. I have therefore resigned my commission in the army, and, save in defense of my native state, with the sincere hope that my poor services may never be needed, I hope I may never be called on to draw my sword."—(*Southern Generals*, 36.)

<sup>1</sup> The President of the Convention said: "You are at this day among the living citizens of Virginia, 'First in War;' we pray to God most fervently that you may so conduct the operations committed to your charge that it will soon be said of you that you are 'First in Peace,' and when that time comes, you will have earned the still prouder distinction of being 'First in the hearts of your Countrymen.'" Lee replied: "I would have much preferred that your choice had fallen



BIRD'S-EYE VIEW OF RICHMOND AND VICINITY.







JAMES E. B. STUART

and the nature of its communications with its base of supplies on the York River, Stuart, with fifteen hundred cavalry, was sent to make a raid clear around the rear of the Union forces on the north bank of the Chickahominy. He set out on the 13th of June, veiling his purpose by going first northward, in order to give the impression that his object was to re-enforce Jackson. Then turning sharply southeastward to Hanover Court-house, he found himself unexpectedly clear to the right and rear of the Federal lines. Thence he dashed toward the White House, destroying some dépôts of provisions, which were protected by scarcely a corporal's guard, and turned southwestward to the Chickahominy, which he reached at midnight of the 14th, some miles below Bottom's Bridge. Here he found the ruins of an old bridge, from which a temporary foot-bridge was constructed, over which the men crossed, the horses swimming the stream. Only a single man was lost by Stuart in this daring expedition. He brought with him a hundred and sixty-five prisoners, and more than twice as many horses.<sup>1</sup> McClellan saw in this exploit only a raid productive of no important result.<sup>2</sup> But the real result was of immense moment. It showed that McClellan's communications were utterly unprotected, and that he was open to a blow on this vital point. Lee at once directed Jackson to move rapidly down from the upper valley of the Shenandoah, and join him upon the north side of the Chickahominy, where his main force would be at the appointed time. To mask this movement, Whiting's division was ostentatiously dispatched in the direction of Jackson, apparently with the design of strengthening him for a movement toward Washington.<sup>3</sup> The ruse succeeded. The movement was hardly made when it was known to McClellan and at Washington. The President saw in it a weakening of the Confederate force at Richmond equivalent to a corresponding strengthening of McClellan. The general saw in it an illustration of the strength and confidence of the enemy opposed to him. Lincoln wished to know when McClellan would attack; McClellan replied that the attack would be made "after to-morrow, as soon as Providence will permit."<sup>4</sup>

emy seemed to be to attack Richmond by regular approaches. The strength of his left wing rendered a direct assault injudicious, if not impracticable. It was therefore determined to construct defensive lines, so as to enable a part of the army to defend the city, and leave the other part free to cross the Chickahominy and operate on the north bank. By sweeping down the river on that side, and threatening his communications with York River, it was thought that the enemy would be compelled to retreat or give battle out of his intrenchments."—(*Lee's Rep.*, i., 5.) "The earth-works designed by Lee were of considerable magnitude, and were constructed in different shape, to suit the conformation of the ground. They swept all the roads, crowned every hillock, and mounds of red earth could be seen, in striking contrast with the rich green aspect of the landscape. Redoubts, rifle-pits, casemate-batteries, horn-works, and enfilading batteries were visible in great numbers in and out of the woods in all directions. Some were mounted with heavy siege-pieces of various calibre, but the majority were intended for field-guns."—(*Southern Generals*, 52.)

<sup>1</sup> Stuart's Report, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 192.

<sup>2</sup> "The burning of two schooners laden with forage, and fourteen government wagons, the destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at Garlick's Landing, and some little damage done at Tunstall's Station, and a little *éclat*, were the precise results of this expedition."—*McC. Rep.*, 231.

<sup>3</sup> "Yours of to-day, making it probable that Jackson has been re-enforced by about ten thousand from Richmond, is confirmed. . . . If this be true, it is as good as a re-enforcement to you of equal force. I could better dispose of things if I could know about what day you can attack Richmond."—(Lincoln to McClellan, June 18.) "Our army is well over the Chickahominy. . . . the rebel lines run within musket range of ours. Each has heavy supports at hand."

#### STRENGTH OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY IN VIRGINIA FROM SEPTEMBER, 1861, TO JUNE, 1862.

General J. E. Johnston, at the request of the writer of this History, furnishes the following authentic statement of the force under his command during this period:

"January 3d, 1862.

"In September, 1861, the effective strength of the army under my command in Northern Virginia was about 37,000. It occupied Leesburg, Centerville and Manassas, and the Lower Occoquan.

"On the 31st of December it had been increased, by improved health and the addition of Loring's and Holmes's troops, to 54,000, including Jackson's command. Jackson's 8000 were near Winchester and Romney. There were 2600 at Leesburg; 31,800 at Centerville and Manassas; 7000 on the Lower Occoquan and near Dumfries; and 5000 about Fredericksburg. This army was much reduced during the winter by the effect of what we called the 'Bounty and Furlough Law,' but received some recruits from the South in the early spring. When, in April, it moved to Williamsburg, its strength (effective) was about 50,000, of which 6000 were left with Jackson in the Valley, and 6000 with Ewell, on the Rappahannock.

Jackson commenced his march to join Lee on the 17th. It was expected that he would be at Ashland, fifteen miles from the extreme right of the Federal line, on the 24th. Up to this time McClellan believed him to be at Gordonsville, seventy miles away. Reports, industriously circulated so as to reach Washington, placed him every where: at Gordonsville, at Port Republic, at Harrisonburg, at Luray, and even at New Creek—a hundred or a hundred and fifty miles from his real position. Some informants said that he was moving toward Richmond; others that he was to march upon Washington and Baltimore as soon as McClellan should attack Richmond. The President believed that these reports were mere bluffs, and suspected that the real movement was toward Richmond, as it proved to be.<sup>1</sup>

Picket-firing and desultory skirmishing with artillery had been going on all along at intervals. On the 25th, the "bridges and intrenchments being at last completed, an advance of our picket-line on the left was ordered, preparatory to a general forward movement." The object was to ascertain the nature of the ground beyond a belt of swampy woods half a mile in front of Fair Oaks Farm. The attempt was vigorously opposed, and a desultory fight occurred, lasting from eight in the morning to five in the afternoon: "not a battle, but merely an affair of Heintzelman's corps, supported by Keyes," with some aid from Sumner. According to McClellan, his point was fully gained. The Confederates give a different report of the "affair." As events happened, it matters little whether or not a few hundred yards were here won. The "forward movement" for which it was preparatory was made the next day, but by Lee, not by McClellan.<sup>2</sup>

At five o'clock McClellan telegraphed to Washington that the "affair is over, and we have gained our point fully. . . . all is now quiet." An hour and a half later another dispatch from him went over the wires. It said that Jackson's advance was at Hanover Court-house; Beauregard was at Richmond; there were 200,000 men opposed to him; he should probably be attacked next day; he would do all he could, and, if his army was destroyed by overwhelming numbers, he could at least die with it, and share its fate; if the result of the coming action was disaster, he was not responsible; there was no use of again asking for re-enforcements.<sup>3</sup>

There were, indeed, some errors in this dispatch. None of Beauregard's army had come to Richmond. Instead of 200,000, the Confederates had barely half as many effective men; instead of "having to contend with vastly superior odds," McClellan's army was somewhat in excess of the enemy. Beauregard was at a quiet watering-place in Alabama, because his "physicians urgently recommended rest and recreation." These physicians were apparently none other than Jefferson Davis and his chief adviser Benjamin, who, to say nothing of old grudges dating as far back as Bull Run, were displeased with his abandonment of Corinth.<sup>4</sup> But the essential part was true. Jackson, for once a day behind his time, was near Hanover Court-house, with not merely his advance, but with his whole force. He himself had been that day at Richmond, where a general council of war was held, at which the plan of attack for the next day was settled;<sup>5</sup> and two hours before the dawn of the next morning six divisions of the Confederate army would be on their march beyond the Chickahominy, to fall upon the Union right, not half their number, isolated on the north side of the stream.<sup>6</sup>

A general engagement may take place any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. They have certainly great numbers and extensive works. If ten or fifteen thousand men have left Richmond to re-enforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries."—(McClellan to Lincoln, same day, *Com. Rep.*, 336, 337.)

<sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 235, 236.

<sup>2</sup> This "affair" is named by the Confederates the Battle of King's School-house. Its actual results appear to be that the Federals lost about 600 men—516, not including Palmer's brigade, as stated by McClellan; the Confederates, probably, not quite as many. McClellan says (*Rep.*, 236, 237): "Our object was fully accomplished; the enemy was driven from his camps." Wright, who commanded the Confederate centre, says (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 386): "When the fight ceased at dark, I occupied the very line my pickets had been driven from in the morning, and which I continued to hold until the total rout of the Federal army on the 29th." Lee says (*Rep.*, i., 6): "The enemy attacked on the Williamsburg road. The effort was successfully resisted, and our line maintained."

<sup>3</sup> Several contrabands just in give information confirming supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court-house, and that Beauregard arrived with strong re-enforcements in Richmond yesterday.

<sup>4</sup> I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at (200,000) two hundred thousand, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack.

<sup>5</sup> I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent, repeatedly, the necessity of re-enforcements; that this was the decisive point, and that all the available means of the government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it, and share its fate.

<sup>6</sup> But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility can not be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that there is no use in my again asking for re-enforcements."—*McC. Rep.*, 238.

<sup>7</sup> *Southern Generals*, 237.—After the evacuation of Corinth, May 30th, "Mr. Davis telegraphed to General Bragg to assume permanent command. General Beauregard was thus laid on the shelf, not to be reinstated, as Mr. Davis passionately declared, though the whole world should urge him to that measure."—(General Jordan, Beauregard's Chief of Staff, in *Harper's Magazine* for October, 1865.) For some of the grounds of the old dispute between Davis and Beauregard, see *ibid.*; also *Southern Generals*, 223-225.

<sup>8</sup> POLLARD, ii., 311.

<sup>9</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 122, 126, 173.

"The remaining 38,000 were sent to the position near Yorktown in two bodies. I accompanied the second, which arrived on the 17th of April. Magruder's own force was about 15,000, making our army at Yorktown near 53,000, exclusive of cavalry. Sickness and the fight at Williamsburg reduced this number by 6000. Our loss at Williamsburg was about 1800.

"According to the above numbers, the strength of this army, when it reached the neighborhood of Richmond, was about 47,000. To this were added, near the end of May, Anderson's and Branch's troops—about 13,000—and three brigades of Huger's division—not quite 7000. If the effect of sickness is not considered, this would make the army amount to 67,000 at the time of the fights at Fair Oaks and Seven Pines. On that occasion, four brigades of G. W. Smith's division were engaged at Fair Oaks; and at Seven Pines, D. H. Hill's four, and two of Longstreet's, were engaged on the 31st of May. On the morning of June 1st there were nine Confederate brigades at Fair Oaks, five of them fresh, and thirteen at Seven Pines, seven of them fresh—that is to say, which had not been engaged the day before."





CAMP LEE, HEAD QUARTERS, NEAR RICHMOND.



CONSCRIPTION OFFICE, CAMP LEE.

## CHAPTER XX.

## THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

## III. FROM THE CHICKAHOMINY TO THE JAMES.

Plans of Operations.—The Strength of the Armies.—Lee's General Order.—*Battle of Mechanicsville, or Beaver Dam Creek*: The March from Richmond.—The Federal Position.—The Attack upon the Right.—The Attack upon the Left.—Repulse of the Confederates.—McClellan's Plans.—Change of Base resolved upon.—*Battle of Cold Harbor, or Gaines's Mill*: The Federals fall back.—The new Position.—Advance of the Confederates.—The Assault by A. P. Hill.—Its Repulse.—General Assault by Longstreet, D. H. Hill, and Jackson.—Porter hard pressed.—Slocum re-enforces him.—The Union Line broken.—Ineffectual Cavalry Charge.—Batteries captured.—Arrival of French and Meagher.—The Pursuit checked.—The Federals cross the Chickahominy.—Operations on the right Bank.—The Fight at Golding's Farm.—The Council of War.—McClellan's Letter to the Secretary of War.—Results of the Battle.—Peril of Richmond.—The Change of Base.—Topography of the Region.—The Federal Retreat.—Lee's Embarrassment.—Stunt at the White House.—The Confederate Pursuit.—Skirmish at Price's Farm.—*Battle of Savage's Station*: Heintzelman's unauthorized Retreat.—Destruction of Stores.—Magruder's Attack.—The Retreat continued.—*Battle of Frazier's Farm, or Charles City Cross Roads*: The Confederate Pursuit.—Lee's Plan of Operations.—Why it failed.—Holmes' and Wise's Movements.—The Federal Position.—Longstreet's Attack.—McCall's Defense.—The Fight in the Woods.—Hooker's and Kearney's Divisions.—A. P. Hill's Attack.—Gains Ground.—Is repulsed.—Close of the Action.—The Result.—McCall's Division.—*Battle of Malvern Hill*: The Federal Position.—Repulse of D. H. Hill in the Morning.—Lee's Order.—Magruder and D. H. Hill attack in the Afternoon.—The Battle as seen from both Sides.—The Confederates repulsed.—Condition of their Force.—McClellan retreats to Harrison's Landing.—Errors in this Campaign.—Lee's first Error should have been fatal.—McClellan's Error at Cold Harbor.—His Failure to attack Richmond.—His general Failure as a Commander.—Absent at all important Moments.—Lee's second strategical Error.—Position and Movements during the six Days.—Lee's Error at Malvern.—McClellan's last Error.—Jackson in the Battles.—General Review of the Subject.—The Losses in these Battles.

THURSDAY, June 26th, had been fixed upon by both McClellan and Lee as the day when each was to commence an offensive movement. Neither was aware of the intention, and each was deceived as to the object and position of the other. Lee presumed that McClellan intended to lay siege to Richmond by regular approaches. The city was in no condition to sustain a prolonged and close investment. It was not provisioned for a fortnight in advance, and its line of supply was liable to be interrupted at any moment. His object was simply to raise the siege. This he proposed to do by assailing McClellan at the point where he himself was most vulnerable: by threatening his line of communications with the York River, whence, as Stuart's raid had shown, his supplies were wholly drawn. McClellan's purpose was to attack Richmond by direct assault.<sup>1</sup>

The armies by which these two plans were to be carried out were almost equal in number, character of troops, and equipment. Each consisted of a little more than 100,000 effective men, present for duty. Making every allowance for defective reports on either side, the difference could not have been more than 5000. In a contest between forces so nearly balanced, the victory would rest with that which was most ably commanded. The general who made the fewest errors would win.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> "The intention of the enemy seemed to be to attack Richmond by regular approaches. By sweeping down the Chickahominy on the north side, and threatening his communications with York River, it was thought that the enemy would be compelled to retreat or give battle out of his intrenchments."—(*Lee's Rep.*, i., 5.) "On the 25th, our bridges and intrenchments being at last completed, an advance of our picket line on the left was ordered, preparatory to a general forward movement." "On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final advance, the enemy attacked our right, and turned my attention to the protection of our communications and depôts of supply."—(*McC. Rep.*, 236, 239.)

<sup>2</sup> The strength of McClellan's force at this time is fixed within a few hundreds by official evidence. McClellan (*Report*, 53) states its numbers (from which should properly be deducted 1101 men with Colonel Ingalls, Quartermaster, at the White House) on the 20th of June to have been, "Officers and men, present for duty, 105,825." This is exclusive of Dix's Corps of 10,000 at Fortress Monroe, which was too far removed to take any part in the operations. The Report of

Lee's plan of operations was carefully elaborated by himself and Jefferson Davis, and carried into execution under the eye and by the direction of both, who were on the field, and under fire at the most decisive points. A chance shot might at any moment, by killing either, have changed the whole course of the war.<sup>1</sup>

The whole scheme of operations was set forth on the 24th, in an elaborate General Order from Lee, in which the movements of each division were carefully prescribed. A. P. Hill, Longstreet, and D. H. Hill, with 34,000 men, were to march from before Richmond, cross the Chickahominy above the extreme right of the Union lines, and join Jackson, who, with 30,000, was coming down from the north. Half of the cavalry were also to cross the Chickahominy. On the south side of the river were left only Huger's and Magruder's divisions, numbering 24,000, and the reserve artillery and the remaining cavalry, about 3000 in all, making less than 30,000 men of all arms on that side.<sup>2</sup> This plan involved one error, which should have

McClellan's adjutant general of the same day (*Com. Rep.* 337) gives the apportionment of this force. From this number should be deducted the losses by casualty and sickness for the week between the 20th and the 26th. These, including the 600 killed and wounded in the "affair" of the 25th, could not vary greatly from 1500.

The Confederate force consisted of the divisions of Huger, Magruder, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and D. H. Hill, the reserve artillery of Pendleton, and Stunt's cavalry, in front of Richmond; and Jackson's command, comprising the three divisions of himself, Ewell, and Whiting, coming down from the Valley of the Shenandoah. To these are to be added a portion of Holmes' division and Wise's brigade, brought over from the other side of the James River near the close of the operations. A. P. Hill (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 173), D. H. Hill (*Ibid.*, i., 187), and Holmes (*Ibid.*, i., 151) give the number of their force. Longstreet does not state his, but four of his six brigade commanders (*Ibid.*, i., 330, 331, 346, 353) give the number in their brigades, which enables us to fix very nearly the strength of the whole division. Magruder (*Ibid.*, i., 190) gives his, and (*Ibid.*, i., 191, 202) enables us, in connection with the statements of two of his four brigade commanders (*Ibid.*, i., 367, 371), to fix very nearly that of Huger. Pendleton (*Ibid.*, i., 224) enumerates fifteen batteries as constituting the reserve artillery; to each of these we assign 100 men. Stuart's cavalry (*Ibid.*, i., 398) consisted of six regiments and three legions: we give the strength wholly by estimate. The precise numbers are, however, of little consequence, as the cavalry was not actually employed on either side. The main possible source of error in estimating the Confederate force consists in fixing the strength of Jackson's command, of which we find no official statement. The lowest probable estimate is 27,000, the highest 35,000; we put it at 30,000, not merely as a medium between the two, but as the one which, upon careful examination, appears to be the closest approximation to the truth.

From the foregoing data we deduce the following table, representing the effective force upon each side on the 26th of June.

UNION FORCES		CONFEDERATE FORCES	
Sumner's Corps	17,581	A. P. Hill's Division	14,000
Heintzelman's Corps	18,810	D. H. Hill's Division	10,000
Keyes's Corps	14,610	Longstreet's Division	10,000
Porter's Corps	19,960	Magruder's Division	13,000
Franklin's Corps	19,405	Huger's Division	11,000
McCall's Division	9,514	Holmes's Division	7,000
McClellan's Staff, Engineers, Cavalry Division, Provost Guard, etc.	4,844	Jackson's Command	30,000
	104,724	Pendleton's Artillery	1,500
Deduct losses, June 20 to 26 (say)	1,500	Stuart's Cavalry	4,000
Entire Force, June 26	103,224	Entire Force, June 26	100,500

Besides this effective force, "present for duty," each army contained many sick. Of these, on the 20th of June, there were in McClellan's army 12,225, probably increased on the 26th to 13,000; moreover, there were nearly 30,000 reported as "absent," a considerable portion of whom were undoubtedly away on sick-leave. We have no means of ascertaining the number of these in the Confederate army; but scattered incidentally through the reports are evidences that it was very considerable. It is clear, however, that Lee brought into the field every effective man at his disposal.

<sup>1</sup> "The plan was submitted to his Excellency the President, who was repeatedly on the field in the course of its execution."—(*Lee's Rep.*, i., 5.) The presence of Davis is repeatedly mentioned in the reports of different officers. We find him on the 26th giving direction for the battle at Mechanicsville; on the 27th and 28th we find him on the field; and on the 30th at Frazier's Farm, where "the fight was commenced by fire from the enemy's artillery, which swept down the road, and from which his Excellency the President narrowly escaped accident."—(*Ibid.*, i., 177.)

<sup>2</sup> The following are the most important portions of the General Orders of Lee, "No. 75; June 24th (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 44, 45):

"General Jackson's command will proceed to-morrow from Ashland toward the Slash Church, and will encamp at some convenient point west of the Central Railroad. Bruch's brigade of A. P. Hill's division will also, to-morrow evening, take position on the Chickahominy, near Half Sink. At 3 o'clock Thursday morning, 26th instant, General Jackson will advance on the road



ASHLAND.



MECHANICSVILLE.



insured his destruction. It was made on the assumption that the bulk of the Union army was still on the north side of the Chickahominy, whereas, of the 100,000 men of which it was composed, only 30,000 were on that side; the remaining 70,000 had already crossed, and were strongly posted on the south side.<sup>1</sup> While thus assailing the Union army on that side with double its force, he left Richmond open to assault from more than twice the number by which it was defended. But the very magnitude of the error prevented its being suspected. Neither McClellan nor one of his generals ever imagined that Richmond was practically uncovered. It is curious to find that during the 27th—the decisive day—while on the north side of the river the Confederate force was two to one, and on the south side the Union force two to one, the commanders on both sides, and at all points, believed themselves to be fighting with or confronted against superior numbers.

#### TUESDAY, JUNE 26.—MECHANICSVILLE.<sup>2</sup>

During the evening of the 25th—at almost the hour when McClellan was awakened from the dream of rejoicing over what he thought the successful result of the advance of his picket line preparatory for the final advance of his whole army on the following day, by the unwelcome tidings that Jackson was close at hand, threatening his right and rear—A. P. Hill had marched northward and concentrated his whole division near Meadow Bridge. Branch's brigade had gone still farther in order to communicate with Jackson, who was to be at that point at early dawn; the whole movement being entirely hidden by the formation of the ground from the view of the Union pickets on the opposite side of the Chickahominy.<sup>3</sup> Two and three hours after midnight Longstreet and D. H. Hill commenced their still longer march through mud and darkness in the same direction, reaching their assigned positions in front of Mechanicsville at eight in the morning.<sup>4</sup> Branch waited for six hours for the approach of Jackson. At ten word was sent that he was close at hand. Branch then crossed the Chickahominy, and moved slowly down its north bank, driving the Union pickets before him. A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, waited at their post for hours, also momentarily expecting the approach of Jackson. Three o'clock came, and yet no tidings.

leading to Pale Green [Walnut Green] Church, communicating his march to General Branch, who will immediately cross the Chickahominy, and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As soon as the movements of these columns are discovered, General A. P. Hill, with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy near Meadow Bridge, and move direct upon Mechanicsville. To aid his advance, the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will at the proper time open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville, and the passage across the bridge opened, General Longstreet, with his division and that of General D. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at or near that point—General D. H. Hill moving to the support of General Jackson, and General Longstreet supporting General A. P. Hill—the four divisions keeping in communication with each other, and moving *en echelon* on separate roads, if practicable. The left division in advance, with skirmishers and sharpshooters extending in their front, will sweep down the Chickahominy and endeavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge; General Jackson, bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam Creek, and taking the direction toward Coal Harbor. They will then press forward toward the York River Railroad, closing upon the enemy's rear, and forcing him down the Chickahominy. Any advance of the enemy toward Richmond will be prevented by vigorously following his rear, and crippling and arresting his progress. The divisions of General Huger and Magruder will hold their positions in front of the enemy against attack, and make such demonstrations, Thursday, as to discover his operations. Should opportunity offer, the feint will be converted into a real attack; and should an abandonment of his intrenchments by the enemy be discovered, he will be closely pursued. . . . Commanders of divisions will cause their commands to be provided with three days' cooked rations. The necessary ambulances and ordnance trains will be ready to accompany the divisions, and receive orders from their respective commanders."

Magruder states (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 191) that when these orders had been executed "there were but 25,000 men between the enemy's army of 100,000 and Richmond." He underrates the actual force of all arms by some 3000.

<sup>1</sup> Lee seems never to have discovered this error, for in his Report, prepared eight months later, he says (p. 8): "The principal part of the enemy was now [June 27th] on the north side of the Chickahominy."

<sup>2</sup> The battle of Thursday, June 26th, is usually styled by Federal authorities that of Beaver Dam, from the small stream on whose banks it was fought; Lee, and all Confederate authorities, more properly call it that of Mechanicsville. Lee calls the battle of the 27th that of the Chickahominy; by the majority of Union authorities it is styled that of Gaines's Mill; but we follow all other Confederate Reports, and designate it as the battle of Cold Harbor. Various names have been given to the action of June 30th, such as Glendale, Charles City Cross Roads, and White Oak Swamp; we follow Lee and all other Confederate Reports, and call it the battle of Frazier's Farm, that being the place where the sharpest fighting occurred.

<sup>3</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 173, 258.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, i., 122, 180.



JAMES LONGSTREET.

Jackson had been delayed by the Union skirmishers spread out along his line of march. Hill resolved to cross at once, rather than to hazard the failure of the whole plan by longer deferring the execution of his part of it. The crossing was effected without serious opposition, and the bulk of the division, Branch being yet far behind, pressed down toward Mechanicsville. Here, but on the south side of the stream, Longstreet and D. H. Hill were in waiting, and, after a little delay in repairing the bridge, also crossed the Chickahominy, the Union advance falling back from the village for a mile to a position beyond Beaver Dam Creek.

This was held by two brigades of McCall's Pennsylvania Reserves, who had joined McClellan a fortnight before. The position was a strong one—the creek curving around Mechanicsville for a mile; the water, waist-deep, was five or six yards wide, with steep banks. It was impassable for artillery except by bridges on two roads, one crossing at Ellison's Mill, near its mouth, the other a mile above. These roads and the open fields between them were commanded by artillery, and the whole line on the north bank was defended by rifle-pits and felled trees. The position could be carried in front only by a superior force, and with heavy loss. But it could be turned on the right; and A. P. Hill supposed that this had been already done by Jackson, who would then have interposed his force between McCall and Porter, cutting off both retreat and re-enforcements. Without waiting to ascertain whether this had been accomplished, Hill marched his whole division across the open fields, swept by the Union batteries. The main stress of his attack was at first directed upon the Union right at the upper road, which was held by Reynolds. The Confederates advanced gallantly under a murderous fire, and reached the edge of the creek. A few even succeeded in crossing above Reynolds's position, and gained a lodgment on the opposite side; but they effected nothing. Elsewhere the assault was repulsed, the assailants suffering fearfully.

Davis and Lee, who were watching the fight from different positions on the other side of the Chickahominy, ordered D. H. Hill to send forward a brigade to the support of the division which had been roughly handled. Ripley's was dispatched, and a little before dark aided A. P. Hill in a furious assault upon the Union left at Ellison's Mill, which was held by Seymour. The attack failed even more disastrously than that upon the right. At 9 o'clock, the Confederates, repulsed at all points, fell back beyond artillery range, and the firing gradually ceased.

This action was fought on the Union side wholly by Reynolds's and Seymour's brigades, numbering 6000, and five brigades of the Confederates, numbering about 12,000. The Confederate loss in killed and wounded was about 1500, of which two fifths fell upon Ripley's single brigade. The Union troops had every advantage in position, and their loss was not more than 300.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For the data upon which the losses in this and subsequent battles are estimated, see Note at



ELLISON'S MILL.





JOHN F. REYNOLDS.

From the moment when McClellan learned of the approach of the enemy on his right, he wisely gave up all idea of maintaining his position on the north bank of the Chickahominy. At noon of the 26th he telegraphed to the Secretary of War that his pickets were being driven in, he supposed by Jackson's advance-guard; that his communications would probably be cut off, and even Yorktown might be recaptured; the case was a desperate one, but he would do his best to outmanœuvre, outwit, and outfight the enemy.<sup>1</sup> The Quartermaster at West Point was directed to send supplies to the front to the last moment; to hurry the remaining stores up the James River, burning every thing which could not be got off—to prepare, in fact, for a change of base from the York to the James River—a change which should have been made weeks before.<sup>2</sup> More than a week before, McClellan had made some arrangements looking to this movement. Had it been undertaken in time, the whole course of the campaign must have been changed. Lee, instead of raising the siege of Richmond by threatening the line to the York River, must have assailed McClellan in his intrenchments, or subjected the ill-provisioned city, with its immense protecting army, to the hazard

the end of this chapter. The Reports of the various Confederate Commanders are very minute, and fully set forth the completeness of their defeat.

Lee says (*Report*, i., 6): "Jackson's march on the 26th was longer than had been anticipated, and his progress also being retarded by the enemy, A. P. Hill did not begin his movement until 3 P.M., when he crossed the river and advanced upon Mechanicsville. Longstreet and D. H. Hill crossed the Mechanicsville bridge as soon as it could be repaired, but it was late before they reached the north bank. D. H. Hill's leading brigade, under Ripley, advanced to the support of the troops engaged, and at a late hour united with Pender's brigade of A. P. Hill's division in an effort to turn the enemy's left; but the troops were unable, in the growing darkness, to overcome the obstructions, and after sustaining a destructive fire of musketry and artillery at short range were withdrawn."

D. H. Hill (*Ibid.*, i., 180) says: "I had received several messages from General Lee, and one from the President of the Confederate States, to send forward a brigade. In advancing this brigade I met General Pender, whose brigade had just been roughly handled, who told me that, with the assistance of two regiments of Ripley's brigade, he could turn the position at Ellison's Mill by the right, while two regiments should advance in front. General Ripley was ordered to co-operate with Pender, and the attack was made about dark. The enemy had intrenchments of great strength and development on the other side of Beaver Dam, and had the banks lined with his magnificent artillery. The approach was over an open plain, exposed to a murderous fire of all arms, and an almost impassable stream was to be crossed. The result was, as might have been anticipated, a disastrous and bloody repulse."

Ripley (*Ibid.*, i., 230) says: "I was informed by General A. P. Hill that the enemy had a strong and well-served battery and force in position near Ellison's Mill, to attack which he had sent Pender's brigade by the right, and other troops to the left; and it was arranged that my brigade should co-operate. While the troops were in motion I received orders to assault the enemy from General Lee, and also from General D. H. Hill. Night coming on, and it being deemed important to attack the position at once, the advance was ordered along the whole line. We drove back the enemy from his advanced positions, and closed in upon the batteries and their heavy infantry supports, all of which poured upon our troops a heavy and incessant fire of shell, canister, and musketry. The ground was rugged, and intersected by ditches, and covered with abatis a short distance in front of the position to be assaulted. A mill-race, with scarped banks, and in some places waist-deep in water, ran along the front of the enemy, at a distance ranging from fifty to one hundred yards. To this position our troops succeeded in advancing, notwithstanding the fire of the enemy was exceedingly severe. The loss was heavy in the extreme, amounting in the 44th Georgia to 335, and in the 3d North Carolina to 142. Some time after nightfall our troops were withdrawn. The fragments of the 3d North Carolina and the 44th Georgia were rallied some distance in the rear, under some difficulty, owing to the loss of all their field and many of their company officers." In this assault of hardly an hour's duration Ripley's single brigade of 2366 men lost 574 in killed and wounded—more than one fourth being killed outright.

A. P. Hill (*Ibid.*, i., 174), after describing the several assaults made by his division, and their "failure with heavy loss," adds: "It was never contemplated that my division alone should have sustained the shock of this battle; but such was the case, and the only assistance I received was from Ripley." Each of Hill's four brigade commanders who were engaged in this action speak of heavy losses in their command.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, 241, 243—"The superiority of the James River route, as a line of attack and supply, is too obvious to need exposition."—*Ibid.*, 242.

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 240.

of a siege or of direct assault. This change of base demanded that the whole army should be united on the south side of the Chickahominy. McClellan thought that Jackson—whose force was supposed to be the whole, instead of less than half, of that opposed to him on the right—was so close that the trains could be saved only by accepting battle on the north side. He did not expect to win a decisive victory. His utmost hope was to hold his own for a few hours.<sup>1</sup> The battle was to be fought by Porter, and McClellan wished to give him all the re-enforcements which could be spared from the other side of the river. He asked each commander of a corps on the south side how many men he could spare to re-enforce Porter, after retaining sufficient to hold his own position for twenty-four hours. The answers showed that not one of them imagined that the greater part of the force of the enemy which had confronted them had been withdrawn and was now on the other side. Keyes wanted to keep all the men he had, "if the enemy is as strong as ever in front;" Heintzelman would undertake to hold his intrenchments with four brigades, which would leave two disposable for service on the other side of the river. The afternoon of the next day, when the battle of Cold Harbor hung in even scale, Franklin, half of whose corps had already been sent over, did not think it prudent to take any more troops from him; and Sumner ventured only to say that he could send two of his eight brigades, and even that would be hazardous.<sup>2</sup> These two brigades were sent, but an hour too late to change the fortune of the day. They were too late to take part in the battle, but just in time to prevent a sore defeat from becoming a total rout.

## FRIDAY, JUNE 27.—COLD HARBOR.

The position at Beaver Dam Creek was far in advance of the main force and easily turned. During the night the force which had held it was quietly withdrawn, leaving only enough to serve as a blind, and they were to retreat as the enemy advanced. A new line was taken up five miles below. The thirty heavy guns which had been placed in batteries between these two positions were removed across the Chickahominy, with nearly all the wagons of Porter's corps, and New Bridge, the upper one on the stream, was destroyed behind them. This was done during the night, and as the morning of the 27th broke, hot and sultry, Porter and McCall, freed from all impedimenta, stood ready for action.

The position was a strong one. A small unnamed stream, curving sickle-wise, empties into the Chickahominy. The banks are in most places fringed with a belt of swamp, but in places they rise steeply, and the bed of the stream forms a ravine. On the eastern side the land rises in a gradual slope crossed by gullies, about fifty feet above the swamp, and spreads into a flat table-land, with here and there a gentle swell. Patches of woodland dot the plain, which is mostly cleared and cultivated, the farm-houses standing alone each in the midst of its own fields. Two places find names on the map: New Cold Harbor, nearest the Chickahominy, and Cold Harbor a mile northward. Each consists of two or three dilapidated houses, a rifle-shot apart. Cold Harbor was the centre of Porter's line, which thence turned sharply eastward for a mile. The whole semicircular line covered the heads of the bridges crossing the Chickahominy. Hasty preparations had been made for defense. The trees in the swamp had been felled; rifle-



THOMAS REYNOLDS.

<sup>1</sup> "Our retreat was a contingency I thought of; but my impression is, that up to the time of the battle of Gaines's Mill, I still hoped that we should be able to hold our own."—(McClellan, in *Com. Rep.*, 435.) "By desperate fighting, our right wing inflicted so severe a loss upon the enemy as to check his movement on the left bank of the river, and give us time to get our material out of the way."—*Ibid.*, 434.

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 250-258.





NEW GOLD HARBOR.

pits and barricades had been flung up on the hill-side; and the crest was crowned by the artillery, which could thus play over the heads of the infantry upon an advancing enemy; but the elaborate earth-works which now seam the region were the work of Grant, almost two years later. The plain over which was the approach to the front of this line was also swept by the heavy guns two miles away on the other side of the Chickahominy.

Butterfield held the extreme left of this line, extending to the swamps of the Chickahominy; next came Martindale—both of Morell's division—then Griffin's brigade; then Sykes, with his division: all of these, of Fitz-John Porter's corps, formed the first line. Behind this was McCall's division: Meade, then commander of a brigade, who was a year and a week after to win the battle of Gettysburg, the true turning-point of the war, was on the left; next Reynolds, in a few hours to be a prisoner of war; then Seymour, who a few hours before had crushed Ripley and Pender at Beaver Dam, as reserve behind the second line. Stoneman's cavalry were miles away to the north; they could be of no use on this field, which must be contested by infantry and artillery. Porter, fearing that Stoneman would be cut off by the advance of Jackson, sent orders to him to retreat to the White House, and afterward rejoin the army as best he could—where, no one knew.

If a battle was to be fought here by these forces, no stronger position could have been chosen, and no better dispositions made. Porter expected to be hard pressed in front; he hoped to hold his position without aid long enough to cover the retreat of the army; but he asked that some division on the other side should be held ready to support him.<sup>1</sup>

At dawn of the 27th the Confederates at Mechanicsville were astir. They had been aroused by a sharp artillery fire, and expected a renewal of the fight at Beaver Dam. After an hour they discovered that the firing was a ruse to detain them, and that the Federal forces had retired. Another hour was spent in repairing the bridges so that the artillery could cross; and then the divisions took up the line of march, as prescribed in Lee's order. D. H. Hill bore to the left to unite with Jackson, who was still behind, having encamped for the night within sound of the cannonade. A. P. Hill and Longstreet—Hill in advance—kept to the right, following the road along the Chickahominy. The march was slow and cautious, for on rounding any swell of land they might come upon their enemy in force. Noon had passed before five miles had been accomplished. Passing Gaines's Mill, where a slight skirmish occurred, from which has been given one of the names to the whole battle, they came in sight of the Union force drawn up on the hill-side beyond the unnamed creek. Between them lay an open plain a quarter of a mile wide, swept by artillery from the crest in front and from the other side of the Chickahominy, and bounded by a wood tangled with undergrowth, and traversed by a sluggish stream which converted the soil into a dense morass. Here a slight delay occurred to form the line.

It was past two o'clock<sup>2</sup> when Hill was directed to begin the assault. Longstreet was held back, because it was thought by Lee that Jackson's approach on the left, which was every moment expected, would cause the extension of the Union line in that direction. Hill's brigades dashed across the plain, floundered through the swamp, and pressed up the opposite slope in the face of a fierce fire of artillery and musketry. Some brigades advanced close to the infantry lines; a

few regiments even pierced them. But they were soon forced back. For two hours the battle raged with equal obstinacy on either side. The Federal troops gained ground, and from being assailed became the assailants. Hill was defeated, crushed, and almost routed. Some of his regiments stood their ground; others threw themselves flat on the earth to escape the withering fire; others rushed from the field in disorder.

The completeness of the defeat at this point is fully shown in the Confederate reports. Lee<sup>1</sup> and Hill<sup>2</sup> affirm it in general terms. Archer<sup>3</sup> says: "My troops fell back before the irresistible fire of artillery and rifles. The obvious impossibility of carrying the position without support prevented me from attempting to check the retreat. Had they not fallen back I would myself have ordered it." Pender<sup>4</sup> says: "My men were rallied and pushed forward again, but did not advance far before they fell back; and I think I do but justice to my men when I say that they did not commence it. The enemy were continually bringing up fresh troops, and succeeded in driving us from the road." Whiting, of Jackson's command, who came to the relief of these troops, says:<sup>5</sup> "Men were leaving the field in every direction, and in great disorder; two regiments, one from South Carolina and one from Louisiana, were actually marching back from the fire. The 1st Texas were ordered to go over them, and through them, which they did. . . . Near the crest, in front of us and lying down, appeared the fragments of a brigade. Men were skulking from the front in a shameful manner; the woods on our left and rear were full of troops in a safe cover, from which they never stirred. . . . Still farther on our extreme right our troops appeared to be falling back. . . . The troops on our immediate left I do not know, and I am glad I don't. Those that did come up were much broken, and no entreaty or command could induce them to come forward, and I have great reason to believe that the greater part never left the cover of the wood on the west side of the ravine." Whiting does great injustice to the troops of Hill. They were, indeed, defeated and broken, but it was after two hours of desperate fighting, under every disadvantage of position, against a force quite equal to them, as the record of their losses shows. Thus the regiment from South Carolina, which "was actually marching back under fire," must have been the "1st Rifles, S. C. Volunteers." Of this regiment its colonel, Marshall, reports:<sup>6</sup> "In that charge we sustained a loss of 76 killed, 221 wounded, and 58 missing; and on the next morning I had only 149 officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates for duty. Early on the morning after the battle I made a detail from each company to bury their dead, and so severe was the work of death in some of the companies that it took the detail all day to bury their dead;" and of those "missing" in the morning all but four rejoined their regiment.<sup>7</sup> Hill states the case fairly. After acknowledging the repulse, he says:<sup>8</sup> "My division was engaged full two

<sup>1</sup> Lee's Rep., i., 8.<sup>2</sup> Ibid., i., 154.<sup>3</sup> Ibid., i., 176.<sup>4</sup> Ibid., i., 502.<sup>5</sup> Ibid., i., 256.<sup>6</sup> Ibid., i., 505.<sup>7</sup> Ibid., i., 253.<sup>8</sup> Ibid., i., 176.

AMBROSE P. HILL.

<sup>1</sup> McC. Rep., 246-253.<sup>2</sup> There is a general discrepancy between the Union and the Confederate notation of the time of the different points of the whole series of actions, the latter making them usually about an hour later than the former.





FITZ-JOHN PORTER.

hours before assistance was received. We failed to carry the enemy's lines, but we paved the way for the successful attack afterward, and in which attacks it was necessary to employ the whole of our army that side of the Chickahominy. About four o'clock re-enforcements came up on my right from General Longstreet, and later Jackson's men on my left and centre, and my division was relieved of the weight of the contest."

Longstreet's division had been drawn up in the rear of Hill, covered from fire by a low ridge. Lee, finding Hill sorely worsted, ordered Longstreet to make a feigned attack upon the left, hoping to divert a part of the Union force to that direction, and thus relieve Hill. Longstreet soon found that the force here was too strong to be disturbed by a mere feint, and that to be of service he must make a real attack with his whole force. Jackson now came into view; D. H. Hill, who had joined him, in advance, on the extreme right, Ewell and Whiting on the left, and Lawton a little in the rear. The line was now complete, and a general advance along its whole extent was ordered.

Porter, in the mean while, seeing the immense force advancing upon him, had, two hours before, asked for re-enforcements. Slocum's division of Franklin's corps had been all day kept in readiness on the south side of the Chickahominy for this purpose. They had, indeed, been ordered over at daybreak, and had begun to cross; but when half way over the order was countermanded. They were now hurried over, and came upon the field at half past four, when the general Confederate attack had been fairly com-



DANIEL BUTTERFIELD.

menced. Porter's whole line was so severely pressed at every point that he was forced to divide Slocum's force, sending parts of it, even single regiments, to the points most threatened.<sup>1</sup>

The general Confederate assault was commenced by D. H. Hill upon the extreme Union right, held by Sykas with his regulars. He opened by a sharp artillery fire; but in half an hour the battery was withdrawn badly crippled. Meanwhile he could hear, by the direction of the fire on his right, that the Federals were forcing A. P. Hill and Longstreet back. The assault must be made hand to hand. In the face of a fierce fire, by which his force

<sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 243-251. McClellan says (*Rep.*, 248): "At 3 30 Slocum's division reached the field, and was immediately brought into action at the weak points of our line." It is clear that he places the arrival of Slocum a full hour too early; for at 3 25 he telegraphed to Porter (*Ibid.*, 251): "Slocum is now crossing Alexander's Bridge with his whole command." To finish the crossing, form, march up the bank, and reach the field of action, must have required an hour or more. There is some confusion as to the recall of Slocum's division in the morning. McClellan says (*Rep.*, 243): "General Franklin received instructions to hold General Slocum's division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the direction of General Porter, to move it at once to his assistance without farther orders;" and (*Ibid.*, 251) "Slocum's division commenced crossing the river to support Porter soon after daybreak on the morning of the 27th; but as the firing in front of Porter ceased, the movement was suspended." Franklin testifies (*Com. Rep.*, 622): "At seven o'clock in the morning of that day I was ordered to send Slocum's division to assist Porter. This order was countermanded about nine o'clock, after a part of the division had crossed the Chickahominy. The order to send the division over was signed by Colonel Colburn, and I sent back some word, I do not remember what. General Marey answered that he hardly supposed the general commanding could have intended to send the division over; that there must have been some mistake about it, he thought. Then about nine o'clock, perhaps nearly ten, the order was countermanded, the order countermanding coming from General McClellan, though I do not remember who signed it. What was the reason for ordering the division back I do not know."



HENRY W. SLOCUM.



GEORGE A. McCLELLAN.



was sorely galled, and some of the regiments thrown into disorder, he succeeded in passing the swamp in his front, and pressed up the opposite slope, only to be forced back. Ewell had come up on Hill's left, and attempted to carry the position in front of him; but most of his command gave way under the fierce fire which they encountered. "We were attacked," he says, "in front and flank by superior numbers, and were for hours without re-enforcements." The "hours" were less than an hour, and the "superior numbers" existed only in the imagination of the assailants, justifiable, indeed, by the terrible fire to which they were exposed. Trimble, of this division, led his brigade toward the Confederate right; he met two regiments coming out of the field in confusion, who cried out, "You need not go in; we're whipped; you can't do any thing!" "Get out of our way!" his men replied; "we will show you how to do it!" and they charged at a run across the field against the Union lines.<sup>1</sup> Still Ewell was losing ground, when Lawton's brigade came upon the field. This brigade, 4000 strong, composed wholly of Georgian troops, was a part of the force sent from Richmond a fortnight before to join Jackson, and "mask his withdrawal from the Valley." Jackson had incorporated this brigade with his "own" division, and it held the rear of his entire command. It was ordered forward from the place where it had been halted, two miles from the battle-field. Lawton went as rapidly as possible over a road blocked up by artillery and ambulances. Coming upon the field, he learned that Ewell "was sorely pressed, and that re-enforcements were promptly needed." Here he met two regiments standing in the open field, who had just been driven from the open woods. "I moved," he says, "through the interval between these regiments, promptly formed line of battle, and accepted the position which they had abandoned. A continuous line of 3500 men moving forward in perfect order, and at once opening fire along its entire length, chiefly armed with Enfield rifles, promptly marked the preponderance of musketry on our side." This long line advanced toward the thickest of the fight. In the wood Ewell was seen. He shouted "Hurrah for Georgia!" as he saw Lawton's long line advancing.<sup>2</sup>

It was now half past six, an hour before sunset. The whole Confederate force on this side of the Chickahominy, with the exception of Kemper's single brigade of "1433 muskets," of Longstreet's division, which was held in reserve,<sup>3</sup> was brought into action. Opposed to them were only Porter's corps, McCall's division, and Slocum's sent over from the other side. Making allowance for losses on each side up to this time, the Confederate force on the field numbered about 56,000; the Union force, 33,000.<sup>4</sup> The Confederates, at a fearful sacrifice, had crossed the swamp at all points, and thus neutralized the former great advantage of position against them. The Union



THE FINAL CHARGE AT COLD HARBOR.

line was pressed along its whole length by a force of almost two to one. The crowning attack was made half an hour before sunset, and the Union line gave way almost simultaneously on the right, centre, and left. Where it first broke no one can say. Each Confederate commander believed that his troops gave the decisive blow. In our judgment the most decisive blow was struck near the centre, where Hood's Texans, of Whiting's division, charged upon a battery which was so posted that it had done fearful execution all through the fight. "In this charge, in which upward of a thousand men fell, killed and wounded, before the fire of the enemy, and in which fourteen pieces of artillery were captured, the Fourth Texas, under the lead of General Hood, was the first to pierce these strong-holds and seize the guns."<sup>1</sup> About the same time, Longstreet, on the extreme left, had driven back the Union force opposed to him, and was pressing them toward the brink of the Chickahominy. Five companies of cavalry, who had been kept in reserve, charged upon the pursuers, but were scattered at the first fire.<sup>2</sup>

D. H. Hill, on the Confederate left, had been annoyed by an isolated battery which swept the road by which he proposed to attack in flank the Union right. A sudden charge by two of his regiments captured this battery; it was held only for a few minutes, then retaken, and the Confederates driven back, the regiment which had captured the guns losing half its number in the work. Brief as the time was, it was enough. The temporary

<sup>1</sup> Jackson in *Lee's Rep.*, i., 135.

<sup>2</sup> [McC. *Rep.*, 248; *Lee's Rep.*, i., 124.] This slight cavalry affair is the only one in which that arm was actively engaged on either side during the seven days, with the exception of a Confederate charge two days later, which McClellan (*Rep.*, 258) calls "a sharp skirmish with the enemy's cavalry;" but Bowers, the commander of the Confederate cavalry regiment, tells the exact story. He says (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 417) that he charged upon the Federal cavalry, but was driven back, carrying with him two officers and eleven privates wounded, but leaving behind two more officers and "forty-six non-commissioned officers [and privates?] missing, being wounded, killed, and thrown from their horses."

<sup>1</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 309.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i., 270.


<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, i., 124, 353.

<sup>4</sup> Confederates: Jackson, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, 64,000; deduct losses, thus far, 8000=56,000. Union: Porter, 19,000; McCall, 9000; Slocum, 8000=36,000; deduct losses, thus far, 3000=33,000. These are given merely as a close approximation to the actual numbers at that moment.



CAVALRY CHARGE AT COLD HARBOR.





SKIRMISHING IN THE WOODS.

silence of the terrible battery enabled the rest of Hill's division to advance. The extreme right of the Union line gave way; it rallied, and was again forced back, not without disorder, toward the river-bank. Hill asserts<sup>1</sup> that it was "this final charge upon their right flank which decided the fortunes of the day." The truth is, that the Union line, now pressed along its whole length by a twofold force, which had at a fearful sacrifice overcome the advantage of position, gave way on every point almost at once, and fell back toward the bluff which here bounded the Chickahominy. They were followed, though cautiously, by the enemy in the twilight which was fast closing in.

It was not a rout, though fast threatening to become one. The core of every division remained solid, but fragments were flying off, like sparks from an iron under the blacksmith's hammer. But all, soldiers and fugitives, pressed toward the bridges which stretched through swamp and over river, beyond which lay safety. All at once a great shout was heard, and French's and Meagher's brigades—Meagher, they say, leading in his shirt sleeves—dashed up the bluff, driving through the stragglers, who were thronging toward the bridge, and advanced to what was now the front. Their presence gave heart to the fugitives, who rallied behind them and marched up the hill. The Confederates paused in the pursuit, and, after delivering a few ineffectual volleys, withdrew as night set in, and the battle was over. An hour earlier, and these two brigades alone would have turned the wavering scale and won a victory. As it was, they were just in time to prevent a great defeat from becoming a disastrous rout. D. H. Hill, moralizing afterward, says: "A vigorous attack might have resulted in the total rout of the Yankee army and the capture of thousands of prisoners. But I was unwilling to leave the elevated plateau and advance in the dark along an unknown road, skirted by dense woods, in the possession of the Yankees."<sup>2</sup>

When morning broke the whole Union force was safely across the Chickahominy, and the bridges behind them were down. Three regiments, at different points, had been isolated by the Confederate rush, were surrounded and made prisoners. Many stragglers, scattered through the wood, were picked up next day by the cavalry who scoured the region. In all, the Federals lost about 2000 prisoners, among whom was General Reynolds, who, three days later, at Richmond, met his division commander, McCall, captured in a subsequent battle. The Union loss in this action was about 4000 in killed and wounded; that of the Confederates, 9500. The Federals also lost 22 guns, of which 20 were captured by the enemy; the others were run off the bridge while crossing.

During the whole of this action, while Lee was with his troops controlling their movements and directing the fight, McClellan was on the opposite side of the river.<sup>3</sup> He was kept in alarm by the messages sent to him hour by

hour from different positions on that side. At half past eight, Smith, on the extreme right, reported that six or eight regiments had moved down to the woods in front of Sumner. At eleven, Sumner telegraphed that the enemy threatened an attack on his right, near Smith; and an hour and a half later, that there was sharp shelling on both sides; and two hours after, that there was sharp musketry firing in front, to which he was replying with artillery and infantry, and the man on the look-out reported that there were some troops—how many could not be made out—drawn up in line of battle opposite his right. Then, at intervals, Franklin reported. In the morning the enemy were massing heavy columns on his right; then, an attack had been begun there on Smith, which proved to be an artillery fire;<sup>1</sup> but his own shells were bursting well, and Smith thought Sumner would soon have a cross-fire upon the enemy which would silence them. At a quarter past five, Franklin, half of whose corps, under Slocum, were across the river, thought it not prudent to take any more troops from him at present. Ten minutes after, McClellan replied that Porter was hard pressed, and it was not a question of prudence, but of possibilities; if Franklin could possibly hold his position until dark with two brigades, he should send one to support Porter. This last order seems not to have reached Franklin, for he says that during the whole day he did not know that a battle was going on across the river.<sup>2</sup>

All the movements by the Confederates on this side of the Chickahominy are detailed at length by the different commanders. The substance is, that with pickets, skirmishers, and artillery, they felt the Union line along its whole length, showing themselves at points here and there, and then the force vanished, to reappear at a different spot, thus trebling their apparent numbers. The nature of the ground afforded facilities for these operations. There was a series of swamps, forests, low ridges, and ravines, which shut out all sight of what was passing at a few hundred yards' distance. If a body of troops showed itself at any point, no one could say whether it was a single regiment or the head of a full division. So an artillery fire upon any point

<sup>1</sup> McClellan writes (*Report*, 252) "from 3 pieces." This is probably a simply clerical error, for Franklin testifies (*Com. Rep.*, 622), "We had put up a work during the night of the 26th. The enemy opened upon that work, and such of our artillery as he could see, early on the morning of the 27th, and there was a very severe cannonading, with 30 guns on each side, I should judge, lasting about an hour. Their object appeared to be to drive us away from Golding's, but it was evidently a diversion to prevent our sending assistance to Porter. There was no infantry fighting till about dark."

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 251-253. Franklin testifies (*Com. Rep.*, 623): "At my position at Golding's, the woods were so dense between Fitz-John Porter and myself that we did not hear a musket or heavy gun of his all day. We did not know that there was any infantry fight going on. We saw some of the enemy's infantry going up to attack what we supposed to be his position, and we shelled them as well as we could from our side. I was about two miles distant from the field of battle at Gaines's Mills." General J. E. Johnston reports a similar occurrence at Fair Oaks. Though not more than three miles from the battle-field of May 31, he did not hear the cannonading, which was yet distinctly audible at the Federal head-quarters, ten miles or more distant, across the stream. Johnston supposed that this was occasioned by some peculiar condition of the atmosphere.

<sup>3</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 183.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, i., 181.

<sup>1</sup> "During the battle at Gaines's Mills I was on the right bank of the river, at Dr. Trent's house, as the most central position."—McClellan's testimony, in *Com. Rep.*, 436.



might be a mere feint, or the prelude to an attack in force. All the shows of force which had all day long disturbed McClellan were but feints. The only real attack on that day, south of the Chickahominy, was just at sunset, when Toombs, anxious to distinguish himself, sent two small infantry regiments, re-enforcing them afterward, to force the Union pickets. The attempt cost dearly. Half of the Georgia Second went into action 271 strong, and lost 120; the Fifteenth carried in 370, and lost 70 in killed and wounded. Toombs claims that after "two hours of fierce and determined conflict" the Federals were "driven back and repulsed." Franklin says: "There was no infantry fighting until about dark, when two brigades of the enemy attacked Hancock's brigade, which was in position as the advance of the picket line. He had a sharp engagement for about three quarters of an hour, when the enemy was driven back. It was then entirely dark, too late to make any pursuit."<sup>1</sup>


Toward midnight McClellan held a council of war—the only one, apparently, during the campaign. Even then he seems to have had some purpose of re-crossing the Chickahominy and risking another battle on that side. If the purpose was a serious one it was soon abandoned, and orders were given for a retreat to the James River.<sup>2</sup> He then wrote a bitter letter to the Secretary of War: He knew the whole history of the day. On this side of the river, the right bank, we repulsed several strong attacks; on the left our men did all that men could do, but they were repulsed by vastly superior numbers soon after he had brought his last reserves into action. If he had 20,000, or even 10,000 fresh troops to use to-morrow, he could take Richmond; but he had not a man in reserve, and he should be glad to cover his retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. A few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory; as it was, the government could not hold him responsible for the result. "If I save this army now," he concludes, "I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army."<sup>3</sup>

#### SATURDAY, JUNE 28.—THE RETREAT.

Lee had indeed won a formal victory, but at a fearful cost. In the two actions he had suffered a loss in killed and wounded of almost 10,000 men, double that which he had inflicted. He had indeed driven the enemy from the field of battle, and across the river; but this crossing was just what his opponent was endeavoring to effect. He had cut McClellan's line of communication and supply with the York River; but that line had been already given up, and a far better one chosen. To accomplish this, he had placed his army in a position which, had his opponent known it, rendered its destruction inevitable. Two thirds of it, 54,000 strong after its losses, was on the north side of the Chickahominy. The other third, ten miles away in a straight line, was before Richmond. Between them, and more than equal to both, the Union army, at last united, lay like a solid wedge. The river, which McClellan had so long found to be an impassable barrier, lay right between Lee's two wings, which he could unite only by retracing his two days' march up the left bank to Mechanicsville, then down the other side to Richmond. Had McClellan on the 28th or 29th struck at Richmond with his whole available force, the city must have fallen in five hours. The bridges being down, 25,000 men could have held the whole line of the Chickahominy from Bottom's Bridge to New Bridge, leaving fully 70,000 for the assault of Richmond, which was defended by only 27,000, along a line of nearly ten miles. The fall of Richmond must have involved the destruction or dispersion of the force across the Chickahominy, for at Richmond were his only dépôts of supplies. His men had marched out with only three days' rations, and were followed by a very small train. The rapidity of Jackson's march, and the nature of the country traversed, show that he could have only a meagre train. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that, away from Richmond, the Confederates had within a hundred miles provisions sufficient to supply Lee's 54,000 men for five days; and without supplies, an army in that time becomes a disorganized and paralyzed mass, incapable of offense or defense. If McClellan had but known

<sup>1</sup> Lee's Rep., i., 280; Com. Rep., 622. This skirmish at Golding's Farm is the only affair which in any way justifies McClellan's assertion (Report, 257): "On the right bank we repulsed several strong attacks."

<sup>2</sup> Of this council Heintzelman testifies (Com. Rep., 355). "At about eleven o'clock I got a telegram that General McClellan wished to see me immediately at his headquarters, about a mile and a half off. I found them all packed up and ready to move. The general stated the situation of affairs and what he proposed to do. One thing was to move across to the James River. The other plan was to collect all the troops from my side of the Chickahominy and have a battle the next day, and throw every thing upon the result of that battle. I asked him what would be the result if we lost. He said that if we were defeated the army would be lost, but he was inclined to risk every thing upon that battle. I told him that it was of vital importance to the country, I thought, to save that army; that we were ruined if that army was lost; and that I thought it was better for us not to fight that battle, but to fall back from there to the James River; that we could reach there with a loss, perhaps, of a few pieces of siege artillery and some wagons, and then we could receive re-enforcements. He said that was his opinion; still, he felt inclined to risk every thing on a battle. The next day we commenced to retreat. That was the first time I was consulted in that campaign, any thing more than by mere conversation."—See also McC. Rep., 254, 255.



RICHARD S. ELLI.

his own position and strength, and that of his opponent, he could hardly have wished that Lee should have placed his troops in any other position than that occupied by them just after the battle of Cold Harbor. Magruder, who was in chief command on the left bank, appreciated the sore peril of the Confederate capital and cause. He saw that a vigorous attack upon him could not be other than successful.<sup>1</sup>

But McClellan had resolved, instead of giving battle to Lee on the left side of the Chickahominy, or of assaulting Richmond on the right, to abandon the whole position, and retreat with his entire force to the James River. The different commanders were ordered to load the wagons with ammunition and provisions, and the necessary baggage of officers and men, and to destroy every thing which could not be carried off. The sick and wounded, who could not march or be carried, were to be left behind. These were fewer than might have been expected. Of the 13,000 on the sick-list, and the 3000 wounded in the two previous days, about 2500 in all were thus abandoned.

The problem of the "Change of Base" was, after all, a very simple one. It was merely to march an army for ten or fifteen miles with no enemy in front, but with one, erroneously supposed to be superior, in its rear, and upon one flank. The main difficulty was to carry off the guns and trains of supplies and ammunition. The country over which the march was to be made favored the retreating army. The retreat must indeed be slow, for the roads were few and difficult, but the pursuit must be slower, for these roads could be obstructed at every step.

Some three or four miles from the extreme left of the Union position White Oak Creek empties into the Chickahominy. This creek is bordered by a swamp. For five miles the stream has some volume, and the swamp is narrow, three or four hundred yards wide; then it spreads out, for eight miles toward Richmond, to a breadth of three miles or more. From the Chickahominy to the head of the swamp it was crossed by only two roads. Southward, toward the James, the ground rises slowly, and becomes a dry flat instead of a wet flat, but with swamps along the sluggish streams, cov-

<sup>1</sup> Magruder, in Lee's Rep., i., 191: "From the time at which the enemy withdrew his forces to this side of the Chickahominy and destroyed the bridges to the moment of his evacuation—that is, from Friday night until Sunday morning—I considered the situation of our army as extremely critical and perilous. The larger portion of it was on the other side of the Chickahominy; the bridges had all been destroyed, and but one was rebuilt, the New Bridge, which was fully commanded by the enemy's guns from Golding's; and there were but 25,000 men between his army of 100,000 and Richmond. I received repeated instructions during Saturday night from General Lee's headquarters, enjoining upon my command the utmost vigilance, directing the men to sleep on their arms, and to be prepared for whatever might occur. I passed the night without sleep, and in the superintendence of their execution. Had McClellan massed his whole force in column, and advanced it against any point of our line of battle, as was done at Antietam by the greatest captain of any age, though the head of his column would have suffered greatly, its momentum would have insured him success, and the occupation of our works about Richmond, and consequently the city, might have been his reward. Our relief was therefore great when information reached us that the enemy had evacuated his works, and was retreating."


<sup>2</sup> McC. Rep., 257, 258.





COMMENCEMENT OF THE RETREAT.—JUNE 29.





MAP OF THE REGION NEAR RICHMOND.

ered with scrubby forests, with here and there a clearing. The maps show roads in abundance and intricate confusion, but they are mainly mere paths, over some of which no wheeled vehicle had passed for years. Three roads, however, starting from Richmond, spread out like the sticks of a fan, and then unite half way between the swamp and Malvern Hill, the point to which McClellan directed his retreat. Thence they branch out in every direction toward the lower bridges of the Chickahominy, some miles below the railroad, and toward the rich plantations which border the James. Just skirting the swamp is the Charles City Road, then the Central or Darbytown, then the Newmarket. It was by these roads that Longstreet and A. P. Hill, who, having recrossed the Chickahominy and turned the head of White Oak Swamp, marched to make their attack on the 30th upon the retreating column; and Magruder, coming from near Richmond, reached Malvern, where he was so disastrously beaten back on the 1st of July.

McClellan's retreat was in the following order: At noon on the 28th, Keyes, who lay nearest, crossed White Oak Creek and took position on its opposite bank, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains. These, which would have stretched for a distance of forty miles if drawn up in

single line—accompanied by a herd of 2500 cattle—were got safely over, and proceeded on their way, Keyes's corps guarding the advance. They reached the James River without molestation on the morning of the 30th. Franklin and Porter followed from the rear by the same route, and were over on the morning of the 29th. At daybreak of this day Heintzelman and Sumner evacuated their works in front, falling back toward Savage's Station, which they were to hold until night, and then to cross the swamp by the upper road. A part of these several corps were to keep a line of battle fronting toward the creek to check pursuit from the rear, while others were to take position across the three roads, and so fronting toward Richmond, in order to protect the trains passing behind them from assault in flank. McClellan, having given general directions for the movements and positions of the troops, rode to the James to select the best position on that river, and to consult with the naval commanders there.<sup>1</sup>

On the morning of the 28th Lee was wholly at a loss what next to do. There was no force in front of him on his side of the Chickahominy; but

<sup>1</sup> McC. Rep., 256-266.





DESTRUCTION OF THE TRAIN

still McClellan might propose to cross the river lower down, and give battle, in order to preserve his communications with the York River. The cavalry, with Ewell's division of Jackson's command, were sent down to the railroad to observe the state of things there. As they approached, the few troops guarding the railroad passed the river, burning the bridge behind them. Ewell remained until evening, and then rejoined his command. Stuart, with his cavalry, dashed down the railroad toward the White House, which they reached next morning. With him was the proprietor of that estate, Fitz-Hugh Lee, son of the Confederate commander. The house was in flames; nearly all the immense quantity of stores accumulated here had been removed, and were on their way to the James.<sup>1</sup> The abandonment of the railroad and the destruction of the bridge showed that no attempt would be made to hold that line; but still it might be McClellan's purpose either to move upon Richmond or to reach the lower bridges on the Chickahominy, cross the stream, and retreat down the Peninsula. Lee was therefore forced to wait until the intent of his opponent was developed. During the night it was evident that the Union army was in motion, and the Confederate pickets failing to detect any approach to the lower bridges, it became evident that the retreat was toward the James River. So, early on the morning of the 29th, Longstreet and A. P. Hill were ordered to cross the Chickahominy by the New Bridge, which had been rebuilt by Magruder during the night of the 27th, and, crossing in front of Richmond, to move down by the Central Road; Magruder and Huger were to move by the Charles City Road, thus taking the Federal army on the flank; while Jackson at a later hour was to cross by the Grapevine Bridge, and move down near the right bank of the river, thus threatening the rear.<sup>2</sup>

## SUNDAY, JUNE 29.—SAVAGE'S STATION.

At dawn Magruder discovered that the Federal works at Fair Oaks were abandoned, and Sumner and Heintzelman were slowly falling back toward Savage's Station. The works on the extreme right were held a little longer. An attack was made upon them, but it was repulsed, with a loss of 150.<sup>3</sup> Magruder, in the mean time, followed cautiously down the railroad, opening a distant fire at intervals—Sumner's retiring troops turning occasionally, and then keeping on the retreat. Late in the afternoon they had fallen back nearly to Savage's Station from the front and the right. Sumner and Heintzelman had been ordered to hold this point until nightfall, the positions of each being assigned to them by McClellan. But Heintzelman abandoned his position before the time, and crossed the swamp by the upper road, giving orders for the destruction of the ammunition and stores remaining at Savage's Station which could not be carried off by the trains. The stores and provisions were piled up in a great pyramid and set on fire. The ammunition and shells were heaped upon a train, which, with steam up, was sent down the railroad to the Chickahominy. Fire was set to the train, and before it reached the site of the bridge it was ablaze, and the shells began to explode. So great was the momentum, that the engine and first car leaped clear across the chasm and landed on the opposite side.

<sup>1</sup> Smart (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 402) gives a glowing account of the quantity of munitions and stores destroyed here. He says: "The conflagration had raged fearfully at the White House during the night previous, while explosions of shells rent the air. I was informed that 5000 men held the place. . . . Provisions and delicacies of every description lay in heaps, and the men regaled themselves on the fruits of the tropics as well as the substantial of the land. Large quantities of forage were left also. Nine large barges loaded with stores were on fire as we approached. Immense numbers of tents, wagons, and cars in long trains, loaded, and five locomotives; a number of forges; quantities of every species of quartermaster's stores and property, making a total of many millions of dollars—all more or less destroyed." In all, the quartermaster at the White House, however, testifies (*Com. Rep.*, 448): "There were no stores of any importance destroyed. There was some pork destroyed, and some whisky, belonging to the Commissary Department. There were also the stores on one of the trains that I was going to send out at the time the rebels got possession of the road. Most of the stores on that train were abandoned. All the vessels, with the exception of two or three barges which had been got close to the shore, were got off."

<sup>2</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 10.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, i., 169, 285.

At the same instant the whole mass of powder exploded, and the remaining cars plunged, shattered, into the mud of the river.<sup>1</sup>

Magruder, in the mean time, had been delayed by various contradictory orders, but at length came in sight of Sumner's corps drawn up a little in front of Savage's Station, and about half past five o'clock opened a sharp attack with artillery, supporting it by infantry. He had one heavy gun mounted on a railroad car, protected from cannon-shot in front by a sloping iron roof, and from rifle-shot on the sides by thick walls of wood lined with iron. This contrivance, which the Confederates named "the land Merrimac," was used with considerable effect. The action continued hot for more than two hours, when, darkness coming on, the firing ceased as if by common consent, neither side gaining any perceptible ground from the other, though the action was so close that firing was sometimes suspended on account of the impossibility of distinguishing friends from foes. The numbers actually engaged on either side were small. Magruder brought fairly into action only McLaw's

two small brigades, numbering together 2250 men; of these, 845 were killed and wounded. His entire loss was about 400. The loss on the Union side was considerably larger. Early next morning Magruder was ordered by Lee to cross over to the Newmarket Road in order to join in the flank attack of that day. Lee had counted in this action upon the co-operation of Jackson; but he was delayed by the necessity of rebuilding a bridge in order to cross the Chickahominy. Sumner's stand had effected its object of delaying the enemy, and before midnight his force was on its way to White Oak Swamp, leaving behind 2500 sick, wounded, and their attendants in the hospital at Savage's Station.<sup>2</sup>

## MONDAY, JUNE 30.—FRAZIER'S FARM.

On the morning of the 29th Longstreet and A. P. Hill recrossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and after passing through the deserted Union lines, and going almost within sight of Richmond, headed the White Oak Swamp, went down the Darbytown Road, and encamped within striking distance of the centre of McClellan's retreating column. They had made a forced march under a fierce sun, and many of the men dropped from the ranks in utter exhaustion. Magruder and Huger were marching to the same point by parallel roads. Jackson and D. H. Hill crossed the Chickahominy on the 30th, and followed straight upon the line of McClellan's retreat to White Oak Swamp. In the mean while, Holmes, whose brigade was at Fort Darling, on the opposite side of the James River, was to cross with all his disposable force and join in the attack. McClellan's whole force was stretched in a line

<sup>1</sup> This retreat of Heintzelman has occasioned much censure. He himself (*McC. Rep.*, 261; *Com. Rep.*, 356) gives reasons for his movement which seem hardly reconcilable with each other. Sumner, he says, had taken a position in advance of that ordered, and "this movement of General Sumner uncovering my right flank, it became necessary for me to retreat." But immediately after he says that, after having been ordered to hold his position by Sumner, who was the commanding officer on the ground, he saw that Sumner and Franklin had "more troops than could be brought into action judiciously," and "the reason I left with my corps was that the ground was so constructed that there were absolutely more troops there than could find room. The roads in their rear were filled with artillery and wagons. . . . I knew that General Sumner had as many troops as were necessary, and my corps, in case of a forced retreat, would only have rendered it more disastrous. . . . Sumner and Franklin had a very sharp action that afternoon, and repulsed the enemy." Sumner (*McC. Rep.*, 260) says: "When the enemy appeared on the Williamsburg road, I could not imagine why General Heintzelman did not attack him, and not till some time afterward did I learn, to my utter amazement, that General Heintzelman had retreated with his whole corps (about 15,000 men) before the action commenced. This defection might have been attended with the most serious consequences; and although we bent the enemy signally, and drove him from the field, we should certainly have given him a more crushing blow if General Heintzelman had been there with his corps." It is clear that not half of Sumner's force was engaged.

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 259-262; *Lee's Rep.*, i., 10, 160, 193, 290, 295, 298. No reliance can be placed upon the Confederate estimates of the Union loss in this action. Thus Magruder (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 195) says: "I estimate the loss of the enemy to be not less than 2000 killed and wounded; Semmes [who lost 53] reporting not less than 400 dead in his front alone;" while Kershaw, who was more hotly engaged, "turns (*Ibid.*, i., 299) with pride and satisfaction to 500 dead of the enemy left on the field" as evidence of the prowess of his troops.



SAVAGE'S STATION ABANDONED.



eight miles long from the swamp to Malvern Hill, on the James; protected by this line, his artillery and trains were slowly floundering over difficult roads.

Lee's plan of battle for this day was an illustration of grand strategy—the only one deserving the name during the whole campaign. His purpose was to make an attack in column upon McClellan's long line, break through it at the centre, hurl the left back upon Jackson, and assault the right in the rear. To accomplish this plan, his whole strength—more than 80,000 men—were so situated that they might apparently be concentrated at the right moment upon the given point: Jackson upon the rear, all the rest upon the flank. The plan failed because the force could not be brought together in time; and instead of the attack being made by the whole, the action on his side was confined wholly to Longstreet and A. P. Hill, with 18,000 men; and in place of a grand and decisive battle, there were a series of combats, in which each brigade on both sides engaged almost without concert. From the accounts, more or less at variance, and all incomplete, we have to attempt to set forth the leading points in this fierce but desultory conflict.<sup>1</sup>

Holmes, joined by Wise, crossed the James with 7000 men, mostly fresh North Carolinians, and on the morning of the 30th came within sight of McClellan's retreating column, upon whom, in the afternoon, he opened fire from a distance. A few rounds of artillery and a few shells from the gunboats scattered his force, the cavalry and artillery breaking into a wild stampede, and riding over and through the infantry. Two were killed, forty-one wounded, and several others seriously hurt by being run over by the cavalry and artillery. Holmes and Wise made no farther appearance in this campaign, but the day after the battle of Malvern inarched quietly back to their encampments across the James.

Jackson reached the White Oak Creek at noon. He found the bridge destroyed and the approaches covered by artillery from the opposite side. In vain he attempted to repair it all through the afternoon. The men would not work under the heavy fire to which they were exposed. He was but two miles distant from the fierce battle in which Longstreet and Hill were engaged, and the noise of it could be distinctly heard; but he was powerless to aid the attack in which he had been expected to bear so prominent a part.


Longstreet and A. P. Hill resumed their march down the Darbytown Road in the morning, and about noon came in sight of a part of the Union line drawn up, its centre at Frazier's Farm, near a point where a road leading to the James River crosses the roads coming from Richmond, by which they were advancing. Huger was supposed to be coming down the Charles City Road, two miles on the right.

The whole Union line was so long that it was unoccupied in portions. At this point McCall was in the centre, with Kearney on the left, and Hooker, then Sumner, on the right. McCall was somewhat advanced, and upon his division, weakened by the two battles in which it had been engaged, the first onset fell.

After some skirmishing, at about four o'clock Longstreet made the onset with the fiery impetuosity which he ever manifested. The first attack was made by Kemper's brigade, which had not yet been engaged, it having been the only one held in reserve at Cold Harbor. The brigade was driven back, losing 250 killed and wounded, and nearly 200 prisoners—a quarter of its whole number. Its place was taken by others, who, in greater force, dashed upon the same point. They swept in the Union line for a space, but were checked by Hooker and forced back. This was on McCall's left. All the force of Longstreet and Hill now rushed in, each brigade commander apparently acting for himself. Foiled at one point, they dashed upon another, determined to break the line somewhere. At last, Wilcox's Alabama brigade leading, they poured over a swampy stream and through a dense wood, and across an open field upon McCall's right, straight in the teeth of his batteries.

Of this charge McCall says:<sup>2</sup> "On the right, Randall's battery was charged upon by the enemy in great force, and with a reckless impetuosity I never saw equaled. They advanced at a run over a space of six hundred yards of open ground. The guns of the battery mowed them down, yet they never paused. A volley of musketry was poured into them at a short distance by the 4th regiment, in support of the battery, but it did not check them for an instant; they dashed on, and pistoled and bayoneted the cannoniers at their guns. Part of the 4th regiment gave way; the remainder, however, with part of the 7th regiment in their rear, then coming forward, stood their ground like heroes. As I was with the battery at the time, it was my fortune to witness, in the bayonet fight that there took place, such a display of reckless daring on the part of the Alabamians, and of unflinching courage on the part of the Pennsylvanians, as is rarely beheld. My men were, however, overpowered and borne off the ground. The battery was taken, but immediately after abandoned by the enemy, who rapidly retired. Just before sunset, Cooper's battery in front of the centre was, after several charges had been repulsed, finally taken by the enemy, but only to be retaken by the 9th regiment in a most glorious charge."

Wilcox says:<sup>3</sup> "The enemy's battery had an open field of fire, the ground being perfectly level. The 11th Alabama advanced, and, entering upon the open field, came on the battery, which began a rapid fire of grape and canister. The regiment did not halt an instant, but continued to advance steadily and rapidly, without firing, until it approached within two hundred yards of the battery, when it gave loud cheers and made a rush for the guns. Halting in front of it for an instant, they fire upon the battery and infantry



JACKSON IN SIGHT AT WHITE OAK CREEK.

<sup>1</sup> Our authorities are: Lee (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 10), Longstreet (*Ibid.*, i., 125), A. P. Hill (*Ibid.*, i., 177), Jackson (*Ibid.*, i., 184), and Reports of the several Confederate brigade commanders engaged, all given in Lee's Report; McClellan's Report (p. 265-269); the testimony of Heintzelman, Sumner, and McCall (*Com. Rep.*, 357, 365, 566).

<sup>2</sup> *Com. Rep.*, 558.

<sup>3</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 342.



immediately in rear of it, and then make a successful charge upon and take it . . . . The enemy, at first repulsed and driven from the battery, retire to the woods, and deliver a terrible and destructive fire upon this regiment. With its ranks sadly thinned, it heroically stands its ground. The enemy, now seeing this regiment isolated and unsupported, advance from their cover against it. The sword and bayonet are freely used; many of the men received and gave in return bayonet wounds. There are no supports for them; no re-enforcements come, and they are at length forced to yield and retire to the woods in the rear, leaving left upon the field and around the battery in dead alone eight officers, of whom seven were captains or lieutenants commanding companies, and forty-nine privates."

The battle raged with almost equal fury along the whole line. Hill, on the Confederate left, pressed forward his brigades in a mass, and gained ground at first, capturing two full batteries, which he retained; but he was unable to gain any ground permanently, and at last it became apparent that Hooker and Kearney, on their right and left, were slowly gaining, while the earlier repulse of McCall's flanks had been retrieved, and his centre remained unbroken. Lee, indeed, says:<sup>1</sup> "The enemy had been driven with great slaughter from every position save one, which he maintained until he was enabled to withdraw under cover of darkness. At the close of the struggle nearly the entire field remained in our possession." Longstreet reports:<sup>2</sup> "The enemy was driven back slowly and steadily, contesting the ground inch by inch. He succeeded in getting some of his batteries off the field, and, by holding his last position till dark, in withdrawing his forces under cover of night." Sumner errs equally on the other side. He says:<sup>3</sup> "After a furious contest, lasting till dark, the enemy was routed at all points, and driven from the field." There was no rout; though, as most of the Confederate brigade commanders report, their brigades were greatly shattered. A. P. Hill<sup>4</sup> gives the true account of the condition when darkness closed the struggle: "On our extreme right matters seemed to be going badly. Two brigades of Longstreet's division had been roughly handled, and had fallen back. Archer was brought up and sent in, and in his shirt sleeves leading his gallant brigade, affairs were soon restored in that quarter. About dark the enemy were pressing us hard along our whole line, and my last reserve, General J. R. Anderson, was directed to advance cautiously. Heavy re-enforcements to the enemy were brought up at this time, and it seemed that a tremendous effort was being made to turn the fortunes of the battle. The volume of fire that, approaching, rolled along the line, was terrific. Seeing some troops of Wilcox's brigade who had rallied, they were rapidly re-formed, and, being directed to cheer long and loudly, moved again to the fight. This seemed to end the contest, for in less than five minutes all firing ceased, and the enemy retired."

The Confederates captured in the earlier part of the action about 20 guns, and lost about 300 prisoners. Their loss in killed and wounded exceeded that of their opponents. Their two divisions kept a part of the field after their enemy had retired, thus holding the honors of the battle; but they were so fearfully shattered, here and before, that not a man of them was brought into the greater fight fought next day at Malvern. A. P. Hill had crossed the Chickahominy four days before with 14,000 men, and at Mechanicsville, Cold Harbor, and Frazier's Farm had lost 4000 in killed and wounded. Longstreet had crossed with 10,000, and at Cold Harbor and here lost 4200. Some of his brigades had more than half their number killed and wounded. Wilcox carried 1850 into action at Cold Harbor; in the two battles he lost 1035. Pryor had 1400, and lost 850.

Accounts current at the time represent the division of McCall as having

<sup>1</sup> Lee's Rep., i., 11.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., i., 126

<sup>3</sup> McC. Rep., 268

<sup>4</sup> Lee's Rep., i., 177.



BAYONET FIGHT AT FRAZIER'S FARM.

been thoroughly routed on this field. Parts of it were indeed shattered and broken; but, as a division, it fought bravely and held its ground firmly. Of the whole army it alone had fought in two battles—Mechanicsville and Cold Harbor. Here it was opposed to the first onset and the severest brunt of the fight. Meade, then leading one of its brigades, and a year after, lacking two days, to command the whole Army of the Potomac down to the close of the war, claimed for this division no more than its rightful due when he wrote: "It was only the stubborn resistance offered by our division, prolonging the contest till after dark, and checking till that time the advance of the enemy, that enabled the concentration during the night of the whole army on the James River, which saved it." After the battle was over, McCall, riding out into the darkness, fell in with a regiment of the enemy and was captured. He had been almost the whole day under the hottest fire, escaping unharned, though every one of his staff was killed or wounded.

#### TUESDAY, JULY 1.—MALVERN HILL.

The battle at Frazier's Farm was hardly over when the Union forces again took up their retreat toward Malvern Hill, the point selected for resisting the farther advance of the enemy. The rear of the wagons and reserve artillery had arrived there about four in the afternoon. Soon after daylight the last division was in, and the post of each was assigned.

The position was admirably chosen for a defensive battle. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau, a mile and a half long and half as broad, the top nearly free from woods. It slopes gently toward the north and east down to the verge of a thick forest; westward it falls more abruptly into a ravine, which extends to the James River. All along the front are ravines, rendering the approach difficult except by the roads which cross them. On the crest of the hill seven heavy siege guns had been placed in position, and the reserve artillery was so posted that a concentrated fire of sixty guns could be brought to bear upon any point in front or on the left, the direction from which the enemy must advance to the attack. Here the main force was massed. The right, less strongly held, curved backward through a wooded region to the James. Both flanks thus rested upon the river, and were protected by the gun-boats. Porter's corps was on the left; then Heintzelman's, a part of Keyes's, Sumner's, Franklin's, and last, on the extreme right, the remainder of Keyes's.

Jackson crossed the White Oak Creek, and followed in the track of the retreating army. At Frazier's Farm he found Lee, who ordered him to press forward; at 9 o'clock, coming in sight of the Union line, he took up his position, Whiting on the left, then Ewell; D. H. Hill being on the right, who was thus brought in front of Hooker, near the Union centre. Hill was within range of the artillery on the plateau, and suffered severely. "Anderson's brigade was roughly handled, he being wounded and borne from the field." The division was then halted, and the Union position reconnoitred.<sup>2</sup> "The Yankees," says Hill,<sup>3</sup> "were found to be strongly posted on a commanding hill, all the approaches to which could be swept by his artillery, and were guarded by swarms of infantry, securely sheltered by fences, ditches, and ravines. Tier after tier of batteries were grimly visible on the plateau, rising in the form of an

<sup>1</sup> Com. Rep., 589.

<sup>2</sup> McClellan thus describes this part of the engagement: "About 3 P.M. a heavy fire of artillery opened upon Kearney's left and Conch's division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Conch's front. The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Conch's division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was within short musketry range, when they sprang to their feet, and poured in a deadly volley, which entirely broke the attacking force, and drove them in disorder back over their own ground. This advantage was followed up until we had advanced the right of our lines some seven or eight hundred yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better fire. Shortly after 4 o'clock the firing ceased along the whole front, but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw from our front."—McC. Rep., 271.

<sup>3</sup> Lee's Rep., i., 185.



ON THE FIELD.





BATTERY D., FIFTH U. S. ARTILLERY, AT FRAZIER'S FARM.





FIRST MASSACHUSETTS BATTERY AT FRAZIER'S FARM.



amphitheatre. We could only reach the first line of batteries by traversing an open space of from three to four hundred yards, exposed to a murderous fire of grape and canister from the artillery and musketry from the infantry. If that was carried, another and another, still more difficult, remained in rear. I had expressed my disapprobation of a farther pursuit of the Yankees to the commanding general, and to Generals Jackson and Longstreet, even before I knew of the strength of their position. An examination satisfied me that an attack would be hazardous."

But Lee was resolved that his grand stroke of strategy should not fail. He sent a note to each of his division commanders ordering an assault. That brief note of forty words cost him more than 4000 men.<sup>1</sup>

Huger had been directed to march down the Charles City Road and join Longstreet and A. P. Hill in the battle of the 30th. He failed to reach the point in time. Next day he tried to move forward, but got entangled among the other divisions, and finally lost his way. He had had the same misfortune a month ago at Seven Pines; and now, when his divisions came up, they were one by one taken from him and given to Magruder, and formed a part of his command during the battle. At first he was inclined to ignore the arrangement, and even directed one of his brigade commanders not to place himself under Magruder;<sup>2</sup> but his order was disregarded, and he could only remonstrate afterward against the slight which had been put upon him, not for the first time. After the battle was over he was suffered to direct his division in removing the wounded and burying the dead.<sup>3</sup>

The afternoon was now wearing away when Lee ordered the artillery attack which he hoped would break the Union lines. "But, instead of one or two hundred pieces, only a single battery opened, and that was knocked to pieces in a few minutes; and one or two others shared the same fate of being beaten in detail." Hill knew not what to do. He "wrote to Jackson that the firing from the batteries was of the most farcical character;"<sup>4</sup> and received for reply that he must advance as ordered upon hearing the shout from Armistead. At length, an hour and a half before sunset, he heard shouting and firing on his right, and, supposing this to be the signal, urged his whole division forward. He shall tell the story of his charge in his own words, somewhat abridged:

"We advanced alone; neither Whiting on the left, nor Magruder or Huger on the right, moved forward an inch. The division fought heroically, but fought in vain. Garland, in my immediate front, showed all his wonted courage, but he needed and asked for re-enforcements. I found Toombs's brigade in our rear, and ordered it to support Garland, and accompanied it. The brigade advanced handsomely to the brow of the hill, but soon retreated in disorder. Gordon pushed gallantly forward and gained considerable ground, but was forced back. Ripley's brigade was streaming to the rear. Colquitt's and Anderson's brigades had also fallen back. Ransom's brigade had come up to my support from Huger; a portion of it had come, but without its brigadier. It moved too far to the left, and became mixed up with the mass of troops there, suffering heavily, and effecting little. Winder was sent up by Jackson, but he came too late, and also went to the same belt of woods already overcrowded with troops. Finally Ewell came up, but it was after dark, and nothing could be accomplished. I advised him to hold his ground, and not to attempt a forward movement."<sup>5</sup> Hill lost in this action,


<sup>1</sup> Lee's note, given in *Report*, i., 212. See also p. 185, 199. "Batteries have been established to act upon the enemy's lines. If they are broken, as is probable, Armistead, who can witness the effect of the fire, has been ordered to charge with a yell. Do the same."

<sup>2</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 200, 212, 268.

<sup>3</sup> "My brigades were, during the action, under the immediate command of General Magruder. As they were sent forward into the battle at Malvern Hill, I was directed to report them to another commander. As I was treated in the same manner at Seven Pines, I can only hope this course was accidental, and required by the necessities of the service. I therefore make no report, and refer to reports of others for details of the battle of Malvern Hill. After this battle, as required, the division was occupied, under my orders, in removing the wounded and burying the dead."—Huger, in *Lee's Rep.*, i., 149.

<sup>4</sup> D. H. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, i., 186.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*



THE GUN-BATTERIES AT MALVERN HILL.

lasting only an hour and a half, of his own division, 336 killed and 1373 wounded.<sup>1</sup>

McClellan thus describes this part of the engagement:

"At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade, formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open space and charge our batteries; but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them back reeling to shelter, and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry withheld their fire until the attacking columns, which rushed through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed forward with the bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in confusion from the field."<sup>2</sup>

Hill was mistaken in supposing that "neither Magruder nor Huger moved forward an inch," and in afterward reiterating, "So far as I can learn, none of our troops drew trigger excepting McLaws's, mine, and a portion of Huger's." McLaws's division was a part of Magruder's command; and all this time Magruder, with the whole of his own and Huger's force, was engaged in a fierce conflict on the right. From them came the shouting and firing which Hill supposed to be the signal for his own advance. To this attack by Magruder, as well as to that by Hill, belongs McClellan's account just quoted. So close were they in space and time that, viewed from the opposite lines, they appeared as parts of one movement.

Magruder, after a weary and harassing march from the battle-field at Savage's Station, was ordered by Lee to attack on the right of Hill, who was in position. He found Armistead, of Huger's division, awaiting the arrival of artillery. Magruder sent back to hurry it up, and pushed on some of his troops within range of a heavy fire. Just then he received a copy of Lee's note, ordering him, as soon as he heard the yell from Armistead, to "do the same," and charge. Armistead had driven in some skirmishers, and yelled. Lee, supposing that the Union line was broken, and that the troops were retreating, wrote to Magruder to advance and cut them off.<sup>3</sup> He attempted to carry out the order. His plan was "to hurl about 15,000 men upon the enemy's batteries and supporting infantry; to follow up any successes they might obtain; and, if unable to drive the enemy from his strong position, to continue the fight in front by pouring in fresh troops, and, in case they were repulsed, to hold strongly the line of battle where I stood, to prevent serious disaster to our arms."<sup>4</sup> But in a short time his whole force was engaged, breasting a terrific fire of artillery and musketry. "The battle-field," says Magruder, "was enveloped in smoke, relieved only by flashes from the lines of the contending troops. Round shot and grape crashed through the woods; and shells of enormous size, which reached far beyond the head-quarters of our gallant commander-in-chief, burst amidst the artillery parked in the rear. Belgian missiles and Minié balls lent their aid to this scene of surpassing grandeur and sublimity." This determined attack failed in making any impression upon the Union lines or in disturbing a single battery. The Federal troops had no occasion to leave their strong position. It was quite sufficient to mow down the enemy with artillery as they advanced. When darkness set in, Magruder "concluded to let the battle subside," and his wearied men sank down to sleep on the spot they had reached. Some of them were within a hundred yards of the Union batteries.



THE BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.

<sup>1</sup> *Ibid.*, i., 307.

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 271.

<sup>3</sup> Lee to Magruder, in *Lee's Rep.*, i., 210: "General Lee expects you to advance rapidly. It is reported that the enemy is getting off. Press forward your whole line and follow up Armistead's successes."

<sup>4</sup> Magruder, in *Lee's Rep.*, i., 200.




Of these closing scenes, as viewed from the other side, McClellan writes: "About 7 o'clock, as fresh troops were accumulating in front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent with their brigades to relieve such regiments of Porter's corps and Couch's division as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from the reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to take the position so tenaciously defended; but, despite his superior numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the battle of Malvern Hill, though it was not until after 9 o'clock that the artillery ceased its fire."<sup>1</sup>

The Confederates were indeed repulsed fearfully—and, had McClellan only known it and followed up his advantage—disastrously.<sup>2</sup> But the superior forces of the enemy existed, as they had for months, only in the imagination of the Union commander. Neither Longstreet nor A. P. Hill had a man in this action. Jackson's own command was not engaged in the attack, though all of it was within the range of our guns, and suffered a loss of just 41 killed and 363 wounded by the distant fire.<sup>3</sup> D. H. Hill's division, reduced to less than 8000, and Magruder's and Huger's, then not exceeding 20,000, were all.<sup>4</sup>

General Trimble thus describes the condition of the Confederate army on the morning after the battle:<sup>5</sup> "The next morning, by dawn, I went off to ask for orders, when I found the whole army in the utmost disorder. Thousands of straggling men were asking every passer-by for their regiments; ambulances, wagons, and artillery obstructing every road, and altogether, in a drenching rain, presenting a scene of the most woeful and heart-rending confusion." The very show of an attack upon such an army by the unbroken Union force must have defeated it. But there was in the mind of its commander no thought of an attack. When, in the morning, the Confederates looked up the hill which they had so vainly attempted to scale, they saw not a trace of the grim batteries and serried lines which had confronted them the night before. In the storm and darkness the Union army had fled from a victory as though it had been a rout.

McClellan had "perceived that the position at Malvern Hill was the key to our operations in that quarter."<sup>6</sup> His whole army was concentrated here, having during the actions and retreat suffered far less loss than it had inflicted. Here he had wisely resolved to give battle; and yet before the battle was fought he had begun the retreat, and as soon as the "complete victory" was won, the troops were on the march, abandoning the key to the position.<sup>7</sup> Hitherto the retreat had been orderly, but for this last seven miles it presented the aspect of the flight of a routed army.<sup>8</sup> Keyes, who was to form the rear-guard, was instructed: "Bring along all the wagons you can; but they are to be sacrificed, of course, rather than imperil your safety. Celerity of movement is the sole security of this position." Next day, while the retreat was going on, the chief of staff wrote to Keyes: "It is of the utmost importance that we should save all our artillery and as many of our wagons as possible. If you bring in every thing you will accomplish a most signal and meritorious exploit, which the commanding general will not fail to represent in its proper light to the Department."<sup>9</sup> On the 3d, McClellan wrote to the Secretary of War that the army was thoroughly worn out, and required rest and very heavy re-enforcements; but he hoped that the enemy was equally worn out. He hoped the army would have breathing space before it was attacked again. It was impossible then to estimate the losses, but he doubted whether there were more than fifty thousand men with their colors. To "accomplish the task of capturing Richmond," re-enforcements should be sent to him "rather much over than less than one hundred thousand men."<sup>10</sup>

This hasty and disorderly retreat was performed with little molestation from the enemy. Stuart's cavalry, who had rejoined Lee after the battle, followed after, through the storm, making a few captures of straggling men and abandoned arms. Some of the Confederate infantry followed cautiously, and on the 3d came near enough to throw a few shells at the rear-guard,



THE RETREAT FROM MALVERN.

but were quickly dispersed by a fire from the batteries and gun-boats. But no serious attempt at annoyance was made; and after passing a few days near the battle-field of Malvern, burying the dead and gathering abandoned property, the Confederates, on the 8th, retired to Richmond. McClellan felt himself in a condition, on the 7th, to write to the President that his position was very strong, and daily becoming more so; if not attacked that day he should laugh at the enemy; his men were in splendid spirits, and anxious to try it again. Meanwhile the President was to alarm himself as little as possible, and, above all, must not lose confidence in the army.<sup>1</sup>

With the battle of Malvern Hill properly closed the campaign on the Peninsula. To the errors which marked its earlier period, as conducted by McClellan, we advert but briefly. They arose mainly from the exaggerated estimates which he made of the forces opposed to him. Thus, at the close of October, 1861, when the Confederates had at and around Centreville only 40,000 or 50,000, he believed that they numbered 150,000; when they abandoned this point, he put their numbers at 115,000 instead of 50,000. He was held in check at Yorktown for weeks by 11,000, 20,000, and finally 53,000, instead of 100,000, "and possibly more," as he believed. While lying idle in the Chickahominy swamps, confronted, as he thought, by a superior force, there was not a day up to the battle of Fair Oaks when his strength was not greater by half than that of the enemy. And when at length Lee had gathered all his re-enforcements, including Jackson, his utmost effective strength was barely 100,000, instead of the 180,000 or 200,000 which McClellan attributed to him, his own force being fully as great.

Into the six days—which have somehow passed into history as the Seven Days—from June 26 to July 1, in which this ill-starred campaign culminated, were concentrated on both sides more grave errors than can elsewhere be found in modern military history.

Of Lee's initial error in dividing his army, which should have lost him every thing, we have already spoken. The wild attack upon the strong Union position at Beaver Dam Creek can be justified only on the ground that it was made in utter ignorance of his own force at that point, and of that opposed to him. It finds its parallel upon a larger scale in our own attack upon Fredericksburg, six months later.

The battle of Cold Harbor was fought upon the Union side without any assignable object. McClellan indeed says:<sup>2</sup> "The objects sought for had been attained. The enemy was held at bay, our siege-guns and material were saved, and the right wing had now joined the main body of the army." But the material had all been saved hours before the action commenced. The very last of the siege-guns was carried off at sunrise, half past four, and it was not till "after noon that the enemy were discovered approaching in force, and it soon became evident that the entire position was to be attacked."<sup>3</sup> Here were fully eight hours of daylight during which Porter's and McCall's troops, unencumbered by trains, could have crossed wholly without molestation. Any two or three hours of that time would have been amply sufficient for the purpose. In the darkness, and after the fatigue and confusion of a lost battle, the crossing was effected in three or four hours by half more men. The crossing might indeed have been made during the night of the 26th, and the right wing, entirely fresh, with the exception of McCall's division, which had won the fight at Beaver Dam Creek, might have been with the main body of the army on the right bank of the Chickahominy, in the very position where McClellan had been for weeks trying to place them; with the wholly unexpected advantage that the force of the enemy was divided, with the whole Union army and the impassable Chickahominy between the portions. With the bridges destroyed, and the approaches covered by artillery, the whole Confederate force on the left bank of the Chickahominy, for at least two days, was wholly useless for the defense of Richmond.

This battle was not fought to preserve the communications with the White House, for on the day before orders had been given to abandon that base,<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 272.

<sup>2</sup> Some days after the retreat from Malvern Hill McClellan proposed to renew the movement upon Richmond, if he could have a re-enforcement of 20,000 men. In reply to the question, "In what do you consider your chances of success would have been greater, with the addition of 20,000 to the number which you had at Harrison's Landing, than they were when you were in front of Richmond, and before Jackson had formed a junction with the rest of the rebel forces?" he answered: "I should have counted upon the effect of the battles which had just taken place upon the enemy. We had then strong reason to believe that the enemy's losses had been heavier than our own, and that portions of his army were very much demoralized, especially after the battle of Malvern Hill."—*Com. Rep.*, 438.

<sup>3</sup> Magruder, indeed, says (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 202) that "there was a force of 26,000 or 28,000 under my orders engaged and under fire." But he must have considered himself in command of the whole field, and so have included D. H. Hill's division. For he repeatedly states that his own division and that of Huger together numbered, at the outset, only 25,000; of these fully 800 had been killed and wounded at Golding's, Price's, and Savage's Station, and many of his men gave out in the march before reaching Malvern Hill. As one example out of many scattered through the minor Confederate reports, General Howell Cobb says (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 279) that his brigade "commenced the march on the morning of the 29th of June with 2700 men, but fatigue and exhaustion had so reduced our ranks that less than 1500 were carried into the battle of the 1st of July." Of his own division and Huger's, Magruder could not have had more than 18,000 or 20,000 at Malvern Hill.

<sup>4</sup> The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for Harrison's Landing during the night of the 30th of June and 1st of July, the order for the movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse of the enemy at Malvern Hill.—*Ibid.*, 273.

<sup>5</sup> "We were ordered to retreat, and it was like the retreat of a routed army. We retreated like a parcel of sheep; every one was on the road at the same time, and a few shots from the rebels would have panic-stricken the whole command."—*Hooker's Testimony, Com. Rep.*, 58.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 611, 612.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 342.

<sup>1</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 13, 136, 404; *McC. Rep.*, 279.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 247. According to all Confederate accounts, they were not in position to open the attack until nearly two o'clock.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 243. McClellan intimates that this was done in consequence of the operations of the 27th. He says (*Ibid.*, 254): "The operations of this day [the 27th] proved the numerical superiority of the enemy, and made it evident that while he had a large army on the left bank of the

<sup>4</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 249.



and unite the whole force on the right bank. The reasons which McClellan assigns for not effecting this junction on the left bank are valid, and it is only to be wondered at that, after having got his whole army together on the right bank during the night of the 27th, he should even have suggested the idea of recrossing with his whole force and giving battle on the other side. His whole army was now just where it should have been long before, whether for advance or for retreat. But the reasons which he assigns for failing to advance upon Richmond are wholly invalid, not only in view of what is now known, but in view of what was or should have been known at the time. "The enemy," he repeats, "was in our rear, and there was every reason to believe that he would sever our communications with our supply dépôt at the White House. We had on hand but a limited amount of rations; and if we had advanced directly to Richmond, it would have required considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, during which our men would have been destitute of food; and even if Richmond had fallen before our arms, the enemy could still have occupied our supply communications between that place and our gun-boats, and turned their disaster into victory." But, as we have seen, the communications had already been abandoned. The whole army was furnished with supplies on the right bank of the Chickahominy for at least a fortnight. After destroying an immense amount of stores, which the train, forty miles long, was unable to convey, the army was fed, until it reached Harrison's Landing, a period of seven days, from what it carried with it. Even then "some portions of the army had still some rations left."<sup>1</sup> The supplies could by no means have been exhausted; for, besides the amount remaining in the wagons when the army retreated from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Landing, "the large herd of 2500 beef cattle was transferred to the James River without loss."<sup>2</sup> A few hours' combat on the 28th or 29th of June must have resulted in the capture of Richmond. The victorious army, besides the supplies which it would have captured there, would have been in a condition to have drawn its supplies from its new and better base, while the Confederate army on the left bank of the Chickahominy would have been wholly destitute of supplies from any source.

There was not the slightest occasion for leaving Porter and McCall as a forlorn hope, merely to hold a superior force at bay for a few hours. The battle of Cold Harbor was one which might either have been accepted or avoided. But, if accepted, there was no reason why it should have been fought with forces so inadequate as to render defeat a foregone conclusion. Ten thousand out of three times the number of men unemployed within hearing, and almost within sight of the battle, would have changed the issue of the day. With these Cold Harbor would have been a victory instead of a defeat.

The Union army was united during the night of the 27th; the Confederate force was separated, the Chickahominy River and swamp lying between the two portions. The operations of the day showed that the main Confederate force was on the left bank. Whether the Union army was to endeavor to take Richmond, or was to retreat to the James River, and there to find a new and better base, the first thing was to keep the force of the enemy apart. This was all the more imperative now that it was determined to retreat. To do this long enough to secure that the retreat should be un molested, it was only necessary to thoroughly destroy the bridges. This was done so imperfectly that it might as well not have been done at all. The bridges, which it had cost weeks to build, were so little damaged that they were repaired in hours. New Bridge was rebuilt by Magruder during the night of the 27th, without opposition, right under the guns of the Union batteries, and over this Longstreet and A. P. Hill crossed. The Grapevine Bridge, over which Sumner had so hardly passed a month before to repair the defeat at Seven Pines and win the victory at Fair Oaks, was left so little damaged that Jackson reconstructed it in a few hours of the night of the 29th. The thorough destruction of these two bridges would have kept the Confederate force, then across the Chickahominy, on that side long enough to have enabled the retreating army to have gained its new position without another battle.


But the Union army had no commander. From the moment when McClellan learned of the approach of Jackson, he seems to have lost head and heart. Having resolved to retreat instead of to advance, he posted his troops each morning, and his corps commanders saw no more of him for the day. He was busy selecting positions and expediting the passage of trains; doing the work of an engineer rather than that of a general. Each commander of a corps was left to himself to do the best he could. Except at Malvern Hill, the commanding general was not even constructively on the field at any important moment during the whole campaign. He was not present during the battles at Williamsburg or Hanover Court-house, at Seven Pines or Fair Oaks, at Cold Harbor, Savage's Station, or Frazier's Farm. Few of his generals even saw him at Malvern.<sup>3</sup>

Chickahominy, which had already turned our right, and was in position to intercept the communications with our dépôts at the White House, he was also in large force between our army and Richmond. I therefore effected a junction of our forces."

<sup>1</sup> Ingall's Testimony, *Com. Rep.*, 449.

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 256.

<sup>3</sup> During the Seven Days' Battles "the corps commanders fought their troops entirely according to their own ideas. If any body asked for re-enforcements, I sent them. If I wanted re-enforcements, I sent to others. . . . General Sumner fought the battle of Savage's Station entirely himself. . . . The next day [Frazier's Farm] General McClellan again posted his troops, and then went off to the James River. That battle was fought entirely by the corps commanders; at least, I received no directions myself. At Malvern Hill I received no orders from General McClellan after the troops were posted. . . . During that fight he was down at his headquarters on the James River. He came up some time late in the afternoon, and was with General Porter about half an hour. . . . He was the most extraordinary man I ever saw. I do not see how any man could leave so much to others, and be so confident that every thing would go right."—Heintzelman's Testimony, in *Com. Rep.*, 358, 359. Sumner testifies (*Ibid.*, 364, 365): "The action at Malvern commenced on the left at about ten o'clock in the morning. General McClellan had deemed it necessary to go down to Harrison's Landing to determine on the points to



POSITIONS AND MOVEMENTS, JUNE 25 TO JULY 1.

This plan indicates, in a general way, the positions and movements of the armies from June 25 to July 1.

- A. A. Union position at Mechanicsville, June 26.
- B. B. " " Cold Harbor, June 27.
- C. C. " " Savage's Station, June 29.
- D. D. " " Frazier's Farm, June 30.
- E. E. " " Malvern Hill, July 1.
- F. F. " " Harrison's Landing, July 4.

G. G. Union intrenchments before Richmond: a. Keyes; b. Heintzelman; c. Sumner; d. Franklin. H. H. Porter and McCall, after crossing the Chickahominy. Jackson's and D. H. Hill's march. Longstreet's and A. P. Hill's march. Magruder's and Huger's march. Holmes's and Wise's march. The retreat of the Union army was by the same line as Jackson's march, after crossing the Chickahominy.

Lee, unless he was greatly misinformed as to the strength of his opponent, or entertained the most profound contempt for his capacity, must have shared in Magruder's feeling of relief when he learned, on the morning of the 29th, that the Union army, instead of moving upon Richmond, was in full retreat for the James River. The siege of Richmond was indeed raised for the time, but if the retreating army safely reached its new base, the beleaguering could be renewed under more favorable auspices. To secure any permanent advantage, this army must be signally defeated, or, at least, greatly crippled on its march. To effect this was the design of the movements of the 29th and 30th. If Lee had succeeded, as he proposed, in concentrating 70,000 men on the afternoon of the 30th, half upon the flank and half in the rear,<sup>1</sup> yet both so near as to constitute one body, his plan would have succeeded. The plan failed from contingencies which should have been taken into account. The attacking force had to march twice as far as the retreating one, and over a country of which they were ignorant. The

which the troops should retire. I therefore found myself, by virtue of my seniority of rank, in command of the army, without having been formally invested with that command, or having received any instructions in relation to it. I received a note from General McClellan's chief of staff to this effect, that any orders I gave on the field would be approved. About an hour or two afterward I received a verbal message from General McClellan. He was then down the river, two and a half miles from where the battle was going on. . . . Some time afterward General McClellan came on the field. I think he first went up on the left, and came down the line toward the right where I was. He stopped and conversed with me for some time, and then went down toward the right, in the direction of the river. I did not see him again that day. About four o'clock that afternoon a very furious attack was made on our left again. That was the time when Magruder made the assault. . . . I do not know where General McClellan was during this second fight. I presume he was at his quarters. I do not know of his being on the field." McClellan says (*Rep.*, 269): "General Barnard then [the night of the 30th June] received full instructions for posting the troops as they arrived. I then returned to Haxall's, and again left for Malvern, soon after daybreak, accompanied by several general officers. I once more made the entire circuit of the position, and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the army and its dépôts. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines, and seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity." But he says, on the same page, "From the position of the enemy, his most obvious lines of attack would come from the directions of Richmond and White Oak Swamp, and would of necessity strike us upon our left wing." There was no fighting on the right, in the vicinity of which General McClellan remained.

<sup>1</sup> "When I was taken prisoner I was conducted not once to Lee's headquarters. Here Longstreet told me that they had 70,000 men bearing on that point, all of whom would probably arrive during the night."—McCall, in *Com. Rep.*, 588.



result was that the flank attack at Frazier's Farm was made by 18,000 men instead of 40,000, while Jackson, who was to have assailed the rear with 30,000, was held in check, utterly unable to cross the White Oak Creek.<sup>1</sup> The neglect of Lee to acquire minute information of the character of the country is inexplicable. The entire operations were carried on within a dozen miles of the capital of the Confederacy. One would suppose that every rood of ground, and every road and military point, would long before have been accurately surveyed and mapped. Moreover, even during the siege, this region, on the south side of the Swamp, had never been occupied by the enemy. It is doubtful whether, with the exception of a single cavalry reconnoissance in May, a single company of Union soldiers had crossed to the south side of the swamp until within a week. The first duty of a commander is to make himself acquainted with the country where he is to operate. If Napoleon owed to any one thing more than to another his marvelous triumphs, it was to the care with which he studied the topography of his campaigns. Thus alone was he enabled to manoeuvre his forces so as to have them, however apparently separated, brought together at the right moment. "The great art of war," he said, "consists in knowing how to separate in order to subsist, and how to concentrate, in order to fight." Lee had neglected this one essential thing, and, in consequence, his flank and rear assault failed utterly.

Had there been any real commander of the Union army on the field, the Confederate check at Frazier's Farm might have been rendered a severe defeat. Before the fight was fairly begun, the last of the Federal trains were safe at Malvern Hill. The army occupied a line from front to rear of barely eight miles. Jackson, in the rear, was held firmly in check across the Swamp, and could not advance a foot. Longstreet's and Hill's column struck this line near its centre. Keyes's corps, fully equal to Longstreet's and Hill's, had not been engaged at all. It had marched but eight miles in two days, and must have been fresher than the enemy, who had marched fully twice as far, after having fought at Cold Harbor. This corps, or half of it, brought back into the fight at Frazier's Farm, would have given such a preponderating strength to the Union force that Longstreet and Hill, instead of being merely checked, must have been overwhelmed. As it was, they suffered so severely that they could not be brought into the action of the next day. But the commanding general was miles away from the scene of action, and no one of the corps and division commanders could have any knowledge of the whole field and of the positions of the different troops. Each did the best he could under the circumstances, and no troops could have fought more bravely; "but no one knew who and where his next neighbor was; and, what is worse, there was no common head near at hand to direct, and give coherence and unity to the operations."<sup>2</sup> "It was very late at night," says McClellan,<sup>3</sup> "before my aids returned to give me the results of the day's fighting along the whole line, and the true position of affairs."

The battle of Malvern Hill was fought by the Confederates without plan or concert. Of more than 70,000 men, whom Lee had even then within two hours' march, less than 30,000 were brought into action.<sup>4</sup> Opposed to these was the whole Union force of fully 85,000 effective men, holding a position which they could have maintained against twice their number. With such odds, there could have been but one result. The mad Confederate assault failed utterly, and could not but have failed if it had been made with their whole force instead of less than half. D. H. Hill, who had opposed it, endeavors to show that, if properly supported by Jackson, he could have succeeded; but in the very attempt he is forced to point out the "blundering arrangements" of his superiors.<sup>5</sup>

In reviewing the operations of these six days one can not but be impressed by the slight part borne by Jackson. He failed to be at his designated place at Mechanicsville. He reached Cold Harbor only in time to turn the wavering scale. Had Porter been re-enforced, as he should have been, Jackson would have been too late. He was held at bay at White Oak Swamp, utterly unable to aid in the battle raging only two miles away. At Malvern Hill he did not even attempt to bring his own proper divisions into ac-

tion, though he sent Hill upon his hopeless effort to storm the heights, which even that reckless fighter thought impregnable. Where, as in this case, all was accomplished by hard fighting, the losses sustained by each commander afford the best measure of his efficiency. Jackson had 30,000 men, and lost not quite 2300; Longstreet and D. H. Hill, out of 10,000 each, lost each 4000; A. P. Hill, out of 14,000, lost 3900; Magruder, out of 25,000 belonging to himself and Huger, lost nearly 4000, fully four fifths of them in the single battle at Malvern, in which, if it was to have been fought at all, Jackson should have borne the prominent part. The "blundering arrangements" in this battle, of which D. H. Hill complains, must be mainly charged to Jackson.

Never was there better fighting, and never worse generalship than during the six days on the Peninsula. "The Union army," says McClellan,<sup>6</sup> "fought an overwhelming enemy by day, and retreated from successive victories by night, through a week of battle, closing the terrible scenes of conflict with the ever-memorable victory at Malvern, where they drove back, beaten and shattered, the entire Eastern Army of the Confederacy." But at no point, as we have shown by an analysis of forces, was there an "overwhelming" or even a superior force of the enemy except at Cold Harbor, where such a supremacy should not have existed. "Richmond," as McClellan says, "was still within our grasp," as it had indeed been for a month; but the hand which should have grasped it was too feeble for the effort.

We have written, "In a contest between forces so nearly balanced, the victory would rest with that which was most ably commanded. The general who made the fewest errors would win." We might have said, where the whole campaign was a series of errors on both sides, the commander who made the last great error would lose. McClellan's retreat from Malvern was the last great error, and so Lee won. The fruits of victory remained with him; though at a heavy cost, he had won the object at which he aimed, and had good right to say, "The siege of Richmond was raised, and the object of a campaign which had been prosecuted, after months of preparation, at an enormous expenditure of men and money, completely frustrated."<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 445.

<sup>2</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 14.

#### LOSSES FROM JUNE 26 TO JULY 1.

After the retreat to Harrison's Landing, the losses of each division of the Union army, in killed, wounded, and missing, were summed up, but no attempt was made to give the proportion in each engagement (*McC. Rep.*, 272). If any confirmation of the accuracy of the statement were needed, it would be found in a comparison of the official reports of June 20 and July 20 (*McC. Rep.*, 53; *Com. Rep.*, 337, 344). The entire loss, in killed, wounded, and missing, is undoubtedly accurately stated, but as the dead and many of the wounded were abandoned, probably some hundreds should be added to these and taken from the number put down as "missing." Lee, indeed, says (*Rep.*, i., 14) that more than 10,000 prisoners were taken; but this is clearly erroneous. Besides the 2000 at Cold Harbor, and the 2500 at Savage's Station, almost all of whom were sick or wounded, and perhaps 1000 (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 11, 134, 184) picked up by Jackson on his march to White Oak Bridge, very few prisoners were taken by the Confederates.

Of the Confederate commanders, Jackson, D. H. Hill, Longstreet, A. P. Hill, Holmes, and Pendleton, give their exact losses. The losses of Magruder and Huger can be made up very closely from the reports of their brigade commanders. Barksdale (*Lee's Rep.*, i., 296) says that "one third of his brigade fell upon the field: it numbered about 2400, which would make the loss 800." Cobb (*Ibid.*, i., 279) puts his loss in killed and wounded at "nearly 500." McLaws's (*Ibid.*, i., 161, 164), 97 killed, 456 wounded. D. R. Jones (*Ibid.*, i., 172), 103 killed, 708 wounded. Ramsom (*Ibid.*, i., 370), 69 killed, 354 wounded. Malone (*Ibid.*, i., 372, 378), 63 killed, 216 wounded. Armistead (*Ibid.*, i., 438, 439, 448), two regiments estimated, 320 killed and wounded. Wright (*Ibid.*, i., 397), 55 killed, 243 wounded. In all, 3984, of whom 656 were killed, and 3328 wounded. Of the cavalry and reserve artillery, we find mention of about 20 killed and 104 wounded.

The missing in A. P. Hill's division are not given; the number was evidently small, probably about 100. In Magruder's command we find about 400 missing in about two thirds of the brigades; we set down the whole at 600.

From the foregoing data we have compiled the following table of

KILLED, WOUNDED, AND MISSING

	UNION.				CONFEDERATE.			
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
McCall .....	253	1549	1551	3,353	36	1,829	14	2,059
Sumner .....	187	1076	848	2,111	714	3,192	48	4,054
Heintzelman .....	189	1051	633	2,073	703	2,429	237	3,429
Keyes .....	69	507	201	777	619	3,251	100(?)	3,970
Porter .....	620	2440	1198	4,258	656	3,328	600(?)	4,584
Franklin .....	245	1313	1179	2,737	3	50	..	62
Engineers and Cavalry .....	19	62	118	199	20	174	..	194
Total .....	1582	7709	6055	15,349	3151	15,255	999	19,405

The losses in the separate battles can be given only approximately, by considering the troops engaged in each, and the nature of the fighting, aided by a few indicia scattered here and there through the various reports of Confederate commanders.

Keyes was engaged mainly at Malvern Hill, we put his entire loss in that battle. Sumner was engaged at Savage's Station, Frazier's Farm, and Malvern; we divide his loss between those three engagements. Heintzelman at Frazier's Farm and Malvern; we divide his loss between them. McCall was at Mechanicsville, where he lost about 300, and at Cold Harbor, and the Farm, losing about equally in each. Porter was chiefly engaged at Cold Harbor and Malvern; we put three fourths of his loss at the former. Of Franklin's corps, half with Slocum was at Cold Harbor, the other half with Smith at Garland's and Price's Farms, and elsewhere; we put two thirds of his loss at Cold Harbor, dividing the remainder among the other engagements.

Jackson was engaged at Cold Harbor and slightly at Malvern; D. H. Hill at Mechanicsville, Cold Harbor, and Malvern; both of these distinguish between their losses in each engagement. A. P. Hill was at Mechanicsville, Cold Harbor, and Frazier's Farm. We estimate his loss in the first at 750, in the last at 900, leaving the remainder for Cold Harbor. Longstreet was at Cold Harbor and Frazier's Farm; we put his loss in the latter battle at 1100, leaving the remainder for Cold Harbor.

From these data we construct the following approximate table of

KILLED AND WOUNDED IN THE SEVERAL ENGAGEMENTS.

	UNION.			CONFEDERATE.		
	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Mechanicsville .....	50	250	300	125	1,200	1,325
Cold Harbor .....	75	3250	3325	150	8,000	8,150
Savage's Station .....	100	500	600	75	250	325
Frazier's Farm .....	300	1500	1800	1700	2,000	3,800
Malvern Hill .....	375	1500	1875	2500	4,400	6,900
Skirmishes (say) .....	50	500	550	101	400	501
Total .....	1582	7709	9291	3151	15,255	18,406

<sup>1</sup> "Huger not coming up, and Jackson being unable to force the passage of White Oak Swamp, Longstreet and Hill were without the expected support. The advantages in numbers and position were on the side of the enemy. Could the other commands have co-operated in the action, the result would have proved most disastrous to the enemy." . . . "Under ordinary circumstances the Federal army should have been destroyed. Prominent among the causes to which its escape is due is the want of timely information. This fact, attributable chiefly to the character of the country, enabled General McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat, and to add much to the obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing columns."—*Lee's Rep.*, i., 11, 14.

<sup>2</sup> Barnard, *Pen. Camp.*, 44.

<sup>3</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 268.

<sup>4</sup> We estimate the effective Confederate force within five miles of Malvern Hill, on the 1st of July, thus: Jackson and D. H. Hill, 30,000; Longstreet and A. P. Hill, 15,000; Magruder and Huger, 20,000; Holmes, 7000; in all, 72,000. Longstreet, A. P. Hill, and Holmes were not under fire at all. Of Jackson's "command" only D. H. Hill's 8000 were brought fairly in; these, with Magruder's 20,000, were all that actually fought.

<sup>5</sup> "The battle of Malvern Hill might have been a complete and glorious success had not our artillery and infantry been fought in detail. My division batteries, having been three times engaged, had exhausted all their ammunition, and had been sent back for a fresh supply. If I had had them with me, with a good supply of ammunition, I feel confident that we could have beaten the force immediately in front of us. Again, the want of concert with the infantry divisions was most painful. Whiting's division did not engage at all, neither did Holmes's. My division fought an hour or more the whole Yankee force, without assistance from a single Confederate soldier. Some half hour after my division had ceased to struggle against odds of more than ten to one, I had to fall back. McLaws's division advanced but to share the same fate. Notwithstanding the tremendous odds against us, and the blundering arrangements of the battle, we inflicted heavy loss upon the Yankees. The actual loss in battle was, in my opinion (though most persons differ with me), greater on our side than on that of the Yankees."—D. H. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, i., 187.



## CHAPTER XXI. THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

### IV. THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PENINSULA.

Position of the two Armies.—Petersburg fortified.—Pope placed in Command of the Army of Virginia.—Halleck appointed General-in-Chief.—McClellan asks for Re-enforcements.—His Plan of carrying on the War.—McClellan and Halleck.—Jackson and Hill sent to Gordonsville.—Night Attack from Coggin's Point.—Movement to Malvern Hill.—McClellan ordered to withdraw from the Peninsula.—His Remonstrance.—Hooker's Advice.—Halleck's Reasons for the Order.—The Withdrawal.—The Confederates march Northward.

SIX weeks of almost entire inactivity followed the battle of Malvern and the retreat of the Federal army to Harrison's Landing. The Confederate force remained for some days in the vicinity of the battle-field, and on the 8th of July returned to its positions near Richmond, the movement being so completely masked by the cavalry that no intelligence of it reached the Federal commander, who was still fearful of an attack.<sup>1</sup> Lee was apprehensive that an attempt might be made upon Richmond from the new Federal base by way of Petersburg. D. H. Hill was detached from his division, and placed in command of the Department of the South Side, extending from Drewry's Bluff to the South Carolina line. Petersburg was utterly defenseless, not a spadeful of earth having been thrown up around it. A system of fortifications was now begun, which were ultimately developed into the formidable works which afterward resisted for so long the approach of General Grant. All the troops that could be spared from before Richmond were set to work upon these intrenchments, besides a thousand negroes brought from North Carolina.<sup>2</sup>

On the 26th of June, General Pope had been called from the West, and placed in command of the Army of Virginia, comprising the forces of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont. Pope strenuously opposed the movement of McClellan to the James, urging instead that, if he found himself unable to maintain his position on the Chickahominy, he should mass all his force on the north bank, even at the risk of losing much material of war, and endeavor to make his way in the direction of Hanover Court-house, but in no case to retreat farther to the south than the White House on the Pamunkey. After the retreat to the James, it became apparent that the views of Pope and McClellan were wholly opposed to each other. Both commanders urged the appointment of a commander-in-chief over all the forces. General Halleck, who had successfully conducted operations in the West, was appointed to command the whole land forces of the United States as general-in-chief, and was directed to repair to the capital as soon as he could with safety to the operations within his Department of the Mississippi. This order was dated July 11, and Halleck assumed the command on the 23d.

McClellan had not fairly established himself in his new position when he began to urge that he should be largely re-enforced. On the 1st of July he asked for 50,000 men at once. Next day: "Re-enforcements should be sent to me rather much over than less than 100,000 men." In reply to the demand for 50,000, the President said that, according to McClellan's own plan, 75,000 were required for the defense of Washington; while, including Banks, Fremont, McDowell, and those about the capital, there were not more than 60,000; adding to these Wool at Baltimore, and Dix at Fortress Monroe, there were not, outside of the force then with McClellan, 75,000 men east of the Mountains. "Thus the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other considerable force promptly, is simply absurd." McClellan still continued to urge for re-enforcements from any and every quarter. The true defense of Washington, he said, was before Richmond; Burnside, with all his troops, should be brought thither from North Carolina; with a little more than half a chance he could take Richmond.

On the 25th of July General Halleck went to the James in order to consult with the commander of the Army of the Potomac. At that time McClellan's plan was to cross the James River, attack Petersburg, cut off the enemy's communications with the South, making no farther demonstrations against Richmond. Petersburg being then wholly unfortified, this attempt might probably have succeeded. Halleck was, however, utterly averse to the plan, and it was abandoned. McClellan then said that with 30,000 re-enforcements he could attack Richmond with a good chance of success, although he would then have but 120,000 effective men, while he estimated the force of the enemy at not less than 200,000. Halleck would promise only 20,000, and said that unless McClellan could attack Richmond with these, with a strong probability of success, it would be a military necessity to unite the forces of McClellan and Pope. McClellan, after consultation with his officers, decided that he would make the attempt with 20,000, although he would not say that the probabilities were in favor of success; still, there was a chance, and he would try it, and Halleck returned to Washington with the understanding that the attempt should be made. The next day McClellan wrote asking 15,000 or 20,000 more re-enforcements.<sup>3</sup>

The four weeks' quiet on the James was interrupted on the night of July 31. The Union fleet lay stretched along for two miles above and below Harrison's Landing. Just opposite, across the James, was Coggin's Point, a peninsular projection jutting out into the river, diminishing its breadth to 1000 yards. Hill ordered forty-three guns to be quietly placed on the point; this was done without being discovered from the opposite shore, and just after midnight fire was opened upon the Federal shipping and camp.

<sup>1</sup> "The rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions, or reducing us by blocking our river communications. I can not but regard our position as critical."—*McClellan to the President*, July 7.

<sup>2</sup> D. H. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 110.

<sup>3</sup> *Com. Rep.*, 456.

Innumerable lights from the vessels and camp served to show just where lay the objects of aim, and for half an hour there was a continuous bombardment. But, owing to the difficulty of the roads, and the necessity for concealing the operation, only a small quantity of ammunition had been brought forward. In all only 1000 shot were fired, by which ten men were killed and fifteen wounded. The attack failed of its main object, the injuring of the fleet. The fire was returned briskly from the gun-boats, but it was almost harmless, there being nothing to show the position of the enemy. Of the Confederates but one man was killed and two wounded. The ammunition being expended, the guns were withdrawn as silently as they had been advanced.<sup>4</sup> The south bank of the river opposite his position was then occupied by McClellan, who wrote cheerily to Halleck, who had urged him to press the enemy: "I will attend to your telegraph about pressing at once. I will send Hooker out. Give me Burnside, and I will stir these people up."<sup>5</sup>

On the 4th of August McClellan moved, as if to press the enemy. Hooker and Sedgwick advanced to Malvern Hill, drove back the enemy's pickets, took possession of the point, and pushed reconnoissances toward Richmond. McClellan reported: "This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond, only 14½ miles distant; and I feel confident that, with re-enforcements, I could march this army there in five days."<sup>6</sup> When intelligence of this advance reached Richmond, the greater part of the troops there were hurried down, and the night of the 6th closed upon the two armies occupying nearly the same positions as on the 1st of July. Next morning, when the Confederates looked to the hill, they found it abandoned by the Union force.<sup>7</sup> McClellan had, during the night, received peremptory orders from Halleck to withdraw his army from the Peninsula. He sent an earnest remonstrance against this order. His army, he said, was now in excellent condition; he held both sides of the James River, and could act in any direction. He was within 25 miles of Richmond, and was not likely to meet the enemy in sufficient force to fight a battle until he had reached 15 or 18 miles, thus practically bringing him within 10 miles of Richmond. His longest line of land transportation was 25 miles; but, by the aid of the gun-boats, his army could be supplied by water during its advance until within 12 miles of Richmond. The retreat would demoralize the army, would depress the people of the North, and would probably influence foreign powers to recognize the Confederacy. He therefore urged that the order should be rescinded; and that, so far from being recalled, his army should be promptly re-enforced to enable it to resume the offensive.<sup>8</sup> Hooker, indeed, wished to disobey the order of the general-in-chief. He said that they had then force enough to take Richmond; he himself was ready to take the advance. If the movement was unsuccessful, it would probably cost McClellan his head, but that "he might as well die for an old sheep as for a lamb." McClellan for a time seemed inclined to follow Hooker's counsel. On the 10th he gave Hooker a written order to supply himself with ammunition and three days' rations, and to be ready to march the next day. "This order," says Hooker, "was communicated to the whole army, and I firmly believed that order meant Richmond; but, before the time arrived for executing it, it was countermanded."<sup>9</sup>

To McClellan's remonstrance Halleck replied briefly by telegraph, "The order will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute it with all possible promptness;" and at length by letter, setting forth his reasons for giving and adhering to the order.<sup>10</sup>

After this definite and final order for the withdrawal from the Peninsula ten days passed before the army began to move. Sharp criminations and recriminations passed between Halleck and McClellan on account of this delay. But at length, on the 16th, the sick and stores had all been embarked, and the movement of the troops had begun. A long pontoon bridge had been thrown across the Chickahominy near its mouth, and by this and other bridges the troops recrossed that fatal stream. On the morning of the 18th the rear guard was over and the bridge was removed. McClellan, who had apprehended an attack upon his rear, did not feel secure until he had his whole army across the river.<sup>11</sup> But almost the entire Confederate force had been gradually withdrawn from Richmond. Jackson and Ewell had been sent to Gordonsville five weeks before; they had been followed a fortnight later by A. P. Hill. On the 13th of August, Longstreet's, Hood's, and the bulk of Magruder's and Huger's divisions marched northward; and while McClellan was congratulating himself that he had got safely across the Chickahominy, the whole Confederate force was a hundred miles away, confronting Pope on the Rappahannock.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 232.

<sup>5</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 285.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 289.

<sup>7</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 16.

<sup>8</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 288-296.

<sup>9</sup> Hooker's Testimony, in *Com. Rep.*, 579.

<sup>10</sup> After replying to the strategical and political arguments advanced by McClellan, Halleck says: "If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition [for 35,000 re-enforcements] was perfectly reasonable; but it was perfectly impossible to fill it until new troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. To keep your army in its present position until it could be so re-enforced would almost destroy it in that climate; and, even after you receive the re-enforcements asked for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries before you could advance upon Richmond. It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would not require considerable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but, in the mean time, General Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you. . . . I have not inquired, and I do not wish to know by whose advice, or for what reasons, the Army of the Potomac was separated into two parts, with the enemy between them. I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better plan, I should have adopted it. But all of your plans require re-enforcements which it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for re-enforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable troops at your command."—*McC. Rep.*, 299-301.

<sup>11</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 313-316.

<sup>12</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 18, 19; ii., 3, 80.





HENRY W. HALLECK.

## CHAPTER XXII.

POPE'S CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.<sup>1</sup>

Pope placed in command of the Army of Virginia.—Fremont relieved.—Positions of Pope's Forces.—The Plan of Operations.—Pope's Address.—His General Orders.—Similar Confederate Orders.—Pope concentrates his Force.—Jackson ordered to Gordonsville.—Re-enforced by Hill.—Battle of Cedar Mountain.—Banks attacks and is repulsed.—The Losses.—Pope re-enforced.—Jackson retreats to Gordonsville.—Lee joins Jackson, and Pope withdraws beyond the Rappahannock.—Estimate of the Confederate Force.—The Design of Lee.—Manœuvring on the Rappahannock.—Speedy re-enforcements promised to Pope.—Stuart's Raid on Catlett's Station.—Capture of Pope's Dispatch-book, and its Consequences.—Lee's new Plan of Operations.—Jackson marches for Thoroughfare Gap.—Longstreet follows him.—Pope begins to fall back.—Jackson captures Stores at Manassas Junction.—Fight at Bristoe Station.—Fitz John Porter ordered to move.—Taylor's Brigade routed.—Jackson's Peril.—He falls back to Bull Run.—First Battle at Groveton, August 28.—Pope confident of destroying Jackson.—Jackson stands at Bay.—Pope's Plan.—Why it failed.—Affairs at Washington.—Halleck and McClellan.—Second Battle of Groveton, August 29.—Sigel's ineffectual Attack upon the Right.—Fighting upon the Centre and Left.—Longstreet reaches Thoroughfare Gap.—Skirmish at the Gap.—Longstreet's Advance unites with Jackson.—McClellan and Porter.—Pope orders Porter to

attack.—The Order not obeyed.—Hooker's and Reno's Attack upon the Left.—Hatch's Assault along the Turnpike.—Close of the Battle.—Pope claims a Victory.—Pope's new Order to Porter.—Third Battle at Groveton, August 30: Strength of the two Armies.—Pope's Forebodings.—Is convinced that the Enemy is retreating, and orders a Pursuit.—The Confederate Position.—The Union Line.—Porter attacks Jackson's Right.—Reno and Heintzelman attack the Centre.—Jackson demands Re-enforcements.—Longstreet's Movements.—Warren's Stand.—Retreat of the Union Forces.—Losses in the Battles of Groveton.—The Forces after the Battle.—Terror at Washington.—McClellan and his Friends.—The Battle of Chantilly, or Ox Hill.—Death of Kearney and Stevens.—The Retreat to Washington.—Pope relieved from the Command.—Estimate of Pope's Campaign.—The Difficulties in his Way.—His early Measures judicious.—His Error on the 29th.—The Time of Longstreet's arrival on the Field.—The greater Error of the 30th.—Estimate of Lee's Campaign.—Its different Phases.

ON the 26th of June, the day on which the closing operations before Richmond were commenced, General Pope was placed in command of the "Army of Virginia," made up of the corps of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell. Fremont took umbrage at being thus placed under an officer whom he outranked, and asked to be relieved from his command. The request was readily complied with, and he disappears from the history of the war, Sigel being placed in command of his corps. Pope found his army widely scattered. Of McDowell's corps of 18,500 men, one half, under King,

<sup>1</sup> In addition to the authorities heretofore mentioned, we use mainly in this chapter *Pope's Report*, citing from the official copy, published by order of Congress; and the Report of the Fitz John Porter Court-martial, cited as "*Court-martial*."





JOHN POPE.

was at Fredericksburg, on the Rappahannock, the other half, under Ricketts, at Manassas Junction, thirty miles to the north; Banks, with 8000, and Fremont, with 11,500, were at Middletown, fifty miles farther to the northwest, with the Blue Mountains between them and Manassas. Infantry and artillery numbered 34,000, and there were about 5000 cavalry. A considerable part of the force was in bad condition.

The Federal government was still nervously apprehensive for the safety of Washington, though there was not a single Confederate soldier within ten days' march; every man had been withdrawn from the Shenandoah and Rappahannock to the Chickahominy. Pope was ordered, as McDowell had been, to cover Washington from attack from the direction of Richmond, assure the safety of the Valley of the Shenandoah, and then, by menacing the Confederate lines of communication with the South by way of Gordonsville, to endeavor to draw off some of the force then opposed to McClellan before Richmond. The whole plan of the campaign was based upon the supposition that Jackson was still threatening the Valley, and thence Washington, Maryland, and even Pennsylvania. Pope's first object was to concentrate his scattered command upon the line of the Rappahannock, whence he could, by rapid marching, interpose between any body of the enemy moving up the Valley and their main force at Richmond. The retreat of the Army of the Potomac to the James changed the whole aspect of affairs. Pope soon found that his plan for operations was wholly at variance with that of McClellan; and at his suggestion Halleck was summoned<sup>1</sup> from the West, and, as general-in-chief, placed in command of both.

Pope, on taking the field, issued an address to his army<sup>2</sup> censuring, by implication, the course of McClellan, and breathing a spirit of confidence which belied the forebodings which he felt.<sup>3</sup> "I have come," he said, "from the

West, where we have always seen the backs of our enemies; from an army whose business has been to seek the adversary and beat him when found; whose policy has been attack and not defense. I presume that I have been called here to pursue the same system, and to lead you against the enemy. I desire you to dismiss from your minds certain phrases which I am sorry to find much in vogue among you. I hear constantly of taking strong positions and holding them; of lines of retreat and bascs of supplies. Let us discard such ideas. The strongest position a soldier should desire is one from which he can most easily advance against the enemy. Let us study the probable lines of retreat of our opponent, and leave our own to take care of themselves."

This address was followed by a series of General Orders prescribing the mode in which the campaign was to be conducted. The troops were, as far as practicable, to subsist upon the country in which their operations were carried on; vouchers were to be given for all supplies taken, payable at the close of the war, upon proof that the holders had been loyal citizens.<sup>1</sup> The cavalry should take no trains for baggage or supplies, only two days' rations, to be carried on their persons; villages and neighborhoods through which they passed were to be laid under contribution for the subsistence of the men and horses.<sup>2</sup> People living along railroad and telegraph lines were to be held responsible for all damage done to them, and for guerrilla attacks. If roads or telegraphs were injured by guerrillas, the inhabitants living within five miles were to be turned out to repair them. If a soldier was fired upon from a house, it was to be razed to the ground, and the inhabitants sent as prisoners to head-quarters. If such an outrage occurred at a distance from any settlement, the people within five miles should be held accountable, and made to pay an indemnity. Any person detected in such outrages, either during the act or afterward, was to be shot, without awaiting civil process.<sup>3</sup> All disloyal male citizens near, within, or in the rear of the army lines were to be arrested; those who took the oath of allegiance, and gave security for its observance, were to be allowed to remain at home; those who refused were to be sent South, beyond the extreme pickets of the army, and if thereafter found behind, within, or near the lines, would be considered as spies, and subjected to the extreme rigor of military law. If any one violated the oath of allegiance, he should be shot, and his property confiscated. No communication should be held, except through the military authority, with any person residing within the lines of the enemy; and any person concerned in carrying letters or messages in any other way would be considered and treated as a spy.<sup>4</sup>

Stringent as these orders were, their severest provisions had been more than anticipated by the action of the Confederate government in Tennessee. Eight months before,<sup>5</sup> Judah Benjamin, then Secretary of War, issued official instructions "as to the prisoners taken among the traitors of East Tennessee." All, said the order, who can be "identified in having been engaged in bridge-burning, are to be tried summarily by drum-head court-martial, and, if found guilty, executed on the spot by hanging. It would be well to leave their bodies hanging in the vicinity of the burnt bridges." All who had not been so engaged were to be sent to Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and to be kept in confinement as prisoners of war. "In no case," continues the order, "is one of the men known to have been up in arms against the government to be released on any oath or pledge of allegiance. The time for such measures is past. They are to be held as prisoners of war, and kept in jail until the close of the war. Such as come in voluntarily, take the oath of allegiance, and surrender their arms, are alone to be treated with leniency." The Confederate government, however, denounced the orders of Pope as gross violation of the rules of war, and by a General Order<sup>6</sup> it was declared that General Pope, and the commissioned officers serving under him, were not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, and if any of them were captured they were to be kept in close confinement; and if any persons should be executed in pursuance of his General Orders, an equal number of these prisoners, selected by lot, should be hung.

Pope's first movement was to concentrate his scattered forces, so as to bring them within something like supporting distance of each other. Sigel, who now commanded Fremont's corps, and Banks, were withdrawn from the Valley of the Shenandoah, and posted near Sperryville, east of the Blue Mountains; Ricketts, with his division of McDowell's corps, was brought down from Manassas to Waterloo Bridge, twenty miles to the east; King's division of McDowell's corps was still left at Fredericksburg. The Army of Virginia was thus posted along a line of forty miles. The region having been abandoned by the Confederates, a rapid march of two days, either from his right or left, would have enabled Pope to seize Gordonsville, which commanded the main railroad communication between Richmond and the South. Banks, who had in the mean while pushed southward a score of miles to Culpepper, was ordered, on the 14th of July, to send Hatch, who commanded the cavalry, to seize Gordonsville, and destroy the railroads which centre there from both directions. Hatch failed to execute this order, and having again failed a few days after, he was superseded in the command of the cavalry by Buford.<sup>7</sup>

Tidings of the renewed activity of the Federal forces on the Rappahannock soon reached Richmond, and although the Confederate capital was still threatened by McClellan's great army on the James, so important was the possession of Gordonsville, the key of communication with the South, that Lee ventured to weaken his force at Richmond in order to counteract the menacing movements of Pope. On the 13th of July, Jackson, with his own division and that of Ewell, was ordered to proceed to Gordonsville, with the

<sup>1</sup> July 11.<sup>2</sup> July 14.<sup>3</sup> I "took the field in Virginia with grave forebodings of the result, but with a determination tocarry out the plans of the government with all the energy and all the skill of which I was master."—*Pope's Report*, 6.<sup>1</sup> Order No. 5.<sup>2</sup> Order No. 6.<sup>3</sup> Order No. 7.<sup>4</sup> Order No. 11.<sup>5</sup> Nov. 25, 1861.<sup>6</sup> No. 54, August 1, 1862.<sup>7</sup> *Pope's Report*.



promise of re-enforcements in case there should be a chance to strike an effective blow without withdrawing troops too long from the defense of Richmond. Jackson found Pope too strong to warrant him in making any offensive movements, and for a fortnight contented himself with holding Gordonsville. But there being no indication that McClellan meditated moving upon Richmond, Lee, on the 27th of July, sent A. P. Hill to join Jackson.<sup>1</sup> The Confederate force at Richmond was thus reduced by 35,000 men, fully a third of its number.

On the 29th of July Pope left Washington to join his army in the field. On the 7th of August he advanced their position somewhat, concentrating his infantry within a space of ten miles along the road from Sperryville to Culpepper, the cavalry being thrown ten miles forward toward Gordonsville. On the same day, Jackson, having been informed that only a part of the enemy was at Culpepper, marched his command in that direction, hoping to strike a portion of Pope's army before it could be re-enforced. On the morning of the 9th, Banks was pushed six miles forward to a strong position near Cedar Mountain, and Ricketts was posted three miles in the rear. Sigel had been ordered to march to Culpepper, so as to be there in the morning; but, owing to misconception of orders, he did not arrive until late in the afternoon.

In the afternoon of the 9th, Ewell, whose division was in the advance, came in sight of Banks's position, near the northwestern flank of Cedar Mountain, a conical hill which rises sharply a few hundred feet from a plain intersected by creeks and low ridges. On the crest of one of these a body of Union cavalry was seen, the infantry and artillery being hidden by the opposite slope. Two brigades of Ewell's division, moving to the right, ascended Cedar Mountain, and planted their batteries two hundred feet up the side, so as to command the valley below. The remainder of Ewell's division, with a part of that of Jackson, keeping to the left, passed beyond the base of the mountain, and took up a position on a wooded ridge opposite the Union line. Hill's division had not yet come up. Lawton's brigade, the strongest of Jackson's division, was left behind to guard the trains, and took no part in the action. Between the wooded ridges occupied by the two armies lay an open plain a few hundred yards wide; here was a corn-field, and beyond this a wheat-field, upon which the yellow shocks of grain just reaped were still standing. At four o'clock a fierce fire of artillery had fairly opened. Some loss was sustained by the Federals from the batteries on the mountain side; more by the Confederates in the plain below. Winder, who now led the brigade which still bore the name of "Jackson's Own," was killed, and the command of it devolved upon Taliaferro. The cannonade was kept up for an hour, when Banks, believing that the enemy were in no great force,<sup>2</sup> threw his whole division in two columns across the grain-field. One column charged straight across the field upon the Confederate right. Early, who was posted there, being sorely pressed, called for re-enforcements. Hill had now come up, and one of his brigades was sent to Early's support. The main assault was upon the Confederate left. So sudden was the onset, that the extremity of the Confederate line was turned, and, before they were aware of it, they were charged directly in the rear, and forced back upon their centre, which also gave way. All seemed lost. The artillery, hurried to the rear, disappeared behind the crest of the ridge, while the greater part of the infantry broke away in confusion fast verging into rout. Jackson hurried in person to the front, and at length stopped the flight and re-formed his broken line. Two more brigades of Hill's division had now come up, and were pushed into action. The Confederates on the field now outnumbered the Federals by nearly two to one.<sup>3</sup> The Union advance was checked, and then forced back across the open field beyond the ridge from which they had come. In the mean while, Pope, who was with Ricketts's division, only three miles in the rear, became convinced, notwithstanding the assurances which he had just received from Banks, that the enemy was really in force, and that a serious action was going on. He hurried forward with Ricketts, and just at dusk met the retreating forces of Banks. A new line was formed, toward which Jackson advanced cautiously in the darkness, opening upon it a sharp artillery fire, which was returned so vigorously that a Confederate battery was disabled and withdrawn. Jackson then fell back, and passed the night on the battle-field.

In this accidental engagement, which might be denominated simply an "affair" were it not for the magnitude of the loss on both sides, the Confederates lost, in killed and wounded, about 1300; the Union loss was estimated at about 1400 killed and wounded, and 400 prisoners. Besides these there were a large number of stragglers, who never returned to their commands.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Lee's Rep., i., 15; ii., 3.

<sup>2</sup> Banks's dispatches to Pope: "August 9, 2 25. The enemy shows his cavalry, which is strong, ostentatiously. No infantry seen, and not much artillery. Woods on the left, said to be full of troops. A visit to the front does not impress that the enemy intends immediate attack. He seems, however, to be taking positions."—"4 50. About four o'clock, shots were exchanged by the skirmishers. Artillery fire on both sides in a few minutes. One regiment of rebel infantry advancing. Now deployed in front as skirmishers. I have ordered a regiment on the right, Williams's, to meet them; and one on the left, Angur's, to advance on the left and in front."—"5 P. M. They are now approaching each other."—Pope's Report, 218.

<sup>3</sup> The Union force consisted only of Banks's corps, numbering at the outset only 8000. There were present, as is shown by the report of losses (Lee's Rep., ii., 49), forty-two regiments of Confederate infantry, 21,000 men in all; but of these only about one half were seriously engaged in the actual fight. Two thirds of the loss, indeed, fell upon ten of the regiments of Jackson and Ewell.

<sup>4</sup> "No report of killed and wounded has been made to me by General Banks. I can, therefore, only form an approximation of our losses in that battle. Our killed, wounded, and prisoners amounted to about 1800 men, besides which, fully 1000 men straggled back to Culpepper Court-house and beyond, and never entirely returned to their commands. . . . No material of war nor baggage-trains were lost on either side."—Pope's Report, 11. Jackson says: "We captured 400 prisoners, 5302 small-arms, one 12-pounder Napoleon and its caisson, with two other caissons and a limber, and three colors. The official reports of the casualties in my command show a loss of 223 killed, 1060 wounded, 31 missing—total loss, 1314. This was probably about one half that sustained by the enemy."—Lee's Rep., ii., 7. There is reason to suppose that Pope's estimate of his loss was too low; for he puts down Banks's force before the battle at 8000, and afterward he counts it at 5000, a diminution of 3000. If half of the 1000 stragglers returned to their com-

mand, there remain 2500 for killed, wounded, and prisoners, or 2100 killed and wounded, which we think to be about the true number. If all of the stragglers returned, there would still be a loss of 400 prisoners, and 1600 killed and wounded.

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Report, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Jackson, in Lee's Rep., ii., 7.

The Union cavalry followed the retiring enemy to the Rapidan, and captured some stragglers. They then returned to their former position, and occupied the line of the Rapidan from Raccoon Ford to the base of the Blue Ridge. On the 14th, Reno joined Pope with 8000 men of Burnside's command, which had been brought from North Carolina to Fortress Monroe, and thence to Fredericksburg. Pope, with his infantry, now numbering 40,000 men, pushed forward a little beyond Cedar Mountain. A week had not passed, however, before Pope became assured that nearly the whole of the Confederate army had left Richmond, and were concentrated in his immediate front, designing to overwhelm him before he could be joined by any part of the Army of the Potomac. He thereupon fell back beyond the Rappahannock, and by the 19th his army, 45,000 strong, infantry and cavalry, was posted for eight miles along the north bank, from Rappahannock Station to Warrenton Springs. Across the river was Lee, with 85,000, being the whole of the Confederate army of Virginia, with the exception of D. H. Hill's division, which was left a few days longer at Richmond, and Holmes's, which was not moved at all.<sup>3</sup>

Burnside's corps had been brought from North Carolina to Fortress Monroe, and early in August it was known at Richmond that it was being embarked on transports. The direction in which it was sent would furnish a clear indication of the Federal designs. If it came up the James to McClel-

mand, there remain 2500 for killed, wounded, and prisoners, or 2100 killed and wounded, which we think to be about the true number. If all of the stragglers returned, there would still be a loss of 400 prisoners, and 1600 killed and wounded.

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Report, 11.

<sup>2</sup> Jackson, in Lee's Rep., ii., 7.

The Confederate "Reports of the Army of Northern Virginia," while minute upon almost every other topic, are almost wholly silent as to the force engaged in the operations of August and September. We are forced to rely upon other sources for an approximate estimate of these forces. Four independent lines of investigation, taken in connection with a few hints scattered through the Reports, give results so nearly alike, that we consider our estimate as substantially correct.

I. It was shown (*ante*, pp. 361, 379) that the effective force at the commencement of the "Seven Days" was 100,000, and that the losses in battle were about 20,000; to which should be added probably 10,000 by sickness during the ensuing six weeks. The conscription law had been fully in operation since the close of June, and had, as the writer was informed by General J. E. Johnston, during the five weeks after the battle of Fair Oaks, added about 40,000 to the army at Richmond. The operation of this law being very uniform, 40,000 were probably added during the six weeks preceding the middle of August. The recruits, instead of being sent on from the camps of instruction in regiments and brigades, were sent in squads to join the old regiments. This would make the entire force at the middle of August a little more than it was at the close of June—that is, 110,000. Every division and brigade, with the exception of that of Holmes, some 10,000 strong, was finally sent from Richmond and Petersburg in the following order: Jackson, July 13; A. P. Hill, July 27; Longstreet, August 13; D. H. Hill, August 21, joining Lee on the 23d of September, three days after the battle of Groveton. This makes the entire force at the outset 100,000 of all arms.

II. The reports of casualties, which will be cited in the appropriate places, give the loss by regiments in the whole series of battles; and as every regiment was apparently brought into action at one time or another these lists contain the entire number of regiments. We find 177 different regiments of infantry from the different states, as follows: Virginia, 39; Georgia, 37; North Carolina, 26; South Carolina, 17; Alabama, 16; Mississippi, 12; Louisiana, 9; Texas, 3; Tennessee, 3; Florida, 2; Arkansas, 1. From indicia scattered here and there, we put the aggregate strength of the regiments at 500, which gives 88,500 infantry; the artillery and cavalry we put down at 5000 each, making a total of 98,500 of all arms.

III. There were, in all, 40 brigades, each of these comprised from three to six regiments. In many cases the numbers which were carried into the separate actions are noted in the reports. Comparing these, and taking into account the losses previously reported, we find the brigades to have averaged about 2250, making about 90,000 infantry, and 10,000 artillery and cavalry.

These data thus all indicate, without the probability of any material error, that the entire force of the Confederate army, previous to any losses on the march or in action, was about 100,000 of all arms. The regiments brought into each action, and the losses in every battle being going throughout, we shall be able to arrive at a very close approximation of the actual force at each important period of the campaign.

IV. After the foregoing estimate had been made, I obtained an abstract of the official returns of the various Confederate armies during almost the whole period of the war. These returns came into the hands of the government at the surrender of the army of Lee. An abstract of these was furnished by the War Department to Mr. William Swinton, author of the "Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac." For this, and many other documents as yet inaccessible to the general student, I am indebted to Mr. Swinton. These returns corroborate the accuracy with which my previous estimates had been framed. I here give the returns of the Confederate "Army of Northern Virginia" from Feb. 28, 1862, to Feb. 28, 1865. I shall have frequent occasion, in subsequent chapters, to refer to this table. The explanatory notes appended to it are my own. In referring to the strength of this army at different periods, I shall consider only those reported as "present for duty." It will be seen that the returns are wanting for some of the most important periods.

#### RETURNS OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA FROM FEB. 28, 1862, TO FEB. 28, 1865.

Date.	Present and Absent.	Aggregate Present.	Present for Duty.	Date.	Present and Absent.	Aggregate Present.	Present for Duty.
1862, Feb. 28	84,725	27,829	56,896	1863, Nov. 20	96,576	40,488	56,088
" July 20	84,725	42,344	42,344	" Dec. 30	91,53	38,538	54,715
" Sept. 30	130,143	76,430	53,713	1864, Jan. 31	91,53	38,538	54,715
" Oct. 20	157,778	74,430	79,305	" Feb. 20	68,435	28,878	39,557
" Nov. 20	158,790	67,297	91,493	" Mar. 10	79,03	33,061	46,101
" Dec. 31	157,855	61,799	96,056	" April 10	97,516	36,359	61,219
1863, Jan. 31	144,605	61,308	83,297	" June 30	97,516	36,359	61,219
" Feb. 28	114,110	8,743	74,435	" July 10	135,805	66,961	68,844
" Mar. 31	133,680	44,335	89,345	" May 31	146,338	87,854	58,484
" Apr. 30	117,692	63,921	53,771	" Oct. 31	117,103	94,468	22,635
" Aug. 31	133,264	61,300	71,964	" Nov. 30	181,896	93,966	87,930
" Sept. 30	96,164	39,943	56,221	" Dec. 30	157,772	76,424	79,318
" Oct. 31	97,211	39,960	57,251	1865, Jan. 31	141,027	71,744	69,283
				" Feb. 28	160,411	87,062	73,349

\* It has been shown (*ante*, p. 360) that at the close of May this army numbered 67,000, and (*ante*, p. 361) that at the end of June it had fully 100,000 men present for duty.

\* Three weeks after the close of the "Seven Days," its force present for duty, notwithstanding its losses, was nearly 70,000 on the 20th of July. The returns for the next six weeks are wanting; but it is certain that large additions were received, bringing its marching force in August fully up to 100,000.

\* On the 30th of September, a fortnight after the battle of Antietam, there were but 73,000 "present," including sick and wounded. By this time all those who had fallen out in the march had rejoined their commands, so that the campaign from Cedar Run to Antietam cost 38,900, disabled and deserters. During the next two months the army was largely augmented by conscription.


\* The diminution at this time was owing to a part of Longstreet's corps having been sent to North Carolina, where he remained until May.

\* At this time Longstreet had been sent with re-enforcements to Bragg in Tennessee.

\* From this time the effects of desertion and sickness became strikingly apparent. The number of the "absent" exceeds, sometimes very considerably, that of the "present," while of those "present" only about two thirds were fit for duty.

\* The returns for the remainder of the period before the surrender are wanting.





MAP OF THE CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA.

lan, the siege of Richmond was to be pressed. If it went to the Rappahannock, McClellan would be withdrawn from the James. Mosby, soon to be known as a vigorous partisan leader, had been captured; being set free by exchange, he passed Fortress Monroe as Burnside was embarking. He learned from a sure source that the destination was the Rappahannock, and conveyed to Lee the long-wished-for information.<sup>1</sup> Reports, which, however, were premature, also affirmed that a part of McClellan's army had gone to the aid of Pope. It was clear, therefore, that active operations against Richmond were no longer contemplated; and Lee believed that he might venture to leave the Confederate capital, and advance with almost his whole army upon Pope, and overwhelm him before re-enforcements could reach him. Some changes had been made in the organization of his army. Huger, whose incompetency had been demonstrated, was displaced; Magruder was sent to Texas. Their divisions, and that of Whiting, which had been only temporarily attached to Jackson's force during the Seven Days, were united with that of Longstreet, and placed under his command. This body of 50,000 men left Richmond by the 13th of August, and moved with such rapidity that by the 16th it had passed Gordonsville, and was advancing toward the Rappahannock, whither Jackson had proceeded the day before.<sup>2</sup> Thus, two days before McClellan's advance corps and trains had fairly started from their camp on the James, Richmond and Petersburg were left defended only by about 20,000, the division of D. H. Hill and Holmes, with perhaps a few raw conscripts who had not been assigned to their places in the grand army. So secretly had this movement been made, that on this very day reports reached McClellan that the enemy were advancing against him from the Chickahominy; and on the 17th he wrote that he should not feel entirely secure until he had his whole army beyond the Chickahominy,<sup>3</sup> and a week later he thought it necessary to strengthen the defenses of Yorktown to resist an attack from the direction of Richmond. On that very day D. H. Hill left Petersburg with his division, the last to join in the movement toward Washington.<sup>4</sup>

Early on the morning of the 20th the pickets of Pope's right at Rappahannock Station were driven in, and before night the main body of the Confederate infantry, outnumbering him almost two to one, were in his front across the Rappahannock. During the two following days Lee made repeat-

ed attempts to cross at various points, and an almost continuous artillery fire was kept up along the whole line of eight miles, with little loss on either side.<sup>1</sup> Lee then began to move slowly up the river, in order to turn the Union right. Pope had been directed to keep himself in communication with Fredericksburg, whither the Army of the Potomac was being brought, and could not extend his right to check the enemy. He was assured, however, that if he could hold his line until the close of the 23d, he would receive re-enforcements sufficient to enable him to assume the offensive.<sup>2</sup> On the 22d he resolved to cross the river the next morning, and fling his whole force upon the flank and rear of Lee's long column, which was passing toward his right. The manœuvre, except that it involved no long march of the attacking column, would have been almost a repetition of that by which Lee assailed McClellan's retreating column at Frazier's Farm; but such was the disparity of force that it could hardly have been other than a disastrous failure. But a fierce rain-storm during the night raised the waters of the shallow river six or eight feet, swept away the bridges and overflowed the fords, so as to render the movement impracticable, and also prevented Lee from any serious attempt to cross above, which he had begun to do.<sup>3</sup>

An episode occurred during that stormy night of the 22d which, though trifling in itself, changed the whole course of the campaign. Pope's head-quarters were at Catlett's Station, ten miles in the rear of the centre of his line. Here all the army trains were parked, guarded by 1500 infantry and five companies of cavalry. Stuart, with 1500 cavalry, had crossed the river above Pope's extreme right, and, gaining the rear of his line, pressed, without being discovered, down to Catlett's Station. Here, in the midst of the darkest night he ever knew, Stuart found himself in the very midst of the Union camp. By chance he encountered a negro whom he had known before, who offered to guide him to the spot occupied by Pope's staff. A few companies stole unperceived up to the tents "occupied by the convivial staff of Pope," charged upon them, captured one or two of the inmates, and seized some plunder. But of far more importance than all was Pope's dispatch-book, which revealed just the situation of his army, his imminent need of re-enforcements, and his expectation of the time when they would reach him.<sup>4</sup> This bold dash cost one man killed and one wounded. When that unnamed negro, accidentally encountered in the darkness, guided the Sixth Virginia cavalry to Pope's tent, he was potentially fighting the battles of Groveton and Antietam.

The disclosures made by this dispatch-book convinced Lee that, if he could at once throw his force directly upon the Union rear, cutting its communications with Washington, Pope's whole army could be destroyed or captured. To do this his force must be divided, a part marching rapidly around the enemy's right to his rear, the remainder occupying his attention in front until the departing column was well advanced, when it would follow by the same route.<sup>5</sup> The manœuvre was a delicate one, depending upon every movement being executed at the precise time. A sudden storm, or any other accident interfering for a single day, would thwart the whole plan. It was also hazardous, for the Union army might fall with equal or superior force upon either of the separated divisions. Still, the chance of great success was sufficient to warrant the attempt, and not a moment was lost in carrying it out.

The first part, upon the successful execution of which every thing depended, was confided to Jackson, whose capacity for conducting a rapid march had been abundantly tested. On the morning of the 25th he left his position, passed up the south bank of the Rappahannock, crossing the river beyond Pope's extreme right, and then pressed rapidly up the narrow valley between Blue and Bull Run Mountains. The column pressed on by strange country roads and by "high cuts" across open fields, and at midnight, after a march of twenty miles, reached Salem, a little town just opposite the Thoroughfare Gap, through which he hoped to pass the Bull Run Mountains, and emerge directly upon Pope's rear. If that pass should be defended the whole movement would be a failure. Stuart, with all the cavalry, accompanied the column on its right, scouring the region between it and the Union force. It was hoped that the movement would be unperceived and unsuspected by the enemy. "Don't shout, boys, the Yankees will hear us," said Jackson, as the long column passed by a point where he stood, proudly watching their rapid march. "Who could fail," he said, "to win victory with these men?"<sup>6</sup>

Pope, however, was not taken by surprise. Jackson's march had hardly begun when he was informed that "a large detachment of the enemy, numbering 36 regiments of infantry, with the usual number of batteries of artillery and a large cavalry force, was marching rapidly up the North Branch, and was then pressing on toward White Plains and Salem, and from these points would be able to turn our right by the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, or even north of that place."<sup>7</sup> He was, however, compelled

<sup>1</sup> The Confederate loss, August 20-23, was 152 killed and wounded.—*Lee's Rep.*, i., 50.

<sup>2</sup> Halleck to Pope, August 21: "I have telegraphed to General Burnside to know at what hour he can re-enforce Reno. I am waiting his answer. Every effort must be made to hold the Rappahannock. Large forces will be in to-morrow."—Later, same day: "I have just sent [query received] General Burnside's reply. General Cox's forces are coming on from Parkersburg, and will be here to-morrow or next day. Dispute every inch of ground, and fight like the devil till we can re-enforce you. Forty-eight hours more, and we can make you strong enough. Don't yield an inch if you can help it."—*Pope's Report*, 221, 222.

<sup>3</sup> General Haupt, Superintendent of Transportation at Alexandria, to Pope, received August 24: "Thirty thousand troops or more demand transport. We can manage 12,000 per day. The new troops might march, the veterans go in cars, horses driven; baggage, tents, etc., wait until they can be forwarded. Supplies take precedence."—Later, same day: "We expect to clean out all the troops now here, and all that are expected to-day."—*Ibid.*, 227.

<sup>4</sup> Stuart, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 137. <sup>5</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 21. <sup>6</sup> Cooke's *Stonewall Jackson*, 275. <sup>7</sup> *Pope's Report*, 15. Colonel J. S. Clark, who at great risk watched Jackson's march, saw

<sup>1</sup> Cooke's *Stonewall Jackson*.

<sup>2</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 314, 317.

<sup>3</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 18; ii., 81, 90.

<sup>4</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 320; *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 111.



by his orders to hold his force in such a position as to enable him to keep up his communication with Fredericksburg. Assurances of speedy re-enforcements were so precise and definite that he felt warranted in holding his position. He was assured that 30,000 would reach him by the 25th; but on the evening of that day only 8000 had come up.<sup>1</sup>

On the 26th, Longstreet, who had kept up a show of force in front of Pope, yet all the while creeping away to his right, commenced his march to unite with Jackson, who, having left Salem at daybreak, was pressing through Thoroughfare Gap. Pope then abandoned the line of the Rappahannock, and undertook to throw his whole force in the direction of Gainesville and Manassas Junction. On the morning of the 27th he had 54,000 infantry, made up of his own Army of Virginia, and the re-enforcements which had reached him from Burnside's corps and the Army of the Potomac. He had also nominally 4000 cavalry, but their horses were so broken down that hardly 500 were fit for service.<sup>2</sup>

Jackson, in the mean while, had passed Thoroughfare Gap on the morning of the 26th; pressed past Gainesville, which Pope supposed to be strongly occupied, but where there was not a single Union soldier, and by sunset was at Bristoe Station, on the railroad which formed Pope's chief means for supplies. At Manassas Junction, seven miles distant, was a large dépôt of supplies almost without guard.<sup>3</sup> A strong body of cavalry under Stuart, and about 500 infantry under Trimble, were dispatched to seize these stores. They pressed on through the darkness, though the infantry had made a march of more than twenty miles that day, and before dawn had effected their purpose, capturing the only considerable dépôt of stores between Pope's army and Washington.<sup>4</sup> These stores were destroyed by the Confederates, and so were of little advantage to Jackson beyond giving his hungry troops rations for a single day, but their loss proved a serious disadvantage to Pope.

On the morning of the 27th the greater part of Jackson's command moved to Manassas, leaving Ewell at Bristoe, upon which place Hooker was marching. A short action took place in the afternoon, in which Ewell was worsted, but he fell back in good order to Manassas.<sup>5</sup> Fitz John Porter, who, with 4500 men, was at Warrenton Junction, nine miles distant, was ordered by Pope to move during the night to Bristoe, to the support of Hooker, whose ammunition was entirely exhausted. He was to be there at daybreak, but did not reach the place until six hours later.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile a considerable body of Union troops came down toward Manassas along the railroad. They found the Junction too strongly held to be recovered, and after a gallant fight, in which General Taylor was killed, they retreated with much loss.<sup>7</sup>

Pope's force was now concentrating in the neighborhood of Manassas. Had this concentration been effected one day earlier, Jackson would have marched into the jaws of destruction. As it was, he was in imminent peril. He had no alternative but to retreat, but whither it was hard to say. McDowell, marching to his right from Warrenton, was at Gainesville, with a force equal to his own, cutting him off to the west by the route by which he had advanced. To retreat northward toward Aldie would have removed him every step farther from the main army of Lee, which was yet beyond the Bull Run Mountains. He adopted the only course which could have saved him, and even in this the chances were fearfully against him. This was to fall back toward the point from which Longstreet was advancing, and at the same time deceive his opponent as to the direction of his retreat. His own division, now commanded by Taliaferro, moved from Manassas directly north, while Ewell and Hill, with the cavalry, marched northeastward, as if pushing straight for Washington. At Centreville they turned sharply west, and during the 28th rejoined Taliaferro a little west and north of the battle-field of Bull Run.<sup>8</sup> The ruse succeeded. Pope withdrew McDowell from Gainesville, marched him directly toward Centreville, and ordered Heintzelman in the same direction. Jackson had now secured a strong position a little north and west of the battle-field of Bull Run. McDowell's line of march led him close by the right of Jackson, and exposed him to a flank attack. This was made by Jackson just before sunset, and a sharp action, mostly of artillery, ensued, which was terminated by the darkness, neither side gaining any decided advantage,<sup>9</sup> and both suffering heavy loss. Ewell and Taliaferro were severely wounded.<sup>10</sup>

Pope, supposing that Jackson was in full retreat to Thoroughfare Gap, was confident that there was no escape for him. At half past nine he wrote to Kearney, "McDowell has intercepted the retreat of the enemy, and is now

in his front. Unless he can escape by by-paths leading to the north to-night, he must be captured." McDowell must hold his ground at all hazards, prevent the retreat of Jackson, and by daylight the next morning the whole force would be up from Centreville and Manassas Junction, and between them the enemy must be crushed. Jackson had now, after his losses, exclusive of cavalry, not quite 30,000 men. Pope had, or rather supposed that he had, 50,000, who could be brought into action in the morning. Of these, 25,000, under McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds, were supposed to be directly west of Jackson, between him and the Gap; 25,000 more, with Kearney, Hooker, and Reno, near Centreville, on the east. His only apprehension was that Jackson might retreat northward toward Leesburg, and to prevent this, Kearney was to keep close to him during the night of the 28th.<sup>1</sup>

This apparently well-conceived plan was based upon a misconception as to the purpose and position of the enemy. Jackson had no purpose of retreating, but had taken a position which he meant to hold until he should be joined by Longstreet, who was a full day's march nearer him than Pope supposed. The execution of his plan was prevented by a movement previously made by McDowell, who had sent Ricketts toward Thoroughfare Gap, and had before withdrawn King's division to Manassas Junction, near which place Porter now was. Pope's force, therefore, instead of being in the rear and on the front of Jackson, was on his right flank and front—Sigel's corps near Groveton, close on the flank; McDowell and Porter near Manassas; Reno and Heintzelman in front, toward Centreville. McDowell and Porter were ordered, on the morning of the 29th, toward Gainesville, and thus gain a position somewhat in Jackson's rear, while Sigel was to fall upon his flank, and Heintzelman and Reno, marching from Centreville, to attack him in front. These movements would bring the whole force together; and when communication was established, the whole command was to halt, and, above all things, to occupy a position from which they could reach Bull Run that night; for Pope presumed that it would be necessary to do this on account of supplies. "The indications," he said, "are, that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace which will bring them here by to-morrow night or next day."<sup>2</sup>

Pope's expectation upon the morning of the 29th was, with his whole force, two to one, to fall upon Jackson's front, right flank, and rear; and he hoped, with good reason, "to gain so decisive a victory over the army under Jackson, before he could have been joined by any of the forces under Longstreet, that the army of Lee would have been so crippled and checked by the destruction of this large force as to be no longer in condition to prosecute operations of an aggressive character."<sup>3</sup> This accomplished, he would have fallen back across Bull Run, and have awaited supplies and re-enforcements, which would in a day or two have given him a force superior to that of the enemy. This plan failed utterly through the determined resistance opposed by Jackson, and from the fact that Longstreet was nearer at hand than was supposed. At the very moment when this order was written, Longstreet was pressing through the narrow gorge of Thoroughfare Gap; and, instead of coming to Jackson's aid "to-morrow night or next day," he was able to give him essential support that afternoon, and by the next morning, the 30th, to bring his whole force upon the field.

In the mean while all was confusion, doubt, and ignorance at the Federal capital. McClellan left Fortress Monroe on the 23d for Aquia Creek, on the Rappahannock, whither a part of his army had preceded him, and the rest was to follow. Next day he telegraphed to Halleck for orders, and especially for information as to where Pope was, and what he was doing. "I do not know," replied the general-in-chief, "where Pope is, or where the enemy in force is. These are matters which I have been all day most anxious to ascertain." Two days later Halleck telegraphed, "There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a large force into the Shenandoah Valley. Don't draw any troops down the Rappahannock at present; we shall probably want them all in the direction of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had better leave Burnside in charge at Aquia Creek, and come to Alexandria, as very great irregularities are reported there." On the 27th still there was no sure information as to what was going on. Past midnight, McClellan had heard that heavy firing had been heard at Centreville; he had sent to ascertain the truth, and, meanwhile, asked anxiously whether the works in front of Washington were garrisoned and ready for defense. At 1 35 there is news that "Taylor's brigade, sent this morning to Bull Run Bridge, had been cut to pieces or captured;" and McClellan thinks the best policy will be to make the works at Washington "perfectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible, but not to advance them until they can have first artillery and cavalry." At 2 30: "I still think that we should first provide for the immediate defense of Washington on both sides of the Potomac. I am not responsible for the past, and can not be for the future, unless I receive authority to dispose of the available force according to my judgment. Please inform me at once what my position is. I do not wish to act in the dark." At 6: "A dispatch from Pope, dated at 10 A.M., says, 'All forces now sent forward should be sent to my right, at Gainesville.' I have at my disposal here about 10,000 men of Franklin's corps, about 2500 of General Tyler's brigade, and Colonel Tyler's 1st Connecticut Artillery, which I recommend should be held for the defense of Washington. If you wish me to order any part of this force to march to the front, it is in readiness to march at a moment's notice to any point you may indicate." At 4 10, on the 28th: "Franklin is with me here at Alexan-

only a part of his force. Instead of 36 regiments of infantry, Jackson had about 66, all of which were on the march. The entire cavalry force of the Confederate army was at this time with Jackson, for Longstreet (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 81) says that on the 27th he had no cavalry.

<sup>1</sup> *Pope's Report*, 15. Also, considerably enlarged, *Reb. Rec.*, v., 348. Also Note 3, ante, p. 384.

<sup>2</sup> *Pope's Report*, 17.

<sup>3</sup> At half past ten on the evening of that day, McDowell, then at Warrenton, wrote to Pope, "Centreville and Manassas are fortified, the former sufficiently to offer a stout resistance, and the latter enough to aid materially raw troops."—*Pope's Report*, 200.

<sup>4</sup> Among the stores captured were 50,000 pounds of bacon, 1000 barrels of beef, 2000 of pork, 2000 of flour; two trains loaded with stores and clothing, large quantities of forage, 8 guns, 42 wagons and ambulances, 200 tents; 300 prisoners, 200 negroes, and 175 horses also fell into their hands.—*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 155. A sharp dispute arose between Stuart and Trimble as to the credit of this operation, each denying the claims of the other.—*Ibid.*, 143, 150-159. Jackson (*Ibid.*, 93) clearly gives it to Trimble.

<sup>5</sup> *Pope's Testimony on Porter's Trial*. The failure to execute this order formed one of the charges against Porter, who was subsequently tried by court-martial and cashiered.

<sup>6</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 93.

<sup>7</sup> Pope indeed says (*Report*, 18) that, if Jackson had massed his whole force and attacked the Union centre at Bristoe Station, the most serious consequences would have ensued; but the result fully justifies Jackson's course.

<sup>8</sup> Pope says, "Each party maintained its ground." Jackson says, "The Federals did not attempt to advance, but maintained their ground with obstinate determination. Both lines stood exposed to the discharge of musketry and artillery until about nine o'clock, when the enemy slowly fell back, yielding the field to our troops."

<sup>9</sup> The actions of this and the two following days are known as indifferently as the "Second Bull Run Battle," the "Battle of Manassas Plains," the "Second Manassas Battle," and the "Battle of Groveton." They were all one battle, fought on the same ground. We think Groveton the most appropriate, that being the name of a small hamlet near the centre of the battle-field.

<sup>1</sup> *Pope's Report*, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Pope's General Order, No. 5, August 29, to McDowell and Porter.—*Report*, 241.

<sup>3</sup> *Pope's Report*, 22.

<sup>4</sup> The dispatches are dated 1 35, 2 30, 6 P.M., August 27; but the context indicates that they









THOROUGHFARE GAP.

rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing." This order was dispatched at half past four, and received by Porter just two hours later. He attempted to get his leading division, Morell's, into position; but, thinking the enemy in front in too great force, and judging the country impassable for artillery, did not advance, and retained his former position during the remainder of the day, knowing nothing of the battle which was going on four miles away. The failure to execute this order forms the second and gravest charge against Porter.

Sharp fighting, something more than mere "skirmishing," had been going on all the afternoon, especially upon the Confederate left, somewhat weakly held by A. P. Hill, with considerable intervals between some of his regiments. By three o'clock the fighting here had assumed the proportions of a battle. Grover, with his brigade of Hooker's division, rushed in upon the enemy a little to the right of his extreme left. Of this charge Jackson says:<sup>1</sup> "The Federal infantry, in large force, advanced to the attack of our left, occupied by the division of General Hill. It pressed forward, in defiance of our fatal and destructive fire, with great determination, a portion of it crossing a deep cut in the railroad track, and penetrating, in heavy force, an interval of nearly 175 yards, which separated the right of Gregg's from the left of Thomas's brigade. For a short time Gregg's brigade, on the extreme left, was isolated from the main body of the command. But the 14th South Carolina Regiment, then in reserve, with the 45th Georgia, attacked the exultant enemy with vigor, and drove them back across the railroad track with great slaughter. The opposing forces at one time delivered their volleys into each other at the distance of ten paces." Grover says:<sup>2</sup> "After rising the bill under which my command lay, an open field was entered, and from one edge of it gradually fell off in a slope to a valley through which ran a railroad embankment. Beyond this embankment the forest continued, and the corresponding heights beyond were held by the enemy in force, supported by artillery. At three P.M. I received an order to advance in line of battle over this ground, pass the embankment, enter the woods beyond, and hold it. We rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, and here occurred a short, sharp, and obstinate hand-to-hand conflict, with bayonets and clubbed muskets. Many of the enemy were bayoneted in their tracks; others struck down with the butts of pieces,<sup>3</sup> and onward pressed our line. In a few yards more it met a terrible fire from a second line, which in its turn broke. The enemy's third line now bore down upon our thinned ranks in close order, and swept back the right centre and a portion of the left. With the gallant 16th Massachusetts in our centre, I tried to turn his flank, but the breaking of our right and centre, and the weight of the enemy's lines, caused the necessity of falling back first to the embankment, and then to our first position, behind which we rallied to our colors." In this fierce conflict, lasting only twenty minutes, Grover, out of less than 2000 men, lost 484.

Kearney, on the extreme Union right, afterward advanced,<sup>4</sup> and swept "with a rush the first line of the enemy. This was most successful. The enemy rolled upon his own right. It presaged a victory for us all. Still, our force was too light. The enemy brought up rapidly heavy reserves, so that our farther progress was impeded."<sup>5</sup>

A. P. Hill<sup>6</sup> thus describes the fight toward evening: "The evident intention of the enemy was to turn our left, and overwhelm Jackson's corps before Longstreet came up: and to accomplish this, the most persistent and furious onsets were made by column after column of infantry, accompanied by numerous batteries of artillery. Soon my reserves were all in, and up to six o'clock my division, assisted by the Louisiana brigade of General Hayes, with a heroic courage and obstinacy almost beyond parallel, had met and repulsed six distinct and separate assaults, a portion of the time a majority of the men being without a cartridge. The enemy prepared for a last and determined attempt. Their serried masses, overwhelming superiority of numbers, and bold bearing made the chance of victory tremble in the balance. Casting about for help, fortunately it was here reported to me that the brigades of Generals Lawton and Early were near by, and, sending for them, they promptly moved to my front at the most opportune moment, and this last charge met the same fate as the preceding. Having received an order from General Jackson to endeavor to avoid a general engagement, my commanders of brigades contented themselves with repulsing the enemy and following them up but a few hundred yards." Both sides, as usual, claim to have fought against superior numbers; but a comparison of the divisions engaged, as shown in the respective reports, shows that the Confederates had at the close a considerable preponderance. That is, A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Lawton outnumbered Hooker, Kearney, and Reno, to whom they were opposed. The opportune arrival of Longstreet upon the right enabled Jackson to concentrate nearly his whole strength to resist this attack upon his left.

At half past five, McDowell having come up, Pope, supposing that Porter was advancing, in compliance with the order sent an hour before, but only received an hour later, ordered an attack upon Jackson's right, which, ignorant of Longstreet's arrival, he supposed to be the extreme right of the whole Confederate force on the field.<sup>7</sup> This attack was made along the Warrenton Turnpike by King's division, then commanded by Hatch, of McDowell's corps, who, "trusting to find the enemy in retreat, as he was told, and hoping to turn their retreat into a flight, took the men forward with an impetuosity akin to rashness."<sup>8</sup> Instead of finding a retreating enemy, he was confronted, after marching three quarters of a mile, by a strong force. A fierce struggle, lasting three quarters of an hour, took place, mainly between Doubleday's and Patrick's brigades on the Union side, and those

<sup>1</sup> Heintzelman, in *Pope's Report*, 55, says not till several orders had been sent to him to do so, and after Hooker had been driven back.

<sup>2</sup> Kearney, in *Pope's Report*, 79.

<sup>3</sup> In *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 125.

<sup>4</sup> Pope (*Report*, 17) strangely says: "About half past five I directed Generals Heintzelman and Reno to assault the left of the enemy," and then proceeds to describe Grover's assault on the railroad embankment; and adds: "The whole of the left of the enemy was doubled back toward its centre, and our forces, after a sharp conflict of an hour and a half, occupied the field of battle, with the dead and wounded of the enemy in our hands." And again (*Report*, 21): "While this attack [by McDowell] was going on, the forces under Heintzelman and Reno continued to push back the left of the enemy in the direction of the Warrenton Turnpike, so that at about eight o'clock in the evening the greater portion of the field of battle was occupied by our army." Whereas the truth is that Grover's attack began at three, and was soon repulsed, as was also the subsequent one by Kearney and Reno.

<sup>5</sup> McDowell, in *Pope's Report*, 46.

<sup>1</sup> In *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 95.

<sup>2</sup> In *Pope's Report*, 76.

<sup>3</sup> John Estlin Cooke says: "Without ammunition, the men of Jackson seized whatever they could lay their hands on to use against the enemy. The piles of stones in the vicinity of the railroad cut were used; and it is well established that many of the enemy were killed by having their skulls broken with fragments of rock."—*Stonewall Jackson*, 293.





of Hood and Evans on the Confederate. The result, as told by Hatch, was: "Night had now come on. Our loss had been severe, and the enemy occupying a position in the woods on our left, I was forced to give the order for a retreat. The retreat was executed in good order, the attempt to follow being defeated by a few well-directed volleys from Patrick's brigade." Longstreet says: "Hood, supported by Evans, made a gallant attack, driving the enemy back until nine o'clock at night. The enemy's entire force was found to be massed directly in my front, and in so strong a position that it was not deemed advisable to move on against his immediate front, so the troops were quietly withdrawn at one o'clock the following morning. After withdrawing from the original attack, my troops were placed in the line first occupied, and in the original order."<sup>2</sup>

The battle, as a mere conflict of force, was wholly undecisive. The Confederates had not been permanently driven a rod from any position which they wished to hold; at most, their extreme weak left, which was altogether "in the air," had been drawn in a little toward the centre. But Jackson had gained his object. He had held his ground until Longstreet's whole force had come up and taken position by his side and in his rear. Not so thought Pope. He believed that Jackson had suffered a defeat, which only the absence of Porter had prevented from being decisive.<sup>3</sup> Early next morning he sent to Washington the news of his success. "We fought," he wrote, "a terrific battle here yesterday with the combined forces of the enemy, which lasted with continuous fury from daylight until after dark, by which time the enemy was driven from the field, which we now occupy. Our troops are too much exhausted to push matters, but I shall do so in the course of the morning, as soon as Fitz John Porter's corps comes up from Manassas. The enemy is still on our front, but badly used up. We have lost not less than 8000 men killed and wounded, and from the appearance of the field, the enemy have lost at least two to our one. He stood strictly on the defensive, and every attack was made by ourselves. Our troops behaved splendidly. The battle was fought on the identical field of Bull Run, which greatly increased the enthusiasm of our men. The news just reaches us from the front that the enemy is retreating toward the mountains. I go forward to see. We have made great captures, but I am not able yet to form an idea of their extent." McDowell wrote a little more cautiously: "I have gone through a second battle of Bull Run, on the identical field of last year, and unburt. The victory is decidedly ours."<sup>4</sup>

At half past eight on the evening of the 29th, Pope sent a peremptory order to Porter to march at once to the field of battle, where he was to appear at daylight.<sup>5</sup> Two of his brigades, that of Griffin, and Piatt's, temporarily attached to his corps, by some misconception of orders, marched

to Centreville, and took no part in the fighting of the day. The rest of his corps, 7000 strong, joined Pope near Groveton early in the morning. Pope's whole force, with the exception of these two brigades, 5000 strong, and Banks's corps of the same number, which was at Bristoe in charge of the railroad and wagon trains, was at last concentrated. Its effective strength was now reduced to 40,000. Opposed to them were the combined forces of Longstreet and Jackson, now under Lee, who was on the field and assumed command, numbering about 60,000.<sup>6</sup> Both armies were exhausted by their previous marching and fighting, and neither manifested a disposition for a while to assume the offensive. Pope was, indeed, greatly discouraged by a letter which he received at daybreak from Franklin, informing him that rations and forage would be sent from Alexandria if he would send a cavalry escort to bring out the trains. He had no cavalry to send, and if he had, they could not go and return in time to furnish his men with the supplies of which they were in sore need. "It was not till I received this letter," he says, "that I began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations with which I was charged."<sup>7</sup> The natural course, under the circumstances, would seem to have been the one which he had contemplated the day before: to have fallen back to Centreville, or even beyond, and meet his supplies and the re-enforcements, which could not have been long delayed, from Alexandria. Meanwhile he became convinced that the enemy was actually retreating. Lee was drawing in Jackson's exposed left, and the movement of Longstreet's strong right was hidden from view by intervening hills and woods. A paroled prisoner came in and reported that the whole Confederate army was in rapid retreat. This soldier had come into Porter's lines, and was sent by him to Pope with an assurance that he did not believe a word of the story. Pope replied that he believed the soldier, and ordered Porter to advance.

At noon Pope gave a general order to pursue the enemy thus presumed to be retreating, and special orders to different commanders.<sup>8</sup> Lee had no occasion or intention of retreating, nor did he propose to attack, but chose to await the assault of the enemy. His position was the same as on the previous day, except that Jackson's extreme left was drawn in a little. His line stretched northward for a mile, in a somewhat irregular crescent form, the convex side facing the east, and following the course of thickly wooded heights; its centre was also protected by a deep cutting for an unfinished railroad, which formed an admirable earth-work. Longstreet's line ran southeastward behind the crest of another wooded ridge, which concealed him wholly from the view of the enemy, to whom his presence and position was entirely unknown. His reserves lay considerably beyond the rear of Jackson, so that at any moment, without disturbing his front, he could sustain Jackson. His force being larger and his line shorter than that of Jackson, his brigades were much more closely massed. The whole line resembled an irregular L,<sup>9</sup> Jackson forming the perpendicular, Longstreet the horizontal line. Between Jackson's right and Longstreet was a considerable interval; this was, however, swept by artillery massed behind the crest of a ridge in the rear, only the muzzles of the guns being visible. Pope, still believing that Jackson's right was the right of the entire Confederate force, instead of being in fact its centre, directed his main attack, or, as he fancied, his "pursuit," upon this point. His line of battle conformed closely to that of Lee. On the extreme right was Heintzelman, then Reno, then Sigel, forming the perpendicular, confronting Jackson; the other wing consisted of McDowell's command, which comprised his own corps, that of Porter, and the Pennsylvania Reserves under Reynolds—Porter being in the advance, and Reynolds to his right. During the action some changes took place. Of McDowell's corps, King's division, now, as on the previous day, under Hatch, were sent forward with Porter, and Ricketts was added to Heintzelman, while Reynolds was in effect left to act for himself.<sup>10</sup>

After some hours of sharp cannonading, Sykes's division of Porter's corps was pushed forward to support an advance to be made by Butterfield. Thus far they had seen none of the Confederate infantry or cavalry, and of his artillery only the muzzles of the cannon. Butterfield's advance must have been ordered upon the supposition that Jackson was in full retreat. It was gallantly made, and gallantly supported, but it failed utterly. Jackson, sheltered by the railway embankment, was as secure as earth-works could make him, and poured in a furious fire, which tore in pieces the assailants as they emerged from the woods, their own fire being almost harmless against a sheltered foe.<sup>11</sup> Reno and Heintzelman at the same time assailed Jackson farther to the right, aided by Reynolds, who had been moved thither from the rear, where they had been posted to support Porter's "pursuit." Jackson found his centre and left sorely pressed. "The Federal infantry," he says, "about four o'clock moved from under the cover of the wood, and ad-

<sup>1</sup> These estimates include only infantry, the cavalry being of little avail on either side.

The Union force is stated by Pope (*Report*, 23) as follows: "McDowell, 12,000; Sigel, 7000; Heintzelman, 7000; Reno, 7000; Porter, 7000—40,000 in all.

We arrive at an approximation to the Confederate force from the following data: Longstreet's whole force was on the field, as well as that of Jackson. These comprised 35 brigades, and at the outset, according to our previous estimate, numbered 78,750. In the various engagements from Cedar Mountain to the battle of the 29th, they had lost about 8000. The march had been long and exhausting, and probably quite 5000 had fallen out of the ranks from fatigue or sickness, thus leaving 65,000 available. The entire force seems not to have been actually brought into action, for in the detailed list of casualties losses are mentioned in only 115 regiments, which probably at the time averaged 400 each—46,000 in all, leaving 19,000 not directly in action. Pope brought nearly his whole force into action, probably about 35,000. <sup>2</sup> *Report*, 23.

<sup>3</sup> EXTRACTS FROM ORDERS: "The following forces will be immediately thrown forward and in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously the whole day. Major General McDowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit." McDowell to Porter: "Major General McDowell being charged with the advanced forces ordered to pursue the enemy, directs that your corps will be followed immediately by King's division, supported by Reynolds's. . . . Organize a strong advance to precede your command, and push on rapidly in pursuit of the enemy until you come in contact with him."—*Pope's Report*, 47.

<sup>4</sup> Longstreet and Sykes describe the line as an irregular V reversed (<), but an L represents it more closely. <sup>5</sup> McDowell, in *Pope's Report*, 48. <sup>6</sup> Sykes, in *Pope's Report*, 147.

<sup>7</sup> *Pope's Report*, 24; Heintzelman, *Ibid.*, 56; Reynolds, *Ibid.*, 67; Hatch, *Ibid.*, 178.

<sup>1</sup> *Pope's Report*, 179.

<sup>2</sup> *Pope's Report*, 22.

<sup>3</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 82.

<sup>4</sup> Newspapers, August 31.

<sup>5</sup> "Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day, and report to me in person. You are to understand that you are to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow morning."



vanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending the attack to the centre and left. In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed another took its place, and pressed forward as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. So impetuous and well sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the commanding general for re-enforcements."<sup>1</sup> Lee informed Longstreet of Jackson's peril; but, before any succor could be sent, Longstreet found that he could better aid Jackson by another movement. "From an eminence near by," he says, "one portion of the enemy's masses attacking General Jackson were immediately within my view, and within easy range of batteries in that position. It gave me an advantage that I did not expect to have, and I made haste to use it. Two batteries were ordered for the purpose, and one placed in position and immediately opened. As it was evident that the attack upon General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes under the fire of these batteries, I made no movement with my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in position the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken, and that portion of the army put to flight. A fair opportunity was offered me, and the intended diversion was changed into an attack. My whole line was rushed forward at a charge."<sup>2</sup>

Let us now look at the field on the Union left, as seen from its positions. Butterfield's brigade had marched up the hill upon the as yet invisible enemy. "As he advanced there was a great commotion among the rebel forces, and the whole side of the hill and edges of the wood swarmed with men before unseen. The effect was not unlike flushing a covey of quails."<sup>3</sup> Warren—then colonel, soon to be major general—commanding a weak brigade of two regiments, numbering together 1000 men, seized a commanding position which had been vacated by the withdrawal of Reynolds, and held it until he was fairly enveloped by the advancing enemy, and retreated only when the rest of Porter's corps had been driven back. Out of 480 men of the 5th New York, he lost, in killed, 79; wounded, 170; missing, 48. The 10th New York, out of 510 men, lost 23 killed, 65 wounded, 48 missing—412 out of 1000 in this one action.<sup>4</sup> Porter's corps was thus compelled to bear the whole onset of Longstreet's advance. Outnumbered fully three to one, outflanked on the left, and unsheltered on the right, where Reno and Heintzelman were falling back from the enfilading fire of Longstreet's batteries and the fierce onset of Jackson's advance, it retreated, first to the plateau of the Henry House—the scene of the final struggle at Bull Run a year before—and then, the enemy still outflanking, across Bull Run to Centreville. Warren's desperate stand had not, however, been unavailing. To all seeming, it saved the defeat from becoming a rout.<sup>5</sup> The retreat was made in good order. Porter's corps, though defeated, was not routed, and Sykes's regulars covered the retreat of a portion of the army. They had performed the same service on the same ground a year before. Out of scarcely 7000 men, Porter's corps lost, in the few hours during which this action lasted,

2164 men, of whom 323 are put down as killed, 1323 wounded, and 518 missing.<sup>1</sup>

The main stress of the battle had fallen upon the centre of both armies, from thence extending to the Confederate left and the Union right. Hooker, on the Union right, assailed Hill, and gained some advantage.<sup>2</sup> But when the main attack had failed, and the anticipated pursuit had become a retreat, the whole Union force was ordered to fall back toward Centreville. The order was given at eight o'clock. The army retreated in order. It had suffered a defeat; but there was no disgraceful panic like that which had marked the close of the battle fought a year before on almost the same ground.

In this three days' battle the Confederate loss was about 8400: 1400 killed, 7000 wounded. The Union loss was much larger, probably about 11,000.<sup>3</sup> This, however, by no means measures the diminution which the army had undergone. Many had been made prisoners; Lee says "more than 7000, in addition to about 2000 wounded left in our hands." The straggling had been enormous. "Half of the great diminution of our

<sup>1</sup> General Pope says (*Report*, 24): "The attack of Porter was neither vigorous nor persistent, and his troops soon retired in considerable confusion. . . . As soon as they could be rallied, I pushed them forward to support our left, and they there rendered most conspicuous service, especially the brigade of regulars under Colonel Buchanan." Buchanan, however (*Ibid.*, 152), says: "About 5 P.M. the brigade was withdrawn in admirable order." Chapman, who commanded another brigade of Sykes's division, says (*Ibid.*, 172): "About 3.30 P.M., by General Porter's order, the brigade retired in admirable order to the point designated. . . . The movement was executed with surprising order, and elicited my warmest admiration." These, as well as Warren's brigade, belonged to Sykes's division. Of Morell's division of this corps we have no special reports; but Sykes incidentally mentions the gallantry with which Butterfield's brigade of this division made the attack upon Jackson. The losses in Morell's division of two brigades amounted to 1247, exceeding by a third those of Sykes, which certainly does not indicate any want of vigor in its attack. Among the specifications in the charges against Porter was, that on this day he "did so feebly fall upon the enemy's lines as to make little or no impression on the same, and did fall back and draw away his forces unnecessarily, and without making any of the great personal efforts to rally his troops or keep their lines, or to inspire his troops to meet the sacrifices and make the resistance demanded by the importance of his position," etc. This specification was, however, withdrawn by the judge advocate, without offering any proof to substantiate it.—*Court-martial*, 9.

<sup>2</sup> "Hooker's division now advanced into the woods near our right, and drove the enemy back some distance."—Heintzelman, in *Pope's Report*, 56. "The onset was so fierce, and in such force, that at first some headway was made; but their advance was again checked, and eventually repulsed with great loss."—A. P. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 126.

<sup>3</sup> The withdrawal was made slowly, quietly, and in good order, no pursuit whatever being attempted by the enemy."—*Pope's Report*, 24. "The obscurity of the night, and the uncertainty of the fords over Bull Run, rendered it necessary to suspend operations until morning, when the cavalry, being pushed forward, discovered that the enemy had escaped to the strong position at Centreville."—*Lee's Rep.*, i., 25.


<sup>4</sup> The Confederate loss can be fixed very closely upon official evidence. In *Lee's Rep.*, i., 50, is a detailed "List of Casualties at Manassas Plains in August, 1862," made out by regiments, giving the loss in each. The whole number there given is 1090 killed, 6154 wounded. This list is apparently not complete, the reports of Longstreet and Jackson adding considerably to the number.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Total.
Longstreet ( <i>Ibid.</i> , ii., 59): "Total loss to the corps under my command between the 23d and 30th of August, embracing actions at Rappahannock, Freeman's Ford, Thoroughfare Gap, and Manassas. . . ."	663	4016	4679
Jackson ( <i>Ibid.</i> , ii., 95): "Losses in my command in its operations from the Rappahannock to the Potomac. . . ."	805	3547	4352
	1468	7563	9031
Deduct from the above losses in minor engagements before the 27th ( <i>Ibid.</i> , i., 50). . . .	27	94	
And losses (estimated) at Chantilly, Sept. 1. . . .	140	400	540
Total in these actions. . . .	1635	8057	9692

This includes the losses at Bristoe on the 27th, which are also included in the Union losses. The Union losses can be given to a considerable extent only by estimate. Porter's and Reynolds's loss is given in full, Heintzelman's with the exception of one brigade. Sigel puts his whole loss at 1983, but does not discriminate between killed, wounded, and missing. We put the last at 500, and apportion the others in the usual proportion. Of the losses of McDowell and Reno we find no lists.

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
Porter. . . . .	323	1323	518
Reynolds. . . . .	67	37	189
Heintzelman (est.). . . . .	200	1500	400
Sigel (say). . . . .	300	1500	400
Total in these divisions. . . . .	900	4220	1507

The losses in McDowell's and Reno's corps were probably about equal to the above, and as the field remained in the hands of the enemy, many of those reported as missing were doubtless killed or wounded; these may be estimated at 600. Putting all these imperfect data together, we estimate the Union loss as in the text.



MONUMENT ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF GROVETON.

<sup>1</sup> Jackson, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 96.  
<sup>2</sup> Warren, in *Pope's Report*, 150.

<sup>3</sup> Longstreet, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 82.  
<sup>4</sup> Sykes, in *Pope's Report*, 147, 162.

<sup>5</sup> Longstreet says, "The commanding general soon joined me, and a few minutes after Major General Anderson arrived with his division." (This division, the largest in the force, numbering at least 24 regiments, formed the rear of Longstreet's command, and had been held in reserve a little to the rear.—*Lee's Rep.*, i., 25.) "The attack was led by Hood's brigade, closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly re-enforced by Anderson's division from the rear, Kemper's three brigades and D. R. Jones's division from the right, and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The attacking columns moved steadily forward from point to point, following the movements of the general line. These were, however, somewhat detained by an enfilade fire from a battery on my left." (This was Hazlett's battery, attached to Warren's brigade. See Warren, in *Pope's Report*, 150.) "This threw more than its proper share of fighting upon the infantry, and enabled the enemy to escape with many of his batteries, which should have fallen into our hands."—Longstreet, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 83.





PHILIP KEARNEY.



ISAAC L. STEVENS.

forces," says Pope, "was occasioned by skulking and straggling from the army. The troops which were brought into action fought with all gallantry and determination, but thousands of men straggled away from their commands, and were never in any action. I had posted several regiments in the rear of the field of battle on the 29th of August, and although many thousand stragglers and skulkers were arrested by them, many others passed around through the woods, and did not rejoin their commands during the remainder of the campaign."<sup>1</sup>

At Centreville, on the morning of September 1, Pope had remaining of McDowell's corps, 10,000; Sigel, 7000; Heintzelman, 6000; Reno, 6000; Porter, 9000, including the two brigades which had strayed thither on the morning of the 30th. Banks, with 5000, had rejoined the army, and Sumner, with 11,000, and Franklin, with 8000, had come up from Alexandria, raising the whole army to 62,000, exclusive of cavalry, which was so used up as to be unavailable.<sup>2</sup> Lee, after the battle, had, besides cavalry, about 60,000 present; but D. H. Hill, with his division, which had left Hanover Junction on the 26th, was close at hand, and on the 2d of September came up with his division of 10,000. The advantage of the situation was then really in favor of the Union army. The forces present were nearly equal; but Pope had strong intrenchments, and might certainly expect considerable reinforcements at once.<sup>3</sup> His troops were, indeed, greatly exhausted by the fighting, and marching, and privations of the previous week; but Lee's could not have been in better plight. They had fought as much, marched as far, and fared quite as hard.<sup>4</sup>

But it was determined at Washington that Centreville should be abandoned, and the whole army once more retreat and take shelter within the defenses of Washington. The alarm for the safety of the capital rose again to its height. In their terror, the President and Halleck turned to McClellan. Pope had written to Halleck, charging "many brigade and some division commanders of the forces sent here from the Peninsula" with unsoldierly and dangerous conduct. "The constant talk, indulged in publicly and in promiscuous company, is, that the Army of the Potomac will not fight. You can have hardly an idea of the demoralization among officers of high rank in the Potomac Army, arising in all instances from personal feeling in relation to changes in commander-in-chief and others. I am endeavoring to do all I can, and will most assuredly put them where they shall fight or run away." He urged that Halleck "should draw back this army to the intrenchments in front of Washington, and set to work in that secure place to reorganize and rearrange it."<sup>5</sup> The President urged McClellan to telegraph to his friends in the old Army of the Potomac, adjuring them not to fail in their duty. He complied by writing to Porter: "I ask of you, for my sake and that of the country, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope in all the operations now going on. Say the same thing to my friends in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of them is that, for their country's sake, they will extend to General Pope the same support they ever

have to me." In writing thus, McClellan merely complied with the request of the President. "Neither then, nor at any other time," he says, "did I think for one moment that Porter had been, or would be, in any manner derelict in the performance of his duty." Porter replied, "You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given to General Pope, their cordial co-operation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed and wounded attest our devoted duty." Halleck wrote to McClellan, whom a hurried order had virtually stripped of all command, "You will retain the command of every thing in this vicinity not temporarily to be Pope's army in the field. I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience."<sup>6</sup>

On the 31st, the day after the battle, a heavy storm set in; but Jackson was pushed forward toward Fairfax to turn the Union right, and Pope sent McDowell, Heintzelman, and Reno in that direction, intending to attack on the morning of the 2d of September. But the heads of the two forces came in contact just before dark on the 1st, at Ox Hill, near Chantilly. A fearful thunder-storm was raging, in the midst of which the engagement began. A portion of the Confederates were thrown into some confusion; then reinforced, they drove back Stevens's division of Reno's corps. Stevens was killed in the front of his troops. Kearney rushed in with his wonted dashing bravery, and, riding forward alone in advance of his men to reconnoitre the ground, fell in with a Confederate soldier, from whom he inquired the position of a regiment. Discovering his mistake, he turned to ride away, when the soldier fired, and Kearney fell from his saddle mortally wounded. Darkness closed the action, each army retaining a portion of the field, and both claiming a victory. But before morning the whole Union army was in retreat for Alexandria. Lee, with Longstreet's corps, came up during the day, and was joined on the battle-field by D. H. Hill, with his division fresh except for its rapid march.

With the battle of Chantilly, or Ox Hill, as the Confederates name it, closed Pope's campaign in Virginia. He requested at its close, as he had done at its beginning, to be relieved from the command of the Army of Virginia, and to be returned to his former post in the West. His request was granted, and on the 7th of September he departed from Washington. The Army of Virginia ceased to exist as such, and the whole force, resuming its old name of the Army of the Potomac, was again placed under the immediate command of McClellan.

It would be unjust to judge of the campaign of Pope by its unfortunate result, or by the censures to which it has been subjected, or even by the account of it as told by its commander. If we turn from what was said, and review what was actually done, in the light thrown upon it by the Confederate Reports, we shall find much to praise, and, until the last two decisive days, little to censure. The task imposed upon him was a difficult one. He found the army which he was to command disorganized and scattered. Some of the corps commanders were hostile to others.<sup>7</sup> His appointment was distasteful to many, and he had not acquired a reputation which would compel all to acquiesce in its wisdom, however much it might stand in the way of their advancement. Then his first address to his army alienated the feelings of the whole Army of the Potomac, a portion of whom were to serve under him. This feeling, though less strong than he supposed, stood

<sup>1</sup> Pope's Report, 26.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>3</sup> Halleck to Pope: "August 31, 11 A.M. You have done nobly. All reserves are being sent forward. Couch's division goes to-day. Part of it went to Sangster's Station last night with Franklin and Sumner, who must be with you. Can't you renew the attack?"—Pope's Report, 246.

<sup>4</sup> "Many of the men were barefooted, and limped along weary unto death. They were faint from want of food, and broken down by absence of rest. The phenomenon was here presented of an army living for many days upon green corn and unripe apples only, and during this time making exhausting marches, engaging in incessant combats, and repulsing every assault. The flower of the Southern youth, raised in affluence and luxury, were toiling on over the dusty highways, or lying exhausted by the roadside, or fighting when so feeble that they could scarcely handle their muskets."—Cooke's *Stonewall Jackson*, 277.

<sup>5</sup> Pope's Report, 250.

<sup>6</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 840, 844.

<sup>7</sup> We do not care to dwell upon this point. Abundant proofs of it may be found by any one who chooses to read the Reports of the commanders of corps and divisions.



in the way of that open and hearty co-operation which is essential to the highest efficiency of an army. While there was, we think, no purposed neglect in supporting him in act, still the fact that his plans and movements were openly censured by officers high in rank could not fail to demoralize those of lower grade, and through them the soldiers. Hence the fearful amount of straggling and skulking with which he had to contend from the outset. That he was opposed to a general who in this campaign, and ever after, manifested military capacity of a high order, and whose plans were carried out with unswerving fidelity, was a contingency always to be taken into account. That he was from the first called to meet greatly superior forces was owing to no fault on his part; it should be charged to those who failed to send to him the re-enforcements so absolutely essential and so positively promised. His first steps toward concentrating his forces were none the less commendable because so perfectly obvious. For the battle of Cedar Run he is nowise responsible. Had it proved a disastrous defeat instead of a bloody but indecisive passage of arms, no blame could have attached to him. Fettered by his instructions, and buoyed up by unfulfilled promises of aid, he could not afterward have done other than attempt to hold the line of the Rappahannock. The discovery of his weakness made by Stuart's dash upon Catlett's Station was an accident which might have happened to any one, and the like of which happened to Lee three weeks later. The destruction of the stores at Manassas could not have occurred had the assurances been true, as he had a right to believe, of the force by which that place was held. The marchings and countermarchings from Manassas to Gainesville, then back toward Centreville, and again toward Gainesville, were warranted, and in a measure compelled, by what he had at the moment good reason to believe to be the position and movements of the enemy.

The battle of the 29th was delivered, and all the orders given on the supposition that Jackson, with about 25,000 men, was the only enemy to be encountered, and that Longstreet was at a distance. In the morning he thought that "the indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or the next day." He must have been of the same opinion at half past four in the afternoon, when the order was written informing Porter that "your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank," and directing him to "push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank." But before the order was received, and even before it was written, a considerable part of Longstreet's corps had come upon the field, and taken position upon Jackson's right, so that the line of march prescribed to Porter would have brought him far to the left of what was then the enemy's right flank, and directly in front of at least the advance of the enemy's "whole force." It is certainly strange that at this hour Pope should have been uninformed that Longstreet was on the field, instead of being thirty or forty hours' march away; for between nine and ten o'clock Buford reported to McDowell that before that time he had seen a large body of the enemy, estimated by him at more than 13,000 men, passing Gainesville and apparently marching directly to the battle-field.<sup>1</sup> Pope, indeed, on the morning of the 30th, when he supposed that he had won a victory and that the enemy were in retreat, declared that he had met and driven from the field "the combined force of the enemy," which can only be interpreted to mean the united commands of Jackson and Longstreet. Still, the battle of the day was indecisive, and if Pope had carried out his plan of the morning, and fallen back beyond Bull Run, the substantial fruits of victory would have been his.

<sup>1</sup> Buford, in *Court-martial*, 188. Whatever was then known or might have been known, nothing is now more certain than that a considerable part of Longstreet's force joined Jackson by noon, and bore a considerable part in the action of the 29th, and that before night his whole corps, with the exception of Anderson's division, had arrived, and this came up on the following morning. Lee says (*Report*, i., 23-25), "On the morning of the 29th the whole command resumed their march, the sound of cannon announcing that Jackson was already engaged. Longstreet entered the turnpike near Gainesville, and moving down toward Groveton, the head of his column came upon the field in the rear of the enemy's left." After some manœuvring, which is described, "Longstreet took position on the right of Jackson, Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, being deployed across the turnpike, and at right angles to it. These troops were supported on the left by three brigades under Wilcox, and by a like force on the right under Kemper, D. R. Jones's division formed on the extreme right of the line, resting on the Manassas Gap Railroad." D. R. Jones (*Ibid.*, ii., 217) fixes the time of his arrival at "about noon." Longstreet says (*Ibid.*, 81) "that the noise of battle was heard before we reached Gainesville [which must have been about eight, for Buford saw his strong advance beyond that place by nine], and the head of my column soon after reached a position in rear of the enemy's flank, and within easy cannon shot." Hood, whose division was in the advance, says (*Ibid.*, 209), "Early in the day we came up with the main body of the enemy on the plains of Manassas, engaging General Jackson's forces."

The attack of the 30th was a grave military error, and wholly without excuse, if we regard General Pope's subsequent explanations as setting forth the knowledge which he then had of his condition and that of the enemy. Shortly after daylight he "began to feel discouraged and nearly hopeless of any successful issue to the operations with which he was charged." He was aware, by "twelve or one o'clock in the day, that we were confronted by forces greatly superior to our own, and that those forces were being every moment largely increased by fresh arrivals;" and he "therefore advanced to the attack," in order to "lay upon the enemy such blows as would cripple him as much as possible, and delay as long as practicable any farther advance toward the capital." Yet at twelve o'clock he ordered the forces under McDowell to "be immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously during the whole day."<sup>2</sup> That is, an inferior force was to pursue one already superior, which was every moment largely re-enforced, in the very direction from which those re-enforcements were advancing. Surely the thing then to be done was to fall back beyond Bull Run. If his force was sufficient to warrant him in attacking with any hope of escaping a complete defeat, it was more than sufficient to have enabled him to hold the line of Bull Run against the same enemy; and so long as this line was held, the enemy would be effectually prevented from making any farther direct advance toward the capital.

This campaign was conducted throughout by Lee and Jackson with rare ability. It grew in the end into something very different and far greater than was at first intended. Jackson was sent toward the Rappahannock merely to prevent the seizure of Gordonsville and the railroad. Lee's first object was to remove McClellan from his position on the James, and it seemed to him that "the most effectual way to relieve Richmond from any attack from that quarter would be to re-enforce Jackson, and advance upon Pope."<sup>3</sup> Halleck, at the same time, was equally desirous of relieving Richmond by withdrawing the Army of the Potomac, and McClellan, sorely against his wish, was carrying out this determination. As soon, therefore, as Lee was assured that Richmond was no longer threatened from the James, he pushed his main force toward the Rappahannock, hoping to overwhelm Pope before he could be joined by McClellan. To do this, he must cross the Rappahannock in front, or by the right or left of Pope, who confronted him on the opposite bank. While thus manœuvring, the seizure of Pope's dispatch-book informed him of the precise strength and position of the Union forces, and convinced him that it was possible by a rapid march to gain its rear, cut it off from retreat, supplies, and re-enforcements, and fall upon it with such a preponderance of force as to render its destruction almost inevitable. Rapidity of execution was essential to the success of this plan, and a slight failure in any point of detail might be fatal. We have seen how the plan was executed. Lee's operations from the 24th to the 30th of August must take a high place in the history of the war. To find its equal in boldness of conception, we must go forward nine months to the time when Grant passed the batteries at Vicksburg. To find its superior, we must go forward two years and three months to the time when Sherman began his great March to the Sea.

<sup>1</sup> *Report*, 23, 24.


<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 47.

<sup>3</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 19.



MONUMENT ON THE BATTLE-FIELD OF BULL RUN.





THE CONFEDERATES CROSSING THE POTOMAC.



## CHAPTER XXIII.

## THE INVASION OF MARYLAND.—ANTIETAM.

Result of the Campaign in Virginia.—The Invasion of the North.—Maryland! my Maryland!—Jackson's Scheme.—Lee's Design.—His Force.—Crossing the Potomac.—The Confederate Force.—Lee's Address to the People of Maryland.—His Reception.—The Command given to McClellan.—Reorganization of the Federal Army.—Movements of the Army.—Lee divides his Force.—Harper's Ferry.—The March upon the Ferry.—Lee's Order comes into the hands of McClellan.—The Investment of Harper's Ferry.—Its Capture.—McClellan and Halleck.—McClellan advances.—Battle at Turner's Gap.—Battle at Crampton's Gap.—Lee's Position.—He falls back across the Antietam.—The Battle-field of Antietam.—Approach of the Union Force.—Confederate Troops come up from Harper's Ferry.—Movements of September 16.—McClellan's Plan of Battle for the next Day.—Hooker attacks the Confederate Left.—Is wounded.—His Corps repulsed.—Sumner attacks the Left and Centre.—Sedgwick repulsed on the Left.—The Fight in the Centre.—State of the Action at Noon.—Arrival of Franklin's Corps.—Its Part in the Engagement.—The Confederates worsted.—Their critical Position on the Left.—Over-caution of Sumner and McClellan.—Burnside's dilatory Movements.—He crosses the Antietam and drives back the Enemy.—A. P. Hill comes up from Harper's Ferry.—Burnside repulsed.—Close of the Battle.—Forces in and out of Action.—Estimate of Losses.—Results of the Battle.—The President's Proclamation freeing the Slaves.—After the Battle.—Lee recrosses the Potomac.—Affair at Shepherdstown.—McClellan and the Administration.—Stuart's Raid.—The President's Orders to Advance.—His Letter to McClellan.—McClellan's Plans.—He crosses the Potomac.—Advances toward Warrenton.—Lee moves to Chippewar.—Position of the Armies.—McClellan removed from Command, and Burnside appointed.

IN the brief campaign, lasting only twenty days from the time when the contending forces first encountered at Cedar Run, and only a week after the decisive movement for taking Pope's army in the rear was commenced, Lee had accomplished more than he had ventured to hope. Not only had the siege of Richmond been raised, but Virginia was virtually freed from the presence of the Federal armies; the main part of the force which had threatened North Carolina was withdrawn, and the whole plan of the Peninsular campaign thwarted; and, what was of still greater importance, the abundant harvests of the Valley of the Shenandoah would be reaped by Confederate sickles, and serve for the maintenance of Confederate armies. A bolder thought now came into the mind of the Confederate leader. There were yet some weeks, the most favorable in all the year for active military operations. During these, at least, the war might be carried on in the enemy's country. And so the noise of the battle of Groveton had scarcely ceased, when it was resolved to invade the State of Maryland.

Political considerations had much to do with this determination. It had come to be an article of faith that Maryland, from geographical position and community of institutions, belonged to the Confederacy. Richmond was thronged with refugees from Maryland who declared that the state was held within the Union by mere force, and that she wanted only an opportunity to break the hated bond. The song, "Maryland! my Maryland!" was thrummed on every piano, and sung by every voice. It was held to be the utterance of the people.<sup>1</sup> It needed only the presence of a powerful army to arouse the whole state, and bring her at once into the Confederacy. This accomplished, all the slave states—for Kentucky and Missouri were already claimed by the Confederacy and were represented in its Congress—would be detached from the Union. After the secession of Maryland, Washington could be no longer held as the Federal capital.

Jackson had long wished to lead or follow in an invasion of the North. Immediately after the battle of Bull Run he proposed to march directly into Western Virginia with 10,000 men, there recruit his army to 25,000, and then the Army of the Potomac, crossing at Leesburg, should unite with his own force; both should advance upon Harrisburg, and thence upon Philadelphia in the spring of 1862. With the heart of the North thus pierced by the Southern troops, the strategic points captured, and Washington evacuated, he believed that the Federal government would succumb and agree upon terms of peace.<sup>2</sup> How far Lee shared in these sanguine anticipations is doubtful. His Report, prepared seven months later, seems to imply that he proposed merely to occupy Maryland, and threaten Pennsylvania. He says: "To prolong a state of affairs every way desirable, and not to let the season for active operations pass without endeavoring to inflict farther injury upon the enemy, the best course appeared to be to transfer the army into Maryland. The condition of Maryland encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington government to retain all its available force to provide against contingencies which its course toward the people of that state gave it reason to apprehend. At the same time, it was hoped that military success might afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their liberty." "It was proposed to move the army into Western Virginia, establish our communications with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow, and thus draw him from his base of supplies."<sup>3</sup>

On the 2d of September Lee was joined at Chantilly by the division of D. H. Hill, consisting of five brigades. This gave him a force of about 70,000 men of all arms with which to undertake the invasion of the North; for by battle, disease, and straggling he had lost 30,000. The united army pushed rapidly on to the Potomac, Jackson in the advance. He crossed the river at a ford midway between Harper's Ferry and Washington, thirty miles from each, almost at the point where eight months before the Union

forces had passed over into Virginia to meet the disaster of Ball's Bluff. There was nothing to oppose the passage. As the head of the column reached the middle of the river, Jackson, raised from his usual calm demeanor by what seemed the beginning of his cherished plan of an invasion of the North, paused, raised his hat, while bands and voices struck up the words and music of "My Maryland." The entire Confederate force followed hard after, and on the 7th was concentrated near Frederick City, next after Baltimore the largest town in Maryland. All told they numbered barely 60,000, for without a battle thousands had fallen exhausted by the way, unable to keep up with the swift march.<sup>4</sup>

Lee issued an address to the people of Maryland. It was right, he said, that they should know, as far as concerned them, the purpose which had brought the Confederate army into the state. "The people of the Confederate States had long watched the wrongs and outrages which had been inflicted upon the citizens of a commonwealth allied to the states of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties," and, "believing that the people of Maryland possessed a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government," the people of the South wished to aid them in "throwing off this foreign yoke." There would be no constraint or intimidation; "this army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will only welcome you when you come of your own free will."

But if Lee had anticipated a general rising in Maryland, or even any considerable accession to his army, he was doomed to disappointment. Bradley Johnson, a Marylander who held a command in the Confederate army, was placed in charge of the provost-guard at Frederick. He put forth an address to the people calling upon them to join the delivering forces. "We have arms for you," he said; "I am authorized to muster in for the war companies and regiments. Let each man provide himself with a stout pair of shoes, a good blanket, and a tin cup. Jackson's men have no baggage." This prospect was not alluring to those to whom war had presented itself as a gay holiday show. When the theoretical secessionists of Maryland saw their liberators, officers as well as men, barefoot, ragged, and filthy,<sup>5</sup> they looked upon them with hardly concealed aversion. Yet that ragged and begrimed army was as brave a body of soldiers as the world ever saw. The enthusiasm of the Maryland secessionists exhausted itself in a few women secretly sewing clothing for the army, and in presenting to Jackson a magnificent horse, which threw him the first time he mounted it.<sup>6</sup>

The command of the Union army passed quietly and almost as a matter of course into the hands of McClellan even before Pope had asked to be relieved.<sup>7</sup> The President and General Halleck went to McClellan's house on the morning of the 2d. Lincoln said that things were going on badly in front; the army was in full retreat upon the defenses of Washington, and the roads were filled with stragglers. McClellan should go out and meet the army, take command of it as it approached the works, and put the troops in the best position for defense. Until this was said Halleck had no knowledge of the President's purpose.<sup>8</sup> Lincoln had resolved, in his quiet way, that he must exercise his authority as commander-in-chief of the army until he could find some man into whose hands this power could be intrusted. How often he tried to find such a man, and how fully he trusted him when found, this history will show. A formal order was forthwith issued: "Major General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all the troops for the defense of the capital."

McClellan set vigorously to work to reorganize the shattered army. Some changes were made in the distribution of corps and commanders. Banks was placed in charge of the fortifications around Washington, the command of his corps in the field being given to Mansfield, a veteran officer who had never held any prominent command, but had shown at Norfolk high qualifications. Hooker was placed in command of the corps of McDowell, who disappeared from active duty. Burnside, Sumner, Franklin, and Porter retained the command of their corps. Thus, with the exception of Burnside, who was his personal friend, all the corps commanders had served under McClellan on the Peninsula. The core of the army consisted of the force brought from before Richmond. So admirably had this been organized by McClellan that, in spite of the shock which it had experienced in its retreat from the Chickahominy, its withdrawal from the James, and the disasters which a part of it had suffered under Pope, it took at once the form of a regular army, and formed a nucleus around which were rallied the troops gathered from every quarter. In a week, besides 72,000 men around Washington, and 13,000, mostly new recruits, left un-

<sup>1</sup> Stonewall Jackson, 308.

<sup>2</sup> The extent to which the army was reduced by fatigue and exhaustion is abundantly testified to by all Confederate accounts. Lee says (*Rep.*, i., 35): "The arduous services in which our troops had been engaged, their great privations of rest and food, and the long marches without shoes, had greatly reduced our ranks. These causes had compelled thousands of brave men to absent themselves, and many more had done so through unworthy motives." Cooke says (*Stonewall Jackson*, 341): "All the roads of Northern Virginia were lined with soldiers, comprehensively denominated 'stragglers'; but the great majority of these men had fallen out from the advancing column from physical impossibility to keep up with it; thousands were not with General Lee because they had no shoes, and their bleeding feet would carry them no farther, or the heavy march without rations had broken them down. This great crowd toiled on painfully on the wake of the army, dragging themselves five or six miles a day; and when they came to the Potomac, near Leesburg, it was only to find that General Lee had swept on, that General McClellan's column was between him and them, and that they could not rejoin their commands. The citizens of that whole region, who fed these unfortunate persons, will bear testimony that numbers sufficient to constitute an army in themselves passed the Blue Ridge to rendezvous, by General Lee's orders, at Winchester. These 20,000 or 30,000 men were not in the battle."

<sup>3</sup> "Never had the army been so dirty, ragged, and ill-provided as on this march."—D. R. Jones, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 221.

<sup>4</sup> The government had, indeed, wished to remove him from the command, and had twice urged it upon Burnside. He declined to accept it, and declared that if matters could be so arranged as to remove the objections to him, McClellan could do more with the army than any other man.—*Com. Rep.*, 650.

<sup>5</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 345; Halleck, in *Com. Rep.*, 451.

<sup>1</sup> Here are two stanzas of this song:  
"The despot's he is on thy shore,  
Maryland! my Maryland!  
His touch is on thy temple door,  
Maryland! my Maryland!  
Avenge the patriotic foe  
That flecked the streets of Baltimore,  
And lie the battle-queen of yore,  
Maryland! my Maryland!"

"I hear the distant thunder hum,  
Maryland! my Maryland!  
The Old Line's bugle, fife, and drum,  
Maryland! my Maryland!  
She is not dead, nor deaf, nor dumb,  
Huzrah! she spurs the No them army,  
She breathes, she burns, she'll come, she'll come,  
Maryland! my Maryland!"

<sup>2</sup> Cooke's *Stonewall Jackson*, 86-88.

<sup>3</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, i., 27, 28.





MAP OF OPERATIONS IN MARYLAND.

accountably and against McClellan's wish at Harper's Ferry, there was a movable force of nearly 100,000 men to operate against Lee in Maryland. McClellan took the field at the head of this force.

McClellan took the field in Maryland in person on the 7th, when the march toward Lee was fairly begun. The army moved in three columns. The right wing, under Burnside, comprised his own corps and that of Hooker. The centre, under Sumner, comprised his own corps and that of Mansfield. Franklin, in command of his corps and Couch's division, had the left. Porter's corps, not fully organized, followed after. The movement was slow, for Lee's plan had not yet developed itself. In the six days, from the 7th to the 13th, the advance was barely thirty miles. McClellan was also deceived as to the strength of the enemy, estimating it at 120,000 men—twice the real number.

Lee's object in crossing the Potomac at a point so near Washington, instead of at Harper's Ferry or above, and thence advancing into the heart of Maryland, was to assume a position which should threaten both Washington and Baltimore. This he supposed would draw the enemy after him; and he proposed to give battle to the Union army as far as possible from its base of supplies. For the accomplishment of this purpose, he believed that the possession of Harper's Ferry was indispensable, in order to enable him to keep open his communications with Richmond through the Valley of the Shenandoah. He assumed that the march into Maryland would have caused the Union troops at Harper's Ferry to be withdrawn, as they should have been, and as McClellan wished. This not being done, Lee undertook to dislodge, and, if possible, capture the forces there. To effect this, he divided his army, sending the whole of Jackson's command and half of Longstreet's toward Harper's Ferry, retaining with himself D. H. Hill's division, half of Longstreet's corps, and the greater part of the cavalry.<sup>1</sup> McClellan's advance had been so slow that Lee trusted that

Harper's Ferry could be reduced and his army reunited before he would be called upon to meet the enemy.<sup>1</sup> In forming his plan of operations, Lee must have under-estimated the Federal force as greatly as McClellan over-estimated that of the Confederates. He could not have supposed that the enemy whom he had outnumbered and defeated at Groveton, and whom he had seen in full retreat to the fortifications at Washington, should within ten days have swelled to a force outnumbering his own almost three to one.<sup>2</sup> He must have supposed that his own effective force and that of the enemy were about equal.

Harper's Ferry is at the junction of the Potomac and the Shenandoah. The Potomac, coming from the north, meets the Shenandoah, ranging from the west, at the foot of a spur of the Blue Ridge, here known as Elk Mountain. The united streams have torn a narrow passage through the mountain, rending it from summit to base, leaving on either side steep cliffs a thousand feet high. The eastern cliff is Maryland Heights; the western, on the Virginia side, Loudon Heights. In the angle at the junction of the rivers is an elevated plateau, falling steeply toward the Potomac, and sloping gently toward the Shenandoah, and stretching backward at the level of the surrounding country. The ridge of this plateau is Bolivar Heights, at the foot of which nestles the village of Harper's Ferry. Some one had once

street's "command" properly comprised 21 brigades; but at this time 10 of these were detached for the Harper's Ferry operation, and did not act during the remainder of this campaign under Longstreet. In the remainder of this chapter "Longstreet's corps" will indicate only the 11 brigades which remained with him. The others will be designated by the name of the respective division commanders, McLaws, Anderson, and Walker. D. H. Hill's division consisted of 5 brigades. Thus 24 brigades were detached to Harper's Ferry, and 16 remained with Lee. The effective strength of a brigade at this time, previous to losses in battle, was 1500; some, however, were much stronger, some much weaker.

<sup>2</sup> On the 20th of September, after the loss of 16,000 at South Mountain and Antietam, no considerable re-enforcements having been received in the interval, the Army of the Potomac numbered "present for duty" 164,359, of whom 71,210 were stationed within the defenses at Washington, leaving in the field directly under McClellan 93,169. The nominal force—present for duty, sick, and absent—was 293,798.—*Com. Rep.*, 492.

<sup>1</sup> Jackson's "command," including A. P. Hill's division, comprised 14 brigades. Long-



VIEW FROM MARYLAND HEIGHTS





called this place "the Thermopylæ of America." It might have been so in the times when war was waged with bow and sword, with spear and sling, but with the appliances of modern warfare the place has no defensive value. It is completely overlooked by both Loudon and Maryland Heights at such a distance and height that a plunging fire of artillery or musketry can be poured into it from either without the possibility of reply. It is a mere military trap, unless the commanding heights are also held in force; and then it is worthless, as no enemy need go near it in order to cross the Potomac from either direction to invade Maryland or Virginia. Johnston had perceived this fifteen months before, and abandoned the place without resistance, and against positive orders, the moment it was menaced. Lee strangely considered its possession essential to his proposed operations, and, in order to seize it, divided his army. Had he done otherwise, the course of the campaign must have been wholly different. He would have fought the decisive battle far in the interior with the whole, instead of with a part of his force. Had he been defeated, his army must have been annihilated, for the victorious enemy would have been between him and Virginia, cutting off all possibility of succor or retreat. Had he been victorious, he might probably have anticipated Sherman's march to the sea, for beyond the Alleghanies there was no army to oppose him; and from Philadelphia he might have dictated terms of peace.

Harper's Ferry was held by a force of about 13,000, including an outpost at Martinsburg. They were raw troops, commanded by Colonel Miles. About 1500 men were posted on Maryland Heights, the remainder were intrenched on Bolivar Heights. Lee's plan was to surround this force, and thus capture it. His orders were issued on the 9th, and their execution commenced the next morning. Walker, whose two brigades had been sent to the mouth of the Monocacy to destroy the canal aqueduct, was to cross the Potomac, ascend its right bank, and seize Loudon Heights. McLaws, with eight brigades, was to march from Frederick, pass the South Mountain at Crampton's Gap, cross the narrow valley to the foot of Maryland Heights, which he was to ascend and occupy, disposing his forces in such a way as to hold the roads winding around its base, thus cutting off all retreat in that direction. Jackson, with fourteen brigades, was to cross the South Mountain at Turner's Gap, advance to the Potomac, cross it high above Harper's Ferry, sweep down its right bank, capturing or driving back the force at Martinsburg, and then march directly upon Harper's Ferry. The remainder of the army was to march toward Hagerstown, where, or at Boonesboro', it was to be rejoined by that portion which, it was assumed, would have succeeded in its designs upon Harper's Ferry.

The directions of this order were executed with great precision. Walker took possession of Loudon Heights on the 13th, without encountering the slightest opposition. McLaws reached the foot of Maryland Heights on the 12th. He sent two brigades to scale the ascent and gain the summit. They encountered some resistance from the troops posted there, but this was overcome, the Federals abandoning their works, pitching the guns down the cliff, and making their way across the river to Harper's Ferry. Maryland Heights was in the possession of the infantry of McLaws on the evening of the 13th. The next morning was employed in cutting a road to the top of the Heights practicable for artillery, along which four guns were laboriously dragged, and from these fire was opened upon the town.

Jackson, in the mean while, was pressing upon his longer march with that speed which had gained for his command the name of the "foot cavalry." Leaving Frederick on the 10th, he reached the Potomac next day at Williamsport, 25 miles above Harper's Ferry, and on the 12th entered Martinsburg. The Federal troops abandoned this place at his approach, and fell back to Harper's Ferry. Jackson followed hard after, and on the following morning came in sight of the Union force, drawn up on Bolivar Heights. In three days he had marched 80 miles. The remainder of that day and the whole of the 14th were spent by Jackson in ascertaining, by courier and signal, the positions of Walker and McLaws upon Loudon and Maryland Heights. He found that they had gained the positions appointed for them, and commanded the only roads by which the Federals could retreat down the Potomac or up the Shenandoah, but that the enemy on Bolivar Heights were beyond the effective range of his light guns. Separated as they were from him by rivers, they could afford no direct assistance in capturing the Federal force as it then stood. Jackson undertook to

<sup>1</sup> Lee's Rep., i, 28. For the full text of this order, see McC. Rep., 353. D. H. Hill had left his copy of the order in his room at Frederick, where it was found and given to McClellan three days after. It placed him in full possession of the plans of his enemy; too late, indeed, to enable him to thwart them entirely, but in time to enable him to strike an unexpected blow.




SIGNAL STATION, SUMMIT OF MARYLAND HEIGHTS.

dislodge the enemy from Bolivar Heights, and drive them down into the slaughter-pen of Harper's Ferry. The force with which he was to do this exceeded only slightly that opposed to him. Miles had 12,000 or 13,000. Jackson's "command" numbered at the outset about 32,000. It had fought at Cedar Run, Bristoe, the three battles near Groveton, and at Chantilly, losing in all 6000 men, killed and wounded. Not less than 10,000 had fallen out from sickness or exhaustion on the long march from the Rapidan to the Potomac. He could not have brought more than 15,000 to Harper's Ferry. For the rest, the affair reads almost like a farce, with a few tragic lines interpolated.

By the morning of the 15th Jackson had fairly surrounded Miles; batteries from one side opened upon the other on the Bolivar plateau; the guns from Loudon and Maryland Heights played at the heads of those below, and were duly answered; none doing harm, except that one Confederate shot struck a Federal caisson. Miles called a council of war, and said he had resolved to surrender; one or two of his officers wished to "cut their way out;" the cavalry, 1500 strong, rode up the Potomac, with or without orders, and got off, encountering no opposition, and destroying in their way 75 wagons of the Confederate train. If the infantry had gone the same way there was nothing to hinder; but they were raw troops, commanded by worse than raw officers. Miles raised the white flag in token of surrender. Before it was perceived, he was mortally wounded by a chance shot. White, his superior in rank, who, on coming in from Martinsburg, had waived the command in Miles's favor, went to Jackson to arrange terms of surrender. There was then nothing else to be done, for the troops had degenerated into a crowd of frightened men. He found the Confederate general fast asleep on the ground. Hill, whom White had first encountered, aroused Jackson. "General," said he, "this is General White,





MOVEMENTS FROM SEPTEMBER 10 TO 17

A. A. Jackson's March from Fredrick to Sharpburg.	D. D. Walker's March from the Noocracy to Sharpburg.
B. B. Longstreet's " " " "	E. E. Confederate Position at Antietam. " Obtain.
C. C. McLaws and Anderson's " " " "	H. H. Franklin's March from Pleasant Valley to the An-

Franklin followed the same route as McLaws from Fredrick to Pleasant Valley; the r-manner of the Union army that of Longstreet from Fredrick to Boonesboro, and thence to the Antietam. The arrows show the direction of the march. Where two or more letters come together, it indicates that the several bodies followed the same route.

of the United States army." Jackson made a gesture of recognition, and again closed his eyes. "He has come to arrange terms of surrender," continued Hill. Jackson made no reply; he was fast asleep. Again, half awakened, he said, drowsily, "The surrender must be unconditional; every indulgence can be granted afterward," then fell fast asleep once more, leaving Hill to decide upon the terms.<sup>1</sup> The terms granted were certainly liberal. All were to be paroled, retaining their personal effects, and officers their side-arms; transportation to be furnished to carry away the property. Upon these terms more than 11,000 men were surrendered. The Confederates gained 73 guns, with but little ammunition, 13,000 small-arms, and a considerable amount of stores. The capture cost the Confederates perhaps two score of lives, and the Federals about as many.<sup>2</sup>

Although the affair at Harper's Ferry proved of ultimate disadvantage to the Confederates, it was disgraceful alike to the military authorities at Washington, who left the force in a place where it was of no use, and to the officers who attempted no adequate defense. Miles died a few hours after the surrender, but his conduct was sharply censured by the Military Commission. Ford, who shamefully abandoned Maryland Heights, was dismissed from the service on the ground of "such lack of military capacity as to disqualify him from a command in the service." White was commended as having "acted with decided capability and courage."<sup>3</sup>

Slow, as had been McClellan's advance, it yet carried him farther from Washington than was thought prudent by Halleck. With more than 70,000 men in garrison, the authorities at Washington were nervously apprehensive for the safety of the capital. When tidings were brought that a Confederate force had recrossed the Potomac, it was assumed that the whole army had crossed or was about to cross and assail Washington, either in front, or in the rear by recrossing into Maryland below McClellan. Even as late as the 16th, when the two armies were face to face on the Antietam, Halleck still believed that the bulk of the Confederate force was in Virginia.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cooke's *Stonewall Jackson*, 325.

<sup>2</sup> McLaws speaks of a "sharp and spirited engagement" on Maryland Heights, but does not give his losses.—*Ibid.*, ii., 163. Walker lost on Loudon Heights one killed and three wounded.—*Ibid.*, 204. A. P. Hill lost three killed and 66 wounded. There appear to have been no losses in the remainder of Jackson's command. <sup>3</sup> General Orders, 1862, No. 183.

<sup>6</sup> *The President to McClellan*, Sept. 12: "Governor Curtin telegraphs me, 'I have advices that

The Confederates left Frederick on the 10th, and the place was occupied by the Federals on the 12th, after a skirmish with the enemy's cavalry left behind as a rear-guard. On the evening of the next day, accident, which had three weeks before favored Lee by disclosing to him the situation of Pope, placed in McClellan's hands the order from Lee disclosing his designs, and the position and movements of every division of the Confederate army. Thus informed, McClellan's course was plain. He had 100,000 men within a few hours' march from Frederick. Lee had divided his army into two parts, neither of which, by McClellan's own exaggerated estimate, consisting of more than 60,000, and, in fact, of only half as many. By a rapid march, the whole Union army could be thrown right between these two portions. He proposed to "cut the enemy in two, and beat him in detail." His arrangements were for once made with due promptness. That night orders were sent to every general. Franklin was to cross the South Mountain by Crampton's Gap, cut off McLaws, and relieve Harper's Ferry. The remainder of the army, Hooker and Reno in the advance, followed by Sumner with his own corps and that of Mansfield, with the division of Porter which had come up, was to march upon the heels of Lee toward Boonesboro', crossing the South Mountain at Turner's Gap, six miles above Crampton's, and fall upon that half of the Confederate army which had not been sent toward Harper's Ferry.

Lee had meanwhile moved leisurely past the South Mountain. On the 11th Longstreet had reached Hagerstown, D. H. Hill stopping at Boonesboro'. On the afternoon of the 13th the Confederate commander was startled by intelligence that the Federals, whom he had supposed to be quietly resting at Frederick, were pressing swiftly toward Turner's Gap. If they succeeded in passing the mountains they would be fairly between the portions of his divided army. Hill was hurried back to the Gap at once to keep the enemy in check until Longstreet could be recalled from Hagerstown. Lee felt the full peril of his position. He had with him barely 28,000 men, and these stretched along a distance of 25 miles. To provide for the worst, he sent his trains across the Potomac, escorted by only two regiments.<sup>2</sup>

Hill reached the summit of the Gap early in the morning of the 14th, just before the head of the Federal force came up. His division had left Hanover Junction, a few miles from Richmond, on the 26th of July, and joined Lee at Chantilly, fully 150 miles distant, on the 3d of September; and were then, without a day's rest, pushed forward to the Potomac and into Maryland. They had not been engaged in a single action. But "the straggling had been enormous, in consequence of heavy marches, deficient commissariat, want of shoes, and inefficient officers," so that he could bring less than 5000 men into action<sup>3</sup> out of more than twice that number with which he had set out.

The South Mountain rises to a height of about 1000 feet, the depression at Turner's Gap being about 400 feet. But the Gap is so narrow that a few hundred men with artillery could hold the summit against an army. But

Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland." Receiving nothing from Harpers Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information that the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is recrossing the Potomac." *Halleck to McClellan*, Sept. 13: "Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in uncovering the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column toward Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac and those he may cross over." Sept. 14: "Scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear." Sept. 16: "I think you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your front has crossed the river. I fear now more than ever that they will recross at Harpers Ferry or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off from Washington."—*McClellan to Halleck*, 350.

General Halleck indeed testified (*Conn. Rep.*, 453). "In respect to General McClellan's going too far or too far from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from me to him. He has mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent to him. I telegraphed to him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving General Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington." But, as McClellan's left actually hugged the Potomac, and his centre and right, moving by parallel roads, were more nearly within supporting distance than if they had followed in the rear, it is hard to see how, if he moved at all, he could have gone at a less distance from the river. <sup>1</sup> *McC. Rep.*, 360.

\* This significant fact is mentioned only by D. H. Hill, and that merely incidentally, in his report of the battle of Antietam. "Our wagons had been sent off across the river on Sunday, the 14th, and for three days the men had been sustaining life on green corn and such cattle as they could kill in the fields. In charging through an apple orchard at the Yankees, with the immediate prospect of death before them, I noticed men eagerly devouring apples."—*Lee's Rep.*, ii, 118.

<sup>3</sup> D. H. Mill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 114



MOORESHOPE AND TURNER'S GAP, FROM THE WEST.





WILLIAM D. FRANKLIN

a road, rough though passable, runs along the summits of each of the ridges which bound the Gap on either side; by these the main attack of the Federals was made, the object being to turn, either by the right or the left, or by both, the Confederate force holding the summit of the Gap. Reno's division took the road to the left, and, after sharp fighting, succeeded at noon in gaining the summit, or rather one of the summits, for the crest of the mountain is cloven by a deep ravine, and beyond this the enemy held a strong position. There was now a lull in the contest lasting for a couple of hours, while Hooker, who had reached the base of the mountain after Reno, was working his way up the road on the right of the pass. A solitary peak, which overlooked the country for miles, was the key to the whole position. Whoever held that held the pass. Both sides seemed to apprehend this at once, and each endeavored to gain it. Hooker's men were climbing the steep slope, too steep for artillery to be dragged up. Hill, from the valley below, trained his guns upon the peak, but with little effect. He sent three brigades of infantry up to hold the peak. The lines met, and engaged in a fierce but desultory combat, each availing itself of every natural defense.

Until late in the afternoon the battle on the Confederate side had been fought wholly by Hill. But about four o'clock Longstreet had come up with eight brigades, worn and exhausted by the long march from Hagerstown. Some of these were hotly engaged, but they came two hours too late to change the fortunes of the day. When night closed in the Federals had won every position and held the Gap, through which their whole force could pour on the following morning. Nothing was left for Lee but to retreat, leaving his dead and wounded behind. The action was fought with determined bravery on both sides. In all, the Federals had brought in about 30,000 men, the Confederates 17,000.<sup>1</sup> The Federal loss in this action was 312 killed, 1234 wounded. That of the Confederates was greater. Hill lost, in killed, wounded, and prisoners, nearly 2,000; for at Antietam, three days later, he could bring into action only 3,000.<sup>2</sup> Some of Longstreet's brigades also lost heavily. The Federals secured 1500 prisoners, most of them from the wounded. The entire loss of the Confederates, in killed and wounded, was probably something more than 2000. Reno was killed near the close of the battle. The Confederates lost Garland. Both were brave officers and accomplished gentlemen.<sup>3</sup>

Simultaneously with the battle at Turner's Gap, an action had been going on at Crampton's Gap, a few miles distant. Franklin, with his corps, lacking Couch's division, which had not come up, advanced toward this gap. The foot of the pass was slightly held, and the force pressed on up the slope. Tidings of the approach of Franklin reached McLaws, who had just established himself on Maryland Heights. He sent Cobb back with three brigades, directing him to hold the pass if it cost the last man. Cobb took post near the top of the mountain, behind a stone wall; Slocum's division

charged this in front, while Smith moved round to assail it in flank and rear. The Confederates broke and fled down the slope in confusion, and in the evening Franklin debouched into Pleasant Valley, three miles from Maryland Heights on the opposite side, and only six from Harper's Ferry, whence the sound of firing indicated that the place was still held. The Federals lost 115 killed and 416 wounded; the Confederates more, for they left behind 600 prisoners, mostly wounded.

On the morning of the 15th McLaws drew back his whole force, leaving only two regiments upon the heights, and formed it across the lower end of the Valley, Franklin forming his across the upper end. Both lay watching each other all the morning, each supposing the other to be superior, and neither daring to attack. The numbers were, in reality, nearly equal, the Confederates having a small preponderance.<sup>4</sup>

The passes of the South Mountain having been forced, the position of Lee was perilous. He had with him less than 25,000 men of all arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery. So long as Harper's Ferry held out, the forces sent to capture it were cut off from reuniting with him. The position here was singular. If Jackson and McLaws held the garrison of the Ferry in a vice, that garrison and Franklin held McLaws and Walker in as close a grip. McLaws could not join Lee by marching up Pleasant Valley, for Franklin barred the way; he could not cross the Elk Mountain, for that was impassable for an army; until Harper's Ferry was taken, he could not cross the Potomac, and, by going up its south bank and recrossing, rejoin Lee. "There was," he says, "no outlet in any direction for any thing but the troops, and that very doubtful; in no contingency could I have saved the troops and artillery."<sup>5</sup> Walker, on Loudon Heights, was equally isolated, for between him and Lee was interposed both the Shenandoah and the Potomac. But when Turner's Gap was forced, Harper's Ferry was still uncaptured; but tidings had just come that the place must soon fall, when the troops beleaguering, and themselves beleaguered, would be set at liberty. If a battle could be postponed two days, Lee would be able to bring into action as many of these separated forces as would be able to endure the long march to join him. To shorten this march, he retreated during the night of the 14th toward the Potomac, and, placing the Antietam Creek between himself and McClellan, took up a strong defensive position near the village of Sharpsburg.

The Potomac makes a bend shaped somewhat like the two-horned antique bow, about six miles from tip to tip. The Antietam is like the loosened string of this bow. This stream in itself is no formidable military obstacle. It is passable for infantry at almost every point. Three stone bridges and several fords, within a distance of three or four miles, afford abundant passage for artillery, provided the approaches to them are not fully commanded by an enemy. The region beyond, that is, on the western side, is somewhat broken. There are low swells, with narrow intervening valleys, and patches of woodland and cultivated fields, cut up by roads, fences, and stone walls. The limestone rock every where crops up above the surface, affording tolerable shelter for troops. The position is such that, in case of need, a general with 20,000 men might fairly venture to hold it against 30,000; one with 30,000 might fairly venture to assail an enemy posted there with 20,000.

Lee reached this position on the morning of the 15th, the cavalry forming his rear-guard, somewhat closely pressed by the Union horse. The head of the foremost pursuing infantry column reached the east bank of the Antietam in the afternoon. McClellan had hoped to bring on an action that day. His orders were, that if the enemy were overtaken on the march, they should be attacked at once; if found in force and position, the advanced corps should halt and await his arrival. Coming to the front late in the afternoon, McClellan found the enemy drawn up beyond the Antietam, making an ostentatious display of infantry, artillery, and cavalry on the opposite crests. The Union corps, coming after in different columns, had become somewhat entangled, and McClellan decided, in view of what he saw and could then have known, that it was too late to attack that day. If he had been aware how weak was the force in his front, he might, perhaps, have determined otherwise.

Lee had scarcely crossed the Antietam before he learned that Harper's Ferry had been surrendered, and that all obstacles, except those of time and space, to the reunion of his army were removed. Orders were at once sent for the whole force near the Ferry to hasten to Sharpsburg. Jackson was the first to move.

At 3 in the afternoon his men were ordered to cook two days' rations, and be ready to march. The march was begun an hour past midnight. On the morning of the 16th the corps were within two miles of Sharpsburg. They had made a night-march of fifteen miles in less than six hours, fording the Potomac by the way. The addition which he brought to Lee was small in numbers. The two divisions, Jackson's, or the "Stonewall," and Ewell's, had set out from Richmond 20,000 strong. Within six weeks they had fought at Cedar Run, Bristoe, and during all the three days at Groveton. They had marched from the Rappahannock to Manassas, from Manassas to the Potomac, from the Potomac to Frederick, from Frederick to Harper's Ferry, from Harper's Ferry back to Sharpsburg, losing

<sup>1</sup> McClellan says: "We went into action with about 30,000 men." He supposed that he had encountered "D. H. Hill's corps, 15,500, and a part, if not the whole, of Longstreet's, and perhaps a portion of Jackson's" (*Rep.*, 372). But he had actually met eight brigades of Longstreet's, about 12,000, and D. H. Hill's, 5000. Such was, however, the strength of the position, that if the Confederates had been able in the morning to have brought 10,000 or 15,000 men to its defense, and so held the crests on the two sides of the Gap with artillery, they could not have been dislodged by five times their number—See Longstreet and D. H. Hill, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 84, 114.

<sup>2</sup> *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 114.

<sup>3</sup> D. H. Hill thus brutally mentions the death of these two generals: "This brilliant service cost as the life of that pure, gallant, and accomplished Christian soldier, General Garland, who had no superior and few equals in the service. The Yankees, on their side, lost General Reno, a renegade Virginian, who was killed by a happy shot from the 23d North Carolina."

<sup>4</sup> Franklin's corps (Cobb not having arrived) numbered not quite 13,000. McLaws's command was made up of troops which had suffered least in the previous actions, having been mostly in reserve, and only partially engaged at Groveton. His eight brigades would probably average at this time 1800 each. Deducting the losses of the day before, and the two regiments left on the Heights, there would be between 13,000 and 14,000. He himself says (*Lee's Rep.*, ii., 167): "The force in Harper's Ferry was nearly, if not quite equal to my own, and that above was far superior." He had just before estimated the "force above," that is, Franklin's, at "from 15,000 to 25,000 and upward." The force at Harper's Ferry he knew, at the time of making the report, to have been more than 11,000, for that number had surrendered, and the whole cavalry force had escaped. Our estimate of McLaws's strength is also confirmed by the numbers which he was able to bring upon the field at Antietam two days later.

<sup>5</sup> See McLaws, in *Lee's Rep.*, ii., 167.







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
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